



Arab American University
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**The Palestinian Elite Formation and the Role of the
Economic Elite in the Political Decision Making**

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**This thesis was submitted in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the Master`s degree in Conflict
Resolution and Development**

2021




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Dedication

To the souls of our most honourable martyrs...

To our brave prisoners ...

I dedicate this thesis to whoever likes to witness the independence of Palestine

I dedicate my work to all the honourable leaders who are eager to establish the Palestinian state to be the map of their leadership.

I dedicate this work to my father, who inspired me in this knowledge quest. Also, I dedicate this work to my mother who taught me everything I know and guided me to the righteous path. She is the one who inspired me with her patience, hope and optimism.

In addition, I dedicate this work to my soul-mate – my dear wife- who lived every hardship with me.

Besides, I dedicate this great work to my children who are piece of my heart.

Also, I dedicate it to all my friends, professors, brothers and sisters who lit my sky... To all the mentioned above, I thank you from the bottom of my heart.

Furthermore, I thank all the ones who supported me in this work financially or morally especially Dr. Amjad Abu Ez whose guidance is priceless. Finally, I thank my university including all its administrative and academic staff to whom I grant my utmost gratitude.

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Abstract

This study aims at highlighting the development of the Palestinian political, security and economic elite and the role played by businessmen (economic elite) in the Palestinian political scene from 1965-2020. It is based on a hypothesis that businessmen play a vital role in the Palestinian political scene in the previously mentioned period by providing financial and political support, supporting the Palestinian legitimacy in exchange for mutual interests and supporting the Palestinian diplomacy by opening communication channels with the Arab countries, international community and Israel post Oslo. Finally, their role in the internal Palestinian affairs by mediating in the Palestinian internal reconciliation.

Results show that the role of businessmen prior Oslo agreement represented by opening communication channels with the Arab and international community and supporting the Palestinian economy and the Palestinian legitimacy led by the PLO.

Most businessmen consider that they have a 'marginal' role despite their contribution in providing economic and political support on the one hand and their contribution in supporting the Palestinian political system on the other hand. Others may see that they haven't reached to the political system due to control of the Revolutionary Legitimacy of the Palestinian Faction (RLPF) on the Palestinian political system since its establishment until these days. The researcher has found that the Palestinian businessmen contributed indirectly in supporting the politicians in order to represent them in the political system due to their incompetence to turn their economic power to political power since their role is based on mutual interests. On the one hand, they have

supported the PA politically and financially. On the other hand, they have got other benefits and privileges serving their interests in Palestine.

This study shows that their role has got greater in the last ten years in light of the absence of the Palestinian elections and the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC). It is obvious that the economic legislations concerning the interests of the Palestinian businessmen have taken over other legislations issued from the office of the president which is inclined to issue legislation in the absence of the PLC. Finally, it is clear that the alliance of businessmen with their political elite aims at supporting peace process and the stability of the region in order to keep their economic interests.

Chapter One: Introduction and Theoretical Background

1.1. Introduction

Socio-economic elites emerged in Palestine in light of the development of the Palestinian national struggle procession because of the nature of the Ottoman system which prevailed at that time and was ruled by land tenure system.

After the fall of the Ottoman Empire in the 1st World War and according to Treaty of Sèvres, Palestine was subject to the British Mandate as a colonial state. Then, the concept of political and economic elite evolved including landowners (Toqan, Abdul-Hadi, Al-Husseini and Al-Shawa) and merchants (Al-Khaldi, Al-Alami, Al-Dabagh, Al-Nimir and Al-Nashashibi); most of them were not well-known in the cities.¹

Due to the socio-economic and political situation imposed by the authorities of the British Mandate, the formation of the national elite was under the names of Arab societies that they were centred in the major cities. Still, the British Mandate authorities asked the founders of these societies to use the name of “The Islamic- Christian Societies” to show the local nature of these societies and isolate them from the national movement.

After the defeat of the national project after the war of 1948 and the establishment of Israel on 75% of the lands of the British Mandate, all the political and national movements along with their elites disappeared. Still, what was left is the name of “the

¹ Al-Hout, Bayan Nohid. (1986). Al-Qiyadat we Al-Mossat Al-Siasia fe Filistin 1948-1917. Mo'sasat Al-Dirasat Al-Filistinia. Beirut, 73.

(الحوث، بيان نويهض، (1986) القيادات والمؤسسات السياسية في فلسطين 1917-1948، مؤسسة الدراسات الفلسطينية، بيروت، ص73)

government of Palestine” established by Haj Ameen Al-Husseini in Gaza after a short time from the establishment of Israel despite it was rejected by Egypt.

The main complexes of the Palestinians got the influence of the political swamp including Israel, Jordan, Syria, Egypt and Lebanon and other Gulf countries in addition to other small countries. The Nakba stopped the growth of the Bourgeois in the 1940s in the major Palestinian cities that the majority of the registered companies in 1947 in Jerusalem and Jaffa was not owned by traditional families, but from marginalized or average families.²

The period between Al-Nakba in 1948 and the formation of the PLO was distinguished by a quantum leap in the political and social situations including the reformation of the Palestinian national identity by adding new mechanisms, symbols which were many groups along with the disappearance of the coastal cities and the frozen growth of the Palestinian cities marginalizing their role.

The Arab League decided in 1964 the formation of the PLO giving Ahmad Al-Shoqairi to communicate with the Palestinians in order to establish the Palestinian entity. Despite the welcome of the Supreme Arab Committee led by Mohammed Ameen Al-Husseini of the decision of the Arab League.

The financial issue was sensitive that Abdul-Hamind Shoman contributed in 1967 in cutting the support from the PLO headed by Ahmad Al-Shuqairi who didn't get along

² Al-Hout, Bayan Noihid. (1986). Al-Qiyadat we Al-Mossat Al-Siasia fe Filistin 1948-1917. Mo'sasat Al-Dirasat Al-Filistinia. Beirut, 73.

(الحوت، بيان نويهض، (1986) القيادات والمؤسسات السياسية في فلسطين 1948-1917، مؤسسة الدراسات الفلسطينية، بيروت، ص73)

with Yasser Arafat. This led to his fast resignation and getting things ready to hand things over to Ahmad Hamoda and then Yasser Arafat was the head of the PLO.

The Jordanian regime ruling the West Bank contributed in supporting the Palestinian leaderships and businessmen. Also, it contributed in weakening the role of the *makhater* in favour of the powerful families which paid homage to the Jordanian regime in order to rule over the West Bank.³

After the establishment of the PNA, new security, economic and political elites emerged due to the strong relationships with political decisions makers that the relationship between money, politics and security started to be clearer that economic monopoly spread among power positions politically, economically and security based.

The participation of the economic elite had the effective role in being elected for the Legislative Council in 1996 due to the Israeli- Palestinian peace treaty which led to the return of many leaders of the PLO to the Palestinian territories leading to the move of the Palestinian decision-makers from the Palestinian outside Palestine to the ones inside especially businessmen.⁴

After the death of Yasser Arafat and election of Mahmud Abbas, he proposed his electoral program in 2005. In paragraph 11, he said:” Releasing a workshop for

³ Qure', Ahmad Abu Ala'. (2007). Al-RIWAYA Al-Falastinia Al-Kamila Lilmofawadat min Oslo ela kharitat Al-Tariq- Al-Joz' Al-Thani- Mofawadat Kamb David- Taba wa Stokholm 1995-2000, Beirut, Mo'ssat Al-Dirasat Al-Falastinia, 20.

(قريع، احمد ابو علاء، (2007) ، الرواية الفلسطينية الكاملة للمفاوضات من اوسلو الى خريطة الطريق - الجزء الثاني - مفاوضات كامب ديفيد - طابا وستوكهولم 1995 - 2000، بيروت: مؤسسة الدراسات الفلسطينية، ص20)

⁴ Hilal, Jamil, (2002). Takween Ak-Nukhba Al-Falastinia Month Nush' Al-Harakah Al-Watnia Al-Falastinia Ela Ma Ba'd Qiam Al-Solta Alfalastinia. Mwatn: Al-Mo'assaAl-Falastinia Lidirasat Al-Dinoqratia- Ramallah- Flastine, 24.

(هلال، جميل، (2002). تكوين النخبة الفلسطينية منذ نشوء الحركة الوطنية الفلسطينية إلى ما بعد قيام السلطة الوطنية، مواطن: المؤسسة الفلسطينية لدراسة الديمقراطية، رام الله- فلسطين، ص24).

rebuilding Palestine and establishing a strong economy along with enhancing the role of the private sector including opening the doors for the projects of the private sector which is the main economic source by allowing it participate in economic planning for the PA".⁵

According to the vision of president Mahmud Abbas, the government has put a plan based on free economy as the basis for the establishment of the Palestinian sovereign state. Consequently, it focused on enhancing the economic conditions of the Palestinians according to the philosophy of political resistance supporting Palestinian to stay in their land.⁶

As a result, the role of the economic elite will be focused on through Elite Theory (ET) which described the power relations in the contemporary society hypothesizing that a minority of the economic elite form the power away from democratic elections. It is related to the basics of establishing a state taking power from the economic and political institutions defining the psychological limit between these elites from others including intelligence, skills, determining the best interest of the state and stressing that they are not efficient and cannot run the economy.

1.2. Problem Statement:

The aim of this study is to highlight the role of businessmen in the Palestinian political system and decision making in the political and economic domains and their

⁵<http://president.ps/electoral.aspx>

⁶ Khalifa, Ahmad. (2009). Salam Fayyad Yashrah Mashro'aho Libina' Al-Dawla Wa Yarod Ala Al-Intiqadat. Majalat Al-Dirasat Al-Falastinia. Beirut, 79- 7-8

(خليفة، احمد، (2009)، سلام فياض يشرح مشروعه لبناء الدولة ويرد على الانتقادات، مجلة الدراسات الفلسطينية، بيروت، ع 79، ص7-8)

relationships with the PLO and the PA figuring out the ways they used and to how extent they succeeded.

The problem of this study lies in four main questions. The first question is “what the role of businessmen and economic elite in the Palestinian political system and the Palestinian decision is making since 1964 to 2020?”. Based on the previously said, the aim is to highlight the role of businessmen in making economic and political decisions and its relationships with the PLO and the PA. The second question is “what are the tools they used and to what extent they succeeded? The third question is:” What is the relationship of the economic elite with the Palestinian political system before and after Oslo? The fourth question is “Did they succeeded in turning its power from local economic power to political power?”

1.3. Research Questions:

This study is an attempt to answer the following questions:

1. What is the reality of the development of the political Palestinian elite?
2. What is the role of the Palestinian businessmen in the Palestinian political system after and before Oslo?
3. To what extent businessmen served in peace process a what are the tools and policies they relied on?
4. Did businessmen and economic elite succeed in turning their power to political one?

1.4. The Aims of the Study:

This study aims at:

1. Recognizing the concept of political and economic elite generally and the Palestinian elite specifically.
2. Recognizing the social, intellectual and cultural structure of the Palestinian Political and economic elite.
3. Recognizing the nature of the changes that happened on the Palestinian economic elite after Oslo?
4. Disclosing the reasons of the inability of businessmen to move their powerful influence to the political arena in the Palestinian society?
5. Recognizing the stand of the economic elite from peace process and conflict resolution.
6. Examining The extent of the ability of the Israeli- Palestinian meetings to affect the Israelis to support peace process.
7. Figuring out the role of businessmen in peace process and what their tools and policies are.
8. Figuring out the stand of the economic elite from the democratic process in Palestine.
9. Recognizing the practices of the economic elite and their role in light of the division and the occupation.
10. Recognizing the relationship between economic elite and political elite in Palestine.

1.5. The Importance of the Study:

The significance of the study lies in highlighting the factors contributing in the formation of the Palestinian elite in general and the role of businessmen in the Palestinian political scene and the making of the economic and political decision and their relationship with the PLO and the PA. Also, this study focuses on the tools used by those businessmen and the degree of their success in attaining their economic power and its impact on the political Palestinian scene. Consequently, there is a correlation between economics and politics since they work together in any country as the economic and political role of the economic elite has become essential in political and economic decision making leading to decreasing the crises.

Besides, it is done in challenging political and economic situations in which the Palestinian cause goes through in which is called “the Arab Spring” or the political division among the Palestinian factions. Also, there is a delay in achieving the Palestinian reconciliation leading to appointing economic elite in high positions such as Dr. Salam Fayyad who included many economists and technocrats. As a result, the researcher sees that highlighting the role of the economic elite in the political arena is a necessity in order to analyze the political and economic reality.

This study hypothesizes the following:

1. The Palestinian economic elite contributed in supporting the political legitimacy of the Palestinian political system before and after Oslo.
2. Despite the great economic role of the Palestinian businessmen in Palestine and abroad. Yet, they couldn't turn their power to a political one.
3. The alliance of the Palestinian businessmen with the political elite is to support the political legitimacy and peace process regardless the democratic legitimacy.

1.6. Research Methods:

This study employs the historical method in data collection from its primary sources including books, articles and scientific studies that the historical method in order explore the concept of elitism in general and the different types of elites, namely: political and economic as well as the theories explaining the emergence of elites and their development. Also, it explores their importance and impact on the political decision and policies making in general. In addition, the analytical method is employed using interviews through which data about the role of businessmen and economic elite in political decision making and their tools to achieve it. Interviews were conducted with economic and political decisions makers in Palestine asking them open questions and recording their answers in order to answer the questions of the study and test the hypotheses of the study.

1.7. Limitations of the Study:

- **Space:**

The sample of this study only included a selected member in the political and political leadership in the West Bank.

- **Time:**

This study highlighted the period of the foundation of the PLO until the main period of this study (1964- 2020).

- **Subject:**

This study tackled a highly important subject which is the impact of the economic elite on the political decision as well as the relationships of the Palestinian elites with each other. Also, it explored the legitimacies emerged from them.

1.8. Terms of the Study:

- **Elite:** it is a group or groups who have privileges leading them to perform more influential roles in their societies as if they control what is happening in their societies reflecting on decision making in different aspects of life.⁷
- **Political Elite:** They represent a specific group of people usually small in number and chosen wisely according to their class, training, social status, political power, military power and financial power believing that its ideas have its impact and must be taken seriously.⁸
- **Technocrat:** It is the system in which decision makers are chosen based on experience in a specific area especially intellectually or technically. If this system contradicts with the elected. Decision makers should be in the government. Their existence depends on knowledge and performance instead of political affiliations or what is known as “Parliamentary skills” in the democratic system.

⁷ Baiomi, Ali. (2004). *Dawr Al-Safwa fe Itikhat Al-Qarar Al-Siasi- Al-Tab'a Al-Ola*, Dar Al-Kitab Al-Hadith- Al-Qahira- Masr. 13-14.

(بيومي، على (2004). دور الصفوة في اتخاذ القرار السياسي. الطبعة الأولى، دار الكتاب الحديث، القاهرة-مصر، (ص13-14).)

⁸ Omair, Mison. (2012). *Al-Nokhab Al-Siasia Al-Filistinia Wa Atharoha Ala Al-Wihda Al-Watania. Nokhbat Al-Tashri'i Al-Falastini Al-Thani* Namothajan. *Risalat Majester Ghair Manshora. Jamni'at An-Najah Al-Watania. Nablus, Palestine.* 13.

(عمير، ميسون (2012). النخب السياسية الفلسطينية وأثرها على الوحدة الوطنية، نخبة المجلس التشريعي الفلسطيني الثاني نموذجاً. رسالة ماجستير غير منشورة، جامعة النجاح الوطنية، نابلس-فلسطين، (ص13).)

- **Oslo:** They are the agreements that were signed in Cairo in the 4th of May, 1994 between the PLO and Israel under the patronage of the USA.⁹
- **Decision – making:** It is a dynamic process in its various stages with different interactions starting from the design to decision making stage along with taking all the psychological, political and economic factors in consideration.¹⁰

1.9. Previous Studies:

The researcher explored a number of studies representing the reality of the emergence of elite in Palestine clarifying the most important factors influencing the emergence of these elites and their formation and the most important tools they adopted in order to influence the political decision. They are as the following:

The study of Jameel Hilal entitled as:” *Takween Al-Nokhba Al-Filistinia Month Nosh’ Al-Haraka Al-Watnia Al-Filistinia Ela Ma Ba’d Qiam Al-Solta Al-Filistinia*) issued in 2002 by “*Mwatin*” *Al-Falastinia Ela Al-Dimoqratia*. (The Formation of the Palestinian Elite Since the Establishment of the PLO until the Establihsment of the Palestinian Authority)

This study tackled the issue that families and clans are the most important factors in the formation of elites before Nakba despite that the period between the wars of 1948 and

⁹ Osama Abu Nahl et al. (2012). Maserat Al-Motaghayirat Al-Siasia Wa Atharoha Ala Siasat Monathammat Al-Tahrir men Al-Nasha’a Ala Oslo. Dar Al-Jondi Lilnashr Wa Al-Tawzi’, Jersualem. 451-461.

(أسامة أبو نحل، وآخرون، (2012) مسيرة المتغيرات السياسية وأثرها على سياسات منظمة التحرير الفلسطينية من النشأة على أوسلو، دار الجندي للنشر والتوزيع، القدس، ص451-461)

¹⁰ Darwish, Ibrahim. (1978). Al-Idara Al-Ama fe Natharia Wa Al-Momarasat. Al-Tab’a Al-Oula. Al-Hai’a Al-Masria Lilkitab. 135.

(درويش، ابراهيم (1978). الادارة العامة في النظرية والممارسة. الطبعة الأولى، الهيئة المصرية العامة للكتاب، القاهرة-مصر، ص135.)

1967 witnessed the disappearance of the national and political elite from the area and the local elite emerged instead.

Also, it aimed at clarifying the role of the PLO in forming the Palestinian elite, defining the terms of the Palestinian identity and the political and economic characteristics of the elites before the establishment of the PA. Besides, he explored the sources and characteristics of its formation. Hilal shows that the reality of the economic elite and its role is enhanced by having more influence on the economic legislations and policies by founding bodies to represent them. In other words, in late 2000, a co-ordinated council in co-ordination with the union of the chambers of commerce, the union of industries and businessmen. ¹¹

The study of Hassan Khadir entitled as: “*Khososiat Noshoh*’ was takween Al-Nokhba Al-Falastinia” issue by Ma’had Ibrahim Abu Laghad Lildirasat Al-Dowaliya in 2003. (Special Circumstances of the Establishment of the Palestinian Elite)

This study aimed at recognizing how these elites were founded since the issuing of Belfour Promise until 2000. The external factors of the formation of the Palestinian elite were explored especially after 1948 and between 1967 and 1993. One of these factors were the ending of the Arab system in Palestine to be replaced by the Israeli Civil Administration (ICA); the eruption of the first Intifada and the establishment of the PA. This turned the PA into an employment agency for the factions based on personal relationships leading to the emergence of security and economic elite. A

¹¹ Hilal, Jamil, (2002). Takween Ak-Nukhba Al-Falastinia Month Nush’ Al-Harakah Al-Watnia Al-Falastinia Ela Ma Ba’d Qiam Al-Solta Alfalastinia. Mwatn: Al-Mo’assaAl-Falastinia Lidirasat Al-Dinoqratia- Ramallah- Flastine, 24.

(هلال، جميل، (2002). تكوين النخبة الفلسطينية منذ نشوء الحركة الوطنية الفلسطينية إلى ما بعد قيام السلطة الوطنية، مواطن: المؤسسة الفلسطينية لدراسة الديمقراطية، رام الله- فلسطين، ص24.)

number of open questions about the future of the Palestinian political system were asked especially after the eruption of Al-Aqsa intifada recognized by double leadership as well as asking question about the political, economic and opposition elites and their roles.¹²

The study of Samar Al-Barghouthi entitled as:” *Simat Al-Nokhba Al-Siasia Al-Filistinia Qabl Wa Ba’d Qiam Al-Solta Al-Finistinia*” issued by Al-Zaitona studies and consultations in Beirut in 2009.¹³ (**The Charactersitics of the Palestinian Paolitical Elite Before and After the Establishment of the Palestinain Authority**)

This study aimed at analysing the structure of the Palestinian Political system and the essence of the political interaction in the Palestinian society by studying the Palestinian political, its characters and ways of its formation. Also, it was about the impact of the establishment of the PNA in 1994 as the third turning point in the history of the Palestinian national struggle and state’s establishment. Besides, it was about its impact on the characteristics of the political elite and its positions. This transformation was from a liberation movement to semi-state and forming mixed elites from the West Bank and Gaza and from abroad.

This book was significant from its themes. On the one hand, it talked about the status of the Palestinian political elite in decision making and the execution of the political decision. The determinants of the Palestinian situation require that the political elite come up with options to take their rights. In the first chapter, “Theoretical Framework”,

¹² Khadir Hassan. (2003). Khososiat Noshu’ Wa Takween Al-Nokhba Al-Falastinia. Al-Taba’ Al-Ola. Ma;had Ibrahim Lildirasat Al-Dowalia. Berzeit University. Palestine. 2-25.

(خضر، حسن (2003). خصوصية نشوء وتكوين النخبة الفلسطينية. الطبعة الأولى، معهد إبراهيم أبو لغد للدراسات الدولية، جامعة بيرزيت-فلسطين، ص: 2-25).

¹³ Samar Al-Barghuthy. (2009). *Simat Al-Nokhba Al-Siasia Al-Filistinia Qabl Wa Ba’d Qiam Al-Solta Al-Finistinia*. Al-Zaitona studies and consiltations. Beirut, Lebanon. 51.

(سمر البرغوثي، (2009)، سمات النخبة السياسية الفلسطينية قبل وبعد قيام السلطة الوطنية الفلسطينية، مركز الزيتونة للدراسات والاستشارات بيروت، لبنان، ص51)

was divided into three sub-chapters, namely: the concept of elitism, liberation movement and the PLO. The abundance of titles included in the first chapter led to not summarizing every theme in details.

Still, the definition guaranteed to the readers to learn about the terms of “political class”, “ruling class” and “elites” who possess the real power. This chapter doesn’t make us think that the term “political elite” means “having high status” or “original privilege” or it got the power for being the most efficient not for being God’s will.

The second chapter tackled the social background of the political elite in the PLO represented by the members of the central council in 1991. The first thing noticed is the increase of the educated among them reaching (72.3%) mostly arts graduates from most of the Arab countries.

The average age of the members of the council in 1991 is (52) years as the book says that it is the least to be re-elected. Still, there is a balance between refugees (53%) and non-refugees (47 %) in the membership of the central council. Christians and women represent (5.7%) of its majority. It clear that the change is done for natural reasons like death or sickness. The researcher indicated that the Palestinian elite doesn’t like change that it is distinguished from others from the education and the old age of its members.

The third chapter talked about the political system for the self-governing authority. It was divided into two sub-sections. The first talked about the environment of the system including the economic and political part. The second sub-section talked about the political institution in the PA. It depicts the paradigm after Oslo between the Palestinian in Palestine and the comers from abroad that there was a state of distrusting the

outsiders. People who lived there found themselves under the mercy of the Israeli occupation and the unjust leadership.

The fourth chapter talked about the social background of the political elite of the PA as parallel to chapter two which studied the social background of the political elite in the PLO. As an indicative point about the development of the situation, the PhD holders raised from (12.6%) among the members of the central council in 1991 (P.79) to (14.8%) in 1996 to (24.2%) in 2006 to (24.7%) in the years from 1994 to 2006.

Finally, the fifth chapter tackled the culture of the members of the political elite divided into three categories, namely the elite from abroad, the PLO elite and Hamas's elite being dealt with by a questionnaire about their political, philosophical and practical opinions. Their opinions varied that the PLO elites preferred to the elite from abroad because they are balanced and have self-representation along with understanding the factors influencing the Palestinian and Israeli societies alike in making policies. Still, it is more confident to achieve its goals with the possession of the tools to achieve them.

The Study of Azzam Abdul Satar Sha'th entitled as:" Tawajohat Al-Nokhba Al-Siasia Al-Filistinia Naho Al-Sira' Al-Arabi Al-Israeli" issued by Markaz Al-Zaitona Lildirasat Wal Istisharat in 2019.¹⁴ (*The Tendencies of the Palestinian Political Elite Towards the Arab- Israeli Struggle*).

This study tackled an issue related to the Palestinian situation in light of the calamities it suffered from especially the attempt to end the Palestinian cause. Chapter one explored

¹⁴ Sha'th, Azzam Abdul Al-Sattar. (2019). Tawajohat Al-Nokhba Al-Siasia Al-Filistinia Naho Al-Sira' Al-Arabi Al-Israeli. Markaz Al-Zaitona Lildirasat Wal Istisharat. Beirut. Lebanon.

(شعث، عزام عبد السطار، (2009)، توجهات النخبة السياسية الفلسطينية نحو الصراع العربي - الإسرائيلي، مركز الزيتونة للدراسات والاستشارات، بيروت، لبنان)

the official talks to establish the Palestinian state and the Palestinian political system along with the stages of the formation of the Palestinian political elite in the shadow of the PLO from 1964 to 2017. It talked about the mechanisms of the formation of the legislative and executive elites through the National Council, the Central council and the Executive Committee of the PLO along with the circumstances of their formation including the Political Party Quotas. The Palestinian parties used it to be the best elite and get the highest leadership positions.

In chapter two, the structure of the PA was talked about considering it the second component of the Palestinian political system as it was established after Oslo Accord (1993-1994) by going through public legislative, public and executive elections in the PA's areas in 1996, 2005 and 2006.

It indicated that these elections were the first feature of democracy in the Palestinian political system for more than 30 years keeping the system of the political party quotas in all its institutions. This is what distinguished the PA in terms of its mechanisms in the selection of the members of the political elite in the legislative authority.

This paved the way to the formation of a new elite as a combination of the local elite with the returned elite after Oslo. This study distinguished between two stages. The first is the formation of the political elite in the shadow of the PA through the legislative and presidential elections in 1996 and 2005 known as the traditional elite which included one party only which agreed with Oslo. The second one is in 2006 when the second legislative elections took place with the participation of all the factions along with the appearance of the new P Palestinian elite. Still, after these elections, the stage of

the political elite of one party went through the troubles of the division in the Palestinian political situation after 2006.

The third chapter explored the developments of the Arab- Israeli struggle going through the options of the Palestinians in moving the struggle by using the Fida'e organizations and the peaceful resistance. The option of the armed resistance was affected by the freedom to move regionally. It discussed the concepts of armed and peaceful resistance as the sole Palestinian ideology.

The fourth chapter discussed the political transformations of the PLO by moving from the total liberation to the political settlement under the international mediation starting from 1974. It explored the development in the Palestinian scene at the level of the settlement and the relationship with the Israelis as well as mediations, international and regional initiatives.

The fifth chapter talked about the tendencies of the political Palestinian elite towards the Arab – Israeli struggle by asking the elite's members a question about their view of the future of the struggle in light of the difficult situation in not getting the rightful rights of the Palestinians.

Results showed that the analytical field study left an impression that the Palestinian political elite is waiting without any choice of agreement on the settlement and without a vision or a backup project. Most of the elite agreed on ending Oslo accord (72%); others said that negotiations after Trump's declaration about Jerusalem was in vain (80%).

Still, this study indicated that the freedom of the Palestinian political elite was in dealing with the current situation expressing aims to turmoil in options. However,

(75%) of the elite held an international conference for the jurisdiction according to the International Legitimacy to end the struggle. Consequently, (52%) of them said that the status co didn't allow the foundation of a new international political initiative to resolve the struggle.

The study of Shavi, entitled as: "Civil Society and Political Elites in Palestine and the Role of International Donors: A Palestinian view. EuroMeSCo Secretariat." published in 2004.

It aimed at highlighting the nature of the new civil and social elite in Palestine and their role in the political arena especially after the first intifada in 1987 in which the Palestinian civil society transformed as a result of establishing a number of the institutions of the civil society. What is witnessed before Oslo was signed affected the transitional, occupational and sectarian elites. The first was active in the political arena. The second was active in the institutions of the local community and finally the third was active in the local community and governmental institutions.

The researcher indicated that the eruption of the first intifada in 1987 was a turning point in the development of the civil society that the Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) emerged considering it a tool for political mobilization to offer services for people. In other words, the organizations of the civil society in that period were the result of political parties and they were given the responsibility to lead in the new system. By signing Oslo and the establishment of the PA, the CSOs became independent entities paving the way to the political secular parties and massive participation of the donors and international organizations.

This led to changing the Palestinian civil organization to aids delivery system making sure that these organizations wouldn't become politicized as the donors thought. Still, the PA considered them a threat to its existence since its power was from the international arena and its sources of fund is international. This led the civil societies to change to a political elite contributing in finding their own supporters in decision making inside the PA.

Concerning the organizations of the Islamic civil society, it was established in the midst 1970s aiming at offering care and services for the poor and the marginalized. When Hamas was founded during the first intifada, it depended on the civil society's participation, this led to the emergence of the political elite of Hamas while the secular political elite were the rest of the elites of the civil society.¹⁵

A study entitled as:” *Al-Nokhab Al-Süasia Al-Filistinia wa Atharoha Ala Al- Wihda Al-Wataniya, Nokhbat AlMajlis Al-Tashri’ Al-filistnin Namothajan*”. (The Palestinian Political Elite and its Influence on the Palestinain Unity, the Elite of the Legislative Coucil”

It aimed at recognizing the Palestinian political elites and their impact on the political, cultural, ideological and social tendencies and on the Palestinian national union. The descriptive method was used by the use of interviews with a number of the Palestinian political elite including 132 members of the second legislative council.

This study found that the Palestinian national elite didn't get to the stage where it could change the attitudes of the political parties towards the Palestinian national unity. Also, The Palestinian legislative elite wasn't able to influence the national unity and its

¹⁵ Shafi, S. A. (2004). Civil society and political elites in Palestine and the role of international donors: A Palestinian view. EuroMeSCo Secretariat.

method that the will of the political party above the will of the Palestinian legislative council. Finally, there wasn't any political program agreed upon by all the factions in Palestine and this was why they were not united.

The study of Brynen entitled as: “The Dynamics of Palestinian Elite Formation” issued in 1995, the Palestinian Studies Journal

It aimed to explore the previous studies of the formation of the political elites in order to answer a number of questions about the impact of the ability of the Palestinian government to get to the self-governance. The researcher made sure to measure the accountability of the political elite I the democratic process or by the use of mediation of other parties such as free press, the grievance and human rights department and the civil society. How could divisions add the institutional nature and administrative development in the options of the PA?

It was meant to focus on the style of Yasser Arafat and the PA leadership in general in the domain of the leadership of the PA. It was indicating that the fact of the development of the political elites in Palestine had gone through four main stages as the first was the traditional one. The second stage is the social change while the third one was the Palestinian national mobilization. Finally, the fourth stage is the stage of the influence in the institutions of the state. These stages were different in terms of their nature from the Ottoman Empire represented by landowners to the British Mandate with the emergence of the Palestinian businessmen to the era of the Israeli occupation with the emergence of the factions and parties.

It tackled the disclosure of the dynamics of the formation of the Palestinian elites which were affected by the establishment of the Israeli state with its methods of land

confiscation and damaging the Palestinian economic situation. This affected the matter of the formation of the Palestinian elite as well as of the policies of the Jordanian and Syrian authorities including suppressing women in women movement and the existence of political elite among the middle classes of the PLO such as Ilias Frej, Mahmud Zuhdi Al-Nashashibi, Yaser Amro, Abdul Hafith Al-Shab, Moneb Al-Masri who formed the government of 1995 led by Yasser Arafat.¹⁶

The previously mentioned studies mentioned important information about the Palestinian issue and its development. However, this study will update the information to add an up-to-date value to the previous researchers in order to know the level the binary role of the economic elite in the Palestinian history until 2020 knowing that there aren't any sources about this as far as the researcher know.

1.10. The Organization of the Thesis

This study is divided into five chapters. The first chapter talks about the general background of the study including the study's introduction, problem statement, questions, hypotheses, significance, methodology, limitations, difficulties previous studies, their comments and organization.

The second chapter tackles the general framework including the concept of elites (defined by Pareto, Mosca, Michels, Wright, Miles, Burnham), types of elites, their roles, Palestinian elites (1967-1994), secular Palestinian elite, the troubles of the Palestinian elites, the political leaders, the theoretical tendencies in political science,

¹⁶Brynen, R. (1995). The dynamics of Palestinian elite formation. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 24(3), 31-43.

important issues in political science such as the state, struggle of the elites and the political culture.

The third chapter talks about the development of the Palestinian elites from 1897 to 2020.

The fourth chapter highlights the role of businessmen (economic elite) in the Palestinian political decision since the foundation of the PLO until 2020 as it is divided into two sections before and after Oslo signing.

Finally, the fifth chapter summarizes the conclusion, results and recommendations of the researcher.

