



**Arab American University**

**Faculty of Graduate studies**

**The Impact of the Gulf-Israeli Normalization on the  
Palestinian cause “UAE as a case study”**

**By:**

**AbedAlatife Rasem AbedAlakader**

**Supervisor**

**Dr. Nedal Jayousi**

**This Thesis was submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for Master’s degree in Conflict Resolution**

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**The Impact of the Gulf-Israeli Normalization on the Palestinian cause**  
**“UAE as a case study”**

**By**  
**Abedalatife Rasem AbedAlakader**

**This Thesis was defended successfully on.....25.1.2022..... and approved by:**

**Committee Members**

**Signature**


**1. Supervisor Name**

Dr. Nedal Jayous



**2. Internal Examiner Name**

Dr. Raed Abubadawiq



**3. External Examiner Name**

Dr. Usama Abu Baha



**Declaration**

“I, (Abedatife Rasem Abedalakader), declare that this thesis was submitted in partial fulfillment of the graduation requirements for master degree in conflict resolution/ graduate studies-department of social sciences/Arab American University, Ramallah campus/Palestine. This thesis contains no material that has been submitted previously, in whole or in part, for the award of any other academic degree or diploma. Except where otherwise indicated, this thesis is a conclusion of my own work”

**Student Name:** ..... *AbedAtife Rasem AbedAlakader*

**Signature:** ..... *AbedAtif*

**Date:** ..... *25.1.2022*

### III

#### **Dedication**

This thesis is dedicated to:

My homeland Palestine, the warmest womb;

Jerusalem, the eternal capital of Palestine

The great martyrs and prisoners, the symbol of sacrifice;

The great people of all nations who stand up for Palestinian right of freedom  
and self-determination

My great parents, who never stop giving of themselves in countless ways,

My beloved sisters, who leads me through the valley of darkness with light of  
hope and support, and stands by me when things look bleak,

My friends who encouraged and supported me,

All the people in my life who touch my heart, I dedicate this research to,

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I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my advisor, Dr. Nedal Jayousi, whose sincerity and encouragement I will never forget. He has been an inspiration as I hurdled through the path of this Master's degree. This thesis would not have been possible without him, whose guidance from the initial step in research enabled me to develop an understanding of the subject. I am thankful for the extraordinary experiences he arranged for me and for providing opportunities for me to grow professionally.

I am also grateful for my parents, whose constant love and support keep me motivated and confident. My accomplishments and success are because they believed in me. Deepest thanks to my friends, who keep me grounded, remind me of what is important in life, and are always supportive of my adventures.

## **Abstract**

The historical Arab national classification of Israel as an enemy to the Arab and Islamic States is no more an accurate definition of Arab nationalism. The study aims to discuss several themes to diagnose the recent wave of normalization. These themes are analyzed through measuring the political, and economic changes in the national image toward Israel. The acceleration of the Gulf and Arab states to normalize their relationship with Israel reveals many years of secret engagement that became lastly an official marriage. The study aims to highlight the changes that occurred to the ruling class in the Gulf States that resulted in breaking a long-lasting commitment of their fathers and grandfathers to the Palestinian cause. The study also examines the purposes that could urge other Arab and Islamic states to normalize their relationship with Israel.

The signing ceremony of the so-called Abraham accords back in September 2020 between UAE, Bahrain and Israel, and the silence welcome of several Gulf and Arab states, draws a new era of Arab-Israeli Multilateral cooperation. It also declined centuries of Arab commitment to the Palestinian cause at one hand, and viewing Israel as a brutal colonizer at the other. However, since the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace accords back in 1978. There was a new introduction of peace in the Arab-Israeli context, under the political well of “Normalization”. The study overlooks the definition of normalization in the conflict resolution field, and compare it with the Arab-Israel peace agreements since Camp David accords. The study also overview normalization from an Israel perspective to highlight the Israeli political and economic vision of maintaining peace agreements with their previous long-lasting enemies.

The position of the Palestinian government post normalization was very aggressive toward normalizing countries, as they considered it a “stab in the back” due to their breaching of the Arab initiative signed in Beirut in 2002. The Arab initiative that calls for an Israeli

withdrawal of 1967 borders and a comprehensive solution for the Palestinian refugees, in return of normalization with Israel. However, the study examines the impact of normalization on the Palestinian internal division between West Bank and Gaza. It also overviews the possibility of re-conciliation between conflicting parties and examines the strategy of the Palestinian government to confront normalization.

The study uses a quantitative methodology through developed Questionnaire that aims to collect data, and analyze the political, and economic impact of the Gulf –Israeli normalization on the Palestinian cause. The final approach of the study is to give recommendation for Palestinian policy makers, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates to confront the normalization wave. This study also addresses a clear strategy upon the researcher academic and statistical analysis to overcome the harm of normalization on the Palestinian cause, and draw a fact map to deal with it. The capacity of statistical data is determined through the size of the population used in the questionnaire to overcome the political, and economic impact of normalization on the Palestinian cause. The study concluded that the total degree of the political impact of the Gulf-Israeli normalization on the Palestinian foreign policy is 3.7. It also concluded that there is a high degree among the respondents regarding the need for reformation in the Palestinian diplomacy to be able to confront the normalization wave.

**Table of contents**

<b>Thesis Approval.....</b>	<b>I</b>
<b>Declaration .....</b>	<b>II</b>
<b>Dedication.....</b>	<b>III</b>
<b>Acknowledgment.....</b>	<b>IV</b>
<b>Abstract .....</b>	<b>V</b>
<b>Table of contents .....</b>	<b>VII</b>
<b>List of Tables.....</b>	<b>IX</b>
<b>List of Figures.....</b>	<b>XI</b>
<b>List of Appendices .....</b>	<b>XI</b>
<b>Chapter I .....</b>	<b>- 1 -</b>
1.1 Introduction .....	- 1 -
1.2 Statement of the Problem .....	- 4 -
1.3 Aim and Objectives.....	- 5 -
1.4 Questions of the Study .....	- 5 -
1.5 Hypotheses of the Study:.....	- 5 -
1.6 Rational and Significance of the Study.....	- 6 -
1.7 Limitations of the Study .....	- 6 -
1.8 Operational Definitions: .....	- 7 -

<b>2</b>	<b>Chapter II</b> .....	<b>- 8 -</b>
	Preview .....	- 8 -
2.1	Theoretical Background .....	- 8 -
2.2	Related Literature.....	- 9 -
2.2.1	Camp David accords .....	- 11 -
2.2.2	Oslo accords (1993-2000): .....	- 14 -
2.2.3	Economic Data on West Bank and Gaza: .....	- 18 -
2.2.4	The Jordanian- Israeli peace agreement (Wadi Araba 1994): .....	- 22 -
2.3	Peace for Land vs. Peace for Peace (Gulf-Israel Normalization) .....	- 24 -
2.4	United Arab Emirates-Israeli Normalization, and the Palestinian cause .....	- 26 -
2.5	Netanyahu Perspective of Peace with Arab Countries.....	- 28 -
2.6	The Palestinian Reaction to the Arab Normalization with Israel .....	- 30 -
2.7	Conclusion: .....	- 33 -
<b>3</b>	<b>Chapter III</b> .....	<b>- 37 -</b>
3.1	Study Population and Sample .....	- 37 -
3.2	Method.....	-37-
3.3	Study Framework.....	-38-
3.4	Data Collection .....	- 39 -
3.4.2	The validity of the study tool:.....	- 40 -
3.4.3	Reliability:.....	- 42 -

3.4.4	Analysis of the Tool .....	- 42 -
3.5	Sample Properties .....	- 43 -
<b>4</b>	<b>Chapter IV .....</b>	<b>- 45 -</b>
4.1	Introduction .....	- 45 -
4.2	Findings .....	- 45 -
4.3	Testing the Study Hypothesis .....	- 56 -
<b>5</b>	<b>Chapter V.....</b>	<b>- 60 -</b>
	Introduction.....	- 60 -
5.1	Interpretation of Study Results .....	- 60 -
5.1.1	Interpretation of Results Related to Question RQ1: .....	- 60 -
5.1.2	Interpretation of Results Related to Question RQ2:.....	- 61 -
5.1.3	Interpretation of Results Related to Question RQ3:.....	- 62 -
5.1.4	Interpretation of Results Related to Question RQ4:.....	- 63 -
5.2	Interpretation of the Results related to the Hypotheses of the Study.....	- 64 -
5.3	Recommendations.....	- 66 -
5.4	Conclusion.....	- 68 -
	References.....	-70-
	الملخص.....	- 85 -

## List of Tables

Table 2.1 :Main indicators on growth and employment, source: (Arnon & Weinblatt, 2001). .....	- 18 -
Table 3.1: Distribution of the questionnaire items according to the axes .....	- 40 -
Table 3.2: The results of the factorial analysis test for the study questionnaire items ...	- 41 -
Table 3.3: Cronbach's alpha coefficient for the questionnaire axes.....	- 42 -
Table 3.4: Characteristics of the study sample according to the gender factor .....	- 43 -
Table 3.5: Characteristics of the study sample according to the Age Group factor .....	- 44 -
Table 3.6: Characteristics of the study sample according to the Academic Level factor-	- 44 -
Table 3.7: Characteristics of the study sample according to the field of work factor ....	- 44 -
Table 4.1: Weighted Mean .....	- 45 -
Table 4.2: Means and standard deviation of the political impact of Gulf-Israeli normalization on Palestinian foreign policy .....	- 46 -
Table 4.3: Means and standard deviation of the possibility of urging other Arab states to approach Israel.....	- 48 -
Table 4.4: Means and standard deviation of the Palestinian foreign policy reaction post the gulf-Israeli normalization .....	- 50 -
Table 4.5: Means and standard deviation of a possible unity between Gaza and West Bank post the Gulf-Israeli normalization .....	- 53 -

**List of Figures**

Figure 1: Study framework.....- 38 -

**List of Appendices**

Appendix 1: Questionnaire Referees.....- 76 -

Appendix 2: Study Questionnaire.....- 78 -

## Chapter I

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### Study Framework

#### 1.1 Introduction

The very beginning of the Arab-Israeli peace agreements, since Camp David accords, followed by Oslo agreement and Wadi Araba, witnessed various debates regarding the viability of these peace agreements, and their political vs. national structure. Meaning that, if these peace agreements could establish a mutual status of coexistence, and end decades of direct confrontation. The current wave of normalization is a new level of professed peace agreements with Israel, where Gulf and Arab Normalizing countries ignorance of the Palestinian cause created a status of a national shock, and aroused social, political and national doubts toward the Arab and Gulf States commitment toward the Palestinian cause.

In September 2020, The United states of America sponsored the signing ceremony of the so-called Abraham accords. Abraham accords are peace agreements signed between UAE, Bahrain and Israel. The accords establish friendly and diplomatic relationships between mentioned countries (U.S department of State, 2021). Bahrain and UAE ended decades of Arab commitment to the Palestinian cause that was lastly noted on 2002 through the Saudi Arabia initiative for peace (Arab peace initiative, 2002). The Palestinian Government considered this step as a “stab in the back”, as claimed by Palestinian president Mr. Mahmoud Abbas. The Palestinian government reacted to the accords through withdrawing its assigned ambassadors to UAE and Bahrain, whom were sent back to fulfill their mission at a later stage. It also considered the Gulf- Israeli normalization a serious breaching of the Arab Initiative, and a direct threat to the Palestinian cause (O’Connor, 2020). The Palestinian

government held a conference back in May 2020, with the purpose of gathering all political parties to overcome its political isolation. Thus, the conference adopted various resolutions in regard of the Palestinian-Israeli security coordination, in addition to adopting a unified political strategy to end the Palestinian political division.

The wave of normalization continued to overwhelm the political scene, where Sudan and on a later stage Morocco, declared building close diplomatic relationships with Israel. Both countries were subjected to the conditions determined by the United States. The cost of normalization for Sudan was disintegration of previous economic sanctions and pumping more of American financial support for the benefit of the state treasury (Knopf & Feltman, 2020). On the other side, Morocco received the American recognition of its sovereignty over the Sahara (Jakes, Kirshner, Alami, & David, 2020). Afterwards, the political position of normalization countries toward the Palestinian cause remained the same.

Currently speaking, the Palestinian political position after the Moroccan move remained silent. Many reporters saw that the Palestinian authority is willing to adjust its political strategy in line with the rapid changes in the region. It wants to remain neutral, away from any political confrontation with Arab countries as it may lose its Arab depth, especially when it comes to Egypt and Saudi Arabia, whom are close allies of United Arab Emirates and supporters of its political strategy (Boxerman, Bar-Am, Borschel-Dan, Solomon, MAROTTE, 2020). The Palestinian government position shifted in four months, from a dismissive political and diplomatic position into a status of political quiescence upon the current normalization norm in the region. (Boxerman, Bar-Am, Borschel-Dan, Solomon, MAROTTE, 2020).

The political willingness of the Arab countries to normalize their relationship with Israel, and their serious breaching of the Arab Initiative and their long last commitment to the Palestinian cause, puts the Palestinian question back on the table. The current Arab-Israeli

peace agreements, re-introduced three main national, political and social debates. Firstly, the definition of the Arab Nationalism in terms of Arab states commitment to the Palestinian question. Secondly, the political meaning of peace and normalization for Israel compared to the Arab, and lastly, the validity of the Palestinian right of self-determination and an independent state.

The Palestinian political doctrine, which shifted its national project since signing Oslo accords, from a full liberation of the Palestinian land, to the two-state solution based on 242 and 338 United Nations resolutions (UN resolutions on the Question of Palestine,2019) resulted in establishing a Palestinian entity in the west bank and Gaza. The Oslo declaration of principles of 1993 was a road map for a series of economic and political agreements. However, these agreements focused on building trust measures between both sides, with certain classifications of land, administrative distribution of roles, and security cooperation (Oslo accords, 2018).

The Oslo accords were seen as a political framework for normalizing countries to justify their relationship with Israel, comparing the relationship between the oppressed and the oppressor, with their economic greed, and ignorance of a long last Arab National Cause. However, Israel succeeded to a certain level to occupy the holiness of the Palestinian cause in the conscience of some normalizing countries, moving peace into a new level of not only economic cooperation, but “people to people” normalization. The ultimate goal for Israel was to reach normalization without justice for the Palestinians, who remain calling for their right of ending the occupation, and establishing their own independent state (Shahwan, 2020).

The study answers the questions, which reveals the impact of the Gulf-Israeli Normalization on the Palestinian foreign policy. It also examines the level of pressure exerted on other Arab countries to follow the same footsteps, ensuing normalization agreements, in addition to the

influence of the Gulf-Israeli normalization on the Palestinian Economic Situation. Finally, the study explores the Impact of the Gulf-Israeli normalization on the local Palestinian politics, reflected in the change of its adopted foreign Policy.

