



The Arab American University
Faculty of Graduate Studies

**Palestinian Framing in English Written Israeli
Media after Oslo and During the Second Intifada.
Case Study: Haaretz, Yedioth Ahronoth and the
Jerusalem Post**

Prepared By

Qassam Fathi Mohammad Abu Mwies

Supervisor

Amjad Fouad Abdelaziz Bane Shamsa

**This thesis was submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the Master's degree in
Intercultural Communication and Literature**

January / 2023

© Arab American University 2023, all rights reserved

Thesis Approval

**Palestinian Framing in English Written Israeli Media After Oslo
and During the Second Intifada: Case Study *Haaretz*, *Yedioth Ahronoth*
and *The Jerusalem Post***

By

Qassam Fathi Mohammad Abu Mwies

This thesis was defended successfully on 24/8/2022 and approved by:

Committee members

Signature

1. Supervisor: Dr. Amjad Bane Shamsa

Amjad abu el ezz

2. Internal Examiner: Dr. Shadi Abu-Ayyash

شادي ابو ايياش


3. External Examiner: Dr. Mohammed Abualrob

محمد ابو الرب

Declaration

I hereby declare that the present master's thesis was composed by myself and that the work contained herein is my own under the supervision of Dr. Amjad Fouad Abdelaziz Bane Shamsa, Faculty of postgraduate, Arab American university Palestine. I also confirm that I have only used the specified resources. All formulations and concepts taken verbatim or in substance from printed or unprinted material or from the Internet have been cited according to the rules of good scientific practice and indicated by exact references to the original source. This thesis has been submitted in printed and electronic form. I hereby confirm that the content of the digital version is the same as in the printed version.

Signature:



Date: 25/1/2023

Acknowledgments

I would like to express my eternal gratitude to my supervisor Dr. Amjad Bane Shamsa for the useful comments, remarks, and engagement throughout the learning process of this master thesis. Furthermore, I would like to thank the participants in my interviews, who willingly shared their precious time and expertise during the process of interviewing. I would also like to thank Atta Al-Qumairi for assisting me with the structure of the thesis and providing me with the articles. I also can't forget all of my teachers from school to MA for their amazing teaching and the role they played in shaping my knowledge and personality. Finally, to all my family and friends, who have supported me throughout the entire process, both by keeping me harmonious and helping me put pieces together. I will be forever grateful for your love and support.

Abstract**Palestinian Framing in English Written Israeli Media After Oslo and During the Second Intifada. Case Study: Haaretz, Yedioth Ahronoth and The Jerusalem Post****Prepared By: Qassam Fathi Abu Mwies****Supervisor: Amjad Bane Shamsa**

This research accounts for the findings of qualitative and quantitative content and framing analysis of 60 articles in total reporting about Palestinians in *Haaretz*, *Yedioth Ahronoth*, and *The Jerusalem Post* after Oslo and during the Second Intifada. This work is also concerned with the location of the Palestinian's framing in Israeli media before and after Oslo and during the Second Intifada based on Galtung's 'violence' and 'peace' theory. Palestinians were divided into three groups, which are Palestinian leadership, Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, and Palestinians in Israel. Overall, the findings indicate that Oslo failed to achieve 'peace frames' for the Palestinians in the analyzed newspapers and that Israeli media remained as a 'war media' after Oslo. The results show that the frequency of appearance and personalization increased for the Palestinian leadership. However, their appearances were in negative frames. The other Palestinian groups remained anonymous for the most part, and their framing became worse after Oslo. Moreover, the Outbreak of the second Intifada allowed Israeli media to put the Palestinian leadership under the frame of traitors of peace and that it used Oslo to return to Palestine and destroy Israel.

Palestinian as a whole were included under similar frames and framing mechanisms of the Palestinian leadership. However, Palestinians in Israel remained labeled as ‘Arabs’ in terms of terminology while connected to the other Palestinians in their context. *Haaretz* was the most balanced in terms of personalization for the Palestinian leadership and the frequency of appearances for the three Palestinian groups. However, those differences are considered minor since the remaining framing dimensions and frames are similar to the other two newspapers.

Keywords: Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Israeli press, framing analysis, content analysis, Galtung’s ‘violence’ and ‘peace’ theory, Oslo

Table of Contents

Table of Contents	VI
List of Tables	VIII
List Of Abbreviations	IX
1. Chapter 1	2
1.1 Introduction	2
1.2 Literature review and theoretical framework:	13
1.3 Statement of the Problem:	40
1.4 Significance of the study	42
1.5 Limitations of the study:.....	43
1.6 Methodology.....	44
2. Chapter 2 (Background): Palestinians’ portrayal in Israeli media before Oslo in previous research and its position on Galtung’s dimensions.....	61
2.1 The “Arab”	62
2.2 Yasser Arafat and the PLO leadership before Oslo.....	71
2.2.1 The excising, salience, depersonalization, and demonization of Yasser Arafat and the PLO leadership before Oslo	77
2.2.2 Equalizing the PLO and Arafat’s power before Oslo	83
2.2.3 Decontextualization of PLO and Arafat before Oslo	84
2.3 Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza before Oslo.....	86
2.3.1 The excising, salience, depersonalization, and demonization of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza before Oslo.....	89
2.3.2 Equalizing the power of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza before Oslo	93
2.3.3 Decontextualization of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza before Oslo.....	95
2.4 Palestinians in Israel before Oslo	96
2.4.1 The excising, salience, depersonalization, and demonization of Palestinians in Israel before Oslo	98
2.4.2 Equalizing the power of Palestinians in Israel before Oslo	101
2.4.3 Decontextualization of Palestinians in Israel before Oslo	102
3. Chapter 3: Palestinians in Israeli media after Oslo and during the Second Intifada	105
3.1 Results and findings of inductive quantitative frame analysis	105

3.1.1 The frequency of appearances.....	106
3.1.2 The representation of the three groups.....	107
3.1.3 The dominant frames.....	108
3.1.4 Blame shifting.....	110
3.1.5 Addressing the Palestinian Leadership.....	111
3.1.6 Quoting the Palestinians.....	111
3.1.7 Addressing the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza.....	112
3.1.8 Addressing the Palestinians in Israel.....	113
3.1.9 Palestinians in groups.....	114
3.2 Results and findings of the content analysis.....	114
3.1 Yasser Arafat and Palestinian leadership after Oslo.....	115
3.2 Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza after Oslo.....	144
3.3 Palestinians in Israel after Oslo.....	158
3.4 Discussion.....	170
4. Conclusion.....	186
Bibliography.....	200
Primary Sources.....	200
Appendixes.....	209
Appendix A: Interview Questions.....	209
Appendix B: Coding Manual.....	211
المخلص.....	214

List of Tables

Table 1: The number of the analyzed articles per period and newspaper.	106
Table 2: Palestinian’s frequency of appearances in the three newspapers	107
Table 3: The distribution of the groups in the sample	108
Table 4: The distribution of the main frames found in the articles	109
Table 5: Blame shifting	110
Table 6: The way the Palestinian Leadership is addressed	111
Table 7: Quoting the Palestinians	112
Table 8: Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza name mentions	113
Table 9: Ways of addressing Palestinians in Israel	114
Table 10: Palestinians in groups	114
Table 11: Articles that did not include direct ‘Violence’ consequences in their titles.	147
Table 12: Titles of articles that included Palestinians in Israel	160

List Of Abbreviations

PLO: Palestinian Liberation Organization

PA: Palestinian Authority

IDF: Israeli Defence Forces

Chapter I: Introduction

1. Chapter 1

1.1 Introduction

For more than 74 years, The Palestinian struggle against Israeli occupation has been persisting. Throughout this long period, this struggle took many forms and moved on many fronts. From military to economic and political natures, and from local stages to international stages, the Palestinian struggle has been shifting and will continue to change depending on the situations that arise. With how many fronts and stages the struggle entered, the innate nature of the struggle is likely lost and/or overlooked. Both Palestinians and Israelis identify and present themselves to the world as the rightful owners of Palestine and that the “other” has no truth to their claims. Although political and economic interests are present and play a significant role in the birth and the continuation of the Israeli occupation, the identification of the ‘self’ and ‘other’ claimed by both parties influence the nature of the struggle. In This sense, part of the Palestinian struggle originates from an identity conflict (Oren & Bar-Tal, 2007). However, the identity of the self is not the only significant perception in a struggle. In any struggle, how the different parties perceive and identify the other similarly plays a significant role in shaping and changing the nature of the struggle as well as the actions and/or interactions taken against and with the “other”. The more negative the image of the “other”, the more hostile the struggle becomes, and the more positive the more peaceful the struggle becomes. Thus, the perception a certain group holds of the “other” signifies and defines the hostility or peacefulness of that group towards the “other” and how realistic a resolution of the struggle is. This identity struggle is also a part of an overall identification of the nature of the struggle as a whole, not just the actors in this struggle.

In other words, the identities of the actors in the struggle can affect how the different events in the struggle are described or who is held responsible for them. Similarly, the identity or nature of the struggle itself can change the position of the identities of the actors in the struggle depending on the events. If the struggle is described as a fight against terror then the ‘others’ that use violence are described as terrorists. All of this, in turn, constitutes a narrative for the whole struggle. Narratives can be defined as ‘discursive representations of time-ordered sequences of events’ (Tenenboim-Weinblatt et al., 2016, p.153). As such, those narratives often connect events in the struggle from different points in time. These narratives according to Entman (1993) are usually constructed to achieve or promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, specific agendas, treatment recommendation, and social belief systems in each group. Those social belief systems are constructed using information that is told, retold, and foretold throughout the different stages of the struggle using various methods like religion, schoolbooks, or the news media. Moreover, “people’s information processing and interpretation [of the struggle] are influenced by preexisting meaning structures or schemas”(Scheufele, 1999, p.105). According to Scheufele (1999), there are three ways those schemas function within the same group members as a way to translate a specific reality into their understanding. First, ‘Active processing’ of the information received by a group member and seeking additional information or sources based on the assumption that that information isn’t fully accurate and doesn’t represent the full reality. The second way is ‘Reflective integrators’ which is based on the assumption that those meaning structures or schemas are usually shared by the members of the same group. As a result, those schemas allow same-group members to enter discussions about the information they consume from the various sources

available to them. The last type of usage is the ‘selective scanners’ which refers to members of the same group that only seek information or opinions that reinforce already existing beliefs. Similarly, those members participate in discussions with members of the same group that hold the same belief structure and meaning analysis. As a result, those discussions function as another way to reinforce already existing understandings of reality. The Palestinian struggle against Israeli occupation is no exception to this. These perceptions about Palestinians are reflected and integrated into the Israeli political and cultural realities as they were created and reinforced from the beginning of the Zionist migration and the Israeli occupation until today and are reinforced by the various events that took place throughout the occupation as well as a result of direct interactions, news media, schoolbooks, religious or inherited narratives that can justify the actions of ‘self’ against the ‘other’. Since the struggle originates partly from an identity and a narrative struggle, and as Israel holds more political, economic, international, and military power in this struggle, their perception plays a more significant role in affecting and shaping the nature of the struggle. Thus, this research focuses on how Palestinians are identified by the Israeli side. While these perceptions exist within the Israeli public and political spheres, they are similarly migrated to Western audiences as the West and Israel have close ties to each other. In other words, with the influence the West holds in the world as well as the support Israel receives from them, how Palestinians are portrayed to them by Israel plays a significant role in shaping the nature of the struggle and any possible resolution for it. While there are many domains to investigate those images, this research reviews how Palestinians were presented and analyzes their framing in English-written Israeli media since those

English-written media can be considered the main source of news for Western news outlets.

The media plays a role in shaping public opinion (Kampf, 2006). Media is an outlet to provide the public and international spheres with information and opinions about the present, past, and future reality of the struggle. In most cases, media reports convey the desired message and attempt to direct the understanding of the public to a specific image based on the shared schemas in the targeted group (Scheufele, 1999). These images are mostly the pictures elites desire to convey to the public to shape their understanding and perception of reality. Part of this reality is how the participants of the struggle are portrayed or in this case, the Palestinians. Part of those messages spread by the media is the identity of 'self' and 'other' and the nature of the Palestinian struggle against Israeli occupation. As Israel has close ties to the West and is considered a continuation of Western culture in the Middle East, which means that the Israeli narrative of the struggle as a whole is more accepted by the Western public, media, and political levels than the Palestinian narrative. This also means that however Israeli media frames Palestinians, it is most likely that those frames will be adopted by Western news outlets (Handley, 2009). Those identities are usually presented as a continuous image that paints the nature of the 'self' and the 'other'. Those images are one of the desired effects the media wants to achieve. As media construct those images it creates a general frame to label the desired groups under. This frame can of course be either positive or negative. However, generally speaking, research on media effects shows that the frames of the 'other' groups in the media are negative while 'self' framing is generally positive (Avraham & First, 2010). Dunwoody & Peters (1992) define a frame as "a knowledge structure that is activated by some stimulus and then

employed by a journalist throughout story construction”(Dunwoody & Peters, 1992, p.213). As such, those images presented in the media as a description of the ‘other’ present a knowledge structure or a stereotype about the other. This knowledge structure helps the receiver to define the ‘other’ and analyze the members of the outer group and their actions on an already established understanding. In this regard, news stories about separate events in a struggle can be considered part of an ongoing narrative (Tenenboim-Weinblatt et al., 2016). This view is of importance to the Palestinian struggle as it has been going on for a long time. Since the beginning of the Zionist movement until today, Palestinians have been framed in Zionist media and afterward in Israeli media negatively. This framing indicates an ongoing narration and framing of the struggle and Palestinians as a whole. While it is important to look at the framing of Palestinians from the early stages of the struggle until today, this is simply beyond the scope of this thesis. Similarly, it is important to note that due to the limitations of reaching news articles from the three major English-written newspapers, namely: *Haaretz*, *The Jerusalem Post*, and *Yedioth Ahronoth*, a specific reachable period of the struggle is chosen. This period is from the signing of the peace treaty of Oslo in 1993 until the early years of the Second Intifada. However, this thesis includes a general review of the findings of previous research conducted before the selected period to provide a better understanding of the overall narrative and framing of Palestinians in Israeli media. Moreover, this research places the findings of those researches on Galtung’s dimensions of ‘violence’ and ‘peace’ to create a comparison between the framing of Palestinians in Israeli media between the pre-Oslo and after-Oslo periods. Moreover, due to the lack of available articles, the analysis of the post-Oslo period was limited to 20 articles per newspaper. That means 60 newspapers in total. This was

chosen to create a balance in the analysis since articles from Oslo in 1993 until the beginning of the Second Intifada averaged at around 10 articles per newspaper. However, articles after the outbreak of the Second Intifada are widely available thus creating an unbalanced amount of articles if more articles were chosen. As the Second Intifada is a violent stage in the struggle, the percentage of negative frames naturally becomes more apparent when compared to the Oslo period. Henceforth, to maintain a balanced analysis a close number of articles were chosen for the two periods of 1993-2000 and 2000-2004. Nonetheless, the most important period in this research is from 1993-2000 since the aim of this research is to measure the shift a peace process can have on the media in a struggle.

One of the major attempts at a peaceful resolution to the Palestinian struggle against Israeli occupation is the Oslo accords of 1993. In that agreement, both Palestinians and Israelis signed a peace treaty to attempt to achieve a two-state solution to the struggle. Despite its failure, it does not negate the fact that it is a major event in the struggle. This period is chosen for this research to provide a better look at the role the media played during this period. An event that changed the struggle to some degree and resulted in a change in the narratives of the two parties. Although this change is not necessarily a positive one, it still exists and affects the struggle. The two parties who perceived each other as enemies since the beginning of the Zionist movement attempted to find a peaceful solution to the struggle. This required them to reshape how they identified each other in a process called 'narrative repair' (Samuel-Azran et al., 2015). This means that they had to change the image of the enemy to that of a potential peace partner or attempt to focus on personal circumstances instead of malicious actions or history. As such, the English-written Israeli media is analyzed under the role it played

during this period. When related to a peace process like Oslo, the Israeli media can play either one of two roles according to Galtung (1969, 1990). It can either be peace journalism, which is defined as ‘a normative mode of responsible and conscientious media coverage of conflict, that aims at contributing to peacemaking, peacekeeping, and changing the attitudes of media owners, advertisers, professionals and audiences towards war and peace.’(Tenenboim-Weinblatt et al., 2016, p.151). Or it can function as war journalism which ‘treats conflict as a zero-sum game and is propaganda-oriented, elite oriented, and victory oriented’ (Tenenboim-Weinblatt et al., 2016, p.151) and directs the public into rejecting a peace process and maintaining the current state of the struggle or increasing hostility. To add another dimension to the analysis of the role of the Israeli media during this period, it is important to position it on either side of Galtung's (1969, 1990) ‘violence’ or ‘peace’ triangles. ‘violence’ is defined as “the cause of the difference between the potential and the actual, between what could have been and what is.”(Galtung, 1969, p.168). For the sake of clarification, Galtung defines ‘violence’ as how people, institutions, or specific parts of culture create limitations that prevent the potential of other groups from achieving what could be possible if those limitations didn't exist in the first place. In the case of the media, how the media presents or frames ‘others’ can create limitations on how in-group members interact or see members of the out-group. If media creates those limitations then it exists on one of the dimensions of the ‘violence’ triangle. It can either be on the individual level of ‘violence’ where the journalist as a person creates negative frames solely based on their personal opinions. This of course needs an analysis of their belief systems and their background which is beyond the scope of this research. The second dimension of ‘violence’ is that of ‘structural violence’. In this dimension, the institution as a whole

advocates or works in a way that encourages negative framing of the 'other' for various reasons and uses various methods and levels. One of those reasons is the economical reason in which the media presents media that is relative and relatable to its audience to maintain view rates. Another reason in the case of the Israeli media according to Barak & Sheffer (2006), is that it is part of a safety or a security network created to maintain the public census, especially during periods of escalation. The final level of 'violence' is 'cultural violence' which is "any aspect of a culture that can be used to legitimize violence in its direct or structural form."(Galtung, 1990, p.291). In this dimension, the established belief system and the shared knowledge between the members of the same group and the journalists provide validity to the existence of the individual and structural levels of 'violence'. As such, those forms of violence become acceptable as the norm and considered as part of the overall narrative which is embedded in the cultural belief system. On the contrary, 'peace' triangle means that such limitations don't exist and as such the outer group\s can achieve their potential fully without any obstacles. 'Peace' triangle has three levels similar to the 'violence' triangle. 'Individual' peace dimension means that there isn't any form of 'violence' on the individual level. 'Structural and cultural' violence follow the same concept ,where there are no institutionalized forms of 'violence' and 'violence' isn't accepted or tolerated within the cultural belief system. An analysis of the Israeli media based on these concepts can provide a clearer image of the role the Israeli media played during that time period. In other words, if a peace process like Oslo created a change in the position of the Israeli media from one triangle to the other. However, the findings of this research indicate that the image change in Israeli media after Oslo was not significant enough to shift the narrative of the struggle or the framing of Palestinians from 'violence' dimensions to

‘peace’ dimensions. Instead, Israeli media coverage of Oslo created a narrative of ‘betrayal’ in the mind of the Israeli public during the Oslo period and when the peace process collapsed after Camp David this narrative was reinforced and strengthened by both the Israeli media and the political level to create a narrative of ‘trauma’. This ‘trauma’ narrative was further reinforced by linking the Palestinians with Islamic terror after the events of 11 September 2001 ‘this period was a period of pouring hostile propaganda, and of course, Al-Qaeda came out. It came out in the events of September, and they linked us to it and linked us to extremist Islam.’ (I. Manssor, personal communication, 2021). Similarly, Oslo was used by the Israeli media to create the impression that Palestinians were offered everything they wanted during Oslo and they refused it ‘The most important theory that ruled the Israeli media after the two thousandths, we gave them everything and they refused, and this talk was unanimously accepted by the Israeli society by 90%.’ (M. Musa, personal communication, 2021). Instead, Palestinians resorted to violence to pressure Israel into accepting the Palestinian’s conditions in the peace process. Although this research focuses on Palestinian framing in Israeli media, I argue that strengthening such a narrative after Oslo and the Second Intifada indicates an important shift in the overall narrative of the conflict not only for Palestinians. The narrative of occupation and Palestinians being an occupied people was removed because of the emphasis on the ‘betrayal’ frame after Oslo and the Second Intifada. Thus, the important point is not on how Israeli media framed Israel as the ‘victim’ after the collapse of Oslo; instead, the focus is on how the framing of Palestinians was affected by this narrative.

The framing of Palestinians consists of various groups, types, and methods of analysis. As a result, it is important to specify the types of frames analyzed, their

mechanisms and the methods used to achieve those frames, and which Palestinian group is framed. For starters, this research adopts a mixed deductive and inductive approach to framing analysis. This means that framing mechanisms that are already found or established in prior research are adopted, measured, and analyzed in the 60 articles chosen. Those framing mechanisms are based on Liebes & Kampf's (2009) research where they found six framing mechanisms used in the first intifada. The first dimension excises images of Palestinians. This means the removal of Palestinians from news reports. The second is sanitizing the reports of the suffering of Palestinians. Third, equalizing the amount of harm and power between the two parties of the struggle. This means that news reports demonstrated that Palestinians were able to inflict an equal amount of harm and damage on Israeli soldiers. Fourth depersonalization of Palestinian victims. Victims from the Palestinian side were unnamed and only mentioned as numbers. The fifth demonization of Palestinians means presenting Palestinians as violent and evil people. Sixth is the decontextualization of the conflict. Reporting the first intifada confrontations as separate occurrences while ignoring the political and historical contexts of the conflict (Avraham & First, 2010). However, the First Intifada was a period of 'violent' escalation different from the post-Oslo period. As such, an Inductive analysis of the framing of Palestinians in that period was also adopted to see if there were any new mechanisms or new frames that appeared as a result of the peace process. As such, the dominant frames found in this research are based on an inductive analysis. This means that those frames are derived directly from the articles instead of looking for already established frames. The reason for this is to reduce bias in analysis since deciding what frames should be looked for can result in a narrow point of view when analyzing the articles. Secondly, as the post-Oslo period is different in nature

compared to previous stages of the struggle or after the outbreak of the Second Intifada, new frames can appear. Those frames are selected based on their frequency of appearance in the articles and are considered as a dominant theme that governs the narrative of the articles. Lastly, three Palestinian groups were chosen for the analysis. These groups are the Palestinian leadership, Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza and lastly Palestinians in Israel. Those groups were chosen based on their geographical location and the role they were framed to play in the struggle. A mild separation between those groups was indicated by the interviews conducted prior to Oslo “the danger was mainly from the outside, there was no military security threat from the inside” (I. Manssor, personal communication, 2021). As such, it is important to see if this separation continued after Oslo and after the outbreak of the Second Intifada.

Henceforth, this study focuses on three aspects of Palestinian framing in Israeli media. How the “other” (namely Palestinians) were framed after Oslo in English-written Israeli media? What methods or techniques were used by the selected media outlets to draw the desired images? In addition, how has Oslo affected the position of the framing of the ‘other’ (namely Palestinians) in Israeli media on Galtung’s dimensions of ‘violence’ and ‘peace’? With that in mind, three major Israeli newspapers have been chosen for the analysis, namely: *Haaretz*, *The Jerusalem Post*, and *Yedioth Ahronoth*. All those newspapers were circulating before Oslo, they all are major circulators in Israel with a huge audience and all three of them are written in English. In this sense, the purpose of this study is to conduct a comparative content and frame analysis of Palestinian images and the methods used to frame the ‘other’ in those three newspapers after Oslo. The purpose of this comparison is to fill the gap in the role a peace process can play in changing the position of the media from ‘war journalism’ to

‘peace journalism’. To be specific, this research aims to see if a significant change occurred after Oslo in the position of the English-written Israeli media and their framing of Palestinians on Galtung’s dimensions of ‘violence’ and ‘peace’ and to see if the separation that existed between the three groups before Oslo continued in the years following Oslo and during the Second Intifada.

1.2 Literature review and theoretical framework:

The Palestinian-Israeli conflict as any other conflict got its fair share of media coverage either locally or internationally. This produced a huge number of frames and assumptions about Palestinians throughout the conflict. These frames play a role in shaping the public Israeli opinion towards Palestinians, as it becomes part of the collective memory of Israelis. For civilians, media coverage of the conflict functions as the main source of information about the “enemy”. The frames within those media outlets direct receivers into drawing specific images of the enemy based on the information they select and salience. As a result, these images may direct the public into specific actions or construct stereotypes as a response to the frames presented in the media. So, what are frames? How are they constructed? What role do they play in creating a stereotypical image of the “enemy”? Moreover, since this research aims to create a comparison between frames and how they are constructed before and after Oslo, and most importantly, and what is the position of those frames on Galtung’s ‘violence’ and ‘peace’ dimensions? This section presents previous research on framing theory, stereotypes, and analysis of media in the Palestinian struggle. First in general terms, then followed by how those theories and research related to the subject of this thesis are adopted in this research, thus constructing the theoretical framework.

Every news report falls under specific themes that structure it (Pan & Kosicki, 1993). These themes link and construct the piece into a coherent narrative or story (Pan & Kosicki, 1993). The resulting structures of those themes are “frames”. They function as a structural guide to building a news narrative. Dunwoody & Peters (1992) define a frame as “a knowledge structure that is activated by some stimulus and then employed by a journalist throughout story construction” (Dunwoody & Peters, 1992, p.213). This means that while the media use those “frames” to report or interpret specific events in social reality they also function as constructors of this reality.

The process of framing in the media and society according to Entman (1993) involves an intentional or unintentional selection and removal of information in a news report. This process of selection and salience help the receiver in defining the problem, analyzing and diagnosing the causes, and suggesting solutions based on a shared cultural belief system between the news outlet and the receiver (Entman, 1993.). This means that the media is not just a reporter of events or a recorder of history; instead, media reports are constructed as part of the cultural belief system and similarly take part in constructing that belief system through the framing process. However, the intention of the media is irrelevant to the analysis of “frames”. According to Pan & Kosicki (1993), the analysis of frames tackles news narratives in three ways. First, news narratives consist of symbols that stimulate and interact with an individual’s memory to build upon meaning in those memories. Second, framing functions in systematic patterns to identify stimulates that may be selectively adopted by readers. In other words, continuous construction of a stimulus’s system for individuals within a social group. Finally, frames in any text are most likely to be influenced by individual memories as well as social structures and narratives (Pan & Kosicki, 1993). However,

this view is not fully adopted in this research. Since one of the aspects this thesis aims to answer is the role the Israeli media played following the Oslo peace process. This role, according to Barak & Sheffer (2006) is part of a security network established to “more often than not, [...] present the views and attitudes of the Security Network and support-rather than criticize - the DE.” (Barak & Sheffer, 2006, p.251). This view is taken into consideration in this research since politics plays an important role in the coverage of the media of the Palestinian struggle. An example of this is the “Order for the Prevention of Terror” in 1986 (Oren & Bar-Tal, 2007). In this sense, the frames that appear in the media can be intentional if the media outlet is influenced by the political decisions. Thus making it part of the tools used by the political system to achieve its agenda. This relation between the Israeli media and the political system from the early stages of the struggle is described in length by Barzilai (1996). However this relationship is summed in the following statement “Positive media reporting was not only the result of elite pressure. The media also censored itself so that[...] it did not constitute a pressure group for the policymakers, nor did it make any distinctive input to the decision-making processes.”(Barzilai, 1996, p.50)

As such, the framing process is considered, in this thesis, to involve an active selection of events and information while highlighting the desired information and directing attention away from opposing views or information while choosing semantic elements that direct the audience in the desired direction of thinking. These semantic elements are chosen based on already established belief systems and shared understanding of reality between the audience and the journalists as well as desired outcomes by the media. This shared knowledge according to Scheufele (1999) is named schema and is one of the basis to achieve the desired outcome for the message delivered

in the news piece. According to Scheufele (1999), framing is based on the assumption that “ The framing and presentation of events and news in the mass media can thus systematically affect how recipients of the news come to understand these events.” (Scheufele, 1999, p.107). In this sense, frame construction consists of three levels. The first level is on the journalist level where “public opinion is part of the process by which journalists . . . develop and crystallize meaning in public discourse” (Scheufele, 1999, p.105). Journalists construct news pieces based on the shared comprehension of events or reality with their audiences. Thus, specific events that go in line with what the audience is interested in are chosen. After the topic or event is chosen the language and images used in describing the event are selected based on those schemas. Lastly, the delivery of those news pieces are decided based on their importance and the desired result of those news pieces. The second level in the schema theory is the processing stage where “Media discourse is part of the process by which individuals construct meaning” (Scheufele, 1999, p.105). In this stage, the audience consumes the new information delivered to them by the media based on the already-established understanding of the context that those events appear in. According to Scheufele (1999), there are three ways those schemas function within the same group members as a way to translate a specific reality into their understanding. First, ‘Active processing’ of the information received by a group member and seeking additional information or sources based on the assumption that that information isn’t fully accurate and doesn’t represent the full reality. If the reader is skeptical about the honesty of the media outlet, the adoption will be less. The second way is ‘Reflective integrators’ which is based on the assumption that those meaning structures or schemas are usually shared by the members of the same group. As a result, those schemas allow same-group members to enter

discussions about the information they consume from the various sources available to them. The last type of usage is the 'selective scanners' which refers to members of the same group that only seek information or opinions that reinforce already existing beliefs. If the receiver considers this news outlet to be representative of the truth, he will adopt that point of view. There are various reasons for this adoption of new information by the audience. One of the reasons is that news provides ready answers to questions about the events under the scope. One of a frame's roles for audiences is for individuals to act without putting much energy into analyzing, understanding, and coming up with solutions for the reported events (Dunwoody & Peters, 1992). News is generally presented to deliver unbiased truths, this means that depending on how the receiver conceives news reports, those reports can affect their understanding of the situation. Nonetheless, no matter what the receiver's views on news outlets is, those outlets are still a stage for politicians to exert their powers and opinions. Those politicians still hold power in any society and their words alone can affect public opinion whether the news outlet intends it or not. After this understanding is established, the outcome or result is achieved. At this stage, variable outcomes can occur either on the personal or the cultural levels. These outcomes can also be either desired or undesired based on the intention of the media. While it can be argued that journalists are affected by the schemas held by the audience more than the audience is affected by the news pieces. However, according to Scheufele (1999), this is not the case, especially in conflicts. While those frames are constructed, for the most part, based on the accepted understanding of reality and following the public census, they are still part of the political agenda of maintaining the conflict. This means that part of their construction is to maintain the current state of the conflict as well as the current state of the public

understanding of the conflict. In other words, the role of the media in the conflict is to reinforce the current understanding of the conflict and the 'other' since part of the political agenda is to maintain the current state of the conflict. Moreover, while the media follows the public census, that doesn't negate the ability to maneuver within the parameters of this census. This means that there is room for the media to move within these schemas to achieve a more desired effect on the public understanding of reality or the conflict. According to Iyengar & Simon (1993), media framing can affect the cultural shared memory depending on which category it falls under, namely episodic and thematic. Episodic framing means that events are reported as separate occurrences with no continuous narrative through different reports. This type of covering is mostly seen in covering the Palestinian – Israeli conflict in international media. Thematic framing, however, is a consistent frame represented through long periods of conflict. As the struggle affects the daily life of the two parties in the conflict, it is natural for a continuous framing to occur (Iyengar & Simon, 1993). Thematic framing thus becomes an ongoing narrative as long as the conflict continues in its current form. This means that the characters of the conflict get framed continuously into stereotypes.

Hilton & Von Hippel (1996) define stereotypes as "beliefs about the characteristics, attributes, and behaviors of members of certain groups. More than just beliefs about groups, they are also theories about how and why certain attributes go together" (Hilton & Von Hippel, 1996, p.240). In this sense, stereotypes are frames that focus on the description of individuals in a social group and what expected behaviors or characteristics apply to those individuals. This means that stereotypes function as frames about individuals in "out-group" individuals. Stereotypes are the characteristics of a certain group, why those characters exist, and how members of that group are

expected to behave. This provides an already-made image of the “other” in the mind of the stereotype user. Stereotypes similar to frames do not necessarily come from first-hand experiences. Seiter (1986) explains “Stereotypes are not necessarily based on people’s first-hand experiences with members of stereotyped groups. They may be learned from others or the mass media”(Seiter, 1986, p.15). The usage of stereotypes usually has a negative annotation and plays a role in defining frames, especially in media. Perkins (2018) explains that stereotypes are generally used to switch the result and the cause. Instead of blaming the “in-group” actions which may have resulted in the current characteristics of the “out-group”, Stereotypes switch those results and make them the reason why the “in-group” sees the “out-group” in that stereotype (Perkins, 2018). As an example, in the context of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, stereotyping Palestinians as violent is the reason they make violent actions and as a result, the Israeli military is forced to respond with violence to defend Israel. In this manner, Stereotypes shift the blame of the “in-group” to the “out-group”. This shift as Perkins explains functions as a mechanism to cope with conflicts, to feel safe in the social space the “in-group” occupies as well as reduce the guilt for the actions taken against the “out-group”. Dixon & Azocar (2007) Explains that the effects of mediated stereotypes fall under priming and cultivation. Priming suggests short stimulation of a cognitive linkage used to make an instant interpretation and judgment. Priming is equivalent to episodic framing in the sense that it is a short-term effect. The continued activation of such links can increase their accessibility. (Dixon & Azocar, 2007). In other words, cultivation refers to the long-term shaping of social memory from repeated interaction with media stereotypes. Cultivation is the equivalent of thematic framing.

While similarities exist between frames and stereotypes there are still differences between them. The main difference is that while stereotypes are held beliefs that describe and explain the ‘other’, frames are constructed and can explain both individuals, actions, and events. In this sense, frames that are used to describe individuals or social groups can be considered stereotypes. Stereotypes are part of the mediated frames but do not consist of all types of frames. Similarly, one of the methods to create frames is by analyzing and describing the “other” actions as part of a frame. Shedding light on their actions can reinforce a stereotype and using a stereotype reinforces the overall frame. Henceforth, this research analyzes Palestinian portrayals in Israeli media before and after Oslo while maintaining this interchangeable relationship between stereotypes and frames.

In this sense, there are three types of frames: Media (in-text) constructed frames, individually constructed frames, and socially constructed frames. While Scheufele (1999) argues that, there are two kinds of frames, media frames that construct and function within a news text, and individual frames that are based on social structures, shared and individual memory which is used to analyze and conclude news reports (Pan & Kosicki, 1993). This conception though accurate at the micro-scale which means the direct interaction between news media and the individual. It does not tackle the fact that Individual and social memories are separate. While social memories are shared among the majority of the social group, individual memories are personal. Hence, unexpected interpretations are bound to occur in the interaction between a frame and an individual. Nonetheless, personal memories are nearly impossible to analyze since the possibilities are endless. Despite that, this research will try to analyze news frames by consideration of the personal memories of Israeli viewers based on their interactions with Palestinians.

Thus, Israeli viewers will be divided into two groups, the first are viewers with direct experience of the conflict. The second group is individuals who only experienced the conflict through news media and have no confrontational experience with Palestinians.

Those three types of frames (i.e.: Media (in-text) frames, individual frames, and social frames) can be linked to the three dimensions of Galtung's 'violence and peace triangle'. In his works, Galtung (1969) defines 'peace' as " 'the 'absence of violence.'"(Galtung, 1969, p.168). Moreover, 'violence' is defined as "the cause of the difference between the potential and the actual, between what could have been and what is."(Galtung, 1969, p.168). In other words, Violence is regarded, based on Galtung's (1969) theory, as limiting the potential of individuals or groups to achieve what is possible. 'Peace' on the other hand is regarded as the disappearance of those limitations on those groups. Galtung's 'violence and peace triangle' consists of three dimensions each. 'Violence triangle' dimensions are: 'direct violence which is defined as "The type of violence where there is an actor that commits the violence"(Galtung, 1969, p.170), and 'structural violence which refers to" violence where there is no such actor"(Galtung, 1969, p.170) while 'cultural violence is defined as "any aspect of a culture that can be used to legitimise violence in its direct or structural form."(Galtung, 1969, p.170). The 'peace triangle' has the dimensions of (1) direct peace, (2) structural peace, and (3) cultural peace. All the 'peace dimensions' are defined as the absence of their respective 'violence dimensions' (Galtung, 1990). In this sense, this thesis adopts the following theoretical framework. The three types of frames (i.e.: Media (in-text) constructed frames, individually constructed frames, and socially constructed frames) are linked with either one of Galtung's triangles. After the analysis of the frames in the chosen sample as well as findings of previous research, the framing of Palestinian

media can fall under either one of Galtung's triangles. Individually constructed frames represent 'direct violence or peace' as they relate to the personal construction and digestion of frames based on individual memory. Media (in-text) constructed frames are considered as 'structural violence or peace' as they represent the institutionalization of frames and consist of more than one actor. While socially constructed frames are regarded as 'cultural violence or peace' since one of their functions is to justify the injustice against the 'other'. In this sense, frames can be used and actively affect the position of an individual or a culture on the 'violence or peace' dimensions.

Moreover, this link between Galtung's theory and frames establishes another connection to either peace or war journalism. If the frames that regularly appear in media fall under the 'violence' dimension then the media that constructs and provides these frames are a 'violent' media or a war media. However, for the sake of consistency in measuring those frames and classifications of the framing dimensions found in the Israeli media, this thesis adopts the dimensions based on Liebes & Kampf's (2009) analysis of the most prominent images used to describe Palestinians in Israeli media. Their research concludes that a positive change in the Palestinian image appears during the second Intifada. This change is credited to the shift in the western media landscape, the surge of international news channels, and the change in Israeli society after the Oslo accord. In their analysis, they divide images into two dimensions: animosity and vulnerability. Those two dimensions are defined as follows "the dimension of vulnerability, which constitutes a new trend of opening the frame to include a broader range of Palestinian representations, and the traditional dimension of animosity, representing Palestinians as the enemy." (Liebes & Kampf, 2009, p.9). Similarly, this paper examines the role of both text and visuals in delivering the narrative or portrayal

of Palestinians. The relationship between text and image is categorized into one of the following patterns (1) reinforcing, (2) anchoring, and (3) contrasting. Those dimensions are linked to the position of the real reader of the media. Depending on the dimension, a reader is located in the reception and interpretation of both the visual and text differ. The more a reader is on the dimension of animosity the more the reader blames Palestinians for the violence in the conflict and presents excuses for the violence done by the Israeli side. Differently, the more the reader is positioned on the dimension of vulnerability the more sympathetic toward Palestinian's suffering (Liebes & Kampf, 2009). However, the most important aspect of their research for the sake of this thesis is the six framing dimensions found in Israeli media used to describe Palestinians in the first intifada. The first dimension is excising images of Palestinians. This means the removal of Palestinians from news reports. The second is sanitizing the reports of the suffering of Palestinians. Third, equalizing the amount of harm and power between the two parties of the struggle. This means that news reports demonstrated that Palestinians were able to inflict an equal amount of harm and damage on Israeli soldiers. Fourth depersonalization of Palestinian victims. Victims from the Palestinian side were unnamed and only mentioned as numbers. The fifth demonization of Palestinians means presenting Palestinians as violent and evil people. Sixth is the decontextualization of the conflict. Reporting the first intifada confrontations as separate occurrences while ignoring the political and historical contexts of the conflict. These six dimensions are used as a way to measure the position of the Israeli media on either one of Galtung's triangles. This is described in more detail in the methodology section of this chapter. However, while their research draws a comparison between the images used in both the first and second intifada, it fails to draw a full comparison between those two time

periods. The comparison mainly mentions the mechanisms used in drawing the desired images of Palestinians with no examples, analysis, or reader reception. This comparison also excludes images used from the Oslo accords in 1993 until the outbreak of the second intifada in 2000. The second Intifada cannot be analyzed without an analysis of the Oslo accords, which is one of the reasons for the outbreak of the Second Intifada. This creates a gap in their research, a gap this thesis aims to fill by analyzing this time period.