Chapter Two: Theoretical Framework

2.1. Section One: Contemporary Elitism in Political Science

2.1.1. The Concept of Elitism

2.1.1.1. Introduction

The concept of elitism depends on the idea of the existence of a ruling minority in society controlling the most influential sources of power and struggle on them. This exceeds the level of struggling on sources to new levels of violence. Still, new elites have new trends and new ways to recruit new elites. In other words, the essence of elitism is to explain the attitude of the elite and their interaction. There are many writers who embodied this theory as a system, it is studied as a system of changing a system and supporting another.

Many studies talked about discovering power relations in the market and the civil society especially in the welfare countries. In other words, the emergence of the elite as a system is a political phenomenon related directly to the organization of the market and the ability of the state to infiltrate it. ⁽¹⁷⁾ Also, it tackles the social development issues and social development. ⁽¹⁸⁾

It is rooted in classic sociology and in the writings of Mosca, Michels, Pareto and Weber who are classic elitist per se and the founders of the elitist school. In this sense,

⁽¹⁷⁾ Higley J and Burton M (2006) *Elite Foundations of Liberal Democracy*. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.

⁽¹⁸⁾ Reis E (2005) Perceptions of poverty and inequality among Brazilian elites. In: Reis E and Moore M (eds) *Elite Perceptions of Poverty and Inequality*. London: Zed Books, pp. 26–57.

elitism evolved in the theoretical field having many common ideas with other theories such as the Political Culture Theory (PCT) and Rational Choice Theory (RCT).⁽¹⁹⁾

However, sociology deals with the relationship between the state and the society. Elitism assumes that the function of the elite has a negative impact on this relationship. In other words, the types of systems; changing the system; secularism and many political phenomena have a great relationship with elitism. Many people consider elitism as a variation of a social theory of classes of the society, but there are allegations that their attitude has negative results on the state.⁽²⁰⁾

The idea of elitism and its contradiction with the theory of social classes originated in the classic dialectic argument about the reasons of the establishment of the political systems in sociology in the pre- WW-II. In this sense, Miles and Domhoff who used Elitism Theory (ET) widely. Despite the fact that literature talking about ET is posing fears of the impact of the elite on the restrictions and hierarchy of the work of the elite especially the unpredictable attitude. Still, there are many studies about the concept of ‘elite’ and the ones who participated in finding tools to develop advanced tools of the elites ranging from the questionnaire of the elite to political ethnography.⁽²¹⁾

2.1.1.2. The Concept of Elitism:

The concept of ‘elitism’ has been related to human societies and its development throughout the ages referring to the minority of those societies distinguished from others. They were responsible for running the political and economic affairs of the

⁽¹⁹⁾ Khan SR (2012) The sociology of elites. *Annual Review of Sociology* 38: 361–77.

⁽²⁰⁾ Reis E (2005) Perceptions of poverty and inequality among Brazilian elites. In: Reis E and Moore M (eds) *Elite Perceptions of Poverty and Inequality*. London: Zed Books, pp. 26–57.

⁽²¹⁾ Codato A and Perissinoto RM (2009) Marxismo e elitismo: dois modelos antagônicos de análise social? *Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais* 24(71): 143–95.

society in its practical directions and special vision in order to play a great role in policies making inside the political organization²²

ET confirms that “the general politics reflect the demands of the people”. This assures that the ruling class change people’s opinions concerning the political issues that the elite’s issues are more than the issues of people’s ways of thinking about the reality of things.²³

In the classic elitist literature, it is defined through the abilities and skills of the elite. For example, Pareto distinguish between the elite that has the power and domination being equal to lions and the ones who dominate through their followers using their skills of conviction being equal to foxes. In short, it is like the Machiavellian model of politics. However, Mosca talked about the material part of the control and how it controls people as well as the intellectual and moral supremacy of the elites. Based on that, Elites are defined as the active individuals who control sources and takes over the main positions in the community.⁽²⁴⁾ Therefore, the modern concept of elites is related directly to power and authority being understood as executing the administration of one person even if it is against the will of others.⁽²⁵⁾ Also, power is achieved through the material of symbolic sources that whoever has these sources is one of the elite.⁽²⁶⁾

²² Al-Sawi, Ali. (1996). *Al-Nokhba Al-Siasia Fe Al-Alam Al-Arabi. Al-Tab’a Al-Ola*. Markaz Al-Bohoth Wa Al-Dirasat. Cairo, Egypt.

(الصاوي، علي (1996). النخبة السياسية في العالم العربي. الطبعة الاولى، مركز البحوث والدراسات السياسية، القاهرة-مصر.)

²³ Al-Barghothy, Samar. (2009). *Simat Al-Nokhba Al-Siasia Al-Filistinia Qabl Wa Ba’d Al-Solta Al-filistinia*. Markaza Al-Zaitona Lildirasat Wal Istisharat. Beirut, Lebanon. 46.

(البرغوثي، سمر، (2009)، سمات النخبة السياسية الفلسطينية قبل وبعد قيام السلطة الوطنية الفلسطينية، مركز الزيتونة للدراسات والاستشارات بيروت، لبنان، ص46.)

²⁴ Yamokoski A and Dubrow JK (2008) How do elites define influence? Personality and respect as sources of social power. *Sociological Focus* 41(4): 319–36.

²⁵ Weber M (2005 [1922]) *Economia y sociedad*. Mexico DF: Fondo de CulturaEconómica.

²⁶ Reis E (2005) Perceptions of poverty and inequality among Brazilian elites. In: Reis E and Moore M (eds) *Elite Perceptions of Poverty and Inequality*. London: Zed Books, pp. 26–57.

This definition agrees with the Marxist definition in its view of the ruling class in which power lies in owning production tools regardless any economic assumptions, takes political assumptions seriously.

Consequently, the ET is a small group of social class that can be from other classes or from the dominating groups.⁽²⁷⁾ In addition, they are the people who take over the top positions in organizations or strong movements, so they can influence the political results strongly.⁽²⁸⁾

The main problem in ET is that it recognizes the existence of elites anywhere as long as there are the required tools to practice power. This means that elites might come from the state or the world of companies, gangs, syndicates, mass media, NGOs or any kind of social movement. Still, it is only for the minority of the society and its tools. In short, anyone can become one of the elites, but ET doesn't have any limit for separating elites from institutions or movements. This limitation enhances the existence of criticisms about the concept of "elites".

The previously mentioned concept indicates the chosen individual. Still, with the its development and indications, it is all about the supremacy of a group of individuals among others. This an organized logic in understanding the human history and all its events, so it was depended on in forming an understanding for the sociological components of the society as well as talking about these ideological phenomena of social classes in an attempt to reach to the state of interaction and completeness.

²⁷Dogan M and Higley J (eds) (1998) *Elites, Crises, and the Origins of Regimes*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.

²⁸Cammack P (1990) A critical assessment of the new elite paradigm. *American Sociological Review* 55(3): 415–20.

All the complications of the human history led to the necessity of understanding the role of these elites in moving the human society forming the main distinguishing features for these societies. From this point of view, there are many attempts to understand the dynamics of this social reality and historic movement and the role of the elites in social life in the various aspects of life. It is certain that they made the human history detecting the social change and practice its effective role in directing the social life in the society.²⁹

This change on the social elite in terms of its ability to affect the tendencies of the society led to an abundance in information and the regression of the ability of the elite at the level of forming the general awareness and tendencies of the society.³⁰

Despite the progress of humanity in the area of democracy and the huge political participation of the masses, these elites are still powerful, present in the scene in its leading role in directing the society, and detect its course.

The emergence of Marxism as a theory for the working class and the proletariat, it assured the necessity to give the working class the leadership in the communist societies. Still, this theory survived by the demonstration of its ideas in the communist and capitalist countries. Similarly, the growth of its ideas in the determination of the

²⁹ Ghalion, Burhan. (1986) *Mojtama' Al-Nokhba. Taba' Al-Ola. Mahad Al-Inma' Al-Arabi*. Beirut.

(غليون، برهان (1986). *مجتمع النخبة. الطبعة الأولى، معهد الإنماء العربي، بيروت.*)

³⁰ Tawfiq Al- Madini. (1997). *Al-Mojtama' Al-Madani W Al- Dawla Al-Siasia fe Al-Watan Al-Arabi. Tab' Ola. Manshorat Itihad Al-Kotab Al- Arab*. Cairo. Egypt.

(توفيق المديني (1997). *المجتمع المدني والدولة السياسية في الوطن العربي. الطبعة الأولى، منشورات اتحاد الكتاب العرب، القاهرة- مصر.*)

role of elites without which communities cannot develop or directed to the future.³¹

Consequently, elites are not only an event in the nature of human societies, but it is also an essential solid state in the innate formation of human societies since the beginning of time. Thus, social life cannot exist without the existence of economic, social, political and cultural elites, which have the power to change conditions to the required directions.³²

Still, the phenomena of political and social elites are very important leading politicians and thinkers to understand the nature of human societies and realize the laws behind their existence.

Also, they lead them to analyze the social and human phenomena especially the social issues which have relations to authority, class, wealth distribution and the social and developmental revolution. Based on the previously mentioned, the concept of elitism doesn't necessarily indicate the social stature in the society, but it is a tool for analyzing social phenomenon and explaining them. The concept of elitism is an important field in the ideological analogy between classic Marxism, new Marxism and new sociological critical tendencies at all levels of the development of the human thinking in the second half of the 20th century.³³

³¹ Tharwat Mekki. (2005) *Al-Nkhba Al-Siasia Wa Al-Taghyeer Al-Siasi. Al-Taba Al-Ola. Alam Al-Kotom. Cairo.*

(ثروت مكي (2005). النخبة السياسية والتغيير السياسي. الطبعة الأولى، عالم الكتب، القاهرة.)

³² Thana' Foad Abdullah. (2001). *Al-Dawla Wa Al-Qowa Al-Igtima'ya fe Al-Watan Al-Arabi Aalaqat Al-Tafa'l Wa Al-Sira'at. Taba'a Al-Ola. Markaz Dirasat Al-Wihda Al-Arabia. Beirut- Lebanon.*

(ثناء فؤاد عبد الله (2001). الدولة والقوى الاجتماعية في الوطن العربي علاقات التفاعل والصراعات. الطبعة الأولى، مركز دراسات الوحدة العربية، بيروت-لبنان.)

³³ *The Commander of the Faithful: The Moroccan Political Elite. Traslated by Majid Ni'ma and Abood Atiya. 1st Ed. Dar Al-Wihda Litibaa' Wal-Nasher. Beirut- Lebanon.*

It is necessary to talk about all aspects of the social and political movement of the human societies. The political elite express the point of view of the ruling minority which seize the most sensitive political and social positions and control all the political matters in the country. For example, the Palestinian elites are the safety system of the Palestinians in all their hardships throughout history especially in the tie of the Palestinian revolution.³⁴

This way, the elites' express point of view of the selected class or the elected minority who have the power because of its skills of supposed gifts.³⁵

The modern social and political reflection of what San Simon imagined from the wisdom of the scientists and industrial businessmen. Still, Elites are also about the variation among the rich and the poor that the word "elite" was used in the 19th century to describe upmarket goods extending it to include socially superior class such as military units or the nobility.³⁶

As mentioned in Oxford dictionary, the word 'elite' was first used in 1823 when it referred to social classes. Still, this word wasn't used more commonly but in late 19th

³⁴ Rashwan. Hussein Abdul- Hamid Ahmad. (2002). Al-Taghyeer Al-Ijtima'e Wa Al- Tanmia Al-Siasia Fe Al-Mojtama'at Al-Mamia. Al-Taba' Al-Ola. Al-Maktab Al-Jam'ei Al-Hadith. Alexandria. Egypt. (رشوان، حسين عبد الحميد أحمد (2002). التغيير الاجتماعي والتنمية السياسية في المجتمعات النامية. الطبعة الأولى، المكتب الجامعي الحديث، الاسكندرية-مصر.)

³⁵ Bothomor. (1988). Al-Safwa Wa Al-Mojtama'. Dirasa Fe Elm Al-Ijtima' Al-Siasi/ Tarjamat Mohammed Jawhari Wa Alia Shokri Wa Mohammad Ali Mohammad Wa Alsayyed Mohammed Al-Hoseini. Al-Taba' AlOla. Taba Ola. Dar Al-Ma;rifa Al-Jami'ia. Alexandria. Egypt. 25. (بوتومور (1988). الصفوة والمجتمع. دراسة في علم الاجتماع السياسي. ترجمة محمد جوهرى وعلياء شكرى ومحمد علي محمد والسيد محمد الحسيني؛ الطبعة الاولى، دار المعرفة الجامعية، الاسكندرية-مصر، ص 25.)

³⁶ Abd Ali Al- Saedi. (2014). Sinaat Al-Jahel Al-Moqadas Wa Awham Al-Nokhba. Al-Rased Al-Tanweiri.

(عبد علي السعيدى (2014). صناعة الجهل المقدس وأوهام النخبة، الراسد التنويري.)

century and the 1930s of the 20th centuries in Britain and America especially when the sociological theories used it in Vilfredo Pareto. ⁽³⁷⁾

Consequently, Bottomore's writings about elitism and the society were the most important studies questioning the issue of elitism that Pareto (1848-1923) defined elites as a small and distinguished group of the society controlling the society for its specific characteristics. Still, elites might disappear due to some social changes due to the emergence of new elites coping with the new situation. ³⁸

There are two types of elites, namely: the ruling and non- ruling. The former rules directly or indirectly while the latter are distinguished with high qualities but it doesn't rule. They represent the prestigious class in the society while the rest of the society— according to Pareto's theory of non- elitism- don't have any power over the society. In his writings, he uses those two types due to the existence of a ruling minority due to its characteristics. Others are ruled because they don't have any qualifications for practicing power. Here, Pareto explored the struggle between the elite and the public in the area of the existence of the few elites and the ruled majority as a result of a purely psychological formation. ³⁹

However, Mosca's elite (1858-1914) are expressed as: “among the noticeable absolute facts, there is truth in all the societies beginning from the ones which achieved a lot and still at the top of its power. Here, there are the ruling class who rule others considering them the powerful minority and the controlled.

³⁷The Oxford English Dictionary (1969). Vol.111, Great Britain, Oxford University Press, -]6[. P: 90

³⁸Pareto, Vilfredo. *The Rise and Fall of Elites*, Transaction Publishers, 1991.

³⁹Pareto, Vilfredo. *The Rise and Fall of Elites*, Transaction Publishers, 1991.

Here, Mosca found that the ruling class are more organized practicing power in the society, but the ruled class are not organized and not united by a general economic and intellectual ideology.⁴⁰

According to Mosca, elites are few minorities who rule and don't get their power from their special characteristics, but for its psychological characteristics such as being organized and strong financially, intellectually and morally. One example of these characteristics is having a fortune under the patronage of the greatest good or controlling the administrative or military or religious authorities for its great abilities to direct people's point of view.⁽⁴¹⁾

He sees that people can practice pressure on the ruling classes leading to rejecting the policies of the ruling classes. Consequently, new elites from the masses might emerge suiting the wishes of the people. Mosca thinks that the power of the ruling class lies in considering it an organized small group of people facing the majority which are not organized.⁽⁴²⁾

As for the concept of 'elitism' according to Michels (1876-1936), he thinks that people cannot rule themselves and the control over a huge number of people is easier than controlling a small number of people because the attitude of the crowds is sympathetic. In addition, the ruling elite is the one who organize themselves by using power and giving it to a small group of people allowing them to take decisions.⁽⁴³⁾

⁴⁰ Albertoni, Ettore, Mosca and the Theory of Elitism. Oxford: Basil Blackwell (1987)

⁴¹ Albertoni, Ettore, Mosca and the Theory of Elitism. Oxford: Basil Blackwell (1987)

⁴² Albertoni, Ettore, Mosca and the Theory of Elitism. Oxford: Basil Blackwell (1987) ...

⁴³ Cook, Philip J. (1971). "Robert Michels's Political Parties in Perspective". *The Journal of Politics*. 33 (3): 773–796

Every society must have the rule of the elite leading to saying that whoever finds organization, the oligarchy is found. Furthermore, the emergence of the ruling elites as he said is continuous in the society at the level of the struggle among classes striving for democracy not the struggle among the ruling elite for power. Michels analysed that the work of the political parties shows different factors defining the nature of the work of the organizations starting from the party to the state highlighting that these organizations are ruled by the few elites. ⁴⁴

However, Burnham (1905-1978) phrased his writings and assumptions about elites and their importance as being the key factor for the struggle among groups in order to get power over decision making. ⁽⁴⁵⁾

Despite the influence of Marxism on Burnham's ideas especially in restricting the source of the power of the elite to their economic status by controlling production in the society. He says that, if we were looking for the high governing class, we should look for the class which has the highest income because the control in production is accompanied by an economic, political and social power. ⁽⁴⁶⁾

2.1.2. The Concept of Businessmen (Economic Elite)

It is not hard to define this class procedurally especially in the stable countries. Still, when talking about the Palestinian businessmen, the problem is that the Palestinian who owns a one-million facilities can be a businessman. However, whoever has this much in the US is from the middle class.

⁴⁴Cook, Philip J. (1971). "Robert Michels's Political Parties in Perspective". *The Journal of Politics*. 33 (3): 773–796

⁴⁵ Benjamin Guy Hoffman, *The Political Thought of James Burnham*. PhD dissertation. University of Michigan, 1969.

⁴⁶ Benjamin Guy Hoffman, *The Political Thought of James Burnham*. PhD dissertation. University of Michigan, 1969.

Consequently, capital, sales and profits cannot define anyone as belonging to the businessmen class that many people hide their exact fortune. For example, whoever owns a small shop earning profits cannot be considered a businessman because he might be broke. To conclude, businessmen are people who run a middle industrial facility trying to develop his trade with an industrial record. The economic level of one person differs according to the country and the strategic framework of the society's economy.

2.1.1.3. Section Two: Elites Formation Theories

The spread of the term “elite” started in the 17th century describing upmarket goods and then it became an indication to superior social classes such as military units or nobilities.⁴⁷

In the 20th century, it emerged as a reaction to facing the threat of the Marxist concepts on sociology and political science. This means a confrontation between Marxism and elitism benefiting the attempt to evaluate the theory of elitism and its theoretical background.

Hegel considered the state as the whole cause through which all the contradictions of the civil society and confirming its affiliation to the Capital system to production paradox distribution of wealth and the struggle between the Bourgeois and proletariat. This assures that the state has become an affiliate factor in socialization producing a specific pattern for production. This led to the need to find another frame for Marxism indicating the emergence of elitism.⁴⁸

⁴⁷ Thomas Botomore. (1972). *Al-Nokhba wa Al-Mojtama'*. Tarjamat George Goha. Beirut. AL-Mo'assasa Al-Arabia Lildirasat Wa Al-Nasher. 5.

⁴⁸ Thomas Botomore. (1976). *Elm Al-Ijtima3 Al-Siasi*. Tarjamat Wamid Nathmy. Dar Al-Tali'a Liltiba3a Wa Al-Nashir. Beirut- Lebanon.

Elitism is based on attempts to resolve the ideological struggle in the Western democracy on the legacy of the political sociologist Max Weber and Alexis de Tocqueville through showing the significance of the independent political power. They are the cornerstone of the Western democracy even though that is a confrontation with Marxism for the increasing necessity to resist the emergence of such confrontation to the political Marxism.⁴⁹

On the other hand, the proponents of elitism agreed that societies are divided into ruling minorities and ruled majority.⁵⁰ According to Mosca, the uncivilised and civilized societies differ since there are ruled and ruling groups. The latter have most of the political position. However, the former, are subjects to the latter regardless their legal or aggressive actions. This is similar to Pareto's opinions who developed this theory considering it a total truth and unviable one since social life is about facts depending on psychological differences among individuals.⁵¹

2.1.1.4. Elitism and Class

There are many critics from elitism to Marxism especially concerning the theoretical framework of dealing with the ruling class and the ruled class in the state. They can be summarized as found in **Nicos Poulantzas**'s book "Political Power and Social Classes" as follows:

1. The issue of the prevalent political class in political elites' theories. Here, there is an objection on Marxism, which supposes the unity of the economic elite and the

⁴⁹ Thomas Bottomore. (1976). *Elm Al-Ijtima3 Al-Siasi*. Tarjamat Wamid Nathmy. Dar Al-Tali'a Liltiba3a Wa Al-Nashir. Beirut- Lebanon

⁵⁰ Mostafa Kaml Al-Sayed. (1994) *Dirasat Fe Nathariyat Siasia*. Cairo. Egypt. 256-257.

(مصطفى كامل السيد (1994). دراسات في النظرية السياسية. بدون ناشر، القاهرة-مصر، ص256-257.)

⁵¹ Thomas Bottomore. (1976). *Elm Al-Ijtima3 Al-Siasi*. Tarjamat Wamid Nathmy. Dar Al-Tali'a Liltiba3a Wa Al-Nashir. Beirut- Lebanon

political elite. Still, this doesn't apply all the time. The various attempts to define the concept of political power are no longer related to Marxism as well as the Capitalist system transformation. This is listed on the absence of the economic elite in the Marxist manner referring to the dispatch of property from supervision and the deliberation of the social groups based on other explanations of political power.⁵²

This is what Aron talked about in his book "La Lutte des classes" and "Les Désillusions du progrès" which Bottomore summarized as: "The system became the system of social gradation in the industrialized societies as a result of the economic development which became more complex than even before.

In other words, no attractions between the Bourgeoisie and Proletariat were found. In addition, the percentage of the workers of industrial businesses or manufacturers is decreasing in the advanced countries with the decrease of work hours and the increase of social movements.

This means that the basic circumstances for the class structure strength and continuity from one generation to another as well as the awareness of individuals of their belonging to a specific class is the essence of the paradox between capitalism and socialism on the one hand and industrial and non-industrial societies on the other hand.⁵³

2. The issue of the institutions of the state and bureaucracy according to this cause compared to its Marxist view. All the main functions are centered in the reality of the power of the economic and political class. The ones who do their tasks as in the feudal system, in which the political and administrative functions of the

⁵² Poulantzas, N. A., & O'Hagan, T. (1973). Political power and social classes (pp. 195-224). London: NLB.

⁵³ Thomas Bottomore. (1885). Elm Al-Ijtima' Wal Naqd Al-Ijtima'e. Dar Al-Ma;rifa Al-Jami'ia. Egypt. 147.

class, don't agree with the bourgeoisie. In this case, there must be an explanation for the presence of the institutions of the state based on the political power. This misconception between the power of the state and the institutions of the state adds to the bureaucracy of the state according to Marxism.

That concept takes away the possibility of having a relative independence of Marxism of bureaucracy towards the ruling elite, so elitism sought hiding the independent political power on bureaucracy parallel to the economic and political control of the class leading to the explanation of the extinguished bureaucratic activities.⁵⁴

3. Concerning the class struggle, in elitism and Marxism, there is a grave flaw in defining it based on the economic factor or the struggle resulted from the possession of production tools. Still, the state's military power leads to making it between the elite and the masses. Also, there is another flaw in believing that class clash is different from the one in past ages that the current one is between the bourgeois and the proletariat.⁽⁵⁵⁾

This criticism of elitism is a wrong explanation especially Marxism which misinformed its scientific concepts as well as the misconceptions of Mosca, Pareto and Marx. Marx sought to prove that all kind of societies in the civil life in Europe can be distinguished according to its economic systems and the social changes can be explained by the changes in the economic activities leading to the emergence of new elites.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ Poulantzas, N. A., & O'Hagan, T. (1973). Political power and social classes (pp. 195-224). London: NLB.

⁵⁵ Raymon Aron (1974) Main currents in Sociological Thoughts. Pin-Guin Books, London, p161.

⁵⁶ Thomas Botomore. (1972). Al-Nokhba wa Al-Mojtama'. Tarjamat George Goha. Beirut. AL-Mo'assasa Al-Arabia Lildirasat Wa Al-Nasher. 5.

Similarly, Poulantzas's in "Political Power and Social Classes" confirmed the concept of the multiplicity of political elites as an ideological reaction to Marxism, which represent the functional party proving that the ruling elite have a function in the society. It is avoiding falling in the trap of class clash since the syndicates' leaders are from all the political parties and the responsible bureaucratic leaders are considered leading elite.⁵⁷

Concerning the faction of the political class in the society, Poulantzas's adds that the Marxist concept of the movement of the power from one function to another and the political control by the political leaders, heads of the companies, and the leaders of the military is known as the inevitability of economic Marxism which is related to the political activity of the state's institutions and the belonging of their members to that center.

Despite elitism has many resources of political power, it couldn't explain the relationship between those sources. The criticism of Marxism of misunderstanding the ruling class and urging it to work according the bureaucracy of the state and the belonging to an economic group considering them active members in the political powers.⁵⁸

2.1.1.5. Ruling Class Theory in the World of the North and the South

The attempt to understand the state is all about understanding how the ruling class's political relations were developed with the society. In addition, Carl Marx added to

⁵⁷ Poulantzas, N. A., & O'Hagan, T. (1973). Political power and social classes (pp. 195-224). London: NLB.

⁵⁸ Poulantzas, N. A., & O'Hagan, T. (1973). Political power and social classes (pp. 195-224). London: NLB.

Arnold Ruge in September, 1843 including everything about the political state which is a symbol for struggles in the human process.

Consequently, the political state is a combination of the political and social struggles as well as its needs and facts and this differentiates between the government of the people and the government of the private property ⁽⁵⁹⁾ This way, Marx passed all the allegations about his negligence of the political dimension of the society which kept the relation between the economic and social levels of the society.

In addition, he assured the importance of the existence of the ruling class in directing the public and productive interests of the state, so it had a double role by doing the capital and organizational role in supervising works.

It is obvious that there is an administrative and bureaucratic role of the ruling class in establishing the state as a result of considering the state and the organization of the society computable with the goals of that society. ⁽⁶⁰⁾

The ancient state didn't separate between political and non-political issues merging the political state with the civil society as a sign to the modern state which comprises the political and non-political state. ⁶¹

Here appears the importance of the existence of a class that links the two levels of state at the level of the relationships of the society with production and the social relationships. ⁶²

In other words, the Marxist concept of classes is not based on various political positions in the hand of a specific class. On the contrary, it is based on class conflict,

⁵⁹Saul Padover (1979). *The Essential Marx "Thenon Economic Writings"*. New American Library, New York, p374-375.

⁶⁰James Bill, and Robert L. Hardgrave, *Comparative Politics: The Quest for theory*, (Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Comparative Politics: The Quest for theory, (Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1973), p. 144

⁶¹ Morris Baribi. (1994). *Takawon Al-Dawla Al-Hditha Fe Nathar Marx*. Tarjamat Halim. Adad 4. 94-95.

⁶² Poulantzas, N. A., & O'Hagan, T. (1973). *Political power and social classes* (pp. 195-224). London: NLB.

the political structures, state forms and rule regimes. On the other hand, the historic development of the political and economic systems, a new group of employees named professionals in the bureaucratic work at the civil or military level. This is a very important science in politics and the history of the state. ⁶³

The existence of the state in activities such as tax collection indicates the existence of a group of people not belonging to the capital class relating their existence to the state. From here, bureaucracy is a separate class with specific interests. ⁽⁶⁴⁾

Bureaucracy is the moral result of the state based on the social formation as the state reflect its policies on the members of the socially- divided society, so it belongs to the state and its political authority institutions as expressed by Marx, Engles, Lenin and Gramsci. In addition, it indicates the organizational system of the state and the mechanisms of its internal functions especially in influencing the political ideological and bourgeois affairs in the state which is called the bureaucratic trend.

⁶⁵

Its main problem is that it isn't under the direct control of the political activity of the classes from which it emerged. In other words, its main function is within the social formation of the society and different factions appearing as one unified unit despite the variety of its human resources and belonging ⁽⁶⁶⁾

According to Lenin, the forms of the bourgeoisie state is full of variety, still it is definitely following the bourgeoisie dictatorship system. ⁶⁷ In addition, Bukharin

⁶³ Antonio Gramsci. (1994). *Karasat Al-Sijin*. Tarjamat Adel Ghadem. Dar Al-Mostaqbal Al-Arabi. Cairo- Egypt. 197.

⁶⁴ W. Wesolowski (1979). *Classes, Strata and power*. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, p.31.

⁶⁵ Poulantzas, N. A., & O'Hagan, T. (1973). *Political power and social classes* (pp. 195-224). London: NLB.

⁶⁶ Ralph Miliband (1970). *The state in Capitalist Society: An analysis of the Western System of Power*. The Camelot Press Ltd, London.

⁶⁷ Lenin. (1971). *The State and Revolution*. Selections in three parts, The 2nd part. Dar Al-Taqadom. Moscow. 408-409.

indicates that the active system in the state of capitalism is the collective capital and the production process which is the surplus of the working class of the capital system in an attempt to change this value to production surplus.

As a system, it is one of the images of using the crowds by the few ruling classes and marginalizing working classes. Similarly, Engles in his book:” Anti-Dürring ” described it by saying that words increased production powers controlling the state, the more capitalist the society is, more working classes will be used. Eventually, this capitalist relationship is pushed to its farthest limits. ⁽⁶⁸⁾

In short, capitalistic states are a quantum leap in the path of capitalism because it combines economy and politics; economic administration and human administration. This explains its existence in the Eastern and Western states considering them tyrant governments. ⁶⁹ In the Arab world. There is a middle-class development which owned power from the dominant class from the colonial bourgeoisie practicing the bureaucratic control leading to a major crisis between the public sector and the private sector coexisting in production relationships between them. ⁷⁰

Elitism theory is one of the transitional theories from traditional to behavioral schools, but there are limitations to this theory as follows:

⁶⁸ Tony Cliff (1974). State Capitalism in Russia. Pluto press, London.

⁶⁹ Al-Afif, Al-Akhdar. (1990) Inhiyar Ra’smaliat Al-Dawla Al-Tailandia. Al-Marixia Al-Berostrokya was Mostaqbal Al-Ishtirakiya. Ed. Mahmud Amin Al0Alem. Dar Qadaya Fikriya. Cairo. 97.

(العفيف الأخضر (1990). انهيار رأسمالية الدولة التالينية، الماركسية البيرويستروكيا ومستقبل الاشتراكية. تحرير: محمود أمين العالم، دار قضايا فكرية، القاهرة، ص97.)

⁷⁰ Mahdi Alem. (1990) Moqadimat Nathariya Lidirasat Athar Al- Fikr Al-Ishtiraki Fe Harakat Al-Taharaor Al-Watani. Dar Al- Farabi- Beirut- Lebanon. 322-323.

(مهدي عامل (1990). مقدمات نظرية لدراسة أثر الفكر الاشتراكي في حركة التحرر الوطني. دار الفارابي، بيروت-لبنان، ص322-323.)

1. The independency of the political phenomenon supposing that it is part of other phenomena, so it cannot be understood separately from other phenomena.⁷¹

Practically and epistemologically, the class analysis of the theory demonstrates that politics is affiliated to production interrelated relations. In other words, the ruling elite existence is essential that it is not possible to study the political situation without analyzing the elites influence on politics.

This means that Elitism theory is different from the other theories in comparative politics such as systems, decision making and structural ad functional theory considering it independent and can be analyzed independently from other theories.⁷²

2. The horizontal organization of the society indicated that Elitism is close to a hierarchic society divided into classes according to economic and non-economic standards. Still, it doesn't divide people according to their race, religions or ethic and regional origin.

Elitism see that these divisions don't affect the structure of the society, bit it is all about who controls the political process. Consequently, the nature of the political system, its understanding, its underlying horizontal organization, its patterns and the characteristics of the ruling class is included.⁷³

3. The control of the power in the hand of the ruling elite who are a kind of minority in the society leads to considering Elitism and multiplicity opposites in terms of their

⁷¹ Aref, Naser Mohammed. (1995). *Nathariat Al-Siasa Al-Moqarana Wa Tatbiq fe dirasat Al-Nothom Al-Siasia Al-Arabai*. PhD thesis (Unpublished) Economy and Arts Faculty, Cairo- Egypt. 195-196.

(عارف، نصر محمد (1995). نظريات السياسة المقارنة وتطبيقها في دراسة النظم السياسية العربية. رسالة دكتوراة غير منشورة، كلية الاقتصاد والعلوم الانسانية، جامعة القاهرة-مصر، ص195-196.)

⁷² Paolo Zannoni, "the concept of Elite" *European Journal of. Political Research*, vol. 6 1978, pp. 16

⁷³ Aref, Naser Mohammed. (1995). *Nathariat Al-Siasa Al-Moqarana Wa Tatbiq fe dirasat Al-Nothom Al-Siasia Al-Arabai*. PhD thesis (Unpublished) Economy and Arts Faculty, Cairo- Egypt. 195-196.