The researcher reviewed all available literature, journals, books and articles that can be found in the research field, whether on local, regional or international level. Among the variety of sources to be reviewed, there will be a thorough examination of written reports, political journals, and newspapers, in order to build a solid academic argument that is supported through adopted tools of conflict resolution and transformation.

## **1.2 Statement of the Problem**

The Palestinian government is facing local and international challenges, at economic and political levels. The political division limits a Palestinian unified position in front of the international community on the one hand, and further exacerbate the geographical and political division between Gaza and west bank on the other. The United Arab Emirates followed by Bahrain opened doors for other Arab and Gulf States to build new bridges with Israel such as Sudan and Morocco. Therefore, the willingness of more Arab and Islamic states to follow is an expected move in the upcoming time. The Arab initiative clearly states that the cost of any Arab-Israeli normalization is subjected to Palestinian right of self-determination and establishment of a Palestinian state on the borders of 1967. Therefore; its validity as a unifying political position for Arab and Islamic states is currently questionable. The ultimate goal for Israel was to reach normalization without justice for the Palestinians, who remain calling for their right of ending the occupation, and establishing their own independent state (Shahwan, 2020).

### **1.3 Aim and Objectives**

The overall aim of this study is to investigate the impact of the Gulf-Israeli normalization on the Palestinian cause; more precisely the objectives of this study are:

- To map the political impact of the Gulf-Israeli normalization on the Palestinian foreign policy.
- To measure the possibility of urging other Arab countries to approach Israel.
- To explore the impact of normalization on encouraging a Palestinian unity between West Bank and Gaza.

### **1.4 Questions of the Study**

- What is the political impact of the Gulf-Israeli normalization on the Palestinian Foreign Policy?
- What are the possibilities of urging other Arab states to approach Israel?
- Will the Gulf-Israeli normalization encourage a Palestinian unity between West Bank and Gaza?

### **1.5 Hypotheses of the Study**

1. There is a significant political impact of the Gulf-Israeli normalization on the Palestinian foreign policy.
2. The Gulf-Israeli normalization has a significant possibility on urging more Arab countries to approach Israel.
3. The Gulf-Israeli normalization has a negative impact on encouraging a Palestinian unity between West Bank and Gaza.

## 1.6 Rational and Significance of the Study

The research significance stems from the uniqueness and the importance of its theme. Moreover, this study is addressing a fresh and hot notion from a political perspective. This study could be the first to investigate this phenomenon in Palestine. Once this study is carried out, it should give advice to policy makers in Palestine and may contribute in adopting various political visions to overcome the situation with the least political cost.

The rationale beyond this study is based on the current stagnation of the peace process, where the Palestinian government and leadership are isolated, with almost no political strategy to overcome the impact of the Gulf-Israeli normalization, whether on local or international levels. This stage of approaching Israel is a new political phenomenon that deserves academic research to be the first of its kind, as far as the researcher knows.

## 1.7 Limitations of the Study

- **Topical limitation:** this study is restricted to the Gulf-Israeli normalization, elaborating on the United Arab Emirates as a case study. It is addressing a new political phenomenon that is occurring in the Arab policy towards Israel. It is unique, exceptional and new. Therefore, the researcher anticipates encountering a substantial knowledge gap when it comes to finding literature of the topic Gulf-Israeli normalization.
- **Spatial limitation:** this study was conducted in the West Bank due to Covid-19 Pandemic during the year 2021. The Researcher access was mainly limited to Palestinian universities and governmental Institutions, whom their students, faculty and staff elaborated on the content of the study.
- **Temporal limitation:** this study was conducted between the very beginnings of January 2021, until December of the same year.

- **Population limitation:** the sample consists of Palestinian people who are holding BA, Master and Ph.D. degrees, and serve at NGO's, private sector, public sector, and civil society.

## 1.8 Operational Definitions

**Normalization:** it is a term defined in social philosophy by Michael Foucault as a way to describe the social standards and values imposed by Modern states to normalize social standards within a social schema, to make the individuals look normal, as it represses their free will (Albzour, 2020). Normalization has also a global definition in political science, where it refers to the status of creating normal relations between states after conflict (Agreement on Normalization, 1996). However, in the context of colonialism in Palestine, Normalization is defined as recognition of the state of Israel and its right to exist, which allows Arab countries to establish a normal relationship with it. (Muhsin Awwad, 1988; Samarah, 2011; Yaqeen, 2003). Normalization in this study refers to the recent normalization agreements between Gulf States and Israel, and the past/current political and economic definition of Israel, looking through these agreements.

**Arab nationalism:** it is defined in the political context as a political unification against the western dominance experienced by Arab states in the nineteenth and twentieth century's. It is also defined in the cultural aspect as a share of language and roots. Arab nationalism also has religious bases, where it is considered as unification of Islamic states that speak the language of Quran. (Oxford Reference, 2022). Arab nationalism refers in this study, to the national and religious commitment of Gulf and Arab states to the Palestinian cause in the previous times, and the classification of Israel as the ultimate enemy in the region, compared to the previous status of Israel in the Arab national context.

## 2 Chapter II

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### Theoretical Background and Literature Review

#### Preview

This chapter sheds light on the concepts and theories related to normalization, it also flags the chronology of events of normalization and peace agreements in the Middle East. The chapter ends with a conclusion showing the status of this study with respect to the theoretical background and related literature.

#### 2.1 Theoretical Background

The mechanism of applying conflict resolution tools to reach a peace settlement between the colonized and colonizer has been associated with the term “Normalization”. The capacity of seeking a precise definition of the term depends on its interpretation within a certain abstract meaning (Albzour, 2020). However, in the context of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The term becomes more complex in political definition, where it is controversial to express the relationship between the colonized and the colonizer based on the recognition of the other, without fair mutual benefits.

The term “Normalization” also appeared in various contexts, where it has been explored through (discipline and Punish, 1991) by the French philosopher Michel Foucault. He overviewed the authority’s psychological dominance in the modern societies through implementing penal code against individuals, to create a status of behavioral discipline among human groups, to be able to control them on mental, physical and social levels (Foucault 1991). The use of the term “normalization” in this context was to describe the social standards and values imposed by Modern states to normalize such standards within

the social schema, to make them look normal, as it represses the individual's free will. (Albzour, 2020).

The description of normalization within the context of colonialism in Palestine has been defined by different researchers as a recognition of the state of Israel and its right to exist, which allows Arab countries to establish normal relationship with it in various fields (Muhsin Awwad, 1988; Samarah, 2011; Yaqeen, 2003). However, the term "Normalization" has a global definition in political science, where it refers to the status of normal relations between states after conflict, such as the peaceful reconciliation agreements after World War II between Yugoslavia and Croatia (Agreement on Normalization, 1996), and the Northern Ireland conflict.

It is very crucial to explore the term "Normalization" within its Colonial status in Palestine, and its Global context. The term "Normalization" is used within its colonial status as initiating normal relations, taking in consideration that the colonizing entity "Israel" is a new born state that emerged in 1948. The term refers to the colonizer concept of constructive building of relations before reaching a peaceful agreement. The global scale of normalization comes at the end of conflict, where resolving a conflict is an essential result before starting normalization of relations. Thus, the main purpose of normalization in the colonial concept is to gain recognition and legalize their apartheid colonized system (Albzour, 2020).

## **2.2 Related Literature**

The Palestinian Catastrophe of 1948 (Nakba), revived the conflict of Palestine in the hearts of Arab nationalist. The former Egyptian president Jamal Abdel Nasser succeeded to raise the ideology of Arab nationalism to confront the Israel colonial project in Palestine. He addressed in his book "The philosophy of Revolution", that the Nakba is a threat for the Arab identity, and it is a must for the Arabs to defend themselves through engaging in the

war with Israel (Abdel Nasser, 1954). The Arab National identity was based on the rejection of the colonizer and seeking an Arab geographical and economical Unity. Therefore, there was a complete rejection of the Proclaimed rights of the Zionist movement in Palestine, and a full rejection of UN resolution (181), that was best illustrated in the Arab first summit in (Cairo,1964), the second summit in (Alexandria,1964), third summit in (Casablanca,1965), and the fourth summit in (Khartoum,1967).

The formation of identity usually indicates many questions that identify the self, in order to have a clear position toward the other, based on psychological social identity analysis (Reicher, 2010). However, this was the discourse of the Arab nationalist in identifying themselves on the national and political aspect. After 1948, Arab countries were unified more than ever to confront the Zionist project in Palestine. The collective threat felt by the Arab countries created a status of collective social identity awakening (Reicher, 2004), where the Palestinian conflict were considered as a call for social change to better understand the other (Enemy).

The Arab nationalist rhetoric identification of the term “Normalization” was described as a serious “Betrayal” to the Arab Unity and the libertarian struggle (Albzour, 2020). However, the Tunisian former president Habib Bourguiba was the first Arab president to deliver a speech in 1965 in Jericho, asking to abandon the policy of “whole or nothing”, and pushing further the Arab countries and the Palestinians to deal with 181 resolutions, that calls for the partition of Palestine (Tunisian president Bourguiba’s speech in Jericho-English 1965). Bourguiba’s proposal was fully rejected and he was accused of treason and betrayal.

The Arab defeat in the 1967 war (Naksa) Brought new facts on ground. Israel captured more lands from Arab countries (e.g., west bank, Gaza, Golan Heights, and Sinai Peninsula) and displaced a large number of Palestinians. It is important to mention that the west bank and Gaza were in direct control of the Egyptians and Jordanians. Having said that, in 1973, the

Arab libertarian doctrine started to vanish, and there was a serious willingness to engage in political negotiations to achieve peace with Israel based on the 242 UN security council resolution that calls for a full withdrawal of the Israeli occupying forces from the west bank and Gaza. The sixth Arab summit in Algeria (1973) shaped the outline of achieving a peaceful process of negotiations with Israel, with the absence of two major Arab countries (Libya and Iraq).

The acceptance of the UN Security Council Resolution 242, abandoned the liberation project from the colonial system in Palestine, especially with the recognition of the Palestinian liberation organization as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people in the Arab league seventh summit in Rabat (1974). The label of “betrayal” started to vanish, and the liberation project was displaced, especially after the 1967 defeat, which weakened the Arab nationalism doctrine based on Libertarian ambition from the colonial system in Palestine (Albzour, 2015).

### **2.2.1 Camp David accords**

The political analysis of the term “Normalization” in the Arab-Israeli political context firstly appeared in the signing of the Camp David accords in 1978. The accords used “Normalization” as a political reference to the establishment of relationship between both countries, stating that “Signatories shall establish among themselves relationships normal to states at peace with one another (The Camp David Accord between Israel and Egypt, 2013, P.5). However, the use of the term “Normal relations” in international law language refers to the identification of intended relations, which includes termination of all barriers of diplomatic, economic and cultural relations (Mohamad, 1979. P7).

The framework of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel was based on the political will of Israel and the United States of America, where the establishment of friendly relations between both countries, did not address the United Nations Resolution 242, which opposes the international law legal language of peace treaties. This mechanism of reconciliation highlights the need to redefine the political values and standards of such unilateral step by Egypt (Bar-Tal, 2000), compared to the Arab political vision of Israel as a colonizer at one hand, and the colonizer vision of defining "normal relations" through normalization with an Arab country at the other. Thus, it is important to re-define the colonizer aspect of peace through normalization, compared to a peace agreement based on international law and global definition of it, as a tool to fully resolve a conflict.

The use of the anti-normalization discourse appeared for the first time in Egypt, where the signing of the Camp David peace treaty overwhelmed the public and official opinion, who declared their full rejection of the treaty. There were various moves on the official and public level, where the Egyptian council of ministers witnessed resignations of 3 of its members, in addition to the memorandum addressed to the president Anwar Sadat by the revolution's leadership council which stated that:

**Let it be known, Mr. President, and let all citizens understand, that we are like the rest of our people in our pursuit of peace, and that our ultimate purpose is to liberate our land from the corruption of the Israeli occupation. However, we know, as well, that there is a difference between a peace which achieves justice and security, and national sovereignty which returns rights to their people and achieves peace for them, and a false peace which achieves no justice nor security, one which eliminates the struggles of the past and any hopes for the future (IPS, 1978, p. 161).**

The memorandum clearly objected to the strategy of establishing normal relations with Israel, without achieving 242 resolutions, claiming that Israel's purpose of the agreement is to achieve economic dominance, which opposes the Arab league charter (IPS, 1978, p. 165). The term normalization started to appear repeatedly in parallel to the Camp David accords, where the national progressive unionist party in Egypt through their statement addressed in Cairo (1978), addressed a critical context toward the accords, through criticizing Sadat's strategy of accepting normalization with Israel before the implementation of the UN 242 Resolution, and the withdrawal from Sinai desert. (IPS, 1978, p. 149)

The national progressive Unionist party also addressed the term "Normalization" in the fourth point of their statement, which is entitled "Repercussions of normalization with Israel on Egypt's sovereignty" (IPS, 1978, p. 152), where they draw a clear image of the danger outcome of normalization, on the cultural, economic and political level. They considered the opening of the door of normalization to be a gap in the national history and culture of the Arab nation, which will result in planting Israel as a challenge to the national and religious emotions of the Arab nation (IPS, 1978, p. 152).

Cultural awareness of the danger of normalization established various initiatives since 1978, aiming at fighting normalization, where cultural movements aimed at spreading awareness toward facing the danger of normalization, through workshops and presentations, such as the Arab cultural defense committee in Cairo. However, the anti-normalization narratives were divided into two main concepts. The first concept adopted the full rejection of normalization based on the national perspective of considering Israel "as a threat to the Arab nationalism and aspiration of the future". The second concept were based on a conditional rejection of normalization based on the willingness of Israel to withdraw from 1967 borders, and establishing a Palestinian state, in exchange of recognition of Israel (Committee for the Defense of Arab Culture-Cairo, 1993, p. 20).

### 2.2.2 Oslo accords (1993-2000):

#### **Declaration of Principles (1993):**

The Oslo agreement was signed based on the willingness of the PLO and Israeli government to end decades of conflict, where both parties recognized their right to live in peace in respect of political rights and mutual legitimacy. The declaration of principles in 1993, established many arrangements that were discussed later on through an agreed framework (United Nations, 1993). However, Oslo agreement was not a final status negotiation. It was a transitional period that lasted for five years. The agreement's goal is to implement a withdrawal of the Israeli forces from the occupied territories and transfer control to the Palestine authority in order to achieve security for the civilians.

Oslo agreement did not support the Palestinian political dimension regarding establishing a state with full governance in the long term (Shlaim, 2005). The agreement resulted in the establishment of a self-governing authority over its own people, with legitimate representation through an agreed political right for the Palestinian people to choose their leadership in the west bank and Gaza. However, the permanent status negotiation issues were postponed, which may explain the failure of establishing a Palestinian sovereign entity with long term proposal of establishing a Palestinian statehood.