In the previous part, the main theoretical framework of this thesis is constructed based on already established theories about stereotypes, framing, and war journalism. However, since this study focuses on the Palestinian struggle, the following sections focus on how those theories and concepts appear in the media coverage of various aspects of the Palestinian struggle based on the findings of previous literature.

Similar to any form of knowledge, knowledge in society is developed by processing information. This processing functions in a form of categorizing social understanding and depends on the development of words, concepts, and mental images as well as structures that reflect how these elements create an understanding of reality. These categorizations are mainly found in the social understanding of self, others, and the relationships that govern their interactions (Shaw & Zárate, 2007). These categorizations and understanding of self and the other are considered stereotypes that help identify and define the reality of the individual and the 'other' within their respective groups in a cultural context (Peres & Levy, 1969). While this thesis isn't focusing on the identification of the Israeli self in the Palestinian struggle this identification relates to two concepts that are of importance to this research. Firstly, in

terms of media effect on the perception of the reader of Israeli media on the Palestinian 'other'. Secondly, the level of media effects on the media itself and the frames, images, and methods used within the media. These media effects are generally accomplished through the use of frames that help the reader construct a specific and desired understanding of 'self' and 'other'. According to previous literature, the categories that govern the understanding of the reader regarding the Palestinian 'other' in the Israeli media have been one of the negative annotations (Barzilai, 1996). From the beginning of Jewish migration to Palestine in the early 20th century (Gorni, 1987; Reinharz, 1993), and following the 1948 war (Morris, 1996) up until the famous handshake between Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) leader Yasser Arafat in Washington D.C in 1993 (Manusov & Milstein, 2005), all the way up to the Second Intifada (Dor, 2004; Liebes & Kampf, 2009). Palestinians according to Oren & Bar-Tal (2007) were represented as primitive, savage, and filthy, and as the conflict continued the images of killers and terrorists started to emerge. These images were not directed at one specific group of Palestinians. Instead, Palestinians as a whole were stereotyped negatively in Israeli media (First, 2002). However, since the thesis analyzes the framing of three Palestinian Groups, it is important to see if there is a difference between these groups.

For example, Lowenstein-Barkai analyzes (2021) the representation of enemy leaders in Israeli media. According to the research, of all the outlets the only one that does not show a significant change in the representation of an enemy leader is the Israeli mass media. Even though Arafat's portrayal in the first intifada was the least negative of all the leaders, it was the only one that did not significantly change before, during, and after the Oslo agreement. Despite the positive shift in Rabin's portrayal in Palestinian

media, Arafat's image did not change in Israeli media. One of the suggested reasons for this lack of change is the fact that Arafat's image was more positive than the other leaders. This means that this is the limit to how positive Israeli media can show an enemy leader. In other words, the less negative image of Arafat is the limit of the social acceptance of an enemy leader image within the Israeli context. Another reason for this lack of change is the public perception of Oslo. Oslo was a shock to the Israeli public and was not received positively. If the public is skeptical about a peace agreement, a change in the enemy's leader portrayal becomes less likely to happen (Lowenstein-Barkai, 2021; Manusov & Milstein, 2005). This is especially emphasized in Manusov & Milstein's (2005) analysis of the coverage of Palestinian and Israeli media of the Rabin and Arafat handshake in the white house following the signing of the Oslo agreement. The representation of this handshake is varied between positive, skeptical, and negative changes. While the handshake became a symbol of change, this change was focused on the relationship between the two parties and not on the parties themselves. While those kinds of analyses of nonverbal communications are important, they are still case-specific and do not provide the full picture. For an event like the handshake, the why and how as well as what are the results of this event on the struggle as a whole are of extreme importance in analyzing media effects. While nonverbal cues are not the main focus of this thesis, the effect of the handshake itself as a symbol of change is of importance to this study. As the handshake represented this change, this thesis aims to answer the following question while focusing on the relatively long effects of the peace process on Israeli media: did the media follow this change in its representation? Or did it maintain a cautious approach to the peace process and Palestinians? Or did nothing change at all?

While these questions were partly answered by Liebes & Kampf, (2009) who find that a positive change appears during the Second Intifada in the framing of Palestinians as a whole. Other studies like Lowenstein-Barkai, (2021); Mandelzis, (2003) find that those effects, especially in the framing of the Palestinian leadership, are insignificant and minor. One of the possible reasons that were not discussed for this lack of change in the framing of the Palestinian leadership, is how the media framed the First Intifada as a whole. The First Intifada was framed at the beginning as riots and separated events in the Israeli media (Avraham & First, 2010; Roeh & Nir, 1990). This resulted in reducing the link between Arafat and the PLO and the First Intifada in the media. However, this link still existed as Arafat and the PLO were blamed for the violence and the riots. Nonetheless, the First Intifada was generally framed as separate events that allowed the Israeli media to reduce the frequency of appearances for Arafat and the PLO (Shaw & Zárate, 2007). Mandelzis (2003) for example, finds that a slight shift in the representation Of Arafat and the PLO appeared after Oslo. However, this shift is depicted in the form of “reality”. This means the use of real events, quotes, and pictures to convey a more realistic portrayal. After all, after decades of representing Arafat and the PLO as enemies and demons, an instant shift of their portrayals overnight is impossible “Arafat was their enemy, and suddenly turned into a partner in a process that could lead to peace in the region.” (K. Jaber, personal communication, 2021). In other words, the Israeli media reclassified Arafat and PLO as potential peace partners as they continued their traditional portrayal of Arafat and PLO for the sake of maintaining public consensus (Mandelzis, 2003). This means that while no significant change appeared in the portrayal of Arafat and the PLO, their position shifted from enemies to enemies plus potential peace partners. However, this ‘reality’ that was reported in the

media after Oslo was mostly negative during this period. Thus, creating skepticism toward the peace process as a whole. Moreover, this negative, realistic representation, reinforced what was already believed in the shared knowledge of the Israeli readers. That Arafat and the PLO are terrorists and the peace talks with them should be taken with a grain of salt. In this sense, media effects cannot be studied without their context. Following Oslo, the shift to a realistic approach to the framing of the Palestinian leadership, at least that's how the Israeli media presented those frames, was affected by what was already represented and understood about the Palestinian leadership before Oslo. Since Arafat and the PLO were demonized before Oslo, this demonization carried on after Oslo. Thus, placing the Palestinian leadership in an already negative context that represented them as enemies. Even if the media attempted to change that negative context, the quotes, images and interviews were still understood by both the audience and the politicians as uncovering the 'real' evil nature of the Palestinian leadership (Liebes et al., 2008). These findings are of significance to this study since if a change in the enemy leader's image does not happen, it is unlikely for the image of Palestinians as a whole to change.

In the case of Palestinians in Israel, they were usually removed from Israeli media (Avraham & First, 2010; First, 1998, 2002; Mandelzis, 2003; Peper, 2018; Peres & Levy, 1969; Roeh & Nir, 1990; Shaw & Zárate, 2007), except during elections from Oslo to the Second Intifada (Shaw & Zárate, 2007). However, during the Second Intifada, the representation of this group became more negative and included in the framing of the Palestinian 'enemy' as a whole (Avraham & First, 2010; Dor, 2004; Shaw & Zárate, 2007). However, this group's representation outside of the context of the events directly related to the struggle is of interest. Shor (2008) finds a trend of

portraying Palestinian athletes in Israeli media as physically superior but intellectually inferior to Jewish players. Despite this physical superiority over Jewish players, Palestinian players are expected to have the right character to be able to play in Israeli national teams. This right character means that players have to swallow their pride and accept the prejudice and racism against them doing everything they can to win the games they participate in. This shows that although Israeli Palestinian athletes are Israeli citizens they are not seen as equals to the Jewish players. This is especially emphasized by the background description of those players. These descriptions function as a tool to reinforce the already existing beliefs towards the Palestinians in Israel as a whole. Palestinians in Israel are expected to die either from crime or from becoming drug addicts. The description of the media indicates that no other options are available for Palestinians in Israel unless they have the “right character”. The right character here means working hard to get into national teams and the ones that did not join the national team did not work hard enough. It is not about talent or ability it is simply about working hard and accepting prejudice as part of the job. These background stories thus become stories of salvation and redemption for Israeli Palestinian players. Instead of dying or becoming drug addicts, they are saved by sports (Shor, 2008). This shows that even outside of events relating directly to the struggle, Palestinians are still presented in Israeli media negatively. More importantly, this thesis adopts the concept of the right character to the peace process, the Palestinian leadership, and Palestinians as a whole. This right character of being able to accept prejudice and everything Israel throws at them as part of the process to achieve true peace is of interest. If the Palestinian leadership, and Palestinians as a whole, want to achieve real peace they need to have this right character. Moreover, since the peace process failed it meant that this is not the

case. The failure of Oslo thus can be blamed on the Palestinians as not having the right character to accept everything offered by Israel and that they did not work hard enough to achieve the peace offered to them. Moreover, the adoption of this right character in Israeli media, despite its faults, can be linked to how the Israeli media represents Palestinian victims by Israeli terrorists. Samuel-Azran et al., (2015) find that Israeli media represent the Palestinian victims as innocent Israeli victims who died due to ideological and racist terrorism. This “image” is different from media portrayals of Palestinian victims during the First, and Second intifada, and military attacks against Gaza (Samuel-Azran et al., 2015). However, in the majority of those cases, the identity of the victims as Palestinians is not mentioned. So how does the adoption of the concept of the right character link to this? The representation of Palestinian victims, who hold Israeli citizenship, by Israeli terrorists has its faults as well. Yet, this method is still adopted by the media whenever those cases happen. Similar to how the right character is adopted when talking about Palestinian athletes. In other words, the right character represents desired and undesired attributes of the Palestinian. When using this right character, these desired attributes are emphasized. In this sense, when talking about Palestinian victims, the desired attributes of them being Israeli citizens are emphasized while the undesired attribute of them being Palestinians are removed from the context. This is an interesting parallel to Amara's findings (2016). While Israeli media removes the identity of the Palestinian victims in the cases of Jewish terrorism, their identity is shown in other contexts that position them in a negative light. In fact, forty-five labels were found to be used in the identification of Palestinians in Israel. The majority of the labels used by the Israeli media included the word ‘Arab’ in one way or form. These labels are used to define the boundaries of this group within the Jewish state and all

maintain negative connotations till this very day. In the case of the Palestinian athletes however, these negative attributes are still shown and used to describe the Palestinian athletes since the situation does not involve any negative representation of the Jewish prejudice against them. Instead, the focus is how these negative attributes could have resulted in the death or imprisonment of the athletes and that following the Israeli or Jewish way leads to their salvation from this fate. However, in the case of Palestinian victims, showing their identity can negatively affect the Jewish readers since a feeling of guilt can happen. On another level, the removal of the identity of the Palestinian victims can make the struggle and suffering of Palestinians less apparent to the reader. This is more likely since in the cases of Jewish victims; their identity and various details about them are included in the reports while in the cases of Palestinian victims these details are reduced. This positions Palestinians and Israelis under the dimensions of victims and/or self-defense. According to Wolfsfeld et al. (2008) the usage of “victim mode” and the “defensive mode” are the two prominent modes used by Israeli media to remove these feelings of guilt. To achieve those two modes almost all the anchors, guests, and quotes were Jewish or from Jewish sources. Even when a Palestinian voice is heard it’s usually one that solidifies the image the report is conveying. This method is used in a similar fashion in interviews with the Palestinian athletes. Such representations of the Palestinian voice work only to solidify the negative image towards Palestinians in the minds of the viewers. Similarly, using a high level of dramatization in the reports is apparent, and “victimization” of oneself is used repeatedly in cases of Israeli deaths. What the “other” did to “us”, why, and how are also used while demonization of the other is used. In the case where Palestinians are the victims, Israeli television tries to lower the emotional impact of the event using various

techniques. The most prominent one is the use of voice-over and claiming that the images used by the Palestinian side were only part of the propaganda used against Israel. The “defensive mode” is similarly used to shift blame from the Israeli side. Events of Palestinian victims were represented as an assassination of a terrorist who took part in the killing of Israelis. Blame shifting is thus achieved by indicating that the “Palestinians” are the ones that started it and this assassination is a result of their actions. Even though the report admits that there were civilian casualties it represents it as an unfortunate accident and are usually left anonymous (Liebes & Kampf, 2009). These kinds of representations function in the overall Israeli national narrative against Palestinians. It uses the public’s emotional state during such events to deepen that perception and reinforce the already existing stereotypes (Samuel-Azran et al., 2015). Understanding those mechanisms are of importance to the analysis conducted in this thesis, since they are indicators of specific mods that can appear in an analyzed article. Thus, they create a foundation for the analysis and a better understanding of how these mods are achieved, used and developed. However, the methods used to achieve these mods include visual, textual and vocal dimension. While the focus of this research is on the textual aspect of framing in the Israeli media, an understanding of how the other dimensions are used and work gives a significant insight into media effect and analysis as a whole.

In terms of visual representation of Palestinians, Peper (2018) finds that in the years 2017-2018, most portrayals of Palestinian civilians in the West Bank are those of men shouting and taking part in protests while the few images of women and children are those of them waiting at home. Interestingly, Palestinians in Israel are excluded from the images during that period. As if they are neither Israeli citizens, nor they are

Palestinians. Which makes them irrelevant to the conflict (Peper, 2018). These representations, despite the long period after Oslo, are similar to First, (1998) findings regarding the Palestinian population before the outbreak of the Second Intifada. The visual aspect of the analysis is of interest here since a picture is worth a thousand words. The images of savage, violent, angry hoarding Palestinians are shown repeatedly throughout the struggle. Pictures are powerful tools to reinforce the mental image of the other constructed throughout the conflict. The role photographs play as a symbol and a device for the construction of the Israeli memory and narrative are of importance here since they are considered as a visual stimulus of the stereotypical Palestinian image. Kampf (2006) uses the ‘lynch in Ramallah’ photograph as an example to explore this role. Being exposed to such photographs results in a traumatic shock among the viewers which results in a desire for revenge. Henceforth, those types of photographs become embedded in the collective memory of the viewers and become a symbolic reminder of the nature of the “other”. This becomes evident when a continuation of the arrests and judgments on the participants of that event appear in Israeli media throughout the years. An example of this appears in an article in 2007 in *Yedioth Ahronoth* titled (*Nablus: IDF arrests last participant in Ramallah lynching*) or in another article titled (*Israel Police Arrests Hamas Men Linked to 2000 Lynching of IDF Soldiers*) in *Haaretz* in 2012 or the 2020 article in *The Jerusalem Post* titled (*Remembering the Ramallah Lynching, 20 years later*). This symbolic function appears in the reproduction of the photograph in the national narrative or in building a narrative based on those images. Showing a specific event as part of a narrative and then building on that narrative until it concludes. While this thesis does not include the visual aspect into its analysis, Text and visual function together to form such narratives or memories. Although those

images build a national narrative, the interpretation of those photos without a text depends mainly on the visual representations as well as the previous narratives of the conflict. In this sense, to understand how those photos function and affect the national narrative, it is necessary to analyze the previously existing images in the collective memory of the public which is affected by the media (both visual and textual).

So, what is the role of the media in creating a national narrative, and how does politics affect this role in the Israeli case? This section aims to answer this question based on the findings of previous literature related to the topic.

In the early stages of framing studies, framing effects and agenda settings were considered to be related. However, in the late 1990s, a new trend in research considered framing effects as an extension or a second level of agendas that directed the construction of those frames (Scheufele, 1999). Moreover, since framing effects are considered part of the overall media effects, it is important to consider the desired effects achieved through the use of frames. Similarly, it is important to insert what factors decide the effects that the media wants to achieve into the discussion of the media effects. This thesis aims to start this insertion by looking into the relationship between the Israeli political system and its effects on the role of the media in the Palestinian struggle following Oslo. As a first step, it is important to look into the relationship between the political system and the media and how can politics affect the media. To answer this, one of the direct examples of how the political system can affect media and its coverage is in the fact that Positive interactions, as well as images of Palestinians, were banned before the Oslo accord. This ban was due to a legislative act signed in 1977 by the Israeli Knesset by a vote of 92–4 stating that “the organization

called the PLO aspires, as stated in its covenant, to destroy and exterminate the State of Israel. The murder of women and children, and terrorism, are part of this organization's ideology, which it is implementing in practice." (Oren & Bar-Tal, 2007, p.7). Similarly, in 1986 the Knesset decided to prohibit meetings with PLO representatives by legislating the law of "Order for the Prevention of Terror" (Oren & Bar-Tal, 2007). However, following the Oslo accords the ban on the inclusion of Palestinian voices in Israeli media discourse was removed (Liebes & Kampf, 2009). The law was changed in January 1993, thus making the inclusion of Palestinian voices in Israeli media legal (Oren & Bar-Tal, 2007). Moreover, this thesis adopts the view that political standings can be considered as patterns of attitudes in an existing conflict (Auerbach & Ben-Yehuda, 1987; Yehuda & Auerbach, 1991). This means that those political positions on issues related to the conflict can be considered as patterns of thinking adopted by both the political and the public represented by this political system. These patterns are then considered views that can be developed or remain static based on the direction the conflict is heading to. Since these views are adopted by society as a whole, it can be argued that these views are adopted by the media as well since it and its journalists are part of society (Barzilai, 1996). Based on this view, speeches or quotes of politicians can be representatives of those views that are commonly held by a society or a group within a society. These views are then shared or reiterated with the public through the media. As such, the media becomes the stage where these views are represented and reinforced within the public sphere by the fact that they are similarly held by the political system. In other words, the dialogue direct to the Israeli audience can become a way for them to identify specific aspects of the conflict. in the case of the Israeli media, this is seen in how Israeli politicians represented the threat of rock throwing and how

that affected public opinion regarding this method of protesting during the First Intifada (Pressman, 2017) or how public opinions towards Egyptians and Jordanians became better after signing peace treaties with Israel as a result to the political dialogue following these treaties (Bar-Tal & Labin, 2001). Moreover, previous literature indicates that the media isn't just a stage to represent those views and reinforce them in this indirect manner. Instead, the findings of several pieces of research indicate that the role of Israeli media is to construct those beliefs and maintain the public census as part of a national security network (Barak & Sheffer, 2006). This network exists in various levels and structures within Israeli society and its members all work with the Israeli security institution. They also hold significant power within Israeli society since they are supported by both the political and security levels. One of the main aims of this network is to maintain the structure and views of Israeli society, especially in matters relating to the Palestinian struggle (Shaw & Zárate, 2007). Of course, since the media is part of this network it has similar targets or aims. This relationship thus creates a link between the desired media effects in Israel and the agendas of the political and security levels.

However, this relationship isn't newborn. This relationship was created and maintained from the early stages of the Zionist movement to Palestine in the late nineteenth century (Gorni, 1980, 1987; Peres & Levy, 1969; Reinhartz, 1993; Shaw & Zárate, 2007). Since the beginning of the Zionist project in Palestine, the Zionist, and then later the Israeli media, actively participated in the construction of reality for its readers. On the micro-scale, the Israeli media actively represented Palestinians and Arabs as a savage, primitive and violent population with no cultural background and no right to the ownership of Palestine (Gorni, 1980, 1987; Peres & Levy, 1969; Reinhartz, 1993; Shaw & Zárate, 2007). The blame was usually placed on Palestinians and

'victimization' of self was usually apparent in the coverage of the majority of events relating to the conflict (Wolfsfeld et al., 2008). This is especially the case during violent escalations of the struggle. In the case of the various wars with the Arab countries and/or Palestinian attacks against Israel, the holocaust was used as a metaphor to rekindle the Jewish identity and suffering within the readers. Israeli media usually created comparisons between the current situation and the holocaust, which in turn positioned these events in a wider context (Nossek, 1994). These comparisons are of importance in cases of intractable conflicts. Intractable conflicts are characterized as "protracted, irreconcilable, violent, of zero-sum nature, total, and central. They are demanding, stressful, exhausting, and costly both in human and material terms." (Bar-Tal, 1998, p.22). During such periods one of the most important methods to cope with them is societal beliefs (Dor, 2004). The role of the holocaust in this sense is to present or reinforce societal beliefs about the injustice Jews faced throughout their history. In this way, the Israeli media reminds its readers that they have been faced with injustice throughout their history and that this is just one stage in their struggle to achieve their identity as a Jewish state (Barzilai, 1996; Shaw & Zárate, 2007). This is seen throughout the conflict from the 1948 war to the second intifada. The Israeli media tended to represent the various stages of the struggle as intractable (Alimi, 2007; Dor, 2004; Shaw & Zárate, 2007) and used the holocaust as a method to place these events in the wider context of the Jewish struggle and identity. However, the held belief towards self isn't the only direction these methods adopt. In terms of the 'enemy' or the 'other' the Israeli media shows a tendency in adopting the political method of identification towards Palestinians in Israel (Amara, 2016) and the other Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza and the Palestinian leadership especially before and after Oslo (Bar-Tal,

1998; Bar-Tal & Labin, 2001; First, 1998, 2002; Liebes, 1992; Peres & Levy, 1969; Roeh & Nir, 1990; Shaw & Zárate, 2007). This identification before Oslo usually removed the identity of Palestinians as an independent people and instead merged their identity with the other Arab nations. This can be seen as a method to remove guilt towards the Israeli occupation as well as part of the political agenda in the struggle. Since denying the ownership of Palestinians for Palestine, the claim for this land becomes easier and easily accepted either internationally or locally. Moreover, the denial of the Palestinian identity can be seen as a way to disprove their claim to Palestine. While this identification towards Palestinians in the West Bank and the Palestinian leadership changed after Oslo, they are still considered as part of the Arab world and the claims of the Israeli right to claim Palestine didn't change. Similarly, these representations are limited in nature since the usage of the word 'national' in the description of the Palestinian authority is completely rejected by the Israeli side. In other words, while the Israeli side admitted that the people in the West Bank and Gaza and the Palestinian leadership have their own identification as a part of the Arab world, they aren't considered a nationality.

Those micro-scale points, while important separately, are more important when combined on the macro level. When they are combined they create a story that provides an overall explanation of the conflict and the 'other'. The usage of victimization through the holocaust, the demonization of the other, the intractable representations of the conflict, and the identification of the self and the other in the context all function together to construct a narrative of the conflict as a whole. Studying all those aspects based on the historical context they are built upon is of extreme importance to this study.

These historical aspects provide in-depth insights into how and why those aspects came to be. How are they used? Why are they used? What affects them? And what is the role of politics in their usage and construction? As explained earlier based on the findings of previous literature. The Israeli media is part of a network built to maintain these societal beliefs and construct them in a manner that benefits the Zionist project in Palestine. These benefits can be summed up in two major aspects. First, the increase of morals in the internal fronts in the members of the 'in-group'. This means that these images and narratives represented in the media benefit Israeli readers on a psychological level. Either in terms of removing guilt or increasing commitment to the collective identity and the Zionist project, which aims to establish a Jewish state to protect this identity or in creating the feeling of accomplishment by achieving the image of victory. The second aspect is to undermine the 'other' morally. This can be achieved by blaming the Palestinians for the negative aspects of the struggle, diminishing their collective identity or the Palestinian struggle by placing it under economic or demographic frustrations (Liebes, 1992), or by creating an image of defeat in the Palestinian memory. Those aspects as such can be considered part of the psychological aspect of the struggle. They play a role in the struggle and can negatively or positively affect the direction of the struggle. In other words, the images that are used to achieve those aspects can be considered as a different method of war described as 'imagefare' (Ayalon et al., 2016). In simple terms, 'Imagefare' is another front in the war against Palestinians. This means that the images that appear in the media are used in one way or form to achieve specific objectives in the struggle and not just representations of what is happening on the ground. They function as part of the agenda of the political system and exist on both the local and international levels of representation. While the local

stage is of importance to the analysis of the struggle as a whole, this thesis focuses on the international stage of the Israeli media coverage of Palestinians. This focus is due to three main reasons. The first reason is the focus on how a peace process like Oslo affected the role and methods of the Israeli media coverage of Palestinians. As Oslo was adopted by the USA, the international image represented by Israeli media, English-written in this case, is of importance since it's directed at the international audience instead of the local audience. The second reason is the language barrier since the author of this thesis doesn't know Hebrew. Thus resulting in an ability to analyze Hebrew-written Israeli media. The third reason is the close ties between Israel and the West in general, which results in a more frequent level of adoption of the Israeli narrative and news coverage as a whole when compared to the Palestinian narrative and news coverage. Moreover, since the focus of this thesis is on the effect of Oslo on the English-written Israeli media, and since the Israeli media is considered part of the 'imagefare' and 'security network' of the political system and the Zionist project, another focus of this thesis is the position of this media on the dimensions of peace and violence after Oslo. In other words, did a peace process like Oslo change the position of English-written Israeli media from war journalism to peace Journalism?

1.3 Statement of the Problem:

Based on the previous literature discussed in the literature review the following questions are constructed: How Palestinians were portrayed after Oslo in English-written Israeli media? And if there is a significant change in the image of the three Palestinian groups and the methods used to represent them in English-written Israeli media based on Galtung's 'violence triangle' and 'peace triangle'. These questions aim

to answer if the following hypotheses are valid or wrong. Based on previous research that analyzes the Palestinian framing before and after Oslo

H.1: The framing of the three Palestinian groups didn't significantly change from 1993-2000.

H.2: The framing of the three Palestinian groups became worse after the outbreak of the Second Intifada.

H.3: There is no significant difference between the framing of Palestinians in Israeli media before and after Oslo when the Second Intifada is included in the analysis.

H.4: Palestinians inside Israel had more positive frames in Israeli media compared to the other two groups.

H.5: Israeli media played a negative role in framing Palestinians after Oslo the outbreak of the Second Intifada, as a result, it is positioned on the 'violence triangle' of Galtung's theory.

To answer those questions and fill the gap of knowledge that exists in those hypothesizes, a qualitative and quantitative approach to frames and stereotypes is conducted while those frames and the media that constructed those frames are linked to the dimensions of Galtung's 'violence triangle' and 'peace triangle' and peace and war journalism.

1.4 Significance of the study

The main aim of this thesis analysis is to provide a look into how a peace process affects the framing of media in a struggle. While this includes various dimensions it is still of significance on various fronts. On the scientific front, this analysis builds on the already established literature on media framing and media effects in conflict while including the effects of a peace process on the media and its frames. Here, the usage of Galtung's 'peace and violence' theory is of extreme importance as it measures if such an effect exists in the case of Oslo. Similarly, while there is a good amount of previous research on the framing of Palestinians in Israeli media, only a small percentage of those research is comparative and includes the role of the frames as part of an ongoing narrative in Israeli media. Moreover, this research sheds light on the difference or lack of difference between the framing of the three Palestinian groups. Even less research was conducted taking into account the difference between different groups within the same 'outgroup'. Lastly, this research can be used as a stepping stone for future similar research, where it can be improved to create a more accurate analysis.

Similarly, this research holds a functional value for any Palestinian who wants to conduct similar research in Palestine in the future. For example, one of the biggest challenges I faced during this research was the fact that there is no archive of Israeli media in the West Bank. To solve this, it is recommended to build that kind of archive to encourage similar research. If this is solved, it will result in a more functional infrastructure for future research. Moreover, on the political front, the findings of this research indicate an important aspect regarding Oslo. As a Palestinian Oslo affects my daily life and as a peace process it didn't bring any significant change to how

Palestinians are presented in the Israeli media. Instead, it brought a more negative method of framing and a reused narrative that existed long before Oslo.

1.5 Limitations of the study:

This research was faced with two types of limitations. The first type is functional limitations which consist of the following limitations. The first limitation of this type is the long period of the struggle, which makes it hard to analyze every portrayal in the media throughout the different stages of the struggle. Thus, a sample of those images is chosen while making a count of the frequency of how often positive and negative images are presented in the media. The second limitation is the fact that the researcher does not know Hebrew, which makes the analysis solely based on sources available in English. While this is one of the reasons English-written Israeli newspapers were chosen, another reason is the fact that the Palestinian struggle is represented on various stages around the world. This creates a third limitation which is the numerous possible fronts the framing of the Palestinian struggle exists in. The fourth limitation is the limited access to news articles from the three newspapers, especially before Oslo. For example, online *Haaretz* has articles post-1994 available in their archives, which limits the possibility to analyze articles before Oslo. Similarly, the search engine in the archives of the three newspapers does not function accurately. Likewise, in the West Bank, there is no official archive for Israeli media. Most of the results that appear in the search area are of newer articles mostly from 2014 and forward. As a result, the researcher had to use personal connections to reach a limited number of articles. The second type of limitation exists in the methodology and framing analysis. One of the most apparent limitations of frame analysis is the fact that frames may not be visible in

the text itself, instead, they may be delivered latently based on a context that is shared between the readers and the journalist who belong to the same belief system. As such, framing analysis becomes more challenging and increasingly difficult to accomplish. However, this can be reduced by developing a strict coding system and methodology that considers this aspect. The next limitation is the fact that the researcher is still human with his values, views, and understanding of the conflict. Especially, when considering that I am a Palestinian living in the West Bank and have experienced the Palestinian struggle against Israeli occupation. However, I argue that this is not entirely a negative thing. These experiences allow me as a researcher to be more aware of the effects of such frames on the ground and as such creates a commitment to this research. Nonetheless, this aspect can create bias while conducting the analysis. As such, the strict coding book and methodology function to reduce the effects my own experiences may have on the analysis. The last limitation is the fact that one article can contain more than one frame. To confront this a deductive approach to the dominant themes or frames has been chosen. This allows the researcher to analyze the articles while considering all the found frames without looking for specific frames and stopping once they are found.

1.6 Methodology

This thesis conducts a mix of quantitative and qualitative content analysis, to try to answer the questions above - How Palestinians were portrayed after Oslo in English-written Israeli media? And if there is a significant change in the image of the three Palestinian groups and the methods used to represent them in English-written Israeli media based on Galtung's 'violence triangle' and 'peace triangle'. Moreover, this research adopts a mixed approach of exploratory and explanatory research. While

framing analysis in general and the Palestinian struggle, in particular, are well defined to some extent, this research explores the effects a peace process had on the framing of the ‘other’ in a struggle. This, especially in the Palestinian struggle, isn’t as well defined as framing analysis. This aspect allows for the exploratory aspect of this research since exploratory research aims to explore the main aspects of an under-researched problem. Moreover, this aspect allows for a deductive and inductive mixed analysis where the main dimensions of framing are deduced from previous research and the dominant frames to inductively analyze based on the analysis of the selected articles. Those different types of framing are first identified through framing analysis. The framing analysis in this thesis is constructed based on the abstract ideas of the framing theory discussed in the literature section. Some useful looks at the different mechanisms of framing in previous research are adopted in this research. However, an inductive (qualitative and quantitative) analysis of the dominant frames in the 60 articles is carried out to identify the frames dominant in the context of Oslo. The results of that qualitative and quantitative framing analysis are presented in the analysis, findings, and discussion sections of this thesis.

However, before diving deep into the methodology of analysis it is important to identify how the sample was chosen. Due to the functional limitations in the previous section – the long period of the struggle, the language limitation, the numerous stages of representations, and the limited access to the articles- the following rules were chosen to select the newspapers. Firstly, the newspapers had to be written in English to cover the language barrier and the numerous stages of representation. As such, three newspapers are chosen namely: *Haaretz*, *The Jerusalem Post*, and *Yedioth Ahronoth* since those three newspapers are considered major circulations, and all of them are written in

English and existed before Oslo. In regards to the news articles chosen for the analysis, 60 articles in total were chosen. To equalize the representation of the newspapers in the analysis 20 articles from each newspaper are chosen. This number is chosen due to the limitation of accessible articles especially in the period from Oslo until the outbreak of the Second Intifada. During this period (1993-2000) only 9 articles in *Haaretz* were found while 8 in *Yedioth Ahronoth* and 13 in *The Jerusalem Post*. As such, having significantly more articles from the period of the Second Intifada can create unbalanced results in the analysis since those two periods are different. From 1993-2000 is the peace process period and the Second Intifada is a period of violent escalation. Thus having more articles from the period of the Second Intifada, since these are the only remaining articles available, can point the results in a more negative direction. However, availability isn't the only condition for choosing news articles. Since this research aims to analyze the framing of Palestinians in English-written Israeli media, the articles analyzed had to include one of the three selected Palestinian groups in their content. Thus removing any articles that didn't include Palestinians in their text or discussions. There are three Palestinian groups represented in Israeli media during the first intifada: the first is the Palestinian leadership, the second, is Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, and lastly Palestinians in Israel. The reason for this separation is to draw a complete picture of the portrayals of Palestinians based on their geographical location, role in the struggle, and their relationship with Israel. In this sense, this allows us to answer the question of whether there is a difference between the portrayal of Palestinians based on their position in the conflict or if all Palestinians are lumped together in one frame and one stereotype. However, it is important to note that the fourth group of Palestinians exists geographically which is Palestinians in the diaspora.

Unfortunately, no English-written news articles were found to include them. As a result, they were not included in the research since there is no available content to analyze for them.

Another aspect of importance in this section is the approach to the comparative aspect of the thesis. This thesis aims to explore the difference between the framing of Palestinians before and after Oslo. However, as mentioned earlier, no news articles before Oslo were found to conduct a personal analysis. With this in mind, this research adopts a historical perspective of analysis since the articles analyzed are part of past periods of struggle that still affect the present. However, as no accessible news articles from the three chosen newspapers are available before Oslo, an alternative is to analyze the research conducted during that period and position the findings of those research on Gaulting's dimensions. Various research was conducted analyzing the coverage of the period before Oslo from the beginning of the Zionist movement until First Intifada Alimi, (2007; First, (1998); Liebes, (1992); Pressman, (2017) to name a few. While those researches provide a useful characterization of the coverage of the first intifada and Palestinians or the struggle in general, their focuses are separate. Thus, the structure of the second chapter, which deals with this period, focuses on each Palestinian group separately based on Liebes & Kampf, (2009) characterization of the mechanisms used for the representations of Palestinians (Avraham & First, 2010). Moreover, the third chapter ,similar to the second chapter, focuses on the three Palestinian groups of Palestinians in Israeli media coverage following Oslo. However, the order of the analyzed groups is somewhat different. The order of the groups is as follows: the first group is Yasser Arafat and Palestinian leadership, the second group is Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza and the third group is Israeli-Palestinians. The reason for the

change is the fact that the beginning of the peace process began in Israeli media with the famous handshake between Arafat and Rabin in the Whitehouse. It is also noticed based on the findings of the analysis that the only Palestinian group that does not fall under excising and Saliency, is the Palestinian leadership. Despite some differences between the frequencies of the methods used, especially anonymity, Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza and Palestinians in Israel methods of framing did not change after Oslo.

Following all of those steps, the quantitative and qualitative frame and content analysis of the 60 chosen news articles is conducted. How the materials were analyzed and how the frames were identified as well as the coding process and what to have in mind when filling out the coding matrix are described in the following sections of this methodology.

Starting with the identification of the dominant frames. This process starts with reading the articles and conducting an inductive in-depth analysis of what are the overarching themes of the article. This approach is chosen at this stage to allow for the identification of the existing themes without being limited to specific targets in the research. Following that, the contents of the frame are identified by specific keys or structures that govern the narrative of the article. Keywords are one of the major identification methods for frames in the articles. Based on those findings open coding of the text is conducted to not fail to notice any existing frames. This is of importance since it allows for a better understanding of how the narrative in the whole sample analyzed is told, not just the specific articles. Similarly, this allows a focus on what is being told or what is selected by the authors. After mapping and connecting the various aspects of the dominant frames, entries in the code book are created for each one of the

dominant frames. The entries include keywords or structures as well as the similarities and differences between each text. These entries are then arranged and created in the form of rows, which represent the frame, and columns which represent the keys that help identify which frame each article falls under. Those keys are established as Yes/No questions that focus on the core ideas of the frame to reduce subjectivity. At this stage, the frames are already established and as such are considered deductive as they are already arranged in the coding manual. At this stage, identifying frames becomes a manner of locating which keys exist in each article and then positioning each article under the dominant frame that these keys help identify. Of course, during this phase, the elimination of frames that appear partly or irrelevant to Palestinians in the articles is achieved. This is done by either analyzing the messages in the article to see if it fully fits one specific frame or by analyzing if the frame is clear enough and is shared by more than one article. If the frame that appears in the article has less than half of the keys identified for that frame then it is considered partial. Similarly, if the keys identified for this frame weren't clear enough or had multiple interpretations then the frame is either removed or reanalyzed to specify its position more accurately. Lastly, in the case that this frame only applies to one message or line in one article then it is not considered to be a frame and reanalyzed to see if it fits any other already established frames. If it does not fall under any frame then it is considered irrelevant or frameless.

So, what are the dominant frames found in this analysis? This part presents the frames found during the inductive analysis and then chosen as the five dominant frames. The full list of the measuring devices used in the analysis can be seen in the coding manual in Appendix B in the appendix section at the end of this thesis. To understand the main and most common themes of the articles a variable for each frame is presented

in the coding book of each article. Based on the findings of this coding five dominant frames found in the 60 news articles that were analyzed during the inductive stage were found: violence frame, Oslo frame, economy frame, disorder frame, and the unwillingness for peace frame. In this research, each frame was identified in the articles by a series of questions about the articles. Of course, since the main focus of this thesis is the framing of Palestinians these questions were directed at their framing instead of the conflict in general. For clarification, the following questions represent each frame:

Does the article contain direct or indirect indications of Palestinian violence?