(عارف، نصر محمد (1995). نظريات السياسة المقارنة وتطبيقها في دراسة النظم السياسية العربية. رسالة دكتوراة غير منشورة، كلية الاقتصاد والعلوم الانسانية، جامعة القاهرة-مصر، ص166.)

nature. However, Elitism is the strongest party in the society owning the economic power. Multiplicity of power is the distribution of power among individuals. Still, they don't oppose each other because any individual has the right to own his power influencing the whole society. ⁽⁷⁴⁾

According to the classical and modern elitists, the main difference between the elite and people is possessing political power despite the classical see people as being enable to rule themselves. However, modern elitists see that elites use people using their power, but their existence is not necessary because people have power enabling them to own fortune and power and channel the public opinions on their side. ⁷⁵

This indicates that all the political systems are divided into two classes, namely: the ruled and the ruling. In the former, Bottomore sought to develop the concept of Counter Elite' with the ruling elite I order to find an internal connection between people and the elites. In the latter, the elites are the most important class in the political system. ⁷⁶

4. There are always a controlling minority in every state; this assures that they control the political structure of the society despite the differences in the concepts about elites, their internal formation, source s of power and how to keep its existence in the society, there are some points which should be highlighted:

⁷⁴Paolo Zannoni (1978). the concept of Elite. European Journal of Political Research, Vol. (6), pp.16-17.

⁷⁵Martin Marger (1981). Elite and Masses, An introduction to political Sociology. New York, Van Nastrand Company, pp.78-79.

⁷⁶G. Lenczowski. (1987). Al-Safwa Al-Siasia Fe AlSharq Al-Awsat. Tarjamat: Dr. Adel Mokhtar AL-Howari. Dar Al-Mawqif Al-Arabi. Cairo- Egypt. 24.

- a. There are many concepts for the ruling group, namely: the elite, the ruling class, the political elite, the power elite, the political class and the Oligarchy.⁷⁷
- b. Michels see that these small groups are the ruling class. However, Pareto sees them as a ruling and non-ruling class. The latter is found among the brightest. Still, considering them the elite doesn't mean that they rule in the society because accepting them in this elite requires power to get consensus and acceptance by the ruled and the balanced powers of the elite.⁷⁸

In addition, Bottomore distinguished three degrees of elites, namely: the functional and occupational groups who have a high stature in the society; the political class including all the powerful lobbying groups whose takes is to resolve conflicts for the political leadership and the political elite who are a minority in the political class, but it accepts the ones who work in politics.⁽⁷⁹⁾

- c. Differences in the sources of elites are about the ruling groups regarding to what they are distinguished with, so Pareto called these factors related to the personal characteristics taking the place of economy-based reason for ruling a society the 'residues'' concept.

Still, Mosca focused on the organizational abilities of the ruling class and its ability to achieve their interests which is called 'the political equation' referring to its ability to superior in the key values of the society including military, economic or religious symbols. However, Michels see that the

⁷⁷ Al-Manofy, Kamal. (1987). Oasol Al-Notho AlSiasia Al-Moqarana. Sharikat Al-Rabian Linashir Wa Al-Tawzi'. Kuwait. 73-84.

(المنوفي، كمال (1987). أصول النظم السياسية المقارنة. شركة الربيعان للنشر والتوزيع، الكويت، ص73-84.)

⁷⁸ Paolo Zannoni (1978). the concept of Elite. European Journal of Political Research, Vol. (6), pp.16-17.

⁷⁹ Thomas Botomore (1964). Elites and Society. Basic Books, New York, pp.8-9.

source of the power of the Oligarchy is in its intellectual power and personal characteristics.⁸⁰

- d. Concerning how they keep their power, there are many reactions from the elite analysis confirming that this is achieved via the circulation of the elite including internal circulation which is the ability of the elite to absorb the ideas of people out of the elite which might form another elite. Mosca sees that the stability of the elite comes from the political equation which blinds the ability of the elite to understand the political formula in the society.

That elite has the key to controlling the society based on the controlling powers such as military, fortune and technology. Similarly, Michels calls this process the 'Iron law of Oligarchy' indicating the ability of the elite to stabilize and survive through creating a channel of understanding with the people outside the elite which is called 'elite circulation'.⁸¹

- e. It is possible to analyze and determine an elite by considering it a base for understanding the political phenomenon along with the necessity to determine the dimensions of elites⁸² which intersect with the approaches of the elites, namely: historical observation as talked about by Pareto and Mosca concerning reaching the definition of elites, positions possession in the society.

⁸⁰ Al-Manofy, Kamal. (1987). Oasol Al-Notho AlSiasia Al-Moqarana. Sharikat Al-Rabian Linashir Wa Al-Tawzi'. Kuwait. 73-84.

(المنوفي، كمال (1987). أصول النظم السياسية المقارنة. شركة الربيعان للنشر والتوزيع، الكويت، ص73-84.)

⁸¹ Al-Manofy, Kamal. (1987). Oasol Al-Notho AlSiasia Al-Moqarana. Sharikat Al-Rabian Linashir Wa Al-Tawzi'. Kuwait. 73-84.

(المنوفي، كمال (1987). أصول النظم السياسية المقارنة. شركة الربيعان للنشر والتوزيع، الكويت، ص73-84.)

⁸² G. Lenczowski. (1987). Al-Safwa Al-Siasia Fe AlSharq Al-Awsat. Tarjamat: Dr. Adel Mokhtar AL-Howari. Dar Al-Mawqif Al-Arabi. Cairo- Egypt. 24.

These dimensions intersect with elites' approaches including historical observation as mentioned by Pareto and Mosca concerning the sources of determine the definition of elites, positions approaches, which is represented by determining who leads that elite; decision- making approach which is determining who participates in decision making and reputation approach which is determining who is well-known al an elitist.⁸³

It is worth mentioning that there are restrictions for elites such as social background, socio-political attitude, followed political values, personal characteristics, self- reflection and how to show themselves to the world around them. In addition, there are many possibilities making Elitism theory the most appropriate theory in studying political systems and analysing them including:

1. The nature of human societies is distinguished with having power which cannot be practiced away from the society, so there must be a committee running the affairs of the society especially the small groups which control the society and stabilize it.
2. The history of people and nations indicates that there are a minority who rule and make history.
3. The focus on the ruling minority goes back to the beginnings of the political philosophy of the Greeks, but it was according to the democratic and autocratic systems.⁸⁴

⁸³James Bill and Robert Hardgrave (1973). Comparative Politics: The Quest for theory. Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, Ohio, pp165-167.

(⁸⁴) Richard, Merrit (1971). Systematic Approach to comparative Politics. Rand McNally and Company, Chicago, pp118-129.

4. The concept of 'state' in the Arab Islamic countries indicates circulation of power and change not continuity.⁸⁵
5. The nature of the political Arab contemporary reality indicates that there is a continuity to the concept of state in the Arabs' heritage demonstrated through the nature of the internal and external policies and alliances lacking stability and continuity.
6. The political system is related to the nature of elites leading to changing the system according to the internal changes.

Based on the previously mentioned, there are problems in using this theory in studying the Arabs' political systems, namely:

1. A confusion between the indicator and the indications calling for talking about the concept of elites in Arabic language referring to privileges and having good manners. However, there is a confusion between the meaning and what it really means.⁸⁶
2. The problematic issue of the discrepancy between the what it is like and the truth due to not having clear, specific and announced rules for the political process especially in the Arab countries.
3. The complications of the basis of elites either on residues and the organizational abilities or employing the political equation. Still, what is in the Arab countries is paradoxes due to having many factors leading to them.

⁸⁵ Aref, Naser Mohammed. (1995). *Nathariat Al-Siasa Al-Moqarana Wa Tatbiq fe dirasat Al-Nothom Al-Siasia Al-Arabai*. PhD thesis (Unpublished) Economy and Arts Faculty, Cairo- Egypt. 195-196.

(عارف، نصر محمد (1995). نظريات السياسة المقارنة وتطبيقها في دراسة النظم السياسية العربية. رسالة دكتوراة غير منشورة، كلية الاقتصاد والعلوم الانسانية، جامعة القاهرة-مصر، ص 87.)

⁸⁶ Hariq Elia. (1985). *Al-Saraya Wa- Altahawol Al- Siasi Wa al Ijtimae Fe Al-Mojtama Al-Arabi Al-Hadith*. (80) *Al-Mostaqbal Al-Arabi*. 4.

(حريق، ايليا (1985). السراية والتحول السياسي والاجتماعي في المجتمع العربي الحديث. العدد (80)، المستقبل العربي، ص 4.)

4. The efficiency of the vertical units in the Arab societies is belonging to a tribe or province as a basis for the formation and continuity of elites.⁸⁷ In fact, this contradicts the etymological basis of the theory that the horizontal division of the society is the biggest phenomenon not vertical division. Furthermore, the relationship between the minority possessing the power is the main hypothesis of Elitism's analysis.
5. The role of the leader is in the formation of the elite and keeping it, but in the Arab case, the leader is the center of the society which is known as the (ruler-subject) relationship. This means that studying elitism through the political leadership axel considering elites as subjects who don't have power to influence the political power is negating elitism itself.⁸⁸
6. Co-existing with the elites and counter-elites based on the nature of the relationship between the state and society in the Arab reality along with the crises of weakening the credibility of false mottos, failures and repeated defeats led to weakening the trust of people in elites. These crises founded a state of instability to the legitimacy of these elites paving the way to the emergence of anti- elites peacefully or violently.⁸⁹

⁸⁷ Mabsa Al-Jamal. (1993) Al-Nokhba Alk-Siasia Fe Masr. Dirasa Hala Lilnokhba Al-Wazariya. Al-Tab'a Al-Ola. ,Markaz Dirasat Al-Wihda Al-Arabia- Beirut- Lebanon. 212-217.

(مابسة، الجمل (1993). النخبة السياسية في مصر: دراسة حالة للنخبة الوزارية. الطبعة الاولى، مركز دراسات الوحدة العربية، بيروت- لبنان، ص212-217.)

⁸⁸ Mabsa Al-Jamal. (1993) Al-Nokhba Alk-Siasia Fe Masr. Dirasa Hala Lilnokhba Al-Wazariya. Al-Tab'a Al-Ola. ,Markaz Dirasat Al-Wihda Al-Arabia- Beirut- Lebanon. 212-217.

(مابسة، الجمل (1993). النخبة السياسية في مصر: دراسة حالة للنخبة الوزارية. الطبعة الاولى، مركز دراسات الوحدة العربية، بيروت- لبنان، ص212-217.)

⁸⁹ Mabsa Al-Jamal. (1993) Al-Nokhba Alk-Siasia Fe Masr. Dirasa Hala Lilnokhba Al-Wazariya. Al-Tab'a Al-Ola. , Markaz Dirasat Al-Wihda Al-Arabia- Beirut- Lebanon. 212-217.

(مابسة، الجمل (1993). النخبة السياسية في مصر: دراسة حالة للنخبة الوزارية. الطبعة الاولى، مركز دراسات الوحدة العربية، بيروت- لبنان، ص212-217.)

7. There is a difficulty in explaining and analyzing the elites in the Arab countries regarding their nature and their surrounding confidentiality.

2.1.1.6. Classical Elitism and the Theory of Political Minorities

The classical elitism and the theory of political minorities are to inevitable concepts for elitism since classical elitism used the inevitability of the rule of the elite as a start for their discussion with political liberalism and Marxism. They claimed that democracy and communism were unable to rule the society because it is ruled by the elite. In other words, elites are irreplaceable but with another elite that societies must be ruled by elites.

This agrees with Pareto's rule stated circulation of elites and Mosca's concept of political class and Michel's Iron law of Oligarchy. Still, the law of elite circulation states the circulation of elites in power as a result of having competition.

In addition, elites emerge from a class of political rulers. In return, there are followers. Still, Weber added that social classes are supporters for the theory of the contemporary Elitism theory .⁽⁹⁰⁾

Furthermore, elitism is anti-democratic in its essence because of the law of the minority, so the first understanding of elitism out of Europe was not positive in the first half of the 20th century. Still, there is nothing against democracy in elitism unless realism and democracy are not on the same page. In political sociology, one of the main purposes of Elitism theory is finding reasons for the democratic rule, consequently, the recognition of democracy. .⁽⁹¹⁾

⁹⁰Femina J (2006) Pareto and Political Theory. New York: Routledge.

⁹¹Sartori G (1987) The Theory of Democracy Revisited. Washington, DC: CQ Press.

2.2. Decision-Making:

2.2.1. Definition:

“Decision-making is usually defined as a process or sequence of activities involving stages of problem recognition, search for information, definition of alternatives and the selection of an actor of one from two or more alternatives consistent with the ranked preferences”.

A decision would be “objectively” rational if it maximized the given values in a given situation, “subjectively” rational if it maximized attainment relative to the actual knowledge of the subject. Also, an important characteristic of decision-making is that it is never a product of a single man. It does not originate from a single brain; it is always the product of several men or brains who work together. In any governmental organization several bureaucrats or officers work together and after considering all the aspects a decision is taken. ⁹²

2.2.2. Decision-Making and Pure Science of Politics:

It has been claimed by many, specifically by Robert Dahl (Modern Political Analysis, fifth edition) that decision-making processes constitute the pure science of politics. Now, the question is what is meant by pure science of politics? Dahl says that in earlier time’s pure science of politics denoted evaluation and normative analysis of politics because in those days’ normative approaches to the study of politics was considered scientific political phenomena and concepts were evaluated in the background of norms or normative values and the norms which could win the test were considered scientific.

⁹² Olsen, A. (2020). Equivalency framing in political decision making. In *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*.

But this outlook underwent sea changes in course of time and political scientists began to show indifference to normative aspects of political science. Modern approach such as behaviouralist of Easton or structural-functionalism of Almond heavily relied upon empirical analysis and the decision-making theory could not keep itself away from this type of approach. For arriving at decision, it was thought, facts, data, information etc. are essential as well as their interpretation and application appeared to be a must.

Robert Dahl says: “the term ‘science’ has increasingly come to mean an empirical science of politics. According to this view, an empirical science of politics would be concerned exclusively with the validity of the factual or empirical elements”. The implication of this contention is that without the help of data, facts and information the policy maker cannot make any decision. Rationality along with the data is the most important element of decision-making process.⁹³

2.2.3. Snyder’s Theory of Decision-Making:

Central Idea of Snyder:

The post-Second World War period witnessed a revolution in the thought system of political science. We have already touched behaviouralist, structural-functionalism communications theory etc. Now we shall focus our attention on Snyder’s approach to the study of political science which is commonly known as decision-making theory or approach to the study of politics. From the mid-fifties to the end of fifties Richard Snyder published a series of writings whose chief objective was to propagate the importance of decision-making approach.

⁹³ Linde, J. (2020). Expected Utility and Political Decision Making. In *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*.

His decision-making theory can be explained in the form of following points:

1. We know that the general systems theory of David Easton and the structural-functional approach of Gabriel Almond and other related theories are more or less static in nature which means that all these theories deal with those elements that are static. But Snyder's point of view is that society is not only complex but also dynamic.

If so the real approach to the study of politics would be to conceptualize the analysis so that it can cope with dynamic aspects of society or the changes that are taking place very frequently. Snyder, therefore, claims that his decision-making approach is dynamic. While the decision makers make decision, they consider all the (or most of the) situations. If they fail to do this the decision will not achieve acceptability and credibility.

2. It has been observed by Snyder that the decision-making process has been playing a very crucial part in the administration of any business organization or governmental department. But it is unfortunate that none took care of analysing the concept in details. Only in the fifties of the last century two persons, Herbert Simon and C.I. Bernard dealt with the decision-making concept.

Simon's Models of Man and Bernard's The Function of the Executive were published in 1957 and 1958 respectively. Snyder draws our attention to two important points. One is decision-making plays so important a role in any business organization and governmental department that it cannot be neglected at all. Secondly, if so, a comprehensive theory based on empiricism and scientific methods is to be built up. It is interesting to note that Snyder, Simon and Bernard are contemporary.

Snyder says that it is essential to go through the processes of the decision making, what factors are involved in this process, to analyse the decision, their impact upon the society. If we treat the subject in this way, we shall find that the concept has dynamized the political system and processes of analysing political phenomena.

3. We know that in liberal democratic systems various groups, political parties and non-governmental organizations play important role in the administration. Decision-making process includes all of them (or most of them) into the orbit of analysis.⁹⁴

Broadly, they are three factors influencing decision making:

1. The first is internal setting of the society:

Internal setting includes many elements some of which are:

The nature and functioning of the social organization such as political parties, pressure groups, non-governmental organizations, public opinion, agencies helping the formation of public opinion, nature of the political system etc. All these elements enter into the domain of decision-making process. In a democratic society social, political and other types of organizations enjoy freedom in their day-to-day activities.

A good rapport exists between the authority on the one hand and numerous organizations on the other hand. But in an autocratic regime such a situation cannot be thought. Naturally the content and type of decision in both regimes need not be identical. Again, the process of socialization in all systems is not same. When the policy maker proceeds to decide a policy, it is his duty to bring all these factors into his active consideration.

⁹⁴ LePere-Schloop, M., & Nesbit, R. (2021). Making Disciplinary-Based Theories of the Nonprofit Sector Accessible for Students: An Example Using a Theory from Political Science. *The Journal of Nonprofit Education and Leadership*, 11(1).

Especially the socialization has an important part in the entire process. This is due to the fact that for an effective decision cooperation between the decision-makers and common people is necessary. Cooperation means people's participation. Again, for the implementation of decision people's cooperation is also required. All these are made easy by a high degree of socialization.

2. There is external set up or setting. This condition is especially important for the policy maker who makes decisions for the external relations of the state. It is known to all the students of international politics that today the term international society has earned wide publicity and all the nation-states are the members of this society.⁹⁵

2.2.4. Decision-Making Theories:

New Tendency:

Before the end of the 1950s an elaborate idea about decision-making theory was built up by many and among them the most prominent figures, were Richard Snyder, Chester Barnard and Herbert Simon. The last two scholars developed a theory mainly for the public administration. Richard Snyder was interested in domestic and international politics and he applied his model in these two segments of political science.

But there is an overlapping of decision-making process so far as public administration and political science are concerned. Some of the concepts of decision making meant for the public administration have also their strong bearing in political science. However,

⁹⁵ Wang, R., Harper, F. M., & Zhu, H. (2020, April). Factors Influencing Perceived Fairness in Algorithmic Decision-Making: Algorithm Outcomes, Development Procedures, and Individual Differences. In *Proceedings of the 2020 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems* (pp. 1-14).

the central idea formulated and developed in the fifties continued to spread its wings and influence even in the seventies and early eighties.

Following is the remark of a well-known author: “Indeed during the 1960s and 1970s a distinctive area of study, policy analysis was developed. This set out to examine how policy was initiated, formulated and implemented and how the policy process could be improved”.

We call it a new tendency because interest about decision-making had already emerged in the mid-fifties but in the sixty's and seventies separate areas for the study of decision-making were selected and scholars devoted more time and intellect for the proliferation of the concept. Several factors contributed to the emergence of decision-making theory and the most important of them is the strong urge to verify the concept with the help of data and scientific principles.⁹⁶

2.2.5. Models of Decision Making:

Considering all these some have divided the decision-making process into several models and these may be stated in the following ways:

Rational actor model, Incremental model, Bureaucratic organization model and Belief system model.⁹⁷

⁹⁶ Wan, S., & Dong, J. (2020). *Decision making theories and methods based on interval-valued intuitionistic fuzzy sets*. Springer Nature.

⁹⁷ Wan, S., & Dong, J. (2020). *Decision making theories and methods based on interval-valued intuitionistic fuzzy sets*. Springer Nature.

1. Rational Actor Model:

The basic idea of the rational actor model is derived from economic theory and utilitarianism. The core concept of the theory is based on the idea of “Economic man” who takes all sorts of decision on the basis of rationality and utility.

The economic man or the rational man decides to pursue a particular process which thinks in his judgment rational and which will ensure maximum utility. So, rationality and utility are the two important criteria that lie at the heart of decision-making process.

2. Incremental Model:

There is a second theory which is called incremental model. For a perfect and bold decision, it is necessary that facts and information must be correct and impartial. But in practice this situation hardly prevails. The consequence is the policy/decision becomes faulty. Because of this drawback the decision-makers are not interested in making one-time policy.

They feel that policies are to be formulated in such a way that there will be enough scope of review and change whenever required. This creates a scope for a new model labelled as incrementalism.

Stated briefly, the model is: “Policy-making is therefore a continuous, exploratory process, lacking overriding goals and clear-cut ends, policy-makers tend to operate within an existing pattern or framework adjusting their position in the light of feedback in the form of information about the impact of earlier decisions.”

What transpires from the above analysis is the decision maker adopts a tendency of evasion. He wants to avoid or evade problem or uncertainty and for that reason he decides to follow a policy of incrementalism. Policy is not prepared once for all, rather it is made step by step and the decision-maker proceeds stage by stage. In such an approach there is great importance of flexibility in the policy formulation.

The policy-maker knows that a policy cannot be made once for all. Situation and circumstances change very frequently and the policy maker must amend policy otherwise it will not be able to serve the purpose. For this particular reason the exponents (particularly C. E. Lindblom) have propounded a thesis that it is a continuous process.

In the same line of thought another observer points out: "Policy is not made once for all, it is made and remade endlessly. Policy making is a process of successive approximation to some desired objectives". If circumstances demand any change or reconsideration of policy, the decision maker takes steps in that direction.

The administrator or the policy-maker uses the past experience while making policy and he moves very cautiously. His movement comprises also very small steps. He avoids big jumps that would go beyond current knowledge. The decision-maker, of course, makes prediction but that is based on past experience. The decision-maker avoids radical change in any policy formulation his technique is incremental change or successive change.

Incrementalism also envisages, at limited scale, comparison of satisfactory results. If the consequence of the implementation of policy are satisfactory the decision-maker will make next step. Lindblom, the chief exponent of incrementalism, has said that in this

approach of decision making there is very little scope of change, mistake and miscarriage of any policy because the policy maker refrains himself from taking any type of risk.⁹⁸

3. Bureaucratic Organization Model:

We shall now deal with a model which was framed in the background of Cuban Missile crisis in 1962 and the model was championed by Graham Allison in 1971. We have already noted that the bureaucratic structure or the political organization of political system have positive influence on the policy making processes.

It is believed that the large political and other organizations have their own values, ideas and long cherished and well-guarded inclinations. All these create definite impact upon the decision-making processes. Hence, while decision is being made, the organizational process cannot be neglected.

In all political systems bureaucrats play a crucial role in the various stages of the formulation of decision. The head of the state, Prime Minister, Foreign Minister etc. have a role no doubt but the real and important role is generally played by the bureaucrats. However, the structure and the extent of influence of bureaucrats in all political systems are not identical everywhere.

The bureaucrats and related agencies have their own outlook, values and assessment about incidents and when policy making process starts the top government officers and allied agencies release their efforts to guide the formulation of policies in the light they cherish. In fact, the liberal democratic system state does not play an overriding role.

⁹⁸ Wan, S., & Dong, J. (2020). *Decision making theories and methods based on interval-valued intuitionistic fuzzy sets*. Springer Nature.

The state as state exists and it guides, but it is not the final voice on any national and international issue, organizational structure and bureaucracy are deciding factors. The exponents of the model believe that though the ministers have a positive role in the policy-making process, the actual function is performed by bureaucrats and it is held that during the Cuban crisis this came to limelight. The heads of the states had a role but more important role was played by bureaucrats.⁹⁹

4. Belief System Model:

Generally, there is a belief system which can be termed as ideology or deep-rooted belief. Some scholars are of opinion that in the arena of decision-making beliefs or ideologies have a very important influence. Here crops up a confusion. If the decision-makers are rational it will be supposed that they are not to be influenced by beliefs and ideology. But this argument does not stand the test of reality.

If the belief or attachment to ideology is pervasive, or firm the decision-maker may temporarily give priority to ideology or belief. The policy makers of a communist country will not formulate such a policy as will violate basic principles of communism although rationality demands the violation.

Two examples may be cited. In 1956, Britain, USA and France launched a combined attack against General Nasser, the President of Egypt, on the issue of the nationalization of Suez Canal. Nasser wanted fund from USA and Britain for the construction of Aswan Dam on the river Nile.

⁹⁹ Wan, S., & Dong, J. (2020). *Decision making theories and methods based on interval-valued intuitionistic fuzzy sets*. Springer Nature.

First these two powers agreed and subsequently when they refused Nasser got assurance from the then USSR and this infuriated the two big powers and they attacked Nasser. Here the anti-communist feeling worked. The Cuban Missile Crisis is also the consequence of the same belief.

Fidel Castro, the President of Cuba, got economic and military assistance from communist Russia which was against American interest. These two are the handiwork of anti- communist feeling and policy makers made it a part of their policy/decision.¹⁰⁰

2.2.6. Stages of Decision-Making:

We shall now deal with a very important and interesting aspect of decision-making and it is various stages of decision-making. The decision-making can be divided into several stages. For example, at the very rudimentary stage it is to be decided that time is quite ripe for taking a decision because a problem has arisen and in order to cope with it a decision is to be adopted. Again, the problem is not to be allowed to aggravate.

Taking of a decision is not all it is to be properly formulated. Then the issues of implementation and evaluation arise. Researchers have divided all these into four different categories which are: Policy initiation, policy formulation, policy implementation and policy evaluation.

1. Policy Initiation:

Policy initiation is the crucial stage of decision-making. A policy is initiated, generally, in the background of problems or critical issues. As for instance, there is pollution of different types and their harmfulness is quite known to all. But policies are not taken as

¹⁰⁰ Wan, S., & Dong, J. (2020). *Decision making theories and methods based on interval-valued intuitionistic fuzzy sets*. Springer Nature.

soon as problems arise and this generally happens. There is a gap between the emergence of problem and the taking of a decision or clusters of decisions.

The problem of pollution started to arise in the fifties and sixties and the authorities began to think about it in the eighties. Similarly, there are the problems of unemployment and terrorist activities which are particularly crucial in some parts of the globe. Though the problems are quite old taking of action had actually started in the last decade of the twentieth century. This we call policy initiation.

Policy may originate from two sources. The first is the government or the authority of the political system can take action. This may be called policy from the above. In democracy very often the political parties, pressure groups, public opinion, mass media, political agitation etc. create pressure on the authority to take a decision in order to give relief to the people or to meet their demands. The authority knows that if demands are not met that will open the door to complications.

2. Formulation of Decision:

Once it has been decided that in order to cope with the situation or problem a decision is to be prepared, policy-makers then proceed to adopt decision and this is called policy/decision formulation which is the second stage. Making of decision is also highly complex because the persons associated with this task cannot do the job at a stroke.

Various proposals and alternatives are placed before the policy-makers and they are to select only the necessary ones. This is a tough job because the quality and efficacy of the decision depends to a large extent on the elements with the help of which it has been made. Again, the policy/decision-making is a composite which means number of

persons is involved in the preparation. Differences of opinion there may be and these must be settled before a policy is finally made.

Policy formulation also has a stage. The policy must be stated in clear terms and the objectives shall be stated clearly. It is the duty of the decision-makers to say that the decision has been formulated in the background of certain problems and issues and it is designed to perform such and such tasks.

3. Implementation of Policy:

Implementation of decision is the third stage of policy. In conventional analysis there is a dichotomy between policy-making and policy implementation. The political leaders or the government formulate decision and then it is left for the bureaucrats to implement it. In this way there is a clear dichotomy between formulation and implementation. But in recent analysis this dichotomy has been kept aside.

The formulators of the decision decide the aspects of implementation. They will not formulate such policies as well face problems in the period of implementation. If the formulators could not predict these problems implementation will face not only troubles, the very objective will remain unrealized. In a democratic state if the persons in charge of implementation do not do the job properly the political leaders must be prepared to give explanations to the electorate.

There is another aspect of implementation. Once a decision has been implemented the formulators will have to study the impact of the decision. This is necessary because of the reason that if the policy fails to reach the goal its revision or reformulation will be

required. Of course, hundred percent successes in implementation can never be expected.

4. Evaluation:

The final stage of the decision-making process is the evaluation. The policy makers or the authority after the implementation sits to ponder over the pros and cons of the policy. The chief objective is to study the success and failure of the policy.

This is called evaluation. On what basis the authority starts to evaluate the decision which has been implemented? It collects facts, data or information about the decision and on the basis of all these the evaluation task is done. Needless to say, that here, the communication network function and the political system fully utilizes this for its purpose. What are the consequences of evaluation?

(1) If the activities of the decision are fully unsatisfactory that is the decision has squarely failed then the authority/policy makers may think of abandoning the policy. Of course, this is not a very usual procedure because if the decisions were made after applying a good deal of rationality the question of abandoning it does not arise. If it is abandoned a new policy is being imitated to replace the old one.

(2) If the decision is partly successful, the decision-makers start to investigate the causes of such results and if they feel that there are reasonable grounds of partial success and partial failure, then in that situation they seriously think about revising the decision keeping the causes of failure in mind.

(3) In the cases of complete and partial failure the authority orders a thorough enquiry. It wants to know whether the decision itself is defective or ill-timed or inappropriate.

(4) If the cause of the failure is the defective or ineffective communication network, then the policy makers will make an attempt to rectify the communication system.

(5) The failure may be caused by the people's unwillingness to accept the decision. If the people feel that the decision implemented by the political authority of the state cannot meet their needs, they will not co-operate with the authority in this regard. Or the people may object to the policy or ideological or political grounds the implementation may cause problems.

(6) The success of a policy/decision largely depends upon people's acceptability and this again depends on the answer to the question—who gets? What? And at what cost? In the operative aspects of the decision these questions are of vital importance.¹⁰¹

2.2. Section Three: The Definition of Legitimacies

Despite the disagreement in the definitions of legitimacies, all political analysts agreed on the voluntary acceptance of any citizen in the government making the government legitimate.¹⁰² This indicates that the essence of legitimacy is in the acceptance of the majority of the ruled of the ruler allowing him to practice his power.¹⁰³

¹⁰¹ Berberyan, H. S., van Maanen, L., van Rijn, H., & Borst, J. (2021). Eeg-based identification of evidence accumulation stages in decision-making. *Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience*, 33(3), 510-527.

¹⁰² Dawabsha, Odaid. (1988). Anthimat Al-Hokm Al-Arabia: Al-Shar'ia Wa Al-Siassa Al-Kharijia. Presented to: Al-Oma Wa Al-dola Wa Al-Indimaj Fe Al-Watan Al-Arabi. Tahrir. Ghassan Salama et al. Markaz Dirasat Al-Wihda Al-Arabia. Beirut- Lebanon. 782.

(دوايشة، عضيد (1988). أنظمة الحكم العربية: الشرعية والسياسة الخارجية. ورقة قدمت الى: الأمة والدولة والاندماج في الوطن العربي (ندوة)، تحرير غسان سلامة وآخرون، مركز دراسات الوحدة العربية، بيروت-لبنان، ص782.)

¹⁰³ Sa'd Al-Din, Ibrahim. (1984) Masader Al-Shar'ia Fe Anthimat Al-Hokm Al-Arabia. Presented to: Azmat Al-Dimoqratia Fe Al- Watan Arabi, Bothoth Wa MOnaqashat Al-Nadwa Al-Fikriya Al-Ti Nathamatha Markaz Al-Wihda Al-Arabia. Beirut. 404.

(سعد الدين، ابراهيم (1984). مصادر الشرعية في أنظمة الحكم العربية. ورقة قدمت الى: أزمة الديمقراطية في الوطن العربي: بحوث ومناقشات الندوة الفكرية التي نظمها مركز دراسات الوحدة العربية، مركز دراسات الوحدة العربية، بيروت، ص404.)

In other words, the concept of legitimacy is like a pledge of allegiance in the Islamic heritage as Ibn Khaldun said: “I know that pledge of allegiance is an oath of obedience to the prince who rules the issues of Muslims and whose orders should be followed.”¹⁰⁴

Similarly, Maclver said that legitimacy is achieved when the ruling elite realizes its abilities and gets the appreciation of the majority of the society agreeing on values and basic interests of the society keeping the society in a good shape.¹⁰⁵ However, Max Webber said that if the ruling system is legitimate, citizens feel that its good and worth its obedience.⁽¹⁰⁶⁾

The most stabilized kind of agreement is the ones which is derived from the belief of individuals that it is their duty to accept and obey the rules sticking to the aims of the political system. This submission is a copy of the elites’ principles and agrees with the political system⁽¹⁰⁷⁾

The political system was found to control things and being able to face the challenges of the rule, but its ability and efficiency differs according to societies that some societies oppose their political systems while others obey them.¹⁰⁸

Still, legitimacies don’t act according to the objections of acceptance of the ruled, but the ruled find themselves obliged to accept decisions based on their agreement with the

¹⁰⁴ Bin Khaldun, Abu Zaid Bin Abdul Rahman Bin Mohammad. (1981). Moqadimat Bin Khaldun. Dar Al-Arqam. Beirut. 29.