The Palestinian leadership decision at that time to reach a peace agreement with Israel, could be analyzed through various regional and international causes, where the PLO leadership witnessed a tough position from its Arab neighbors, especially with the limitation of Arab financing, and through the emergence of Islamic movements in the Palestinian territories during the 2nd Intifada, which were a direct threat for its legitimacy, as these movements create a new leadership for the Palestinian people. Having said that, Israel saw an opportunity

to hold its occupation at a low-cost level by allowing the Palestinian Authority to maintain the administrative daily life of the Palestinian people.

**Paris Protocol (1994):**

The Paris protocol is an economic agreement that shaped the economic relationship between the Palestinian liberation organization and the government of state of Israel. However; Paris protocol has created a new perspective of economic cooperation in coordination with Israel, in which the two parties determined their economic interests throughout the principles of mutual respect and fairness. The Protocol overviewed various Economic arrangements that have to do with taxes implemented on imported products, import policy, monetary and financial issues, in addition to agriculture, industry and tourism.

There is no doubt that Paris protocol established an economic entity for the Palestinian people, but it also established a dependent economy. The protocol gave advantage for Israel to take over the monetary and financial stability of the Palestinian Authority, in which the Palestinian authority were only allowed to establish the Palestinian monetary fund, which acts as a financial adviser. However, the circulating currency in the Palestinian territories will be restricted to the Israeli Nis (Shekels). The exchange rate of any other currency shall be subjected to the value of the Israeli Nis. Therefore, the Palestinian banking system and the trade market in the Palestinian territories will be subjected to the value of the Israeli currency (United Nations, 1995).

The economic agreement of Paris protocol also determined the mechanism of taxation, where each side of the agreement will have the right to determine their own taxation policy that have to do with income taxation, and property taxation. In contrast, Israel will be the authorized party to collect the income tax for border customs, and products, in addition to other descriptive arrangements. The so-called "Paris Protocol" has been always subjected to

political terms, where Israel is capable of stopping the transfer of taxes to the Palestinian side in case of conflict with its political opponent. This example is best illustrated in 2015, when the PA decided to join the international criminal court and Israel decided to stop transferring income tax for the PA.

The division of land into three Areas' (A, B and C), limited the Palestinian Authority access into enriched Palestinian lands with natural resources. Therefore; the Palestinian authority lacks sovereignty at its least definition, which undermines any possibility of having an independent economy. The Palestinian trade minister at that time Maher Al Masri argued that "all economic agreements following the declaration of principles were dangerous and had negative impacts on the economy"<sup>13</sup> (Guardian news and Media, 2015).

Arnon and Weinblatt argued in their article "Sovereignty and Economic Development" one of the most important key factors in regard to Paris protocol "imbalanced power" between both conflicting parties. However, they argued that the structure of the protocol does not meet with a satisfactory economic agreement due to power imbalance at one hand, and due to its regard of the closures that is derived from security purposes as a function of political measures. (Arnon & Weinblatt, 2001).

**Thus, the Palestinian economy's poor performance must be attributed to the violent opposition to the peace process, which left Israel with no option but to close the borders. Many Palestinians, as well as other observers, seem to favor another line of thought. They argue that the Protocol should have anticipated that the transition would not be smooth, and incorporated steps to enable the economy to function also in periods of tension. Moreover, they regard the closures not just as a security, but also as a political measure, used as collective punishment following terrorist attacks. According to this view, economic relations cannot be**

**disentangled from the political process, and the closures are a means of subjugation. (Arnon & Weinblatt, 2001).**

Another argument that meets with the failure of the Paris protocol, is the incomplete process of the Protocol, in which Arnon and Weinblatt also argued in their article “sovereignty and economic development”, that the transitional method of the protocol makes it “subsequent to re-negotiating”. Thus, the protocol lacks methods of reinforcement and efficiency because of the different structure of both parties, in which Israel is recognized as a state with sovereignty while the PLO is a political movement, and it lacks power whether on enforcement level of the agreement or efficiency in terms of future vision due to the transitional structure of the Paris protocol. (Arnon & Weinblatt, 2001).

The Paris protocol although affected the employment sector in Palestine. Having said that, after signing the agreement, the number of Palestinian employees inside Israel declined to %14, while it exceeded %30 between the 1970’s and 1980’s. Thus, the living standard of the Palestinian people declined at a very high rate. Unemployment rate as a result increased, where it reached %24 by 1996 (Arnon & Weinblatt, 2001). The Palestinian employment inside Israel became stricter, in which Israel started to implement permits policy which depends on age, sex and marital status. The employment rate inside Israel became more dependent on the “political situation “due to closures which has to do with the political stability in the region.

### 2.2.3 Economic Data on West Bank and Gaza:

Table 2.1: Main indicators on growth and employment (source: (Arnon & Weinblatt, 2001)).

<i>Year</i>	<i>Population (% annual change)</i>	<i>Real GNI per capita (% annual change)</i>	<i>Employed in Israel (percent of total employment)</i>	<i>Unemployment percent</i>
1994	6	-4.9	17.8	15.1
1995	6	-9.6	16.0	18.2
1996	5	-9.0	14.1	23.8
1997	4	3.5	17.1	20.3
1998	4	7.7	21.7	14.4
1999	4	3.5	22.8	11.8

#### **Gaza Jericho Agreement (1994):**

The Gaza Jericho agreement took place in the 4th of May 1994, where it was a reaffirming of mutual understanding between the PLO and Government of Israel for the sake of implementing various security arrangements that has to do with Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza strip and Jericho, in addition to the transfer of Authority from Israel to the Palestinian authority. It also determines the role of the PA judicial, executive and legislative branches. The agreement evaluates the relationship between Israel and the Palestinian authority on security level, where both sides shall prevent hostile acts against each other and have the full responsibility toward the other. The Palestinian authority shall protect Israel settlements and military installation area from any terrorist act according to the agreement. (United Nation, 1994).

The agreement enhanced the mechanism of creating and building confidence measures, where Israel would be committed of releasing Palestinian prisoners upon signing the agreement, in addition to allowing the Palestinians from abroad to enter the Gaza strip and Jericho as per previous understanding between both parties. Thus, both parties would have the willingness to commit to the agreement through temporary international presence of observers and experts to ensure the smooth transfer of power and commitments to the mutual

understanding. The parties also assigned a joint committee with the presence of Jordan and Egypt as important border line countries for security arrangements (United Nations, 1994).

The Gaza Jericho agreement away from sovereignty details and the role of both authorities on ground, witnessed for the 1st time the return of the Palestinian leadership from exile to enter Gaza and Jericho and with the presence of the Palestinian leadership on ground after long decades of exile. This step was seen as a positive move of ending decades of conflict. At the other hand, Critics of the Oslo agreement in general, viewed the agreement as a betrayal of the Palestinian rights for the sake of personal interests for PLO political figures, in addition to a serious compromise of the Palestinian rights for full self-determination and freedom.

The capacity of public criticism of the peace process between the PLO and Israel had different academic and political opinions through time, where the criticism of the agreement at that time, wasn't as much our current time, due to the failure of Israel commitment to the peace process at one hand, and the PA reaction to the agreement through being very committed to its framework. Thus, the evaluation of the peace agreement will always be subjected to both parties' acknowledgment of it, rather than evaluating its descriptive details.

### **Israeli Palestinian Interim Agreement (1995):**

The continuation of processing with the peace process has acknowledged different phases of agreements. After the Gaza Jericho agreement, the Israeli Palestinian interim agreement was signed in 1995, with the presence of various representatives of states. The agreement was signed with the witnessed signature of Russia and the United States, in addition to the main parties of the agreement, Israel and the PLO. The Israeli Palestinian interim agreement set up arrangements for the continuation of transfer of Power in the west bank and Gaza, in addition to the arrangements of establishing the Palestinian police forces after holding the

Legislative and presidential elections. It also addresses the structure of the Palestinian council and its executive authority. (United Nations, 1995).

The interim agreement determines the role of the Palestinian police role in the west bank and Gaza, mentioning that no other group or organization could work in parallel with the Palestinian police (United Nations, 1995). It is well known that the Palestinian organizations represented by different political and ideological groups were and still functioning in the west bank and Gaza strip. Thus, after the failure of the agreement and the Israeli right-wing denial of it through assassinating the previous prime Minister of Israel "Rabin". It was well acknowledged that for Israel, it not about peace with the Palestinians, but it is an ideological conflict rather than a political one. The illusion of peace assassinated "Rabin" and "Yasser Arafat", and what is left of the agreement now a day, is Israel Apartheid colonial system against the Palestinians with full commitment of the Palestinian side to the agreement. It is the same fulfillment to the agreement in the late 90" s, due to the ongoing argument of the lack of alternative for the PLO, especially with the renounce of the Arab regimes to the Palestinian cause, as it is today, where history repeats itself.

### **Wye River Agreement (1998):**

The Wye River agreement proceeds with the arrangements of Economic, security and Jurisdiction collaborations between the PLO and the government of the state of Israel. The Israeli side approved the transferring of %13 of Area C land, to Area A and B, which will remain under Israeli Military responsibility. However, the agreement also reviews the declaration of principles understanding in regard of security, where both sides should collaborate based on mutual respect to prevent any terrorist act against the other, prevent incitements, in addition to full commitment of the Palestinian side to not allow any illegal weapons in the west bank and Gaza (The Wye River memorandum, 1998).

The Palestinian side were requested to deal harshly with the mechanism of security, where the PLO were in direct charge to pass the peace mentality into its institutions and employees through direct instructions from the head of PLO Yasser Arafat. Although, a committee from Palestinian authority and Israel will be meeting bi-weekly to follow up with security collaboration (The Wye River memorandum, 1998). The United States also played the role of the Mediator that assures the implementation of the mutual understanding between both parties through a follow up committee assigned from the U.S administration.

The memorandum also speaks of the importance of enhancing the economic relationship between the PLO and Israel. Israel will allow economic development in the west bank and Gaza through opening an international airport. However, Trade routes was planned through establishing a port that will be operating in Gaza, which allows the expansion of the Palestinian economy for the sake of enhancing the level of life for the Palestinian people (The Wye River memorandum, 1998).

The Mechanism of proceeding with previous agreements were descriptively mentioned in the memorandum through assuring the necessity of processing with the permanent negotiation issues that were discussed in the declaration of principles in 1993, without any delay from both parties. The parties should show willingness to proceed with the negotiations on the basis agreed upon to achieve the goal of final status negotiations no later than 1999 (The Wye River memorandum, 1998). Thus, all agreements and memorandums following the declaration of principles are modifying one another for the sake of reaching a fulfilled peace agreement.

### **Sharm El-Sheikh Memorandum (1999):**

The Sharm AL-Sheikh Memorandum seeks to resolve all outstanding issues between the PLO and the government of the state of Israel in regard to the interim status, especially the

implementation of the Wye river agreement. Having said that, it assures the necessity of carrying on with the permanent status negotiations within a specific timeline no later than 1999. The memorandum also speaks of the continuation of transfer of Area's to the Palestinian authority through several phases (The Avalon project, 1999).

The assurance of highest consideration for the peace agreement was the main goal of the agreements, through the continuation of positive steps toward peace, where Israel agreed upon the release of 350 Palestinian prisoners. In contrast, the Palestinian authority showed a full commitment toward its security duties on the one hand, and its direct and effective steps toward any hostile acts against Israel on the other. (The Avalon Project, 1999). The re-activation of committees agreed upon in previous agreements, especially those of Wye River and interim agreement, that has to do with security, economy and many other fields were the ultimate goal of the Sharm El-Sheikh agreement.

#### **2.2.4 The Jordanian- Israeli peace agreement (Wadi Araba 1994):**

The Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty that is well known as "Wadi Araba " at the southern border crossing between both countries came to draw a continuation of the so called Arab-Israeli peace treaties. The treaty was signed at the heels of the Oslo agreement between the PLO and Israel in 1993. It allowed Jordan to restore 380 square kilometers of its occupied territories, and a share of water from both the Jordan River and Yarmouk (The Jordan-Israeli peace treaty, 1994). It also allowed Jordan to define its western borders, to overcome the claim of recognizing Jordanian territories as Palestinian. The treaty also included signing protocols of mutual benefits, such as trade, communication, transportation and tourism, as well as many other fields of country-to-country economic collaboration (The Jordan-Israeli peace treaty, 1994).

The treaty was the second peace agreement between Israel and one of its Arab neighbors, after the Camp David agreement between Egypt and Israel in 1978, but with a different political atmosphere, as it came one year after the Oslo agreement between Israel and PLO. It also opened doors for Jordan to receive economic and military assistance from the west, and end an era of military and political conflict with a borderline country on the Jordan River (Schenker, 2014).

The economic and military assistance were increased by the United States to Jordan, where the comparative figures between 1993 and 2014, shows that the United States increased its economic support from \$35M, to \$700M in 2014, Although the Military assistance increased from \$9M in 1993, to reach \$300M in 2014 (Schenker, 2014). The figures kept on improving as of nowadays.

The treaty promises of people-to-people normalization never found a way, as its counterpart Camp David accords. The Jordanian population formation, including %60 of Palestinian population, did not allow any opened doors for people-to-people normalization and it kept on opposing it as most of Arab population. Therefore, the treaty was subjected to various political tests even with the Jordanian Parliament, who refused any purchase of the Israeli Gas as a reflection of the Jordanian people's opinion that rejects dealing with Israel, even on political stage and calls for the withdrawal from "Wadi Arab" peace Treaty.

In 2019, Israel left (Al-Baqoura), which is located at the junction of the Jordan River and Yarmouk. This part of land was leased to Israel in the peace treaty of "Wadi Araba " in 1994, but it was recognized as a Jordanian territory (The Jordan-Israeli peace treaty, 1994). However, Jordan did not accept to re-new the lease with Israel and it was seen that the failure to resolve the Palestinian- Israeli conflict, describes the cold peace between Jordan and Israel, as Jordan role were recently minimized through the Trump's declaration of the deal of the century that implies crossing three main Jordanian national red lines. Firstly, through

enforcement of the Jordanian nationality on Palestinian population in return of economic and financial support. Secondly, allowing Israel to annex the western valley of the Jordanian river, and lastly weakening the historical role of Hashemite as the guardian of the Islamic Holy sites in Jerusalem, especially Al-Aqsa Mosque (Zeevi, 2020).

### **2.3 Peace for Land vs. Peace for Peace (Gulf-Israel Normalization)**

The former American administration decided to sponsor a new era of economic deals, looking into the Palestinian rights of self-determination and establishing their independent statehood as a real estate deal, mostly vanishing the political doctrine of conflict resolution through economic deals. In May 2018, the former United States president Donald Trump decided to move the American embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, and few months later in September of 2018, he decided to stop the UNRWA funding (the United Nations Relief and works agency for Palestinian refugees). The unilateral steps of Trump's administration continued to take place, where in 2019, his administration released the economic plan of the so-called peace plan (Deal of the Century), and one year later the political framework of the plan was released, to reveal a destruction of any ambition for the Palestinians to establish an independent state (Mendel, 2021).