(Violence frame)

Does the article contain discussions or present any information about Oslo? (Oslo frame)

Does the article contain discussions about the economic effects of Palestinian policy or actions on Palestinians or Israelis? (Economy frame)

Does the article present Palestinians as instigators of chaos and disorder?

Does the article present Palestinians as emotional and/or chaotic? (Disorder frame)

Does the article present Palestinians as unserious about achieving peace? (Unwillingness for peace frame)

To make the most out of the small sample size of articles an in-depth inductive qualitative content analysis is conducted on each article following the framing quantitative analysis. This provides an advantage of accurately identifying the frames as well as the narrative of the articles in the sample and what type of language or

terminology is used to describe each Palestinian group. However, this comes with the disadvantage of the results being less generalizable due to the low number of articles analyzed. During this content analysis, various aspects were taken into consideration other than the text or language itself. For starters, the position and the size of the articles as well as the headlines in the newspaper were accounted for. Similarly, the position of Palestinians within the text itself was accounted for. The earlier an article appeared in the newspaper, the bigger the title and the size of the article were all considered as a show of interest and importance of the events that are described in the article. Similarly, the amount of text that directly quoted Palestinians was seen as either a negative or positive factor. Quotes or discussions about Palestinians from the Israeli side are considered to be either positive or negative based on the content of the article while direct quotes about Palestinians were considered either positive or negative based on the context they were presented in. For example, direct quotes from Palestinians that were used to reinforce the Palestinian desire for violence were considered negative even though the Palestinian voice was introduced while quotes that presented the Palestinian interest in peace were considered positive. With that in mind, the framing of these groups is analyzed based on Liebes & Kampf, (2009) mechanisms. Liebes & Kampf, (2009) found six framing mechanisms used in the first intifada. Those dimensions are adopted in this thesis as the main dimensions of framing to be analyzed for each Palestinian group. The Findings of this analysis are discussed in detail in chapter three of this thesis. However, for the sake of clarification, a general preview of the methodology used to analyze those framing dimensions is presented here. First is excising images of Palestinians. This means the removal of Palestinians from news reports. This is measured in two steps; firstly analyzing the frequency of appearance for

Palestinians as a whole outside of the articles analyzed since each analyzed article includes one of the Palestinian groups. This is done by taking fourteen days of content from each newspaper and measuring the frequency of appearance for Palestinians in general. Secondly the frequency of each Palestinian group is individually measured within the sample to provide a qualitative perception of each group's appearance. The second is sanitizing the reports of the suffering of Palestinians. This is analyzed through measuring how much of the blame is positioned at Palestinians since this means a shift of focus from the suffering to the responsibility or result of their actions. Another method to measure this dimension is by analyzing the content and language used to describe the Palestinian suffering of each group. Third equalizing the amount of harm between the two parties of the conflict. This dimension is measured by measuring the amount of harm Palestinians can inflict on the Israeli side as well as what kind of threat they possess. Fourth depersonalization of Palestinian victims. This dimension is measured by analyzing how Palestinian victims are described and how the situation is presented in the articles. In other words, if the victims from the Palestinian side were individualized or left unnamed and how the situation is told, and who is responsible for the event? The fifth dimension is the demonization of Palestinians. This is measured by analyzing the language used to present Palestinians as violent and evil people and how frequently it appears. Sixth and the last dimension is the decontextualization of the struggle. Reporting the first intifada confrontations as separate occurrences while ignoring the political and historical contexts of the conflict (Avraham & First, 2010). Based on this finding, the contexts the article\ presents; individually and as a collective, are accounted for as part of the overall narrative of the struggle. Each event here is analyzed separately at first then followed up by a connective analysis of the overall

narrative presented in the sample as a whole. Those dimensions as well as other aspects of the articles are analyzed using in-depth content analysis. To increase the objectivity of the analysis, questions are used to represent the analyzed aspects in the coding manual. These questions are as follows:

(Blame shifting)

Are Palestinians held responsible for the escalation of events?

(Labeling)

Are the Palestinians in the articles addressed by their names?

Are the Palestinians in the article addressed by their political position?

Does the article present Palestinians of each group differently than the other groups?

Is there any demonizing language used to describe Palestinians?

Among those labels:

Vicious, cruel, brutal, barbaric, inhuman, tyrant, savage, ruthless, terrorist, extremist, fanatic, Islamist, rioting Palestinians, scores of Palestinian university students, Palestinian gunmen, stone-throwing youths., A knife-brandishing Palestinian, assailant, attacker, jihadist, suicide bomber, and fundamentalist

Which group of Palestinians is quoted the most? (Main source of Palestinian speech)

Are Palestinians presented in groups or as individualized? (Palestinian grouping)

(contextualization of the struggle)

Do the articles include anything related to the long-term achievements, nature, causes, and effects of the struggle?

Following the findings of this analysis, a category based on Galtung's classification of peace or war Journalism is created. This coding category consists of four levels, which are: article level, newspaper level, sample level, and finally on which dimensions of Galtung's triangles the Israeli media falls under. The first level is based on Liebes & Kampf, (2009) framing dimensions. The appearance of one or more of those dimensions in a frame or an article positions that frame and article into war journalism while the absence of any of those dimensions and frames positions it into peace journalism. This means that each frame or article is categorized separately into either peace or war journalism. On the level of the newspapers, each newspaper is categorized into either war or peace journalism based on the percentage of articles that fall under each category. If the majority of articles fall under peace journalism then the analyzed newspaper falls under peace journalism and if the majority of the articles fall under war journalism then it is considered war journalism. This level is included to see if there is any major difference that exists between the three newspapers. The third level is that of the total sample or English-written Israeli media in general. In this level, the same process as the second level is adopted while removing the variable of the newspaper. This level was included since the findings indicate that there isn't a significant difference between the three newspapers and that they adopt similar frames and framing mechanisms. The last level is the position that the three newspapers take on Galtung's triangles of peace and violence. This level categorizes the role the English-

written Israeli media plays in framing the Palestinian struggle on either triangle. Based on the position of the media in the previous levels, its position can exist on either triangle of peace or violence. Its position can either be on one or more of the triangle's dimensions. It can be either one of the Individual peace, structural peace, cultural peace dimensions or the Individual violence, structural violence, and cultural violence dimensions.

After the construction of the different variables for the analysis, a coding manual to carry on the analysis is created. As mentioned earlier, the variables are constructed in the form of rows while the columns are for the values of each article regarding each variable. Other information like the title of each article, the newspaper, the date, and the author are filled up in their specific place in the coding manual. The following variables are included in the coding manual as follows:

Headline

The headline or title of the article.

Publication

Which publication does the article belong to? Can take the following values:

(0) Haaretz (1) Yediot Aharonot (2) the Jerusalem Post

Date

The date the article was published in.

The main frame of the article

A variable for one or more of the dominant frames is identified by a variable value. The most identifiable values are selected. How to identify each value is Clearfield here:

If the article answers the following question with a yes then it falls under the violence frame:

Does the article contain direct or indirect indications of Palestinian violence?

The Oslo frame is identified by a yes answer to the following question:

Does the article contain discussions or present any information about Oslo?

The Economy frame is identified by a yes answer to the following question:

Does the article contain discussions about the economic effects of Palestinian policy or actions on Palestinians or Israelis?

For the Disorder frame, the article answers the following questions with a yes:

Does the article present Palestinians as instigators of chaos and disorder?

Does the article present Palestinians as emotional and/or chaotic?

If the following question is answered with a yes then the article falls under the Unwillingness for peace frame

Does the article present Palestinians as unserious about achieving peace?

Other dimensions

To put the main frames into a better understandable context as well as to help with the qualitative content analysis the following variables are included in the coding manual.

If this question is answered by a yes then blame shifting is identified:

Are Palestinians held responsible for the escalation of events?

In regards to labeling.

If the answer to the following questions is a yes then the article falls under the individualization dimension:

Are the Palestinians in the articles addressed by their names?

Are the Palestinians in the article addressed by their political position?

The following question aims to identify if separate labeling between the three groups exists. If the answer is yes, identifications of the labels of each group are identified and measured through content analysis.

Does the article label Palestinians of each group differently than the other groups?

(0) Yes (1) No

The following question is if demonizing language is used and each variable identifies which term or label is used.

Is there any demonizing language used to describe Palestinians?

(0) Vicious, (1) cruel, (2) brutal, (3) barbaric, (4) inhuman, (5) tyrant, (6) savage, (7) ruthless, (8) terrorist, (9) extremist, (10) fanatic, (11) Islamist, (12) rioting Palestinians, (13) scores of Palestinian university students, (14) Palestinian gunmen, (15) stone-throwing youths, (16) A knife-brandishing Palestinian, (17) assailant, (18) attacker, (19) jihadist, (20) suicide bomber. (21) Fundamentalist, (22) others (23) none.

The question has three variables identifying each group and is linked to how the Palestinians quoted are addressed:

Which group of Palestinians is quoted?

(0) Palestinian leadership (1) Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza (2) Palestinians in Israel

The position of the Palestinian quote in the text consists of four variables:

The position of the Palestinian quote in the text?

(0) the beginning (1) the middle (2) the end (3) No quotes

The answer to the following question consists of three variables:

Are Palestinians presented in groups or as individualized?

(0) groups (1) individuals (2) not mentioned

The following question has two variables, if the answer is yes, the context provided by the article is qualitatively analyzed and an analysis of the existence of a connection to other contexts in other articles is carried out.

Does the article include anything related to the long-term achievements, nature, causes, and effects of the struggle?

(0)Yes (1) No.

The position of the news piece about Palestinians consists of three variables:

The position of the news piece about Palestinians is?

(0) at the beginning (1) in the middle (2) at the end

The size of article consists of four variables:

The size of the article about Palestinians is?

(0) One sentence (1) One paragraph (2) two Paragraphs (3) three or more paragraphs

The last dimension is what period the article is from. While the period from Oslo to the outbreak of the second Intifada consists of more than one period, especially after 1996-1997 with the tunnel outbreak. Two periods are selected in this thesis due to the lack of articles to fully cover all the periods after Oslo.

Which period does the article belong to?

(0) From Oslo to the Second Intifada, 1993-2000 (1) After the Second Intifada, 2000 and forward

**Chapter II: Palestinians' portrayal in Israeli media before Oslo in
previous research and its position on Galtung's dimensions**

2. Chapter 2 (Background): Palestinians' portrayal in Israeli media before Oslo in previous research and its position on Galtung's dimensions

News representations of the “other” are part of the ongoing cultural narrative. Each representation functions as an identifier for the different social actors in a conflict. The narrative or the context of both the cultures and the conflict help identify and draw a more coherent picture of how the current representations came to be and what they mean in the continuous context of the conflict. The history of the framing process and the changes in narratives are important to understand how those frames are created. What do they mean in the overall narrative? How are they shaped by the conflict? And how do those narratives extend to and shape the future? (Tenenboim-Weinblatt et al., 2016). While no accessible articles before Oslo were available, an alternative to conducting this comparison is by looking at the findings of previous research that analyzed media coverage of Palestinians during that period of the struggle. While this can be considered a literature review, this isn't fully the case. For the sake of this research, the findings of previous research in that period are analyzed based on Liebes & Kampf, (2009) six framing dimensions. These findings are then analyzed under Galtung's theory and positioned on either peace and war journalism or peace and violence triangles and their dimensions. This adds a new layer of context to the analysis as well as provides a shared ground for the comparison with the results of this thesis's analysis in the third chapter. Moreover, the interviews conducted provide another level of understanding of the framing of Palestinians in Israel during that period. As such, this chapter focuses on Palestinian frames found in Israeli media before the Oslo accords in 1993 based on the findings of previous research and the interviews conducted. This

allows us to see if a significant change occurs between the framing of Palestinians before and after Oslo.

2.1 The “Arab”

Starting with the most used term to describe the Palestinians for the longest period of the conflict, the “Arab”. From the very beginning of the Zionist migration to Palestine, the term “Arab” was used to describe the people living in Palestine as well as the people of all the surrounding, hostile Arab nations. However, it is important to note that this research is not focused on this period since this will result in an extremely huge body of work. Hence this part mentions a general overview of the narrative of that period to provide a context for the analysis conducted on the three Palestinian groups during the First Intifada, the Oslo years, and the Second Intifada periods. The term “Arab” was usually linked to negative attributes and stereotypes such as “primitive, savage, backward, and uncivilized”. Terms like “Arabs of Palestine”, “Palestinian Arabs”, “the indigenous people”, “the local population” or “Arabs in Palestine” were the dominant terms used to describe the Palestinian People. Three main reasons can explain why the term ‘Arab’ was used. The first reason is that Arabs themselves use this term to represent their national identity. The second reason is to deny the Palestinians of their national identity. The third reason is to indicate that ‘Arabs’ have a wide space of land as a collective entity and won’t be affected by the small area the Zionist movement aims to control, which is Palestine.

These stereotypes worked as a way to remove the national identity of the Palestinian people living there .

“Since the Zionist leaders planned to occupy our country and displace Palestinians from it. [...] They strip the Palestinian from the idea that he is part of a national people. They [...] presenting Palestine on the basis that the Palestinians. They, as a group, are immigrants who used to come here seeking to work in the institutions of the British Mandate or before in [...] the Ottoman occupation, in the past.” (A. Abuarqob, personal communication, 2021)

This narrative that the Palestinians are not a nation, and that they were savages and uncivilized was expressed by the early Zionist literature. An example is Jabotinsky's letter which was sent in 1925 to Frederick Kisch, head of the Zionist executive's Political Department stating the following regarding achieving peace with the native “Arabs”:

“We cannot promise any reward either to the Arabs of Palestine or to Arabs abroad. A voluntary agreement is unavoidable, [...]. We must either suspend our settlement efforts or continue them without paying attention to the mood of the natives. Settlement can develop under the protection of a force which is not dependent on the local population, behind an iron wall which they will be powerless to break down. (Gorni, 1987, p. 166)

This statement indicates two important points. Firstly, that Palestinians were considered part of the overall Arab nationality and not independent from them. Hence removing their independent identity from the discourse. Secondly, the emphasis on the need to use power to achieve the Zionist goal of a Jewish state. This was simply because “Arabs” understand and respect power more than anything else. However, this is not the only conception that was made about Palestinians in early Zionist literature. Moshe Smilansky, a writer in this period, wrote in 1914 in *ha-Olam* (the official Hebrew weekly of the World Zionist Organization published from 1907 to 1950) “We should not forget that we are dealing with a semi-savage people, with; extremely primitive concepts. This is their nature.”(Gorni, 1987, p. 63-64). Similarly, Smilansky stated that “ the Arabs have developed base characteristics which are [...] most evident among the urban quasi-intelligentsia: lying, cheating, suspiciousness, and slander—all these are faults in which the Arab masses wallow.” (Gorni, 1987, p.64). These views were even emphasized by Chaim Weizmann in his letter to Balfour in 1918. He described the Palestinians as "superficially clever and quickwitted," respecting "only power and success" and "treacherous [by] nature.” (Reinharz, 1993, p.252). In this regard, the Palestinian's identity was linked and melted to that of the ‘primitive, barbaric and treacherous Arabs’ who only valued strength above all else. This means that one of the most reasonable ways to deal with them is through deception and force. Those were languages that the ‘Arabs’ related to and understood based on this view. Even the ‘Arab’ national identity in the Middle East was questioned at that stage. A common theme of the Zionist literature at that time is linking the modest cultural aspects of the “Arab’s” national identity to relations with the West. This meant that the savage uncivilized “Arabs” either in Palestine or in the Arab countries did not constitute a

nation. Instead, the national aspects were mostly derived from the close relation of some “Arab” countries to the West. Hence, without this limited openness to Western culture, ‘Arabs’ would have never developed any cultural aspects and would have remained completely tribal. An example of this is in Jabotinsky's article written in 1916, titled ‘*Turkey and the War*’. In that article, he argues that there is no united Arab nation in the Middle East. Instead, the cultural diversity that exists in the region is a result of racial patterns, and most of the people living in the Middle East are not culturally mature yet. However, in certain countries, like Egypt, the foundations of a national identity existed as a result of their relations with the West. (Gorni, 1987)

This concept can be linked to the third reason for the usage of the term ‘Arab’ which is to indicate that ‘Arabs’ have a vast area of land that they don’t use effectively. Therefore, they won’t be affected by the small area the Zionist movement aims to control, which is Palestine. In this sense, ‘Arabs’ are represented as tribes that control a large area of land. This vast area is more than they can or need to develop themselves. Since they don’t constitute a nation, giving up on the small area of Palestine won’t affect them or their development. Especially since the area of Palestine and the people living in it are considered underdeveloped. An example of this, according to Gorni, (1987) work, Glickson (a Jewish journalist in that period) believed that “the large area of Palestine and its present economic backwardness offered a wide living-space for Jewish immigrants, without detriment to the Arab population.” (Gorni, 1987, p.107). All these examples showcase the negative stereotyping and framing of the Palestinians in Zionist literature since the early stages of the conflict.

Similarly, the conflict with the “Palestinian Arabs” in that period wasn’t considered or represented as a political conflict. Instead, it was considered an economical conflict based on the same letter by Weizmann. He stated in it that “The problem of our relations with the Palestinian Arabs is an economic problem, not a political one. From a political point of view, the Arab center of gravity is not Palestine, but the Hedjaz,” (Reinharz, 1993, p.252). Thus denying not only the national identity of the Palestinian but the denial of the religious, historical, and geographical importance of Palestine. Another example of this narrative is within Moshe Smilansky’s works. Moshe Smilansky was an advocate of coexistence between “Arabs” and “Jews”. According to his views “There is no inherent and inevitable conflict between the national hopes of Jews and Arabs. There is none because our perspective is not political but rather economic and cultural. Our ideal is economic and cultural autonomy.” (Gorni, 1987, p.64). Even the struggle of the “Arabs in Palestine” against the British mandate was regarded by some as a result of the nature of “Arabs”. According to Gorni, (1987), Yitzhak Tabenkin “denied that the Arab struggle against the British was anti-imperialist in nature, insisting that it was a typical example of Arab xenophobia.”(Gorni, 1987, p.251). From all of the previous examples, the narrative used by the Zionist authors at that time placed the conflict into two dimensions. The first, more moderate dimension, is that of an economical conflict instead of a political conflict. The second dimension is that the conflict is part of the nature of those ‘barbaric Arabs’. To describe the narrative used by the Israeli media which explains “Arabs” use of force in the conflict as part of their nature. Those stereotypes and frames were prominent in the narrative used against Palestinians in the early stages of the Zionist movement in Palestine “The violent anti-Zionist propaganda in the Arab press, and the

increasingly numerous Arab attacks on Jews were reflected in the Hebrew press, particularly in *HaHerut* [a Hebrew newspaper published in Jerusalem during the years 1910-1917], which gave extensive coverage to Arab opinions and warned against the inherent dangers.” (Gorni, 1980, p.60). During that period, the framing of Palestinians activates the six dimensions of excising, sanitizing, equalizing, depersonalization, demonization, and decontextualization. The removal of the Palestinian national identity and narrative is the dimension of excising. Hiding the suffering of the Palestinians as a result of the actions of Zionism during that period is Sanitizing. Merging the Palestinians as part of the collective Arabs in the area depersonalizes them (Palestinians). Demonizing them through the usage of the ‘barbaric’, ‘primitive’, ‘liars’, and ‘dangerous’ frames. Equalizing their power with the continuous discussion about the threat they represent to the Zionist project in Palestine. And finally, removing the conflict from its political context and framing it as an economical conflict or as part of the ‘evil’ nature of ‘Arabs’. As such, those frames place the framing of Palestinians in the early stages of the Zionist movement and its media under Galtung, (1969) war journalism and triangle of ‘violence’.

These stereotypes continued to dominate the framing of the Zionist movement until the war of 1948. Following the war of 1948, the term ‘Arab-Israeli’ conflict was continuously used in the Israeli media in the majority of the different stages of the conflict. One of the reasons for this is the fact that before Oslo, Arab countries like Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon among others participated in the 1948 war which further emphasized the preexisting narrative about the “Arab-Israeli” conflict. Different Arab countries participated in another five wars against Israel following the war of 1948. Those wars were in 1956, 1967, 1973, 1978, and 1982. As such, the Israeli media

represented the conflict as a conflict with all the Arab countries instead of just with the Palestinians, who were completely denied their national identity in the Israeli discourse. This view was in line with the governmental narrative designed for the conflict. This is evident according to Shaw & Zárate, (2007) in the analysis conducted by Wolfsfeld for *Haaretz* and *Yedioth Ahronoth* during the years 1965, 1985, 1995, and 1997. The analysis finds that during the pre-Oslo era, especially in 1965, Palestinians appeared in 49% of the reports and were narrated under the context of the Arab countries. However, with time this percentage rose to 80%, especially after the Oslo accords. (Shaw & Zárate, 2007) One of the earliest adoptions of the Israeli press of the governmental narrative is in the mobilization of the media during the 1948 war. According to Barzilai (1996) “ As soon as the war began, all of the political parties,[...] and media pundits informed the public that the state was in the throes of a struggle for survival and, to avert the danger, needed not only fighting forces and weapons but also the economic backing of the civilian”(Barzilai, 1996, p. 42). This was effective as “ Voluntary organizations immediately directed volunteers to assorted sectors of the economy.” (Barzilai, 1996, p.42). This shows how the media was effectively mobilized during 1948 and the role it played at that stage. Moreover, this shows how aligned the media was with the political sphere during that period. Another example of this alignment is the Qibya massacre in 1953. After the death of three Israelis in an infiltration operation by Arabs from Jordan. A unit from the Israeli army ‘retaliated’ the following night by sneaking a unit into the Jordanian valley and throwing grenades at civilian houses in the village of Qibya. This ‘retaliation’ resulted in the death of around 60 ‘Arabs’. Morris (1996) concludes his analysis of this event that in Israeli media the following was found. Firstly, the Israeli press almost completely neglected the actions of the army unit

that sneaked into Qibya. The only exception to this was the *Communist Party newspaper*. Secondly, they (the Israeli media) almost completely focused on the attack done by the ‘Arabs’ attack instead of the attack conducted by the Israeli unit. Thirdly, the major outlets shifted the party responsible for the act from military to civilians who lost their tolerance for ‘Arabs’ and decided to attack “nests of murderers,”(Morris, 1996). The commitment of the Israeli media as an active participant in the conflict continued throughout the following periods. For example, Barzilai (1996) explains that during the 1956 war with Egypt, the Israeli media completely accepted and adopted the government’s narrative for the war, which was that Israel set out to fight ‘Arab Terrorism’ and prevent an anticipated attack from Egypt. Similarly, the media “Even during the fighting, news of military successes reached the civilian hinterland through the media (primarily the press), which, subject to security censorship, omitted reports of failures.”(Barzilai, 1996, p.50). One of the reasons for this commitment is that the media “censored itself so that[...] it did not constitute a pressure group for the policymakers,” (Barzilai, 1996, p.50). This self-censorship goes in line with how most of the interviewed journalists described the Israeli media's relationship with the political system. Most of the answers consisted that the Israeli media is military and censored especially during intensified periods of the conflict and that this commitment to the military and political narrative is self-established and self-imposed “They are, I mean, part of this institution, and it is not imposed. There is self-motivation, [...] the premise that these restrictions are imposed on these reporters. I mean, this hypothesis is unrealistic. These adopt, based on their own motives.” (A. Abuarqob, personal communication, 2021). In other words, the media Journalists feel self-committed to this censorship. It is part of the role they play in maintaining the census in the public sphere.

Which plays an important role in uniting the Israeli internal front in the conflict especially when violence erupts. This trend was similarly constant in the 1967 war where the media worked hand in hand following the narrative of the government to ‘solidify’ the unity of the public sphere “The media, whether deliberately or inadvertently, bolstered nationalist and patriotic feeling and rejected opposition as a luxury.” (Barzilai, 1996, p.114). All as part of the self-entitlement of the media to focus the attention towards the ‘enemy’ instead of internal conflicts. Take the Lebanese war in 1982 for example, the political narrative that it was fought to protect “ the northern settlements [...] of (enemy) fire.”(Barzilai, 1996, p.217). In general, this allowed the Israeli government, the political parties, and the public to focus on the war instead of internal conflicts. When faced with a common threat, it is natural to unite and direct all efforts on facing and winning against this threat. The importance and effectiveness of this unity is further emphasized when it achieves victory against a threat of the national level. Especially when the objective of such wars was represented as a protection against the threat of complete ‘annihilation’. This threat of ‘annihilation’ was the overarching context for all the wars fought with ‘Arabs’. Especially since it was linked to the holocaust and the ‘Arab’s’ desire to completely uproot Israel from the area. This was further emphasized by the boycott, the siege and complete rejection of any relations with Israel by the Arab countries in the early stages of the conflict. However, this started to change following the peace treaty with Egypt in 1979.

Following that peace treaty, the usage of the term ‘Arab’ implied a distinction between Egypt, the Palestinians, and the other hostile ‘Arab’ countries. However, it is important to note that the peace treaty was seen as the coming to light of the framing of ‘Arabs’. As mentioned earlier, ‘Arabs’ were seen as people who value strength more

than anything else. Following the peace treaty with Egypt, which was considered a result of the defeat of Egypt in the war with Israel, this “ proved the truth of the old Zionist view that the Arabs would accept the Jews only when they realized that it was impossible to uproot them from the country” (Gorni, 1987, p.324). Nonetheless, the peace treaty with Egypt and later on with Jordan in 1994 and the Oslo accord resulted, to some extent in a distinction in the usage of ‘Arabs’ term “ Only with the formal termination of the conflict with Egypt in 1979 was the common Arab front against Israel cracked.” (Bar-Tal & Labin, 2001, p.275). Which resulted in creating a different or new front that didn’t include Egypt. However, it is important to note that despite such peace treaties, the term “Arab” still holds to this day a negative meaning in both the Israeli media and the shared public memory. Indeed the word ‘Arab’ was and still is the most used label in the Israeli discourse as well as the most negative one until Oslo. This generalization of the ‘Arab’ frame was the dominant way for Israeli media to tackle the conflict and Palestinians during the pre-Oslo period. However, since this research is mainly focused on the framing of ‘Palestinians’ and not the entirety of the collectivity of the ‘Arab’ people, the following sections will focus on the framing of the Palestinian leadership, the Palestinians in the West Bank, and Gaza and the Palestinians inside Israel respectively.

2.2 Yasser Arafat and the PLO leadership before Oslo

Following the expulsion of the PLO from Jordan in 1971 and the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel in 1979, the PLO moved to Lebanon and focused its operation from there. Operations like attacks on the Lebanese Israeli borders, or operations inside the borders were intensified especially after 1978. As a result, Israel directed its

attention to Lebanon which was considered a hive for the ‘terrorist’ organization the PLO and a country inside a country (Shaw & Zárate, 2007). This group was chosen in this analysis as its leadership, especially Yasser Arafat, was framed as the evilest group of the Palestinians before Oslo. However, it is important to note that a separation between the Palestinian civilians and the PLO was initially made to some extent in both the Israeli media and the political dimensions. The inclusion of the political view of the PLO is of importance since the political dimension functions as a stage to represent both societal beliefs and attitudes in a struggle (Yehuda & Auerbach, 1991). In the political dimension, the study by Auerbach & Ben-Yehuda (1987) analyzing the political attitudes of Menachem Begin (the leader of the Likud party and Israeli prime minister from 1977) and Moshe Dayan (the defense minister from 1967 until 1974 and foreign minister in 1977). Finds that Begin completely rejected the PLO as a representative of ‘Arabs’ in Palestine as he stated “the so-called PLO – that murderous Nazi organization, the baser of which there has never been in history since and except or beside the armed Nazi organizations”(Auerbach & Ben-Yehuda, 1987). However, it is important to note that he did not distinguish between the existence of Palestinians as an independent national identity and the PLO as their representative. Nonetheless, he didn’t accept the PLO as a representative of the ‘Arabs of the land of Israel’ as he called them. Similarly, Dayan didn’t recognize the Palestinian existence in Israel and rejected their identity as an independent people. Instead, he linked the Palestinians to Jordan in terms of identity and nation. However, he did recognize them as civilians and that it is possible to achieve peace with them “as for the possibility of compromise between us and Arabs . . . I appreciate some of the Palestinian notables in the West Bank, in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza, and today it is really possible to talk with them” (Auerbach & Ben-Yehuda,

1987, p.333). Regarding the PLO however, he had a similar opinion as Begin as he expressed “(and as for) the Palestinian 'freedom fighters' . . . History knows how to distinguish between such groups, disguised as combatants, mounting high minded slogans, and true revolutionaries . . . Soldiers were one thing, terrorists who killed civilians were another” (Auerbach & Ben-Yehuda, 1987, p.331). Similar results were found in a second analysis done by Yehuda & Auerbach (1991). In contrast to the prior analysis, this analysis was conducted on two leaders from the Labor Party. Those two leaders are Shimon Peres (defense minister from 1974 to 1977) and Yihel Allon (deputy prime minister until 1977). The results of Yehuda & Auerbach (1991) analysis show a similar delegitimization of both the Palestinians and the PLO from both leaders. In regards to hostile intentions for both the PLO and Palestinians, the analysis shows that Allon expressed that kind of view in 84% of his expressions while Peres expressed it in 81%. 83% of Peres's expressions and Allon in 92% of his statements, showed different levels of hostility towards both the Palestinians and the PLO. For example, Peres in describing the PLO in the Knesset in 1979 stated “its Nazi characteristics are immanent to its nature, not only to its behavior” (Yehuda & Auerbach, 1991, p527). Similarly, Allon described the decision-making of the leaders of the PLO which “makes decisions on the murder of innocent people as political tools”(Yehuda & Auerbach, 1991, p.526). He similarly linked the covenant of the PLO to Nazism when he described it as “an Arabic *Mein Kampf* [the title of Adolf Hitler’s book] which calls for the destruction of Israel”(Yehuda & Auerbach, 1991, p.527). However, both leaders showed a more positive attitude toward Palestinians when compared to the PLO, especially when talking about the possibility of peace. For example, when talking about a solution for peace Allon stated that “to say a clear and emphatic no to the PLO but a

significant yes to the Palestinians”(Yehuda & Auerbach, 1991, p.530). Similarly, Peres stated “Our rejection of the PLO is not linked with rejecting the rights of our neighbors, the Palestinian Arabs. We mean them well. We want to bestow good and honor on them, on their identity, their heritage, their children, and future” (Yehuda & Auerbach, 1991, p.530). In this sense, both leaders differentiated between the PLO and the Palestinians in the capacity to achieve peace with them. Since “Journalists tended to support prevailing values and reflect the political positions of the ruling party or its satellites. Their function, they believed, was primarily to channel information from the administration to the public, to the neglect of the feedback”(Barzilai, 1996, p.74). This meant those views about the PLO were adopted by the media. This goes along with the fact that Israeli media was not allowed to conduct interviews with any member of the PLO as a result of the decision of the ‘prevention of terror’ in the Knesset. This meant that the PLO and its leadership were removed from the discourse as both a representative for the Palestinians as well as a liberation movement. As such it was not considered as part of the conflict or as a possible party in peace negotiations. This is similar to how Palestinians were completely removed from the conflict before 1948 and were not even included in talks related to the conflict. Instead all the talks were done by different ‘Arab’ parties. This delegitimisation and demonization of the PLO from its birth in 1964 until the signing of Oslo is especially reflected in how the Palestinians who associated with the PLO during that period were seen in a more negative manner than other Palestinians in the Israeli public (Shaw & Zárate, 2007). Any Palestinian who associated themselves with the PLO was considered a potential terrorist. However, this distinction began to disappear after the 1982 Lebanon War and especially after the first Intifada to completely end with the signing of Oslo. After the 1982 Lebanon War, it

became obvious that the majority of Palestinians regarded the PLO as their representative (Mandelzis, 2003). This meant that sooner or later the Political parties in Israel had to deal with the PLO as the representatives of the Palestinians. As such, it is important to distinguish between two periods for the framing of the PLO. The first period is before the Lebanon War in 1982 and the first Intifada and after the first Intifada leading to Oslo. Before the Lebanon War in 1982, the legitimacy of the PLO as the representative of the Palestinians was completely denied and whoever associated with it was seen as a potential 'terrorist'. However, following the Lebanon War in 1982 and especially the First Intifada, this changed and led to the recognition of the PLO as a representative of the Palestinians and the signing of Oslo. In this sense, the context of the framing of Yasser Arafat and the PLO becomes reflected in the frames of Palestinians altogether with time. Leadership represents the people, thus analyzing the frames assigned to this group becomes important as it plays a role in shaping the frames of the other Palestinian groups, especially in the post-Oslo period. Nonetheless, the Lebanon war provides an interesting case. According to Barzilai (1996), for the first time in Israeli media history, public debate against military actions were supported by the Israeli media and even protests against the war ensued during that period "Public debate was strongly highlighted by the media. Most of the media advocated the dissent, leading protestors to hope that the government would accede to their demands." (Barzilai, 1996, p145). The Lebanon war was represented at the beginning as a limited operation to protect the borders against 'terror attacks' conducted by the PLO. The aim was, according to the military narrative, to push the PLO 40km away from the borders, since this was the range of their weapons. That kind of operation was accepted and favored on both the political level and the public level, with 84% of the public favoring

such an operation (Barzilai, 1996). However, this narrative was soon proven fake as the war continued and the Israeli forces reached Beirut. The real objective of the war was the destruction of the PLO's military structure in Lebanon as well as its removal from the conflict as a political actor. Nonetheless, these debates during the Lebanon war did not mean that the framing of the PLO became better nor did it bring any noticeable changes in Israeli policy. Instead, the debates during the war were focused on whether the PLO was dangerous enough to necessitate a full-scale war or if the results of the war explained the cost both on the economic level, which was 2.5 billion USD (Barzilai, 1996), and human levels. Those debates can be seen as part of the internal conflict between the right headed by the Likud, which won the elections for the first time in 1977, and the left headed by the Labor party, which was the dominant figure in Israeli elections before 1977. After the conclusion of the war, the debates shifted their focus toward how the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) should retreat since the PLO was already forced to leave Lebanon thus securing the borders and weakening the PLO foundation in the region. In this sense, the debates were the focus of the media during the war. The war and the PLO were secondary when compared to the internal conflict between the two leading parties. While the Israeli media maintained the delegitimization of the PLO and the negative narrative towards it. However, this did not last long as the First Palestinian Intifada, which is seen as a result of the Lebanon war, took place five years later. The results of the Lebanon war only emphasized the political role of the PLO in the conflict, especially among Palestinians, at the following stages "the defeat of the Liberation Organization in Lebanon was a resounding defeat, this defeat rebounded on the awareness of the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip positively, in a very positive way. [...] One of the strategic factors that established the 87 Intifada was this

stage” (M. Musa, personal communication, 2021). This helped to establish the PLO as the representative of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza following the outbreak of the First Intifada which led to the signing of the Oslo accords.

In this part, the research analyzes the findings and framing mechanisms used to represent Yasser Arafat and the PLO leadership in previous research. The analysis is based on the six framing dimensions: excising, salience, depersonalization, demonization, equalization, and decontextualization. Those six dimensions are interchangeable and linked together. This means the occurrence of one of those dimensions indicates the existence of another. As such, they will be discussed with each other. Similarly, they will be discussed relative to Galtung’s triangles of ‘violence’ and ‘peace’.

2.2.1 The excising, salience, depersonalization, and demonization of Yasser Arafat and the PLO leadership before Oslo

As explained earlier, the PLO before the Lebanon war in 1981 was delegitimized and demonized by the different political parties and the government. This led to the removal of the PLO from Israeli media, which only functioned as a narrator of the dominant political views in Israel instead of being a critical media. Excising images of the Palestinian leadership meant its removal from news reports. According to Shaw & Zárate (2007) before the recognition of the PLO in Oslo in 1993 “The PLO was seen as a terrorist organization, and the media reflected the general consensus not to recognize this national organization.” (Shaw & Zárate, 2007, p.144). This did not change during the Lebanon war in 1982. The PLO continued to be delegitimized throughout the war. The fact that the war itself was aimed at the removal of the PLO as

a military threat, as well as a political actor from the conflict, explains the political mentality of that period. Sharon for Example stated, "From a military point of view, the PLO can be completely neutralized. From a political point of view - almost completely" (Barzilai, 1996, p.142) and arguably, from a discourse point of view it can be similarly neutralized. If Israel was ready to enter a war to remove the PLO as a factor from the conflict, then it is only natural to remove it from the media. The media and the political levels were almost inseparable during that period when it came to security issues. Even the debates that appeared during the Lebanon war were not focused on the framing of the PLO, instead, they were part of the internal conflict between the two major political parties the Likud and the Labor Party. The Labor Party saw an opportunity in the war to reduce the popularity of the Likud, which it succeeded in doing. The public opinion towards the Likud dropped significantly during the war. According to Barzilai (1996) records show "a 39 percent decline in the number of those who viewed the Likud as "the party best suited to run the country" and a 45 percent erosion of electoral support for the Likud."(Barzilai, 1996, p.194). As such, those debates were meant as part of the internal political war between those two parties. When it came to the frequency of the PLO appearance during the war in Israeli media, it remained the same.

Similarly, during the First Intifada Mandelzis (2003) finds that during 255 days of content analysis, Yasser Arafat and the PLO were only mentioned 13 times in both *Yedioth Aharonoth* and *Haaretz*. This lack of representation was due to the political direction that the media adopted and because of the Order for the Prevention of Terror. This prevention was because of the Knesset ban in 1986 for any contact with PLO members by legislating the Order for the Prevention of Terror. Even in the nine months before Oslo, the frequencies of the PLO and Arafat appearances were 21.9% in *Yedioth*

and 24.3% in *Haaretz* (Mandelzis, 2003). Similarly, First (1998) analyzes four categories of 'Arabs' in 496 broadcasts dealing with the 'Arab-Israeli conflict' during the First Intifada. Those four groups are 'Arabs in Israel', 'Arabs in the occupied territories', 'Arabs living in countries that made peace with Israel', and 'Arabs living in countries that did not make peace with Israel'. The research concludes that from all the 496 broadcasts 'Arabs' only appeared in 15% of the broadcasts. 7% of the 'Arabs' in the occupied territories, were 'Leaders', Leaders from the 'Israeli Arabs' represented 39% of that group's appearances and 75% of the representation of 'Arabs from other nations' was that of leaders. All the while violence constituted 70% of all the 'Arab' appearances in the broadcasts. This kind of frequency in appearance indicates the active excising of Yasser Arafat and the 'Arab' or Palestinian leadership. Israeli media and government in this regard actively prevented Israeli citizens from any form of contact with the voice of the Palestinian leadership while at the same time advocating for the appearance of 'Arab' leaders from other nations. In other words, the PLO was not part of the accepted leadership for the Palestinians and this was reflected in their appearances in the media when compared to the leaders of other Arab nations or the local leadership. In other words, the 'leaders' from the other 'Arab' countries and local leaders were presented as the legitimate representatives of the Palestinians at the expense of the PLO and Yasser Arafat. This frequency of the PLO and Yasser Arafat situates its framing on the excising dimension. This dimension falls under the category of 'violence' based on Galtung's definition. Galtung defines 'violence' as limiting the possible or as the difference between what is and what is possible. In this sense, preventing the Palestinian leadership from presenting their voice and opinions in Israeli media despite it being possible in reality is considered 'violence'. This 'violence' exists

as a result of the institutional laws and political views that are reflected in a media structure that adopts self-commitment to the ‘violence’ in the framing of the Palestinian leadership.