(بن خلدون، أبو زيد بن عبد الرحمن بن محمد (1981). مقدمة ابن خلدون. دار القلم، بيروت، ص29.)

¹⁰⁵ Bin Khaldun, Abu Zaid Bin Abdul Rahman Bin Mohammad. (1981). Moqadimat Bin Khaldun. Dar Al-Arqam. Beirut. 29.

¹⁰⁶Max Weber (1947). The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. Translated by Henderson and Taclott Parsons, edited with an introduction by Talcott Parsons. Oxford University Press, New York, pp.124-126.

¹⁰⁷ David Easton (1965). A Systems Analysis of Political Life. Wiley, New York, p.278.

¹⁰⁸ Baha’ Al-Din , Ahmad. (1984). Shar’yat Al-Solta Fe Al-Alam Al-Arabi. Dar Al-Shoroq- Cairo- Egypt. 10.

(بهاء الدين، أحمد (1984). شرعية السلطة في العالم العربي. دار الشروق، القاهرة-مصر، ص10.)

values, principles and wishes of the political system not according to personal benefits. This means that it is beyond accepting and rejecting decisions because it is accepted to object decisions, but this doesn't negate the existence of a specific legitimacy directing the public according to the history of the society.¹⁰⁹

This means that having a legitimacy is a developmental necessity that can grow or disappear that ruling elites can take over power without being based on legitimate sources but over time, it will. This indicates that any political system starts with a clear legitimacy, but it might lose it over time because it is there to get to the head of the local authority.¹¹⁰

There are two types of legitimacies, namely: revolutionary and constitutional. The former depends on revolutions in order to get independence to take away royal regimes after independence giving people who ruled people the legitimacy.¹¹¹ The latter indicate the rule can be predictable conditioned by results and origins and linked to known and agreed upon rules. Consequently, the political system in this kind is based on democracy and participation in the rule of society allowing institutions to play a great role in the political process.

In addition, there are two types of legitimacies in political systems, namely: theocratic and democratic. The former can be defined as the legitimacy in which the main belief is that God is the main source of power who should be obeyed no matter what happens.

¹⁰⁹ Baha' Al-Din, Ahmad. (1984). *Shar'yat Al-Solta Fe Al-Alam Al-Arabi*. Dar Al-Shoroq- Cairo- Egypt. 10.

(بهاء الدين، أحمد (1984). *شرعية السلطة في العالم العربي*. دار الشروق، القاهرة-مصر، ص10).

¹¹⁰ Ibrahim. *Asader Al-Shar'ia Fe Anthimat Al-Hokm Al-Arabia*. 407.

(ابراهيم. *مصادر الشرعية في أنظمة الحكم العربية*. ص407)

¹¹¹ Ibrahim. *Asader Al-Shar'ia Fe Anthimat Al-Hokm Al-Arabia*. 407.

(ابراهيم. *مصادر الشرعية في أنظمة الحكم العربية*. ص407)

However, the latter indicates that the power of the ruler is not legitimate unless it was legitimized by the ruled.

Here, there are two different concepts, namely: the legitimate authority and the ruled-out authority. In the former, legitimacy is according to the common sense of people while in the latter, it is subject to rules or according to previous law.¹¹²

This means that the main factor in adding legitimacy to the efficiency of the political system lies in the compatibility between the general principles or the common culture or ideology of the political system with the convictions of the individuals living according to that system.

Consequently, the legitimacy of the political system is based on the agreement of the individuals and their convictions of the efficiency of the system and its compatibility with the political system, its principles and the convictions of people.

Here, the efforts of the Arab regimes systems to legitimize the internal system of their systems is their main goal. Max Webber distinguished between legal rationale which is one of the main components of legitimacy based on legalized rules of the duties and rights of the rulers and his associates; the ways of changing him by transfer of power and the succession of authorities.⁽¹¹³⁾

Easton called structuralism because of the importance of institutions and the process of institutionalization.⁽¹¹⁴⁾ Also, Huntington described this process as a path granting

¹¹² Al-Shawi. Monther. (1981). Al-Qanon- Al-Dostori: Nathariah Al-Dawla. Markaz Al-Bohoth Al-Qanonia. Wazarat Al-Adel. Baghdad. 66-75.

(الشاوي، منذر (1981). القانون الدستوري: نظرية الدولة. مركز البحوث القانونية، وزارة العدل، بغداد، ص66-75.)

¹¹³ Weber. The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. Pp.130-135.

¹¹⁴ Easton. A Systems Analysis of Political Life. Pp.52-55.

institutions and legal procedures a value.⁽¹¹⁵⁾ Structural legitimacy equals legal rationale in specifying rights and duties¹¹⁶ It is based on three elements:⁽¹¹⁷⁾

1. The constitutional element and its content that the legitimate authority is according to the constitution and legitimacy of the country.
2. The representation element which is convincing the ruled that whoever rules them represent them.
3. Achievement element is that the authority achieves great things benefiting the society they serve.

2.2.5. The Sources and Problems of Legitimacies in the Arab World

It is inevitable that there are twenty-six elites in the Arab world and twenty-six political systems, but they share the same culture and religious beliefs making them distinguished from other societies. The political Arab elite is traditional, religious, tribal and oppressive, still tends to go to the path of modernism as long as it doesn't violate religious beliefs. This divided the elites to traditional and modern, which has an identity of the modern and traditional world. Also, there is the religious, secular, state- like, national, dependent, revolutionary, conservative, democratic, military and oppressive giving the Arab political elites a blurry unstable situation.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁵ Samuel Huntington (1968). *Political Order in Changing Societies*. Yale University Press, New Haven, pp.24.

¹¹⁶ Salama Ghassan. (1987). *Nahaw Aqd Ijtimae' Arabi Jadid: Bahth Fe Shar'yat Dostoria. SilsilaT Al-Thaqafa Al-Qawmia.- Markaz Al-Dirasat Al-Wihda Al-Arabia*. Beirut. Lebanon. 25.

(سلامة، غسان (1987). نحو عقد اجتماعي عربي جديد: بحث في الشرعية الدستورية. سلسلة الثقافة القومية، مركز دراسات الوحدة العربية، بيروت-لبنان، ص25.)

¹¹⁷ Karl Wolfgang Deutsch (1963). *The Nerves of Government, Models of Political Communication and Control*. Free Press of Glencoe, London.

¹¹⁸ Mohammad Al-Swedi. (1990) *Political Sociology: Fields and Cases*. 62.

(محمد السويدي، علم الاجتماع السياسي: ميدانه وقضاياها، الجزائر 1990، ص: 62)

Still, the countries of the Arab world faced many problems including formulating its legitimacy as a state and a ruler. In other words, the legitimacy of the state, which is the political entity, and the legitimacy of its authority are the major problems. There are countries such as Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Yemen and Oman who witnessed the pre-modernization stage such as the “pre-modernization”, “riverside central states”, “*Makhzan* state” despite that most of the Arab countries have witnessed the foundation of the first countries in this century. In other words, some countries witnessed that in the first quarter such as Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. However, others did so in the second quarter such as the Arab Gulf, Sudan, Somalia, Libya and Mauritania.

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When they got their official political independence, elites were on the head of the governments which didn't have enough power to get the legitimacy it deserves from legitimate sources. Some of those countries remained on its traditional legitimacy having the Qur'an as their main source and referring to their national ancestors at Quraish's tribes.

Others tried to form new elites based on legal constitutional rationale leading to a parliamentary republic formation. The rest of the countries combined the rational and traditional sources in the formation of their constitutional parliamentary royalties. Still, some countries depended on their revolutionary legitimacy by following an ideological leadership and the one-sided party which rules alone or in coordination with other

¹¹⁹ Ibrahim, Sa'd Al-Din. (1985) *Al-Mojtama Wa Al-Dawla fe Al-Watan Al-Arabi*. Mashro' Istishraf Mostaqbal Al-Watan Al-Arabi. Markaz Dirasat Al-Wihda Al-Arabia. Beirut- Lebanon. 334.

(ابراهيم، سعد الدين (1985). المجتمع والدولة في الوطن العربي. مشروع استشراف مستقبل الوطن العربي، مركز دراسات الوحدة العربية، بيروت-لبنان، ص334).

forces in the society.¹²⁰ At the same time, some countries sought to choose one of those sources after their independence.¹²¹

Some people applied Easton's classification of the sources of legitimacy in the Arab regimes talking about the phenomenon of the charismatic leadership connected to one leader or a number of leaders from various countries. Still, the problem lies in passing on his characteristics which are phenomenal in any society. This period expands from the 1950s to the 1970s of this century that the Arab regimes depended on their ideologies as the source of the legitimacies. According to Michael Hudson, the main component of most of the ruling regimes of the Arab world is their ideologies.⁽¹²²⁾

Furthermore, their ideologies were nationalistic that it is related to the tight national realization or the extremism of isolation.¹²³ As a result, some regimes might find itself trapped in those ideologies, but they might agree at some point. Still, when thinking about the institutional process which regressed in the sources of the Arab legitimacies due to division, dependency and the oblivion of democracy and efficiency. Consequently, they became one of the arms of the central foreign authority and a tool for the external domination.

The main reasons for the weakness of the Arab legitimacies are:

¹²⁰ Sira' Al-Adwar Fe Al-Mashriq Al-Arabi: Natharat Fe Al-Mostaqbal. Al-Mostaqbal Al-Arabi. 211, 6. (صراع الأدوار في المشرق العربي: نظرات في المستقبل، المستقبل العربي. العدد (211)، ص.6.)

¹²¹ Sa'd Al-Din Ibrahim. (1984). Masader Al-Shar'ia Al-Arabia Fe Anthimat Al-Hokm Al-Arabia. Waraqa Qodinat Ela: Azmat Al-Dimoqratia Fe Al-Watan Al-Arabi: Bohoth Wa Monaqashat Al-Nadwa Al-Fikria Alty Nathamaha Markaz Dirasat Al-Wihda Al-Arabia. Markaz Dirasat Al-Wihda Al-Arabia. Beirut.

(سعد الدين، ابراهيم (1984). مصادر الشرعية في أنظمة الحكم العربية. ورقة قدمت الى: أزمة الديمقراطية في الوطن العربي: بحوث ومناقشات الندوة الفكرية التي نظمتها مركز دراسات الوحدة العربية، مركز دراسات الوحدة العربية، بيروت)

¹²² Michael Hudson (1977). Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy. Yale University Press, New Haven, pp.17-18.

¹²³ Salama.Nahw Aqd Ijtimae Arabi Jadid. Bahth Fe Sharia Al-Dostoria. 21.

(سلامة. نحو عقد اجتماعي عربي جديد: بحث في الشرعية الدستورية. ص.21.)

1. There are many cases related to the modern national state which were not settled since the oblivion of the Ottoman Empire inside the Arab countries, namely: identity, power and equality.¹²⁴
2. The fragility of the state that many countries might seem strong by seizing the legislative authority, decision-making and taking security procedures due to having many security forces. In return, they are weak economically, socially and politically in a positive manner.¹²⁵ This makes it lose the essence of its legitimacy in the eyes of the ruled giving them the attitude of obedience.
3. The Arab countries were not founded as states of law and institutions since laws change according to the will of the rulers since they have great powers to change the legal issues and the commonality of working according to emergency situations which give them greater powers than before.¹²⁶
4. The consensus that the Arab countries failed in achieving its greatest goals which are developing an economically and socially unified states¹²⁷, achieving

¹²⁴ Sa'd Al-Din Ibrahim. (1984). Masader Al-Shar'ia Al-Arabia Fe Anthimat Al-Hokm Al-Arabia. Waraqa Qodinat Ela: Azmat Al-Dimoqratia Fe Al-Watan Al-Arabi: Bohoth Wa Monaqashat Al-Nadwa Al-Fikria Alty Nathamaha Markaz Dirasat Al-Wihda Al-Arabia. Markaz Dirasat Al-Wihda Al-Arabia. Beirut.

(سعد الدين، ابراهيم (1984). مصادر الشرعية في أنظمة الحكم العربية. ورقة قدمت الى: أزمة الديمقراطية في الوطن العربي: بحوث ومناقشات الندوة الفكرية التي نظمتها مركز دراسات الوحدة العربية، بيروت، ص 414-416.)

¹²⁵ Ibrahim, Hasanin, Tawfiq. (1992) Bina' Al-Mojtama Al-Madani. Al-Moashirat Al-Kamia Wa Al-Kaifia. Waraqa Qodimat Ela: Al-Mojtama Almadani Fe A-Watan Al-Arabi Wa Dawroho Fe Tahqiq Al-Dimoqratia: Dohoth Wa Monaqashat Al-Nadwa Al-Fikria Alty Nathamaha Markaz Dirasat Al-Wigda Al-Arabia. Markaz Dirasat Al-Wigda Al-Arabia. Beirut. Lebanon. 691-692.

(ابراهيم، حسنين توفيق (1992). بناء المجتمع المدني: المؤشرات الكمية والكيفية. ورقة قدمت الى: المجتمع المدني في الوطن العربي ودوره في تحقيق الديمقراطية: بحوث ومناقشات الندوة الفكرية التي نظمتها مركز دراسات الوحدة العربية. مركز دراسات الوحدة العربية، بيروت-لبنان، ص 691-692.)

¹²⁶ Anabtawi. Monther. (1983) Dawr Al-Nokhba Al-Mothaqafa Fe Taziz Hoqoq Al-Insan Al-Arabi. Al-Mostaqbal Al-Arabi. 52. 4- 31.

(عنبتاوي، منذر (1983). دور النخبة المثقفة في تعزيز حقوق الانسان العربي، المستقبل العربي. العدد (52)، ص 4-31.)

¹²⁷ Daher Masoud, (1994). Moshkilat Biba Al-Dawla Al-Haditha Fe Al-Watan Arabi. Mosasat Eibal Lil Nasher. Cyprus. 283.

(ضاهر، مسعود (1994). مشكلات بناء الدولة الحديثة في الوطن العربي. مؤسسة عيبال للدراسات والنشر، قبرص، ص 283.)

social justice, liberating their lands, deepening their cultural originality and developing good relations with a society lived under pressure and instability.

This society had to form social forces to start violent actions to defy the state.¹²⁸

5. The existence of many problematic issues related to legitimacies in the Arab world which were one of the sources of crises in the Arab world instead of activating the role of the civil societies and have more political and economic achievements represented by fair representation of the strata of the society.

Other than limiting political freedom, diminishing the role of the civil society, tightening control procedures; violence towards political powers and empowering the assurance of the governing Arab regimes of the social, economic and cultural formation process in light of the criteria and social systems.¹²⁹

Furthermore, the Arabic political system is distinguished by the presence of a controversial relationship between the ruler and the authority unlike democratic regimes. It is represented by the “eternal unity with authority “and the “involuntary dissociation”. The former is the perfect form of full unity between the ruler and the ruled since it started with the political inheritance in the republic regimes.

¹²⁸ Ibrahim, Hasanin, Tawfiq. (1992) Bina' Al- Mojtama Al-Madani. Al-Moashirat Al-Kamia Wa Al-Kaifia. Waraqa Qodimat Ela: Al-Mojtama Almadani Fe A-Watan Al-Arabi Wa Dawroho Fe Tahqiq Al-Dimoqrata: Dohoth Wa Monaqashat Al-Nadwa Al-Fikria Alti Nathamaha Markaz Dirasat Al-Wigda Al-Arabia. Markaz Dirasat Al-Wigda Al- Arabia. Beirut. Lebanon. 691-692.

(ابراهيم، حسنين توفيق (1992). بناء المجتمع المدني: المؤشرات الكمية والكيفية. ورقة قدمت الى: المجتمع المدني في الوطن العربي ودوره في تحقيق الديمقراطية: بحوث ومناقشات الندوة الفكرية التي نظمها مركز دراسات الوحدة العربية. مركز دراسات الوحدة العربية، بيروت-لبنان، ص693).

¹²⁹ Ghalion Borhan, (1994). Al-Mihna Al-Arabia: Al-Dawla Did Al-Oma. (2). Markaz Dirasat Al-Wihda Al-Arabia . Beirut, Lebanon.

(غليون، برهان (1994). المحنة العربية: الدولة ضد الأمة. الطبعة الثانية، مركز دراسات الوحدة العربية، بيروت-لبنان.)

2.3. Types of Legitimacies:

2.3.5. Religious Legitimacy:

It is a socio-religious class in the time of religious knowledge and its affairs such as *Ifta'*, law and order and education. Furthermore, it has its own scientific and religious authority on the other classes as it has common interests and roles. Elites' definitions mentioned it as a group of people not individuals.¹³⁰

The religious elite has common characteristics in case it got in the political life to get to power. Only then it can be called a religious elite as it is in Iran, Turkey and Algeria or what others might call Islamopolitan regime. Clergymen live in a specific way related to religion and the psychological rhythm of life without having any illusion with his fellow creative and artistic humans.¹³¹

George Lindbergh considers all religious men from all religions as a full class having the duty of directing and educating the young to keep the traditions of the society and supervise their practices by supporting values and customs.¹³²

C. Wright Mills saw that the elites of the US are excluded to the leaders in the army, politicians and businessmen, but he neglected some other influential and non-influential elites that all the studies indicate the influence of religious elites in America including Christians and Anglicans.¹³³

¹³⁰Nathalie HEINICH: Retour Sur La Notion D'élite, Cahiers internationaux de Sociologie, Vol. CXVII, 2004, p.314.

¹³¹ Daniel Herve, John Paul: Sociology of Religion". Al-Majles Al-Ala Lilthaqafa. Cairo. 2005.

¹³² Rashwan. Hussein Abdulhamid. Aldin Wa Al- Mojtama Dirasat Fe Elm Al-Ijtima Al-Dini. Markaz Al-Iskandaria Lilkitab. Egypt. 2004.

(رشوان حسين عبد الحميد: الدين والمجتمع دراسات في علم الاجتماع الديني، مركز الإسكندرية للكتاب، مصر، 2004).

¹³³ Ahmad Mansour. Adwa Ala Al-Siasa Al-Amerikia Fe Al-Sharq Al-Awsat. Dar Ibn Hazm. Beirut. Lebanon. (1) 1994.

The concept of leadership indicates holding the responsibility of running Muslims' earthy and after life issues by showing them the dos and don'ts of manners and showing them how to get to paradise.¹³⁴ In addition, religious elites have huge religious knowledge practicing its duties in Ifta', law and order and education as well as its power over other elites in the society.⁽¹³⁵⁾ The religious leadership is responsible for the process of behavioural social interaction in the society which is related to the Islamic creed representing the highest values people sacrifice their money and themselves for.¹³⁶

Concerning the concept of the religious legitimacy, it means God's legitimacy which is based on the basis of people belief abiding to whoever likes to be strong, faithful, wary and open-minded in the society in compatible with the greatest good and with the help of people around.¹³⁷

God Al-Mighty said in the Holy Quran:” *Indeed, in the Messenger of Allah you have an excellent example for whoever has hope in Allah and the Last Day, and remembers Allah often*” (Al-Ahzab, 21). This verse indicates that the good elite is the counsellor of the rulers intellectually and behaviourally that Prophet Mohammed

(أحمد منصور: أضواء على السياسة الأمريكية في الشرق الأوسط، دار ابن حزم، بيروت، لبنان، ط1 ، 1994.)
¹³⁴ Al-Wakeel. Mohamed Al-Sayed. (1980). Al-Qiyada Wa Al Jondia Fe Al-Islam. Dar Al-Wafa. Egypt. 7.

(الوكيل، محمد السيد (1980). القيادة والجنديّة في الإسلام. دار الوفاء، مصر، ص7.)

¹³⁵ Nathalie Heinich (2004). Back to the Notion of Elite, Notebooks Sociology, Vol. CXVII, p.314.

¹³⁶ Al-Bukhari. Abu Abdullah Mohammad Bin Ismael. (1979). Fath Al-Bari. Sharh Ahmad Bin Ali Bin Hajr Al-Asqalani. Tahqiq: Hamad Foad Abdulbaqi. Revised: Mohammad Al-Din Al-Khatib. Dar Al-Marifa. Beirut. 11.

(البخاري، أبو عبد الله محمد بن اسماعيل (1979). فتح الباري، شرح أحمد بن علي بن حجر العسقلاني. تحقيق: حمد فؤاد عبد الباقي،

مراجعة: محمد الدين الخطيب، دار المعرفة، بيروت، ص11)

¹³⁷ Mohammed, Taher Samad. (1989). Mada Tawafiq Al-Simat Al-Qiyadiya Ma Al-Mayeer Al- Islamia Fe Ikhtyar Al-Qa'd Al-Tarbawi. Dirasa Maydania. Maktabat Jadda. 61.

(محمد، طاهر صمد (1989). مدى توافق السمات القيادية مع المعايير الإسلامية في اختيار القائد التربوي، دراسة ميدانية، مكتبة جدة، ص61.)

(PBUH) was the role model of his followers confirming the importance of having a leadership from an Islamic point of view.¹³⁸

In short, Islam necessitates the existence of a leadership hierarchy in terms of rank and nature of duties that the president is different from other personnel as they differ according to their abilities and gifts.¹³⁹

It is the first legitimacy in the Arab history which is represented in devotion in inviting others to Islam and take the Islamic creed as a way of life as our Prophet Mohammed (PBUH) demanded others to change the wrong doings not copying people's acts blindly in his Hadith: "*Do not be a people without a will of your own, saying: 'If people treat us well, we will treat them well; and if they do wrong, we will do wrong,' but accustom yourselves to do good if people do good, and do not behave unjustly if they do evil.*"¹⁴⁰

Islam cherishes the importance of leadership since it prevents the loss of all the efforts and powers that Mohammad (BUH) said:" If three travelled, they should give the leadership to one of them". From the hadith, leadership includes all the acts of the ruler and responsible for everything happens to Muslims that Prophet Mohammed (PBUH) said:" *All are responsible for your people*".¹⁴¹

¹³⁸ Joma' Wa Nouri. (2011). 305.

(جمعة ونوري (2011). ص305).

¹³⁹ Al-Ajamy. Mohammad. (2008). Al-Itijahat Al-Haditha Fe Al-Qiada Al-Idariya Wa Al-Tanmiya Al-Bashariya. Dar Al-Maseera Lilnasher Wa Al-Tawzi'. Jordan. 109

(العجمي، محمد (2008). الاتجاهات الحديثة في القيادة الادارية والتنمية البشرية. دار المسيرة للنشر والتوزيع والطباعة، الأردن، ص108).

¹⁴⁰ Al-Faqhy. Ibrahim. (2008). Sihr AlOQiyada Kayf Tosbih Qaeda Faalan. (1). Dar Al-Yaqeen Lilnsher Wa Al-Tawzi'/ Egypt. 51.

(الفاقي، ابراهيم (2008). سحر القيادة كيف تصبح قائدا فعلا. الطبعة الأولى، دار اليقين للنشر والتوزيع، مصر، ص51).

¹⁴¹ Al-Ajamy. Mohammad. (2008). Al-Itijahat Al-Haditha Fe Al-Qiada Al-Idariya Wa Al-Tanmiya Al-Bashariya. Dar Al-Maseera Lilnasher Wa Al-Tawzi'. Jordan. 109

(العجمي، محمد (2008). الاتجاهات الحديثة في القيادة الادارية والتنمية البشرية. دار المسيرة للنشر والتوزيع والطباعة، الأردن، ص109).

Islam urged leaders to have good manners such as being a role model, fraternity, religiousness, mercy, being selfless and this is indicated in the hadith of prophet Mohammed (PBUH):” *Any slave whom Allah makes him in charge of subjects and he dies while he is not sincere to them, Allah will make Jannah unlawful for him.*”

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There are interrelations between religious and political elites especially if the final destination is getting the power in a society such as the case in Iran, Turkey and Algeria.¹⁴³

Concerning the religious elites in the Arab world, their performance there is weak due to the nature of those elites and the tasks thrust to them by the king or president such as appointing the *Shekh of Al-Azhar* in Egypt, the Imam of *Al-Amawi* mosque in Syria, the Imam of *Al-Zaitona* mosque in Tunisia and the Imam of *Al-Qaraween* mosque in Morocco. This means that disobeying the rulers of those countries means losing heaven or the trophy of the country.

They have become one of the administrations of the state supporting the rulers without giving advice that is against rulers’ will. In other words, religion is one of the tools of fighting injustice because it changes the structure of the society. However, since the religious elites joined governments, they haven’t used their powers to unit people except

¹⁴² Kanan. Nawaf. (2009). *Al-Qiyada Al-Idariya*. Dar Al-Thaqfa. Amman- Jordan. 42.

(كنعان، نواف (2009). القيادة الادارية. دار الثقافة، عمان-الاردن، ص42.)

¹⁴³ Daniel Herve, John Paul: *Sociology of Religion*”. Al-Majles Al-Ala Lilthaqafa. Cairo. 2005.

what Al-Khumini – the leader of the Islamic revolution in Iran- who used religion to overthrow Al-Shah and succeeded in doing so.¹⁴⁴

The greatest threat in history is that some religious elites change their convictions according to the will of their rulers especially in period of socialist Egypt Islamizing socializing and describing the prophet's followers as good socialists. However, when Egypt was open to capitalism, socialism became a bad trend and called for capitalism because it liberates people from the slavery of socialism.

This doesn't mean ignoring the religious content and considering them hindrances of the democratic transformation, freedom of speech and political participation because it doesn't make sense as long as religious elites do their roles effectively in the social development process resisting injustice, marginalization, and superiority.¹⁴⁵

The Palestinian religious elites played a great role throughout the Palestinian history starting from Al-Shekh Ameen Al-Husseni, the Mufti of Jerusalem. Not to mention Al-Shekh Iz-Aldin Al-Qassam who worked as a religious, revolutionary tribal and fighters to liberate Palestine elites.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁴ Al-Shemy, Mohammed Nabil. (2016) Al-Nokhba Wa Ta'theroha Fe Takween Wa Istiqrar Al-mojtamat Wa Tashkeel Nasaq Al-Hokm Wa Al-Fikr. Al-Markaz Al-Dimoqrati Al-Arabi.

<https://democraticac.de/?p=26489>

(الشيمي، محمد نبيل، (2016)، النخبة وتأثيرها في تكوين واستقرار المجتمعات وتشكيل نسق الحكم والفكر، المركز الديمقراطي العربي،

<https://democraticac.de/?p=26489>

¹⁴⁵ Al-Shemy, Mohammed Nabil. (2016) Al-Nokhba Wa Ta'theroha Fe Takween Wa Istiqrar Al-mojtamat Wa Tashkeel Nasaq Al-Hokm Wa Al-Fikr. Al-Markaz Al-Dimoqrati Al-Arabi.

<https://democraticac.de/?p=26489>

(الشيمي، محمد نبيل، (2016)، النخبة وتأثيرها في تكوين واستقرار المجتمعات وتشكيل نسق الحكم والفكر، المركز الديمقراطي العربي،

<https://democraticac.de/?p=26489>

¹⁴⁶ Khala, Kamel. Falastin Wa Al-Intidab Al-Baritani. 1922-1939. Markaz Al-Abhath Al-Falastini. Beirut. 1974.

(خلة، كامل، فلسطين والانتداب البريطاني 1922-1939، مركز الابحاث الفلسطيني، بيروت، 1974)

2.3.6. Family Legitimacy:

Family legitimacy or the sectarian system is followed in two transformations related to the state itself as well as the civil society and its relation with the international system. It indicates everything related to the political structure starting from the legitimacy, sovereignty of the state to possessing power and social leadership.

It is noticed that sectarianism is always related to dictator states in which authority circulation and mass social movement hinder its normal development leading to parliamentary state.

Sectarianism in the state neutralises the state as an ethical and legal principle organizing the society and control everyone for the purposes of a specific class in the society. This way, the states' institutions might be corrupted and its work might fail leading to cancelling the organization of social relationships and authority swap in the society in order to keep the authority for a specific class who control the future of the majority regardless their way of work.¹⁴⁷

One of the examples of such system is Lebanon which was established by a French decision in 1920 in favour of the Maronite sect at the expense of other sects, so it was established based on the share of the Maronite sect despite its democratic and liberal experience.

Despite all the previously mentioned, the Lebanese authority is controlled by the families which inherited politics and properties such as Al-Hariri family which controlled Lebanon's policies' directly. The other controlling legitimacy is the tribal

¹⁴⁷ Andreiv. (1985). Ask AlAela Wa Al-Malakia Al-Khasa WA Al-Dawla. Tarjamat. Ilyas Shahan. Moscow. Dar Al-Taqadom.

(أندرييف. (1985). أصل العائلة والملكية الخاصة والدولة. ترجمة الياس شاهين. موسكو: دار التقدم.)

one which controls the Arab political systems based on mutual benefit between tribes and the authority, so tribal legitimacies supported the governments in return for participating in the rule and share distribution.¹⁴⁸

2.3.7. The Revolutionary Legitimacy of the Palestinian Factions

If the Palestinians recognized the RLPF as one of the elites of the society, this means that they believe that this leadership can make change and improve their life conditions because they are up to the goals of the people. Once the RLPF achieved the goals of the people, the relationship between the elite and people gets stronger transforming it to a political elite. However, if it didn't give the other elites the chance to participate in the political work in a democratic atmosphere, the RLPF would be a dictator elite. The fate of some socialist revolutionary leaders in the socialist camp and the Arab world witness that.

Similarly, the Palestinian political elite got its legitimacy from its revolutionary speech which abides the Palestinians to stick to the goals of the Palestinian people summarized by liberating Palestine from the sea to the river and implement the right of return by using armed struggle. When that didn't happen, they moved to settlement and giving up all the strategic goals which comprised one of the sources of its legitimacy.

This change in the political agenda in the first years of the Palestinian Authority (PA) explained giving up the revolutionary way and national goals doubting the elitism of the PA.

¹⁴⁸ Saba, Elias. (2004). *Al-Fasad Wa Al-Hokm Al-Saleh Fe Al-Bilad Al-Arabia Halat Lebanon*. Beirut. Markaz Dirasat Al-Wihda. Al-Arabia.

(سأبأ، الؤأس. (2004) . " الفسأء والءكم الصألء فؤ البلاء العربؤة ءالة لبناؤ .بؤورؤ: مركز دراساء الوءءة العربؤة.)

This led other elites to emerge such as the Islamic groups and claim that they are the political elite of the people because they express the goals and hope of the Palestinians. What happened with Fatah faction happened with Hamas since the latter got its legitimacy from resistance and Jihad to shine as the elite of the Palestinian society. Then, it won the legislative elections on the 25th of January, 2006. However, after becoming the source of authority in Gaza or its coup against the PA in mid of June 2007 and stopped its resistance. At that moment, it lost its legitimacy.¹⁴⁹

This legitimacy formed the legitimate basis in the Arab World that most of the Arab forces got its legitimacy from taking out the conqueror especially in Algeria, Egypt, the Sudan, Iraq facing a struggle between tribal and the RLPF which did its role in liberating their countries from occupation.

2.3.8. Royal Legitimacy

The royal Arab regimes based their legitimacy on religious, tribal and conservative loyalty. Hudson see that the main element in these regimes is the personality of the royal highness considering these regimes as mono-authoritative. These traditional sources originated from the economic and social structure. Still, this traditional origin is not enough to keep the political system, so they attempted to have additional sources for their legitimacy by adopting a liberal system developing the social and economic structures. In addition, they tended to publicize the programs of services and social welfare in order to improve their public image in the eyes of their society especially in the oil-producing countries. This leads to offering job opportunities for many people in

¹⁴⁹ Ahmad Nasouri. *Ishkaliat Wa Tahadiat Al-Nitham Al-Siasi*. (Damascus University- Political Science Faculty, Unpublished lectures for Diploma Students of Political Studies. 2005.

(أحمد ناصوري، إشكاليات وتحديات النظام السياسي (جامعة دمشق، كلية العلوم السياسية، مجموعة محاضرات غير منشورة لطلاب دبلوم الدراسات السياسية، 2005)

other social classes, establishing the traditions and symbols of royal crowns specifying the specialities of the royal family.

Also, it leads to establishing modern civil, security and military institutions to enhance the power of the state and expand its control on the rest of the state and society.¹⁵⁰

One of the main examples of the royal regimes is the Jordanian, Saudi, Moroccan and Bahraini. All of the previously mentioned supported their legitimacies by taking advantage of the tribal, religious, revolutionary legitimacies as well as modernizing their legitimacies with the modern political systems. Still, the new generation was not satisfied with that because they stick to the strict Islamic traditions while others seek a fair distribution of wealth and social justice. Consequently, these systems are still afraid from expanding the circle of political participation rejecting any politicization of the masses in their countries.¹⁵¹

2.3.9. The Military Legitimacy:

The sociological military ideology is related to the existence of the geographic nature and the human, economic, military and social nature of that society. All the military ideologies throughout ages were almost the same even if time was different. On the one hand, Aristotle, wrote this in his book “Politics” or “Aristotle’s Politics” confirming the importance of the military aspect in the political field that he said:” The military elite is

¹⁵⁰ Ahmad Nasouri. *Ishkaliyat Wa Tahadiat Al-Nitham Al-Siasi*. (Damascus University- Political Science Faculty, Unpublished lectures for Diploma Students of Political Studies. 2005.