The capacity of economic deals for Trump's administration carried on with a new political atmosphere through establishing normalization deals between the Gulf States and Israel. In the last few months of his presidency in 2020, a series of normalization agreements were signed between Gulf States and Israel, where the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain came first, followed by Morocco and Bahrain (Mendel, 2021). The returns of the normalization agreements disregarded the political framework of the Palestinian cause, breaking out the Arab initiative for peace, which forbid any diplomatic or political relation between Arab states and Israel, unless there is a political resolution of the conflict based on United Nations resolutions 242, 334, with the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, and

acknowledging the right of return for Palestinian refugees based on 194 United Nations Resolution ( Arab peace initiative, 2002).

The political and economic benefits of the normalization agreements were in return of personal and unilateral interests for normalizing countries, with a full absence of a fair and just resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, where Sudan paid the price of normalization in return of being taken off the list of states that sponsors Terrorism. Morocco had an American recognition of legitimizing its illegal occupation to the Western Sahara territory, while the United Arab Emirates were subjected to normalization for the sake of buying f-35 air military planes, and Israel had it all with Netanyahu greed of establishing peace agreements with Arab and Gulf States without any concessions (Mendel, 2021). The exchange of peace for land, as for Camp David accords in 1978, Wadi Araba agreement in 1994, and Oslo accords in 1993, became a very costly price for Israel. The new Israeli perspective on peace reached a new level of “peace for peace”.

The new level of “peace for peace” that Netanyahu claims, in exchange of “peace for land” which refers to the political scheme of ending occupation for peaceful relations with the Arab world, drove a new foreign policy for Israel. The former Prime Ministers of Israel had to make concessions to reach peace, where “Menachem Begin” had to withdraw from Sinai to make peace with Egypt. Ehud Barak and Olmert had to negotiate with Syria on the plan of withdrawing from the Golan Heights, and lastly Rabin who signed the Oslo agreement with the Palestinian liberation organization, for the sake of creating a Palestinian authority, which witnessed an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho (Mendel, 2021), in addition to a serious of administrative and logistic arrangements, that has to do with building trust measures, as the researcher highlighted in the previous section.

## **2.4 United Arab Emirates-Israeli Normalization, and the Palestinian cause**

The Israeli-Emirati bilateral relationship did not come to surface out of blue. Their relationship was undercover for several years and closer to public in 2015, when Israel opened a diplomatic office on low diplomatic appearance. The United Arab Emirates claimed that this office was part of the renewable energy agency. Israel operated in homeland security from Abu Dhabi since 2007 to 2015, under the direct sponsorship of an Israeli Logic company, which invested an estimated number of 6 billion U.S dollars (Mendel, 2021). The capacity of Investment of Israeli Logic industries in the United Arab Emirates included also Oil Refineries and security systems for ports through installing one of the most advanced systems throughout the Emirates International borders. It also supported Emirates with advanced planes to spy on Iran.

The mutual interests of both countries, considering Iran as their direct enemy, allowed the making of the so-called "Abraham Accords" normalization deal, to strengthen Israel's bilateral relationship with the United Arab Emirates along with other Gulf and Arab States. Neither Israel Pushed for the deal without considering the Palestinian rights of self-determination and statehood, nor the Emirates did. The Emirates claimed that the deal suspended the annexation plan of the west bank, but it was never off the Israeli table (AFP, TOI, 2021).

The Economic benefit of the deal placed Dubai on the Israeli Map of Expanding its Tourism, businesses sectors and Technology. It also allowed a full exchange of Diplomatic relations through opening embassies and exchanging ambassadors. The business exchange since then reached \$500 Million between both counties, with a militant deal of \$23 Billion sale of F-35 fighter jets for the United Arab Emirates (AFP, TOI, 2021). Although, referring to the Israeli

consulate in Dubai, the tourism sectors were positively enhanced through nearly 20,000 Israelis visiting the United Arab Emirates since signing the agreement (Israel Consulate in Dubai, 2021).

The shift in viewing the Emirati-Israeli normalization compared to the Jordanian, Israeli, PLO peace treaties with Israel, relies on more than political settlement of conflict, Economic and business figures or security cooperation. The Emirates willingness of peace with Israel crossed the Arab National Doctrine. it is mostly defined as a matter of civil society, where the common national doctrine that links the interest of the Arabs with the Palestinian cause have no meaning for the Gulf countries, especially the United Arab Emirates. The United Arab Emirates is a small populated country with almost 1.4 Million population of Emirate's nationality, enriched with Oil resources. The monarchy that rules the country broke out the Moral and national belonging to the Palestinian cause, turning the solidarity into Collusion, and self-determination into a GDP figure (Mendel, 2021).

The United Arab Emirates acts toward Normalization exceeded the forbidden "people to people normalization". Moreover, hundreds of flights were exchanged between Israel and the United Arab Emirates. It is the first time in history where Israel opens relations with an Arab country, through disconnecting the Palestinian Cause and its occupation to the Palestinian People. The argument that claims an improvement in the Israeli attitude toward Arab is best illustrated through the demolishing of a Palestinian village called "Khirbet Humsa" in the Jordan valley two months ahead of the agreement, where 73 people left homeless, with no hope of surviving the Israeli Brutal attitude toward the Palestinians (Mendel, 2021).

## 2.5 Netanyahu Perspective of Peace with Arab Countries

The former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu wrote a book entitled “a place among the nations (Israel and the world). This book highlights the Israeli perspective of peace with the Arab countries, through assigning a whole chapter entitled “Lasting peace”. Netanyahu's perspective of peace is based on unconditional recognition of the Arab countries of Israel and its right to exist, as a start point to resolve the conflict. He calls for peace agreements with Israel, and the acceptance of normalization through declining economic sanctions. Netanyahu believes that normalization will result in resolving deep conflict between societies through peaceful coexistence, which is based on nothing, but the willingness for peace (Netanyāhū, 1993).

Netanyahu methodology was based on the Zionist mobilization of viewing the Arab world. He suggested that peace with the Arab countries should not include any pre-conditions that call for an establishment of a Palestinian independent state, as the partition of Jerusalem will be a direct threat for Israeli existence. Therefore, Arabs must be subjected to the reality of the existence of the Jewish state, as a neighboring country (Netanyāhū, 1993). The argument that Netanyahu debates, belongs to the reality of Gulf-Israeli normalization, which is based on nothing for return, with a full subjection to the reality of the existence of the Jewish state and a full ignorance to the Palestinian people right of self-determination and establishment of an independent state.

The argument of peacemaking with the Arab states has various perspectives for Netanyahu, where he believes that the geo-political changes in the region after the collapse of the Soviet Union had vanished the biggest strategic support for an Arab expected confrontation with Israel, in addition to the Iraq's defeat against the NATO, which showed the radical regimes that they should be subjected to the new middle east reality (Netanyāhū, 1993). Thus, Netanyahu clarified that peace with the Arab countries became possible after then, because

the Arab countries became more flexible to give up their traditional positions. He argues that when the price of the war gets higher, then it's better to increase the interest in preventing it and bring peace for the sake of economic development and bilateral cooperation.

Netanyahu believes that the more industrialized countries focus on mutual trade, the more possibility of marginalizing Arab countries on economic and political level. Therefore, peace with Israel will be a bridge for Arab countries to industrialize the western world, through using advanced technology and investments to gain various financial services and open new economic channels (Netanyāhū, 1993). However, Netanyahu's advertisement for peace is based on a pure economic perspective, where he speaks of the benefits of Jordan cooperating with Israel on the level of seawater desalination, with the possibility of Saudi Arabia to join the project. He also advertises for the advanced Israeli drip irrigation system, which could be used by countries such as Syria that lack water irrigation systems. He also clarifies those benefits of free tourism and the smoothness of the Arab people to approach Israel geographically, and benefit from its health institutions (Netanyāhū, 1993).

The "people to people" normalization" for Benjamin Netanyahu needs foreign external pressure on Arab regimes to practice democracy, which will allow a shift in the traditional Arab ideology toward Israel. Netanyahu claims that the PLO approach of peace at the time of signing Oslo agreement clashes with the Arab approach of western peace, where the PLO vision of peace is a tactical truce for a long-lasting war. Therefore, it is a threat for the existence of Israel (Netanyāhū, 1993). This analysis of peace approaches by Netanyahu illustrates that it is impossible nowadays to have a two- state solution. The normalization and peace agreements with the Arab countries should not be subjected to the Palestinian right of self-determination, as it threatens the existence of Israel.

## **2.6 The Palestinian Reaction to the Arab Normalization with Israel**

The de facto political situation within the Palestinian territories, West Bank and Gaza, due to the ongoing Israeli occupation and local political divide, forces us to navigate political positions on the controversial topic of normalizing relations with Israel, beyond the scope of official rhetoric of the Palestinian national authority. Accordingly, this study will examine this sensitive topic, by showcasing and highlighting positions and perceptions of an inter-related mix of actors within the Palestinian context, which would include different political factions, civil society, and grassroots-based movements.

The official position of the Palestinian National authority was limited to harsh statements by President Mahmoud Abbas and other officials in government. After the signing of the tripartite agreement which is known as “Abraham Accords”, between UAE-Israel-US to officially normalize relations between the Arab and the Jewish State. During a meeting in the headquarters in Ramallah, which was attended by the PLO’s executive committee, alongside personnel representing different Palestinian factions such as, PLF- The General Command and Hamas, president Abbas reiterated his refusal of the Abraham Accords and specifically called it a “a collectively detested stab in the back”, as he added that regardless of the accords, the Palestinian cause persists to be fundamental for the Islamic and Arab world, as well as the international community which stands strong behind a tangible political solution for Palestinian-Israeli conflict, in accordance international law and the UN charter. Lastly, he emphasized on the independence of the Palestinian leadership and its decision making, refusing any kind of tutelage (The Palestinian position on normalization - Musawa TV channel, 2020).

Senior Advisor to president Abbas, Nabil Abu Rudeineh, while reading an official statement from the headquarters of the Palestinian TV in Ramallah, reiterated the president’s position on the Abraham Accords, while considering that the claim that Israel stopped its annexation

plans in accordance with the agreement, is a mere fig leaf for UAE's desire for an official security and economic cooperation with the Jewish State. The statement also mentioned that this type of agreements with Israel is a "betrayal of Jerusalem, Al-Aqsa and the Palestinian cause". Additionally, Abu Rudeineh demanded from the UAE to cancel the agreement as it defies the Arab peace initiative of 2002 alongside Arab and Islamic summits. On the other hand, the Palestinian foreign ministry declared that it is recalling its ambassadors from UAE and Bahrain after their declaration that their respective states will normalize relation with Israel, in pursuant to the instructions of the Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas (France24, 2020).

In another press statement by the Palestinian ministry of foreign affairs and expatriates, Israel was accused of sabotaging any prospects for a peaceful solution in the region, which means further instability, as it is using these normalization agreements to replace the two-state solution and end any possibility for a realization of a Palestinian state. While also adding that Israel is attempting to steer things in line with its colonial interests, by moving the spotlight towards peripheral issues at the expense of Palestinian rights and a tangible solution for the conflict. (DW, 2020).

Against the backdrop of a shaky local Political atmosphere, The PA's statements, regardless of their harsh tone, seem like a futile reactionary rhetoric considering that they reinstated their ambassadors in both Bahrain and UAE a few months after recalling them, while not bothering with recalling their diplomats from Morocco and Sudan, which followed suit with the Arab normalization parade. This move was seen by analysts as a capitulation to the realities on the ground, alongside fearing any further clash with any Arab state. (Rojoub, A, 2020).

( Hamas's part is from the same source) When it comes to the reaction of other Palestinian political factions, Hamas' would be the most prominent since it is holding de facto power

over the government in Gaza. Hamas warned of the repercussions of these agreements on the Palestinian cause, alongside the Arab and Islamic region, and recommended not to follow through with them. The movement was clear in calling on all states who took part in this unfortunate process to retract, in order to be in line with the aspirations of the region's people who detest all kinds of the alleged coexistence and normalization with Israel. Hamas further emphasized that the Zionist entity is harnessing this process to continue with their oppression of the Palestinian people, by increasing on one hand, their violations of the sanctity of Al-Aqsa Mosque, and their repressive policies in the Palestinian territories. Hamas also called on the region's nations to restore their central role in defending Palestine and its cause. On the local arena, it called for the adoption of a strong and effective national strategy to confront all projects that aim to eviscerate the Palestinian cause. (Majed, M. 2021).

Notwithstanding, Hamas's zealous rhetoric proved to be different to the actions of the movement's actions, as their chief, Mr. Ismail Haniyeh, paid a visit to Morocco, for the sake of meeting official figures after the recent Gaza war, despite Morocco being the last of the four states to join the normalization train. This visit was not met with a great reaction from the Palestinian public, whom perhaps had better expectations from the militant movement, especially after what was publicly perceived as a symbolic and moral victory in the last armed confrontation with the Israeli army. (Eljehtimi, Al Mughrabi, 2021).

As for the Palestinian civil society, their reaction seems to be in coherence with the campaigns of one of the most popular grassroots movements in Palestine, which is the boycotts, divestment and sanctions (BDS). A scolding statement was posted on the BDS's website following UAE's declaration of normalizing with Israel, stating that this is the regime's gravest betrayal of the struggle for Palestinian liberation and self-determination. This is taking into consideration that the deal was announced as Israel was once again bombing the besieged and impoverished Gaza Strip and attacking Palestinians in the West

Bank, which is a sign that it would do nothing to diminish Israel's brutal assaults on the Palestinian people. The BDS statement continues by saying that this agreement comes in the context of the Emirati regime's perpetration of its own crimes against the people of Yemen, in partnership with the despotic Saudi regime and with full complicity of the US and several European states. The statement further claims that apartheid Israel has become a model for far-right and authoritarian regimes worldwide, exporting its «field-tested» weapons and expertise in militarism, systemic racism, mass surveillance, racial profiling, and bloody oppression, it is quickly losing support in mainstream liberal circles worldwide, including among younger Jewish Americans (Palestinian BDS National Committee,2020).

In the same statement, the BDS has called on the Arab public in general, specifically citizens of the UAE, firstly, to Boycott all activities, akin to the Dubai Expo which are that sponsored by the UAE regime, and secondly, boycott any corporation in the UAE that operates and/or make business deals in Israel. Lastly, refrain from travelling to present day Israel and/ or the occupied Palestinian territories, including religious visits to Jerusalem (Palestinian BDS National Committee, 2020).