This adoption of the Israeli media to the narrative of the government regarding the PLO reflected strongly on the public opinions towards it. In 1979, only 37% of Israelis believed that the PLO would recognize Israel (Shaw & Zárate, 2007). This is evidence of how effective such frames can be. A structure that removed the Palestinian leadership voice allowed for the focus on the negative traits only. Making specific aspects of the Palestinian leadership’s personality, actions, and narrative more noticeable in the media is considered Sanitizing. This means that the Israeli media adopted this frame and as such was granted the ability to emphasize the ‘terrorist’ and ‘evil’ narrative of the PLO. The Israeli media represented the PLO as the one responsible for the majority of ‘terrorist attacks’ which led to the Lebanon war. Similarly, it was the one responsible for the Palestinian ‘violence’ during the First Intifada. According to Shaw & Zárate (2007) Israeli media during the First Intifada “presented the Palestinians as a violent community led by a terrorist organization (PLO) that agitated the population to break the law and act violently against the Israelis in an attempt to destroy the state of Israel.”(Shaw & Zárate, 2007, p.148-149). However, this ‘terrorist organization’ was not accepted as a legitimate leader for the Palestinians and instead was seen as a negative influence on the Palestinians and a hindrance to peace efforts. Since the moment it was born, the PLO was represented as a terrorist organization thus, its complete removal from the conflict is considered favorable for both the Israelis and the Palestinians if they ever want to achieve peace. With the fact that the PLO before Oslo was outside of Palestine indicated that the ‘Arabs’ in the West

Bank and Gaza were without a functional leadership. This allowed the ‘evil’ PLO to manipulate the Palestinians into committing ‘terrorist’ acts that threaten the existence of Israel. Of course, this goes in line with the ‘violent’ nature of the Palestinians. However, the PLO used this nature to achieve its ‘evil’ objective of the annihilation of Israel. This view existed before the First Intifada and was one of the reasons for the Israeli attempt to increase the influence of a local leadership from 1970 - 1973. One of the fears of the Labor Party during the 70s was that “in the absence of any dialogue between the Israeli government and the Palestinian leadership in the territories, the PLO would gain control of political life while Israel would endeavor to stamp out terror by the use of force.” (Barzilai, 1996, p.107). To prevent this, the destruction of the PLO and increasing the influence of the local leaders were needed. One of the ways to increase this influence is through the media. Focusing on the negative aspects of the PLO as well as reducing its appearance in the media all the while increasing the appearance of the alternative leadership, which was twice the appearance of the PLO (Mandelziz, 2003), is part of the political war against it. As such, the salience of the PLO in the media falls under Galtung’s ‘violence’ triangle since firstly it was negative in nature and secondly, it was part of a political plan to remove the influence of the PLO inside Palestine.

This emphasis on the ‘terror’ of the PLO allowed for the insertion of any desired information about them. These pieces of information emphasized the demonization of the PLO and presented its members and leaders as violent and evil. Despite their low frequency of appearance, Israeli media demonized Arafat and the PLO in their portrayals. Arafat was represented as a “terrorist” and “bloodthirsty” to destroy Israel. He was referred to as “the Nazi in the Bunker,” “the beast on two legs” or even as “Hitler in his lair” (Mandelziz, 2003, p.3). Even his appearance was portrayed

negatively, he wore a military uniform and carried a revolver, which indicated his readiness for violence at all times (Mandelzis, 2003). Loathing of Arafat and the PLO was a common pattern apparent among the politicians “ It is hard to describe the extent to which even “the hairs on his face,” in the words of Prime Minister Menachem Begin, were the subject of worldwide derision.” (Mandelzis, 2003, p.3). Similarly, the PLO was called a “terrorist organization”. Its members were described as “murderers” and the organization’s covenant was described as the Arabic equivalent of Hitler’s book by Israeli media. It was even illegal to use the Hebrew word ‘person’ to call any PLO leader since it constituted respect (First, 1998). These images represent a false image of the Palestinian leadership and the conflict in general which results in the dimension of demonization falling under the category of ‘violence’ based on Galtung’s definition as well. According to Galtung’s distinction for the types of violence: psychological ‘violence’ includes “lies and brainwashing”(Galtung, 1969, p.169). In this sense, lying about the nature of the conflict and the nature of the Palestinian leadership since the Palestinian leadership was considered the main ‘enemy’. This laid the Israeli media on the dimension of ‘violence’.

Arafat was the personification of the evil nature of the PLO. His name and face were known to Israelis and thus his image as the evil, satanic enemy leader became the image of all the other nameless Palestinians following him. The dehumanization of Arafat and the demonization of his intentions all serve to condemn his and his followers’ actions and justify military action against them. Demonization thus was achieved by drawing these kinds of images for the Palestinian leadership. Despite the emphasis of the Israeli media on the threat of Arafat and the PLO, the majority of the Palestinian leadership, except Arafat, were usually anonymous. In other words, Arafat

was the main Palestinian character among the Palestinians. His image and his personification represented that of the other Palestinians under his command. This is evident in the fact that Arafat appeared in 25% of news articles in *Yedioth Ahronoth* and 30% in *Haaretz* while the PLO or other members appeared in 17% in *Yedioth Ahronoth* and 22% in *Haaretz* (Mandelzis, 2003). In this sense, Israeli media used Arafat as a personification of the ‘enemy’ and its characteristics while delegitimizing him as a human being and instead presented him and all he represents as a ‘demon’. This personalization of Arafat as the ‘head of the snake’ created a generalization of all the Palestinians who associated with him.

All of those dimensions combined functioned to remove the Palestinian leadership as well as all the other Palestinian who associated with them from the consciousness of the Israeli public and to present a specific narrative about them that helped maintain the interests of the political elites against Arafat and the PLO.

2.2.2 Equalizing the PLO and Arafat’s power before Oslo

Another method used by Israeli media in delegitimizing the Palestinian leadership is the equalization of power. Equalizing means that the amount of harm between the two parties of the conflict is equal or that the ‘enemy’ poses a threat to the ‘self’. This means that news reports demonstrated that the PLO and Arafat were able to inflict a significant amount of harm and damage on Israeli soldiers and civilians. Before Oslo and especially before the first Intifada the PLO and Arafat were considered to control confrontations between Palestinians and Israelis. In this sense, Arafat and the PLO were usually blamed for the violence. According to Alla Alremawi (2021) when asked about the framing of the Palestinian leadership, “The Israeli media's view of

Fatah remained as the movement that is facing confrontation with the occupation in southern Lebanon and has operations in the Palestinian territories.” (A. Alremawi, personal communication, 2021). This meant that “The danger was mainly from the outside. There was no military security threat from the inside, That’s why they focus on the image of ... the guerrilla who comes crossing the border, “(I. Manssor, personal communication, 2021).

In this sense, Israeli media presented Arafat and the Palestinian leadership as a threat to Israel. This threat exists on both the ‘psychological’ and ‘personal’ levels of ‘violence’. Especially when this threat was usually linked to the Holocaust. Mandelzis(2003) argues that the Israeli press used the Holocaust to magnify the significance of the Palestinian threat and Arafat’s dangerous nature. This resulted in creating a national consensus on the intensity of the threat by the PLO and Arafat and the right of Israel to defend itself. Galtung argues that a threat of destruction functions as a form of ‘violence’. According to his view this threat functions “in at least two senses it can be seen as psychological violence: the destruction of things as a threat of possible destruction of persons, or something very dear to persons” (Galtung, 1969, p.170).

2.2.3 Decontextualization of PLO and Arafat before Oslo

The interactions between all the previous dimensions remove Arafat and the PLO from their original context and place them in a new context. This process is achieved over a long period and involves a continuous removal of the original context which is partly achieved by excising and saliencing the Palestinian leadership while placing them in the new desired context in a way that benefits Israel. From the lack of appearance in Israeli media and the crude representation of Arafat and the PLO to the

emphasis on their threat to the existence of Israel, decontextualization is apparent. Since the establishment of the PLO in 1968 Israeli news depicted it as a “terrorist organization” that was established to annihilate Jews and Israel as well as create a Palestinian state including the whole area of historical Palestine. This target is aligned with the aim of the neighboring Arab countries. The Israeli government and media were promoting a feeling of solitude and a nation under threat to the Israeli public (Mandelzis, 2003). The framed intentions and nature of the PLO and Arafat as “Terrorist, bloodthirsty, tyrant, who wants to kill, who wants to shed blood, no more and no less.” (K. Jaber, personal communication, 2021), the narrative of the holocaust, and the decontextualization of the first intifada and the conflict altogether were all used to create this feeling of danger and threat in the Israeli public sphere. In this sense, the decontextualization of Arafat and the PLO is part of the overall decontextualization of the conflict. Since “The dominant narrative and to which it is most devoted is that this is a struggle for existence.” (I. Manssor, personal communication, 2021), the decontextualization of the PLO and its leader Yasser Arafat since they were portrayed as the main threat to this existence is part of the overall narrative of the conflict.

By using all those dimensions Israeli media was only mirroring political opinions about Arafat and the PLO, “An analysis of Israeli press coverage of terrorist attacks on Israel reveals that the Israeli press uses these events to convey the basic myth of the Holocaust and the revival of the Jewish state.” (Nossek, 1994, p.1). This narrative resulted in the Israeli media becoming ‘Israeli media is a war media. I.e. if you look at it in all its dimensions in wartime, it is fully subject to Israeli military control. Therefore it implements a policy on the battlefield’ (Sh. Jabareen, personal communication, 2021). This adoption of the military views by the media and their active role in the progress of

governmental agendas results in the media falling under the ‘structural violence’ dimension. An example of this is how both the military and media attempted to create new leadership for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaze. This ‘alternative leadership’ as they called it aimed to function “as a replacement to the dismissed mayors, Minister of Defense Sharon and Menahem Milson, the first head of the administration, formed the Village Leagues in hope of cultivating an alternative leadership to the pro-PLO mayors” (Alimi, 2007, p.64). This in a sense meant that media ‘frames’ were used by Israeli media against the PLO and Arafat in hopes of eliminating their influence in the West Bank and Gaza and increasing the acceptance of peace negotiations with this ‘alternative leadership’ later on: “There were two electoral processes in the West Bank after the occupation, one in 72 for the municipalities and one in 76. [...] These researchers believe that the real goal is [...] that Jordan fails and loses its control over the West Bank so that it cannot claim the West Bank.” (M. Musa, personal communication, 2021). Similarly, Israeli media provided those kinds of frames for the PLO to maintain public consensus and offer an acceptable reason for the ‘violence’ used against the PLO and its supporters in the West Bank and Gaza. This function positions the Israeli media as part of the cultural violence as defined by Galtung. According to him, cultural violence is “any aspect of a culture that can be used to Legitimize violence in its direct or structural form.” (Galtung, 1990, p.1).

2.3 Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza before Oslo

Based on the previous section, the Israeli media framed the PLO as a terrorist group and Arafat as a ‘terrorist’ before Oslo, and that framing positioned it on both structural and cultural levels of Galtung's theory of ‘violence’. However, the conflict is

with Palestinians as a whole, and confrontations between Israel and Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza were also part of the conflict. These portrayals function as stereotypes representing the majority of the Palestinians that were in direct contact with Israel at all times. Those stereotypes are based on pre-existing ideas about the “other” derived from culture and reinforced and transmitted using mass communications like the news media. The shared framing of the conflict is that of an intentional threat or “A collective case that deals with the Palestinian on the basis that he poses a danger, This danger necessitates the process of guarding against it and getting rid of it” (A. Alremawi, personal communication, 2021). Conflicts with Palestinians were regularly presented by images supported by the public, media, culture, religion, and political leaders. This framing began, as discussed earlier, from the early stages of the Zionist project in Palestine. These frames laid the foundations for the image of Palestinians in public memory throughout the different stages of the conflict until today. Similarly, these frames helped maintain the public census during escalation periods of the conflict. While a distinction was made between the Palestinians and the PLO as different groups, the negative views of Palestinians were close to that of the PLO. In 1978, the percentage of Israelis that believed Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza hated Israelis was 44% only to rise to 66% by 1979. During that period, Israel was the direct authority over them. As such, they were considered “a burden on the shoulders of the Israeli occupation. Because the Israeli occupation had always coexisted on a daily basis.” (N. Jamhor, personal communication, 2021). This burden consisted of providing all the basic human needs like food, medicine, and services. Palestinians were not able to provide those basic needs for themselves and needed the management of the Israeli occupation to provide those necessities for them. This image of the ‘poor’ and ‘naïve’

Palestinians created a relationship between Palestinians and Israelis that was focused mainly on economical interactions “people [...] had a relationship with Israel through work.” (M. Musa, personal communication, 2021). This means that the Arab way of life is not one of progress or stability, instead it was represented as chaotic and regressive which is in direct contradiction with the ‘Western’ culture adopted in Israel (First, 1998). Using the combination of the ‘easily manipulated’, ‘poor’, and ‘naïve’ Palestinians, Israeli media focused on presenting Palestinians as a lost and fragmented people with no real leadership. This lack of leadership directed them to follow the ‘evil’ PLO in hopes of improving their quality of life. However, it is important to note that until that point in time Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza were called Arabs in Israeli media. This meant that they were linked with the surrounding Arab countries, which were considered a threat to the existence of Israel. The word Arab has negative implications in Israeli society since it is linked to “the word ‘Arab’ points to the Arab countries, which are in a state of hostility with the State of Israel. For that reason the Jews consider the word ‘Arab’ as negative.” (Amara, 2016, p.219). The first intifada is no exception to this situation as witnessed in the various pieces of research conducted on news coverage of Palestinians during the First Intifada.

The researches on Palestinian framing in Israeli media during the first intifada share similar findings. These findings include the negative portrayal of Palestinians in Israeli media as well as similar mechanisms used in the framing process. These mechanisms are mainly: excising images of Palestinians, sanitizing the reports of the suffering of Palestinians, equalizing the amount of harm between the two parties of the conflict, depersonalization of Palestinian victims, demonization of Palestinians, and decontextualization the conflict that placed the Palestinians in these events.

2.3.1 The excising, salience, depersonalization, and demonization of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza before Oslo

The same dimensions of analysis for the Palestinian leadership are used for all three groups. It is important to divide the framing of Palestinians before Oslo into two periods. The first period is before the first Intifada. Before the first Intifada, Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza were framed according to Mawai Mousa as “Locals” or “Local Arabs” (M. Musa, personal communication, 2021), or as “Primitives” (K. Jaber, personal communication, 2021). This was before linking the Palestinians framing with that of the PLO and Arafat. Israeli media’s representation of the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza was that of a simple and naïve people who were fooled by the PLO and Arafat. However, similar to the excising of the PLO before Oslo, Palestinians were actively excised from the media narrative. According to Shaw & Zárate (2007), in 1965 Palestinians were linked to other Arab nations in 49% of the reports about the conflict. However, Palestinians became the focus of 80% of the reports in the following years, especially after the Lebanon war and the First Intifada. Nonetheless, Palestinians were still considered a threat since they were to the ‘barbaric Arabs’, and the fact that the PLO and Arafat easily mobilized them against Israel. This is especially evident in the increase of the security threat frames of Palestinians from 32% in 1965 to 53% in 1985 (Shaw & Zárate, 2007). Similarly, the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza were excised from the desire for peace during that period as they appeared only after 1985 in that dimension with 17% of the reports (Shaw & Zárate, 2007). This meant that an inferior perception of their desire for peace existed which further emphasized their ‘evil’ and ‘violent’ nature.

The second significant period is the first Intifada. During the first six months of the Intifada, according to Roeh & Nir (1990) events were referred to as ‘riots’ or ‘disturbances’; later the terms ‘uprising’ or the ‘Intifada’ were used. They similarly found no significant difference in the coverage of the Intifada between *Haaretz* and *Yedioth Ahronoth*, the two newspapers analyzed. This means that both of those newspapers gave similar framing for the events of the Intifada and the actors in it. In the early stages of the first intifada, Palestinians were excised from news discourse. While some mentions of Arabs or Palestinian civilians appeared in news reports of that period, those mentions were mostly anonymous. Even those mentions indicated that the Israeli press tended to play down the Intifada (Liebes, 1992). After analyzing 54 news broadcasts, First (1998) finds that only 15% of all the participants appearing on the broadcasts analyzed during the First Intifada were ‘Arabs’. This 15% includes 75% anonymous actors, and 88% of those 75% anonymous actors were Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza. Even though this meant that the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza were the most apparent group of ‘Arabs’ during the Intifada, this frequency is not of significance since all the ‘Arab’ groups were underrepresented. Another point of interest is that participants of the Intifada were usually represented as ‘ill-tempered masses’ or ‘violent mobs’ (First, 1998). This resulted in a generalization as well as an excising of their individualism. They were all part of the same current and generally, no difference in their representations was made. This meant that this mechanism was used to indicate the insignificance of the Intifada and to show that the situation is under Israeli control. Similarly, the blame for the events was put on the PLO “In the beginning, it was dealt with as riots, that it is a passing thing, and that this was an incitement by the organization from extremist members that are leading these

confrontations.” (I. Manssor, personal communication, 2021). Thus, maintaining the previous framing of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza as being manipulated by the PLO. This is of importance since the existence of the Palestinians was almost removed from the discourse of the First Intifada. The First Intifada and the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza were framed as an extension of the PLO. Israeli media removed the voice of the Palestinian leadership, which in part included the suffering of Palestinians. As such, this indicates the use of excising in the framing of the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, which falls under the ‘violence’ dimensions of Galtung’s theory.

Even professions and roles are mostly neglected as First, (1998, 2002) found that 64% of the cases lacked any identification of their jobs. Similarly, broadcasters negatively described anonymous, Palestinian actors, 79% of the time. According to First (2002), terms like “instigators”, “trouble makers”, “rioters” or “ill-tempered masses” were the dominant terms used by broadcasters to describe the anonymous Palestinians with only 21% of the cases using positive terms like “peacemaker” or “decent citizen” (First, 2002). These negative terms were further reinforced by the portrayal of the physical appearances of the participants and their environment. First (1998) found that more than half of the houses had no yards, flowers, or paint; the walls were bare and had little furniture. The streets were run-down but clean and the cars were mostly old models. Furthermore, Palestinians themselves rarely wore traditional clothing except for the Kaffiyeh, their faces were not shaven and 10% had dental issues, in some cases, they were shown without shoes or not wearing fitting outfits for winter (First, 1998). All these images reinforce the barbaric and dull nature of the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza at the expense of the suffering they face under the occupation. This barbaric

nature furthermore emphasizes the absence of leadership for the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. If there was legitimate leadership, Palestinians would not have been in such bad shape. Similarly, 71% of the first participants in the news about the Palestinian - Israeli conflict were Jews (First, 1998). This means that direct commentary about the Palestinians - Israeli conflict was only provided from the Israeli point of view. This point of view similarly, reduced the suffering of the Palestinians. This is apparent in the fact that only 7% of the reports in *Haaretz* and *Yedioth Ahronoth* represented Palestinians as victims in the years 1965 and 1985 while the media provided little information about Palestinian victims during the First Intifada (Shaw & Zárate, 2007). This further increased the distance between the conflict and Israelis as it was only represented from their point of view. Based on those numbers, the salience of the suffering of the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza as well as any positive portrayals of them is apparent before and during the first Intifada. The main focus was on the 'violence' and the underdevelopment of their communities, mentality, and environment. Especially when compared with the Palestinian leadership as mentioned previously. In this sense, the focus was mainly on the PLO, which overshadowed all the other Palestinian groups and was blamed for the encouragement of violence. However, riots by Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza were still shown by Israeli media. As a result, Palestinian framing was linked to the 'violence' of the 'devil', which is Arafat while maintaining the delegitimization of the First Intifada and the participants in it. As a result, laying the framing of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza under the dimension of salience, which is another 'violent' dimension, based on Galtung's theory.

The third dimension is depersonalization. This anonymity is especially prominent in the mentioning of Palestinian victims. As mentioned earlier, First (1998)

found that 70% of the appearances of ‘Arabs’ were related to violence. Palestinian victims reported were mostly nameless and the toll is usually understated. On another note, Roeh & Nir (1990) found that only 6% of the cases personalized Palestinians in the media, while the rest was left anonymous. Israeli press mostly reported the number of Palestinian victims provided by Israeli official sources while later acknowledging the possibility of additional unreported casualties. Thus, removing Palestinian victims from the dimension of personalization to the dimension of depersonalization. Removing the human nature of the ‘other’ falls again under the dimension of ‘violence’ in Galtung’s theory.

This dehumanization works with all the previous methods to achieve a demonetization effect on the framing of the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. They were all considered supporters of the ‘Nazi’ PLO that aimed to create ‘disturbances’ and ‘terror’ in Israel and aspired to the complete ‘annihilation’ of the Jewish state. The First Intifada was discussed concerning the themes of ‘law and order’. As such, those Palestinians attempted to break the law and order of Israel by joining hands with the demonized PLO and Arafat (Liebes, 1992; Shaw & Zárate, 2007). The PLO and Arafat’s framing already fell under the ‘violence’ dimensions of Galtung’s theory and as a result, the framing of the Palestinians who participated in the Intifada was associated with them and followed the same conclusion.

2.3.2 Equalizing the power of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza before Oslo

Power equalization in a struggle functions as a method to provide excuses for the violence against the “other” and to embed feelings of fear and under threat by the “other”. In the case of the first intifada, equalization of the ability to harm was

represented in how the Israeli media represented Palestinians. Palestinians were represented according to Liebes (1992) as huge, impassioned crowds armed with “lethal” rocks. The image of a small group of IDF soldiers facing an angry mob of Palestinians armed with “deadly” rocks indicates that Palestinians have enough ability to harm Israeli soldiers. This is further reinforced by reporting that Israeli soldiers have to constrain themselves against that “violent” crowd (Liebes, 1992). The fact that 70% of the representations contained violence or confrontations between Israelis and Palestinians increases this notion as the reports only show the danger Israeli soldiers were in when facing the ‘dangerous’, ‘face-covered’, ‘lawbreakers’, ‘Molotov cocktail throwers’ and Palestinian ‘fighters’ (Liebes, 1992). This is evident in how 96% of Israelis in 1990 considered the protestors in the Intifada as using force (Pressman, 2017). This mechanism is used to remove the feeling of guilt about the victims and create a feeling of unattachment from the suffering of the ‘other’ “For these readers, empathy, and compassion for the sufferers may be more easily repressed, and various types of excuses would be mobilized.” (Liebes & Kampf, 2009, p.18). This was accomplished by including two aspects in the narrative. Firstly the ‘intentional violence done by Palestinians. This ‘intended violence’ functions as a focal point for Israeli media to direct the attention of their readers to the ‘threat’ and ‘violence’ of the ‘other’ against ‘us’. According to Galtung’s theory, “Ethical systems directed against intended violence will easily fail to capture structural violence in their nets and may hence be catching the small fry and letting the big fish loose.” (Galtung, 1969, p.172). In other words, their evil nature is what directed the Palestinians to commit those acts of violence as well as the influence of the PLO, which was already regarded as a ‘terror organization’. Secondly, the narrative of ‘self-defense’. Since Palestinians posed a

threat to Israel, all the violent actions done by the Israeli army are considered self-defense “any action towards the Palestinians is attributed to a state of self-defense. Even when it becomes clear that there is a crime, [...] the behavior of this event is indicated that there is a psychological crisis that the person suffers from or a mentally ill person.” (A. Alremawi, personal communication, 2021). Those two aspects work together in emphasizing the ability of the Palestinians to harm Israeli soldiers. However, Israeli soldiers were represented as the heroes who put their lives in danger to protect ‘peace’ and ‘order’. Thus, a comparison between ‘us’ who attempted to protect the tranquil life of civilians, and ‘them’ who tried to destroy that ‘peace’ were drawn. However, Palestinians were still considered an unorganized ‘enemy’ and as a result, their actions were still considered marginal and insignificant. Even after linking them to the PLO, the fact remained that their leadership, which is Arafat and the PLO, were still outside of Palestine and did not have a full influence on the inside front.

2.3.3 Decontextualization of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza before Oslo

The context of the conflict during the first intifada was neglected and avoided like Palestinians themselves. Israeli news outlets examined the confrontations of the first intifada as separate occurrences. That representation removed the confrontations of their historical context as being part of the ongoing conflict. Instead, they were represented as episodic confrontations that are being dealt with separately by the IDF. Terms such as "law and order" violations were used to describe the confrontations in the early stages of the intifada. Later on, titles such as “disturbances in Judea and Samaria,” were used while keeping the image of the IDF being the one in control. As the intifada continued a broader context sometimes was provided relating the “violations” as

economic or demographic-related incidents (Liebes, 1992). This was specially reinforced with the images of Palestinians, their homes, streets, cars, and clothing. Those images as mentioned mostly consisted of a “poor” vibe, which indicated economic issues and explained the violence. This was again linked to the absence of true leadership in the West Bank and Gaza and that the occupation was necessary for those ‘Arabs’ to live a good life. However, Israeli media mostly did not bother explaining the reasons for those ‘riots’ instead the emphasis was that this is the normal nature of ‘Arabs’. The context Israeli media provided was simply that “the Israeli media, with all its colors, speaks of the Palestinian as an existential element. I mean, the media considers the Palestinians a danger to Israel's security, and there was no media discourse that comforted the Israeli side from the Palestinians.” (A. Alremawi, personal communication, 2021). In this sense, Israeli media played a significant role in removing the first Intifada from its original context to the context they desired. The Intifada was moved from a dimension of fighting for ‘freedom’ and ‘independence’ towards a dimension of ‘economical’ struggle or the ‘violent’ nature of ‘Arabs’. This Places the context of the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza in the First Intifada under the dimension of ‘violence’ in Galtung’s theory as Palestinians were represented out of context and instead were positioned towards more negative contexts.

2.4 Palestinians in Israel before Oslo

The third group of the analyses is the Palestinians in Israel. Despite holding Israeli citizenship, they are still considered Palestinians. They are considered a hostile minority according to First (1998) and were under-reported and presented in Israeli media before Oslo, similar to their counterparts in the West Bank and Gaza. For

example, Peres & Levy (1969) conducted a survey and found that: a) in 1967 that 80% of Jews found 'It would be better if there were fewer Arabs' and this rose to 91% the following year after the war. b) 'The Arabs will never reach the level of progress of Jews' was 62% in 1967 and rose to 76% in 1968. c) 'Every Arab hates Jews' was 73% in 1967 and rose to 80% in 1968. d) 'Disagree to rent a room to an Arab' was 80% in 1967 and increased to 86% in 1968. e) 'Disagree to have an Arab as a neighbor' remained at 67% in both years. These views increased significantly when the labeling of Palestinians inside Israel changed from 'Israeli Arabs' to 'Israeli Arabs that consider themselves Palestinians' or if 'They associated themselves with the PLO'. Shaw & Zárate (2007) found a drop of 18% in 'the willingness for friendship with an Arab' whenever the 'Arabs' considered themselves Palestinians and the 'associated with the PLO' was the most dehumanized group among all the labels of the Palestinians inside Israel. These results show the negative view of Palestinians inside Israel among Israelis. As they were labeled 'Arabs' this naturally included them in the framing of the 'Arabs' as a whole which was negative from the beginning of the conflict. This inclusion similarly alienated them and inserted them into the group of the 'other' or the 'enemy'. For this reason, an analysis of their coverage in news media is relevant to the overall framing of Palestinians. In this part, the research looks at what mechanisms were used to frame Palestinians in Israel to see if they were considered as part of the "enemy" and if there are any significant differences between their coverage and the coverage of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza.

2.4.1 The excising, salience, depersonalization, and demonization of Palestinians in Israel before Oslo

Similar to their Palestinian counterparts in the West Bank and Gaza, Palestinians in Israel were usually overlooked and under-represented “they are not a minority in the first place as the Israeli wants to portray them. Rather, they are groups affiliated with the Arabs, and not an expression of an entity that existed before the occupation, which is Palestine. “(N. Jamhor, personal communication, 2021). In their analysis of the coverage of Palestinians inside in *Haaretz* and *Yedioth Ahronoth* in 1973, 1984, and 1992 Wolfsfeld et al.,(2000) find that Palestinians inside Israel only appeared in about 2% of all news articles published by the two newspapers, with a frequency of appearance once every 14 days. The two newspapers averaged at 54 reports for *Yedioth Ahronoth* and 60 reports for *Haaretz* in a year. The Majority of those reports were on the back pages of the news and were negative. This negativity appeared in 76% of the news items in 1973 were negative, 88% in 1984, and 82% in 1992. The same was found in TV coverage. Similarly during the First Intifada, First (1998) finds that 48% of Palestinians in Israel victims were left anonymous. However, a focus on Palestinians in Israel leaders was found with an emphasis on their numbers in the Israeli political system. Even though they are underrepresented in the ruling Elite, during the first Intifada they were represented as a major political force. According to First, (1998), ‘Arabs’ appeared in 15% of the broadcasts during that period and the Palestinians in Israel appeared in 39% of that 15% representation. This appearance of Palestinians in Israel was mostly focused on their leaders with an emphasis on their numbers in Israeli political systems and Arabs from other nations. A possible explanation for this is the desire for Israel to delegitimize Yasser Arafat and the PLO while presenting

Palestinians in Israel leaders as the “alternative leadership” for them or according to Nehro Jamhooor as a way for Israel to “show itself to the world as a democracy. Israel was exploiting the Palestinians using their participation in the Knesset, as if it was saying that we are creating horizons for them that are not found in the Arab countries, neither in Egypt nor in Syria." (N. Jamhor, personal communication, 2021)

On the first Land Day, when the Israeli government announced its plans to confiscate land belonging to ‘Arab’ citizens living in Galilee in northern Israel. Violent clashes erupted, leaving six Arabs dead and many more injured. Avraham & First, (2010) find that during the events of the Land Day only 10 relevant items were broadcasted and time devoted to the coverage of the events during the two later weeks didn’t exceed 30 minutes. Barely any on-scene coverage of the protests appeared on broadcasts. Similar to the low frequency of the coverage of the First intifada, Land Day was underrepresented and barely any coverage of Palestinians in Israel protest appeared on the broadcasts. Even the broadcasts that discussed the event consisted of alienation and undermining of the ‘Arab citizens’. On the following day of the protests, and after the death of 6 ‘Arabs’, only one report barely mentioned a funeral march. While the report included the funeral and the victim, it remained vague on how the victim died and with a clear indication that he was not an innocent civilian but a disturbance of public order (Avraham & First, 2010). Similarly, the ‘Arab’ voice was completely removed from the picture and the speakers of the protests were mainly the voices of official sources except for Local Arab council leaders who have decided by a vast majority to oppose the strike (Avraham & First, 2010). As a result of this underrepresentation, Palestinians in Israel’s framing fell under the dimension of excising and their suffering

under the salience dimensions which are 'violent' dimensions based on Galtung's theory.

Moreover, delegitimizing the strike as part of an attempt by the communist party to "take over the Arab street" and the Israeli Communist Party under the lead of Tawfik Zayyad was represented as the "demon" resulting in this situation (Avraham & First, 2010). Thus, shifting the blame completely on the "other", especially since no explanations were provided for why the protests occurred outside of this frame 7% before the event and 6% after (Aburaiya et al., 1998). This again indicates the 'manipulative' nature of 'Arabs'. Even 'Arabs' inside Israel were directed by the communist party to start the riots. It is important to note that this is the same mechanism used when relating the 'violence' of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza to the PLO and Arafat. In this sense, Palestinians in Israel had been represented from the first Land Day until the first Intifada as being easily manipulated by 'outsiders' or 'enemies' of Israel. This in a sense means that they are incapable of deciding for themselves. Instead, they needed an outside influence for them to move. This was further reinforced by explaining that some 'Arab' cities or towns flourished despite land confiscation. This flourishing was regarded as a result of the Arab citizens working in Jewish cities. Palestinians could not even progress without working in Jewish cities and similarly, they could not decide for themselves. This meant that 'Arabs' needed 'others' to function and progress. This places the framing of Palestinians in Israel under the dimension of depersonalization as they were considered an extension of others instead of individuals. Depersonalization is another dimension that falls under Galtung's theory of 'violence'.

Another aspect of the framing of Palestinians in Israel was framing the protests and strikes as an act of disobedience against the government and public interest. Thus, framing the protests as “Law and order” events is similar to how the First Intifada was framed. This meant that Palestinians in Israel were actively attempting to create ‘chaos’ inside Israel as an extension of outsider ‘evil’ influences like the communist party. However, despite these outside influences they were still considered a threat since it is in their nature to be violent. In this sense, Palestinians in Israel were considered part of the arsenal for those outside influences that inflicted damage to Israel from the inside. This in a sense made Palestinians in Israel a more significant threat than Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza “the inside is a fifth column that how it is being looked at historically. They only view them from a security perspective, this is a demographic danger, this is a danger in the center, and a cancer, as Lieberman and others described them, in the heart of the country.” (I. Manssor, personal communication, 2021). Because of this framing, Palestinians in Israel were demonized as part of the overall enemy. The fact that even the victims in the first Land Day were considered ‘chaos’ agents meant that they could be a threat and placed them in the dimension of ‘violence’ based on Galtung’s theory.

2.4.2 Equalizing the power of Palestinians in Israel before Oslo

The Land Day coverage provides an insight into the power dynamics represented by the Israeli Media. The protests were framed as part of “Law and order” and as disobedience against the government and public interests (Avraham & First, 2010). The protests were seen and presented as an attempt for Palestinians in Israel citizens to define their relationship with Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza and the

neighboring Arab countries. One of the reports explained that the strike should be seen as part of the Arab population's attempt to deal with their identity within the conflict. Another report told of a corresponding protest in the occupied territories, which further linked the protests as part of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and indicates that Palestinians in Israel are being mobilized against Israel. As stated by the reporter: 'Should we interpret this as a demonstration of political power, whose intent is to demonstrate that there is another body representing Israeli Arabs?'"(Avraham & First, 2010, p.488) Moreover, the mention of the involvement of the police and the curfew that was forced on some Arabic villages indicates that these protests have power, and restraining them may need force. One report before the outbreak of the protests describes the suffering that may fall upon the citizens that join the protests. Another report states the intentions of Tawfik Zayyad of grasping the government by the throat (Avraham & First, 2010). All of these reports and framing were used to indicate the 'threat' of Palestinians in Israel against the 'order' or 'peace' of Israel. This 'threat' is more evident because they live inside Israel. This gave them an advantage in inflicting 'damage' to the structure from within. This 'threat' further places the 'framing' of Palestinians in Israel into the 'violence' dimension of Galtung's theory.

2.4.3 Decontextualization of Palestinians in Israel before Oslo

In both the first intifada and the Land Day protests reframing and decontextualization of the events that occurred are obvious. In both cases, the reasons for the outbreaks are neglected and reframed as "Law and order" confrontations (Avraham & First, 2010). The aim for both those cases is to disrupt the public order and create chaos while the blame is focused on the "evil" leadership that is directing

Palestinians in Israel into getting involved in the violent conflict despite the benefits they gained from working in Jewish cities. Similar to how Arafat and the PLO were blamed for the outbreak of the Intifada, Tawfik Zayyad and the Communist Party were blamed for the protests on Land Day. Israel media thus removed both cases from their historical and political contexts and assigned a different narrative for them. Only 7% of the reports before the event took place and 6% after provided context to the protests (Aburaiya et al., 1998). A narrative where Palestinians in Israel protest are used in the conflict to disrupt the public order of the Israeli people. Avraham & First (2010) explain that all the framing methods in the Land Day coverage served “to eradicate the existence of the minority group and its demands, and included the need for the majority to be held accountable for the results of the conflict and to learn any lessons from it”(Avraham & First, 2010, p.495). This decontextualization was used again to remove the guilt from the ‘injustice’ and ‘violence’ inflicted against Palestinians in Israel and to place the actions of the Israeli police and army as ‘self-defense’ for the sake of maintaining ‘order’. This Places the context of the Palestinians in Israel before Oslo into the same dimensions as Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza as well as inside Galtung’s ‘violence’ triangle since similar methods and contexts were used for both groups.

**Chapter III: Palestinians in Israeli media after Oslo and during
the Second Intifada**

3. Chapter 3: Palestinians in Israeli media after Oslo and during the Second Intifada

The following section presents selected results found in the analysis of the 60 news articles from *Haaretz*, *Yedioth Ahronoth*, and *The Jerusalem Post* after Oslo. Selected in the sense that they relate to the topic and scope of this research especially since a huge number of variables can be measured and provide insights and results that can be beyond the scope of this thesis. These findings of the inductive and deductive quantitative analysis alongside the content analysis led to the dominant frames described in the methodology section of this thesis. The findings of the content and qualitative analysis are described in more detail in the next section of this chapter. Since this thesis aims to locate the position of the Israeli media after Oslo on the dimensions of peace and violence as well as peace and war journalism based on Galtung's theory, a summary of the findings of each period is included later in this section.

3.1 Results and findings of inductive quantitative frame analysis

The content and frame analysis consists of 60 total articles taken randomly from two different periods after Oslo. The first period is from Oslo to the outbreak of the Second Intifada and the second period is after the beginning of the Second Intifada. The reason for this division between the two periods is the role the Second Intifada played in the framing of the Palestinians. The period of Oslo cannot be studied without its collapse in Camp David and the Second Intifada. 20 articles from each newspaper were analyzed from both periods and 30 articles for each period were analyzed from the three newspapers combined. While the distribution is not equal, it provides an overview of

the frames and methods used during those two periods. An overview of the number of the analyzed articles per period and newspaper can be found in table 1.

Table 1: The number of the analyzed articles per period and newspaper.