(أحمد ناصوري، إشكاليات وتحديات النظام السياسي (جامعة دمشق، كلية العلوم السياسية، مجموعة محاضرات غير منشورة لطلاب دبلوم الدراسات السياسية، 2005)

¹⁵¹ Ali Hilal and Nivin Misad. (2002) *Al-Nothom Al-Arabia Al-Siasia. Qadaya Al-Istimrar Wa Al-Taghyeer*. (Beirut. Markaz Al-Dirasat Alwihda Al-Arabia. (2) 131- 139.

(علي هلال ونيفين مسعد، النظم السياسية العربية: قضايا الاستمرار والتغيير (بيروت، مركز دراسات الوحدة العربية، الطبعة الثانية، شباط 2002) ص 131 – 139).

the base for the rule deciding that no one can know the policy but the ones who carries weapons”¹⁵²

He didn’t define weapons carriers as being related to working in the official military forces, but it included all the individuals who carried weapons and trained to use it through participating in the national duty in the society. In short, he linked the civil political work with the military experience”¹⁵³

In other words, the political arena is not the same as the military one since politics has specific rules that a militant doesn’t necessarily fit to be in the political elite. That’s why democratic countries don’t merge military and political elites. However, in the Arab countries they do leading to the failure of running the country’s issues leading to a feeling of discontent and deterioration living in the military coup’s situation. In short. Being an excellent tank driver doesn’t mean success in leading a civil institution or even kindergarten.¹⁵⁴

In the Arab world especially in Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Syria, Yemen and the Sudan, military legitimacy was from the middle classes and its classes especially the lower ranked officials who took over the authority by having a military coup with a holistic vision of an economic and social change based on one party.

Eventually, they will be divided into sectarian and strata’s alliances distinguished with family bias which is the main condition for the emergence of power elites in the Arab

¹⁵² Belly, Ahmad. Al-Safwa Al-Askaria Wa Al-Bina’ Al-Siasi Fe Masr. 36.

(بيلى، أحمد (1993). الصفوة العسكرية والبناء السياسي في مصر. ص 36.)

¹⁵³ Ismael Ali Misad (1989). Al-Madkhal Ela Elm Al-Ijtima Al-Siasi. Dar Al-Nahda. Beirut. 160.

(إسماعيل على سعد، المدخل إلى علم الاجتماع السياسي، دار النهضة، بيروت 1989، ص: 160،)

¹⁵⁴ Abdul- Minem Al-Madani. (1990) Al-Safwa Al-Siasia Wa Al-Tanmia Al-Siasia. (Majalat Al-Wihda. (66). 127.

(عبد المنعم المدني، الصفوة السياسية والتنمية السياسية (مجلة الوحدة)، العدد 66، مارس 1990، ص: 127)

world. This depends on the tools of the military and security control in the bureaucratic institution established to serve the ruler and give him the legitimacy through his national speech for liberating Palestine and making socialistic economic and social reforms.¹⁵⁵

Militants in Syria and Iran and Egypt formed alliances with nationalists and technocrats in order to form ruling political elites in Egypt who overthrown the royal rule by the revolution of July 1952. This revolution led to a political unity and independence and a social revolution leading to achieve justice for all.

The followers of Abudnasser socialist rule expanded the public sector, controlled the production of the state and reforming industries and other agricultural reforms. This led to moving from a royal feudal society to a military bourgeoisie society keeping Egypt a bureaucratic society suffering from military, economic and social defeat.¹⁵⁶

2.3.10. Capital Legitimacy

It is linked with the existence of many capitalists and their relationships with the occupations by getting more privileges through being members in political parties and getting permits of exporting and importing goods. Still, they benefited from raging the Second World War (WW2) by supporting their financial positions and establishing their

¹⁵⁵ Al-Naqeeb, Khaldon. (1991) Al-Dawla Al-Tasalotia Fe Al- Mashriq Al- Arabi A- Moaser. Beirut. Markaz Dirasat Al-Wihada Al-Arabia. 75.

(النقيب، خلدون. (1991)، الدولة التسلطية في المشرق العربي المعاصر. بيروت: مركز دراسات الوحدة العربية، ص75)

¹⁵⁶ Saed, Mohammed Al-Saed, Iman Mare. (2004) Al- Fasad Wa Al-Hokom Al-Saleh Fe Al-Bilad Al-Arabia Halat Masr. Markaz Dirasat Al-Wihda Al-Arabia.

(سعيد، محمد السيد وإيمان مرعي. (2004) " الفساد والحكم الصالح في البلاد العربية حالة مصر. بيروت: مركز دراسات الوحدة العربية)

economic strength. In this capitalist environment, there were many *Bashawat* or *Bekawat* who worked in economy and politics especially in Egypt.¹⁵⁷

Also, some ministers, deputies, sheikhs and high officials were assigned as members of the board of directors in order to benefit from their financial power to serve their interests.¹⁵⁸ Besides, the relationship of the kings with the occupation were strong because of the wish of the occupation to find national forces keeping their best interest to keep occupation in Egypt.¹⁵⁹

Similarity, the occupation did some procedures concerning farming lands and irrigation projects which founded social movements among the countryside. This increased the number of landowners and won the support of peasants to avoid their revolution leading to the deterioration of the social and economic situation of *Omdas* and *Mashayekh*.¹⁶⁰

Concerning Egypt, it got its independence on the 28th of February, 1922 that the first constitution was issued in 1923. Its first government consisted of bourgeois ministers. Still, with the accumulation of the real-estate in front of the courts, the government interfered in order to protect the agricultural sector which increased the space of owned

¹⁵⁷ Arab, Mohammed Saber. (2003). *Hojom Al Al-Qasr Al-Malaky*. Hadith 4 Feb. 1942. Maktabat Al-Osra. 413.

(عرب، محمد صابر (2003). هجوم على القصر الملكي. حادث 4 فبراير 1942. هيئة الكتاب، مكتبة الأسرة، ص 413.)

¹⁵⁸ Arab, Mohammed Saber. (2003). *Hojom Al Al-Qasr Al-Malaky*. Hadith 4 Feb. 1942. Maktabat Al-Osra. 413.

(عرب، محمد صابر (2003). هجوم على القصر الملكي. حادث 4 فبراير 1942. هيئة الكتاب، مكتبة الأسرة، ص 413.)

¹⁵⁹ Abdul- Latif Ali. (2006). *Al-Qwa Al-Ijtia'ia Fe Masr Wa Tataworiha*. (1882- 1919) (1). Maktabat Al-Anklo Al-Masria. Cairo. 118.

(عبد اللطيف، على (2006). القوى الاجتماعية في مصر وتطورها (1882-1919). الطبعة الأولى، مكتبة الأنجلو المصرية، القاهرة، ص118.)

¹⁶⁰ Abdul- Latif Ali. (2006). *Al-Qwa Al-Ijtia'ia Fe Masr Wa Tataworiha*. (1882- 1919) (1). Maktabat Al-Anklo Al-Masria. Cairo. 118.

(عبد اللطيف، على (2006). القوى الاجتماعية في مصر وتطورها (1882-1919). الطبعة الأولى، مكتبة الأنجلو المصرية، القاهرة، ص118.)

agricultural lands of the Egyptian bourgeois at the expense of foreigners. Then, the foreign privileges were cancelled in 1937 and the law of forbidding the possession of foreigners' agricultural lands was issued in 1951.

Then, the Egyptian capitalist class including foreigners and Egyptians was formed with having a hidden struggle between them based on crossing the interests of each other and the advancement in industries. However, the foreign industry was a threat to the Egyptian one, so Egyptians established the Bank of Egypt especially after what banks witnessed from 1860 to 1870 that cotton prices rose sharply.¹⁶¹

2.3.11. Technocrat Legitimacy

It refers to the system in which decision makers are assigned according to their experience in a specific field especially in technological or technical one. Such system contradicts the fact that decision makers should be from the government and based on their political affiliations or their parliamentary skills.¹⁶²

Technocrat means defending the scientific methods in solving social problems based on developing on of the sector or many sectors in the country. This is part of the bureaucrat of the technicians considering that the government assign elected personnel from experts and professionals to perform the tasks of the government and recommend the technocrat legislation.

The economist and socialist Thorstein Veblen are one of the founders of technocrat in 1919 when he used this term in his article:” The methods of Having an Industrialized

¹⁶¹ Abdul-Malik Anwar. (1964) Masr Mojtama Jadid Yabnih Al-Askariyon. Dar Al-Talia. Beirut. 55.

(عبد الملك، أنور (1964). مصر مجتمع جديد بينيه العسكريون. دار الطليعة، بيروت، ص55.)

¹⁶² Berndt, Ernst R. (1982). "From Technocracy to Net Energy Analysis: Engineers, Economists and Recurring Energy Theories of Value". Studies in Energy and the American Economy, Discussion Paper No. 11, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Democracy” assuring that industrialized democracy can be implemented by merging workers in decision making in the companies. ⁽¹⁶³⁾

The technocratic rule indicates that a group of specialists in a specific area such as economists, doctors, literary experts and others are ministers who have a role in the political life. This means that it given them power to make decisions based on their background. In addition, it is different from the traditional democratic government in terms of its selection of the elected leaders considering the technocrat government as non- factional. ⁽¹⁶⁴⁾

It is the duty of these governments to reform the social and political systems and fight back corruption, so being a part of a faction is less likely to happen. Still, it is responsible in front of the parliament and councils. However, decisions are not taken by the elected members and the policies of the country are not decided in the headquarters of the parties and the highest personnel are not assigned as ministers or PMs from the head of the parties or factions. ⁽¹⁶⁵⁾

The role of technocratic governments is obvious in the public works by presenting the elite of experts and technicians, but this means the rule of experts not people! ⁽¹⁶⁶⁾ Consequently, this government gives political power to technicians ignoring the class of the majority leading to the emergence of a ruling class of technicians and experts. ⁽¹⁶⁷⁾

¹⁶³ Duncan Donnell and Marco Valbruzzi (2014). Defining and Classifying Technocrat-led and Technocratic Governments. *European Journal of Political Research*, vol.53, no.4, pp.656-657.

¹⁶⁴ Duncan Donnell and Marco Valbruzzi (2014). Defining and Classifying Technocrat-led and Technocratic Governments. *European Journal of Political Research*, vol.53, no.4, pp.654-656.

¹⁶⁵ Duncan Donnell and Marco Valbruzzi (2014). Defining and Classifying Technocrat-led and Technocratic Governments. *European Journal of Political Research*, vol.53, no.4, pp.656-657.

¹⁶⁶Christina Ribbhagen, *Technocracy within Representative Democracy: Technocratic Reasoning and Justification among Bureaucrats and Politicians* (Gothenburg: University of Gothenburg, 2013), pp. 15-16.

¹⁶⁷ Frank N. Laird, "Technocracy Revisited: Knowledge, Power and the Crisis in Energy Decision Making," *Organization & Environment*, vol. 4, no. 1 (1990), pp. 49–61.

This means the absence of democracy and delivering power to technocrat protecting political elites below it. In other words, the emerge of the government of technocrat means that experts will lead people and people's representation will diminish.

In Palestine, Salam Fayyad took over the Palestinian government in the West Bank during the second intifada and the Palestinian division, so that stage was a stage of the project of economic and political project for the establishment of the Palestinian state supported by technocrat class as well as other political high- profile personnel. This government based its work on peaceful economic relationships with Israel according to the Palestinian states' criteria such as economic liberalization and privatization considering the private sector as its main players.

At that period, the PA started restoration plans imposed by international institutions depending on the support of technocrat government in order to get the international, diplomatic and western support in order to improve international trust in the PA and its institutions as a stage for the establishment of the state. This is done by privatization and security sector empowerment.

Furthermore, the Palestinian government thought that the improvement of the security and economic circumstances of the Israelis and Palestinians will pave the way to the establishment of the PA by implementing the security document which is the first step to re-bridge the trust of the Israelis in the Palestinian initiatives aiming at fighting terrorism adding a professional nature to the Palestinian national forces. This is the most effective way of convincing Israel to allow the increase of "the Palestinian Self- rule" reducing the space of its occupations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This is done by

easing the inspection of the Israeli checkpoints, increasing the number of Palestinian forces in the area and enhancing the coordination with the Israeli army. ⁽¹⁶⁸⁾

That government had a local, regional and international importance because of its ability to stop corruption and decreasing the power of the executive authority. Despite that, it didn't get the acceptance of the Palestinian presidency and some influential powers in the Palestinian political decision in Fatah because of the political practices of the government. This means that there are technocratic personalities who have a great political ambition. ⁽¹⁶⁹⁾

As for Palestine, the 15th, 16th and 17th government were technocratic in which Dr Rami Hamdallah supervised the choice of the ministers and the heads of councils as well as ministers' administration and members who were from different social, political and economic elites. ¹⁷⁰

The chosen government consisted from various national factions under the umbrella of the PLO in addition to the technocratic class in the West Bank. It was followed for the importance of the role it serves in facing crises and pressures giving it the chance to implement policies suit the politicise of the international policies of the international donors.

¹⁶⁸ J.D. Crouch II, Montgomery C. Meigs & Walter B. Slocombe, Security First U.S. Priorities in Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking, Washington Institute Strategic Report (2008), p. 19, accessed on 10/4/2018, at: <https://goo.gl/DZq5dK>

¹⁶⁹ Roger Cohen, "The Story of Salam Fayyad: The Success That Failed," The New York Times, February 14, 2013, accessed on 10/4/2018, at: <https://goo.gl/hvB6Bg>

¹⁷⁰ Farsakh, Laila. (2015). Mahiyat Al-Tanmiya Al-Iqtisadiya Al-Filistinia: Naqlat Naw'ya Fe Fahm Al-Iqtisad Al-Filistini. Majalat Al-Dirasat Al-Filistinia. (26/101). 94-98.

(فرسخ، ليلي (2015)، "ماهية التنمية الاقتصادية الفلسطينية: نقالات نوعية في فهم الاقتصاد الفلسطيني. مجلة الدراسات الفلسطينية، المجلد (26)، العدد (101)، ص94-98)

This government created the position of the prime minister of the economic affairs giving the impression of continuing working according to the free economy model which it followed since the very beginning.¹⁷¹ Despite all that, it didn't do its task and faced the hopes of the Palestinian in liberating Palestine from the Israelis and had many mischiefs at the political, economic and social level.

In the crises of the Palestinian technocratic government, the Palestinians realized its mischiefs in administrating the executive authority at the civil and security level. Also, at the level of the judiciary authority, governmental services and economic and foreign policy. Despite the attempts of the technocratic class to reform the political system and enhance the Palestinian conditions, this turned the table on them.¹⁷²

¹⁷¹ Jameel, Hilal. (2013). Al-Wataniya Al-Falstiniya Fe Mowajahat Tahafot Al-Siasa. Majalat Al-Dirasat Al-Filistinia. (24),95, 9.

(جميل هلال (2013)، "الوطنية الفلسطينية في مواجهة تهافت السياسة"، مجلة الدراسات الفلسطينية، المجلد (24)، العدد (95)، ص9)

¹⁷² Jameel, Hilal. (2006). Al-Nitha Al-Siasi Al-Falastini Bad Oslo: Dirasa Tahlilya Naqdiya. Al-Mo'sasa Al-Filistinia Li Dirasat Al-Dimocratiya.. Mowatin. Ramallah. Palestin. 143-144.

(جميل هلال (2006). النظام السياسي الفلسطيني بعد أوسلو: دراسة تحليلية نقدية. المؤسسة الفلسطينية لدراسة الديمقراطية-مواطن، رام الله-فلسطين، ص143-144.)

Chapter Three: The Development of the Palestinian Elites (1897-2020)

3.1. The Ottoman Regime (1897-1920)

The Palestinian elites and leaderships were from traditionally influential personalities descending from aristocratic families due to the system prevailed in the Ottoman era being characterized with the nature of land property system.¹⁷³ Furthermore, the Ottoman empire gave the Palestinian elite the privileges of supervising tax pardon, not participating in military campaigns and not contributing in the war expenses imposed by the Sultan or Wally.

Then, these family turned into feudal families in Palestine that they owned whole villages for low prices such as Al- Hosseini, Abdelhadi, Al-Ghossein, Abu Khader and Al-fahom. Other families were great merchants such as Al-Alamy, Al-Dabagh, Al-Nimir and Al-Nashashibi who were the last generation of feudal class. They controlled vast lands especially in Jerusalem. For example, Al-Nashashibi competed with Al-Hosseini in trade and positions.¹⁷⁴

They benefited from the deterioration of the Ottoman Empire and its less centralized administration allowing scientists in these cities to participate in the society. The led to the formation of an unchangeable social hierarchy that they witnessed the increase and weakness of the Empire's position.

¹⁷³ Akhdar, Hassan. (2003). *Khososiat Noshu' Wa Takween Al-Nkhba Al-Filistinia*. Ed. 1. Ramallah. Ma'had Ibrahim Abu Laghad Lildirasat Al-Dowaliya. Mo'sasiat Al-Nasher. Nisan. P.p. 31.

(خضر، حسن). (2003)، خصوصية نشوء وتكوين النخبة الفلسطينية. ط1. رام الله: معهد إبراهيم أبو لغد للدراسات الدولية، مؤسسة الناشر، نيسان، ص31)

¹⁷⁴ Shbib, Samih. (1999). *Al-Osoul Al-Iqtasibia we Al-Ijtimaia Lil-Haraka Al-Siasia fe Filistin 1920-1948*, Mo'asat Al-Aswar, Akka, Ramallah, Ministry of Culture, 111.

(شبيب، سميح). (1999)، الاصول الاقتصادية والاجتماعية للحركة السياسية في فلسطين من عام 1920-1948. ط1. عكا، رام الله: مؤسسة الاسوار، بالتعاون مع وزارة الثقافة الفلسطينية، ص15)

Consequently, assigning some unpopular *sheks* mostly led to struggle and instability unless the original nominee of the people takes over. After his return, he promises he will do his best to get social aids and help the Sultan implement his policy among people.

The Palestinian elites had a great role in the political life and the leadership and national movement of the society taking advantage of the deteriorated economic situation, the weakness of the state and the extremity in tax collection and conscription to practice its power on the peasants and small workers and merchants.

Furthermore, they will defend them in the official departments in exchange for material and cash gifts and providing their houses with oil and grains leading to their control on the lands of the peasants and transferring the ownership to them. In short, they collected knowledge and money in their control.¹⁷⁵

Palestine was influenced by its political elite from late 19th century to early 20th century going through many changes in all the aspect of our life from the Ottoman organizations to the change in that system. In other words, the Palestinian elites had to deal with all these changes positively or negatively.

This was as a result of the historic role of these elites in mediating between the classes of the Palestinian society on the one hand and the Ottoman authority on the other. They sought in their sectarian and family framework to get the high positions in the midst of an occupational, family or religious status of the Palestinian society and its national movement.

¹⁷⁵ Akhdar, Hassan. (2003). *Khososiat Noshoh Wa Takween Al-Nkhba Al-Filistinia*. Ed. 1. Ramallah. Ma'had Ibrahim Abu Laghad Lildirasat Al-Dowaliya. Mo'sasiat Al-Nasher. Nisan. P.p. 31.

(خضر، حسن. (2003)، خصوصية نشوء وتكوين النخبة الفلسطينية. ط1. رام الله: معهد إبراهيم أبو لغد للدراسات الدولية، مؤسسة الناشر، نيسان، ص31)

Also, during the British era, many of the Palestinian elites emerged including Diya' Yousef Mohammad Al-Khalidi, Rawhy Al-Khalidi, Gargy Habib Hanaia, Ghaleb Al-Khalidi, Al-Shekh Abdul-Qader Al-Mothafar, Al-Shekh Ali Al-Rimawi, Ragheb Al-Nashashibi, Ahmad Aref Al-Husseni, Faidi Al-Alami as representatives for the faction of *Itihad* and *Taraqi* in the Chamber of Deputies in 1914.¹⁷⁶

Consequently, it was imperative for elites to interact in the developments of the Ottoman Empire especially in the times of Al-Hamidi (1876-1908) and Al-Tarqaqi (1908-1917) in order to keep their status and historical and social power in the Palestinian society.

Some of them reached sensitive positions such as representing the Ottoman Empire in the foreign countries such as in the case of the Khalidi from Jerusalem. In addition, Yousef Diya' Al-Khalidi the only deputy from Palestine in the first Ottoman parliament among the one hundred and twenty members being given the title of "the emissary of Jerusalem"¹⁷⁷

Still, after the change in the Ottoman political system after the revolution of 1908 and the isolation of Sultan Abdul-Hamid II, the reactions of the Palestinian elites varied. On the one hand, the ones who represented the system of Abdul-Hamid II by being appointed as a president of a municipality or even judges' deputy, they changed their

¹⁷⁶ Qasimia, Khairiya. (1998). *Al-Hamla Al-Entikhabia Fe Motasarifiyat Al-Quds Am 1914: Awdat Ela Al-Moqadimat Wa Tahlil Al-Tawajohat. Al-Majala Al-Tarekhia Al-Arabia Lildirasat Al-Othmania*. Ed. 17&18. July. P.p: 388.

(قاسمية، خيرية (1998)، الحملة الانتخابية في متصرفية القدس عام 1914م، عودة إلى المقدمات وتحليل التوجهات" المجلة التاريخية العربية للدراسات العثمانية. العدد 17 و18، أيلول، ص388)

¹⁷⁷ Al-Wa'ri, Naela. (2015). *Mawqif Al-Olama' Wa Al-Ayan Wa Al-Iqtaen Fe Falastin (1865-1914)*. Ed. 1. Beirut: Al-Mo'asasa Al-Dowaliya Lildirasat. P.p 211

(الوعري، نائلة. (2015)، موقف العلماء والاعيان والاقطاعيين في فلسطين بين عام 1865-1914. ط1. بيروت: المؤسسة العربية للدراسات، ص211)

mind and supported the opposition describing the previous system as unjust and dictator raising the flag of the French revolution.

In other words, Ragheb Al-Nashashebi, Fedi Al-Alami, Mohammad Isaf Al-Nashashebi and Khalil Al-Nashashibi called for freedom, equality, social welfare and justice, but they supported the previous system years later after the deterioration of their economic situation.¹⁷⁸

This led to the emergence of the feeling of enmity and distrust among the Arab represented by their elites and the Turks leading to tension in the relationship and some of the members of the elites joined the camp of the enemies of the Ottoman Empire raising the flag of the Arabic Revolution such as Saed Al-Husseini who was the president of Jerusalem municipality in 1908 and was re-elected to the Chamber of Deputies in 1914.

Soon after that, he joined the government of Prince Faisal led by Rida Basha Al-Rikabi who was the Foreign Affairs Minister in that government. Another member is Salim Al-Husseini who went out to hand over the keys of the city to the British Army in the 9th of December 1917.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁸ Akhdar, Hassan. (2003). *Khososiat Noshu' Wa Takween Al-Nkhba Al-Filistinia*. Ed. 1. Ramallah. Ma'had Ibrahim Abu Laghad Lildirasat Al-Dowaliya. Mo'sasiat Al-Nasher. Nisan. P.p. 31.

(خضر، حسن. (2003)، خصوصية نشوء وتكوين النخبة الفلسطينية. ط1. رام الله: معهد إبراهيم أبو لغد للدراسات الدولية، مؤسسة الناشر، نيسان، ص31)

¹⁷⁹ Mana', Adel. (2006). *Al-Nokhba Al-Maqdisia Olama' Al-Madina Wa Ayaniha: Hawliat Al-Quds*. Ed. 4. Al-Quds: Al-Dirasat Al-Maqdisiya. Winter. P.p. 10.

(مناع، عادل. (2006)، النخبة المقدسية علماء المدينة وأعيانها "حوليات القدس". العدد4، القدس: مؤسسة الدراسات المقدسية، شتاء، ص10.)

3.2. The British Mandate (1920-1948)

The Palestinian elites in the era of the British Mandate were centred in the Palestinian cities which were a natural extension of the Palestinian elite in the Ottoman era belonging to the owners, merchants and the middle-class intellectuals who led the political life in the Palestinian parliaments, executive committees and political factions.

This led to the increase of the chance of this class to educate their children in order to keep their social class standards and traditions and retain their fortunes and political powers for its ability to influence the Palestinian society.¹⁸⁰

This was due to the acceleration of the development of the coastal cities and Jerusalem in late 19th century with keeping its expansion throughout the British Mandate until Nakba in 1948 that most of the cities were under the control of the Israelis after displacing their citizens and the Western part of Jerusalem leading to significant transformations in the classes of the Palestinians in the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s especially the emergence of the class of proletariat, representative people in the society and other influential classes in the Palestinian society.¹⁸¹

In the era of the British Mandate, elites were divided into three categories, namely: the proponent of the British policy with internal objection of the establishment of the Israeli state. The members of this category served in high and strategic positions and allied politically with Prince Abdulla whom the British assigned as a prince in the East of

¹⁸⁰ Al-Qasimia, Khairiya. (1990). Al-Haraka Al-Wataniya Al-Falastinia Fe Tholothai Al-Qarn Al-Hali 1900-1964. Al-Mawsoa' Al-Falastinia, Qism Al-Dirasat Al-Khasa. P.p 57.

(قاسمية، خيرية، (1990)، الحركة الوطنية الفلسطينية في تلتلي القرن الحالي 1900-1964، الموسوعة الفلسطينية، قسم الدراسات الخاصة، ص57)

¹⁸¹ Shbib, Samih. (1999). Al-Osoul Al-Iqtasibia we Al-Ijtimaia Lil-Haraka Al-Siasia fe Filistin 1920-1948, Mo'asasat Al-Aswar, Akka, Ramallah, Ministry of Culture, 111.

(شبيب، سميح، الاصول الاقتصادية والاجتماعية للحركة السياسية في فلسطين 1920-1948، مؤسسة الاسوار عكا، رام الله، وزارة الثقافة، 1999، ص97)

Jordan. In other words, they were loyal to him without being part of revolutionary movement against the policy of the British Mandate.¹⁸²

The second category was the one which opposed the British policy based on Belfour Promise, still they had mutual relationships with it without adopting the policy of violence an armed revolution. Instead, it protests against the Zionist policy of the mandate. It asked the British government to give up that policy and the promise. One of the prominent example of this category is Al-Haj Ameen Al- Husseini who led this policy from 1921 until the rise of the Great Arab Revolution in 1936.¹⁸³

The third category held the responsibility of the Palestinian current state on the British Mandate which empowered Zionism asking for revolutionary acts against it represented by the Palestinian Independence Faction and Al-Shekh Iz-Al-Din Al-Qassam being considered new compared to the previous categories.¹⁸⁴

The period of the British Mandate was distinguished with reshaping the Palestinian elites as Mahmud Al-Aloul stated:” The start of the Palestinian revolution against the British Mandate and its policy, which aimed to give the Jews a national homeland in Palestine at the expense of the Palestinians, contributed in changing the status co at that time. Then, it was based on family, clans and socio-economic power which led to the emergence of the RLPF.

¹⁸² Hamouda, Sameh. (2009). Yawmiyat Al-Nokhba Al-Filistinia Fe Ahd Al-Intidab. Majalat Al-Dirasat Al-Filistinia. Ed. 78. Spring. P.p. 170.

(حمودة، سميح (2009)، يوميات النخبة الفلسطينية في عهد الانتداب، مجلة الدراسات الفلسطينية. ع78، ربيع، ص170)

¹⁸³ Hamouda, Sameh. (2009). Yawmiyat Al-Nokhba Al-Filistinia Fe Ahd Al-Intidab. Majalat Al-Dirasat Al-Filistinia. Ed. 78. Spring. P.p. 170.

(حمودة، سميح (2009)، يوميات النخبة الفلسطينية في عهد الانتداب، مجلة الدراسات الفلسطينية. ع78، ربيع، ص170)

¹⁸⁴ Hamouda, Sameh. (2009). Yawmiyat Al-Nokhba Al-Filistinia Fe Ahd Al-Intidab. Majalat Al-Dirasat Al-Filistinia. Ed. 78. Spring. P.p. 170.

(حمودة، سميح (2009)، يوميات النخبة الفلسطينية في عهد الانتداب، مجلة الدراسات الفلسطينية. ع78، ربيع، ص170)

If the common aspect was economy, the elite there would be economic and if revolutionary and struggling actions were there, the most common elite is the RLPP which emerged as a dominating power in Palestine.¹⁸⁵

Thus, the Palestinian elites varied according to their political and intellectual levels, and this division was as a result of the educational and cultural upbringing of their members as well as the variation in their loyalties, eco-political relations with the government and other powers and factions in the Arab world. Also, there wasn't a central personality whom many members support, so division was the only obvious result for this struggle in order to control the Islamic Supreme Assembly between Al-Hosseini and Al-Al-Nashashebi since it was an attraction to many Muslims.¹⁸⁶

At the genesis of the Palestinian elites, the Arab countries and the Arab League intervened in the formation of the political elites and the political decision that in 1946, the Supreme Arab Committee was formed following a decision from the Arab League in Bloudan conference.

These Palestinian factions were agreed upon in this conference held in Jerusalem despite they were represented by the Arab party as there was an attempt by the Palestinian Arab party to establish a national leadership called "The High Arab Committee" in 1945-946.¹⁸⁷

¹⁸⁵ Al-Aloul, Mahmud. V.P of the Chairman of Fatah. Interview: 2019.

(العالول، محمود، نائب رئيس حركة فتح، مقابلة بتاريخ 2019)

¹⁸⁶ Hamouda, Sameh. (2009). Yawmiyat Al-Nokhba Al-Filistinia Fe Ahd Al-Intidab. Majalat Al-Dirasat Al-Filistinia. Ed. 78. Spring. P.p. 170.

(حمودة، سميح (2009)، يوميات النخبة الفلسطينية في عهد الانتداب، مجلة الدراسات الفلسطينية، ع78، ربيع، ص175)

¹⁸⁷ Shbib, Samih. (1999). Al-Osoul Al-Iqtasibia we Al-Ijtimaia Lil-Haraka Al-Siasia fe Filistin 1920-1948, Mo'asat Al-Aswar, Akka, Ramallah, Ministry of Culture, 111.

(شبيب، سميح، الاصول الاقتصادية والاجتماعية للحركة السياسية في فلسطين 1920-1948، مؤسسة الاسوار عكا، رام الله، وزارة الثقافة، 1999، ص97)

All this disagreement among the Palestinian elites in the era of the British Mandate contributed in the failure of the political elites in facing the challenges back then that there was a competition among the Palestinian dignitaries and the division among the Palestinian families including Al-Husseini and Al-Nashashebi leading to violence among them.

However, the period of (1936-1939) represented the stage of assassinations, and weakness in elite formation due to the division in the Palestinian forces and elites during the confrontation of the Israeli army throughout the 1948 war. These disagreements were purposely started in order to prevent the Palestinians from unifying their forces against the British policies and the policy of supporting Zionism.¹⁸⁸

3.3. The Jordanian Custodianship (1948-1988)

The Nakba of 1948 determined the history of the Palestinian land and the neighbouring countries because of the special connection between Jordan and Palestine since Jordan received many Palestinian refugees setting up tents for them. This influenced the Jordanian population's structure reflecting on the Jordanian demographic and social fabric.

The establishment of the state of Israel and the absence of the Palestinian entities paved the way to Jordan to annex the West Bank in 1950 as Egypt annex Gaza Strip according to the geographic nature of the area after the Second World War, the Cold War between the USSR and the USA and the divisions among the Arab countries.

¹⁸⁸ Al-Khaldi, Rasheed. (2008). Al-Qafas Al-Hadidi: Qisat Al-Sira' Al-Falastini Liqamat Al-Dawla. Beirut. Al-Mo'asa Al-Arabai Lil-Dirasat Wa Al-Nasher. P.p. 112. Akhdar, Hassan. (2003). Khososiat Noshu' Wa Takween Al-Nkhba Al-Filistinia. Ed. 1. Ramallah. Ma'had Ibrahim Abu Laghad Lildirasat Al-Dowaliya. Mo'sasiat Al-Nasher. Nisan. P.p. 31

(الخالدي، رشيد، (2008)، القفص الحديدي: قصة الصراع الفلسطيني لإقامة الدولة، بيروت، المؤسسة العربية للدراسات والنشر، ص112)

Also, the level of fear among the Palestinians remained dominant as Israel kept occupying the West Bank if Jordan let go its responsibilities of supervising the West Bank. In other words, if this annexation was a Palestinian request to avoid the Israeli occupation, it would contribute in its annexation.¹⁸⁹

As a result of the defeat of the national project after the war of 1948 and the establishment of the state of Israel on 75% of Palestine, the national political activities diminished leaving only the name of “the Government of Palestine” established by the Supreme Arabic Committee in Gaza after the establishment of Israel. The head of the Palestinian government kept his position as an observer in the Arab League until his death in 1963.¹⁹⁰

The main groups of the Palestinians joined political leagues including Israel, Jordan, Syria, Egypt, Lebanon and the Gulf countries. As for the growth of the bourgeois families in Palestine in the 1940s stopped that most of the companies registered in 1947 in Jerusalem and Jaffa wasn't owned by traditional families, but by middle-class families.