## **2.7 Conclusion:**

The researcher highlighted three main aspects of peace building between Israel and three main parties of the conflict. The ultimate focus was to reveal the shift in the political and national aspect in the Arab world toward the recognition of Israel and building peace through political and diplomatic channels. The Camp David accords in 1978 witnessed the first break out of Arab nationalism doctrine led at that period by former Egyptian president Jamal Abdul Nasser, which forbade any possibility of recognizing Israel or even dealing with it, as it was considered the Ultimate enemy for Arab national and religious doctrine. It also brought new concept of how Israel shapes its peace with the Arab countries through normalization, and the use of economic and diplomatic interests that favorably overcomes the political concept

of conflict resolution in uprooting the main cause of the conflict, which is mainly the Palestinian cause. Having said that, Israel managed since then, back-to-back with the United States to advertise for peace on the account of the political rights of the Palestinian people. Thus, Normalization became its economic and diplomatic method to reach out peace with Arab countries. The Palestinian cause which was once the main doctrine of Arab nationalism and patriotism started to vanish since Egypt signed the Camp David Accords, and a new era of recognizing Israel took over.

The shift in conflict from militant resistance to the political and peaceful aspect for the Palestinian Liberation Organization in Oslo accords had a great impact on breaking out the forbidden politics with Israel. The researcher overviewed Oslo accords in details, to assist the reader to understand in the upcoming stages of the research, the nature of the relationship between Israel and the Palestinian Authority in all means of politics, economy, administrative distribution of roles and classification of land, and how it could be compared with the Gulf States-Israel perspective of normalization, as the Palestinian are in direct conflict with Israel, living at the same territories in the west bank and Gaza, sharing all means of life with a sensitive relationship between the oppressed with the oppressor.

The researcher also managed to highlight the peace treaty between Jordan and Israel (Wadi Araba), as it came on the heels of Oslo accords with a different political atmosphere compared to the Camp David accords. The researcher also highlighted the direct role of Jordan on the Palestinian cause since signing the peace treaty to be able to connect the essence of the Palestinian cause, compared to the direct benefit of the Arab and Gulf States recent normalization with Israel, based on its direct impact on Palestinian right of self-determination and statehood. These factors will outline the tools of measurement for the direct impact of normalization of the Gulf states with Israel since Trump's administration

were inaugurated, compared to Jordan and Egypt's status of peace building with Israel at a certain period of time with different political and national doctrines.

The transformation of conflict in the Arab-Israeli context was introduced into a new stage of economic cooperation and political aspiration. The Israeli vision stays within its national and religious context, where it interprets normalization as a low-cost price for its continuous occupation for the Palestinian people, and its ongoing violation of human rights and international community resolutions. However, The Gulf States paid a very critical price, not on economic level, but on the upcoming Arab national orientation. The idea of not acknowledging Israel as a brutal occupier, and the abandonment of the Palestinian rights of a statehood and self-determination after decades of a bloody conflict, makes the morals of the Gulf States monarchies subjected to various patriotic questions. Gulf and Arab normalizing countries brought the Arab patriotism into a new level of low morals and least commitment to the Palestinian people rights at one hand, and question their commitment to human rights and human dignity on the other.

The Palestinian government relied on the Arab willingness to end the occupation since decades, but since the former Egyptian president Sadat signed the Camp David peace agreement with Israel. He opened doors for political and national interpretation of Arab nationalism at one hand, and the vision toward Israel on the other. People to People normalization was never reliable on the political well of Arab and Gulf states. It was always a national redline for Arab people, but lately during the norm of normalization with Gulf States. Few voices were raised from Gulf States acknowledging Israel as the Ultimate ally, and denying the Palestinian rights. These voices were a red alert for Palestinians to acknowledge that they walk alone, with the stab in their back.

The debate regarding normalization in parallel with acknowledging the Palestinian rights was never viable on the political and diplomatic level. Rights are never subjected to political

changes in the region nor giving up on the national and human cause of the conflict. Gulf States and normalizing Arab countries did not only pay the price based on the national and patriotic rhetoric, but also on the way they gain their interest back from the Trump's administration, where their political and economic interests were legitimized on the account of the Palestinian blood and ongoing suffer.

The narrative of comparing Oslo agreement with the recent normalization norm differs in terms of political and national context. Israel as an occupying power controls the daily life of the Palestinians. The researcher went through Oslo agreement by details to establish a connection on the reader's mind to acknowledge that Oslo agreement disregard the debate, of its validity determines a direct relationship between the Palestinian government and Israel based on managing the daily lives of the Palestinians, as Israel controls water resources, electricity, borders and many other main standards of life. Thus, the political cause of Oslo has a different political interpretation than normalizing Gulf and Arab states' relationship with Israel, which does not justify at any level the recent normalization norm. The researcher's previous argument does not back up the cause and effect of the Oslo agreement, but highlights the debate of a discipline and rational discussion regarding conflict resolution tools and methods.

### **3 Chapter III**

#### **Methodology**

##### **3.1 Study Population and Sample**

The study population consists of academics, civil society, NGOs, and graduate students in the field of social sciences. However, due to the large size of the community, and the inability to extract a precise statistics of the population. The researcher chose an intentional sample from the study community. The size of the sample is (180) individuals. This sample was chosen to represent the study community, especially its domains. However, due to the Corona Virus pandemic, and the declaration of a state of emergency in the Palestinian territories since March 2020 until the date of the completion of this study. The study tool was converted into an electronic questionnaire, which was distributed electronically on the 16<sup>th</sup> of December 2021, and submitted on the 25<sup>th</sup> of December 2021, with a sufficient number of answers that have been obtained. The questionnaire included (141) answers, with a response rate of (79.4%), which fits perfectly with the study methodology.

##### **3.2 Method**

The methodology of the study depends on quantitative method of analysis. Fact's mapping is employed through a meticulously designed questionnaire. The target sample for questionnaire was mostly for academics, civil society, non-governmental organizations, and post graduate students with social sciences field. The questionnaire targeted more precisely individuals with social sciences backgrounds, which enriches the content of the study. The researcher is expected to give recommendation for Palestinian policy makers, and Palestinian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates. The recommendations highlights an urgent political strategy to overcome the harm of the Gulf-Israeli normalization on the future of the Palestinian cause. However, the justification of the research is based on the current

stagnation of the peace process, where the Palestinian government and leadership are isolated, with almost no political strategy to overcome the impact of the Gulf-Israeli normalization, whether on local or international levels.

3.3 **Study Framework.** Study framework has been adopted as figure (1):




Figure 1: Study Framework

### 3.4 Data Collection

The researcher designed, developed and administered a questionnaire as a tool for data collection, where it encourages frank and free answers from the respondents through a smooth and soft mechanism. The questionnaire was developed in parallel with the relevant literature, to maintain an academic reference for the essence of the study.

#### 3.4.1 Description of the tool

The tool is composed of the following parts (see the questionnaire in Appendix no.2):

- **Part One: Demographic factors.**

Gender, age group, Academic Level, Field of study.

- **Part Two: Dimensions of the study.**

- The political impact of Gulf-Israeli normalization on Palestinian foreign policy.
- The possibility of urging other Arab countries to approach Israel.
- The reaction of the Palestinian foreign policy post the Gulf-Israeli normalization.
- The possibility of unity between Gaza and the West Bank post the Gulf-Israeli normalization.

- Table No. (3.1) shows the order of the questionnaire items according to the dimensions and axes of the study:

**Table 3.1: Distribution of the questionnaire items according to the axes**

<i>Item</i>	<i>Total</i>
<b>Part One</b>	
demographic factors	4
<b>Part Two</b>	
The political impact of Gulf-Israeli normalization on Palestinian foreign policy.	11
<b>Part Three</b>	
The possibility of urging other Arab countries to approach Israel.	10
<b>Part Four</b>	
The reaction of the Palestinian foreign policy post the Gulf-Israeli normalization	10
<b>Part Five</b>	
The possibility of unity between Gaza and the West Bank post the Gulf-Israeli normalization	10
<i>The total number of the paragraphs of the questionnaire</i>	<i>45</i>

#### 3.4.2 The validity of the study tool:

The validity of the study tool was verified through presenting the questionnaire to (3) specialized referees whose details are presented in Appendix No. (1), in order to ensure that the questionnaire is suitable for what it was prepared for.

The feedback that the researcher received from the referees are mainly concentrated on adjusting the format of the questionnaire, and editing fragment sentences for a clear and focused questionnaire that directly answers the questions of the study. The amendments and recommendations had a major role in improving the formulation of the paragraphs, in direct relevance with the aims and objectives of the study.

The study validity tool was also measured statistically through distributing the questionnaire to an exploratory sample of the study population, which included (30) research subjects,

that is subsequently excluded from the total sample of the study, where statistical analysis was conducted, questions answered and hypotheses verified.

Through the exploratory sample, a factor analysis test was conducted for the study tool items, as shown in the table (3.2):

**Table 3.2: The results of the factorial analysis test for the study questionnaire items**

<i>No.</i>	<i>Extraction</i>	<i>No.</i>	<i>Extraction</i>	<i>No.</i>	<i>Extraction</i>	<i>No.</i>	<i>Extraction</i>
1	.716	12	.651	23	.816	34	.792
2	.798	13	.724	24	.632	35	.683
3	.814	14	.692	25	.624	36	.674
4	.650	15	.727	26	.778	37	.605
5	.744	16	.713	27	.643	38	.715
6	.817	17	.816	28	.642	39	.763
7	.671	18	.683	29	.790	40	.707
8	.647	19	.734	30	.816	41	.814
9	.648	20	.819	31	.686		
10	.621	21	.757	32	.636		
11	.800	22	.854	33	.733		

Looking into the previous Table (3.2). It is clear that all results of the factorial analysis of the study tool are related to the main question of the study “The impact of Gulf-Israeli normalization on the Palestinian cause”, which is determined through high percentage of saturation. The overall relevance of the questions to the study is above (60%). Thus, the questions are compatible with each other at one hand, and efficiently answers the question of the study.

### 3.4.3 Reliability:

The verification of the reliability of the study tool was conducted through calculating the internal consistency coefficient (Cronbach Alpha) for the questionnaire axes. The following table (3.3) shows the results:

**Table 3.3: Cronbach's alpha coefficient for the questionnaire axes**

<i>Item</i>	<i>N of Item</i>	<i>Alpha</i>
The Reliability of the political impact of Gulf-Israeli normalization on Palestinian foreign policy.	11	.730
The Reliability of the possibility of urging other Arab countries to approach Israel.	10	.682
The Reliability of the reaction of the Palestinian foreign policy post the Gulf-Israeli normalization	10	.796
The Reliability of the possibility of unity between Gaza and the West Bank post the Gulf-Israeli normalization	10	.588
<i>Total Reliability for the Questioner</i>	<i>41</i>	<i>.808</i>

According to the foregoing, the total reliability value of the study tool for all axes is (0.808). The overall result shows a moderate degree of reliability. It is a great indicator of the connection built between the questions of the study, and the developed questionnaire.

### 3.4.4 Analysis of the Tool

Using the statistical program (SPSS V.26), the study tool was analyzed through the following tests (Dwedery , 2000):

- Factor Analysis Test: it measures the relationship between set of factors, through applying set of tests to a number of examinees. It also calculates the correlation coefficient to represent the linear dependence of two variables.
- Reliability Analysis (Alpha): it measures the degree of stability or internal consistency of items or variables in a composite index that was put on the summation

scale. It is generally used to measure the degree of stability of multiple items that is internally divided, where Alpha measures internal consistency.

- Standard regression coefficient test: it is a mathematical method to estimate the relationship between two or more variables, in terms of units used to measure the relationship between (dependent) variables, which is called regression models.
- One-way ANOVA test: it is the process of calculating the variance between samples and the variance within samples combined. It is used to find the differences between more than two groups, taking into consideration that the statistical parametric characteristics are available. The significance of the differences in this scale is measured through the value of (F).

### 3.5 Sample Properties

The characteristics of the study sample according to demographic factors are as follows:

- **Gender:**

The percentage of Male is (51.7 %), while the percentage of Females is (48.3 %), which is shown in the following table (3.4):

**Table 3.4: Characteristics of the study sample according to the gender factor**

<i>Factor</i>	<i>Value</i>	<i>Freq.</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Gender	Male	74	51.7%
	Female	69	48.3%
	<i>Total</i>	<i>143</i>	<i>100%</i>

- **Age Group:**

According to the age group, the top age group in the study sample is 26-40 years old, representing (72.7%), while the lowest proportion is over 40, representing (10.5%), which is shown in the following table (3.5):

**Table 3.5: Characteristics of the study sample according to the Age Group factor**

<i>Factor</i>	<i>Value</i>	<i>Freq.</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Age Group	18-25	24	16.8 %
	26-40	104	72.7 %
	40 and above	15	10.5 %
<i>Total</i>		<i>143</i>	<i>100%</i>

- **Academic Level**

According to the academic level, the highest percentage of the study sample is for master's qualification, representing (50.3%), while the lowest percentage is for Ph.D. degree, representing (13.3%), which is shown in the following table (6):

**Table 3.6: Characteristics of the study sample according to the Academic Level factor**

<i>Factor</i>	<i>Value</i>	<i>Freq.</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Academic Level	BA	52	36.4 %
	MA	72	50.3 %
	Ph.D.	19	13.3 %
<i>Total</i>		<i>143</i>	<i>100%</i>

**Field of work**

According to the Field of work, the highest percentage is for the private sector, representing (37.1%), while the lowest percentage is for free lancers, representing (7.0%), which is shown in the following table (3.7):

**Table 3.7: Characteristics of the study sample according to the field of work factor**

<i>Factor</i>	<i>Value</i>	<i>Freq.</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Field of Study	Public Sector	46	32.2 %
	Private sector	53	37.1 %
	Ngo's	20	14.0 %
	Free lancing	10	7.0 %
	other	14	9.8 %
<i>Total</i>		<i>143</i>	<i>100%</i>

## 4 Chapter IV

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### Findings of the Study

#### 4.1 Introduction

This chapter includes a presentation of the results of the study, which aims to answer questions of the study entitled “the impact of Gulf-Israeli normalization on the Palestinian cause.” Having said that, five-point Likert scale was used, through calculating the extent and length of the category, with a value of (0.80), as shown in the following table (4.1) (Abu Saleh, 2001).