	Oslo – Second Intifada	After the Second Intifada	Total
<i>Haaretz</i>	9	11	20
<i>Yedioth Ahronoth</i>	8	12	20
<i>The Jerusalem Post</i>	13	7	20
Total	30	30	

3.1.1 The frequency of appearances

Fourteen random days, separate from the articles analyzed, were analyzed for each newspaper to provide a percentage of the frequency of appearances for any of the Palestinian groups from the overall news pieces. The analyses show that after Oslo news about Palestinians appeared in 22.4% of *Haaretz*, 24.7% in *Yedioth Ahronoth*, and 13.4% in *The Jerusalem Post*. In regards to the position of the articles in the newspapers, 85% of those appearances were positioned on the first three pages in all newspapers. *Haaretz* had the most percentage of articles about Palestinians in the first three pages with 90% of its articles appearing in the first three pages. *Yedioth Ahronoth* and *The Jerusalem Post* both had 80% of their articles in the first three pages. In terms of length, the articles differed depending on the described news or the newspaper. While no significant difference was found between *Haaretz* and *Yedioth Ahronoth* in terms of length, *The Jerusalem Post* had around 35% of its articles about Palestinians in the ‘news in brief’ section. This means that 35% of the articles about Palestinians in *The Jerusalem Post* were summarized into quick reports instead of detailed articles. The

results show that there was no significant frequency of appearances for Palestinians after Oslo. However, it is important to note that after the outbreak of the Second Intifada these appearances increased by 30% for each newspaper. Table 2 shows the frequency percentage of Palestinians in each newspaper on average after Oslo.

Table 2: Palestinians' frequency of appearances in the three newspaper

Newspaper	Percentage
<i>Haaretz</i>	22.4%
<i>Yedioth Ahronoth</i>	24.7%
<i>The Jerusalem Post</i>	13.4%

3.1.2 The representation of the three groups

All 60 articles are related to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and contain at least one group of the three chosen Palestinian groups for analysis. In all three newspapers, it is apparent that the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza were the most dominant. Among the 20 *Haaretz* articles, eight articles mentioned the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza while 12 articles mentioned them in *The Jerusalem Post* and eight articles in *Yedioth Ahronoth*. Only three articles about Yasser Arafat were found in *Haaretz*. However, in *The Jerusalem Post*, eight articles included Arafat but those inclusions did not focus only on Arafat. Most of the articles included the PLO or other Palestinian groups such as Hamas. Ten articles were found talking about Arafat in *Yedioth Ahronoth*. Of all the articles analyzed only eight articles talk about Palestinians in Israel. Six articles were in *Haaretz* and two in *Yedioth Ahronoth* while no articles about Palestinians in Israel were found in *The Jerusalem Post* from the sample taken. This last group is the least represented group in the period of the Analysis. All the

articles about the Palestinians in Israel are from after the outbreak of the Second Intifada. However, it is noted this distribution varies between the newspapers. *Yedioth Ahronoth* had more focus on the Palestinian leadership than the other two newspapers while *The Jerusalem Post* focused more on the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza. *Haaretz* is the most moderate in the distribution of the coverage between the three Palestinian groups. An overview of the group's distribution is provided in table 3.

Table 3: The distribution of the groups in the sample

	Leadership	Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza	Palestinians in Israel
<i>Haaretz</i>	6	8	6
<i>Yedioth Ahronoth</i>	10	8	2
<i>The Jerusalem Post</i>	8	12	0
Total	24	28	8
Percentage	40%	46%	14%

3.1.3 The dominant frames

Table 4 shows the distribution of the main frames found in the articles based on the inductive and deductive analysis discussed in the methodology section. One frame per article was chosen, even though some articles fell under more than one frame. The first frame is 'violence' which appeared in 12 of *Haaretz's* articles, 13 in *The Jerusalem Post*, and 15 in *Yedioth Ahronoth*. The second frame is 'Oslo'. This iframe contains articles that mainly talk about the state or specific events relating to 'Oslo'. This frame was found in three articles in *Haaretz*, six articles in *The Jerusalem Post*, and four articles in *Yedioth Ahronoth*. The third frame is 'Economy'. This frame was found in

only one article in *Haaretz* and one in *The Jerusalem Post*. No articles fell under this frame in *Yedioth Ahronoth*. The last frame is ‘disorder’. Though it can be linked to the frame of ‘violence’, this frame is separated, as it does not necessarily contain ‘violent’ acts. Instead, it falls under nonviolence. This frame was mainly found in articles talking about Palestinians in Israel. This was the case in the four articles in *Haaretz* about Palestinians in Israel as well as 1 of the articles in *Yedioth Ahronoth*. These findings indicate that the dominant frame in the articles is ‘Violence’, while the frame about ‘Oslo’, ‘economy’, and ‘disorder’ was significantly less. The last frame which is the unwillingness of Palestinians for peace appeared significantly in the overall narrative of the articles and is shared with other frames like the ‘violence’, ‘disorder’, and the ‘economy’ frames. This frame appeared in 85% of the articles in *Haaretz*, 80% in *Yedioth Ahronoth*, and 75% in *The Jerusalem Post*. While table 3 showed a moderation in *Haaretz's* focus on the different Palestinian groups, this moderation did not get reflected in the distribution of frames as 65% of its articles included frames of ‘violence’ and 85% of its articles negated the willingness of Palestinians for peace. However, in the case of the coverage of the Palestinians in Israel, this was different as 66% of the articles about them fell under the ‘disorder’ frame and only 34% fell under the ‘violence’ frame.

Table 4: The distribution of the main frames found in the articles

	Violence	Oslo	economy	disorder	Unwillingness for peace
<i>Haaretz</i>	12	3	1	4	17
<i>Yedioth Ahronoth</i>	15	4	0	1	16
<i>The Jerusalem Post</i>	13	6	1	0	15

Total	40	13	2	5	48
Percentage	68%	21%	3%	8%	80%

**note: the unwillingness for peace frame is a shared frame and appears alongside other frames*

3.1.4 Blame shifting

The analysis shows that in the majority of the articles in the three newspapers, the responsibility of the five previous frames was shifted toward the Palestinians. In the ‘violence’ frame all of the articles in all three newspapers blamed the Palestinians for the violence either explicitly or implicitly. In the ‘Oslo’ frame, *Haaretz* blamed the Palestinian leadership in two articles out of three, *Yedioth Ahronoth* in 3 out of 4 articles, and *The Jerusalem Post* in five out of six articles. On the ‘economy’ frame, *Yedioth Ahronoth* blamed the Palestinian leadership in its article while *Haaretz* related the economic difficulties to the newborn nature of the Palestinian Authority. In the frame of ‘disorder’ *Haaretz* blamed the Palestinians in Israel in 3 out of 4 articles and in the fourth article Israel was implicitly held responsible while *Yedioth Ahronoth* blamed them in its article. Regarding the Unwillingness for peace frame, Palestinians were blamed in 92% of the articles especially when the article talks about ‘violence’, ‘disorder’, or ‘economy’. In total, the news articles blamed at least one of the Palestinian groups 92% of the time in those frames.

Table 5: Blame shifting

	Palestinians	neutral	Israelis
<i>Violence</i>	40	0	0
<i>Oslo</i>	10	3	0
<i>economy</i>	1	1	0

<i>disorder</i>	4	0	1
<i>Unwillingness for peace</i>	44	4	0
Total	55	4	1
Percentage	92%	6%	2%

3.1.5 Addressing the Palestinian Leadership

The Palestinian Leadership appeared in *Haaretz* in six articles, in 10 articles in *Yedioth Ahronoth*, and eight articles in *The Jerusalem Post*. *Haaretz* addressed Arafat and the Palestinian Leadership by both name and political position in 100% of the articles while both *Yedioth Ahronoth* and *The Jerusalem Post* addressed the Palestinian Leadership and Arafat by name only 100% of the time and the political position in 50% of the articles. This means that the Palestinian Leadership was always identified either by name only 38% of the time and by Political position 62% of the time in the overall sample. Table 6 shows how the Palestinian Leadership was addressed in those 24 articles according to the newspapers.

Table 6: The way the Palestinian Leadership is addressed

	By name only	By political position (name included)
<i>Haaretz</i>	0	6
<i>Yedioth Ahronoth</i>	5	5
<i>The Jerusalem Post</i>	4	4
total	15	15
percentage	38%	62%

3.1.6 Quoting the Palestinians

As it becomes clear in table 7, direct quotes from the leadership appeared in eight articles from *Haaretz*, 10 articles from *The Jerusalem Post*, and nine articles in

Yedioth Ahronoth. While quotes from civilians were found in two cases relating to the Palestinians inside Israel. The majority of those quotes are either related to the ‘violence’ frame, the ‘disorder’ frame the ‘unwillingness for peace’ frame. This shows that the three newspapers use quotes during intensified confrontations or to emphasize the unwillingness of Palestinians to achieve peace or how they are being manipulative or violent.

Table 7: Quoting the Palestinians

	Leadership	Civilians
<i>Haaretz</i>	8	1
<i>Yedioth Ahronoth</i>	9	1
<i>The Jerusalem Post</i>	10	0
total	27	2
percentage	45%	3%

3.1.7 Addressing the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza

Different from how the Palestinian Leadership was always identified. Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza were mentioned by name in 35% of the 28 articles that included them. As they appeared in eight articles in both *Haaretz* and *Yedioth Ahronoth* while they appeared in 12 articles in *The Jerusalem Post*. The analysis shows that they were mentioned by name in only 10 articles. Nine of those articles mentioned the names of ‘terrorists’ and the last one mentioned the names of two out of five Palestinian casualties. Of those nine articles, seven out of eight appeared in *Haaretz* and two out of eight in *Yedioth Ahronoth* while the tenth one was the only one in *The Jerusalem Post*. This means *Haaretz* again is the most consistent in the mentioning of names of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. Out of all the 28 articles that mentioned Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, only 36% of them

mentioned Palestinians by name. The Majority of those mentions were of killed Palestinians and only 4% mentioned Palestinian victims that were not ‘terrorists’. No other mentions of Palestinians’ names were found. Table 8 shows these representations.

Table 8: Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza name mentions

	Anonymous	By name (terrorist)	By name (civilian)
<i>Haaretz</i>	1	7	0
<i>Yedioth Ahronoth</i>	6	2	0
<i>The Jerusalem Post</i>	11	0	1
Total	18	9	1
percentage	64%	32%	4%

3.1.8 Addressing the Palestinians in Israel

As the least appearing group in the sample, the only mentions of names and political position is found in *Haaretz*. Out of the six articles relating to them in *Haaretz*, 25% of the cases mentioned their leaders’ names or Political positions. No other names mentioned were found in all the other articles talking about Palestinians inside Israel. However, it is important to note that the word ‘Arab’ was used 100% of the time to describe every member of political leaders, civilians, or ‘terrorists’. In other words, Palestinians in Israel were always grouped under the label of ‘Arab’, not as Palestinians. Political leaders were usually described as leaders of the ‘Arab’ sector or minority and the same goes for civilians. This means that the 12.5% for each way of addressing is included under the umbrella of the ‘Arab’ label. However, it is important to note that despite this separation in the labeling of this group, the content analysis shows that in terms of context there is no such separation and all of the Palestinian groups are treated as one group. This will be addressed later in the content analysis of this chapter.

Table 9: Ways of addressing Palestinians in Israel

	By name only	By political position and name	Arab
<i>Haaretz</i>	1	1	6
<i>Yedioth Ahronoth</i>	0	0	2
Total	1	1	8
percentage	12.5%	12.5%	100%

3.1.9 Palestinians in groups

The analysis shows that eight articles in *Haaretz* and *Yedioth Ahronoth* represented Palestinians as rioting mobs while 11 articles in *The Jerusalem Post* represented this grouping. This frame applies to both Palestinians in Israel and Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. In the case of the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, all of those articles were related to violence thus indicating that nothing good comes from the Palestinians protesting together. While the articles about the Palestinians in Israel fell under the ‘disorder’ frame.

Table 10: Palestinians in groups

	Palestinians in groups
<i>Haaretz</i>	8
<i>Yedioth Ahronoth</i>	8
<i>The Jerusalem Post</i>	11
Total	27
percentage	45%

3.2 Results and findings of the content analysis

The following part used framing Analyses as well as content analyses for the articles under the six framing dimensions of excising, salience, demonization, equalization, and decontextualization. This analysis provides a more detailed view of

the framing dimensions of each group in the three newspapers and where those dimensions locate the Israeli media in Galtung's theory of peace and violence. This is of importance to better define the changes in the framing methods of the three Palestinian groups used before and after Oslo.

3.1 Yasser Arafat and Palestinian leadership after Oslo

The main Palestinian figure after Oslo is Yasser Arafat. As the leader of the PLO before Oslo and the PA after the handshake, this established him as the Palestinian leader and the head figure of the Palestinian Leadership. In the analysis conducted on the framing of Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian Leadership, the following can be found regarding the six framing dimensions of excising, salience, depersonalization, demonization, equalization of power, and decontextualization.

3.1.1 The excising, salience, depersonalization, and demonization of Yasser Arafat and the PLO leadership In Israeli media after Oslo

After the signing of the Oslo accords in 1993, Arafat and PLO's representations increased dramatically. The analysis conducted on the 60 articles indicates that the frequency in which Arafat and the PLO appeared, increased significantly after Oslo. However, during the Second Intifada, the frequency of appearance of Yasser Arafat became less when compared to the years preceding Oslo. Among the 20 *Haaretz* articles, only six articles about Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian Leadership were found. However, in *The Jerusalem Post*, eight articles included Arafat but those inclusions did not focus only on Arafat. Most of the articles included the PLO or other Palestinian groups such as *Hamas*. 10 articles were found talking about the PLO in

Yediot Aharonot. In total, the Palestinian leadership appeared in 40% of the articles analyzed. This is a clear indication of the increase in Arafat and the PLO's appearance in Israeli media. This increase in appearance can be considered part of the general atmosphere of that period as peace talks about the conflict began. Oslo brought interest for both the media and the public in 'peace'. Especially since Arafat and the PLO were considered the legitimate representatives of Palestinians after Oslo. Arafat and the Palestinian leadership became the dominant Palestinian figures in Israeli media. This dominance is primarily related to the personalization of the Palestinian Leaders. Compared to the other Palestinian groups, Palestinian Leaders were always mentioned by either name or political position. This means that they were identified in 100% of their appearances in Israeli media. However, there existed a difference between the three newspapers in this identification. It is important to note that one of the differences found between the three newspapers is that *Haaretz* is the most consistent in mentioning the political position of Arafat or the other leaders. In all of the articles about Arafat or the Palestinian leaders in *Haaretz*, the political position was mentioned more than once while in *Yediot Aharonot* and *The Jerusalem Post* half of the articles did not mention the political position of Arafat and only addressed him by his name. This means that the political position was identified in 62% of the articles while name-only identification was in 38%. An example from each newspaper for this identification of Arafat is as follows. "Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat" (Kuttler, Hillel and news agencies (Netanyahu to meet Clinton next week) *The Jerusalem Post*, April 2, 1997). "[Palestinian Authority Chairman] Yasser Arafat" (Eldar, Akiva (The Peace That Nearly Was at Taba) *Haaretz*. 14 February 2002.). And "Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat" (Shaked, Roni (The Palestinian GSS Also Operates in the

Heart of Western Jerusalem) *Yediot Aharonot*. 26 June 1998.). At other times, he was referred to by his name only, like in "The assumption is that Arafat will declare statehood, and our belief - based on polls - is that at that time a majority of Israelis will say that if Arafat unilaterally declares a state, Netanyahu will have the right to annex the rest of the territories." (Kuttler, Hillel (US pledges to give Palestinians \$400m.)*The Jerusalem Post*, December 1, 1998), and "Arafat quickly declared yesterday that he will arrest Hamas and Islamic Jihad activists. He knows that this time he cannot shake off responsibility." (Ben-Yishai, Ron (The Hamas is Guilty, Arafat is Responsible) *Yediot Aharonot*. 31 July 1997.) Or in "The operation launched 32 years ago to expel Yasser Arafat from Jordan was called 'Black September,' " (Shavit, Uriya (Out of Jordan) *Haaretz*. 10 April 2002). However, it is important to note that despite the mutual recognition between both sides, the 'Palestinian National Authority' was never used, neither in addressing Arafat nor in general, this is still practiced in the media and the official interactions between the Palestinians and Israelis as of the writing of this thesis. This can be considered a reflection of the political stand on the Palestinian nationality in the media (Sh. Jabareen, personal communication, 2021). In other words, despite the agreed mutual recognition between the Palestinians and Israelis in Oslo. The Palestinian nationality is still uncomfortable for the Israeli government. This is apparent in the refusal of all the Israeli governments to address the Palestinian Authority as the 'Palestinian National Authority'. This refusal continued from Oslo in 1993 until this very day in 2022. This is especially important in terms of political relations since that is how the Palestinian Authority addressed itself during the Oslo talks and in its official internal documents. However, so far the Israeli government does not accept any official documents from the Palestinian side that contain the 'Palestinian National Authority' in

it (Sh. Jabareen, personal communication, 2021). Nonetheless, similar to how Arafat was addressed, other Palestinian leaders were either introduced by name or their political roles, or both. Take the following examples :“Top Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat” (Dudkevitch, Margot and Najib, Mohammed (PA: Covenant already revised) *The Jerusalem Post*. 26 January 1998.) and “PA Higher Education Minister Hanan Ashrawi, Hassan Abu Libdeh, director of the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics.” (Wohlgelernter, Ellie and Collins Liat (Gov’t moves to stop PA census in Jerusalem) *The Jerusalem Post*, December 10, 1997). As proven by the analysis, the Israeli media started including Arafat and the Palestinian leadership in their articles frequently after Oslo. This is especially apparent when important events occurred either relating to the peace talks or escalations of violence in the struggle. As a result, the dimension of excising the Palestinian Leadership was greatly reduced in the framing of the Palestinian leadership. Thus removing this dimension of the framing of the Palestinian leadership from the dimensions of ‘violence’ in Galtung’s theory into the dimension of ‘peace’.

In regards to the salience of the framing of the Palestinian Leadership, its narratives, and statements. Direct quotes from them and interviews conducted with them as well as other Palestinians were increasingly apparent in the Israeli media. However, in the case of the quotes, the analysis found that all of those quotes were put in one of the four following contexts.

1) The first context is a comparison between the Palestinian and Israeli narratives. This means that quotes from Israeli politicians were included in the discussion as a comparative statement of the reality of the situation. This in a way exposes the lies of

the Palestinian leadership. An example of this is Salah Tamari (head of the Palestinian Land and Settlements Committee in the legislative council). He stated when talking about a bypass road that was under construction between Kedumim and Yitzhar ““these roads connect Jewish settlements, they isolate Palestinian populations from one another. The land on both sides of the road becomes useless and the result is a crippling and altering of the growth of the Palestinian people at all levels,” to be followed later by “Peter Lerner, spokesman for the Civil Administration, says the bypass roads are not built with that intent. “These are regional roads that were planned before Oslo,” he said. They serve all of the populations living in the area.” (Lynfield, Ben (A virtual state in the making) *The Jerusalem Post*. 26 April 1999.). Another example is how Israel accused the Palestinian Authority of violating the Oslo Accords when an assault on the Abraham's Oak Russian Orthodox Monastery in Hebron happened. In this case, a quote from the government press office was provided first

“A statement issued yesterday by the Government Press Office said that under the terms of the Oslo Accords, the PA [Palestinian Authority] is obligated to safeguard holy sites and ensure free access to them. The statement quoted Annex II, Appendix I, Article 32, which says that “both sides shall respect and protect the listed below religious rights of Jews, Christians, Moslems and Samaritans.” (Shapiro, Haim (Israel: PA assault on monastery violated Oslo Accords) *The Jerusalem Post*. 10 July 1997.)

In response, Palestinian Preventive Security Chief Jibril Rajoub, in the last line of the article, was quoted as “We didn't touch anybody,” Rajoub was quoted as telling

the Associated Press.” (Shapiro, Haim (Israel: PA assault on monastery violated Oslo Accords) *The Jerusalem Post*. 10 July 1997.). In both cases, the Palestinian leadership was quoted to explain the situation. However, this was countered by a quote from an Israeli politician. The quote of the Israeli politician holds more weight and is considered more truthful in the eyes of the public and as such renders the argument of the Palestinian leadership useless. Another aspect of this context is that in cases of violence the quotes from the Palestinian leadership are either small or provided at the end of the article. The smallness of the quote for example in the second article provided indicates that the Palestinian leadership does not care enough to put a full statement regarding the incident. Especially when the one that was quoted to comment on this matter is not the leader of the PA Yasser Arafat but Preventive Security Chief Jibril Rajoub. Secondly, the position of the quote at the end of the article in the second example indicates a marginalization of the quote and puts it as unimportant or not worth investigating. However, in the first example, the quote from the Palestinian side was before the quote from the Israeli side. In this sense, the quote from the Israeli side was the big final of the argument as it countered the Palestinian argument.

2) Other cases of quotes appeared in cases of internal conflicts between different Palestinian factions. An example of this is the arrest of Muhammad Nursi Twalba (an operative in the military wing of the Islamic jihad) by the Palestinian Authority. He was quoted in an interview with *Yedioth Ahronoth* before the arrest that “I am not afraid and I will continue the fight”. While the Palestinian Authority officials were quoted as the following

“It is not possible for the jihadists to decide on their own that they do not respect the decisions of the Palestinian leadership, unlike all factions. And it is not possible that when the PA representatives and the apparatus come to them, the jihadists open fire on them,” (Waked, Ali (Jenin: A sharp confrontation between the PA and jihad) Yediot Aharonot. 14 November 2001.).

This case provides an interesting look into the framing of the internal conflicts of the Palestinians in Israeli media. At the beginning of this article, Muhammad Twalba was represented as a ‘terrorist’ and an enemy of Israel. However, he was also represented as an enemy of the PA and was regarded as a threat to both sides. Since the faction he associated with is acting in a way that is disrespectful to the PA and opened fire on them, this suggests to the reader that the Palestinians are fighting lovers. They do not stop fighting even among themselves. This indicates that they are not a peaceful people and as such peace cannot be achieved, not between the Israelis and Palestinians and nor among themselves. Finally, this kind of context allows for the delegitimization of the PA or an emphasis on their inability to lead correctly. The argument here is that; Twalba is considered a freedom fighter among the Palestinians. That means that he is respected and liked among the Palestinians, which was hinted at when the article mentioned that Palestinians in Jenin protested against the PA after his arrest. This shows that the actions of the PA did not fall under the census of the Palestinians and instead indicates the existence of a crack between the Palestinian people and the PA. While internal conflicts are normal in every society, this kind of violent confrontation indicates a ‘violent’, ‘fractured’ nature of the Palestinian people and their leadership. This fractured nature further proves that Palestinians are not a united entity; instead, they are

split and do not constitute a united nationality. In this sense, the PA and Arafat were considered at best to be failing at managing the other Palestinian extremist factions like the Islamic Jihad and Hamas and at worst in other cases to be working with them.

3) The third case found in the articles analyzed is the usage of positive quotes from the Palestinian leadership. The political officials of the Israeli government welcomed those quotes; however, the media questioned their effectiveness or legitimacy. An example of this is in Arafat's open letter to the Israeli side "I ordered the Palestinians to obey my past order to stop the fire." In honor of Rosh Hashanah (the Jewish New Year). This letter was met positively by Peres "Foreign Minister Shimon Peres said in response that this was an important statement with positive elements, both in the general commitment to peace and in the explicit order to stop the fire." However, the article itself questioned the effectiveness of such orders since the author said that "it had no actual validity" and that "Despite Arafat's statement, the exchange of fire in the territories continued on Monday," (Somfalvi, Attila and news agencies (Arafat to Israelis: I ordered a ceasefire commitment) *Yediot Aharonot*. 17 September 2001). This context represented Arafat as either a liar who is willing to say and only says what is needed or as lacking enough influence to control the Palestinians. This is especially evident when this statement is compared to the actions or results of his words. In that case, it either ends up as disingenuous and manipulative or as a failure in leadership. When Arafat said that he ordered Palestinians to stop 'violence' with respect to the Rosh Hashanah, he shows that he respects such national Israeli events. However, when the 'violence' continued despite his statement, and the fact that he was usually blamed for the 'violence', gives the indication that he is using such events and words for his advantage to manipulate the Israeli political side or showing that he doesn't have enough control to stop the

‘violence’. In both cases, the quote was represented by the author of the article as meaningless, and it had no actual value since the ‘violence’ didn’t stop. The author in this sense plays the role of a judge even though Peres responded to Arafat’s statement positively. This goes in line with how the Israeli media historically was self-committed to achieving a negative framing for Arafat and the Palestinian leadership.

4) The last case found was that of the use of quotes to show the Palestinian Leadership as a threat. As an example, Referring to the attempt to establish a monument and fence by the Morag settlement in Gush Katif “A statement issued by the Palestinian Authority cabinet in Nablus on Friday escalated PA rhetoric of recent days, blaming the US, the IDF, and settlers for what it said is an ‘explosive situation everywhere because of Israeli settlement aggression.’ It warned that ‘the Palestinian masses will confront the settlements.’ ” (Immanuel, Jon and news agencies (PA cabinet warns of mass confrontation over settlements) *The Jerusalem Post*. 15 June 1997). Several aspects are of importance in this case. Firstly, the Palestinian leadership was introduced as responsible for the intensifying violence in both the actions and language of the conflict. This intensification of the conflict was explained as part of the Palestinian policy in recent days. Secondly, the Palestinian leadership blamed everyone from the US, settlers, and the IDF but did not admit to being the one responsible for the intensification of the situation by the use of such language and warnings. Lastly, this article undermined the reason for these kinds of statements and did not explore the context. This is seen in the use of ‘what it said’, which indicates that this situation is born from the Palestinian perspective and that the Palestinian leadership is overreacting in its response.

All of these themes advocate negative narratives about the Palestinian Leadership with the exception, to some extent, of the third theme. This indicates that the PA can be useful to Israeli security. However not because it wanted to but because it was a result of the internal conflict between the PA and the Jihad. Nonetheless, interviews and direct quotes stating the political or social role and the names of the Palestinian leadership increased significantly after Oslo and continued to a lesser extent during the Second Intifada. As such, the dimension of salience for the Palestinian leadership also moved to a positive position in Galtung's theory.

Similarly, based on those findings, Arafat and the Palestinian leadership became personalized following Oslo. The mentioning of their names, political positions, and direct quotes all functioned as a form of personalization. As mentioned earlier, the Palestinian leadership appeared in 40% of the articles analyzed. In all of those articles, the name or political position of the leader was mentioned. This made it possible to identify Leaders, their words, their manner of speech, and which actions are related to which leader. This personalization specifically appears on TV or Radio. In the case of the visual media, they gave a humanized side to the different Palestinian leaders. An example of this is how Arafat was represented in a doll show on Israeli TV. However, since TV is not part of the analysis conducted in this research, the focus is on the written personalization in the three newspapers. Another indication of the personalization of the Leadership is the use of quotes from them. In 45% of the articles, a Palestinian leader was quoted. This indicates that their voices and opinions became heard more frequently. Especially when those quotes are linked to socially acceptable topics and events like the New Year. In this sense, the dimension of personalization in the framing of the Palestinian leadership moved towards 'peaceful' framing in

Galtung's theory. In regards to Oslo and peace, the Palestinian leadership, and especially Arafat were seen as lacking this 'right character' to achieve real peace. Same as how the athletes from the Palestinians inside Israel were required to have this 'right character' which meant that they had to accept the racism against them to succeed, the Palestinian leadership needed to do everything the Israeli leadership wanted to be seen as serious about peace. However, it can be argued that; the Palestinian leadership couldn't reach that 'right character' in Israeli media no matter what they did because of the previous negative frames and stereotypes about them. A 'terrorist' like Arafat would never repent and become truly peaceful, which was based on the Israeli narrative true, especially after the outbreak of the Second Intifada. Nonetheless, the Palestinian leadership in general, and Arafat, in particular, were the most personalized Palestinian group in the articles analyzed.

However, this does not mean that the framing of the Palestinian leadership moved completely to the 'peace' triangle. So far, in this section, the three previous dimensions of excising, salience, and personalization were discussed separately. However, they do not function in a separate manner and with no relation to other dimensions. As will be explained soon, contradictory to the findings of (Mandelzis, 2003) that a positive change in the image of Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian leadership appears after Oslo. From the articles analyzed, the previous three dimensions were the only ones that witnessed a positive change when they are analyzed separately. However, when analyzed with the other remaining dimensions they move back to the 'violence' framing as they were positioned before Oslo.

This appears directly in the following dimension, which is demonization. The demonization dimension consists of or relates to four frames dominated in the analyzed articles.

1) The most dominant frame in which the Palestinian leadership appeared was the ‘unwillingness for peace’. This frame appeared in 80% of all the articles analyzed. The same percentage of the articles that included the Palestinian Leadership included this frame. As it is apparent from the analysis, the frequency of referring to Arafat or the Palestinian leadership as unserious about the peace process is significant and the following narrative was apparent

“These people have embraced peace not because they believe in peace or understand peace as we do. No, they have because they are weak and because the balance of power is not in their favor. Because this is an opportunity, but any opportunity that comes to them, they will pounce on us and such... Oslo, the Palestinians, they used it as an opportunity to enter and get weapons and attack us.” (I. Manssor, personal communication, 2021)

For example, in *The Jerusalem Post* before the Albright negotiations from 1997 to 2000, Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai said, "I hope that the Palestinians will be as serious in carrying out the decisions and agreements in the area of terror and other matters in the agreement." (Bushinsky Jay, Collins, Liat and O'Sullivan, Arie (Map won't be ready for Albright) *The Jerusalem Post*, December 10, 1997). This quote indicates that the Palestinian leadership was not serious about peace or stopping their “terror” while at the same time presenting Israel as a serious partner for peace. In this

sense, this statement falls on the dimension of the demonization of the Palestinian leadership. Since Palestinians are not serious about achieving peace and stopping their “terror”, this means that they have other agendas for entering the peace process or continuing it. This view was reflected on both the military and political levels before and during the Second Intifada. Before the Second Intifada, the articles provide an example of how Israeli politics adopted the view of Arafat not being serious about peace “Therefore, the political cabinet yesterday conditioned the continued meetings of the committees on real action on the part of Arafat. If he will not soon do this, and thoroughly, Netanyahu will be left with only one choice: To suspend negotiations until the security conditions for their resumption exist” (Ben-Yishai, Ron (The Hamas is Guilty, Arafat is Responsible) *Yedioth Ahronoth*. 31 July 1997). In this example, we see how even in 1997 the political elites considered and took policies based on the view that Arafat is not doing anything in regards to achieving peace and preventing ‘terror’ from the other Palestinians. Instead, this article argues that Arafat gave legitimacy to ‘small’ attacks as long as they do not happen inside the green line. This context was similarly adopted by the IDF during the second intifada “senior IDF commanders adopted Gilad’s assessment, which was based on his perspective, and according to which Yasser Arafat’s foray into negotiations was a scheme aimed at leading to Israel’s destruction, and that he in no way plans to reach an agreement.” (Pedatzur, Reuven (More Than a Million Bullets) *Haaretz*. 29 June 2004.). This kind of view that Arafat entered the peace negotiations is one that dominated the articles as mentioned earlier. The first example shows how the political level in Israel considered Arafat and the PA as unserious about peace or prevention of ‘terror’. Throughout the history of Israeli media, the adoption of the military or the view of the security institution is dominant. This was not different in

the Oslo years. The Israeli media continuously questioned the image of a partner in peace and was always under skepticism. The second example shows how this view possibly affected the political decisions before the Second Intifada while the third example shows how this view was adopted completely by the IDF during the second Intifada. The framing of Arafat and the PLO, especially after the outbreak of the Second Intifada returned to how it was before Oslo and in fact, it became even worse, as the outbreak of the Intifada was all the evidence Israel needed to prove that Arafat was never serious about peace.

2) The second frame that the demonization of the Palestinian leadership appears in is that of ‘violence’ or ‘terror’. This frame appeared in 68% of all of the analyzed articles. While it appeared in 50 % of the articles that mentioned the Palestinian Leadership. The previous examples can provide an onlook at how this frame is apparent throughout Oslo and during the second Intifada. However, to provide a more in-depth example. One of the articles includes the following:

“Former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is absolutely right: If Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat, as Prime Minister Ariel Sharon said in interviews given before the Rosh Hashana holiday, is Israel's bin Laden, the prohibition on meeting with him should not be imposed solely on Foreign Minister Shimon Peres.”

(Eldar, Akiva (The Arafat-bin Laden Equation Won't Stick) *Haaretz*. 24 September 2000.).

Throughout this article references to Arafat being a “terrorist” and “murderer” are frequent and an attempt to explain why the world legitimized Arafat and Palestinian

“terror” while comparing it to Bin Laden’s attacks on the Us at the world trade center. The comparison between Arafat and Bin Laden’s terrorism is presented mostly from the point of view of the “enlightened world”. The article argues that the core difference between Arafat and Bin laden according to Western leaders is the right to fight against the occupier. However, this view is only represented as unfair to Israel and is considered a wrong view. “Terror” is still terror no matter the reason or the legitimacy assigned to it. This is evident when the author asks, “While the United States is engaged in mobilizing the world for an all-out war against bin Laden and all other terrorist leaders, how can Israel's deputy prime minister have a friendly, conciliatory meeting with the twin of the Satan of Afghanistan?” (Eldar, Akiva (The Arafat-bin Laden Equation Won't Stick) *Haaretz*. 24 September 2000.). The demonization of Arafat in this article as well as the articles mentioned in the previous examples all show the link that was made continuously between Arafat and ‘terror’ and how he hasn’t changed from the man whom he used to be before signing Oslo and returning to Palestine. What did not change is the framing of Arafat and the Palestinian Leadership. The Israeli media continued to use the same frames for this group. All the previous examples are negatively contextualized and portray an image of a terrorist leadership that pretended to want peace but did nothing to achieve it. They were instead contextualized in a manner that indicated that they were able to fool the Israelis, especially people on the left, into agreeing to peace. This gave the people who advocated for peace during that period a sense of guilt, because, they were seen by everyone, including themselves, as naïve people who trusted Arafat. This of course has extreme importance in the overall context of the conflict. This narrative and view were burned into the shared memory of everyone and as such will become an obstacle in any future peace negotiations. If the

people who advocated for peace during the attempt in Oslo were seen in this manner, any future attempts will be reviewed based on this experience. As such, it is not too far-fetched to say that the failure of Oslo and this narrative condemn any future peace attempt into an early bad spot.

3) The third frame that the Palestinian leadership appeared in was the frame of ‘Oslo’. This frame is different from the frame of ‘unwillingness for peace’ in the sense that it is directly related to either the negotiations, specific events, or topics relating to Oslo like the creation of the Palestinian state and its progress. This frame did not focus entirely on the narrative about the unwillingness or willingness for peace. However, it is important to note that this frame did not only appear concerning the Palestinian Leadership. It similarly appeared in public opinions about the peace process in general. This frame relates to 21% of all the analyzed articles and 16% of articles relating to the Palestinian leadership. An example of this is in the article titled (Mordechai, Shaath agree on Gaza air, sea ports). In this article, the author discussed the progress of the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. For example, he states the following: “The meeting was aimed at finding “common ground and a way to return negotiations to their correct path,” said a spokesman for PA Chairman Yasser Arafat.” (Bushinsky, Jay (Mordechai, Shaath agree on Gaza air, sea ports) *The Jerusalem Post*. 10 July 1997). This article among others talked about the progress of the negotiations between the two sides and represented international opinion, which was concerned about the progress of the talks and the growing intensity between the two parties. An example of this is quoting US president at the time Ben Clinton as he said “I’m very concerned about the growing tensions between the Palestinians and the Israelis” (Bushinsky, Jay (Mordechai, Shaath agree on Gaza air, sea ports) *The Jerusalem Post*. 10 July 1997). It similarly mentioned

the divide among the Palestinians who were against the meeting and the position of the Palestinian Leadership in general about the meeting “Sources close to the PA leadership said the idea of a Mordechai-Shaath meeting provoked furious debate and angry recriminations before it took place.” (Bushinsky, Jay (Mordechai, Shaath agree on Gaza air, sea ports) *The Jerusalem Post*. 10 July 1997). In general, however, the articles that presented this frame were not focused on the ‘violence’ or lack of action toward peace from the Palestinian side. Instead, they presented a more general view of the progress of the negotiations and the general reaction, whether locally or internationally, about events or topics that are related to the Oslo talks.

4) The last frame in which the Palestinian Leadership appeared is the economical dimension. This frame appeared in only one article talking about the Palestinian Leadership. In the article, during the preparation for the Clinton speech in 1998 Eytan Bentsur altered his speech, which according to the article was supposed to be positive, as a response to Arafat blaming the Israeli closure policy as a reason for the bad economical state of Palestinians. Bentsur included the following “whoever speaks of closures as hurting the Palestinian economy does not focus on the real issue, and has to take into account the number of lives saved by this measure” (Kuttler, Hillel (US pledges to give Palestinians \$400m.)*The Jerusalem Post*, December 1, 1998). This article Blames Arafat on two occasions. The first time is when he blames the closure policy during the meeting, which resulted in Bentsur changing his positive address into a negative one. The second time, though it is expressed implicitly, is in the speech of Bentsur, which includes the danger Palestinians under Arafat's rule present to the lives of Israelis and why this policy is necessary. In this sense, even on the economical dimension of the conflict Arafat and the Palestinian Leadership are blamed. This article

implies that Arafat should have known better than to talk about the closure policy during such an important event and that he is held responsible for the action of his people and the responses to those actions. If he stopped violence, the closure policy would not exist. However, this is not true. The closure policy existed long before Oslo either against the Palestinians in Israel or in the West Bank and Gaza Palestinians (M. Musa, personal communication, July 15, 2021). The excuse of terror is one to make this Israeli policy more acceptable internationally and internally.

As seen, when the increased frequency of the Palestinian Leadership's appearance and their personalization is linked to the dimension of demonization they fall back to being inside the 'violence' triangle of Galtung. In this sense, the positive increase in the frequency of Arafat and the Palestinian leadership's appearance in Israeli media becomes negative. The more they appeared in the news, the more they fell under those negative frames and the more negative their appearances and their personalities became. The unwillingness for peace, the 'terror' or 'violence' frame, and even the economy frame all worked as a categorical identification for the Palestinian Leadership. This resulted in a confirmation of the entire negative frames that existed before Oslo. However, before Oslo for example, it was still considered a possibility that they would use peace talks to enter Palestine and destroy Israel, but after Oslo and the Second Intifada, it became a sure thing. In this sense, the framing of the Palestinian Leadership not only returned to how it was before Oslo. Based on the findings of the analysis, all the Palestinian groups were included in the narrative that any Palestinian is "A monster, they portrayed the Palestinian as dangerous, a monster and bloody, with the killing of children and women, with the explosion of cafes, the explosion of hotels, the explosion

of buses, and so on. I mean, it reinforced the image of the savage Palestinian.” (I. Manssor, personal communication, August 3, 2021).