¹⁸⁹ Akhdar, Hassan. (2003). *Khososiat Noshu' Wa Takween Al-Nkhba Al-Filistinia*. Ed. 1. Ramallah. Ma'had Ibrahim Abu Laghad Lildirasat Al-Dowaliya. Mo'sasiat Al-Nasher. Nisan. P.p. 31

(خضر، حسن. (2003)، خصوصية نشوء وتكوين النخبة الفلسطينية. ط1. رام الله: معهد إبراهيم أبو لغد للدراسات الدولية، مؤسسة الناشر، نيسان، ص37)

¹⁹⁰ Shbib, Samih. (1999). *Al-Osoul Al-Iqtasibia we Al-Ijtimaia Lil-Haraka Al-Siasia fe Filistin 1920-1948*, Mo'asat Al-Aswar, Akka, Ramallah, Ministry of Culture, 111.

(شبيب، سميح، الاصول الاقتصادية والاجتماعية للحركة السياسية في فلسطين 1920-1948، مؤسسة الاسوار عكا، رام الله، وزارة الثقافة، 1999، ص97)

In fact, from the 536 registered companies in Jerusalem in 1947, the percentage of the ones owned by powerful families such as (Al-Dajani, Al-Khalidi, Al-Nashashibi, Al-Huseini) was 10%. Also, in Jaffa, in about 670 registered companies, it was 3.5%.¹⁹¹

The period from Al-Nakba to the formation of the PLO was distinguished with many transformations in the Palestinian political scene including the reformation of the Palestinian national identity adding new symbols, terms and mechanisms, the disappearance of the coastal cities and marginalizing their role; the migration of the Palestinians from Gaza and the West bank and the formation of huge gatherings of Palestinians in the Gulf. This led to the emergence and formation local elites in light of the annexation of the West Bank and Jordan and the annexation of Gaza to Egypt.¹⁹²

This stage included many local and international changes affecting the formation of the Palestinian elite along with continuous and official endeavours to establish the state of Palestine that Egypt urged the Arabi League in 1959 to gather the Palestinians and establish their independent state.

The Arab League decided resolution number 1933 which was issued in 1963 stating the approval of the council the recommendation of the political committee assuring that the Palestinians are the rightful owners of the Palestinian land as they have the right to reclaim it and decide its fate practicing their full national rights.¹⁹³

¹⁹¹ Al-Hout, Bayan Noihid. (1986). Al-Qiyadat we Al-Mossat Al-Siasia fe Filistin 1948-1917. Mo'sasat Al-Dirasat Al-Filistinia. Beirut, 73.

(الحوت، بيان نويهض، (1986) القيادات والمؤسسات السياسية في فلسطين 1917-1948، مؤسسة الدراسات الفلسطينية، بيروت، ص73)

¹⁹² Al-Salhi, Bassam. (1993). Al-Zama Al-Siasia Wa Al-Dinia Fe Al-Ard Al-Mohtala Waqiha Wa Tatworoha (1967-1991). Dar Al-Quds Lilnasher wa Al-tawzi.

(الصالحى بسام، (1993)، الزعامة السياسية والدينية في الارض المحتلة واقعها وتطورها 1967-1991، دار القدس للنشر والتوزيع.)

¹⁹³ Horani, Faisal. (1980). Al-Fikir Al-Siasi Al-Falastini 1964-1974. Markaz Al-Abhath Monatham Al-Tahrir Al-Falastinia, Beirut, 43.

In this political arena, Ahmad Al-Shoqairi, who was the representative of Palestine in the Arab League according to the charter of the Arab League concerning Palestine. After the resolution of the Arab League, he started his talks with the Arab countries about establishing an independent state for the Palestinians. He sought to use the support of the Arab countries until the PLO was recognized as the representative of the Palestinians all over the world in Jerusalem in the held conference for the establishment of the Palestinian state. Also, the national charter, the main system and internal lists of the PLO were agreed upon electing Ahmad Al-Shuqairi the head of the executive committee of the PLO and in 1964, the second Arab Summit was held in Alexandria recognizing the PLO and its institutions.¹⁹⁴

At that time, Al-Shuqairi assured that the Palestinian organization will not form a government and would not have a regional sovereignty on the West Bank and Gaza Strip without going against the Jordanians because it is an official international entity.

The Jordanians, the Arab leaders agreed on establishing the PLO without practicing sovereignty in the West Bank being cooperative with the Jordanians.¹⁹⁵

3.4. The Israeli Occupation (1967-1993)

After 1967, as the Jordanian and Egyptian rule ended in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Palestinians found themselves at the verge of political, social and economic transformations which had future impact especially in the presence of the Israeli

(حوراني، فيصل، (1980)، الفكر السياسي الفلسطيني 1964-1974، بيروت، مركز الابحاث، منظمة التحرير الفلسطينية، ص23)
¹⁹⁴ Akhdar, Hassan. (2003). *Khososiat Noshu' Wa Takween Al-Nkhba Al-Filistinia*. Ed. 1. Ramallah. Ma'had Ibrahim Abu Laghad Lildirasat Al-Dowaliya. Mo'sasiat Al-Nasher. Nisan. P.p. 31
 (خضر، حسن. (2003)، خصوصية نشوء وتكوين النخبة الفلسطينية. ط1. رام الله: معهد إبراهيم أبو لغد للدراسات الدولية، مؤسسة الناشر، نيسان، ص39)

¹⁹⁵ Al-Mawsoa MI-Filistinia. (1990). Section 2. *Al-Dirasat Al-Khasa*. Ed. 1. Beirut. P.p. 202.
 (الموسوعة الفلسطينية، (1990) القسم الثاني، الدراسات الخاصة، ط1، بيروت، ص202)

military occupation. Also, the migration of the Palestinians to other countries including Arabic and no- Arabic ones led to deriving the society from enormous economic and professional skills.¹⁹⁶

War and seeking refuge distracted the Palestinian leaderships including tribal and feudal which began to form in the Arab countries. In light of the establishment of the PLO in 1964, the political elite restored the national political activities in two stages, namely: the foundation of the PLO by the resolution of the Arab League and the war of 1967 which resulted in the occupation of the whole Palestinian historical land. In this stage, the Palestinians began to make their own decisions and policies.¹⁹⁷

The PLO was formed by the efforts of the elite holding national beliefs in order to liberate Palestine which declared the Palestinian national charter. This elite comprised the leaderships of the national activities before AL-Nakba calling for an independent idealism based on armed struggle.

Others called this movement “the realistic or national faction” which was formed by young refugees calling for social a national right asked for in an acceptable manner without following the left-wing’s revolutionary methods.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁶ Daerat Shon Al-Quds Monathamah Tahrir Al-Filistinia. (2010). Momarasat Wa Ijra’at Al-Ihtilal Al-Israeli Month Hozairan. P.p 6119-7921. Silsilat Taqarir Al-Quds.
(دائرة شؤون القدس منظمة التحرير الفلسطينية (2010). "ممارسات وإجراءات الاحتلال الاسرائيلي منذ حزيران 7921 - 6119 "سلسلة تقارير القدس (1).)

¹⁹⁷ Saleh Jihad. Ahmad. (2012). Al-Qwa Al-Sha’ia Wa Qiyadataha Al-Moqawima Men Ajl Al-Quds Ba’d Harb Hozairan 1967. Jam’iat Yaom Al-Quds. Amman- Jordan.
(صالح، جهاد أحمد (2012). القوى الشعبية وقياداتها المقاومة من أجل القدس بعد حرب حزيران 1967م. جمعية يوم القدس، عمان-الأردن.)

¹⁹⁸ Akhdar, Hassan. (2003). Khosasiat Noshu’ Wa Takween Al-Nkhba Al-Filistinia. Ed. 1. Ramallah. Ma’had Ibrahim Abu Laghad Lildirasat Al-Dowaliya. Mo’sasiat Al-Nasher. Nisan. P.p. 31
(خضر، حسن. (2003). خصوصية نشوء وتكوين النخبة الفلسطينية. ط1. رام الله: معهد إبراهيم أبو لغد للدراسات الدولية، مؤسسة الناشر، نيسان، ص39)

Furthermore, the transitional period of the PLO (1967-1969) witnessed organizational, administrative and legal changes aiming at reconstructing the Palestinian national movement by uniting the movements and Fida'e' organizations to the PLO in order to represent all the Palestinian factions by the Palestinian national charter.

Also, the list of internal laws of the national council and executive committee of the organization were amended and the popular liberation forces were founded as well as the national fund and the Palestinian research centre.¹⁹⁹

The establishment of the PLO led to the emergence of elites again restoring the idea of the national council to discuss the national issues and solve them by common consent among the political elites. This stage is called the second stage of the establishment of the PLO.²⁰⁰

Since then, the PLO had become the institutional entity representing the Palestinians and their national awareness considering it the basic step for having popularity among the Palestinians and other countries and international organizations seeking to be recognized internationally and regionally as a national hub for the Palestinians.

It could achieve political and diplomatic goals as being recognized as a full member in the Arab League and the only legal representative for the Palestinians according to the Rabat summit in 1974. Also, it got the membership of the UN as non-observant member

¹⁹⁹ Hamouda, Sameh. (2009). *Yawmiyat Al-Nokhba Al-Filistinia Fe Ahd Al-Intidab*. Majalat Al-Dirasat Al-Filistinia. Ed. 78. Spring. P.p. 170.

(حمودة، سميح، (2013)، منظمة التحرير في الفترة الانتقالية 24 كانون الاول 1967-1969، مجلة شؤون فلسطينية، مركز الابحاث، منظمة التحرير الفلسطينية، رام الله، العدد 253-254، ص49)

²⁰⁰ Hilal, Jamil, (2002). *Takween Ak-Nukhba Al-Falastinia Month Nush' Al-Harakah Al-Watnia Al-Falastinia Ela Ma Ba'd Qiam Al-Solta Alfalastinia*. Mwatn: Al-Mo'assaAl-Falastinia Lidirasat Al-Dinoqratia- Ramallah- Flastine, 24.

(هلال، جميل، (2012)، تكوين النخبة الفلسطينية، مواطن، رام الله، فلسطين. مركز الاردن الجديد للدراسات، عمان، الاردن، ص40)

in the same year due to be recognized by more than 120 countries around the world when Yasser Arafat announced the independence of Palestine in 1988.²⁰¹

After that, the change in command appeared in transferring leadership from the occupied territories represented by the families and clans to the PLO in 1967 that it began to practice its jurisdiction gradually. Bashar Al-Masri said: “With the beginning of the municipal elections in the Palestinian cities and villages, the role of the PLO began to be clear in interfering who had the right to nominate himself / herself. Before that, elections were according to well-known families such as Al-Masri, Al-Shaka’a, Toqan in Nablus; Khalaf, Al-Taweel, Qawasma and Al-Ja’bari in Ramallah and Hebron; Al-Shawa in Ghaza.

In 1967, the formation of national factions founded by Abu Jihad Al-Wazeer through the PLO. By doing so, the PLO was responsible for assigning the municipality’s head and members enhancing the role of the PLO.²⁰²

3.5. Leadership and Peace Process

The negotiations with participants in Madrid conference in October 1991 as a parallel path for bilateral negotiations with two big goals. On the one hand, the aim was to ease the progress at the bilateral level, but there was an Israeli opposition against the participation of Yasser Arafat and the PLO in the negotiations.

This gave a great role to the Palestinian elites in the West Bank and Gaza Strip that Dr. Saeb Oraiqtat, Dr. Hanan Ashrawi, Haidar Abdul-Shafi as the representatives of

²⁰¹ Hilal, Jamil, (2002). Takween Ak-Nukhba Al-Falastinia Month Nush’ Al-Harakah Al-Watnia Al-Falastinia Ela Ma Ba’d Qiam Al-Solta Alfalastinia. Mwatn: Al-Mo’assaAl-Falastinia Lidirasat Al-Dinoqratia- Ramallah- Flastine, 24.

(هلال، جميل، (2012)، تكوين النخبة الفلسطينية، مواطن، رام الله، فلسطين. مركز الاردن الجديد للدراسات، عمان، الاردن، ص40)

²⁰² An Interview with Bashar Al-Masri. A Palestinian Businessman. Nablus. 11.12.2019.

Palestine in negotiations. Consequently, there was a new power in Palestine and restoring part of the Palestinian political decisions to the occupied territory.²⁰³

Self-governing authorities were established due to political circumstances founded by Oslo agreements which is led political and economic dependency to Israel even in security matters.²⁰⁴ Similarity, Abu Jihad Al-Aloul said:” before signing Oslo Agreement, Yasser Arafat didn’t have any money because the Gulf war imposed a political and financial siege on the PLO as a result of supporting Saddam Hussein in his war against Kuwait. Still, Arafat tried to get money from his African friends, but he failed leading him to sign Oslo.²⁰⁵

Oslo talks channel was established after the frustration of the Palestinians being part of the negotiating delegation with Jordan stipulating that no PLO member should be in it because they receive their orders from the PLO in Tunis. Instead, Palestinians from 1948 lands were allowed to negotiate, but there was a disagreement between the Palestinian delegation in Washington and the leaders of the PLO IN Tunis who were deprived from participating directly in negotiations.²⁰⁶

²⁰³ Ahmad Qure’ Abu Ala’. (2007). Al-Riwaya Al-Kamela Lilmofawadat min Oslo Ela Kharitat Al-Triq. Part:2. Mofawadat Camp David- Taba, Stockholm 1995-2000. Beirut: Mo’asasat Al-Dirasat Al-Filistinia. P.p 20.

(احمد قريع ابوعلاء، الرواية الفلسطينية الكاملة للمفاوضات من أوسلو الى خريطة الطريق - الجزء الثاني - مفاوضات كامب ديفيد - طابا وستوكهولم 1995 - 2000، بيروت: مؤسسة الدراسات الفلسطينية، 2007، ص20)

²⁰⁴ Ahmad Qure’ Abu Ala’. (2007). Al-Riwaya Al-Kamela Lilmofawadat min Oslo Ela Kharitat Al-Triq. Part:2. Mofawadat Camp David- Taba, Stockholm 1995-2000. Beirut: Mo’asasat Al-Dirasat Al-Filistinia. P.p 20.

²⁰⁵ Al-Aloul, Mahmud. V.P of the Chairman of Fatah. Interview: 2019.

(احمد قريع ابوعلاء، الرواية الفلسطينية الكاملة للمفاوضات من أوسلو الى خريطة الطريق - الجزء الثاني - مفاوضات كامب ديفيد - طابا وستوكهولم 1995 - 2000، بيروت: مؤسسة الدراسات الفلسطينية، 2007، ص20)

²⁰⁶ Osama, Abu Nahl et al. (2012). Maseerat Al-Motaghayirat Al-Siasia Wa Atharoha Ala Siasat Monathamat Al-Tahrir Al-Filistinia Min Al-Nasha’ Ela Oslo. Dar Al-Jondi Lilnasher Wa Al-Tawzi. Al-Quds. P.p.451-461.

(أسامة أبو نحل، واخرون، (2012)، مسيرة المتغيرات السياسية وأثرها على سياسات منظمة التحرير الفلسطينية من النشأة على أوسلو، دار الجندي للنشر والتوزيع، القدس، ص451-461)

Oslo agreements' idea came from the personal relationships between Palestinian and Israeli personnel that Madrid conference's was based on UN resolution (242), but the US clarified the Israeli point of view in the interpretation of this resolution concerning 1967 occupied lands in negotiations led by the American Secretary of State James Baker III.

Also, this resolution deals with June 1967 without mentioning the Palestinian cause related to the establishment of Israel in 1948 on the Palestinian lands. James administered it²⁰⁷ with the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1991 and then the Israeli demand was imposed that the delegation should be from the Palestinians of 1967 without any Palestinians from eastern occupied Jerusalem.²⁰⁸ Oslo contributed in getting the PLO to the political arena by marginalizing the political elites in the West Bank who marginalized Madrid conference.²⁰⁹

Abu Ala' stated that the negotiations started with confidential stage by the Palestinian and Israeli sides, even the Arabs and Americans didn't know about them that only Yasser Arafat, Mahmud Abbas, Yaser Abd Rabo and Abu Ala' Ahmad Qure' knew about them.²¹⁰

²⁰⁷ James Adison Baker 3rd is an American lawyer and politician who worked as the Chief Staff of the White House and he Treasury Minister in the reign of President Ronald Regan. Also, he was the Foreign Minister and the General Staff of the White House in the reign of president George Bush Senior. He was born in Houston and studied at Hill Secondary School and Bronston University before serving at the Navy.

²⁰⁸ Waage, Hilda. (2000). Tafseer Qanat Oslo Al-Siriya. Traslated by: Motasem Mahmud. Maa'had Abhath Al-Salam Al-Dwali. Oslo. P.p. 139.

(هيلدافوغ، (2000)، تفسير قناة أوسلو السرية، ترجمة: معتصم محمود، معهد أبحاث السلام الدولي، أوسلو، ص 139)

²⁰⁹ An Interview with Ashrawi, Hanan. A Palestinian activists and a member in the PLO: 2018.

²¹⁰ An interview with Abu Ala' – Ahmad Qure'. The member of the central committee of Fatah and a member in the executive committee: 2019.

3.6. The Establishment of the Palestinians National Authority (1994-2020)

When the Palestinian Authority (PA) was established in 1994 as a result of signing Oslo agreement, the PA based its work on central system as a start of the emergence of new political, economic, security and social classes replacing the old ones benefiting the ones close to decision makers. It played a great role in reshaping the map of the Palestinian elites; after its establishment, new elites emerged after the PA started practicing its powers.²¹¹

The Palestinian elite were divided into many names, namely: administrative and security elites which didn't exist before. Despite that most of their members were from Fatah, the PLO and its civil and security institutions, the nature of their status and their role and legislations and positions made them new elites with new privileges.²¹²

Since the first moments of their formation, they follow the general leader fully forming Arafat's main supporters that the number of public civil workers until his death more than (65, 000) including (6000) having (A1-D) degrees. Anyhow, these figures increased especially the holders of (A4) degree that their number reached (730) employees. The overall number of employees in the civil service reached more than (80,000) employees.

²¹¹ Hilal, Jamil, (2002). Takween Ak-Nukhba Al-Falastinia Month Nush' Al-Harakah Al-Watnia Al-Falastinia Ela Ma Ba'd Qiam Al-Solta Alfalastinia. Mwatn: Al-Mo'assaAl-Falastinia Lidirasat Al-Dinoqratia- Ramallah- Flastine, 24.

(هلال، جميل، (2002)، تكوين النخبة الفلسطينية، مواطن، رام الله، فلسطين. مركز الاردن الجديد للدراسات، عمان، الاردن، ص5)

²¹² Ersheed, Samer. (2007). Tatheer Itifaq Oslo wa Al- Intifada Althania Ala Harakat Fath Wa Al-Solta Al-Falastinia. Risalat Majesteer Manshoora. Birzeit University, Ramallah, Palestine, p.p. 71.

(ارشيد، سامر، (2007)، تأثير اتفاق أوسلو والانتفاضة الثانية على حركة فتح والسلطة الفلسطينية، رسالة ماجستير منشورة، جامعة بيرزيت، رام الله، فلسطين، ص71)

Of course, the mentioned numbers don't include security employees who reached a couple of thousands of officers who had high ranks and tens of thousands of soldiers.²¹³

Most of them were stopped working after the establishment of the PA, most of the military commanders were coming back from the abroad or from Fatah that all the members of protective security were assigned by Fatah members themselves.²¹⁴

Also, the political elites' role was significant in the period of the PA which formed in Palestine and the Diaspora due to the Palestinian political activities in resisting the Israeli occupation known as the factions of the PLO. Other factions also emerged from it such as Hamas, Al-Jihad Al-Islami which were not included in the PLO.

Hamas's elite included members and leaders at the political level and the workers in social and humanitarian organizations, but it was the opposition. Furthermore, new factions and political groups emerged after the foundation of the PA based on their partial or full agreement with the PA as well as other independents who followed the previously mentioned factions.

Also, a new elite of the seniors of NGOs who became highly paid and travel with special arrangements. Despite they were Leftist, but they worked away from politics and worked in the developmental area making them away from their original factions. Yet, they became more liberal than national in the Palestinian issue. This doesn't mean that

²¹³ Hilal, Jamil, (2002). Takween Ak-Nukhba Al-Falastinia Month Nush' Al-Harakah Al-Watnia Al-Falastinia Ela Ma Ba'd Qiam Al-Solta Alfalastinia. Mwatn: Al-Mo'assaAl-Falastinia Lidirasat Al-Dinoqratia- Ramallah- Flastine, 24.

(هلال، جميل، (2002)، تكوين النخبة الفلسطينية، مواطن، رام الله، فلسطين. مركز الاردن الجديد للدراسات، عمان، الاردن، ص3)

²¹⁴ An interview with Jibreel Al-Rjoub. The Secretary of the Central Committee of Fatah, the member of the central committee, the chief of the Palestinian Union and the former Director of the Palestinian Preventive Security, the head of the high council of youth and sport and the Olympic Palestinian committee and the association of Palestinian scotuts. Ramallah. 12.2.2020.

all NGO's workers had the same privileges because some of them don't have the same privileges and facilitations as he leaders of the NGOs.²¹⁵

With the presence of the PA, Yasser Arafat made sure to bring economic elites who came in 1994 to transfer some of their investments to the Palestinian land in return of special privileges.²¹⁶ Bashar Al-Masri indicated that the presence of the economic elite was achieved by Yasser Arafat who brought them to build the Palestinian state and establishing the infrastructure of the Palestinian state.

One of these examples is Paltel company in which investors were given the right to monopolize it for 20 years based on President Arafat's decisions. He did so to make sure that it's Palestinian per se that one of the investors was Moneb Al-Masri, Sabih Al-Masri, Al-Sokhtian, Al-Aqad, Al-Kharawi, Al-Qattan in the West Bank and Hasib Al-Dabagh, Saed Al-Khori who played a vital role in establishing the infrastructure sector and supporting the Palestinian state.²¹⁷

The economic elites were not formed in Palestine, but they allied with each other in Gaza and the West Bank during the Israeli occupation. These alliances came at the expense of the local economic elites including weak parties who joined these alliances. Bashar Al-Masri indicated that they came as a result of their common interest that they

²¹⁵ Hilal, Jamil, (2002). Takween Ak-Nukhba Al-Falastinia Month Nush' Al-Harakah Al-Watnia Al-Falastinia Ela Ma Ba'd Qiam Al-Solta Alfalastinia. Mwatn: Al-Mo'assaAl-Falastinia Lidirasat Al-Dinoqratia- Ramallah- Flastine, 24.

(هلال، جميل، (2002)، تكوين النخبة الفلسطينية، مواطن، رام الله، فلسطين. مركز الاردن الجديد للدراسات، عمان، الاردن، ص3)

²¹⁶ Ersheed, Samer. (2007). Tatheer Itifaq Oslo wa Al- Intifada Althania Ala Harakat Fath Wa Al-Solta Al-Falastinia. Risalat Majesteer Manshoora. Birzeit University, Ramallah, Palestine, p.p. 71.

(ارشيد، سامر، (2007)، تأثير اتفاق أوسلو والانتفاضة الثانية على حركة فتح والسلطة الفلسطينية، رسالة ماجستير منشورة، جامعة

بيرزيت، رام الله، فلسطين، ص73)

²¹⁷ An Interview with Bashar Al-Masri. A Palestinian Businessman. Nablus. 11.12.2019.

got privileges in return for their investments as agreed with Yasser Arafat. They were able to have good relationships with the PA and Fatah.²¹⁸

3.7. The Legislative Elections and the New Palestinian Elite:

The Palestinian elections in 2006 comprised a dramatic change the democratic process in Palestine that the results were a turning point for their change in the Palestinian political system. In other words, Hamas's rule represented the duality of power as a result of the leadership of the head of Fatah on the PLO and the Palestinian forces. Having such elections at their time and sticking to the results is a special democratic image of the Palestinians being able to stick to the success of the democratic process by keeping peace during the elections.²¹⁹

There was a change in the formation of the second legislative council being controlled by one party since 1996 when Fatah controlled it for 10 years. That win meant that the council's main seats (74) will be to the opposition of holding peace treaties or rejecting considering Israel as a peace partner to the PLO. Then, Fatah got 45 seat and 3 members from the martyr Abu Ali Mustafa as well as two members from *Al-Tariq Al-Thalith* list and Palestine independent list and other 4 independent members.²²⁰

²¹⁸ Hilal, Jamil, (2002). Takween Ak-Nukhba Al-Falastinia Month Nush' Al-Harakah Al-Watnia Al-Falastinia Ela Ma Ba'd Qiam Al-Solta AlFalastinia. Mwatn: Al-Mo'assaAl-Falastinia Lidirasat Al-Dinoqratia- Ramallah- Flastine, 24.

(هلال، جميل، (2002)، تكوين النخبة الفلسطينية، مواطن، رام الله، فلسطين. مركز الاردن الجديد للدراسات، عمان، الاردن، ص7)

²¹⁹ Abu Arab, Khalil Mohammed Mahmud. (2008). Athar Al-Intikhabat Al-Tashri'ia Al-Thania Ala Al-Tahawol Al-Democracy Al-Falastini. Risalat Majester. An-Najah National University. Palestine. P.p. 101-102.

(ابو عرب، خليل محمد محود، (2008)، أثر الانتخابات التشريعية الثانية على التحول الديمقراطي الفلسطيني، رسالة ماجستير، جامعة النجاح الوطنية، نابلس، فلسطين، ص101-102)

²²⁰ Samar Al-Barghuthy. (2009). Simat Al-Nokhba Al-Siasia Al-Filistinia Qabl Wa Ba'd Qiam Al-Solta Al-Finistinia. Al-Zaitona studies and consiltations. Beirut, Lebanon. 51.

(سمر البرغوثي، (2009)، سمات النخبة السياسية الفلسطينية قبل وبعد قيام السلطة الوطنية الفلسطينية، مركز الزيتونة للدراسات والاستشارات بيروت، لبنان، ص51)

The new local and legislative elite reflected the Palestinian society and its political, social and economic directions in terms of age that most of them were young which reflects giving the young the flag to lead and prove they are worthy of leading the Palestinians unlike the previous era when the old were ruling the society at the traditional level.²²¹

In terms of religiousness, the local and legislative elites were religious representing the religious awake and the presence of the political Islam and the Christian quota. Also, they were highly educated relating that to the significance of education to the Palestinians as well as the importance of the cultural aspect and the role of the intellectuals as one of the sources of elites.²²²

The civil sector comprised the biggest source for the local and legislative elite in the second legislative, however, the share of the bureaucratic institution larger in the local elite due to the special status of the teachers and the employees of the public sector in the local society.

Furthermore, independents were not the majority in the local elite due to the emergence of the role of family and social alliances in light of the regression of the role of political

²²¹ Abdul-hadi, Zuhair. (2007). Al-Taghyerat Fe Malameh Al-Nokhba Al-Filistinia Al-Jadida Ala Do' Nataej Al-Intikhabat Al-Mahalya Wa Al-Tashrieya Al-Thania. Risalat Majester Manshora. Birzeit University. Palestine. P.p. 135.

(عبد الهادي، زهير، (2007)، التغيرات في ملامح النخبة السياسية الفلسطينية "الجديدة" على ضوء نتائج الانتخابات المحلية والتشريعية الثانية، رسالة ماجستير منشورة، جامعة بيرزيت، فلسطين، ص135)

²²² Abdul-hadi, Zuhair. (2007). Al-Taghyerat Fe Malameh Al-Nokhba Al-Filistinia Al-Jadida Ala Do' Nataej Al-Intikhabat Al-Mahalya Wa Al-Tashrieya Al-Thania. Risalat Majester Manshora. Birzeit University. Palestine. P.p. 135.

(عبد الهادي، زهير، (2007)، التغيرات في ملامح النخبة السياسية الفلسطينية "الجديدة" على ضوء نتائج الانتخابات المحلية والتشريعية الثانية، رسالة ماجستير منشورة، جامعة بيرزيت، فلسطين، ص135)

parties and Leftists and the weakness of the performance of the PA especially in the 2nd Intifada.²²³

3.8. Political Division and its Impact on the Formation of Political Elite

The Palestinian elections was supposed to be the solution for the crisis of the political system, but it led to deepen the Palestinian division because Hamas explained its win in the elections as a commission to lead the Palestinians, so it was a way to change the references and basics of the PA as the sole representative for the Palestinians.

It sought to have a self- governance employing democracy to perform a coup on the PA, but the failure of the coup led to trapping Hamas's government in a siege. Eventually, Hamas accepted the deals of Makka and the government of the national reconciliation. Still, the intersection of the external agendas and Israel's policies led to the division of Hamas in Gaza which weakened the possibility of constructing a national strategy to resist or having a peaceful settlement.²²⁴

Due to the absolute control of both governments, different elites were formed in Gaza and the West Bank in light of the absence of partnership, institutional questioning and popular supervision. This led to the oppression of freedoms as division was solidified after the coup of Hamas on the PA separating Gaza and the West Bank. Hamas made

²²³ Abdul-hadi, Zuhair. (2007). Al-Taghyerat Fe Malameh Al-Nokhba Al-Filistinia Al-Jadida Ala Do' Nataej Al-Intikhabat Al-Mahalya Wa Al-Tashrieya Al-Thania. Risalat Majester Manshora. Birzeit University. Palestine. P.p. 135.

(عبد الهادي، زهير، (2007)، التغييرات في ملامح النخبة السياسية الفلسطينية "الجديدة" على ضوء نتائج الانتخابات المحلية والتشريعية الثانية، رسالة ماجستير منشورة، جامعة بيرزيت، فلسطين، ص135)

²²⁴ Al-Naqeeb, Khaldon. (2007) Harakat Al-Islam Al-Siasi Wa Al- Sulta: Dirasa Fe Aliat Al-Haimana Wa Al-Maqama. Majalat Al-Siasa Al-Dwaliya. Ed. 169. 42.

(النقيب، خلدون. (2007)، حركات الإسلام السياسي والسلطة: دراسة في آليات الهيمنة والمقامة. مجلة السياسة الدولية. عدد169، المجلد42.)

use of all the political system in Gaza as it renewed the whole system changing Fatah's leaders and everything related to the old system.²²⁵

Despite the wish of that government to work professionally led by Salam Fayyad, who formed the government of technocrat, he executed the plans based on raising the efficiency of the PA's institutions by embodying the work of the institutions not individuals.

However, it went away from factional wars and decrease the margin of contradictions in the stands of the factions in the performance of the government aiming at getting the popular support and supporting the governmental programs.²²⁶

It can be said that the government began as a temporary government in order to be given the trust to lead. But division prevented that. President Abu Mazen issued a number of official orders set a rule indicating the division in the Palestinian political system. Still, Fatah's control over the government contributed in forming political, economic and security elites in which the members of the executive committee of the PLO were as well as the general secretaries of the Palestinian faction.

Some of the members of the legislative council, the members of the central committee of Fatah, leaders of the security divisions and economic classes who control decision makers were also included. These elites were formed as a result of eliminating Hamas

²²⁵ Abu Ramadan, Mohsen. (2012). Tashakol Al-Nokhab Al-Filistinia Al-Jadida.
<http://palestine.assafir.com/>

(أبو رمضان، محسن، (2012)، تشكل النخب الفلسطينية الجديدة، [\(http://palestine.assafir.com/](http://palestine.assafir.com/)

²²⁶ Fuad, Wisam. (2007). Salam Fayyad Aql Al-Mowathaf Alawlamy Fe Be'a Ghayr Moawlama. Majalat Al-Quds. Markaz Al-Ilam Al-Arabi. Ed. 108. P.p. 43-45.

(فؤاد، وسام، سلام فياض عقل الموظف العولمي في بيئة غير معولمة، مجلة القدس، مركز الاعلام العربي، العدد 108، 2007، ص43-45)

from the West Bank as the elites which were formed based on eliminating Fatah from Gaza.²²⁷

Concerning the educated and the civil society, it could be said that the approach was intense between Fatah and Hamas in light of the regression of the democratic and Leftists forces. As a result, this division took away part of the class of the educated and civil organizations which were closer to the government in the area.