**Table 4.1: Weighted Mean**

<i>Range Value</i>	<i>Likert Scale</i>	<i>Verbal Interpretation</i>	<i>Shortcut Degree</i>
1.00-1.49	Strongly Disagree	Very low	V. L
1.50-2.49	Disagree	low	L
2.50-3.49	Neutral	Moderate	M
3.50-4.49	Agree	High	H
4.50-5.00	Strongly Agree	Very high	V. H

#### 4.2 Findings

##### **RQ1: What is the Political Impact of the Gulf-Israeli Normalization on the Palestinian Foreign Policy?**

The mean and standard deviation of the answers were extracted for each question of the study, in addition to the total percentage of the impact of Israeli-Gulf normalization on Palestinian foreign policy, and the results were as in the following table (4.2):

**Table 4.2: Means and Standard Deviation of the Political Impact of Gulf-Israeli Normalization on the Palestinian Foreign Policy**

#	Statement	Mean	Std. Deviation	percent	Degree
1.	Normalization fails the effort for two states solution	3.86	.961	77.2 %	H
2.	Normalization limits the role of Palestinian diplomacy with normalizing Gulf states	3.86	.877	77.2 %	H
3.	Normalization affects normalizing gulf states voting in the United nations in favor of Palestine	3.80	.916	76.0 %	H
4.	Normalization prevents the annexation of the west bank	2.94	.944	58.8 %	M
5.	Normalization prevents the implementation of the deal of the century	2.39	.986	47.8 %	L
6.	Israel maintains status quo in the west bank and Gaza	3.57	.900	71.4 %	H
7.	Arab initiative is no more valid for two states solution	3.94	.846	78.8 %	H
8.	Political willingness for conflict resolution exceeds the role of international law	3.81	.787	76.2 %	H
9.	Palestinian diplomacy requires reformation	4.43	.783	88.6 %	H
10.	One state solution could be an alternative post normalization	3.36	.938	67.2 %	M
11.	Palestinian foreign policy fails the Palestinian people	4.20	.890	84.0 %	H
<i>The total degree of the political impact of the Gulf-Israeli normalization on Palestinian foreign policy</i>		<i>3.77</i>	<i>.388</i>	<i>75.4 %</i>	<i>H</i>

The previous table shows the total degree of the political impact of Israeli-Gulf normalization on the Palestinian foreign policy, with a mean of (3.77) and a standard deviation of (0.388), with a high response rate (75.4%).

Among the previous results, the highest response questions from the respondents were question no. (9), with response rate of (88.6%). This percentage reflects a high agreement among the respondents regarding the need of reformation in the Palestinian diplomacy, to be able to confront the normalization wave, as well as question no. (11), with a high response rate of (84.0%), which indicates a high degree of approval that the Palestinian foreign policy has failed the Palestinian people.

Question no. (7), reflects a high response rate of (78.8%), indicating that the Arab initiative is no longer valid for a two-state solution post the Israeli normalization agreement with the UAE. As for the lowest questions in terms of responses. Question no. (5), comes with a low degree and response rate of (47.8%), which reflects low number of responses regarding the fact that normalization with the UAE, prevented the implementation of the deal of the century.

Although, question no. (4), comes with a moderate response rate of (58.8%), which reflects a moderate degree of respondents' who agrees upon the assumption that the Emirati's normalization with Israel prevented the annexation of the West Bank to Israel.

Question no. (10) Also comes to a moderate degree, with a response rate of (67.2%), reflecting a moderate agreement that the one-state solution could be an alternative to the two-state solution.

As per the given results, one can notice that the political impact of the Gulf-Israeli normalization on the Palestinian foreign policy is great, with a direct and negative impact on the interests of the Palestinian foreign policy.

**RQ2: What are the Possibilities of urging other Arab states to approach Israel?**

The mean and standard deviation of the answers were extracted for each question measured in this field, in addition to extracting the total degree of the possibility of urging other Arab states to approach Israel, and the results were as follows: Table (4.3):

**Table 4.3: Mean and standard deviation of the possibility of urging other Arab states to approach Israel**

#	Statement	Mean	Std. Deviation	percent	Degree
12.	Abraham accords encourages other Arab and gulf states to normalization their relationship with Israel	3.72	.875	74.4 %	H
13.	Israel is capable of approaching other Arab and gulf states	4.14	.810	82.8 %	H
14.	Palestinian cause is no more an Arab national priority	3.89	1.056	77.8 %	H
15.	Arab states approach Israel for economic interests	3.78	.974	75.6 %	H
16.	Israel normalization agreements with Arab and gulf states do not exceed economic cooperation.	2.50	.985	50.0 %	M
17.	Arab commitment to the Palestinian cause is no more a national orientation	3.93	.869	78.6 %	H
18.	Normalization is only on governmental level	2.39	.972	47.8 %	L
19.	People to people normalization is not possible	3.15	.934	63.0 %	M
20.	Palestinians lost hope in any possible support of the normalizing countries for the Palestinian cause	3.71	.924	74.2 %	H
21.	normalization agreements with Israel become an address for all Arab and Gulf states to approach peace in case they gave up on their Moral commitment to the Palestinian national cause	3.66	.896	73.2 %	H
<b>Total Degree of the possibilities of urging other Arab states to approach Israel</b>		<b>3.48</b>	<b>.417</b>	<b>69.6 %</b>	<b>M</b>

The results show that the total degree of the possibility of urging other Arab states to approach Israel is at a moderate degree, as the given arithmetic mean is (3.48), with a standard deviation of (0.417). However, the total response rate on this field constituted (69.6%), which refers to a moderate rate.

Looking into the previous table, the study concluded that the highest responses go for question no. (13) With a percentage of (82.8%), which reflects a strong approval among the respondents that Israel has the ability to approach other Arab and Gulf states. Question no. (17) Also comes with a high approval rate of (78.6%), referring to a strong approval among the respondents that the Arab commitment to the Palestinian cause is no longer a national orientation for these countries. Thus, the prioritization of the Palestinian cause on the Arab national agenda has been overwhelmed by various regional and international interests. Having said that, same results apply to question no. (14), which comes with a high response rate of (77.8%), showing a great agreement among the respondents that the Palestinian issue is no longer an Arab national priority.

Following up on same results, one can notice that the lowest response goes for question no. (18), with a low approval rate of (47.8%), reflecting that there is a low approval among the respondents that normalization is only at governmental level. This is considered as a negative and dangerous indicator, as normalization could be transformed into a new level of people to people deals, which could replace the image of the brutal colonizer into a peace figure. Question no. (16) Comes with a moderate approval degree of (50.0%), which shows the moderate approval of respondents regarding the shape of the Israeli normalization agreements with Arab and Gulf States in terms of economic cooperation, but rather goes beyond this cooperation into other fields of cultural, social and political normalization. Question no. (19) Also refers to a moderate rate of (63.0%), which indicates to a balanced

agreement among respondents that people to people normalization is possible to a certain degree.

Through the previous results, it becomes clear to the researcher that there are dangerous and direct threats to the Palestinian cause through Israel's great ability to approach different Arab and Gulf states, especially in light of the decline of Arab national interest toward the Palestinians cause. Having said that, Israel aspirations of normalization with Arab and Gulf States go beyond a political normalization, but rather a cultural and social normalization. Israel attempts to adjust its image through normalization, reveals the Israeli perspective of peace based on economic interests at one hand, and its political orientation in the region through moving from the sight of an ultimate enemy to the Arab states into a political and economic alliance, with no political calculations regarding the Palestinian cause.

**RQ3: How the Palestinian Foreign Policy will react post the Gulf-Israeli Normalization?**

The mean and standard deviation of the answers were extracted for each question measured in this field, in addition to extracting the total degree of the Palestinian foreign policy reaction post the Gulf-Israeli normalization, and the results were as follows: Table (4.4):

**Table 4.4: Mean and standard deviation of the Palestinian foreign policy reaction post the gulf-Israeli normalization**

#	Statement	Mean	Std. Deviation	Percent	Degree
22.	Palestinian government has no clear strategy post normalization	3.62	.964	72.4 %	H
23.	Palestinian diplomacy could prevent more normalization agreements	2.67	.940	53.4 %	M
24.	Palestinian government lack political alternatives to confront normalization	3.62	.985	72.4 %	H

#	Statement	Mean	Std. Deviation	Percent	Degree
25.	Palestinian people have no more faith in the normalizing countries agenda toward the Palestinian cause	3.77	.976	75.4 %	H
26.	Palestinian government diplomacy lacks efficiency in dealing with normalizing countries	3.69	.973	73.8 %	H
27.	International law failed the Palestinian government diplomacy	3.66	.943	73.2 %	H
28.	Palestinian government maintain its relationship with normalization countries post normalization	3.50	.895	70.0 %	H
29.	Palestinian foreign policy failed the Palestinian people ambition of a statehood	3.67	.984	73.4 %	H
30.	Palestinian government lack political alternatives beside the two-state solution	3.61	.986	72.2 %	H
31.	Palestinian government foreign policy requires reformation.	4.01	.938	80.2 %	H
<b>The total degree of the Palestinian foreign policy reaction after the Gulf-Israeli normalization</b>		<b>3.58</b>	<b>.613</b>	<b>71.6 %</b>	<b>H</b>

Looking into the results given in the previous table (4.4), it is clear that the total approval degree of the Palestinian foreign policy reaction post the Israeli normalization comes at a high level, where the mean reached (3.58), with a standard deviation of (0.613) and high response rate of (71.6%). This means that there has been a strong political reaction against the Gulf-Israeli normalization.

The above table shows that the most answers of respondents' is presented in question no. (31) With a high approval degree of (80.2%), regarding the need for reformation in the Palestinian foreign policy.

Question no. (25) Also reflects high approval rate (75.4%) among the respondents' opinion of their lost faith in normalizing countries agenda's. Thus, it is clear that recent normalization agreement is an indicator of national separation based on the view to the other.

Question no. (26), comes with high approval rate of (73.8%), stating that the Palestinian government diplomacy lacks efficiency in dealing with normalizing countries. This is a clear indicator that the issue is not with the Palestinian diplomacy itself, but with the mechanism of dealing with it, through shifting traditional diplomacy into a creative one.

As for the least questions in terms of responses. Question no. (23) Comes with a moderate approval degree rate of (53.4%), which reflects the average respondents' opinions regarding the ability of Palestinian diplomacy to prevent further normalization agreements in the future.

Question no. (28) Has a high degree rate of approval according to the study scale (70.0%), but it was among the least paragraphs in terms of responses. Therefore, fewer respondents highly approved the assumption that the Palestinian government would maintain its relationship with normalization countries post normalization. It is clear that answers have been based on facts, as the Palestinian government sent back its ambassadors to normalizing countries after withdrawing them.

The overall analysis based on the given answers for the question entitled "Palestinian foreign policy reaction post the Gulf-Israeli normalization" is strong and aggressive. However, the results shows the need for major and structural reformation in the Palestinian diplomacy, and major changes in the adopted foreign policy toward normalization countries, as the Palestinian people has no more faith in their political and national agenda's toward the Palestinian cause.

**RQ4: Will the Gulf-Israeli normalization encourages a Palestinian unity between Gaza and the west bank?**

The average and standard deviation of the answers were extracted for each question that measured in this field, in addition to extracting the total degree of the level of possible unity

between West Bank and Gaza post the Gulf-Israeli normalization; and the results were as follows: See Table (4.5):

**Table 4.5: Mean and Standard Deviation of the level of possible unity between West Bank and Gaza post the Gulf-Israeli normalization**

#	Statement	Mean	Std. Deviation	Percent	Degree
32.	The geographical separation between Gaza and west bank deepens the Palestinian division	3.87	.906	77.4 %	H
33.	Normalization will encourage a Palestinian internal re-conciliation	3.06	.970	61.2 %	M
34.	Israel has a clear interest in preventing a Palestinian internal Re-conciliation	4.12	.852	82.4 %	H
35.	Palestinian internal re-conciliation is not a priority	2.92	.979	58.4 %	M
36.	Palestinian unity is not possible	2.24	.986	44.8 %	L
37.	Hamas's strategy cannot meet with Palestinian government strategy for a statehood	3.31	.996	66.2 %	M
38.	Both Hamas and Palestinian authority self- interests prevents a unity between Gaza and west bank	3.94	.958	78.8 %	H
39.	Gaza and west bank political reconciliation cannot be achieved due to their different political orientation	3.43	.946	68.6 %	M
40.	Unity between Gaza and west bank only could be achieved through general elections	3.28	.974	65.6 %	M
41.	Palestinian people lost faith in any possibility of achieving reconciliation based on a clear national strategy to be adopted by conflicting parties	3.80	.973	76.0 %	H
<i>The total degree of the level of possibility of unity between Gaza and the West Bank after the Gulf-Israeli normalization</i>		<i>3.39</i>	<i>.387</i>	<i>67.8 %</i>	<i>M</i>

Looking into the previous table, one can notice that the total degree of the possible unity between Gaza and the West Bank post the Gulf-Israeli normalization is at a moderate degree, as the mean is measured at (3.39), with a standard deviation of (0.387), and a moderate degree of (67.8%). This mean that the respondents views the Gulf-Israeli Normalization as a motivational move to a certain limit into encouraging a possible unity between West bank and Gaza.

The results of the previous table show that the highest answer in terms of answered questions goes for question no. (34), with a high response rate of (82.4%), which confirms the Israeli interest in preventing reconciliation between the west bank and Gaza. It is well acknowledged by the respondents that Israel is implementing divide and rule, to enhance its security management of the west bank, and maintain the siege on the Gaza strip.

Question no. (38), also comes with high degree rate of responses (78.8%), indicating that that there are self- interests for conflicting parties (Fatah and Hamas), which prevents them from conducting a serious and actual reconciliation that may lead to unification between the west bank and Gaza.

Paragraph no. (32) Shows that there is a significant role of the geographical separation in consolidating the division between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, as per the responses given with an average a rate of (77.4%).

As for the least questions in terms of responses. Question no. (36), reflects a low rate of responses (44.8%), showing that a small percentage of respondents believes that a Palestinian unity is not possible, which reflects the necessity of reconciliation between conflicting parties. The necessity of national unity is derived from the Palestinian basic needs liberation and self-determination, as a tool to re-unify against the occupation.

Question no. (35), comes with a moderate response rate of (58.4%), indicating that achieving internal Palestinian reconciliation is not a priority, which means that achieving reconciliation is not the top priority but among the priorities of the Palestinians. Thus, this result could be derived from the fact that Palestinians lack trust or faith in ruling parties, whether on west bank or Gaza to achieve their basic and national interests, speaking of improving the level of life, and achieving their political goal of liberation and self-determination.

As for question no. (33) That comes to a moderate degree rate, with a (61. 2%).The respondents showed a moderate agreement toward the encouragement of the Gulf-Israeli normalization on a Palestinian internal reconciliation. Thus, the moderate degree may refer to the wobbling belief in the willingness of conflict parties for reconciliation, disregard direct impact of normalization. It is more of an internal orientation of respondents based on their view on the Palestinian internal situation.

Question no. (40) Indicates that there is a moderate degree of approval among the respondents, with a percentage rate of (65.6%), that the internal Palestinian reconciliation would be achieved only through holding general elections in the Palestinian territories. The results that are not crucial in terms of high percentage, shows that the Palestinian people are in need for elections but the 2006 experience affected the assumption that elections may total resolve the conflict between Gaza, and west bank, as it has been deepen even with the structure of the authority and the ideological orientation.