In conclusion for the four previous framing dimensions, based on Galtung's (1969) definition of ‘peace’ as the absence of violence, the framing of the Palestinian leadership remains under the dimensions of ‘violence’. The argument that ‘violence’ was removed from the framing of the Palestinian leadership completely after Oslo is invalid since Arafat and the PLO remained framed negatively as ‘terrorists’ or as using Oslo to enter Palestine and destroy Israel or as ‘unserious’ about peace. This framing laid the foundation for the framing of ‘betrayal’ by Arafat and the PLO for the good intentions of the Israeli leadership. The second Intifada and the failure of Oslo were framed as ‘the result the Palestinian leadership always had in mind’. In this sense, Arafat and the Palestinian leadership were demonized based on this narrative, which was adopted by both the political levels and the media. As such, ‘violence’ was not removed from the framing of the Palestinian leadership, and demonization continued during the Oslo years and the second Intifada.

3.1.2 Equalizing of PLO and Arafat’s power after Oslo

The previous framing dimensions and how Israeli media framed Arafat and the PLO after Oslo indicate an increase in the frequency and personalization of their appearance in news pieces. This in turn indicates the wide acceptance of Arafat as the leader of the PLO and Palestinians. While this was the case pre-Oslo, especially after the Lebanon war and the first Intifada, it further solidified the power Arafat and the PLO held in the conflict and among Palestinians. The continued use of the political positions of Arafat and the Palestinian leadership and blaming the Palestinians 92% of

the time for any outbreaks of violence reminds the readers of the power they hold in the conflict. An example of this power is how Arafat was blamed for ‘small’ attacks against Israel as if he controlled them, “Arafat did not want attacks within the Green Line but gave legitimacy to "small" attacks against settlers and soldiers in the territories.” (Ben-Yishai, Ron (The Hamas is Guilty, Arafat is Responsible) *Yediot Aharonot*. 31 July 1997.), and in “The chairman of the PA, Yasser Arafat, conveyed a message to Israelis on Monday in honor of Rosh Hashanah: "I ordered the Palestinians to obey my past order to stop the fire.” (Somfalvi, Attila and news agencies (Arafat to Israelis: I ordered a ceasefire commitment) *Yediot Aharonot*. 17 September 2001.). This indicates that he held the power to decide when the ‘violence’ is opened and or reduced. Another example is “The Palestinian Authority cabinet vowed on Friday not to give in to what it called Israeli "aggression" despite the heavy human toll and the financial and material losses of a nine-week-old uprising.” (Dudkevitch, Margot and news agencies (PA, Fatah, Hamas vow to step up intifada) *The Jerusalem Post*. 3 December 2000.). In all of the examples mentioned, the indication is that the Palestinian leadership, headed by Arafat, has the power to control the responses and violence of Palestinians. They could increase violence or create a cease-fire as they hold the authority over the Palestinian public. This created a frame of ‘organized terror’ for the Palestinian leadership. Before Oslo and especially before the first Intifada, the Palestinian leadership was framed to have a limited influence on Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza despite the leadership being outside of Palestine. However, with their return to Palestine after Oslo, their influence increased. Even their framing as an organization and an Authority increased in Israeli media with the appearance of armed groups like Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, which is the armed division of Fatah, or the militarization of the Palestinian

Authority security members. All of those aspects were included in the equalization of powers during the second Intifada and indicated a bigger threat from the PLO than ever before. In the words of Galtung “A revolution brought about by means of a highly hierarchical military organization may after a brilliant period of egalitarianism, and after major challenge, revert to a hierarchical structure.”(Galtung, 1969, p.172). This was applied to the PLO as they were moved from the frame of a guerilla organization before Oslo, into the frame of the hierarchical authority of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. This progress from a guerilla organization into this kind of structure appears in articles that talk about the progress of the Palestinian state. One of the articles analyzed starts with the following opening “Palestinians already have many of the institutions and symbols of a state. But that's a long way from realizing independence.” (Lynfield, Ben (A virtual state in the making) *The Jerusalem Post*. 26 April 1999). This article gives an in-depth analysis of how the Palestinian state is being developed. From the flag to the national anthem, to economic development or improvements of the infrastructure and communication sectors are all analyzed in-depth and represented as a growth for the Palestinian state. Of course, it also mentions the fact that the biggest hurdle for the birth of the state is the geographical separation between the West Bank and Gaza. However, it also mentions how the PLO started to construct the institutions of the state long before it was allowed to return to Palestine after Oslo. Thus indicating the power and influence they had and still have in Palestine. This is an indication of how the PLO had enough power during its years outside to start constructing such infrastructure despite all the efforts of Israel to reduce the organization’s influence in the West Bank and Gaza.

From the previous examples, it is apparent how the media frames of the PLO following Oslo further emphasized the ‘power’ the Palestinian leadership held. It is no

longer functioning from outside the borders, it has a direct influence on the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, and it is constructing an infrastructure of a state actively. All those new dimensions of the Leadership's power posed a bigger threat to the Israelis. Even factions outside of the PA like Hamas and Jihad were seen as more dangerous than the PA. Their being outside of the PA meant that they did not have to follow the rules of Oslo like Arafat or the PA. This was evident in the fact that most of the demands for Arafat to stop terror were related to one of those factions. However, another reason was their militarization. Their militarization was more dangerous than that of the PA since it included suicide bombing and active arming of their members. All those forms of militarization put them on the map as a bigger target than Arafat and the PA. Nonetheless, Arafat and the PA were considered to be working with them, or at least allowing them to work freely inside the West Bank and Gaza. This was seen as a possible alarm for Israel. If the PA decides to join hands with those factions, the amount of danger they would possess is extreme. Especially when those factions are considered to fall under the ideology of Islamic extremism, which is considered by Western governments and societies as one of the most dangerous nests for 'terrorism'. In other words, if the PA joins hands with the other factions, the power they will hold is extreme and if a full-scale war breaks out, it will be hard for Israel to control the situation. This war can be seen as the Second Intifada, which saw an immense amount of violence from the Israeli side. One of the examples of this violence is the fact that the IDF used over 700 thousand bullets in the first month of the Intifada alone. In the case of the second Intifada, the framing of conflict was that of a conflict between two states or two armies. This was a change from the usual 'riots' frame that was present in all the previous conflicts that happened before Oslo. In the Second Intifada, there was an official

Palestinian security force that joined the fighting in some cases; there is an official cabinet for the PA and a real Leadership. Fights in the Intifada were considered to be on equal terms, which can explain the excessive use of force against the Palestinians during the Intifada.

All of those aspects position the dimension of power in the framing of the Palestinian Leadership towards the ‘violent’ triangle of Galtung’s theory.

3.1.3 Decontextualization of PLO and Arafat after Oslo

As mentioned earlier, the Palestinian Leadership fell under four contexts or frames. Three of those frames mentioned the Palestinian Leadership in terms of ‘violence’, ‘terror’, and ‘unwillingness for peace’. These frames haunted the Palestinian leadership in general and Arafat in Particular from 1993 throughout the peace process and eventually during the Second Intifada. Despite the orders to cease fire and the attempts to continue the peace process after Oslo, the intentions of Arafat and the PLO were questioned or decontextualized frequently. Even the Palestinian Authority (PA) Covenant was questioned and considered to include the desire to destroy Israel. As a result, Israel demanded the covenant be changed as a requirement for the continuation of peace negotiations after Oslo even though the PA already changed the covenant and removed the parts, which indicated the desire to destroy Israel. In the following example, we find the following:

“Israel's insistence that the covenant is revised by the PNC was reiterated yesterday by Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu's communications adviser David Bar-Illan: "Just because they refuse to do it

doesn't mean that we have to accept that," he said. Bar-Illan contended that the covenant's revision was a "sine qua non" for any IDF redeployment." (Dudkevitch, Margot and Najib, Mohammed (PA: Covenant already revised) *The Jerusalem Post*. 26 January 1998.).

In this case, the reader was first informed of the existence of the desire to destroy Israel in what can be considered the codebook of the PA. Despite the change the PNC (Palestinian National Council) made, the Israeli government still considered a danger to exist in the convent. This covenant, as framed, further indicates that the PA cannot be trusted despite the fact; that it has been five years since the signing of Oslo and that the convent has already been changed. The PA at its core is still an enemy that desires to destroy Israel and this still shows in their covenant. This was more proof that the peace negotiations are merely a façade and that the PA header by Arafat aimed to destroy Israel all along. This narrative removed the context of the whole peace process into the frame of the 'unwillingness for peace' as well as 'violence'. If the PA and Arafat are serious about peace, they will remove all the covenant parts the Israelis deem 'violent'. If they do not comply with these demands, they are not serious about peace. As such, they cannot and should not be trusted. However, the PA covenant is not the only thing that was decontextualized by Israeli media. The actions of Arafat and the PLO leadership were similarly decontextualized throughout that period. As an example: Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai said, "I hope that the Palestinians will be as serious in carrying out the decisions and agreements in the area of terror and other matters in the agreement." (Bushinsky Jay, Collins, Liat and O'Sullivan, Arie (Map won't be ready for Albright) *The Jerusalem Post*, December 10, 1997). Again, the frame of Palestinians not being serious about peace and prevention of 'terror' appear and

indicate the hidden intentions of the Palestinian leadership. Another example appears in the comments regarding the 1997 census by Netanyahu:

"It is unacceptable to us that in the sovereign state of Israel, a foreign body is trying to undermine our sovereignty," Netanyahu said. "This is a gross violation of an agreement, and I have asked Minister Kahalani to thwart the attempts by the Palestinians" to carry out the census in Jerusalem." (Wohlgelernter, Ellie and Collins Liat (Gov't moves to stop PA census in Jerusalem) *The Jerusalem Post*, December 10, 1997).).

In this example, Israeli sovereignty is under threat as the Palestinians insist on carrying out the census in Jerusalem. This is seen as a violation of the agreement, while at the same time Israeli settlements were still being constructed all the time on lands that were, in that same agreement, in the PA's area of control. However, the part about the settlements never gets mentioned as it is not of relevance to the Israeli reader. What is truly important is to uncover Arafat and the Palestinians' true and ugly nature and expose their plans. This decontextualization is especially evident in cases of a violent eruption. However, it is important to note that during the Oslo years and even after, the peace defined by the Israeli media was not specific enough to lead to a concrete removal of 'violence' from the framing of Palestinians. While the framing of the 'peace' process itself is not part of the study, it still affected the framing of the Palestinian leadership. Moreover, based on the interviews conducted, it is clear that the framing of 'peace' based on the definition of the Israeli media and government presented a closed door for the Palestinian leadership in the peace process. What the Israeli government offered was nowhere near what the Palestinians wanted or could accept, yet this 'peace' proposed by

the Israeli government was framed as everything the Palestinians wanted ‘And that’s why when the negotiations erupted, he [Barak] came back to say that there was no Palestinian partner, and Abu Ammar was evading, and he never wanted peace and was lying. The second intifada began and the events became as if their narrative had been confirmed’ (I. Manssor, personal communication, August 3, 2021). This narrative of peace being everything they wanted, or that everything possible to achieve peace was done by ‘us’ yet they refused it. This, furthermore emphasized that Arafat and the Palestinians were never serious about achieving real ‘peace’. The peace that was offered in Oslo was seen by the Israeli government, media, and the public as a test of intentions. When the Second Intifada started, they failed the test and as a result, Arafat and the PLO were blamed for the eruption of the Intifada and the Failure of the peace. This frame is emphasized in the following example

“For Yasser Arafat, Black September was a test. He was asked to honor agreements, and repeatedly violated them; he was asked to rout out the extremists in his camp, and he didn't rout them out; he was asked to opt for realistic strategic goals, and he didn't opt for them. From Jordan he continued to Lebanon, from Lebanon he was expelled to Tunis, from Tunis again to Gaza and to Ramallah, where he found himself, 32 years after Black September, once again causing chaos, and once again besieged by armored forces which he will not be able to subdue.” (Shavit, Uriya (Out of Jordan) *Haaretz*. 10 April 2002.)

This article summarizes this frame perfectly. As seen, at every stage of the conflict between Arafat and Israel, he failed the tests. From black September to the Second Intifada. He wasted every chance he was offered to achieve peace and he will have to face the consequences of his actions. So far, the majority of the context found surrounding the Palestinian Leadership was usually bad. The only exception found for a positive article referring to the PLO was in (Immanuel, Jon, and news agencies (Netanyahu credits PA with helping find Edri) *The Jerusalem Post*. 11 April 1997.). In this article, Netanyahu thanks the PA (Palestinian Authority) for its participation in finding the body of Edri. Netanyahu said “I wish to make it clear that in the last part of this operation we received very specific support from the Palestinian Authority” (Immanuel, Jon and news agencies (Netanyahu credits PA with helping find Edri) *The Jerusalem Post*. 11 April 1997.). However he made it clear that the PA’s “Full cooperation, both in the prevention of violent demonstrations and in the war against terror, is still not being carried out, and it is important that it should be” (Immanuel, Jon and news agencies (Netanyahu credits PA with helping find Edri) *The Jerusalem Post*. 11 April 1997.). This means that even with the help from the PA in such a case, the encompassing frame of the PLO and all of their effort to achieve ‘peace’ is the unwillingness to hold their part of the deal to fight against ‘terrorism’. The fight against ‘terrorism’ is the condition for them to be framed under a peace frame. As long as they don’t fight the ‘terrorism’ defined by the Israeli side which usually involves Arafat and the PA themselves, they will always be framed and considered as lacking in the willingness for peace. Following this kind of framing, the failure of Oslo and Camp David were blamed on Arafat and the PLO. The failure of Oslo resulted in the outbreak of the Second Intifada and as a consequence: “during this period in which the media

returned to talk about the terrorism of the Authority, and there was general agreement in the entire Israeli media that President Abu Ammar, Mr. Abu Ammar, is a terrorist, He was hiding behind the acceptance of peace an ideological intent to remove Israel” (A. Alremawi, personal communication, August 2, 2021). While these contexts were the dominant way for the Israeli media to frame the Palestinian Leadership under these frames. Another method used to achieve this decontextualization, which is the usage of quotes from Palestinian leaders. However, those quotes were either removed from their context or represented as hypocritical. Examples of the usage of direct quotes from Palestinian leaders after the outbreak of the Second Intifada are the following:

"We are not against the talks, but stopping the intifada must not be a condition for renewing the talks," Barghouti said. "And the condition for negotiations to succeed is to continue the intifada.".... He said the uprising has a life of its own even though Fatah now coordinates it and PA Chairman Yasser Arafat, whom he called a strong leader, has a guiding influence on its activities.” (Dudkevitch, Margot and news agencies (PA, Fatah, Hamas vow to step up intifada) *The Jerusalem Post*. 3 December 2000.)

The context of the statements of Barghouti was framed by mentioning his crimes against Israel, Which immediately puts him in the demonization dimension for the Israeli readers. As such delegitimizing his words and removing them from their original context shifts the focus to his crimes from the beginning of the article. This use of context continues as more quotes from Khaled Mashaal were presented, “ Hamas also urged Palestinians on Friday to escalate their uprising. “Great people of Palestine: burn the ground under the feet of the invaders. Ramadan is a great month to escalate,"

(Dudkevitch, Margot and news agencies (PA, Fatah, Hamas vow to step up intifada) *The Jerusalem Post*. 3 December 2000.). All of those quotes are used to indicate the violent nature of the Palestinian leadership and how the context changes to “Israel defending itself” against those leaders who incite violence from their people. This context as mentioned earlier is also the context adopted by the IDF during the second Intifada “IDF commanders projected their viewpoint regarding Arafat's intentions onto the entire Palestinian society.” (Pedatzur, Reuven (More Than a Million Bullets) *Haaretz*. 29 June 2004). It is important to note that after the second Intifada finished Israeli media and politicians admitted to the fact that it was not Arafat or the PLO who destroyed the peace process “The demonization of Arafat, and with high-ranking army officers, even like the head of intelligence, said that this story was unfounded. Our accusations against Arafat were greatly exaggerated.” (M. Musa, personal communication, July 15, 2021). However, this did not change the view of Israel who considered it all the fault of Arafat and the PLO. At that point, the media already orchestrated a narrative for the whole period after Oslo that was easily and widely accepted by Israeli readers until this very day

“the Israeli was looking for a solution because you are confusing his daily life, the Israeli was. That is why the conditions were created for there to be an Oslo. Because the Israeli felt that you are practically a danger and a creator of a crisis, a creator of an existential crisis. After Oslo and after the Israeli wall, he felt that he did not see you, that he did not see your suffering, not touching it.” (N. Jamhor, personal communication, 2021).

Thus placing the context of the PLO and Arafat after Oslo and especially after the second Intifada on the dimension of 'violence' in Galtung's triangles.

3.2 Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza after Oslo

Similar to how Arafat and the PLO's appearances increased after Oslo, Palestinian civilians' appearances in Israeli media based on the analysis increased as well. However, Arafat and the PLO were the sole representatives of Palestinians after Oslo, before and during the second Intifada while Palestinian civilians were rarely personalized in Israeli news discourse. An exception to this however can be found, to some extent, whenever Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza were involved in violence. In those occurrences, Israeli media mentions Palestinians of this group. In some cases, Palestinians were mentioned by name and at other times only represented as numbers or as what role they played in the violent event reported.

3.2.1 The excising, salience, depersonalization, and demonization of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza after Oslo

Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza are the most dominant group to appear in the analyzed articles during the years that followed Oslo. However, the frequency of their appearances in Israeli media was dominated by their involvement in violence. The 20 *Jerusalem post* articles consisted of 12 articles talking about Palestinians from the West Bank or Gaza and all of those articles were related to violence. Five of those articles were before the outbreak of the second Intifada, seven were during the second Intifada, and all are violence-related. Eight of *Yediot Aharonot's* articles mentioned Palestinians, five were related to violence, and the remaining two were related to

internal conflict between Palestinians and the PA and the IDF preventing movement for Palestinians outside Area A because of Palestinian violence. Similarly, Eight *Haaretz* articles mentioned Palestinians, six articles are violence-related, and the remaining two consist of the titles shown in table 10. Thus making the Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza the dominant group in appearances, which constituted 46% of the analyzed articles. This is different from the first Intifada and before Oslo when they barely appeared in Israeli media. However, what applied in the earlier section for the Palestinian leadership applies to this group. With the increase in their appearances the negative images that they were represented in further emphasized their evil nature. This is shown in the fact that blame was positioned on Palestinians in 92% of the cases. Nonetheless, their appearances increased and news about this group became regular during that period. This meant that similar to how the excising of the Palestinian leadership increased after Oslo. The excising of the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza increased, thus placing this dimension into the triangle of 'peace' in Galtung's theory.

However, when it comes to the sanitizing of this group. Out of the 60 articles analyzed from the three newspapers, only 10 articles included the names of Palestinians. This of course does not include the Palestinian leadership. However, out of all the 10 articles that included the names of Palestinians only one mentioned the names of Palestinian victims that were killed by mistake. Even in that article, not all the names of the victims were mentioned. The title of the article is 'Five Palestinians killed, Israeli baby wounded in unrest'. Out of all those five killed Palestinians, only two were mentioned. The other 3 were not included in the article. This case gave limited details on how those two Palestinian victims were killed as shown in the example below:

“Among the victims was Mohammed Arja, 12, who died of wounds sustained Thursday at the Karni crossing in the Gaza Strip. In Al-Bireh, near Ramallah, soldiers fatally shot Shehada Jafari, 26, of Beitunya, yesterday. He was holding an electric drill which may have been mistaken for a weapon, according to witnesses and the Palestinian Red Crescent.” (Dudkevitch, Margot (Five Palestinians killed, Israeli baby wounded in unrest) *The Jerusalem Post*. 3 December 2000.)

The other nine articles mentioned the names of the Palestinians and categorized those Palestinians as “terrorists”. The most information given about Palestinians in those nine articles was their age, name, and their social or political position. Even though it is the most frequent group in the articles analyzed, the names, and the victimization of this group are very low. Even in the cases of anonymous members of this group doing positive actions. Only the following example was found which is talking about how a Palestinian helped an Israeli truck driver that was attacked by other Palestinians “He was picked up by a Palestinian driver who took him to a nearby IDF post.” (Jerusalem Post Internet Staff (Two IDF soldiers stabbed north of Jerusalem) *The Jerusalem Post*. 3 December 2000.) Among all the 60 articles, this was the only mention of a Palestinian good deed. However, no emphasis, no mention of a name, and no comment was made on it; instead, it was just mentioned as a passing accident that is rare and does not deserve any details or any positive comments from the authors. The main focus here was that Palestinians attacked the Israeli truck driver and that he was fine but his truck was damaged. While the anonymous Palestinian that helped him reach the IDF center was barely mentioned. Only two other cases discussed the suffering of

Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza and both were after the Second Intifada.

Those articles are shown in table 10:

Table 11: Articles that did not include direct ‘Violence’ consequences in their titles

Title	Newspaper	Year
Humiliation at the Checkpoints	<i>Haaretz</i>	Jul. 8, 2003
Palestinian Unemployment Up to 45%; 366,000 Now Out of Work	<i>Haaretz</i>	Aug. 22, 2002

Those two articles did not exhibit this kind of function either in their titles or content. Instead, they were focused on the effects of the Intifada either from an economical point of view or how Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza were humiliated at the Israeli checkpoints. In other words, the focus was on the economical and human levels of the effects of the Second Intifada. As the analysis shows, the sanitizing of the suffering or the human actions of the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza is more severe than that of the Palestinian Leadership. Even though both only had one good action attributed to them and both didn't get victimized, except in the case of those two Palestinian victims mentioned earlier. When compared to the Palestinian Leadership, the names of the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza were only mentioned 32% of the time while the names of the Palestinian Leadership were mentioned 100%. So far, the analysis shows that the framing of Palestinians falls under sanitizing despite them being the most represented group in the 60 articles analyzed. This is a negative way of framing that falls under the triangle of ‘violence’ in Galtung.

As mentioned, the only difference that was found between the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza and the Palestinian leadership so far is the fact that the Palestinian Leadership is more personalized. As mentioned, only 10 articles mentioned the names of the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. While the majority of the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza in the three newspapers were introduced as anonyms or represented with negative terms like “rioting Palestinians”, “scores of Palestinian university students”, “terrorists”, “Palestinian gunmen”, and “stone-throwing youths.”, “A knife-brandishing Palestinian”, “assailant”, “attacker”, “jihadist”, “suicide bomber”. Those terms were the main method of representing Palestinians. Those “terrorists” were usually killed by either assassination or confrontation during a violent act. In those cases, Israeli media used terms like “fatalities”, “killed” and “dead” to describe the murder of those Palestinians. However, as seen from the terms used, the word Palestinian was used in every case that described the nationality of the Palestinians. This is different from how it was before Oslo. At that period, the Israeli media used the word ‘Arab’ instead of ‘Palestinian’ to describe the nationality of the Palestinians in the articles. All of this anonymization achieves the depersonalization of the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. This depersonalization is further emphasized by the fact that they appeared as part of angry mobs or rioting groups 45% of the time in the articles analyzed. This focus on groups is of importance for two reasons. The first is that it makes the anonymization of Palestinians easier for the media since there is a significant number of Palestinians in the context provided. The second and most important reason is to indicate that Palestinians all act the same. They are all in the riots, they are all being violent, and they are all participating in the attack on that truck driver. In this sense, the generalization of this group is achieved and similar to the cases in the First

Intifada. This depersonalization and generalization again positions the Palestinians' framing in Israeli media under the 'violent' triangle of Galtung's theory.

The analyzed articles show that the frequency of reporting Palestinians increased whenever there were violent outbreaks or the effects of that 'violence' on specific aspects of the life of either Palestinians or Israelis appeared. An indication of that is the fact that 95% of the articles analyzed were titled as the result of the Palestinian "terror" or 'unwillingness for peace' on Israelis or Palestinians. These results vary from the number of people killed by the violent actions of Palestinians to the reaction of the IDF to those violent actions or the celebration of Palestinians for the actions of "terror". Only two articles did not include those kinds of titles; all were from *Haaretz*. Those articles are shown in table 10 above. Those two articles did not relate Palestinians to being instigators of violence. Instead, they were focused on the effects of the violence in the Intifada on their daily lives. While those two articles were the exception, all the other 26 articles related Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza to violence in some shape or form. In this sense, Israeli media actively excised Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza who were positioned outside of the context of violence and only showed members of this group whenever they were positioned under the frame of violence. This means that the only time Israeli readers were introduced to Palestinians was almost always concerning violence. The only exception to that is the mention of a Palestinian taking an injured Israeli to an IDF center. However, as mentioned earlier, this example also included other Palestinians who participated in a 'violent' attack against an Israeli civilian. This in turn links violence to this group and makes their characteristics only related to 'violence' and 'evil', which also leads to a demonization effect in the minds of the readers. If you only see a group of people involved in violence then that group

will be automatically stereotyped as a violent group. This demonization of the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza is even more apparent in cases where they were shown celebrating the violence committed by them or other Palestinians. Two examples titled (Palestinians celebrated the attack in Ramallah) and (Hamas "exhibition" in Nablus: body parts and pizza chunks) show this trend. It is not enough for Palestinians to commit acts of 'violence'; they also actively celebrate them as part of 'ritualistic' behavior that indicates the wickedness of their nature and that they identify themselves and their happiness with the suffering of others. Much like a 'demon', the framing of the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza falls under the category of demonization, which is actively portrayed and generalized on them. This 'demonization' as previously argued falls under the 'violence' triangle of Galtung's theory.

So far based on the analysis, the position of all the dimensions of salience, depersonalization, and demonization of the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza falls into the dimensions of 'violence' in Galtung's theory. The only exception to this as argued before is the excising of this group, which when taken separately is a positive dimension but when connected to the other dimensions becomes negative and thus falls as well under the 'violence' triangle in Galtung's theory.

3.2.2 Equalizing of power of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza after Oslo

After Oslo, Palestinians were no longer seen as lacking leadership. Instead, they became an organized group. That they acquired unity and as a result can be deployed more efficiently. This is specially reinforced after the outbreak of the second Intifada. Images of Palestinians using not only rocks but also firearms, and committing suicide bombings indicated an organized function of "terror". This gave a more dominant sense

of danger and threat to the Israeli people “The manifestations of armaments and the killing of agents appeared, thus this weakened the spirit of sympathy with the Palestinian cause and with the Palestinian movement.” (M. Musa, personal communication, July 15, 2021). Palestinians are no longer the “barbaric” violent people that lacked leadership and unity, now they are an organized ‘enemy’, which can effectively harm Israel, and its people. This was frequently reinforced in Israeli media as; out of the 60 articles analyzed, only two did not relate Palestinians to direct Violence, but instead they described the continued results of “terror” acts. Look at table 10 for reference. With the introduction of “terrorist cells” One article in *The Jerusalem Post* titled “Tzurif cell: A chronology of terror” describes the “terrorist” actions conducted by this kind of organized “terror”

“Tzurif cell: A chronology of terror

JERUSALEM (April 11) - The Kafr Tzurif Hamas cell began its terror with drive-by shootings in late 1995 and moved on to kidnappings and eventually the suicide bombing in Tel Aviv last month, according to the IDF.

March 21, 1997 - Cell member Moussa Ranimat blows himself up at the Apropro cafe in Tel Aviv killing Yael Gilad, Anat Rosen-Winter, and Michal Midan-Avrahami, and wounding 47 others.

September 9, 1996 - Kidnapping and murder of Staff-Sgt. Sharon Edri hitchhiking to his home in Moshav Zanoah. His body is buried near the village.

July 26, 1996 - Drive-by shooting near Moshav Tirosh killing Uri Munk, his son Ze'ev, and his wife Rachel.

June 9, 1996 - Members of the cell open fire on a car near Moshav Gefen, killing Yaron and Efrat Unger, of Kiryat Arba.

January 16, 1996 - Murder of Maj. Oz Tivon, a doctor, and Sgt. Yaniv Shimel, a medic when their car is attacked near Karmeit Tzur.

December 9, 1995 - Drive-by shooting near Neveh Daniel in Gush Etzion. Yonatan Moshitz and his daughter Lior are wounded.

November 18, 1995 - Opened fire on a vehicle driven by a resident of Jerusalem as it passed the village of Beit Omar. No one was injured.”

(O'Sullivan, Arieh (Tzurif cell: A chronology of terror) *The Jerusalem Post*. 11 April 1997.)

In this sense, placing the Palestinian damage on Israel as an act of “terror” while placing the Israeli damage as an act of “self-defense” or “payback” indicated to the readers that the “other” has the ability and willingness, and does put “us” in danger. The theme of ‘organized terror’ is of importance for all the Palestinian groups after the second Intifada since they were considered part of the same identity and social structure. The difference between the three groups was their geographical location and their hierarchy within the organization. Arafat, the PLO, and other parties like Hamas were the leaders of this ‘organized terror’. Following their orders are Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza who commit ‘direct violence’ against Israelis. In this sense, the main

Palestinian group that conducts the ‘violence’ is the Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza. As they are represented to be either; following orders from the ‘evil’ leadership or acting ‘violently’ on instinct. In the first case, they are part of this ‘organized terror’ that is actively working, planning, and militarizing to destroy Israel while in the second case they can group and attack at any time and place without any prior warning. In this sense, it does not matter if you see them coming or prepare for them, there is always a threat around any corner at any time. As a result, one of the political actions that were represented in the Israeli media as a way to prevent this is the separation policy. This policy was represented in the media as the solution the Israeli government came up with to protect its citizens from this ongoing threat of terror and power of the ‘evil’ Palestinians. This narrative for the policy becomes easily accepted when the frequency of the Palestinians' appearances in the media increases and it is almost always about how they harmed ‘us’. As a result of their actions and the danger they pose, ‘we’ have to protect ‘ourselves’ at any cost otherwise ‘we’ will be annihilated. Both those frames of the equalization of the power for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza represent the danger this group poses to the Israelis and as such positions the framing of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza under the ‘violence’ dimension of Galtung’s theory.

3.2.3 Decontextualization of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza after Oslo

Demonization and equalizing of power are especially affected by decontextualization and similarly affect them. To reframe the “other” as a demon and present their capacity to harm “us”, decontextualizing the conflict is essential. While Israeli media introduced the Palestinian voice after Oslo and in the Second Intifada, the

contextualization of the failure of the peace process, the outbreak of the Second Intifada, the deaths in it, and the actions of Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza are systematically decontextualized. Israeli media achieved this decontextualization using various methods. One of the most dominant methods is using several inserts and voice-overs that place those images within a more acceptable framework for the Israeli audience. In this frame, the report usually presents the casualties from the Palestinian side and then places those victims as part of the 'enemy' that attacked first. Their death is a result of their actions which forced 'us' to act under the category of 'self-defense'. This context is apparent in all of the articles that relate the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza to violence. A second use of the voice-over technique is to deny the narrative of the 'enemy' and place it under the frame of propaganda. This leads the audience into questioning the legitimacy of the Palestinian's claims about their casualties. Thus, reducing the emotional effect of such information and presenting the audience with a coping mechanism for the violence Israel used against Palestinians. The most prominent terms used to activate this frame are "reportedly" or "Palestinians claim". As an example of this frame, *The Jerusalem Post* reported on "Clashes" saying the following "The settlers reportedly beat the two 17-year-old Palestinians before releasing them. One of the youths reportedly sought hospital treatment." (Dudkevitch, Margot (Clashes continue in Hebron) *The Jerusalem Post*. 11 April 1997.). The usage of reportedly for both the violent acts of the settlers and the result of that violent act puts the information under skepticism. Another case is

"On Friday, Palestinians shot at troops from several buildings at the junction. As the gunfire persisted, soldiers fired an anti-tank missile. According to the Palestinians, Al-Bireh was shelled four times and a

building was damaged. On Friday night shots were fired at Psagot, located next to Al-Bireh.” (Dudkevitch, Margot (Five Palestinians killed, Israeli baby wounded in unrest) *The Jerusalem Post*. 3 December 2000)

It is noticeable that the only sentence, which did not present an absolute statement, is the one that included the Palestinian narrative or statement. In this method, the ‘enemy’ is framed as willing to lie about the deaths of its members to justify the violence it commits against ‘us’. Thus placing the Leadership which is usually the one presenting this information under doubt of its honesty and commitment to its people.

Another technique used is generalizations. This method is used by contextualizing all of the Palestinian actions, especially the ones that result in Israeli casualties, under the premise of Shahadah. Presenting a general theme that all Palestinian violent acts fall under Shahadah allows the audience to shift the blame of the events towards this concept. Especially when reporting how Palestinians adopt and celebrate this act. One of the examples of this is “Until now, these pre-mortem arrangements were the exclusive province of Muslim fanatics” (Rubinstein, Danny (The Fine Line Between Shahid and Suicide) *Haaretz*. 27 August 2001.) or how “Palestinians celebrated the attack in Ramallah” (Waked, Ali (Palestinians celebrated the attack in Ramallah) *Yediot Aharonot*. 2 June 2001.). Even quotes from Palestinian leaders are used to reinforce this concept.

Another method is to provide a full yet false context for the situation. This usually presents Israel as in the act of “self-defense”. The example of the Palestinian worker that was shot by mistake is the best to show how even in that situation the media provided a context in which this action becomes more acceptable.

“In Al-Bireh, near Ramallah, soldiers fatally shot Shehada Jafari, 26, of Beitunya, yesterday. He was holding an electric drill which may have been mistaken for a weapon, according to witnesses and the Palestinian Red Crescent.

The army said that soldiers were fired upon from the building in which he was working and returned fire.

"The man who was shot was identified by soldiers as a suspect at one of the positions from which the Palestinians had been firing," an IDF Spokesman said." (Dudkevitch, Margot (Five Palestinians killed, Israeli baby wounded in unrest) *The Jerusalem Post*. 3 December 2000.)

These methods are used to remove the presentations from their overall context and place them into a more acceptable frame for the viewers. Israeli Media effectively shifted the context of the event to that of “self-defense” against the violent “other”. Focusing on the nature of the other as violent, barbaric, and evil while presenting the “self” as the victim in the defense. Blame shifting is another technique used extensively by the Israeli media in the analyzed articles to remove guilt and discomfort from the Israeli audience. This method was used 92% of the time in articles that consisted of violence. This method indicates that It is not “our” fault, it is theirs, and thus “we” are not held accountable for any violence that happens in the conflict. Shifting responsibility for the ‘violence’ is another mechanism for ‘violent’ framing where the victims were blamed for the conflict. ‘Violence’ in this sense is not seen as a result of the conflict but instead is represented as the cause of the conflict. Palestinians were seen as making decisions to act violently not only based on individual decisions but also

based on the expected social norm that surrounded them due to the influence of the Palestinian leadership, which drastically increased after Oslo. This goes in line with Galtung's theory where he argues, "Pure cases [of violence] are only pure as long as the pre-history of the case or even the structural context are conveniently forgotten."(Galtung, 1969, p.178). The Palestinian 'violence' in Israeli media is not a pure case of 'violence' in this sense. Instead, a made-up pre-history of the Palestinian and 'Arab' 'violence' was constructed by the media from the beginning of the Zionist project in Palestine. This influenced and continues to influence the conflict and turned the 'violence' of the Palestinians into a 'pure' nature based on the Israeli narrative. After Oslo, this context became more important as Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza were included in the context that the failure of Oslo was a result of the PLO and the Palestinians as a whole. Palestinians never wanted peace and the only reason they agreed to Oslo was because of their desire to destroy Israel and because of their weakness. This context was strongly reflected after the outbreak of the Second Intifada in public opinion. According to (Shaw & Zárate, 2007), in November 2000, 78% of Israelis believed Palestinians have little to no regard for human life, and in 2001; 63% believed that it was impossible to achieve peace with Palestinians while 80% believed that even if a peace deal was made, Palestinians will not honor it. Similarly, in both 2001 and 2002 70% believed that Palestinians do not accept the existence of Israel and would destroy it if they could. Even if those polls were conducted during the second Intifada, This does not negate the fact that they are the result of preexisting narratives that have been constructed from the beginning of the conflict. All these mechanisms allow the audience to cope with the current situation and prevent them from feeling guilt for what "we" do to "them". As such, the contexts in which Palestinians from the West

Bank and Gaza appear within Israeli media fall under the ‘violence’ triangle of Galtung’s theory

3.3 Palestinians in Israel after Oslo

There is a historical and national link between Palestinians in Israel and Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. This connection was usually emphasized in the coverage of the Palestinians in Israel, especially following Oslo and the Second Intifada. Even though Palestinians in Israel had little coverage before Oslo, this coverage was usually negative and connected to either Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza or ‘Arabs’ in general. This connection increased drastically after Oslo. As discussed earlier, the move from the unorganized guerrilla of the PLO and the chaotic leaderless Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza towards a theme of a hierarchical organization following Oslo. The construction of this organized entity was linked to Palestinians in Israel during Oslo and after the outbreak of the second intifada. Before the Second Intifada, the majority of actions or protests from the Palestinians inside Israel were seen and framed as ‘disorder’. As such, they were framed as being under the influence of the PLO and active participants in the plot to destroy Israel. This was especially emphasized when Palestinians in Israel supported Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza and joined the Second Intifada. As a result, “this population was perceived by much of Israeli society, including many journalists, as part of an all-out threat to the existence of Israel.” (Avraham & First, 2010). With this increased inclusion of Palestinians in Israel into the “enemy” group, their coverage followed similar mechanisms to that of Palestinians in the other groups.

3.3.1 The excising, salience, depersonalization, and demonization of Palestinians in Israel after Oslo.

Before the outbreak of the second Intifada, Palestinians in Israel were almost completely removed from Israeli media. However, after the beginning of the second Intifada; the inclusion of Palestinians in Israel into the category of the “enemy” allowed Israeli media to use similar methods to frame this population as with Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. As mentioned earlier, the frequency of Palestinians in Israel’s coverage after Oslo was very low. Of all the articles analyzed only eight articles talk about Palestinians in Israel. Six articles were in *Haaretz* and two in *Yedioth Ahronoth* while no articles about Palestinians in Israel were found in *The Jerusalem Post* from the sample taken. In this sense, Palestinians in Israel constituted 14% of all the articles analyzed. Thus becoming, as always, the lowest frequency in appearance among all the three groups. This low frequency before and after the second Intifada falls under the dimension of excising and indicates an active removal from Israeli media for this group. This goes in line with the level of frequency that this group possessed before Oslo, which indicates that regarding the dimension of excising Oslo brought no change. However, it is important to point out that all the articles found talking about Palestinians in Israel were after the beginning of the Second Intifada. This was in part due to their direct involvement in the Intifada, especially in the early stages of the outbreak. Only two articles talked about Palestinians in Israel concerning the dimension of ‘violence’. The remaining articles all included discussion about specific events that Palestinians in Israel either considered racist or took an active part in them, which were contextualized as part of the ‘disorder’ frame. Table 11 includes the titles of the articles.