Despite the general independence of the personnel and organizations, there was a bias to other parties keeping their identities away from the two great factions. The speech of the organizations of the civil works took care of the diplomacy and eloquence concerning certain violation in the area they were specialized.²²⁸

Some personalities in the civil works attempted to break the siege by addressing international delegations leading to the possibility of establishing the state in Gaza first. It was recognized that the Palestinian state should be at the borders of 1967 starting from Gaza without the West Bank including Jerusalem.

The civil organization couldn't prevent the emergence of opposition to that scheme replacing all that with the mediation to end the division and regain the national unity and guaranteeing freedoms and this mission didn't suit the historical role of the political elites in the stage of the national liberation.²²⁹

²²⁷ Abu Ramadan, Mohsen. (2012). Tashakol Al-Nokhab Al-Filistinia Al-Jadida. <http://palestine.assafir.com/>

(ابو رمضان، محسن، (2012)، تشكل النخب الفلسطينية الجديدة، [\(http://palestine.assafir.com/](http://palestine.assafir.com/))

²²⁸ Abu Ramadan, Mohsen. (2012). Tashakol Al-Nokhab Al-Filistinia Al-Jadida. <http://palestine.assafir.com/>

(ابو رمضان، محسن، (2012)، تشكل النخب الفلسطينية الجديدة، [\(http://palestine.assafir.com/](http://palestine.assafir.com/))

²²⁹ Abu Ramadan, Mohsen. (2012). Tashakol Al-Nokhab Al-Filistinia Al-Jadida. <http://palestine.assafir.com/>

3.9. Conclusion:

Throughout the Palestinian history, political elites struggled and competed to lead the Palestinians, but they competed and made alliances. Such elites can be tribal elites which ruled and combined forces with Arabic and regional power contributing in supporting these tribes giving them privileges and powers even after the 1948 Nakba and 1967 Naksa.

However, the Diaspora of the Palestinians led to the departure of the revolutionary elites which earned its legitimacy from its struggling role and sacrifices. Consequently, other elites started competing leading to weakening the role of the Palestinian elites in the 1948 lands, but this role was strengthened after the first intifada which contributed in transferring the Palestinian leadership.

Also, Oslo and peace process contributed in the emergence of new elites in which some were as an extension to the previous ones such as the military and popular as well as the tribal and revolutionary. Other elites included technocrats, experts and businessmen who became part of the Palestinian political system.

Chapter Four:

The Role of Political Elite in the Palestinian Political Decision

This chapter shed light on the role of the Palestinian businessmen (economic elite)

In the Palestinian political scene from 1965 to 2020. This study is based on the assumption that businessmen played a great role in the previously mentioned period in providing financial and political support; legitimizing the Palestinian leadership including the PLO and the PA in exchange for privileges and opening communication channels and supporting the Palestinian diplomacy with the Arab countries, the international community and Israel after Oslo. Finally, they had a role in the Palestinian internal affairs through interfering in the factional Palestinian reconciliation.

The researcher found out in this chapter that there is an important role for businessmen in opening communication channels with the Arab and international community, still the majority of businessmen think their role is marginal and their contribution in providing political and economic support was in vain.

Others see that they didn't even get to the political system due to the RLPF and tribal elites' control over the political system until nowadays. Also, the researcher found that they contributed in supporting politicians directly and indirectly for their inability to transfer their economic power to political one.

The researcher divided the roles of the economic elite in this chapter chronologically into two main periods:

- The role of the economic elite since the foundation of the PLO until signing Oslo agreement.
- The role of the economic elite after signing Oslo agreement until 2020.

4.1. The Role of Businessmen (Economic Elite (1964-1993)

4.1.1. The Relationship of Businessmen with the PLO:

The 1948 Nakba became a historical determinant affected the Palestinians and their land as well as the surrounding Arab region that it became an additional factor in the intervention issue and the internal connection between Palestine and the rest of the countries namely Jordan. Jordan received thousands of Palestinians and held tents for them in the camps which affected the demographic structure of the Jordanian society due to migration and the unity between the two Banks. Furthermore. The establishment of Israel and the occupation of the greatest part of Palestine led to the oblivion of the Palestinian state leading Jordan to suggest the unity of the two Banks in 1950 highlighting that Egypt would rule Gaza Strip.

This temporal annexation agreed with the international and local variables in the area especially after World War II, THE Cold War between the USSR and the US and the divisions among the Arab countries and the abundance of their loyalties because the Palestinians were afraid that Israel would occupy the whole West Bank if Jordan gave it up. This led to the announcement of the annexation of the West Bank by Jordan.²³⁰

²³⁰ Khadir Hassan. (2003). Khososiat Noshu' Wa Takween Al-Nokhba Al-Falastinia. Al-Taba' Al-Ola. Ma;had Ibrahim Lildirasat Al-Dowalia. Berzeit University. Palestine. 2-25.

(خضر، حسن. (2003)، خصوصية نشوء وتكوين النخبة الفلسطينية. ط1. رام الله: معهد إبراهيم أبو لغد للدراسات الدولية، مؤسسة الناشر، نيسان، ص37)

4.1.2. The Role of Businessmen in the Palestinian Political System Before Oslo:

Businessmen and the economic elite played a great role in supporting the political system and the Palestinian revolutions that the Palestinian capital contributed in supporting the political system and cooperated with the PLO.

The first was the formation of the PLO when the first national council was held in 1964 in Jerusalem that the first Palestinian leadership consisted of high-profile personnel, the heads of the clans and businessmen both countrymen and expatriates.²³¹, so, this first formation was based on the national concept of a fair cause and the continuity of struggle.

Also, it participated in the Palestinian political life contributing in going over financial crises due to the assistance of Abdul Hasib Al-Sabagh, Saed Khorri, Abdul-Majid Shoman and others who supported and affected the political decision.²³²

In addition, their role expanded to include supporting the PLO and establishing the Palestinian National Fund headed by Abdul-Majid Shoman that it represented the financial, administrative monitoring department in the PLO. It was founded in 1964 funded by liberation tax from the Palestinian workers' salaries in the Arab countries.²³³

Since its establishment, it supported the struggle of the Palestinians and their persistence wherever they were keeping its vital role every time the PLO was under financial siege.

Also, it enabled the Palestinian institution to perform their tasks to serve the Palestinians

²³¹ An interview with Rawhi Fatouh. The member of the Central Committee of the International Relations Commission. Ramallah.: 8.1.2019.

²³² An interview with Rawhi Fatouh. The member of the Central Committee of the International Relations Commission. Ramallah.: 8.1.2019.

²³³ An interview with Ramzi, Khouri. The General Manager of the Palestinian National Fund. Ramallah. 1.3.2020.

as well as supervising the financial and administrative issues of the emissaries and diplomatic consulates all over the world which were about 108 consulates.²³⁴

4.1.3. The Role of Businessmen in Providing Financial Support

The relationship between businessmen and the PLO is mutual starting from the period of the former president Yasser Arafat who kept good relationships with businessmen calling them “comprador” in the positive meaning. He accepted the membership of the League of the Palestinian students studying at Cairo led by Yasser Arafat and a number of people who became businessmen. In addition, Zahi Al-Alami’s company was one of the greatest Engineering Consultations Company in the Arab worlds. He participated in the 71st conference of Fatah, but his disagreement with Yasser Arafat’s way led to freezing his membership. Still, he kept the good relationship with him assuring the great role businessmen had in providing financial support for the movement.²³⁵

Many businessmen had charitable contributions in order to support educational, social and economic projects such as establishing Al-Ta’won Institution in 1983 which supported the educational, social and economic sectors after expelling most of the Palestinian fighters from Lebanon after the Israeli invasion to Lebanon in 1982 led by Ariel Sharon.

What indicated the importance of this institution was organizing a festival “For You Jerusalem” under the patronage of Al-Shekh Zayed in Abu Dhabi in order to urge the Arabs to face the Jews’ attempts to Judaize Palestine. It funded projects for restoring the

²³⁴ An interview with Ramzi, Khouri. The General Manager of the Palestinian National Fund. Ramallah. 1.3.2020.

²³⁵ Hanafi, Al-Sari. (1996). Bayn Alamyn Rijal Ammal Al-Filistin Fe Al-Shatat Wa Al-Kayan Al-Falastini. Risalat Doctora. Cairo. Egypt.

Islamic and Christian ruins in Jerusalem and supporting the Arabic existence through building a whole neighbourhood on 10000 M2 in Jerusalem.²³⁶

Also, the Arab Bank founded Abdul-Hamid Shoman's institution in 1978 (a cultural institution), with a non-profit initiative by the Arab Bank to privatise part of its annual profits to establish it in order to be the PLOs social and cultural assistant. He based it on three main parts: leadership mentality, literature and art and creativity. In addition, it was named after Abdul-Hamid Shoman, who was the founder of the Arab Bank (1888-1974).

He believed in the importance of supporting education and supporting it by fostering the human Arab creativity represented by enhancing leadership mentality through scientific research. Besides, it launched Abdul-Hamid Shoman's prize for Arab researchers in 1982 and Abdul-Hamid Shoman's Fund for the support of science in 1999 in order to communicate with researchers through activities in Abdul-Hamid Shoman's cultural forum in 1986.²³⁷

4.1.4. The Role of Businessmen in Supporting Fatah:

The support of businessmen to the PLO extended to supporting the factions of the PLO for its prominent role in its quests for liberation, so many businessmen launched donation campaigns in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to help the Palestinian leadership. Mohsen Qattan made a tour with a group of Palestinian leaders to collect donations

²³⁶ Hanafi, Al-Sari. (1996). Bayn Alamyn Rijal Ammal Al-Filistintion Fe Al-Shatat Wa Al-Kayan Al-Falastini. Risalat Doctora. Cairo. Egypt.

(حنفي، ساري، (1996) بين عالمين رجال الاعمال الفلسطينيين في الشتات والكيان الفلسطيني، رسالة دكتوراة، القاهرة، مصر)

²³⁷ Hanafi, Al-Sari. (1996). Bayn Alamyn Rijal Ammal Al-Filistintion Fe Al-Shatat Wa Al-Kayan Al-Falastini. Risalat Doctora. Cairo. Egypt.

(حنفي، ساري، (1996) بين عالمين رجال الاعمال الفلسطينيين في الشتات والكيان الفلسطيني، رسالة دكتوراة، القاهرة، مصر)

from Kuwait as well as in Saudi Arabia that Prince Salman Bin Abdul-Aziz di the same to the martyrs of Palestine.²³⁸

Since the launching of Fatah in the 1960s, Yasser Arafat made use of owning three partners in harvesting the Palestinian capital in the Gulf. One of them is Gwied Al-Ghpson who participated in developing the economy of the UAE as he was a prominent member of the Palestinian National Council in 1977, the head of the Palestinian National Fund in 1984 and a member in the executive committee of the PLO. The other one is Abdul Mohsen Al-Qattan who was the head of the Palestinian National Council. The last one is Nabil Sah'th who was responsible for the Palestinian Strategic Planning Council and owned Taim Company which was one of the biggest companies in the administration.²³⁹

The Palestinian businessmen played a vital role in the establishment of Fatah that Arafat used political financial support to get to the leadership of the PLO trusting Shoman who supported him to get new leaderships with positive attitudes. Then, he cut the support from the PLO leading Al-Shuqairi to quit and give the responsibility to Yahya Hamouda and then Yasser Arafat.

Also, Saed Khori, Zohair Hasib and Abdul Majid Shoman covered Fatah's activities financially by establishing a cooperative institution providing about 50 million dollars every year to serve the Palestinians and enhance the Palestinian national, political and

²³⁸ An interview with Ahmad Qure'. The member of the PLO. The head of the Palestinian Legislative Council after the elections of 1996. Ramallah. 22.9.2019.

²³⁹ Khadir Hassan. (2003). Khososiat Noshu' Wa Takween Al-Nokhba Al-Falastinia. Al-Taba' Al-Ola. Ma;had Ibrahim Lildirasat Al-Dowalia. Berzeit University. Palestine. 2-25.

(خضر، حسن. (2003)، خصوصية نشوء وتكوين النخبة الفلسطينية. ط1. رام الله: معهد إبراهيم أبو لغد للدراسات الدولية، مؤسسة الناشر، نيسان، ص 41-43)

military struggle against the Israelis. After the formation of the PLO, it gave the Palestinians the responsibility to work without the support of the Arab countries which increased the responsibility on the Palestinian economic elite.²⁴⁰

Yasser Arafat made sure to contain successful businessmen in other countries who supported the Palestinian cause in the financial hardships in the period of the Gulf War distinguished with cutting funds from the PLO and Fatah especially after the fall of Iraq.²⁴¹ This is due to the Palestinian supported of Saddam Hussein in his invasion to Iraq, so the Kuwaiti support was cut and the cut from the Palestinian employees stopped.²⁴²

These developments gave businessmen the greatest importance in providing the financial support for the PLO especially in Tunis When the PLO suffered from lack of financial resources. In other words, the Palestinian businessmen met in Tunis and clarified the mechanisms of keeping the financial resources of the PLO and the way of facing the lack of financial resources granted by the American administration.²⁴³

Obviously, the economic elites offered financial support for the political leadership such as Sabih Al-Masri, Hasib Al-Sabagh and Saed Khouri by collecting the money and offering it secretly to support the Palestinian society. In addition, Sabih was in charge of the bills contributing in raising donations to the educational sector in Palestine through the PLO enhancing its existence in the international community.²⁴⁴

²⁴⁰ An interview with Moneb Al-Masri. A Palestinian businessman. Nablus. 18.7.2019.

²⁴¹ An interview with Ibrahim Barham. The CEO of the Safad Goup Companies. Ramallah. 17.1.2019.

²⁴² Mohammad Hijazi. (2009). Monathamat Al-Tahrir Al-Filistinia Wa Harakat Hamas Sira Ala Tamtheel Al-Falastini. Majalat Tasamoh. Ed.24. P.p. 73-81.

(محمد حجازي، منظمة التحرير الفلسطينية وحركة حماس صراع على التمثيل الفلسطيني، مجلة تسامح، مج. 7، ع24، 2009، 73 -

²⁴³ An interview with Rawhi Fatouh. The member of the Central Committee of the International Relations Commission. Ramallah.: 8.1.2019.

²⁴⁴ An Interview with Bashar Al-Masri. A Palestinian Businessman. Nablus. 11.12.2019.

4.1.5. The Role of Businessmen in Establishing Communication

Channels

4.1.5.1. Establishing Communication Channel with the Arab

Countries

Businessmen were like the guarantee in the relationship between the Arab countries and the PLO that they kept good relations with the Arabic regimes. One of the main businessmen who did so was Abdul-Majid Shoman with the Jordanian leadership, Abdul- Muhsen Al-Qattan and Monib Al-Masri.

In Black September, Monib Al-Masri who owned an engineering company “Edge”, played a vital role between Yasser Arafat and the Jordanian government when was the Jordanian Public Works Minister. He was in the delegation visiting Yasser Arafat along with Abdul-Majid Shoman, the Saudi ambassador in the woods of Jarash. It was an attempt to achieve the reconciliation between the Palestinian and Jordanian leadership.

The delegation met Abu Ammar as the latter asked for a period of time to do some tasks. Eventually, Arafat refused the reconciliation between him and King Hussein Bin Talal saying that he felt going to Jordan that way as if he was a man on the run. In other words, he was supposed to be received as a president of a country.²⁴⁵

At that moment, the Palestinian businessmen played a great role in urging Arafat to complete this political settlement to accept the settlement UN resolution 242 after the attempts of the American president Ronald Regan. After that, Arafat issued three documents. The first was written by the journalist Hana Saniora; the second was written

²⁴⁵ An interview with Moneb Al-Masri. A Palestinian businessman. Nablus. 18.7.2019.

by a group of businessmen including Abdul-Majid Shoman and the third was written by the Egyptian ambassador.²⁴⁶

To conclude, businessmen contributed in the Palestinian official diplomacy as mediators between the Palestinian leadership and other leaderships leading to enhance their stature among the countries in which they invest as well as their stature in the PLO and other factions. For example, Jordan received the Palestinian leadership in order to keep the latter's allegiance to the Jordanian regime since businessmen didn't transfer their political power to lobbying groups.

One of the businessmen who played a role in the Kuwaiti- Palestinian relationships was Abdul-Mohsen Al-Qattan. Also, Bashar Al-Masri played a great role in the Qatari-Palestinian relationships through real estate sector in cooperation with the Qatari companies.

4.1.5.2. The Role of Businessmen in Establishing Communication

Channels with Foreign Countries:

Palestinian initiatives were launched to establish associations for businessmen in order to form a Palestinian lobby to support the PLO and raise donation as the Unified Fund for the Holy Land in Chicago. The Second type was different in terms of the structure, goals and directions such as the association of the Arab Bankers in North America, The

²⁴⁶ Hanafi, Al-Sari. (1996). Bayn Alamyn Rijal Ammal Al-Filistinien Fe Al-Shatat Wa Al-Kayan Al-Falastini. Risalat Doctora. Cairo. Egypt.

(حنفي، ساري، (1996) بين عالمين رجال الاعمال الفلسطينيين في الشتات والكيان الفلسطيني، رسالة دكتوراة، القاهرة، مصر)

Chamber of Commerce in Central America and the association of the Canadian businessmen.²⁴⁷

The third type of associations was established in 1983 when the Palestinians were displaced, so a group of economic and intellectual personnel Arabs and Palestinians proposed the initiative of meeting in London and talk about establishing a Palestinian association to support the perseverance of the Palestinians.²⁴⁸

The role of businessmen remained present in the political area before the foundation of the PLO and after it playing different roles in the National Liberation Movement, Palestinian factions especially Fatah, so their existence was necessary to deal with the occupation. Since then, they took leading positions in the PLO and political mediation such as the mediation between the PLO and the American administration in the 1980s.

4.1.6. The Role of Businessmen in the Diaspora

In the Diaspora, businessmen in the US were classified into three main categories, namely: The Arab lobby in the US; the businessmen who thought it was impossible to gather all the Palestinian group politically and ideologically. Consequently, they participate in supporting a candidate by raising donations for him such as Talat Othman and Hassan Khatib. The third type was done at the Islamic level by having popular

²⁴⁷ Hanafi, Al-Sari. (1996). Bayn Alamyn Rijal Ammal Al-Filistintion Fe Al-Shatat Wa Al-Kayan Al-Falastini. Risalat Doctora. Cairo. Egypt.

(حنفي، ساري، (1996) بين عالمين رجال الاعمال الفلسطينيين في الشتات والكيان الفلسطيني، رسالة دكتوراة، القاهرة، مصر)

²⁴⁸ Hanafi, Al-Sari. (1996). Bayn Alamyn Rijal Ammal Al-Filistintion Fe Al-Shatat Wa Al-Kayan Al-Falastini. Risalat Doctora. Cairo. Egypt.

(حنفي، ساري، (1996) بين عالمين رجال الاعمال الفلسطينيين في الشتات والكيان الفلسطيني، رسالة دكتوراة، القاهرة، مصر)

mobility by meeting religious men such as John H. Sununu, but these movements remain individual.²⁴⁹

According to Hanafi (1996), businessmen's role in the 1980s and 1990s differed according to the geographical dimension especially in the constructions area that there were three projects funded by Palestinian businessmen in the US. Concerning the Palestinian businessmen in Egypt, they funded about 19 projects due to the geographic proximity to Gaza. Still, this didn't apply to all Palestinian businessmen in Syria who rejected to do business there for economic and political reasons.

Furthermore, the percentage of the Palestinian businessmen rejecting investing in Palestine 10% in the US, 10% in Canada, 24% in the UAE and 17% in Egypt. In short, their contribution was not enough since they were waiting for the political and economic situations to get better.²⁵⁰

It is noticed that businessmen in the Diaspora are unknown since they had to reform themselves because they were distant from each other geographically such as Othman Al-Qadi, Khori, Sabagh, Qattan, Sadiq while other close area as remained to Al-Hosseini, Al-Shawa and Al-Shanti.

4.1.7. The Role of Businessmen in the Relationships with Israel

The role of the Palestinian businessmen was not specific to establishing communication channels with the foreign and Arab countries, but also with Israeli companies in the

²⁴⁹ Hanafi, Al-Sari. (1996). Bayn Alamyn Rijal Ammal Al-Filistintion Fe Al-Shatat Wa Al-Kayan Al-Falastini. Risalat Doctora. Cairo. Egypt.

(حنفي، ساري، (1996) بين عالمين رجال الاعمال الفلسطينيين في الشتات والكيان الفلسطيني، رسالة دكتوراة، القاهرة، مصر)

²⁵⁰ Hanafi, Al-Sari. (1996). Bayn Alamyn Rijal Ammal Al-Filistintion Fe Al-Shatat Wa Al-Kayan Al-Falastini. Risalat Doctora. Cairo. Egypt.

(حنفي، ساري، (1996) بين عالمين رجال الاعمال الفلسطينيين في الشتات والكيان الفلسطيني، رسالة دكتوراة، القاهرة، مصر)

economic field since Israel had a great agricultural, commercial and economic development.

At that time, they didn't prevent themselves from dealing with Israel commercially, but the Egyptian transactions were secret in Egypt. Still, all the Palestinian businessmen were against normalization with Israel, but their common interest ruled their relationships.

4.1.8. The Role of Businessmen in the Palestinian Political System after

Oslo:

4.1.8.1. The General Stand of the Economic Elite from Oslo

Accords:

The points of view of the Palestinian businessmen from Oslo Accords varied according to the places of their trade during the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian land and the Palestinian migrations all over the world. It is true that some of them knew about Paris agreement since Arafat met some businessmen in Tunis such as Monib Al-Masri, Hasib Al-Sabagh and other, but the ones in the 1948 lands didn't know about it.

Mustafa Al-Barghothi said once that if the Palestinian businessmen were consulted, many points would have been changed, so it was signed without letting businessmen know about it leading to the Palestinian dependence on the Israeli economy.²⁵¹

The points of view of businessmen varied according to his historical background, economic and social status and his relationship with the Palestinians. Also, they differ according to their relationship with the hosting community and the size of the

²⁵¹ An Interview with Bashar Al-Masri. A Palestinian Businessman. Nablus. 11.12.2019.

community and the nature of the relationship with the PLO. As indicated by Bashar Al-Masri:²⁵² The Palestinian businessmen's role in Oslo Accords was in their participation without any influence, but without playing a lobbying role.

Furthermore, Dr. Akram and Nabil Sah'ath were giving moral support while the influence of the politicians was weak for example, Dr. Hana Ashrawi and Mohamad Shtaya were the key players in the process.²⁵²

Still, businessmen were marginalized as Bassam Al-Walwel indicated that it didn't participate in Oslo Accords or in phrasing Paris agreement since it was the summary of political decisions according to the PLO.²⁵³

He also said that the signing of Oslo Accords was done without consulting businessmen, after that happened, Arafat met the Palestinian businessmen telling them about the agreement and their need to rebuild the state.²⁵⁴

However, Ahmad Qure' was the mediator in the businessmen's class that he said that he assisted Awni Al-Shawa, Dr. Yousef Al- Sayegh. The latter worked for the economy department and one of the most significant economists in the world. He studied at Cambridge and Harvard.²⁵⁵ It was apparent that the PA used the assistant of economic and academic elites to put the economic plans.

²⁵² An Interview with Bashar Al-Masri. A Palestinian Businessman. Nablus. 11.12.2019.

²⁵³ An interview with Bassam Al-Walwel, A Palestinian businessman. Ramallah. 17.1.2019.

²⁵⁴ An interview with Sameer Haleh, A Palestinian businessman. Ramallah. 21.5.2019.

²⁵⁵ An interview with Ahmad Qure'. The member of the PLO. The head of the Palestinian Legislative Council after the elections of 1996. Ramallah. 22.9.2019.

Also, Mohammad Mostafa said:” I guess, according to my best knowledge, in the period of Oslo, there were efforts from the economic elite led by Dr. Yousef Al-Sayegh who put the first plan for the stage after Oslo”.²⁵⁶

The results of the interviews with the economic elites showed that the role of businessmen was secondary that all their roles after Oslo- secretly- were the reason for their absence. One of the leaders of the PA who negated the role of the Palestinian businessmen in signing Oslo was Jibril Rajob saying:” They offered Abu Ammar 3 billion dollars that Oslo Accords was confidential and strict to a group of people before it expanded after Madrid Conference.

Also, Abu Ammar went to Jordan to meet the leaderships including businessmen which were of two kinds, namely: the ones who got privileges, companies’ agencies, didn’t pay anything for Palestine; others invested his money in Palestine such as Hasib Al-Sabagh and Saed Khouri.²⁵⁷

This was confirmed by Sameer Haleh that he said that the presence of the political elites was “not clear and marginalized”.

Also, businessmen didn’t encourage Abu Ammar to sign Oslo because there is not time difference between the signing of the accords in August and the meeting in Tunis in November when he told them about Oslo signing asking for their support to establish the Palestinian state. They told him we’re ready to establish the state and support you,

²⁵⁶ An interview with Mohammad Mostafa. The head of the Palestinian investment fund, Ramallah. 11.8.2019.

²⁵⁷ An interview with Jibril Rajob. The Secretary of the Central Committee of Fatah, the member of the central committee, the chief of the Palestinian Union and the former Director of the Palestinian Preventive Security, the head of the high council of youth and sport and the Olympic Palestinian committee and the association of Palestinian scouts. Ramallah. 12.2.2020.

this was done in Tunis”²⁵⁸ The majority of businessmen were with signing Oslo Accords encouraging him to sign it except the ones in Syria who were affected by the Syria government’s stand.

Also, one of the results of the interviews revealed that the Palestinian businessmen as other Palestinians suffered from lack of nationality looking of security the state provides to secure their companies and face instability and regional threats.

Consequently, many of them thought of Oslo as the first step towards establishing the Palestinian state thinking that the “revenues of that peace’ will be transferred to the West Bank and Gaza to Singapore and the Middle East. This encouraged them to go with the Palestinian leadership in their project keeping their promise to work on developing the Palestinian economy.

Also, businessmen turned into political supporting elites to the legitimacy for the Palestinian leaders in exchange for financial privileges after Oslo which supports the hypothesis of the researcher that businessmen contributed in adding legitimacy on the Palestinian political system.

Besides, others benefited from the bilateral relationships with other countries creating opportunities for some businessmen to pass policies and suggest initiatives and political projects.

²⁵⁸ An interview with Sameer Haleh, A Palestinian businessman. Ramallah. 21.5.2019.

4.1.8.2. The General Stand of the Economic Elite in Egypt from the Peace Treaty:

The answers of the sample of the study of Sari Hanafi in his research about the stand of the Palestinian businessmen from Oslo in 1996 showed that 65% of them agreed and supported it; 35% supported it and agreed on it; 25% of them strongly agreed on it while 17% strongly disagreed on it.

For example, the Businessmen Association in Egypt expressed its support to president Yasser Arafat published in Al-Ahram newspaper, still they didn't invest in the West Bank. In fact, 25% of the Palestinian businessmen in Egypt had plan for projects in the West Bank, but they were not productive except three industrial projects to make oxygen bars and wheat mill (Mahmud Al-Fara) and the project of plastic shoes (Yousef Al-Shanty) and other housing projects.²⁵⁹

The Palestinians made use of the enthusiasm of the Egyptians towards the Peace Agreement that they were partners in establishing companies in Palestine. For example, Al-Fara held many deals with the major Egyptian companies such as Al-Moqawilon Al-Arab that Othman Ahmad Othman, Mohammed Hussein Sanbur company and Fehmi, Al-Hosseini contributed in establishing the Palestinian Arab Engineers company.

Along with the previously mentioned, Mahram Bakhom which was an Egyptian company for engineering investments, Osos Al-Rayes in Gaza for public works teamed

²⁵⁹ Hanafi, Al-Sari. (1996). Bayn Alamyn Rijal Ammal Al-Filistin Fe Al-Shatat Wa Al-Kayan Al-Falastini. Risalat Doctora. Cairo. Egypt.

(حنفي، ساري، (1996) بين عالمين رجال الاعمال الفلسطينيين في الشتات والكيان الفلسطيني، رسالة دكتوراة، القاهرة، مصر)

up with Kmal Al-Zohair establishing the Palestinian- Egyptian exchange company incorporated with Al- Naser works.²⁶⁰

4.1.8.3. The Stand of the Economic Elite in Syria from Peace

Agreement:

In Syria, most of the Palestinian refugees from 1948 occupied land had the right to rights of any citizen but being elected and voting, so they rejected it because they didn't see Gaza-Jericho agreement as a solution for their problem. Furthermore, the stand of the Palestinian businessmen in Syria was a reflection for the opposition Syrian regime rejecting peace agreement with Israel.

However, Palestinians in Lebanon were proponents of that agreement seeing the possibility to have peace with Israel. Thus, in the US and Canada, there were common interests concerning Oslo Accord. If they were with or against, it would be based on political or economic reasons away from ideologies and Leftist or Islamic speeches.²⁶¹

²⁶⁰ Hanafi, Al-Sari. (1996). Bayn Alamyn Rijal Ammal Al-Filistintion Fe Al-Shatat Wa Al-Kayan Al-Falastini. Risalat Doctora. Cairo. Egypt.

(حنفي، ساري، (1996) بين عالمين رجال الاعمال الفلسطينيين في الشتات والكيان الفلسطيني، رسالة دكتوراة، القاهرة، مصر)

²⁶¹ Hanafi, Al-Sari. (1996). Bayn Alamyn Rijal Ammal Al-Filistintion Fe Al-Shatat Wa Al-Kayan Al-Falastini. Risalat Doctora. Cairo. Egypt.

(حنفي، ساري، (1996) بين عالمين رجال الاعمال الفلسطينيين في الشتات والكيان الفلسطيني، رسالة دكتوراة، القاهرة، مصر)

4.2. The role of Palestinian Businessmen in Political Decision Making

4.2.1. The Contribution of the Palestinian Businessmen in the Palestinian Economy:

The results of the foreign investment study of the resident institutions in Palestine in 2018 showed that the size of direct foreign investments in Palestine reached 1758 million dollars until the end of 2018. They clarified that 64.3% of those investments were in financial mediation; 30% were in internal trade and 3.5% were in the industrial sector. Besides, 81.3% of the overall direct foreign investments in the resident institutions in Palestine was from Jordan; 7.2% from Qatar and 2.6% from Egypt.²⁶²

Concerning the new registered companies in the Ministry of National Economy, a number of companies were registered in 2019 registering a drop of 2.7% compared to last year. Also, the Palestinian capital dropped 48.1% compared to last year. Besides, about 1779 new companies were registered in the governorates of the West Bank with a total capital reaching 282.6 million dollars. If compared to last year, about 1829 new companies were registered in the same area with a total capital reaching 544 million dollars in 2018.²⁶³

The Palestinian economy witnessed internal changes in the GDP with the emergence of new productive sectors such as IT. Data show that the market share in the GDP was about 7% in 2019. Similarly, the contribution of the banking financial sector increased

²⁶² PCBS. (2019). Al-Wad Al-Iqtisadi Fe Falastin. Ramallah. Palestine.

(الجهاز المركزي للإحصاء الفلسطيني، (2019)، الوضع الاقتصادي في فلسطين، رام الله، فلسطين)

²⁶³ PCBS. (2019). Al-Wad Al-Iqtisadi Fe Falastin. Ramallah. Palestine.

(الجهاز المركزي للإحصاء الفلسطيني، (2019)، الوضع الاقتصادي في فلسطين، رام الله، فلسطين)

greatly as it was noticed in the number of banks and their branches. Before the PA, banking was only via the Israelis, but the number of local and international banks increased to 15 banks and 232 branches.

The financial data of the banking sector until the end of 2019 indicated an increase in the assets of the banking sector with a percentage 11.2% to reach 17.9 billion dollars.

Also, credit portfolios witnessed an increase with about 7.2% to reach 9 billion comprising 50.4% of the total assets of the banking sector. This signals the activation of the role of financial mediation between the surplus units and the local economy's fiscal deficit as well as providing chances for more funding in the economic wheel. On the other hand, this reflected the trust of people in the increase of deposits reaching 13.4 billion dollars increasing 9.5% from 2018. Also, there was a 3.6% increase in the rights of possession in the banking sector reaching 2 billion dollars.²⁶⁴

4.2.2. The Role of Businessmen in Providing Financial Support:

Two roles emerged for the Palestinian businessmen after Oslo Accord and the establishment of the PA that first type of businessmen supported the agreement and moved on to peace process supporting the PA financially through returning home and investing in it or providing political support for the Palestinian leadership giving it legitimacy.

Also, the Palestinian businessmen contributed in keeping the PA and its legitimacy facing all financial crises leading to economic collapse. The second type didn't

²⁶⁴ PMA. (2019). Al- Taqriri Al-Sanawi 2019. <https://www.pma.ps>
(سلطة النقد الفلسطينية، (2019)، التقرير السنوي لعام 2019، [/https://www.pma.ps](https://www.pma.ps))

participate in the peace process and opposed it reflecting their environment in order to keep their interests.