As for question no. (37), it shows a moderate degree of approval (66.2%) that Hamas' strategy cannot meet with the Palestinian government's strategy of statehood. This reflects a variation in the political view of a Palestinian perspective of statehood. The Palestinian government political view does not meet to a certain level with Hamas views, as Hamas ideology is derived from and the Muslim brotherhood, and refuses to be part of the Palestinian liberation organization. However, question no. (39) Also shows an average

degree of approval (68.6%), that there is no possibility of Palestinian reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas due to the difference in their political orientation.

### 4.3 Testing the Study Hypothesis

#### **H<sub>1</sub>-1: There is a significant Impact of the Gulf-Israeli Normalization on the Palestinian Foreign Policy.**

The mechanism of testing and validating the hypothesis has been processed through collecting needed data after validating the questionnaire. The data for the first question of the study shows a significant impact of Israeli-Gulf normalization on the Palestinian foreign policy (75.4%). The Gulf-Israeli normalization revealed major failure in the making of Palestinian foreign policy, which requires a direct and major reformation to overcome any upcoming potential harm.

The sensitive timing of the Gulf- Israeli normalization, post the declaration of the deal of the century, and the direct breaching of the Arab initiative weakened the possibility of reaching a two-state solution. Having said that, with regard to the Arab initiative and the relationship with Israel, Gulf-Israeli normalization came at a time when Palestinian foreign policy was preoccupied with no clear strategy to overcome the Deal of the Century and its political /economic repercussions, as the previous American administration decided to cut the financial assistance directed to UNRWA, and Palestinian government. The Palestinian government reaction post the normalization did not exceed a diplomatic protest, through withdrawing its ambassador from normalizing countries, where they were sent back at a later stage with no pre-conditions nor justified clarification. The above hypothesis H<sub>1</sub>-1 confirms the validity of the negative impact of Gulf-Israeli normalization on the Palestinian foreign policy.

**H<sub>1</sub>-2: The Gulf-Israeli Normalization has a significant effect on urging more Arab countries to approach Israel.**

Looking into the results of the second question of the study, and the data provided by the respondents; the above Hypothesis H<sub>1</sub>-2 has been verified. It is clear that the Gulf-Israeli normalization has a significant effect on urging other Arab countries to approach Israel. The results were moderate, but it exists to a certain degree. However, there is a great possibility in the future to maximize such results, upon the ongoing opening of diplomatic channels between Israel and various Arab and Gulf states, in addition to the exposure of normalization to go beyond the limit of political dialogue into economic cooperation, and cultural exchange.

The acknowledgment of the Gulf-Israeli normalization agreements in the conflict resolution context does not exceed a temporary vision of peace, which is based on nothing but an economic and cultural exposure of Israel into the Gulf and Arab states to change its typical image of a colonizer into a moral alliance to confront the Iranian threat in the region. For normalizing Arab and Gulf states, normalization is their path in exchange of economic and military political gifts from the American administration. Thus, the political context of the Arab-Israeli conflict that is originally based on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has been overwhelmed by unilateral interests for certain Gulf and Arab states on the expense of the roots of the conflict, that is derived from Arab view of Israel as a brutal colonizer at one hand, and the long lasting morals of commitment to the Palestinian cause, due to its national and religious depth in the Arab conscious. However, upon the recent political changes in the region and the collapse of the historical commitment to the Palestinian cause based on the previous analysis. More Arab and Gulf states are expected to approach Israel within the political context of mutual interest.

The captured peace in the Israeli political context is ultimately a low price occupation for the Palestinian people. The argument of the succession of the Israeli diplomacy in approaching Arab and Gulf states won't be valid without an Arab collusion and breaching of their political, moral and religious commitment to the Palestinian cause. Israel offered nothing but a clear and obvious justification of a long lasting relationship behind the scenes, which could further explain the ongoing occupation of Palestine, with no political Arab willingness to confront Israel, even with the least possible and realistic approaches. In contrast, they paraphrased the Israeli colonization context into a status of acceptance and encouragement of approaching Israel on the expense of a bigger image of an Arab national collusion.

**H1-3: The Gulf-Israeli normalization has a negative impact on encouraging a Palestinian unity between West Bank and Gaza.**

The previous hypothesis has been tested; through using the data provided by the respondents to the questionnaire. Thus, Hypothesis H1-4 has been proven correct and verified. The data shows that there is a pure Israeli interest in maintaining the Palestinian division and preventing an internal reconciliation. The Gulf-Israeli normalization, introduced a new stage of mutual interest in maintain the Palestinian division, within the formula of confronting Iran's expansion in the region.

The clear announcement of Hamas regarding the Iranian support for its military wing, and its close relationship with its political leadership, pushed further into a status of hatred and political confrontation between Gulf States monarchies/Israel and Hamas leadership. Thus, the Palestinian government representation on international level has two main political gaps, where it has to gain legitimacy through elections, and involve Hamas in the formation of a new government. In contrast, Hamas partially refuses some of the Palestinian government

pre-conditions to join the government and maintain the division between west bank and Gaza, with two separated governments.

Since signing the Gulf-Israeli normalization agreements. Arab and Gulf States financial support for the Palestinian government decreased to score 0% in 2020. The pre-conditions of imposing the deal of the century in return of economic and financial aid, left the Palestinian government with no choice but to confront the political willingness of the United States administration, with the ultimate support of the Gulf States to impose the deal of the century that calls for economic resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The internal Palestinian conflict with its complicated analysis, weakened the Palestinian government foreign policy to confront normalization.

## **5 Chapter V**

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### **Analysis of Findings, Recommendations and Conclusion**

#### **Introduction**

This chapter includes a presentation of the study results; with special attention dedicated to answer its questions and hypotheses, in addition to achieve its objectives. Moreover, this chapter also analyzes the results of the study, through comparing them with previous studies that has been done in same field. It also suggests recommendations for Palestinian policy makers, and Palestinian ministry of foreign affairs.

#### **5.1 Interpretation of Study Results**

The following is a review of the findings of the study based on the sequence of questions.

##### **5.1.1 Interpretation of Results Related to Question RQ1:**

- The results showed that the overall level of the political impact of the Gulf-Israeli normalization on the Palestinian foreign policy was significant. The degree of this impact reached (75.4%) as most of what the respondents viewed.
- The results showed that (88.6%) of the respondents viewed significant weakness in the Palestinian diplomacy ability to confront the Gulf-Israeli normalization. They also agreed that there is an urgent need for reforms in the Palestinian diplomacy.
- As indicated by the results, there is a large gap between the satisfaction of the Palestinian people and the performance of the Palestinian foreign policy concerning the Gulf-Israeli normalization, which is viewed by percentage rate as of (84.0%).

- The results also showed that the Israeli-Gulf normalization has weakened the Arab and Palestinian position in accepting a future two-state solution as (78.8%) of the respondents viewed, which widens the rift in the Arab ranks towards accepting or considering this solution.
- The results showed that the Israeli-Gulf normalization had no noticeable political benefits except for Israel. Moreover, they showed that the normalization did not come as an attempt to prevent the Israeli annexation of the Palestinian territories in 1967 in the west bank, as it has been claimed by normalizing countries.
- The results also showed that normalization was part of the deal of the century and not against it. In addition, they showed that normalization never aimed at preventing the deal of the century, but was rather one of its terms. Only (47.8%) of respondents believed that normalization prevented the passing of the deal of the century.

#### **5.1.2 Interpretation of Results Related to Question RQ2:**

- The results showed that the general level of the possibility of urging other Arab countries to approach Israel post the Gulf-Israeli normalization was moderate, with (69.6%) of the respondents supporting that.
- The results of the study showed that the general trend in Israeli politics relied on achieving peace without offering anything substantial, and that Israel lured many Arab countries to sign normalization agreements with it, with (82.8%) of the respondents agreeing with these statements.
- (78.6%) of the respondents believed that there is a weakness in the Arab national commitment to the Palestinian cause.

- (77.8%) of the respondents believed that the Palestinian issue is no longer a priority for Arab countries, with other issues being more prominent for those countries now.
- The results showed that Gulf-Israeli normalization agreements are not only at the governmental level, but in other fields and sectors as well. The percentage of those who believed that it is only at the governmental level was only (47.8%).
- The results of the study showed that the Gulf-Israeli normalization would not only consist of economic cooperation, which is what (50.0%) of the respondents see, but it will also exceed to different fields.
- The results showed that the level of people to people normalization in these agreements reached an average of (63.0%), which means that the Gulf States tend to make these normalization agreements, exceeded their political/economic role into individual and public level.

### **5.1.3 Interpretation of Results Related to Question RQ3:**

- The results of the study showed a significant reaction in the Palestinian foreign policy post normalization, which were viewed as of (77.1%). These figures shows that political movements were made, but with no clear strategy to overcome the harness.
- (75.4%) of the respondents stated that the Palestinian people lost confidence in normalizing countries. They also believe that normalizing countries' agendas toward the Palestinian cause are no longer trusted by the Palestinian people.
- (73.8%) of the respondents believed that the efficiency of Palestinian diplomacy with normalizing countries is weak, and there is a great need to improve Palestinian diplomacy efforts towards these countries.

- The results showed that the ability of the Palestinian diplomacy to face Gulf-Israeli normalization agreements was at its lowest level, as of (53.4%).
- The results showed that the Palestinian government has not actually cut off its relationship with normalizing countries, but attempted to maintain a thin line in its relationship with these countries.

#### **5.1.4 Interpretation of Results Related to Question RQ4:**

- The results show that the possibility of achieving unity between Gaza and the West Bank post the Gulf-Israeli normalization is at a moderate degree of (67.8%). This means that there is a moderate percentage of respondents who believe that normalization agreements could help in achieving a Palestinian national unity.
- The results showed that there was a huge agreement among the respondents (82.4%), that Israel has an interest in maintaining the internal Palestinian conflict between the west bank and Gaza.
- The results of the study provided by the respondents (78.8%), showed that self-interest and personal greed of conflicting parties leadership (Fatah and Hamas), and prevents achieving reconciliation.
- The results showed that (77.4%) of the respondents believes that the geographical separation between the West Bank and Gaza Strip plays a major role in consolidating the political conflict between the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
- The results of the study showed that the possibility of a Palestinian reconciliation between West Bank and Gaza Strip could be accomplished with a moderate degree of (55.2%).

- The results showed that a moderate percentage of respondents (58.4%) find that achieving internal Palestinian reconciliation is not a priority. This means that there is a division in the Palestinian Public's opinion towards this issue.
- The results also showed that (61.2%) of the respondents believe that normalization agreements will lead into achieving Palestinian internal reconciliation, and national unity.
- (65.6%) of the respondents believe that achieving Palestinian internal reconciliation could only be accomplished through holding general elections in Palestine.
- The results showed that (66.2%) of the respondents believe that Hamas strategy toward a Palestinian statehood does not meet with the Palestinian government strategy.
- The results showed that the possibility of reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah is weak, due to their different political orientations, with a moderate degree of (68.6%).

## **5.2 Interpretation of the Results related to the Hypotheses of the Study**

Through testing the study hypotheses, the study concluded several results, as follows:

- Hypothesis H<sub>1</sub>-1 was accepted, the results shows a negative impact of the Gulf-Israeli normalization on the Palestinian foreign policy. Thus, normalization weakened the Palestinian demand of a two-state solution, which opened doors for annexation of Palestinian lands in the west bank. It also weakened the Arab consensus toward the Palestinian cause through breaching the Arab initiative signed in Beirut, which minimize the Palestinian foreign strategy played cards to confront Israel greed of confiscating Palestinian lands, and the continuation of establishing illegal settlements in the west bank.

- Hypothesis H<sub>1</sub>-2 was accepted, which shows the effect of the Gulf-Israeli normalization on encouraging more Arab states to approach Israel. The results of the hypothesis test were moderate, but it could be maximized in the future due to presence of further political, economic and security cooperation with Israel. Therefore, the regional atmosphere may encourage more states to move towards normalization with Israel.
- Hypothesis H<sub>1</sub>-3 was accepted, as the study verifies the existence of a negative impact of the Gulf-Israeli normalization on the Palestinian internal conflict, where the Palestinian political representation is also weakened on an international scale. The absence of democratic elections, and the ongoing division, leaves the Palestinian government with few choices to confront the international community requirements of legitimacy of representation on a political scale, with double standards of not accepting the rule of Hamas in case it came up to power.

### 5.3 Recommendations

1. Immediate reformation in Palestinian diplomacy, in an attempt to prevent the danger of people to people normalization
2. Adjusting a clear foreign strategy to overcome the harm of normalization.
3. Moving out from the comfort zone regarding the end of deal of the century, and activating the non-violence resistance in face of settlement expansion and confiscating of lands.
4. Targeting the public opinion through activating the media machine, to raise the awareness regarding the importance of the Palestinian cause for the Arab national depth, in addition of exposing the colonial and apartheid practices of Israel against one of the most religious places for Muslims and Christians (Al-Aqsa mosque and church of holy sepulcher).
5. Working through unifying the Arab position toward normalization, and undermining its danger on the long-term.
6. Immediate and direct Palestinian internal reconciliation to unify and strengthen the Palestinian voice against any project that seeks to impose solutions on the Palestinians, in addition to prevent any attempt to steal the Palestinian independent decision.
7. Hamas and Fateh should overcome any personal-interests that prevents reconciliation for a bigger national and patriotic goal.
8. Urgent and immediate general elections are needed.
9. Decreasing the number of Palestinian embassies around the world, and work on the principle of quality over quantity.

10. Directing Palestinian diplomacy into the Arab arena, and getting out of the comfort zone of their ultimate support for the Palestinian cause, through learning from the previous normalization experience.
11. Increasing the efficiency of Palestinian diplomats through improving their interpersonal skills and invest in new generation that are capable of enhancing the quality of Palestinian diplomacy.
12. Increasing the capacity of political representation in the west bank and Gaza, and abandon the political fanaticism, to be able to unify the compass into one goal away from any internal dispute.
13. Allow more involvement and partnership of the civil society in the making of the Palestinian politics.
14. Maintain a status of positive internal atmosphere, to push further into a democratic and just rule in both, west bank and Gaza.
15. Push further into the exploitation of Palestinian youth energy in the Palestinian ministry of foreign affairs and expatriates, through posting them in different embassies abroad, and activate public diplomacy, to be able to develop the Palestinian narrative in direct confrontation with the colonizer narrative.
16. Give up on the harsh political and public statement against normalizing states and Arab countries in general. Instead, approaching them on a diplomatic and public level to clarify the Palestinian position.
17. Advise the Palestinian Ministry of Education to monitor and critically asses the curricula that is related to the Palestinian cause in the Arab world to prevent the infiltration of the Israeli narrative in Arab schools and Universities.