Table 12: Titles of articles that included Palestinians in Israel

Title	Newspaper	Year
14 Killed, 39 Hurt in Suicide Bombing in Haifa Restaurant	<i>Haaretz</i>	31 March 2002
Deir Yassin Massacre, 55 Years On	<i>Haaretz</i>	10 April 2003
Justice for Ikrit and Biram	<i>Haaretz</i>	11 Oct .2001
Sings in Jewish-Arab Cities must be bilingual, court rules	<i>Haaretz</i>	26 July 2002
Netanyahu: Israel's Arabs are the real demographic threat	<i>Haaretz</i>	18 December 2003
Urban Plan Seen as Racist Move in Arab Sector	<i>Haaretz</i>	13 May. 2003
Suddenly, Dead Arabs interest you	<i>Yedioth Ahronoth</i>	19 September 2001
The year of the great war	<i>Yedioth Ahronoth</i>	16 September 2001

This increase in frequency for the Palestinians in Israel after the outbreak of the Second Intifada is of interest. In a sense, it can be seen that the outbreak of the Second Intifada brought more of a change to their frequency of appearance in Israeli media than in Oslo. Thus when comparing the two periods in the analysis, it can be argued that before the beginning of the Second Intifada the excising of Palestinians in Israel was negatively positioned on Galtung's 'violence' triangle. After the Second Intifada it became positively positioned on it. This is further solidified by the fact this group is the least group that is contextualized under the 'violence' frame which represents 25% of the articles they appeared in. However, an alternative frame was associated with them, which is the 'disorder' frame. This frame constituted 75% of their appearances in the articles analyzed. However, the 'disorder' frame can be considered a different form of violence.

In terms of the dimension of salience, the involvement of Palestinians in Israel in the second Intifada indicated a dangerous reality where those Israeli citizens were part of the conflict. As such, the removal of their suffering or attempts to delegitimize their actions or statements and opinions emerges in the majority of the articles they appear. Similarly, Two out of 8 articles included direct quotes from Israeli Palestinians. For example in the article, “suddenly dead Arabs interest you.” The jobs of the interviewed Palestinians in Israel and some information like the age of their dead family members were introduced. However, the interviewer directly begins the article as follows “the October riots were just the beginning. Then came the Arab-Israeli terror squads and the suicide bomber from Abu Sanan. Everything has changed.” (Rofa, Sharon (Suddenly, Dead Arabs interests you) *Yediot Aharonot*. 19 September 2001.). This beginning indicates the amount of danger the Palestinians in Israel represent following those events. However, no explanation or context for the ‘riots’ or the suicide attacks was provided. This beginning immediately disregards the suffering of those family members and instead focuses on ‘us’ instead of ‘them’. Even when he moves to the questions. All of those questions function in the same manner and fall under the dimension of salience. The questions asked were mainly from an Israeli point of view. The questions are:

“How did an Israeli Arab commit a suicide attack?”

“That Israeli Arabs are members of terrorist cells? What happened?”

“The current situation certainly causes many in Jewish society to see you as enemies. You do not notice the looks of fear directed at you in the street?”

“A year to break out of the events of October: In retrospect, should Israeli Arabs have acted differently today? Without violence?”

” And yet we live in a democratic state. Is this outburst of rage that you support compatible with the values of democracy?”

“What, in fact, are you most angry about the Jewish citizens for?”,

“What will make you feel part of this country?

When, if at all, can we live here with a real sense of peace?”

(Rofa, Sharon (Suddenly, Dead Arabs interests you) *Yediot Aharonot*. 19 September 2001.).

No questions tackled the causes of the October “riots”; instead, they were focusing on the consequences of the involvement of Palestinians in Israel in the bombing during the Second Intifada on Israeli Jews. The questions indicate that the families do not believe in democracy, they are angry, think violence is the answer, their actions resulted in Israelis not being able to live in peace, and they do not feel like a part of Israel. All these questions try to delegitimize the families and their opinions and mirror those questions to all the Palestinians in Israel. The questions are generalized and completely removed from the ‘others’ perspective. In this sense, this interview falls under the dimension of salience as their suffering is completely removed and the focus is on ‘our’ suffering. Another aspect is the ‘blame shifting’, which shows in this article as the introduction and questions indicate pointing fingers of responsibility at the Palestinians in Israel in general. Nonetheless, questions were asked and their opinions

were still presented to the audience. This salience and blame-shifting fall on Galtung's 'violence' triangle. Outside of the context of violence, the inclusion of Palestinians in Israeli voices appears in the reaction to Netanyahu's speech, in which he stated that Palestinians in Israel are the real demographic threat. In that article, the voices of Palestinians in Israel's political representatives were included as the reaction of the Palestinians in Israel to the speech. Arab Knesset members like Ahmed Tibi, Azmi Bishara, of Balad (National Democratic Alliance), Makhoul Issam Makhoul, Talab a-Sana (United Arab List), Labor whip Dalia Itzik, and Yossi Sarid, MK (Meretz) all were quoted on the speech (Alon, Gideon, and Benn, Aluf (Netanyahu: Israel's Arabs Are the Real Demographic Threat) *Haaretz*. 18 December 2003). These direct quotes from the political level and the mention of their names and political affiliations indicate personalization. However, this personalization is strictly given to political leaders and not civilians. This indicates that the majority of the group is usually depersonalized and the only personalization that happens is on their political level or when they are related to 'violence'. However, in the article titled "Signs in Jewish-Arab Cities must be bilingual, court rules" (Kra, Baruch (Signs in Jewish-Arab Cities Must Be Bilingual, Court Rules) *Haaretz*. 26 July 2002.) no official responses from Palestinians in Israel were introduced. Instead, the mention of the cause of the rule is a petition by Adalah, the Legal Center for the Rights of the Arab Minority in Israel. The remaining responses in the article are all from Jewish politicians and Judges. This means that Palestinians in Israel's voices were not included in a matter directly linked to them. Instead, the arguments presented in the article attempt to change the context into either a civil right or a political, or even an identity issue. Statements like "Rubinstein also argued that should the state require cities to put up Arabic signs, this would harm Hebrew's status as

Israel's principal language.” In addition “The entire issue is political rather than legal in nature, Cheshin concluded, and therefore, it should be resolved by the country's political institutions rather than the court.” (Kra, Baruch (Signs in Jewish-Arab Cities Must Be Bilingual, Court Rules) *Haaretz*. 26 July 2002.). All of those quotes work to indicate that the demand to include Arabic in signs in mixed cities is an attack by the ‘Arabs’ on the identity of Israel. No remaining articles include the voice of Israeli Palestinians. So far the analysis shows that Palestinians in Israel were the least represented group. With their low frequency comes a high level of salience. Even though violence-related articles are not as frequent when compared to Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, Palestinians in Israel were still rarely heard. For example, the article titled “Netanyahu: Israel’s Arabs are the real demographic threat.” Direct quotes from Israeli Arab political figures and their political positions were mentioned. Nonetheless, compared to both the Palestinian leadership and Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza, Palestinians in Israel were the most excised, salinized, and depersonalized among the three groups. This means this group scored as the worst one in the three dimensions analyzed so far. Either they do not appear at all or if they appear their suffering is removed or their voices or the context of their protests. All of which remove aspects of their conflict with a political system that discriminates against them. This also reflects in the media as it adopts the political narrative. In all the articles analyzed that included Palestinians in Israel, the word ‘Arab’ was used instead of Palestinians to label them. In all of the articles Analyzed, the Palestinians in Israel are the only group that was identified in Israeli media by the term ‘Arab’. As such, it could be argued that a separation between Palestinian inside Israel and Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza was created; however, this does not seem to be the case. One of the reasons for this is that the term

'Arab' is used as a general identifier that includes all Arabs including the Palestinians. "As time went on the word came to have a negative connotation encompassing all Arabs of all denominations, social backgrounds or political affiliations without exception."(Amara, 2016). In this sense what applies to the other Palestinian groups and Arabs applies to this group and vice versa. This shows the threat they pose against Israel in terms of collective Identity. However, they can still be called Arab on the official level and be treated as Palestinians socially. Secondly, to identify Palestinians in Israel as separated from the Jewish Israelis and at the same time maintain their status. As long as they are labeled 'Arab' no country will demand to take them back. In this sense, they are still considered as part of the narrative of 'a people without a land'. Lastly, the coverage of the media indicates that they were included in the framing of the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza despite using a different term to identify them. This label further positions the framing of Palestinians in Israel under the depersonalization dimension and falls under the dimension of 'violence' in Galtung's (1990) theory.

On the dimension of demonization, there is no significant difference between Palestinians in Israel and the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza since both were considered as part of the 'enemy', which is led by Arafat and the PLO. However, in terms of 'violence', they appear less frequently under this context. The focus of their contexts is dominantly framed as part of the 'disorder' frame. Which indicates that they attempt to create disorder from within Israel. This indicates a bigger threat since they are linked to the 'evil' Palestinian Leadership and the 'violent' Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. Similarly, they are presented and considered as a real demographic threat to Jewish superiority in Israel. As such, they are always seen as a potential threat

to the national identity of Israel. In other words, their existence alone inside Israel poses a threat. Lastly, they are still considered ‘Arabs’ and Palestinians and as such, they pose the same qualities as Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza. In this sense what applies to the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza in terms of ‘violence’, ‘generalizations’, and being under the effect or control of the Palestinian Leadership also applies to Palestinians Inside. All of those dimensions and demonizations similarly position Palestinians in Israel with the other two groups in the dimension of ‘violence’ in Galtung's (1990) theory.

3.3.2 Equalizing of Israeli Palestinian power after Oslo

Similar to the Land of Day coverage, Israeli media presented the events that involved Palestinians in Israel during the second Intifada mostly as part of a “law and order” frame. Where Palestinians in Israel were creating disorder and Israel reestablishing national order. This danger is further placed into the ‘violence’ dimension as a result of their participation in the suicide bombing. Thus, linking Palestinians in Israel to Palestinians in the occupied territories and the Palestinian leadership. This is best demonstrated in the following:

The year after the October riots was a year of rage, of disillusionment - and also of a slow disengagement from conventions. Israeli Arabs talk about the first suicide from the sector, about the anger towards the Jews - and about the future, if there is one. (Rofa, Sharon (Suddenly, Dead Arabs interests you) *Yediot Aharonot*. 19 September 2001.)

And in:

Rubinstein also argued that should the state require cities to put up Arabic signs, this would harm Hebrew's status as Israel's principal language. Furthermore, he said, adding languages to the signs could cause confusion. (Kra, Baruch (Signs in Jewish-Arab Cities Must Be Bilingual, Court Rules) *Haaretz*. 26 July 2002.)

Similarly:

Family representatives rejected the proposals - another reason for the cabinet's refusal to allow the villagers to return. The government will also argue in its case to the High Court that most of the families have already reached compensation agreements, in the form of land or money, with the government. (*Haaretz* (Justice for Ikrit and Biram) *Haaretz*. 11 October 2001.)

And in :

The organization identified the bomber as 18-year-old Shadi Tubasi, a resident of the camp. His family said he carried an Israeli identity card, meaning he was an Israeli citizen. (Shadmi, Haim and Ratner, David. (14 Killed, 39 Hurt in Suicide Bombing in Haifa Restaurant) *Haaretz*. 31 March 2002.)

All of the above examples indicate the role Palestinians in Israel played in creating disorder in some shape or form during the second Intifada. The first example

talks about the riots, the first suicide bomber, and anger toward Jews. Linking anger and the ability of Palestinians in Israel to do suicide bombings indicates them being a threat. The second example indicates that the desire to add Arabic to mixed cities is an attack on the national identity of Israel and will create confusion. The third example presented the family representatives as stubborn when they refused the offer made for them by the government. Similarly, stating that most of the families already reached compensations, yet they are still attempting to reach a court rule indicates their desire to create disorder. This is of importance since this example indicates a form of punishment by both the cabinet which will consider their refusal as a reason to prevent them from returning to their villages and the media which emphasized the position of the government in the case which frames them as 'manipulative' and 'liars'. Galtung (1969) argues that one of the forms of structural violence is "If you do not behave, we shall have to reintroduce all the disagreeable structures we had before."(Galtung, 1969, p.172). In this case, their rejection of the proposal moved them towards a frame of 'disorder' and 'rejection' by both the government and the media. The fourth example describes the identity of the bomber as an Israeli citizen. This further positioned them as a group under the frame of 'threat'. In a sense, their framing is that of an 'enemy' from within. This is further indicated by their involvement in the 'bombings' of the second Intifada. This time, their leadership is not the one that directed them to act 'violent' Instead; they became linked with Arafat and the Palestinian leadership in the West Bank and Gaza. This relationship in their framing further connected the Palestinians in Israel to the 'violent' dimensions of the Palestinian leadership and Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza.

3.3.3 Decontextualization of Palestinians in Israel after Oslo

While the context was provided to some extent in the articles analyzed, it does not necessarily mean that the context was positive for Palestinians in Israel. As mentioned earlier, context is mostly provided from an Israeli point of view, not from the Palestinians Israel's point of view. The article "Suddenly, Dead Arabs interests you" starts by describing the anger after the October "riots" but has no context as to why those riots took place or how the victims were killed. Even more, the questions asked all were in some way or form accusing the Palestinians in Israel of the desire for violence as analyzed earlier. In the article "Sings in Jewish-Arab Cities must be bilingual, court rules", the reason why the court made the decision was explained, however, the situation is set in the frame of harming the national identity of Israel. Similarly in the article titled "Justice for Ikrit and Biram" the context provided barely mentioned the effects of the "uprooting" of Palestinians from those villages. Instead, the focus was mostly on how the government, court, and IDF have acted since 1948. There is a mention of the refusal of the family representatives for the deal presented by the committees. However, this refusal was presented as a negative action since it was considered by the cabinet as a reason to refuse the return of the villagers to their homes. Nonetheless, it is important to note that this article admits that those Arabs became a symbol of injustice and that the government is ignoring the importance of this symbolism. In the "Deir Yassin Massacre, 55 Years on" *Haaretz* introduced a brief context of the massacre and the march in Jerusalem to commemorate the 55th anniversary of the massacre.

From all these examples, it is noticed that Israeli media tend to shift the context in some way or form to make it more acceptable. However, there is some inclusion of the Palestinians in Israel's point of view and some context to their suffering in the case of events unrelated to the Second Intifada. Nevertheless, when it came to events relating to the participation of Palestinians in Israel in the Second Intifada this inclusion falls short since most of the articles adopt the Israeli point of view eventually and instead focus on the point of view of the government or Jewish speakers. Thus placing the Palestinians in Israel into two different contexts for their coverage. The first group of events is the ones unrelated to the Second Intifada, which were usually contextualized as part of the intention to create 'disorder and chaos'. The second group is those of direct participation in the Second Intifada, which was contextualized as Palestinians in Israel being part of the 'organized terror' created by Arafat and the Palestinian leadership. Both of these two contexts are negative and position the framing of Palestinians in Israel continuously under the frame of a 'threat', which is a 'violent' dimension in Galtung's (1990) theory.

3.4 Discussion

Every society is a constructed structure that produces and consumes ideas continuously. These ideas are usually ones that were already consumed or produced by society and are reiterated in a loop repeatedly. This is somewhat of a paradox. While humans usually get bored with consuming the same foods or drinks repeatedly, even the most beautiful scenery becomes normal and dull if they are seen every day. However, ideas seem to be different. Ideas that exist in society are constructed, repeated, and reinforced and despite all of this repeated exposure, members of the society enjoy it.

Those ideas, as they are recurrent in this circle, become stronger and more connected to and in the thought process and the shared memory of the members of society. One of the reasons for this enjoyment or at least acceptance of the repetition of ideas in society is the desire to achieve control. Ideas are one of the main ways we see and understand the world. The more our understanding of the world is proven to be accurate, the more predictable the world is. People do not like that kind of unpredictable change, as it constitutes a lack of power and control over their own lives. This kind of desire for control results in a rejection of any new ideas that put this control and predictability under threat. This applies to every society, especially in a conflict. During a conflict, the need for a solid ideological ground for the members of a society is necessary to maintain a functional social order. A frightened society that feels powerless and threatened will not be able to function normally and that will put it in danger of collapsing. Keeping 'us' in a positive position while our 'enemies' in a more negative position is one of the ways to fortify the mental solidity of society. That is why in times of conflict, maintaining the types of ideas produced and consumed by society is important. The more members believe 'we' are in the right, that we are winning and the other is 'wrong', is 'bad', the easier it is to maintain a feeling of security and control while removing negative feelings of guilt or powerlessness. One of the most important methods to introduce and produce such ideas in any society is mass communication. Whether it is social networks, newspapers, radios, any form of mass communications, and mass emotional and mental charging are of significance in maintaining a positive look of the self and a negative one of the other in conflict. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is no exception to this logic. Especially when considering that Israeli society can be considered a newborn society. In other words, it is not a fully matured society so

reinforcement of the belief systems in it is more necessary and urgent. These belief systems hold perceptions towards 'self' and 'other', 'right' and 'wrong', 'good' and 'evil', and so on. As a result, they are continuously used and reinforced by the media to prove that 'we' are 'right' and make 'us' feel good about 'ourselves', or that 'we' are winning the conflict and the 'other' is losing and was never meant to win because the 'other' is bad and 'we' are good. All these ideas and more are tackled and presented in mass media during conflict periods all over the world. As such, it is only natural for them to exist in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Therefore, this study aims to find out what kind of ideas are presented in Israeli media concerning this conflict and the Palestinian 'others'.

To achieve this the current study aimed to conduct a comparative inductive and deductive content and frame analysis of the representation of the Palestinian Leadership, Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza, and Palestinians Inside Israel in the Palestinian – Israeli conflict by three major English-written newspapers, *Haaretz*, *Yedioth Ahronoth*, and *The Jerusalem Post*. 60 articles in total were chosen from the three newspapers split under two periods of the conflict, from 1993- early 2000 and from 2000 to 2004. In all three newspapers, the amount of coverage for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict increased as the 'violence' intensified, leading eventually to the collapse of the peace process completely in 2000 and the outbreak of the second Intifada. Based on the analysis, there exist some differences between the three newspapers when it comes to the distribution of actors between the three Palestinian groups as well as the amount of personalization in those representations. However, these differences are considered minor as they only function on limited dimensions related to the frequency of the appearances but not on the frames used themselves. Nonetheless, as will be

demonstrated in the following part, those differences are most apparent in *Haaretz*, and not between *Yedioth Ahronoth*, and *The Jerusalem Post*. This can be linked to the ideological direction *Haaretz* and some of its journalists adopt which is considered moderate left or moderate right by the newspaper's journalists.

In general, as evident from the analysis and previous literature, Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza were introduced as “primitive”, “naïve” and “manipulated” by the PLO before the first intifada. They barely appeared in Israeli media unless there were ‘violent’ events involving them. Even when they appeared in Israeli media, they were mostly anonymous. However, following the outbreak of the First Intifada, this frame changed. During the first Intifada Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza were framed as “rioters”, “terrorists” and “lawbreakers” while maintaining the ‘ignorant’ and ‘naïve’ narrative, which led to them becoming an extension of the PLO. However, following this logic, a difference in the framing of Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza and the PLO. This means that a differentiation was made between the Palestinian people as a civil group and the Palestinian leadership and its followers in the West Bank and Gaza, which was a symbol of the ultimate enemy in Israel “On the inside, as an example, when an event or operation occurred, they were shown as saboteurs, but they did not have the same intensity and the same feelings of fear that they had from the Palestinians from the outside.” (I. Manssor, personal communication, 2021). These frames continued even after Oslo whenever there were ‘terror’ attacks or ‘violent’ confrontations despite this group representing a 46% appearance rate in the articles analyzed. Israeli media mostly related those confrontations to the PLO and Arafat. This finally became the nature of Palestinians altogether after the outbreak of the second Intifada. The articles depicting Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza usually

represent them either as ‘terrorists’ or as part of rioters or an angry mob that is taking part in ‘violent’ protests or celebrations. Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza had been framed as part of the army that the Palestinian leadership mobilized after the failure of Camp David. This merge of framing for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza with the Palestinian leadership allowed Israeli media to frame them more negatively. As they fell under the framing of the Palestinian leadership, Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza were considered as big of a ‘threat’ as their leader. In this sense, what applied to the Palestinian leadership after the outbreak of the second Intifada applied to them as well. Hence, the framing of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza falls, as their leadership, into Galtung's (1990) dimensions of ‘structural and cultural’ violence. So how was the Palestinian leadership represented before and after Oslo?

The framing of the Palestinian leadership was that of a terrorist organization and Arafat was framed as a ‘terrorist’ who had limited operations inside Palestine, due to the fact they were outside of Palestine. This was the case until the Lebanon war in 1982 and was further emphasized following the outbreak of the First Intifada in 1987. After that point, the PLO was considered the primary initiator of ‘violence’ against Israelis. The PLO and Arafat were framed as the instigators of ‘violence’ and the representatives of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza by the Israeli government at that time. As a result, peace talks with Arafat and the PLO began in 1993 leading to the signing of Oslo in 1995 and the return of Arafat and the PLO to Palestine. Following the peace talks, both the Palestinians and Israelis agreed to reach a final solution in a transitional period of five years. During those years, talks continued between the two parties while the media continued to report on the progress of the peace treaty and both sides. Israeli

media started using terms like 'peace partners' and started including and personalizing the Palestinian leadership more in their discourse with 40% appearances in the analyzed articles. While media define and construct social meanings and narratives, it is similarly affected and limited by the social-political reality and narrative of the culture that produces it (Avraham & First, 2010). In this sense, the images constructed by the media affect the media in the long run. Positive images for example can allow more freedom in the representation of the "other" in the future, while negative representations limit the parameter in which the media can change its representations within it. After Oslo, the Palestinian leadership began getting included in the Israeli news after the removal of the laws that forbid meetings between the two sides. This change from portraying the "other" as the evil "enemy" to a 'peace partner' so suddenly resulted in an unneeded backlash against the outlets that allowed such a change as in the case of the protests against *Haaretz*. While the repercussions of these changes on the news outlets are not the focus of this study, they still indicate a change in the Israeli media. However, these were the only instant changes that Oslo brought to the framing of the Palestinian leadership. The framing of Arafat as a 'terrorist' and the PLO as a 'terror organization' never disappeared from Israeli media. On the contrary, almost all articles talking about the Palestinian Leadership were connected to either 'violence', 'Oslo', or 'unwillingness for peace'. At the same time, Israeli media, especially right-winged ones, emphasized that the Palestinian leadership was using Oslo to enter Palestine and construct a solid ground for themselves there capable of destroying Israel. This was an old dimension to the framing of the Palestinian leadership during the Lebanon war, a framing that became important with time. It is of interest to note that during the Lebanon war it was the Left who introduced this fear of the PLO starting a state in the West Bank and Gaza aimed to

destroy Israel. However, during the Oslo years, it was the Right who used this frame. Throughout the period before the Second Intifada, every action or word done or stated by the Palestinian leadership was thoughtfully investigated under that frame by the media. Israeli media continuously put the Palestinian leadership under the microscope and functioned as part of the military establishment especially since “Most of the present correspondents who dealt with the Palestinian issue, correspondents from the army and the Shabak. Therefore, their role is to deal with Palestinian news from a security perspective.” (N. Jamhor, personal communication, 2021). In this sense, Israeli media was looking at the Palestinian leadership with a predetermined assumption that they are here to build themselves up to power and with time betray 'us'. This continued as violent events or with every setback in the peace process until its complete collapse after the Camp David talks in 2000. After the failure of Camp David, the Second Intifada began and at that point, the media used the previous narrative to blame Arafat and the Palestinian leadership for the Second Intifada. During the Second Intifada, the framing of the Palestinian leadership did not only return to how it used to be before Oslo, it got even worse as the Israeli media reemphasized the narrative of the PLO using Oslo to enter Palestine and destroy Israel. In other words, the frame was 'if the Palestinian leadership was serious in achieving peace, the second Intifada would have never happened since war is in direct contradiction to 'peace''. Throughout the conflict, the framing of the Palestinian leadership progressed from “the lone individual, proceeding via mobs and crowds ending up with the organizations of modern guerrilla or army warfare.” (Galtung, 1969, p.174). Thus making the framing of the Palestinian leadership fall on the ‘violence’ dimension of Galtung’s theory. However, this last frame strongly lends itself to ‘violence’ since this context considered a peace process

like Oslo as a scheme by the Palestinian leadership to destroy Israel. Even though Israeli media used different terms like 'peace partners' before the second Intifada and despite the increased appearances and personalization of the Palestinian leadership in Israeli media, Israeli media still choose to distrust the Palestinian's leadership intentions during Oslo and presented the viewers with a frame that was in line with the frames before Oslo. Whether the Israeli media knew that the Second Intifada would start or wanted to direct the public opinion of the peace process in that direction is irrelevant as the changes in the framing of the Palestinian leadership are not significant enough to move it from the 'violence' frame towards 'peace' frames. Israeli media still worked as part of the 'structural violence' and according to Galtung "structural violence is also meaningful as a blueprint, as an abstract form without a social life, used to threaten people into subordination" (Galtung, J. 1969, p.172). However, this also allows the framing of Israeli media to be part of the 'cultural violence' since Galtung defines it as "any aspect of a culture that can be used to legitimize violence in its direct or cultural form." (Galtung, 1990, p.1). This means that Israeli media remained on the dimensions of both the 'structural and cultural' violence in framing the Palestinian leadership during the Oslo years and the Second Intifada. It is important to mention that despite the insignificant changes in the framing of the Palestinian leadership, the previous framing of this group before Oslo resulted in a rejection of the new peace partner, especially in the early years after Oslo because it was difficult for the Israelis to comprehend the sudden change in the image or portrayal of the Palestinian leadership since "Arafat was their enemy, and suddenly turned into a partner in a process that could lead to peace in the region." (K. Jaber, personal communication, 2021).

The representation of Palestinians in Israel followed this process as well. Before the first Intifada, they only appeared during violent events or “riots” but were almost completely excluded from the media. This continued during the Oslo years until the second Intifada with only a 14% appearance of the analyzed articles after Oslo. After the outbreak of the Second Intifada Palestinians in Israel were included in the frames of the Palestinian leadership, as they (Palestinians in Israel) got directly involved in the ‘violence’. This allowed Israeli media to position them on the dimension of ‘direct threat’ even when their ‘riots’ or ‘protests’ weren’t directly related to the Second Intifada. This group became an ongoing threat that lives within Israel and as a result, every action or word was considered part of the war the Palestinian leadership started and they fell under the ‘disorder’ frame in the majority of the articles. However, to some degree, the ‘threat’ the Palestinians in Israel presented was more of a danger than the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza were since they are inside Israel and can directly harm Israel. Especially with the creation of the wall and the geographical separation between the West Bank and Gaza from Israel. They became the only Palestinian group that can directly harm Israel. They were also the only Palestinian group that was continuously labeled as ‘Arabs’ after Oslo. However, this in no way or form means that they became separated from the other Palestinian groups in the media or the public memory of Israel. Thus, the framing of the Palestinians in Israel within Israeli media similarly falls, like their counterparts, into Galtung, (1990) dimensions of ‘structural and cultural violence’.

In the case of Israeli media, the negative portrayal of Palestinians throughout the entirety of the conflict backfired on attempts of change after Oslo. Before Oslo, Israeli media excluded the Palestinian voice and represented Palestinians as savage, violent,

and evil people. After Oslo, the Palestinian voice began getting included in the Israeli news after the removal of the laws that forbid meetings between the two sides. This change from portraying the “other” as the evil “enemy” to a ‘peace partner’ so suddenly resulted in a backlash against the outlets that allowed such a change as in the case of the protests against *Haaretz*. While the repercussions of these changes on the news outlets are not the focus of this study, they still indicate a change in the Israeli media. However, the degree of this change is somewhat misrepresented or overrepresented based on the findings of this study. Some described these changes as positive and that the human side of the Palestinians was being included in the Israeli media, especially during the Oslo years, and to some extent in the Intifada (Liebes & Kampf, 2009). While some cases provide such framing, these cases and changes are mostly related to the terminology of the presentation. For example, the Palestinians' were differentiated from ‘Arabs’ by using the term ‘Palestinians’ or describing the leadership as the ‘Palestinian Authority. For the first time after the arrival of the Zionist migration to Palestine, Palestinians are not called ‘Arabs’. Some Israeli Journalists began to officially use the word ‘Palestinians’ in talking about Palestinians. However, as argued in chapter 2 of this work, the word ‘Arab’ was used as a way to deny Palestinians their national identity and merge them with the ‘Arab’ identity. So now, with the use of the word ‘Palestinians’ did that change? Based on the analysis, this does not seem to be the case. Israeli media in general, which is in a kind of a committed relationship with the political system, maintained the usage of the frames used before Oslo. After Oslo, three main currents of news media appeared. First is the mainstream right. This current is the most dominant in Israeli media and society and was led during Oslo and the Intifada by *Yedioth Ahronoth* as the most-read newspaper in Israel, *The Jerusalem Post* falls under this current as well

after Oslo, though it was part of the second current before Oslo. This stream was in direct opposition to the peace process and was usually active in criticizing both the Israeli government and the Palestinians. The second current is that of Liberal media. This current was and still is mostly and solely represented by what is considered to be the *New York Times* of Israel, which is *Haaretz*. The most diverse newspaper in the inclusion of the three Palestinian groups was *Haaretz*. *Haaretz* was found to be the most consistent in the usage of the political positions of the leadership in its articles. This consistency in *Haaretz* also appears in the naming of the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza as well as direct quoting of the Palestinian Leadership. This is the case for the leadership in the West Bank and Gaza at least as the Palestinian Leadership inside Israel was only quoted twice. Despite the differences that existed, the results of the analysis show that *Haaretz* mostly was in line with the mainstream media. Of course, there are differences between it and the other two newspapers in terms of personalization or coverage of the three Palestinian groups. However, the major frames that appeared in its articles fell mostly under the same lines as the other two newspapers. One or more of these three groups were usually blamed for ‘violence’, ‘disorder’, or ‘unwillingness for peace’ especially when violent events erupted. To be specific 92% of the time Palestinians were blamed for any of those negative frames, while the majority of the Positive framing represented Israel or Israelis. Only one case implicitly implied that Israel is responsible to some extent, which was an article about the Dier Yaseen massacre. Since the blame falls on the Palestinians most of the time the names or political positions of the Palestinian leadership were mentioned in varying degrees between the three newspapers whenever talking about them. The third direction in the media was that of newspapers that only believed this peace was a temporary thing and

covered it as such without considering it as important or relevant to the overall conflict (I. Manssor, personal communication, 2021). Except for a few Journalists that identify themselves as liberals or adopt more of a leftist way of writing. The Israeli media, in general, delivered similar frames after Oslo. The frames of Palestinian ‘terror’ and ‘violence’ appeared in the majority of articles in all of the newspapers analyzed. The unwillingness to achieve real peace, as defined by the Israeli government, similarly dominated the discourse at the time. While media scholars criticized Israeli media for walking the government's path in the coverage of the first and somewhat the second intifada (Liebes & Kampf, 2009). Lobbyists and the Israeli public ironically saw the small changes in some Israeli media as being unpatriotic in their coverage of both Oslo and the second intifada. This in part was due to the already pre-constructed perception of Palestinians in that period. According to Shaw & Zárate (2007), in 1994 and 1995 between 54% and 71% thought that Palestinians would destroy Israel, and that about half of the Israeli public thought that a minority of Palestinians objected to ‘terrorism’, while the other half of the Israeli public believed that the majority of Palestinians were against ‘terrorism’. Conversely, based on polls from 1995 to 2000, between 52% and 67% considered that the Palestinians preferred peace. However, the Israeli public did not understand what that peace was. They only understood that the Israeli government is offering everything to the Palestinians and that they are being tested. If they fail this test, then that means they never wanted and will never want peace ‘Oslo: This was the Palestinians, as the media showed, that they took advantage of it as an opportunity to enter and enter weapons and attack us.’ (I. Manssor, personal communication, 2021). This contradiction between the fact that the Israeli public considered Palestinians positively to some extent from 1995 -2000 without understanding the peace process or

what is being offered or what is happening on the ground in terms of the actual application of peace from both sides is an interesting paradox. This shows how much the media can be a powerful tool that the public trusts blindly. Oslo was only understood as the peace that 'we' offered to them, their rejection of it, and them failing to do what 'we' want, were all considered evidence of the unseriousness of the Palestinians in achieving peace. All of that was taken by heart from the audience, was imprinted into the public opinion and the shared memory of the society which till today believes that Oslo failed because of the Palestinians. The reality is, even if the Israeli media wanted to support the peace talks and change the public opinion towards it, which happened to some extent in the early stages of Oslo, the Israeli media dug its own grave in a sense. The frames they shaped throughout the conflict alongside the political narrative they adopted blindly are the reasons why the public saw their attempts to change it as unpatriotic. From the very first stages of the Zionist migration to Palestine, the media was an active narrator in the conflict. All the frames they narrated were negative towards the Palestinians and the media throughout the conflict always showed these violent people as they attempted to take 'us' out of this land, to throw 'us' into the sea. Those 'barbarians' will never stop until they achieve that. Oslo, according to (Manusov & Milstein, 2005), was a surprise to the media as well as the Israeli public. As the Oslo Accords began, a movement of limited change in Israeli media followed, but these changes by the media were even more of a surprise to the Israeli public than the accords themselves. Despite them being small, these changes presented a new voice that had never been heard before, and as such was rejected by the readers. Even if that change needed time to solidify its existence and improve, it never got the chance. The Oslo period did not last long as it was followed immediately by the Second Intifada.

This violent outbreak was to many Israeli journalists and readers the evidence for all the frames and narratives that existed before and after Oslo. After all, the PLO was put under the test during the Oslo talks. They, according to the Israeli media and government, were put under a test to achieve real peace. Before the outbreak of the Second Intifada, the actions and statements of the PLO and Arafat were continuously analyzed by the government, media, and the public under this premise. With every violent confrontation, they were held responsible while their actions and statements were explained under the premise of them not being serious about peace, and that they have a 'master' plan to destroy Israel. To accomplish this plan they needed to be inside Palestine and as such agreed to enter peace negotiations. This was a narrative that the Israeli media adopted and emphasized wholeheartedly based on the analysis of the 60 articles as well as the interviews conducted. This narrative included Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza as they were the active conductors of the violence Arafat and the PA Leadership ordered to push the Israeli government against the wall to achieve what they (the Palestinian leadership) wanted. Even the Palestinians inside were considered participants in the conflict and this plan. The majority of their appearances in Israeli media were related to their aim to create a 'disorder' on the internal front, especially during the Second Intifada. Thus placing the Palestinians in all three groups as direct conductors of violence against Israel. This resulted in placing the Israeli government into the frame of fighting against the injustice, terror, and underhanded methods of the Palestinians. In this sense, it became a hero that fights against the villain. A villain that consists of the whole population of Palestinians and was linked to the Nazis and the Holocaust, which is considered one of the biggest injustices and darkest chapters in Jewish history and shared memory. This villain exists in every Palestinian that is born

or is yet to be born. This becomes apparent in the emphasis of the Israeli government on the demographic aspect of the conflict (A. Abuarqob, personal communication, 2021). Especially when it comes to Palestinians inside Israel since they are considered part of the Israeli citizenship. The demographic dimension was and still is considered one of the important aspects to achieve superiority. The more Palestinians that exist inside Israel the more danger they present. That is why the separation policy between the two people began. This policy was first applied to the Palestinians inside Israel in the form of military rule from 1948 up until 1966. This rule limited their rights as Israeli and placed them in what can be considered a state within a state. The official role of this military rule was to safeguard the national security of Israel. When considering that it was only enforced in areas the Palestinians in Israel lived in, it can be seen how they were considered a national-level security threat. The Military Rule's main objective was to produce a system of complete control, dependency, monitoring, isolation, and exploitation of the Palestinians inside Israel. They were not allowed to participate in elections, move freely, or own property. After 10 years of the military rule removal in 1966, the first Land Day happened as a protest against land expropriation in Palestinian areas. The land day coverage was discussed in chapter 2 of this thesis. Nonetheless, this policy of separation existed in all of the political, geographical, and media dimensions of the conflict. It did not stop when the military rule was removed and instead was continued in different forms and against a different group of Palestinians. After the first Intifada, physical restrictions of movement began on the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza fully manifested itself with the construction of the separation wall around areas controlled by the Palestinian Authority (N. Jamhor, personal communication, 2021). This is of importance to the framing of Palestinians, as they were considered so

big of a threat for the Israeli government to build separation walls around them at least that is how it was framed during the Second Intifada. This policy as mentioned did not only exist on the physical level but was also reflected on other dimensions like the political, historical, economical, and discourse levels. As such, it is obvious that any policy in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict affects the media frames and the stereotypes held by the public. In other words, it can be considered that the frames in the media reflect the policy of the Israeli government during Oslo up to the Second Intifada.

4. Conclusion

This work aims to find if Oslo had an effect on the framing of the three Palestinian groups in English-written Israeli media based on Galtung's (1990) 'violence' and 'peace' triangles. To achieve this, measures of Galtung's 'violence' and 'peace' levels were applied to the 'frame' and 'content' analysis of the three Palestinian groups before and after Oslo in the selected three newspapers. Six framing dimensions were analyzed based on Liebes & Kampf, (2009) findings which are excising, salience, depersonalization, demonization, equalization of power, and decontextualization. While this study is limited by the unavailability of articles before Oslo, the interviews conducted alongside the analysis of the findings of previous research provide a valuable look at the framing of the three Palestinian groups before Oslo. Contrary to researchers who found that a positive change happened in the framing of Palestinians in Israeli media after Oslo and the second intifada, the degree and nature of this change are questionable. The findings of this analysis demonstrate several changes in the framing of the three Palestinian groups after Oslo. However, those changes were not completely positive. So, what do these findings indicate from a broader perspective?