Businessmen contributed in the Palestinian economic development greatly driven by their desire to support the Palestinians and create job opportunities for them.

The post-Oslo stage and the rule of the PLO the agreed areas with the Israelis signalled the emergence of the role of the economic elite and their role in political decision making that they were supporting the resistance of the Palestinians in their quest liberation.

Still, after signing Oslo Accord, their role exceeded the financial support that a number of businessmen in the US and Canada visited the Palestinian territories to seek for investment chances due to having international nationalities allowing them to go back. They opened their offices waiting for chances to seize because they realized the economic chances with the peace process, so they started studying the possible economic projects contributing in the development of this country.²⁶⁵

The first idea was a cement company providing Gaza with all constructions' requirements, but it wasn't completed. Instead, it would be executed in a three-year plan getting cement from the Jordanian company covering the need of the West Bank and Gaza. In the third year. The factory would be completed, but it didn't work because powerful people in the PA had other plans. It is obvious that there is harmony in the relationships between capital and politics.²⁶⁶

²⁶⁵ An interview with Ziad Turk, the General Secretary of PADECO. Ramallah. 21.9.2019

²⁶⁶ An interview with Ziad Turk, the General Secretary of PADECO. Ramallah. 21.9.2019

In 1996, there were 221 economic projects were authorized by the PA to be proceeded including the proponents and opponents of those projects that the opponents of these projects considered them humanitarian aids creating job opportunities. One of the Palestinian businessmen in Egypt sated:” Even if the PLO used our investments, I refuse to let people die out of hunger, this is the best we can offer to our people”.²⁶⁷

Many businessmen contributed in supporting peace process as part of their strong belief in peace rejecting violence by supporting economy. Despite they think investing in Palestine was dangerous, but they saw it as an alternative for violence sacrificing money for the survival of a whole nation.²⁶⁸

The ones who rejected investing in Palestine from the US, Canada, the UAE, Egypt were 10%, 10%, 24%,17%. It obvious that their contribution was not as much, but they were waiting for the stabilization of the economic and political situations in Palestine. The contribution of Palestinian businessmen from the US and Canada reached 9% and 35% due to the merger of the community in which refugees and businessmen live.²⁶⁹

Other than individual movements of some businessmen, some attempted establishing companies such as Palestine Investment Bank, The Palestinian Arab Company for investment, the Palestinian Islamic Bank and Global Peace Company.²⁷⁰

²⁶⁷ Hanafi, Al-Sari. (1996). Bayn Alamyn Rijal Ammal Al-Filistintion Fe Al-Shatat Wa Al-Kayan Al-Falastini. Risalat Doctora. Cairo. Egypt.

(حنفي، ساري، (1996) بين عالمين رجال الاعمال الفلسطينيين في الشتات والكيان الفلسطيني، رسالة دكتوراة، القاهرة، مصر)

²⁶⁸ Hanafi, Al-Sari. (1996). Bayn Alamyn Rijal Ammal Al-Filistintion Fe Al-Shatat Wa Al-Kayan Al-Falastini. Risalat Doctora. Cairo. Egypt.

(حنفي، ساري، (1996) بين عالمين رجال الاعمال الفلسطينيين في الشتات والكيان الفلسطيني، رسالة دكتوراة، القاهرة، مصر)

²⁶⁹ Hanafi, Al-Sari. (1996). Bayn Alamyn Rijal Ammal Al-Filistintion Fe Al-Shatat Wa Al-Kayan Al-Falastini. Risalat Doctora. Cairo. Egypt.

(حنفي، ساري، (1996) بين عالمين رجال الاعمال الفلسطينيين في الشتات والكيان الفلسطيني، رسالة دكتوراة، القاهرة، مصر)

²⁷⁰ An interview with Moneb Al-Masri. A Palestinian businessman. Nablus. 18.7.2019.

The role of businessmen exceeded their traditional roles that in the 14th of October, 2016, businessmen organized a conference in Brussels allowing Palestinian businessmen in the Diaspora, Europe, the Northern and Southern America, the West Bank, Gaza and 1948 lands as well as 50 political and economic personalities namely the Secretary of State in Brussel Bianca Debaets. This conference was supported by fine official participants that president Mahmud Abbas attended it.

He did so in order urge them to invest in Palestine by enhancing partnership with Palestinian businessmen in the 1948 land and the Diaspora. Monib Al-Masri said:” We are trying to build bridges among businessmen and businesswomen everywhere in order to rise with the Palestinian economy and develop the private sector to be the cornerstone for the establishment of the Palestinian state”.²⁷¹

He indicated the important role of Palestinian businessmen from the 1948 land and the Diaspora in order to support the government that “the committee of the Palestinian businessmen in Europe” was formed in the Romanian capital Bucharest in 2019 in cooperation with the Expatriates Department in the PLO.

A company was established with a capital reached 30 million aiming to support investment in Palestine and Assist the PA to dispatch from the Israeli economy. Sha’th said:” We all work together to put the pillars of an economy capable of supporting our state, the ideas of this conference are rich and the most important one is the idea of establishing investment companies and activating the local economy allowing young contributors to buy stocks and cooperate with them to develop themselves”²⁷²

²⁷¹ An interview with Nabil Shahth. The head of Expatriates affairs in the PLO. 22.12.2019.

²⁷² An interview with Nabil Shahth. The head of Expatriates affairs in the PLO. 22.12.2019.

Their role developed to transferring sums of money to support investments in the Palestinian territories that Nabil Sha'ath said:” expatriate businessmen sent about 2.8 billion dollars in 2019 out of 8 billion sent to Jordan, Palestine and Lebanon; part of them was deposited in the bank while the other part was real states”²⁷³

In return, the PA rewarded them by giving the returners privileges monopolizing industries such as telecommunication and exports as well as supporting them in the economic relations with Israel and protect them.

The researcher found that there was a mutual interest between businessmen and the political system which was before Oslo Accords. Despite that, they couldn't change their economic power to political power for many reasons. To begin with, they didn't want to enter the political work arena in order to keep their investments safe. Secondly, some of them have religious beliefs and finally they were not pleased with the Palestinian political system and its interaction with the Palestinian opposition and occupation. Also, it is obvious that they are weak because they used the political cover of Oslo to open the channel with other businessmen.

4.2.3. The Role of Businessmen in Light of the Following Palestinian Governments.

The Palestinian political system adopted several strategies to deal with the Palestinian businessmen starting from being taken care of by Arafat and the following leaderships namely Ahmad Qure' and Salam Fayyad. The latter adopted the liberal methods in economy asking to restructure the hierarchy of the Palestinian economy in cooperation

²⁷³ Da'na, Tariq. (2014). Al-Ra'smalia Al-Falastinia Al-Motamadia. Shabakat Al-Sisat Al-Filistinia.

<https://al-shabaka.org/>

(دعنا، طارق، (2014)، الرأسمالية الفلسطينية المتمادية، شبكة السياسات الفلسطينية، [/https://al-shabaka.org](https://al-shabaka.org/)

with businessmen to be parallel to capital liberalism and the requirements of the new international system of the donors.

In this time, the role of businessmen was strong leading to the emergence of new socio-political elites that businessmen's power increased in the political institutions. Sometimes, businessmen and the technocrat agreeing with capitalism took high positions in Fayyad's government.

He reformed the banking sector enabling the government to sign long term contracts reaching 4.2 billion dollars in 2013 which was 50% of the GDP with an interest of about 200 million dollars. For such an economy which needed international aids, this high debt is real concern that businessmen can lobby on the government to change its policy threatening to withdraw their investments or preventing other investments to start. The Palestinians pay the price if the PA raised the GDP and lowered expenditure in 2012.²⁷⁴

After the resignation of Salam Fayyad's government, Dr. Rami Hamdallah took his place despite his efforts to attract businessmen and urging them to support his policy. Still, the political circumstances and the struggle between Fatah and Hamas led to the deterioration of the relationship between him and the private sector as they opposed the policy of social security law.

Businessmen from Fatah lifted the economic support on the government led by Rami Hamdallah that Al-Barghothi stated:” the prominent role of businessmen appeared in fighting the social security law because most of them didn't give employees their rights and this complicated the law. Others found personal interest in opposing the law

²⁷⁴ An interview with Mosafa Al-Barghothi. The General Secretary of the Personal National Initiative. 23.1.2019.

because they felt that their rights are trivial on the one hand and businessmen didn't abide with the lowest level of payments, so they were afraid of this law.²⁷⁵

The key argument here was that the rejection was based on the lack of trust in the government because there is no guarantee the government wouldn't use money for something else. Secondly, who would guarantee the survival of the PA in light of this occupation. Thirdly, businessmen didn't prevent employees to go and protest against it. Monib Al-Masri was against it that he stated: "I am against it as I advised Dr. Rami that this law doesn't guarantee employees' rights. It was suggested to trap Dr Rami to make him quit because he is not from Fatah and there is a raging war between the members of Fatah"²⁷⁶

Al-Hamdallah contributed in renewing the contracts of the telecommunications companies which was 290 million dollars. This was an agreement for Al-Masri family and his associates in the time of Yasser Arafat giving Al-Masri family exclusive privileges to establish the Palestinian telecommunication company.

After Mohammad Shtaya took over, he invited businessmen to the political system consulting them with the law as he assigned the Minister of Economy from businessmen class. Also, he made sure to hold consultation sessions with them to make them partners in making the economic decisions. Bassam Walwel that the role of the private sector became influential at the level of the political decision without participating in the government exactly as Dr. Mohammed Shtaya did. However, previous governments were hesitant do this step which follow their own interests to be able to pass laws.

²⁷⁵ An interview with Moneb Al-Masri. A Palestinian businessman. Nablus. 18.7.2019.

²⁷⁶ An interview with Bassam Al-Walwel, A Palestinian businessman. Ramallah. 17.1.2019.

Nowadays, they are partners in the economic development of the national economy for example Shtaya took six businessmen in his team heading to Iraq.²⁷⁷

Consequently, the role of businessmen became effective in decision making in closure or banning work or limiting movement. It is no longer the government's decision to take, they should be consulted to know their next steps on the ground. The main decision which they controlled is keeping banks open as being owned by businessmen and keeping big companies owned by influential businessmen in the Palestinian economy open.

Despite the results of the interviews about the development of the role of the Palestinian businessmen and their participation in the Palestinian political system due to the facilitations of the following governments from Ahmad Qure' government to Mohammad Shtaya's.

Still, there are many determinants for the efficiency of the role of businessmen in the political system participation which is their overprotection of their commercial interests in the West Bank and Gaza as well as having the upper hand in any government. This makes them unwilling to participate in any government as long as they have direct influence on the government.

²⁷⁷ Al-Ajala, Mazen Salah. (2019). Al-Qarsana Al-Israelia Bala Eradat Al-Maqasa Al-Filistinia Al-Siaqat Wa Al-Khayarat Wa Al-Tadaeyat. Al-Markaz Al-Falastini Libhath Wa Al-Dirasat Al-Istratisjia. Masarat. (العجلة، مازن صلاح، (2019)، القرصنة الاسرائيلية بلع إيرادات المقاصة الفلسطينية السياقات والخيارات والتداعيات، المركز الفلسطيني لأبحاث السياسات والدراسات الاستراتيجية، مسارات.)

4.2.4. The Role of the Economic Elite in the Crisis of Clearance and the Drop of External Aids:

The general expenditure in January and February 2019 reached 1300.9 million Nis despite the fact that it should be (4283.8) million Nis which means that the clearance covers 50% of the overall expenditure and 99% of the bill of the salaries of the public employees. This shows the importance of the clearance transfer in funding the current expenditure contributing in solving lack of liquidity problem due to late international aids to the Palestinian budget.²⁷⁸

In the crisis of the refusal of the PA to receive the clearance, the importance of businessmen has become clear that they proposed supporting the PA with 210 million dollars to face the aftermath of the crisis of the piracy of the Palestinian clearance. This initiative was indicated by Monib Al-Masri saying:” talks were on to support the PA with 210 million dollars over the next three months due to the duty of the private sector the sole partner of the government in this circumstance”²⁷⁹

From the exploration of the role of businessmen in Palestine in supporting the government, it is notable that they have an important role in covering the needs of the Palestinian government financially based on their mutual interests.

The provided support is an expression of keeping the mutual interests between the government and businessmen that the financial stability improves the investments of businessmen. This cannot be achieved away from the government which should be able

²⁷⁸ An interview with Moneb Al-Masri. A Palestinian businessman. Nablus. 18.7.2019.

²⁷⁹ PCBS. (2020). Athar Ja'hat Korona Ala Al-Mo'sassat Al-Iqtisadia Khilal Al-Fatra (5.3.2020-31.5.2020)

(الجهاز الاحصائي المركزي الفلسطيني، (2020)، أثر جائحة كورونا على المؤسسات الاقتصادية خلال الفترة (2020/3/5-2020/5/31))

to do its duties fully towards the society, so any threat to the government is a threat to businessmen.

Consequently, they make sure the government get sufficient financial support to stabilize its economic interests that the absence of security and chaos in light of the weakness of the government affects the financial power of the investors.

4.2.5. The Role of the Economic Elite During COVID-19 Pandemic:

COVID-19 pandemic is one of the most disastrous crises the Palestinians have ever lived that the GDP of many sectors decreased including constructions, industrial, agriculture and services that the increase reached 21%, 9%, 9% and 3% which dropped the most being considered the largest sector in the Palestinian economy. Also, the local revenues decreased in 14% in the first quarter of 2020 to reach 3.4 billion Nis while the second quarter decreased to reach 1.9 billion Nis due to the piracy of clearance.

Besides, expenditure dropped 40% in the first quarter of 2020 and reached 3.5 billion in the second quarter. The difference in the account is 1.6 billion Nis raising the general debt 3.3. % In the first quarter of 2020 to reach 10 billion covering 18% of the GDP. Also, the share of the local debt in this quarter reached 55% opposite to the external debt reaching 45%.²⁸⁰

The loans in the first half of 2020 reached 617 million dollars while facilitations of 2019 reached 619 million dollars. Also, 74% of the facilities of the private sector were shut following the order to the Council of Ministry dated 22/3/2020 concerning the procedures of preventing the spread of COVID-19. This led to the unemployment of

²⁸⁰ PMA. (2020). Al-Iqtisad Al-Filastini Fe Thil Jaehat Korona. <https://bit.ly/2JpeuXg>
(سلطة النقد الفلسطينية، (2020)، الاقتصاد الفلسطيني في ظل جائحة كورونا. <https://bit.ly/2JpeuXg>).

320,000 workers based on the decision of the 20th of April, 2020 in which 55% of the economic authorized facilities are allowed to work.

In other words, 77653 facilities are allowed to work and about 164,291 workers are allowed to work. In addition, 81% of the facilities are open leaving 19% of them off work and 156,000 workers would be unemployed.²⁸¹

This led the government to decide many decisions to decrease the spread of the virus affected by economic variables and the demands of the Palestinian businessmen.²⁸²

It is noted that the role of the Palestinian businessmen in light of COVID-19 and the complication of the political situation of the Palestinian- Israeli relationships, the American administration imposed cutting aids from Palestine and other Arab countries as well as the refusal to take the clearance highlighted the role of the Palestinian businessmen.

The Palestinian government started its partnership with the private sector establishing Waqfat Ez (A stand of Pride) fund in order to help the Palestinians in the crisis that many donated especially businessmen from Palestine and the Diaspora distributing donations through committees.²⁸³

Also, the president announced supporting the small businesses which were damaged from the pandemic in coordination with the private sector that this support will be given in the form of loans through the banks and other financial institutions administered by the Palestinian Monetary Fund which will donate 210 million dollars.

²⁸¹ Mowazanat Al-Taware' of Palestine. (2020). Diwan Al-Riasa. Published in April, 9 2020.

(موازنة الطوارئ 2020 لدولة فلسطين، ديوان الرئاسة، نشرت بتاريخ 9 نيسان 2020)

²⁸² An interview with Talal Naser Al-Din, the CEO of BerZeit Medicines. Ramallah. 5.4.2020.

²⁸³ Abdulalik, Al-Jaber. (2020). Three promising initiatives. Al- Jaber youqadem kharita Iqtisadia litajanob Azmat Korona wa Nataejoha. Moqabal Manshora Ala Sam Al-Ikhbariya.

(عبد المالك الجابر، ثلاث مبادرات واعدة.. الجابر يقدم خارطة طريق اقتصادية لتجنب أزمة "كورونا" ونتائجها، مقابلة منشورة على موقع سما الاخبارية، بتاريخ 2020)

Abdul-Malik Al-Jaber said that this supported the resistance of the government and supported the Palestinian economy saying:” businessmen offer guarantees from the Arab, Islamic and international institutions to grant small loans for small and medium companies by establishing an institutional fund valued by 1 billion dollar giving loans with little interest rate in order to have operational expenses’ cycle over the next six months including employees to be able to run after the crisis.”²⁸⁴

Besides, the role of the Palestinian businessmen emerged when they analysed the economic situation due the siege on the Palestinian leadership and the forming an economic team in order to have an economic study of the situation to make the right decision to deal with the economic crisis.

Also, they proposed a framework of loans as a swift solution for poor people to invest and give work to others to decrease revenues from Israel in order to improve the economic situation in Palestine in light of COVID-19.²⁸⁵

In addition, the government of Mohammed Shtaya, consulted the economic elite and businessmen in confidential sessions in order to take the point of views of the head of the chamber of commerce to close the four governorates including Hebron, Bethlehem, Ramallah and Al- Bereh and Nablus. The emergency committee and the businessmen were consulted to exclude the small shops from the closure under the condition of abiding with the health ministry protocol.

This indicates their importance and the government’s utmost care is to please them. It also noticed that businessmen call for press conferences to talk about how to get out of

²⁸⁴ An. Interview with Osama Amro. The union of Palestinian Buisnessmen. Ramallah. 20.9.2020.

²⁸⁵ Walakat Al-Anba’ Wa Al-Ma’lomat Al-Filistinia. Wafa. Rijal Al-Amal Yo’lenon Royatohom hawl Sobol Al- Khoroj Min Al- Azma Al-Iqtisadia Fe Thil Korona. <https://www.wafa.ps/>

(وكالة الانباء والمعلومات الفلسطينية، وفاق، رجال الأعمال يعلنون رؤيتهم حول سبل الخروج من الأزمة الاقتصادية في ظل جائحة كورونا، [/https://www.wafa.ps](https://www.wafa.ps/))

this situation through holding a press conference in Ramallah calling all businessmen to a holistic dialogue in order to study the way of overcoming the economic, political and social crises of COVID-19.²⁸⁶

4.2.6. The Role of Businessmen in Establishing Communication

Channels with the Israeli Society

The role of businessmen overcame being providing financial support, it became to establish communication channels with the Israelis in order to convince them to adopt the peaceful options to solve resolve the conflict as Monib Al-Masri said. Based on that, 500 Palestinian and Israeli businessmen under the supervision of Davos Forum, they launched the initiative of breaking the impasse which was organized in the Dead Sea in 2013 in order to achieve peace between them based on the two-state solution. It was announced in the presence of the Secretary of State John Kerry, the Palestinian president Mahmud Abbas and the Israeli president Simon Perez.

The political role of the Palestinian businessmen in the Diaspora is opening communication channels with Israeli businessmen as instructed by the Palestinian leadership. Monib Al-Masri is the one who suggested breaking the impasse initiative aiming to achieve a fair solution in the Palestinian cause because this means more danger on both sides. Consequently, they called for being courageous and end the struggle despite the high representation of the Palestinian businessmen.

The real solution is dealing with all the final situation causes and start a period of peace and hope. As leading businessmen, we support the political leadership to end this strife for good.²⁸⁷

²⁸⁶ An interview with Moneb Al-Masri. A Palestinian businessman. Nablus. 18.7.2019.

Dr. Mustafa said that this initiative had announced goals to encourage the politicians to break the impasse between the Israelis and Palestinians, but this wasn't successful.²⁸⁸

The attempts of businessmen or the economic elite to show their abilities to influence the political decision by suggesting initiatives to end the strife between the Israelis and the Palestinians led to considering this elite an eco-political elite which stood in the face of all the challenges of the government. One thing can prove the struggle among the political and economic elites which is the failure of breaking the impasse initiative.

Sameer Hila said that it failed because the political elite put his terms on the Israelis in the presence of the Palestinian businessmen not the other way around. The political elite didn't show up to sign for 1967 borders.

The Palestinian and Israeli businessmen told them that they aren't politicians, and they are not here to have an agreement because governments do.²⁸⁹

²⁸⁷ An interview with Mohammad Mostafa. The head of the Palestinian investment fund, Ramallah. 11.8.2019.

²⁸⁸ An interview with Sameer Haleh, A Palestinian businessman. Ramallah. 21.5.2019.

²⁸⁹ An interview with Sameer Haleh, A Palestinian businessman. Ramallah. 21.5.2019.

Chapter Five: Conclusions

In the exploration of the development of the Palestinian elite, it is noticeable that the tribal and patriarch system is still in control on the Palestinian political system as any Arab traditional society. It is indicated in the research that the RLPPF is still in control and in harmony with the tribal legitimacy.

Also, it is indicated in this study that the Palestinian political system before and after Oslo employed the tribal legitimacy to rule and control the political and social system in light of the struggle in the transformation from the traditional and tribal system to a modern one without completing the transformation.

It is proven that the Palestinian system lives the past in the present and the present in the past in an attempt to mix modernity with legacy and tribal habits in which social systems of traditional society interact with modernity leading to a hybrid or political legitimacies.

The Palestinian political system used the tribe to pass its policies in the period of the Ottoman Empire adding a colonial legitimacy to its existence. It emerged in the colonial time and after it and in the time of the British Mandate and the Israeli occupation leading to the emergence of Palestinian leaders belonging to the bourgeois class marking the ideology with the tribal extremism.

The construction of a legitimacy should be based on achieving independence from the occupation leading to the development of the Palestinian political system because turned its attention to the way of developing the society to the project of the omnipotent chief.

Also, Oslo formed a new chance to the emergence of new elites which keep trying to stick to its nature in light of the overpower of other legitimacies. The PA and the Palestinian

political system used businessmen and tribal issues as tools for unofficial control on the society to pass its own policies.

In addition, the nature of the political system and its strategies to cooperate with the Palestinian businessmen started with the stage of welcoming them by Yasser Arafat until the present government keeping their political role present since before the establishment of the PA and after it.

The Palestinian capital played a vital role in the liberation process and the issues of the factions especially Fatah to the national bourgeois class. Consequently, it is impossible to let it go and it is important for the government to cooperate with businessmen because they provide it with the required funding as they had leading roles and positions in the PLO and in its political mediation including its mediation between the Palestinians and the American administration in the 1980s.

The Palestinian businessmen suffered from the lack of nationality being over-protective over their investments and profits keeping them away from regional threats. Consequently, many approved Oslo as the door to the establishment of the state of Palestine thinking that the outcomes of the peace of Oslo will be taken to the West Bank, Gaza, Singapore and the Middle East.

This encouraged them to go with the government to Oslo and push the economic wheel by legitimizing the political power of the government in return for financial privileges and monopolizing other industries supporting the hypothesis that businessmen added legitimacy to the Palestinian political system.

Also, they did so because of their mutual relationships as they tried to keep the relations as they were before Oslo. Despite that, they couldn't turn their power into political one

for many reasons. To begin with, they wouldn't like to get in the political work in order to avoid ruining their commerce.

Secondly, most of them had Islamic tendencies and they were not satisfied with the system and how it deals with the Palestinian opposition and the occupation. In addition, they are weak because they used Oslo to open a direct line with other economists.

The provided support is an expression of keeping the mutual interests between the government and businessmen that the financial stability improves the investments of businessmen. This cannot be achieved away from the government which should be able to do its duties fully towards the society, so any threat to the government is a threat to businessmen.

Consequently, businessmen make sure to enhance the level of support to the government to stabilize their economic interests whose deterioration might threaten the stability of their projects. The absence of security and the proliferation of chaos makes the government weak and unable to cover the needs of the people. Consequently, this is considered an influential factor on the ability of businessmen to protect their financial interests.

Besides, the PA's political power has been supported by businessmen or the crony capitalists who has been having complex interactive relationships with the local political economy. Furthermore, they have become a neo-liberal colonization of the Palestinian economical political reality. In other words, they are the funders of the PLO's political activities. Thus, cronyism is facilitated by a number of neoliberal measures such as market deregulation, privatisation and discriminatory taxation. For example, the

privatisation of a state's firm may be delivered to politically connected businessmen offering great financial gains and political power.

In other words, this system consists of both state capitalism and neoliberalism whereby the state and its resources are a cash cow at the disposition of the autocrat and his familial entourage. Furthermore, the relationship between political and economic elites depends on the ideological points of view from 1948 starting from the old traditional elite to the 1950s and 1960s leading to the emergence of the leadership of the PLO and the Palestinian factions and the exiled Palestinian capitalists.

Then, they agreed to bridge the gap between the Palestinian National Movement (PNM) and the capitalist's elite. However, the Palestinian left consider them opposed them because of the debate of the role of national bourgeoisie and the Palestinian division linking their role with imperialism.

Their relationships were active even before Oslo that after Black September; the battle between the Palestinian guerrilla fighters and the Jordanian regime in 1970 was mediated by Munib Al-Masri who was the Jordanian Minister of Public Works establishing a formal channel of negotiations between the two conflicting parties leading to the expulsion of the PLO bases from the Jordanian territory.

After Oslo Accord and Paris Economic Protocol kept the PA under the control of the economic elite and Western donors that the latter stipulated the security of Israel as a condition for getting funding. Then, many gigantic companies have emerged such as Al-Masri's Palestinian Development and Investment Company (PADECO) has led the Palestinian economy and then other companies followed such as AQARIA, PPC, PEC, PPIC and PEEC. After the arrival of Arafat to the West Bank, the Palestinian

businessmen controlled the communications sector such as Al-Masri's telecommunication company which renewed its contract with the PA monopolizing this sector and controlling it.

The Oslo accord framework helped nurturing the PA cronyism in two fundamental ways including structuring the logic of peace dividends prioritizing the liberal peace logic of economic cooperation and prosperity to achieve political settlement. The second contribution considering Israel's security as a condition for Western donors' funding.

The real strength of the relationship between the Palestinian businessmen and the PA has continued since Salam Fayyad government's economic restorations which led to the rise of the economic elite. After that, the second generation of monopolies emerged including other funder such as the Palestinian Investment Fund (PIF) in order to replace the PCSC. Furthermore, the PIF manages several companies and investment portfolios including real estate, energy, tourism, banking and financial market possessing about 990 million dollars (16% of the GDP). In other words, the most prominent fund has come from monopolistic practices of economic elites who supported the Palestinian market and led to its survival in all its crises. ²⁹⁰ As noted by Hanieh," these companies completely dominate the political economy of the Palestinian territories, and it is almost impossible to find a large or medium sized company in which they do not own a significant stake. ²⁹¹

There were two types of monopolies, namely: private and public. In the former, special rights given by the PA to a chosen group of private investors to manage large infrastructure projects such as telecommunications and electrifications. These important

²⁹⁰ Dana, Tariq. "Crony capitalism in the Palestinian Authority: a deal among friends." *Third World Quarterly* 41, no. 2 (2020): 247-263.

²⁹¹ Dana, Tariq. "Crony capitalism in the Palestinian Authority: a deal among friends." *Third World Quarterly* 41, no. 2 (2020): 247-263.

sectors were privatized from their institution. The latter represents the companies owned by the PA and were unregulated and unaccountable public import monopolies leading to hidden commercial dealings by public servants and to privileged access for private companies.²⁹²

The aftermath of the intra-Palestinian division in 2007 has seen new forms of governance and policies that changed the political economy of the West Bank. These changes were the result of two simultaneous processes. The first process was the systematic implementation of neoliberal policies introduced by Salam Fayyad. However, neoliberalism had constituted the guiding framework of the PA's economic policies since its early years of establishment.²⁹³

The second process was designed by the Israeli right-wing strategy of 'economic peace', which promised to unleash market forces to improve socioeconomic standards and economic development in the West Bank. Key international donors aided these developments

Basically, the US and EU undertaking policy measures referred to in certain circles as 'The West Bank First Strategy', designed to 'asymmetrically impact economic conditions in the newly politically divided areas of the Palestinian territories in a to influence the political orientation of their respective populations'.

'Fayyadism' and 'economic peace' are two sides of the same coin, hinting at an ideological encounter between the coloniser and colonised. In effect, this encounter has

²⁹² Dana, Tariq. "Crony capitalism in the Palestinian Authority: a deal among friends." *Third World Quarterly* 41, no. 2 (2020): 247-263.

²⁹³ Aggestam, Karin, Fabio Cristiano, and Lisa Strömbom. "Towards agonistic peacebuilding? Exploring the antagonism–agonism nexus in the Middle East peace process." *Third World Quarterly* 36, no. 9 (2015): 1736-1753.

been vastly profitable to Palestinian capitalists, who have benefited from various institutional and legal reforms implemented by the PA and by Israel's relative facilitation of trade, movement and opportunities for Israeli–Palestinian economic partnerships.²⁹⁴

²⁹⁴ Haddad, Toufic. *Palestine Ltd.: Neoliberalism and nationalism in the occupied territory*. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2016.

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James Adison Baker 3rd is an American lawyer and politician who worked as the Chief Staff of the White House and the treasury minister in the reign of President Ronald Regan. Also, he was the Foreign Minister and the General Staff of the White House in the reign of president George Bush Senior. He was born in Houston and studied at Hill Secondary School and Bronston University before serving at the Navy.

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الملخص

هدفت هذه الدراسة الى تسليط الضوء على تطور النخبة السياسية والأمنية والاقتصادية الفلسطينية بشكل عام والدور الذي لعبه رجال الاعمال الفلسطينيين (النخب لاقصادية) في المشهد السياسي الفلسطيني من العام 1965 وحتى العام 2020، يعتمد هذا البحث على فرضية مفادها بأن رجال الاعمال لعبوا دوراً في القطاع السياسي الفلسطيني خلال الفترة المذكورة عبر أربع وظائف وهي تقديم الدعم المالي (المادي) والدعم السياسي، ومنح ودعم الشرعية مقابل تبادل المنافع ودعم الدبلوماسية الفلسطينية عبر فتح قنوات اتصال مع (الدول العربية، والمجتمع الدولي، واسرائيل ما بعد اوسلو)، واخيراً برز دورهم في الشؤون الداخلية الفلسطينية عبر التوسط في المصالحة الفلسطينية الداخلية،

واظهر البحث ان الدور والوظائف التي لعبها رجال الاعمال (النخب الاقتصادية) قبل اوسلو تمثل في فتح علاقات وقنوات اتصال مع المجتمع العربي والدولي ودعم الاقتصاد الفلسطيني والشرعية الفلسطينية بقيادة منظمة التحرير، وبالرغم من ذلك ما زالت الغالبية العظمى من رجال الاعمال تعتبر ان دورهم ما زال هامشياً، وبالرغم من مساهمتهم في توفير الدعم السياسي والاقتصادي وفي مساهمتهم بدعم النظام السياسي الفلسطيني، والبعض الاخر يرى انهم حين يرى فريق آخر منهم انهم لم يصلوا بعد للنظام السياسي بسبب سيطرة الشرعية النضالية على النظام السياسي الفلسطيني منذ بداية التأسيس وحتى يومنا الحالي، ووجد الباحث ان رجال الاعمال ساهموا بشكل غير مباشر في دعم السياسيين لتمثيلهم في النظام السياسي، وذلك بسبب عدم قدرتهم على تحويل قوتهم ونفوذهم الاقتصادي الى قوة سياسية، حيث اتضح ان طبيعة الدور بين رجال الاعمال والنظام السياسي الفلسطيني قد بني وفق المصلحة المتبادلة، فمن جهة حرص رجال الاعمال على توفير الدعم السياسي والمالي والتموي للسلطة والنظام السياسي، ومن جهة اخرى حصلوا على منافع وامتيازات تخدم مصالحهم في فلسطين.

واظهر البحث ان دور رجال الاعمال الفلسطيني تعاضم خلال العشر سنوات الماضية في ظل غياب المجلس التشريعي والانتخابات الفلسطينية، يظهر ذلك جلياً في استحواذ التشريعات الاقتصادية المتعلقة بمصالحهم على الحصة الأكبر من نصيب التشريعات والقوانين التي صدرت من مكتب الرئاسة الفلسطينية المكلفة بإصدار التشريعات في ظل غياب المجلس التشريعي، وأظهر البحث ايضاً ان تحالف رجال الاعمال مع النخب السياسية من أجل دعم عملية السلام ودعم الاستقرار للحفاظ على المصالح الاقتصادية المكتسبة لهذه الفئة.