## 5.4 Conclusion

Through the previous results, the study came out with several conclusions, the most important of which are:

1. Gulf-Israeli normalization has a significant negative impact on the Palestinian cause, and it is, as described by Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, a stab in the back for the Palestinian people.
2. The real fear of the Gulf-Israeli normalization lies in its extension into the public level, where the political normalization may exceed into people to people normalization, as of cultural and social fields.
3. The Gulf-Israeli normalization is an outcome of the deal of the century, where Israel succeeded to normalize its relationship with Arab and Gulf states with no political price.
4. The Palestinian diplomacy failed to feel the pulse of normalization prior to its official declaration, which reflects a limited diplomatic sight and public disappointment.
5. The impact of the Gulf-Israeli normalization was highly negative on the Palestinian foreign policy, which left Palestinian leadership with no clear political strategy to maintain its political rights, especially with the breaching of Arab initiative.
6. The Gulf-Israeli normalization agreement is a new political phenomenon in the Arab context, with least commitment and consideration of Palestinian rights.
7. The Gulf-Israeli normalization will further encourage Arab and Gulf States to approach Israel, at the expense of the Palestinian cause.

8. Israel also seeks to approach more Arab and Gulf states, using its advanced economic capabilities, in addition to its political leverage over the United States foreign policy in the Middle East.
9. The Palestinian cause is no more a priority in the Middle Eastern politics, where the emergence of new alliances in the region post normalization to confront Iran, and the political/economic acceleration to approach Israel, override the importance of the Palestinian cause on the political and national level, especially for Arab and Gulf states.
10. The Palestinian foreign policy reaction post the Gulf-Israeli normalization were aggressive, but with no clear strategy to overcome it on a diplomatic level.
11. The Palestinian public level lost trust in the Arab national depth of the Palestinian cause, where they believe that that Palestinians are left alone in light of Arab collusion toward the Palestinian rights of freedom and statehood.
12. Palestinian diplomacy lacks efficiency in dealing with normalization wave.
13. The Palestinian political level reaction post The Gulf-Israeli normalization agreements did not exceed recalling its ambassadors for consultation, who were sent back to fulfil their mission at a later stage, in addition to harsh political statements.
14. Gulf-Israeli normalization did not to a certain level urge the Palestinian political parties (Fatah and Hamas) to overcome the internal division, but rather maintained status quo in west bank and Gaza.

The different ideology and political orientation, in addition to the overwhelming self-interests for both Hamas and Fatah leadership, prevented serious steps toward reconciliation even with the Arab and Gulf abandonment of the Palestinian rights of freedom and statehood.

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• **List of Appendices :**

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**Appendix 1: Questionnaire Referees**

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<i>Name</i>	<i>Position</i>	<i>Email</i>
	Head of social sciences department at the Arab American University / faculty of Graduate studies	R_o_lawyer@hotmail.com
Dr. Raed Abu Badawi		
	Conflict resolution Professor at Arab American University	Ayman.yousef@aaup.edu
Dr. Ayman Yousef		
	Head of United Nations section at the Palestinian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates	omar@mfae.gov.ps
Dr. Omar Awadallah		

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**Validity of the questionnaire**

**First Referee /Dr. Raed Abu badawia**

The feedback received given by Dr. Raed Abu Badawia focused on three main concepts. The first concept focused on editing the fragment sentences through clarification of political meaning behind used words/definitions of the study. The 2<sup>nd</sup> concept focused on the format of the questionnaire in terms of details, where the researcher had to develop the questions to meet with the aims and objectives of the study. The third concept focused on the adjustment of the format through editing the personal information section of the questionnaire to meet with the goals and purpose of it.

**Second Referee/ Dr. Ayman Yousef**

The feedback given by Dr. Ayman Yousef focused on the understanding of the reader for the questionnaire, where he advised to develop the introduction of the questionnaire through adding the definition of “Normalization” and “Arab Nationalism” used in the study, as it determines the reader understanding of the questionnaire objective. He also requested an editing for the personal information part used in the questionnaire through adding age category and job title, as the questionnaire is not addressed to a random sample.

**Third Referee/ Dr. Omar Awadallah**

The political adjustment of used definitions was the main focus of the feedback given by Dr. Omar Awadallah, where he emphasizes on the necessity of using the proper expression by the researcher when relating to the international law and United Nations resolutions. He also advised to edit few expressions used by the researcher, such as replacing the peace process with two state solution, and use a clearer mechanism through the questionnaire by giving more capacity for the reader to understand the aim of the study, to be able to express his/her point of view through fully understanding of the study aims and objectives.

## Appendix 2: Study Questionnaire



**Arab American University**

**Faculty of Graduate Studies**

### **Conflict resolution**

Dear participants,

The following questionnaire has been developed to collect the necessary information for accomplishing Master's thesis entitled "The Impact of the Gulf Israeli normalization on the Palestinian cause "(UAE as a case study)".

The following questionnaire consists of five parts. The questions of the study are reliable on your understanding of the title of the study, which focuses on normalization. Therefore, kindly refer to normalization, and Arab nationalism definitions provided by the researcher on the next page before answering the questions of the study.

The researcher would be grateful if you appropriately answer the parts in the space provided. Your answers will be kept strictly confidential and the provided information will solely be used for research purposes.

## **Definitions**

**Normalization:** it is a term defined in social philosophy by Michael Foucault as a way to describe the social standards and values imposed by Modern states to normalize social standards within a social schema, to make the individuals look normal, as it represses their free will (Albzour, 2020). Normalization has also a global definition in political science, where it refers to the status of creating normal relations between states after conflict (Agreement on Normalization, 1996). However, in the context of colonialism in Palestine, Normalization is defined as recognition of the state of Israel and its right to exist, which allows Arab countries to establish a normal relationship with it. (Muhsin Awwad, 1988; Samarah, 2011; Yaqeen, 2003). Normalization in this study refers to the recent normalization agreements between Gulf States and Israel, and the past/current political and economic definition of Israel, looking through these agreements.

**Arab nationalism:** it is defined in the political context as a political unification against the western dominance experienced by Arab states in the nineteenth and twentieth century's. It is also defined in the cultural aspect as a share of language and roots. Arab nationalism also has religious bases, where it is considered as unification of Islamic states that speak the language of Quran. (Oxford Reference, 2022). Arab nationalism refers in this study, to the national and religious commitment of Gulf and Arab states to the Palestinian cause in the previous times, and the classification of Israel as the ultimate enemy in the region, compared to the previous status of Israel in the Arab national context.

**Thank you for your cooperation,**

**Part one: Personal Information.**

Please put the mark (x) in the place that suits your case:

▪ **Gender**

Male    Female

▪ **Age**

18-25     26-40    40 and above ( )

▪ **Academic level:**

BA     MA    Ph.D.

▪ **Field of work:**

Public sector     Private sector    NGOFree lancing other

**Part Two**

**Questions One:** Share your Views on the political impact of the Gulf-Israeli normalization on the Palestinian foreign policy.

No	Items	Strongly disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Neutral (3)	Agree (4)	Strongly agree (5)
1.	Normalization fails the effort for two states solution					
2.	Normalization limits the role of Palestinian diplomacy with normalizing Gulf states					
3.	Normalization affects normalizing gulf states voting in the United nations in favor of Palestine					
4.	Normalization prevents the annexation of the west bank					

No	Items	Strongly disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Neutral (3)	Agree (4)	Strongly agree (5)
5.	Normalization prevents the implementation of the deal of the century					
6.	Israel maintains status quo in the west bank and Gaza					
7.	Arab initiative is no more valid for two states solution					
8.	Political willingness for conflict resolution exceeds the role of international law					
9.	Palestinian diplomacy requires reformation					
10.	One state solution could be an alternative post normalization					
11.	Palestinian foreign policy fails the Palestinian people					

### Part Three: Question Two

Share your perspective on the possibility of urging other Arab states to approach Israel.

No	Items	Strongly disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Neutral (3)	Agree (4)	Strongly agree (5)
.12	Abraham accords encourages other Arab and gulf states to normalization their relationship with Israel					
.13	Israel is capable of approaching other Arab and gulf states					
.14	Palestinian cause is no more an Arab national priority					
.15	Arab states approach Israel for economic interests					
.16	Israel normalization agreements with Arab and					

No	Items	Strongly disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Neutral (3)	Agree (4)	Strongly agree (5)
	gulf states do not exceed economic cooperation.					
.17	Arab commitment to the Palestinian cause is no more a national orientation					
.18	Normalization is only on governmental level					
.19	People to people normalization is not possible					
.20	Palestinians lost hope in any possible support of the normalizing countries for the Palestinian cause					
.21	normalization agreements with Israel become an address for all Arab and Gulf states to approach peace in case they gave up on their Moral commitment to the Palestinian national cause					

#### Part Four: Question Three

Share your perspective on the Palestinian foreign policy reaction post the Gulf-Israeli Normalization.

No	Items	Strongly disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Neutral (3)	Agree (4)	Strongly agree (5)
22.	Palestinian government has no clear strategy post normalization					
23.	Palestinian diplomacy could prevent more normalization agreements					
24.	Palestinian government lack political alternatives to confront normalization					
25.	Palestinian people have no more faith in the normalizing					

No	Items	Strongly disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Neutral (3)	Agree (4)	Strongly agree (5)
	countries agenda toward the Palestinian cause					
26.	Palestinian government diplomacy lacks efficiency in dealing with normalizing countries					
27.	International law failed the Palestinian government diplomacy					
28.	Palestinian government maintain its relationship with normalization countries post normalization					
29.	Palestinian foreign policy failed the Palestinian people ambition of a statehood					
30.	Palestinian government lack political alternatives beside the two-state solution					
31.	Palestinian government foreign policy requires reformation.					

**Part five: Question Four**

Share your views on the possibility of Unity between Gaza and west bank post Gulf-Israeli normalization.

No	Items	Strongly disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Neutral (3)	Agree (4)	Strongly agree (5)
32.	The geographical separation between Gaza and west bank deepens the Palestinian division					
33.	Normalization will encourage a Palestinian internal re-conciliation					
34.	Israel has a clear interest in preventing a Palestinian internal Re-conciliation					
35.	Palestinian internal re-conciliation is not a priority					

No	Items	Strongly disagree (1)	Disagree (2)	Neutral (3)	Agree (4)	Strongly agree (5)
36.	Palestinian unity is not possible					
37.	Hamas's strategy cannot meet with Palestinian government strategy for a statehood					
38.	Both Hamas and Palestinian authority self-interests prevents a unity between Gaza and west bank					
39.	Gaza and west bank political reconciliation cannot be achieved due to their different political orientation					
40.	Unity between Gaza and west bank only could be achieved through general elections					
41.	Palestinian people lost faith in any possibility of achieving reconciliation based on a clear national strategy to be adopted by conflicting parties					

## الملخص

إن التصنيف الوطني العربي التاريخي لإسرائيل كعدو للدول العربية والإسلامية لم يعد تعريفاً دقيقاً للقومية العربية. تهدف الدراسة إلى مناقشة بضعة محاور رئيسية لتشخيص الموجة الأخيرة من التطبيع الخليجي الإسرائيلي. تم تحليل هذه المواضيع من خلال قياس التغيرات السياسية والإقتصادية على الصورة القومية إتجاه إسرائيل. إن تسارع دول الخليج والدول العربية لتطبيع علاقتها مع إسرائيل يكشف عن سنوات عديدة من الإرتباط السري الذي أصبح في النهاية زواجا رسمياً. تهدف الدراسة إلى تسليط الضوء على التغيرات التي طرأت على الطبقة الحاكمة في دول الخليج، مما أدى إلى كسر التزام طويل الأمد من الآباء والأجداد إتجاه القضية الفلسطينية، كما تبحث الدراسة الأسباب التي يمكن أن تحت الدول العربية والإسلامية الأخرى على تطبيع علاقتها مع إسرائيل.

إن مراسم توقيع ما يسمى باتفاقيات إبراهيم في سبتمبر 2020 بين الإمارات، البحرين وإسرائيل، والترحيب الصامت من الدول الخليجية والعربية، يرسم حقبة جديدة من التعاون العربي الإسرائيلي المتعدد الأطراف، كما أنه يُنهي عقوداً من الإلتزام العربي بالقضية الفلسطينية من جهة، وإعتبار إسرائيل مستعمراً وحشياً من جهة أخرى. ومع ذلك، منذ توقيع إتفاقية السلام المصرية الإسرائيلية في العام 1978. تم إدخال تعريف جديد للسلام في سياق الصراع العربي الإسرائيلي، تحت مسمى الإرادة السياسية "للتطبيع". تُطلّ الدراسة على تعريف التطبيع في مجال حل النزاعات، ومقارنتها باتفاقيات السلام العربية الإسرائيلية منذ إتفاقية كامب ديفيد. كما أنها تلخص التطبيع من منظور إسرائيلي لتسليط الضوء على الرؤية السياسية والإقتصادية الإسرائيلية للحفاظ على إتفاقيات السلام مع أعدائها السابقين.

إن موقف الحكومة الفلسطينية ما بعد التطبيع كان عدوانياً جداً إتجاه الدول المطبعة، حيث تم إعتبار ما حدث "طعنة في الظهر" بسبب الخرق الواضح لبنود المبادرة العربية الموقعة في بيروت في العام 2002. تدعو المبادرة العربية إلى إنسحاب إسرائيلي كامل من حدود عام 1967 وحل شامل لقضية اللاجئين الفلسطينيين، في مقابل التطبيع مع إسرائيل. تبحث الدراسة تأثير التطبيع على الصراع الداخلي الفلسطيني بين الضفة الغربية وغزة، وتسلط الضوء على إمكانية إحياء المصالحة بين الأطراف المتصارعة، كما أنها تبحث إستراتيجية الحكومة الفلسطينية لمواجهة التطبيع.

تستخدم الدراسة منهجية كمية من خلال بناء استبيان منطور يهدف إلى جمع البيانات، وتحليل التأثير السياسي والإقتصادي للتطبيع الخليجي الإسرائيلي على القضية الفلسطينية. إن النهج النهائي للأطروحة هو تقديم توصيات إلى صانعي السياسات الفلسطينيين ووزارة الخارجية والمغتربين لمواجهة موجة

التطبيع. يتناول البحث استراتيجيات واضحة للباحث من خلال البحث الأكاديمي والإحصائي للتغلب على الضرر الناتج عن التطبيع على القضية الفلسطينية، ورسم خريطة حقائق للتعامل معه. إن سعة البيانات الإحصائية حُددت من خلال حجم العينة المستخدمة في الاستبيان للتغلب على الأثر السياسي والإقتصادي للتطبيع على القضية الفلسطينية. إستنتجت الدراسة بأن المجموع الكلي للتأثير السياسي للتطبيع الخليجي الإسرائيلي على السياسة الخارجية الفلسطينية هو بمعدل 3.7، كما إستنتجت الدراسة بأن الدبلوماسية الفلسطينية بحاجة للإصلاح لكي تتمكن من مواجهة موجة التطبيع.