In terms of research, the results of this thesis strengthen previous findings that news media tends to reflect the general census of the public as well as the political system during a conflict. This is evident throughout the different periods of the conflict from the days of the Zionist movement to this very day. Similarly, the findings indicate that the Israeli media tended to increase the personalization levels of the Palestinian Leadership at the expense of civilians after Oslo. The civilian frame was almost completely removed from the framing of Palestinians in Israeli media. Instead, the

majority of the articles represented Palestinians as part of an angry riot. Another interesting result is the fact that the Israeli media linked all of the three groups into a similar category even though the Israeli media differentiated the labeling of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza from Palestinians in Israel by using the term 'Arab' for the latter. In This sense, the framing of all the Palestinian groups in Israeli media became merged and worse after the failure of Oslo and the outbreak of the second Intifada. As for the reason for such separation in terminology between Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, it can be argued that Israel did not want to admit that they are Palestinians for political, cultural, and historical reasons. If Israel admits that they are Palestinians then that means that Israel admits they existed long before the Zionist movement. In this sense, by admitting that they are Palestinians Israel admits that it lied in its narrative and that it is an occupation. This of course has significant implications on different levels. From a historical point of view, this means that the Palestinians existed before the Zionist movement and as such the narrative that was used from the beginning of the conflict (A land without people to a people without a land) was a lie. This of course applies to both Palestinians inside Israel and Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. However, since Oslo, Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza were, according to the Israeli narrative, given a state of their own, and as such admitting that they are Palestinians instead of 'Arab' does not create problems for Israel. When it comes to Palestinians inside Israel, it is a different story, especially on the political level. If Israel admits that they are Palestinians, then it admits that it removed a great majority of them from their homes and lands and that means they have the right to return to it. Another aspect, in that case, is that they have the right to create marriage relations with their Palestinian counterparts in the West Bank and Gaza. Even though this was allowed

before Oslo, after Oslo, and especially after the Second Intifada, many complications were created to reduce the marriage between the two sides. This of course reduces the integration and connection between the two sides and creates a separation from a cultural point of view. These complications for marriage between the two groups can also be considered a way to reduce the demographic threat of Palestinians. In other words, this separation also aims to reduce the amount of Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza that can enter Israel or hold Israeli citizenship through marriage. However, it is important to note that marriage between the two groups is not impossible but it is not an easy process especially when it comes to gaining Israeli citizenship. Of course, there is the identity aspect as well. The differentiation in terminology can be seen as a way to separate the identity of Palestinians inside Israel from that of the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. However, the link between the two groups still exists in terms of framing and stereotypes. Palestinians inside Israel are considered to be of the same Identity as Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza by the Israeli and political systems and as such, they are seen to be a similar 'threat' to the existence of Israel. In this sense, the Identity of Palestinians inside Israel is linked to the other Palestinian group mentally but not on an official level since that will create complications for Israel. Lastly, from a research perspective, the Oslo accords as discussed earlier failed to create a significant change in terms of the position of Palestinian framing in Israeli media. As such, Israeli media can still be considered as 'war media' instead of 'peace media'. This shows that the media tends to remain in the same dimensions of 'violence' despite the existence of a peace process. This is even truer because the conditions and peace suggested by the Israeli side in Oslo were disadvantageous for the Palestinians. That kind of peace will not last for long and the

Israeli side knew this yet they did not change how they dealt with the peace process. As such, it can be argued that Oslo in many ways was a trap for Palestinians to enter the unending cycle of peace negotiations. Since the Israeli media is considered an extension of the Israeli security establishment, it can be argued that the media played a role in creating, maintaining, or at least preparing the public for the failure of Oslo. These aspects play a role in changing the overall context of the conflict as well as the framing of the 'self' in the media after Oslo. Even though this research is not focused on the conflict in general or the Israeli framing of 'self', the following notes are of importance, especially in terms of the relationship between politics and media. Firstly, Palestinian 'violence' during the Oslo years allowed the Israeli government and media into framing the restriction of movement, which is a 'structural violence' in Galtung's theory, as a reaction to the Palestinian 'violence'. This appeared in the following "whoever speaks of closures as hurting the Palestinian economy does not focus on the real issue, and has to take into account the number of lives saved by this measure" (Kuttler, Hillel (US pledges to give Palestinians \$400m.)*The Jerusalem Post*, December 1, 1998). In this sense, even before the outbreak of the second intifada the closure policy was framed as a reaction to Palestinian 'violence'. Following the outbreak of the second Intifada, however, according to the interviews conducted that "Israel was seeking this endeavor [separation], but later discovered this endeavor, if it is not accompanied by the construction of physical walls, it will not lead to any result." (M. Musa, personal communication, 2021). This realization resulted in the construction of the separation wall during the Second Intifada. Thus changing the frame of constructing the separation wall from a part of the overall separation policy that existed before Oslo into a reaction to the Palestinian 'violence' after Oslo and the outbreak of the Second Intifada.

Secondly, the fact that the second Intifada gave the Israeli government an excuse to create a physical barrier (the wall), and the fact that Oslo delegated the civil authorities to Palestinians resulted in a separation between the realities of Israelis and Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza. Thus rendering the occupation to be a nonexistent problem, especially for the generations that came after the second Intifada. Since there is no feeling of direct 'occupation' or 'violence', this allows Israelis to feel better about themselves. This separation of reality resulted in creating less interest in the conflict in general and created a belief among Israelis that the Palestinians got their independence. Henceforth, any form of 'violence' by the Palestinians is considered a 'terror' act and places Israel further into the dimension of 'victimization'. In this sense, the narrative of 'self-defense' is further enhanced by the failure of Oslo and the outbreak of the Second Intifada, while Palestinians got their state according to the Israeli narrative. In other words, Palestinians have no reason to be violent since they are not under direct occupation and have a geographical area of their own. This allowed for the identification of Israeli 'violence' as a 'legitimized' reaction to any 'violent' acts conducted by the Palestinians. This in a sense is a form of 'cultural violence' since it results in legitimizing any form of Israeli 'violence' against Palestinians. Finally, the framing of the peace process itself is of interest. While according to researchers like (Entman, 1993) the media tends to remove or reduce peace talks during a conflict, the Israeli media instead had a significant amount of articles discussing the peace talks. However, those articles were usually used to position the Israeli leadership in a positive frame of them doing everything and offering everything to achieve peace while placing Palestinians and their Leadership into being unserious about peace. This framing for the peace process can be linked to the fact that the peace process was adopted or managed

by the US and to some extent that put the Israeli government and media into a position where they had to show that they are serious about the peace process. Another reason can be the strong ties Israel has with the US and Europe. In terms of media, Israeli media is widely more accepted and referred to than Palestinian media and this may result in an attempt to show themselves in a more positive image for the Western public to gain more support. Lastly, this kind of framing allows for the removal of guilt from the Israeli side and blame shifting the failure of Oslo onto the Palestinians. In this sense, the Israeli side holds no responsibility for the failure of Oslo, and all of the blame is directed against Palestinians who were never serious about peace and agreed to the negotiations because they had a plot to destroy Israel and needed to enter Palestine.

In terms of differences between the three newspapers, it is important to mention that *Haaretz*, according to the interviews and the results of the analysis, was the only outlet that gave the Palestinians' a stage to present their voice in a more positive frame when compared to the other two newspapers. However, this is extremely limited and depended on the identity of the journalists, both before and after Oslo as well as being limited in specific aspects of the framing dimensions. Israeli media in general negatively represented the Palestinians and mostly got their information and sources from the Israeli political and military institutions. This of course was a result of two factors. First, the identity of the journalist plays a role in the extent of positive framing they use. Leftist Journalists tended to be more objective in their representations of Palestinians. Nonetheless, the percentage of such reporters is extremely limited and insignificant when compared to those of the right-wing, or mainstream media. The second limitation is the fact that Israeli media has military supervision. This means that especially during intense events, Israeli media is committed to the narrative of the

security institution. All of the Palestinian Journalists that were interviewed emphasized this point “The Israeli media is a war media, meaning if you look at it in all its dimensions at the time of war, first it is completely subject to Israeli military oversight, and therefore it implements a policy on the battlefield.” (Sh. Jabareen, personal communication, 2021).

Moreover, the findings of this research, in terms of Israeli media, show that the Israeli media continues to lend itself extremely to Galtung’s violence triangle and war journalism. Whether before or after Oslo, the Israeli media functioned as part of the military and political establishments and the Zionist project. Henceforth, the Israeli media failed to change into ‘peace media’ as a result of the Oslo peace process. While some rare exceptions appeared by an extremely limited number of articles or journalists, these instances are not enough to be considered a phenomenon in Israeli media. The majority of the mainstream media until this day continue to hold the security mentality when dealing with reports about Palestinians. This is evident in the following points. Firstly, the Israeli media before Oslo adopted the military narrative almost completely and was self-committed to military censorship. According to Nehro Jamhor in his interview, he explained “the only media experience that requested the presence of a censor is Israel. In its establishment, in 1948, they established the office of newspaper editors. [...]The media requested that this office be with a military sergeant so that there would be an encryption process for the information.” (N. Jamhor, personal communication, 2021). Secondly, this adoption of the military narrative continued during and after Oslo until today. This is evident from the 60 articles analyzed in this research. As shown in the analysis previously, Israeli media played a negative role during the Oslo years and the peace process of Oslo did not bring a significant change

in the framing of the three Palestinian groups. Instead, it re-emphasized all of the previous negative frames about Palestinians that existed before Oslo and presented new and worse frames than before Oslo. While the frequency of appearance and personalization of the Palestinian leadership increased, their frames only became worse with time as the Israeli media inserted the narrative of accepting peace to enter Palestine and destroy Israel. The Israeli media continuously reminded the readers of the 'Israeli blood' on the hands of the Palestinian leadership. Similarly, Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza also had negative frames and were linked to 'violence' in the majority of the articles. This is especially important after the outbreak of the Second Intifada. With the outbreak of the Second Intifada, the frame of the 'violent', 'evil' people became permanently linked to all Palestinians, and no separation was made between civilians and conductors of 'violence'. In other words, all Palestinians are considered a 'threat' and represented as such in the mainstream Israeli media. This framing also included Palestinians inside Israel as they took part in the Second Intifada. As a result, the frame of Palestinians inside Israel being a 'threat' from the inside became a reality according to the Israeli narrative. Thirdly, this type of coverage is even more emphasized when compared to the coverage of Israeli internal matters or 'violence' or 'terror' against Palestinians and 'victims' from both sides. While this research is not focused on this comparison, the following points are of importance regarding this aspect. The Israeli media in terms of internal matters that relate to Jewish provides a big space for criticism or dialogue and is more professional in reporting about such matters. In terms of events that are related to Palestinian terror, more details were usually given about Israeli 'victims' whether those 'victims' were civilians or military personnel. While reading throughout the articles during the analysis for this research, full articles

were found talking about Israeli ‘victims’ for both civilians and soldiers, with some being memorials for specific events that happened years before the dates of the articles. The number of details usually given in those articles consisted of the names, family reactions, how the event occurred, and even political reactions. The reason for those events was usually framed under the ‘terror’ frame and terms like ‘terrorists’ and ‘jihadists’ were usually used to describe the Palestinians that conducted the ‘violence’. This indicates that a different mentality is used when covering Israeli ‘victims’ When compared to Palestinian ‘victims’ that were usually left unknown and an explanation that falls under the ‘self-defense’ frame was usually provided for why those events occurred. Even the events themselves were labeled differently, events from the Israeli side were usually called ‘military operations’, ‘self-defense’ or ‘attack on terror’ while events from the Palestinian side were usually labeled as ‘terror attacks’, ‘riots’, ‘security threat’ and ‘sabotage’. In cases of extreme ‘violence’ by the Israelis where the Israeli media was unable to use the ‘self-defense’ frame to cover for the Israeli that conducted ‘violence’, other reasons were usually given for such acts. Those explanations usually fall under ‘mentally ill’ or ‘psychologically unstable’. Another interesting point regarding the framing of ‘in-group terrorists’ was found by Samuel-Azran et al. (2015). In his research, he found that when a Jewish Israeli citizen conducted an act of ‘terror’ against a Palestinian inside Israel, the identity of the victims was usually removed from the discourse. Instead, the victim is usually represented as an Israeli citizen; however, in this case, fewer details are usually given when compared to a Jewish victim. Fourthly, after Oslo and especially after the outbreak of the Second Intifada and the September 11 events, Israeli media began to use terms like ‘Jihadists’ and link Palestinian ‘terror’ to that of Al-Qaeda and ‘Islamic extremism’. This link was emphasized by both the

political levels, especially by Ariel Sharon and the Israeli media. Comparisons between Arafat and Bin Laden and New York with Israel usually appeared during the Second Intifada in Israeli media. Fifthly, while this link existed, it similarly created a differentiation between the PA and Fatah from the Islamist factions like Hamas and the Islamic Jihad. This separation however did not mean that either one was seen positively. Arafat was compared with Bin Laden and similarly, Hamas and the Islamic Jihad members were compared to Al-Qaeda. Nonetheless, the term 'Jihadist' was almost exclusively used concerning Hamas and the Islamic Jihad. Sixthly, even though this separation did not indicate a more positive framing for either side, a focus on the conflicts between the two sides was usually apparent. These conflicts were usually covered in a detailed way and went as far as providing a history of the conflict as well as providing reactions from civilians or both sides. This focus can be attributed to one or more of the following reasons. First, the desire of the Israeli media to show that the Palestinian internal front is weak and divided. Second, the Palestinians do not understand the concept of peace and cannot achieve it even among themselves. As such, they cannot be trusted when it comes to creating peace with Israel. Third, an attempt to intensify these conflicts, especially since most of these conflicts were related to the different opinions of the two sides regarding the continuation of the negotiations with Israel. In other words, the peace process was one of the reasons that those conflicts among Palestinians existed. Seventhly, as argued earlier in this section, one of the results of the Oslo accords was the removal of the burden of occupation from Israel since it delegated the civil authorities to Palestinians as well as the construction of the separation wall resulted in a separation of reality. As such, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict became alienated and separated from the daily lives of the Israeli public. This

result is of importance since the reduction of the significance of the conflict allows the Israeli media to reduce the focus on the conflict in its reports. In other words, since the separation of the conflict both authoritatively and physically results in it being irrelevant to the daily lives of the public this resulted in it being irrelevant to the media as well. If people are not interested and are not affected by the conflict then they are not interested in reading about it. Eighthly, this lack of interest in the conflict by the Israeli public relates to the next dimension, which is the economical dimension. Newspapers are corporations in the end and they require income and profit to continue functioning and growing. As such, it is not economically beneficial to them to spend money on reporters and articles that their readers are not interested in reading. This is even truer when looking at how the Israeli public sees the Palestinians. The majority of Israelis see Palestinians in negative stereotypes and consider them to be 'violent' and a 'threat'. Based on those views, any positive framing of Palestinians by the media will be seen as an insult to the Israelis. Especially since the narrative provided by the Israeli media and culture allows the public to see itself as righteous and a victim. If the media provides such positive frames for the Palestinians then that platform will lose readers and as a result, will lose income. This is evident in the protests against *Haaretz* during the second Intifada as a reaction to specific reports about Palestinians. As such, the interest of the chief editors and journalists from an economical point of view does not lend itself to going against the census of their readers. Ninthly, the economical perspective is not the only reason for this commitment. The majority of Journalists in Israeli media are Jewish and as such, they hold similar views to that of the public. Moreover, when considering that the majority of them are of security and military background it becomes more apparent that their work is a reflection of the security institution and any

journalist who is not part of this background or does not fall under the census is usually placed under pressure (Barak & Sheffer, 2006). Lastly, the framing of the conflict plays a significant role in linking all those aspects together. The conflict itself is usually presented in a way that positions Israel as the 'victim' and Palestinians as the 'criminals'. The conflict is usually framed as part of an eternal war against the Jews who returned to their homeland according to the Israeli narrative. This threat does not only originate from Palestinians who live inside Palestine. Instead, all the Palestinians in the world are actively fighting against Jewish existence. Moreover, the surrounding Arab and Islamic countries were part of this threat. This is extremely effective in creating a 'victimization' by the Israeli media. According to this narrative, Israel exists in an ocean of hostility and it is fighting for its existence on the front lines against 'Islamic terror' that shook the whole world after September 11. This desire for the Palestinians and Arabs alike to remove Israel from the Middle East is usually linked to the genocidal desires of Hitler and the Nazis. In other words, when looking at the Zionist narrative and current Israeli narratives, it can be argued that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is only one stage of an existential battle for the Jews against the world. As such, Israel is always the 'victim' based on its narrative and is fighting against everyone. Of course, they admit that they have allies like the US but the threat to their existence always existed throughout history. The only difference between the different periods is who is fighting against their existence. Moreover, when looking at the framing of the conflict from an identity perspective. According to the Israeli narrative, this conflict only exists because their identity is Jewish. If they had a different identity, they would not have had to suffer all of those conflicts and wars. Whether this identity

is considered a nationality, ethnicity, or religion, the conflict is nonetheless framed as a war against the Jewish identity.

All those aspects indicate a significant role of the Israeli media in the conflict. However, it is important to note that the Israeli media is only a part of the overall tools utilized by the Zionist movement and the Israeli government. Other tools like educational curriculums, movies, literature, and religious institutions among others play a similarly significant role in the overall narrative and conflict. However, since this research is only focused on Israeli media the focus here will only be on this tool. The role of the Israeli media can be summed up in the following points. Firstly, the Israeli media is part of the overall tools that maintain and spread the Israeli narrative. Its main function in this sense is to strengthen the Israeli narrative as well as spread new aspects both locally and internationally. That is why there are no significant changes in the framing of Palestinians or the conflict from the early stages of the Zionist movement until today. It still functions as a continuation of that project and that narrative which was the building block for the Zionist project in Palestine. Secondly, the Israeli media plays a role in managing the conflict to some extent. One of the main aspects that help the media manage the conflict is its influence on public opinion. Throughout the conflict, the Israeli media almost always represented, adopted, and defended the political institution and its policies. Providing excuses for various decisions or providing arguments that increase the favorability of such decisions are some of the methods used to convince the public that those decisions are correct “The media practically prepares public opinion for any policies. [...] All of this prepared the Israeli public opinion to accept it, and considered that this means the right of self-defense” (I. Manssor, personal communication, 2021). Part of the reason for this influence is to

maintain a public census as it reduces pressure on the government, especially during intensified periods of conflict. In doing this, the media allows the government to focus on the conflict instead of the internal front. However, its role does not stop at these periods. After the intensified periods end, another important role of the media in the conflict is to achieve what is called the 'image of victory' (N. Jamhor, personal communication, 2021). This concept is of importance to the Israeli public for the following reasons. First, it helps achieve satisfaction for the Israeli public since victory was achieved. In other words, it helps them feel good about themselves. Second, it shows that they are no longer weak and that they need protection and they can fight for themselves. This is of course linked to the narrative of the Holocaust and how one of the reasons Jews suffered like that is because they could not protect themselves and were weak. As such, the image of victory becomes of extreme importance to them since it shows that they are now able to protect themselves. Third, that image of victory becomes embedded in the public memory as part of the overall Jewish struggle and the threat the 'enemy' poses to their existence. Of course, the image of victory does not only play a role in the Israeli public domain. It similarly functions as part of the last function for the Israeli media, which is psychological warfare against Palestinians. Achieving the image of victory is usually accompanied by an attempt to burn the image of defeat in the Palestinian memory. An example of this is the Second Intifada and the Lebanese war. In the Lebanon war, this attempt failed as the majority of the Palestinian public considered it a win for the PLO to be able to last that long against the Israeli army (M. Musa, personal communication, 2021). However, to some extent 'image of defeat' was successfully achieved after the Second Intifada.

Bibliography

Primary Sources

Haaretz

Alon, Gideon and Benn, Aluf (Netanyahu: Israel's Arabs Are the Real Demographic Threat) *Haaretz*. 18 December 2003.

Benvenisti, Meron (The Binational Option) *Haaretz*. 7 November 2002.

Eldar, Akiva (The Arafat-bin Laden Equation Won't Stick) *Haaretz*. 24 September 2000.

Eldar, Akiva (The Peace That Nearly Was at Taba) *Haaretz*. 14 February 2002.

Ettinger, Yair (Deir Yassin Massacre, 55 Years On) *Haaretz*. 10 April 2003.

Haaretz (Humiliation at the Checkpoints) *Haaretz*. 8 July 2003.

Haaretz (Justice for Ikrit and Biram) *Haaretz*. 11 October 2001.

Hass, Amira (Palestinian Unemployment Up to 45%; 366,000 Now Out of Work) *Haaretz*. 22 August 2002.

Kra, Baruch (Signs in Jewish-Arab Cities Must Be Bilingual, Court Rules) *Haaretz*. 26 July 2002.

Pedatzur, Reuven (More Than a Million Bullets) *Haaretz*. 29 June 2004.

Rubinstein, Danny (The Fine Line Between Shahid and Suicide) *Haaretz*. 27 August 2001.

Shadmi, Haim and Ratner, David. (14 Killed, 39 Hurt in Suicide Bombing in Haifa Restaurant) *Haaretz*. 31 March 2002.

Shavit, Uriya (Out of Jordan) *Haaretz*. 10 April 2002.

The Jerusalem Post

Bushinsky Jay, Collins, Liat and O'Sullivan, Arieh (Map won't be ready for Albright)

The Jerusalem Post, December 10, 1997).

Dudkevitch, Margot (Clashes continue in Hebron) *The Jerusalem Post*. 11 April 1997.

Dudkevitch, Margot (Five Palestinians killed, Israeli baby wounded in unrest) *The Jerusalem Post*. 3 December 2000.

Dudkevitch, Margot and news agencies (PA, Fatah, Hamas vow to step up intifada) *The Jerusalem Post*. 3 December 2000.

Immanuel, Jon and news agencies (Netanyahu credits PA with helping find Edri) *The Jerusalem Post*. 11 April 1997.

Immanuel, Jon and news agencies (PA cabinet warns of mass confrontation over settlements) *The Jerusalem Post*. 15 June 1997.

Jerusalem Post Internet Staff (Two IDF soldiers stabbed north of Jerusalem) *The Jerusalem Post*. 3 December 2000.

Kuttler, Hillel and news agencies (Netanyahu to meet Clinton next week) *The Jerusalem Post*, April 2, 1997)

Lynfield, Ben (A virtual state in the making) *The Jerusalem Post*. 26 April 1999.

Shapiro, Haim (Israel: PA assault on monastery violated Oslo Accords) *The Jerusalem Post*. 10 July 1997.

Yediot Aharonot

Ben-Yishai, Ron (The Hamas is Guilty, Arafat is Responsible) *Yediot Aharonot*. 31 July 1997.

Mashur, Lutfi (The year of the Great War) *Yediot Aharonot*. 16 September 2001.

Rofa, Sharon (Suddenly, Dead Arabs interests you) *Yediot Aharonot*. 19 September 2001.

Shaked, Roni (The Palestinian GSS Also Operates in the Heart of Western Jerusalem) *Yediot Aharonot*. 26 June 1998.

Somfalvi, Attila and news agencies (Arafat to Israelis: I ordered a ceasefire commitment) *Yediot Aharonot*. 17 September 2001.

Waked, Ali (Jenin: A sharp confrontation between the PA and jihad) *Yediot Aharonot*. 14 November 2001.

Waked, Ali (Palestinians celebrated the attack in Ramallah) *Yediot Aharonot*. 2 June 2001.

Secondary Sources

Books and scientific articles

Alimi, E. (2007). *Israeli Politics and the First Palestinian Intifada* (0 ed.). Routledge.
<https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203961261>

Amara, M. (2016). Language, Identity and Conflict: Examining Collective Identity through the Labels of the Palestinians in Israel. *Journal of Holy Land and Palestine Studies*, 15(2), 203–223. <https://doi.org/10.3366/hlps.2016.0141>

Auerbach, Y., & Ben-Yehuda, H. (1987). Attitudes towards an existence conflict: Begin and Dayan on the Palestinian issue*. *International Interactions*, 13(4), 323–351.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/03050628708434682>

Avraham, E., & First, A. (2010). Combining the representation approach with the framing concept: Television news coverage of the Arab population in Israel during conflict. *Journalism*, 11(4), 481–499.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/1464884910367594>

- Ayalon, A., Popovich, E., & Yarchi, M. (2016). From Warfare to Imagefare: How States Should Manage Asymmetric Conflicts With Extensive Media Coverage. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 28(2), Article 2. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2014.897622>
- Barak, O., & Sheffer, G. (2006). Israel's "Security Network" and Its Impact: An Exploration of a New Approach. *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 38(2), 235–261.
- Bar-Tal, D. (1998). Societal beliefs in times of intractable conflict: The Israeli case. *International Journal of Conflict Management*.
- Bar-Tal, D., & Labin, D. (2001). The effect of a major event on stereotyping: Terrorist attacks in Israel and Israeli adolescents' perceptions of Palestinians, Jordanians and Arabs. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 31(3), 265–280. <https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.43>
- Barzilai, G. (1996). *Wars, internal conflicts, and political order: A Jewish democracy in the Middle East*. State University of New York Press.
- Dixon, T. L., & Azocar, C. L. (2007). Priming crime and activating blackness: Understanding the psychological impact of the overrepresentation of blacks as lawbreakers on television news. *Journal of Communication*, 57(2), 229–253.
- Dor, D. (2004). *Intifada hits the headlines: How the Israeli press misreported the outbreak of the second Palestinian uprising*. Indiana University.
- Dunwoody, S., & Peters, H. P. (1992). Mass media coverage of technological and environmental risks: A survey of research in the United States and Germany. *Public Understanding of Science*, 1(2), 199–230. <https://doi.org/10.1088/0963-6625/1/2/004>

- Entman, R. M. (1993). *Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm*. 10.
- First, A. (1998). Who is the Enemy?: The Portrayal of Arabs in Israeli Television News. *Gazette (Leiden, Netherlands)*, 60(3), 239–251. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0016549298060003003>
- First, A. (2002). The Fluid Nature of Representation: Transformations in the Representation of Arabs in Israeli Television News. *Howard Journal of Communications*, 13(2), 173–190. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10646170290089944>
- Galtung, J. (1969). Violence, Peace, and Peace Research. *Journal of Peace Research*, 6(3), 167–191.
- Galtung, J. (1990). Cultural Violence. *Journal of Peace Research*, 27(3), 291–305. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343390027003005>
- Gorni, Y. (1980). Attitudes to Arab-Jewish confrontation as reflected in the Hebrew press: 1900–1918. *Studies in Zionism*, 1(1), 47–81. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13531048008575781>
- Gorni, Y. (1987). *Zionism and the Arabs, 1882-1948: A study of ideology*. Clarendon Press ; Oxford University Press.
- Handley, R. L. (2009). THE CONFLICTING ISRAELI-TERRORIST IMAGE: Managing the Israeli–Palestinian narrative in the *New York Times* and *Washington Post*. *Journalism Practice*, 3(3), 251–267. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17512780902798711>
- Hilton, J. L., & Von Hippel, W. (1996). Stereotypes. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 47(1), 237–271.

- Iyengar, S., & Simon, A. (1993). News Coverage of the Gulf Crisis and Public Opinion: A Study of Agenda-Setting, Priming, and Framing. *Communication Research*, 20(3), 365–383. <https://doi.org/10.1177/009365093020003002>
- Kampf, Z. (2006). Blood on their hands: The story of a photograph in the Israeli national discourse. *Semiotica*, 2006(162). <https://doi.org/10.1515/SEM.2006.080>
- Liebes, T. (1992). Our war/their war: Comparing the *intifadeh* and the gulf war on U.S. and Israeli television. *Critical Studies in Mass Communication*, 9(1), 44–55. <https://doi.org/10.1080/15295039209366814>
- Liebes, T., & Kampf, Z. (2009). Black and White and Shades of Gray: Palestinians in the Israeli Media During the 2nd Intifada. *The International Journal of Press/Politics*, 14(4), 434–453. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1940161209336226>
- Liebes, T., Kampf, Z., & Blum-Kulka, S. (2008). Saddam on CBS and Arafat on IBA Interviewing the Enemy on Television. *Political Communication*, 25(3), 311–329. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10584600802197590>
- Lowenstein-Barkai, H. (2021). Changing media representations of enemy leaders: A comparison between the Israeli–Palestinian and the Northern Ireland conflicts. *Journalism*, 22(6), 1484–1502. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1464884918816227>
- Mandelzisz, L. (2003). *The changing image of the enemy in the news discourse of Israeli newspapers, 1993-1994*. 2(1), 12.
- Manusov, V., & Milstein, T. (2005). Interpreting Nonverbal Behavior: Representation and Transformation Frames in Israeli and Palestinian Media Coverage of the 1993 Rabin–Arafat Handshake. *Western Journal of Communication*, 69(3), 183–201. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10570310500202322>

- Morris, B. (1996). Israeli Press on the Qibya Affair, October-November 1953. *Theory and Criticism*, 8, 33–46.
- Nossek, H. (1994). The narrative role of the Holocaust and the State of Israel in the coverage of salient terrorist events in the Israeli press. *Journal of Narrative and Life History*, 4(1–2), 119–134.
- Oren, N., & Bar-Tal, D. (2007). The detrimental dynamics of delegitimization in intractable conflicts: The Israeli–Palestinian case. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 31(1), 111–126.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijintrel.2006.07.003>
- Pan, Z., & Kosicki, G. (1993). Framing analysis: An approach to news discourse. *Political Communication*, 10(1), 55–75.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.1993.9962963>
- Peper, M. (2018). *Peper, M. (2018). The visual representation of civilians in images of the Israel-Palestine conflict in Israeli media..pdf* [Eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis]. <http://hdl.handle.net/10230/36079>
- Peres, Y., & Levy, Z. (1969). Jews and Arabs: Ethnic Group Stereotypes in Israel. *Race*, 10(4), 479–492. <https://doi.org/10.1177/030639686901000405>
- Perkins, T. E. (2018). Rethinking stereotypes. In *Ideology and cultural production* (pp. 135–159). Routledge.
- Pressman, J. (2017). Throwing stones in social science: Non-violence, unarmed violence, and the first intifada. *Cooperation and Conflict*, 52(4), 519–536.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836717701967>
- Reinharz, J. (1993). *Chaim Weizmann: The making of a statesman* (Vol. 2). Oxford University Press, USA.

- Roeh, Y., & Nir, R. (1990). Covering the intifada in the Israeli press: Popular and quality papers assume rhetoric of conformity. *Discourse and Society*, 3, 22–36.
- Samuel-Azran, T., Lavie-Dinur, A., & Karniel, Y. (2015). Narratives used to portray in-group terrorists: A comparative analysis of the Israeli and Norwegian press. *Media, War & Conflict*, 8(1), 3–19. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1750635214531106>
- Scheufele, D. A. (1999). Framing as a Theory of Media Effects. *Journal of Communication*, 49(1), 103–122. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.1999.tb02784.x>
- Seiter, E. (1986). Stereotypes and the media: A re-evaluation. *Journal of Communication*, 36(2), 14–26.
- Shaw, M., & Zárate, M. A. (2007). Stereotypes and Prejudice in Conflict: Representations of Arabs in Israeli Jewish Society? By Daniel Bar-Tal and Yona Teichman. *Political Psychology*, 28(3), 375–378. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2007.00574.x>
- Shor, E. (2008). Contested Masculinities: The New Jew and the Construction of Black and Palestinian Athletes in Israeli Media. *Journal of Sport and Social Issues*, 32(3), 255–277. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0193723508316376>
- Tenenboim-Weinblatt, K., Hanitzsch, T., & Nagar, R. (2016). Beyond peace journalism: Reclassifying conflict narratives in the Israeli news media. *Journal of Peace Research*, 53(2), 151–165. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343315609091>
- Wolfsfeld, G., Avraham, E., & Aburaiya, I. (2000). When prophesy always fails: Israeli press coverage of the Arab minority's Land Day protests. *Political Communication*, 17(2), 115–131.

- Wolfsfeld, G., Frosh, P., & Awabdy, M. T. (2008). Covering Death in Conflicts: Coverage of the Second Intifada on Israeli and Palestinian Television. *Journal of Peace Research*, 45(3), 401–417. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343308088818>
- Yehuda, H. A.-B., & Auerbach, Y. (1991). Attitudes to an Existence Conflict: Allon and Peres on the Palestinian Issue, 1967-1987. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 35(3), 519–546.

Appendixes

Appendix A: Interview Questions

- 1- How was the Palestinian leadership framed before Oslo? And what are the most common framing methods used to describe Palestinian leadership?
- 2- How were Palestinians from the west bank and Gaza framed before Oslo? and what are the most common framing methods used to describe them?
- 3- How were Palestinians in Israel framed before Oslo? and what are the most common methods used to describe them?
- 4- Is there a difference between framing Palestinians and Israelis before Oslo? If yes, what is the difference between them?
- 5- What are the most common terms used to describe Palestinians of the three groups mentioned above before and after Oslo?
- 6- After Oslo until the year 2000, has any change occurred in the framing of three Palestinian groups?
- 7- If yes, what are those changes? and why did they happen?
- 8- After the second intifada started, did a change occur in the framing of the three Palestinian groups? Or did the framing methods used after Oslo continue?
- 9- What are the frames used to describe the three Palestinian groups after the start of the second intifada?
- 10- Did Palestinians in Israel get included in the frames of the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza?
- 11- According to Israeli media, what are the usual or most common causes for Palestinians to commit acts of “violence” or “terror”?

12- Is there any comparison between those causes between Palestinians and Israelis?

Alternatively, does Israeli media try to give reasonable causes for Israelis to commit acts of violence?

13- What is the capacity for violence represented in Israeli media for the three Palestinian groups during the three stages namely before Oslo, Before the second intifada, and during the second intifada?

14- Is there a difference between describing the identity of Palestinians and Israelis during the three periods?

15- Are there different frames for different groups of Palestinians based on the groups they are identified with?

16- Does the identity of the journalists play a role in the framing process?

17- How did Israeli media present the conflict? In other words, has the conflict as a whole been framed as an economic, political, religious, or an identity conflict?

18- What are the reasons for Israeli media to use such frames in describing Palestinians?

19- Do those frames play a role in defining the nature of the conflict? If yes, what is that role and how does it integrate into the overall narrative of the conflict?

P.S: Interview transcripts will be included in a separate attachment due to the large number of pages.

Appendix B: Coding Manual

Variable	Variable value 1	Variable value 2
Headline		
Publication	(0) Haaretz	
	(1) Yediot Aharonot	
	(2) the Jerusalem Post	
Date		
Violence frame	Does the article contain direct or indirect indications of Palestinian violence?	(0) Yes (1) No
Oslo frame	Does the article contain discussions or present any information about Oslo?	(0) Yes (1) No
The Economy frame	Does the article contain discussions about the economic effects of Palestinian policy or actions on Palestinians or Israelis?	(0) Yes (1) No
Disorder frame	Does the article present Palestinians as instigators of chaos and disorder?	(0) Yes (1) No
	Does the article present Palestinians as emotional and/or chaotic?	(0) Yes (1) No
Unwillingness for peace frame	Does the article present Palestinians as unserious about achieving peace?	(0) Yes (1) No
The dominant frame\s	violence frame	
	Oslo frame	
	The Economy frame	
	Disorder frame	
	Disorder frame	

Blame shifting	Are Palestinians held responsible for the escalation of events?	(0) Yes (1) No
Individualization dimension	Are the Palestinians in the articles addressed by their names?	(0) Yes (1) No
	Are the Palestinians in the article addressed by their political position?	(0) Yes (1) No
Separate labeling between the three groups	Does the article label Palestinians of each group differently than the other groups?	(0)Yes (1) No
Demonizing language	Is there any demonizing language used to describe Palestinians?	(0)Vicious (1) cruel (2) brutal (3) barbaric (4) inhuman (5) tyrant (6) savage (7) ruthless (8) terrorist (9) extremist (10) fanatic (11) Islamist (12) rioting Palestinians (13) scores of Palestinian university students (14) Palestinian gunmen (15) stone-throwing youths (16) A knife-brandishing Palestinian (17) assailant (18) attacker (19) jihadist (20) suicide bomber (21) Fundamentalist (22) others (23) none

Quoted group	Which group of Palestinians is quoted?	(0) Palestinian leadership (1) Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza (2) Palestinians in Israel
Position of the quote	The position of the Palestinian quote in the text?	(0) the beginning (1) the middle (2) the end (3) No quotes
Palestinians as a group	Are Palestinians presented in groups or as individualized?	(0) groups (1) individuals (2) not mentioned
Context	Does the article include anything related to the long-term achievements, nature, causes, and effects of the struggle?	(0) Yes (1) No.
The position of the news piece	The position of the news piece about Palestinians is?	(0) at the beginning (1) at the middle (2) at the end
The size of the article	The size of the article about Palestinians is?	(0) One sentence (1) One paragraph (2) two Paragraphs (3) three or more paragraphs
The period of the article	Which period does the article belong to?	(0) From Oslo to the Second Intifada, 1993-2000 (1) After the Second Intifada, 2000 and forward

المخلص

يشرح هذا البحث نتائج المحتوى النوعي والكمي وتحليل تأطير لـ 60 مقالا بالمجمل عن الفلسطينيين في "هآرتس" و "يديعوت أحرونوت" و "جيروساليم بوست" بعد أوصلو وأثناء الانتفاضة الثانية. يهتم هذا العمل أيضاً بمكان تأطير الفلسطينيين في وسائل الإعلام الإسرائيلية قبل وبعد أوصلو وأثناء الانتفاضة الثانية بناءً على نظرية غالتونغ ل "عنف" و "سلام". انقسم الفلسطينيون إلى ثلاث مجموعات هي القيادة الفلسطينية والفلسطينيون في الضفة الغربية وغزة والفلسطينيون في إسرائيل. بشكل عام، تشير النتائج إلى أن أوصلو فشلت في تحقيق "أطر سلام" للفلسطينيين في الصحف التي تم تحليلها، وأن الإعلام الإسرائيلي بقي ك "إعلام حربي" بعد أوصلو. وأظهرت النتائج ارتفاع وتيرة الظهور والشخصنة للقيادة الفلسطينية. ومع ذلك، كان ظهورهم في إطارات سلبية. بقيت المجموعات الفلسطينية الأخرى مجهولة الهوية في الغالب، وأصبح تأطيرها أسوأ بعد أوصلو. علاوة على ذلك، سمح اندلاع الانتفاضة الثانية لوسائل الإعلام الإسرائيلية بوضع القيادة الفلسطينية في إطار خونة السلام، وأنها استخدمت أوصلو للعودة إلى فلسطين وتدمير إسرائيل. وأدرج الفلسطينيون ككل ضمن أطر وآليات تأطير مماثلة للقيادة الفلسطينية. ومع ذلك، ظل الفلسطينيون في إسرائيل يُصنفون على أنهم "عرب" من حيث المصطلحات بينما كانوا مرتبطين بالفلسطينيين الآخرين في سياقهم. كانت "هآرتس" الأكثر توازناً من حيث تخصيص القيادة الفلسطينية وتكرار ظهور المجموعات الفلسطينية الثلاث. ومع ذلك، تعتبر هذه الاختلافات طفيفة لأن أبعاد الإطارات المتبقية والإطارات متشابهة مع الصحيفتين الأخرين.

الكلمات الرئيسية: الصراع الفلسطيني الإسرائيلي، الصحافة الإسرائيلية، تحليل الإطار، تحليل المحتوى، نظرية غالتونغ "العنف" و "السلام"، أوصلو.