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Faculty of Graduate Studies**

**The Palestinian Public Diplomacy
Towards the Israeli Society**

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
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Declaration

I, the undersigned, declare that the work provided in this thesis entitled as: **“Impact of the Israeli Military Occupation on the Palestinian Human Security: Selected Cases of Villages in Nablus and Tubas Areas”**, unless otherwise referenced, is the researcher’s own work, and not has been submitted elsewhere for any other degree or qualification.

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Dedication

To my beloved country, people and identity

To the souls of our most honourable martyrs

To our brave prisoners

To whoever believed in Palestine and its cause

To every Palestinian defending the flag of righteousness and liberations

To all who work hard to protect us

To whoever taught me to live in dignity, my mother and father

To my precious wife who assisted me

To my children who are my heart and soul

To my brothers and sisters

To whoever helped me from parents and friends

To whoever gave me priceless information and culture, my dear professors at the Arab

American University

To all of the above, I dedicate this work

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Abstract

This study tackles the Palestinian public diplomacy towards the Israeli society its formation. Furthermore, the descriptive analytical approach has been employed for its appropriateness to this study as well as the historic approach in order to clarify the historical development of this general concept in general and specifically in the Palestinian environment.

This study investigates the level of the success of the Palestinian leadership since the adoption of the peaceful diplomacy in influencing and persuading the Israeli public opinion to adopt peaceful choices as a way of ending the Israeli- Palestinian struggle.

Furthermore, it measures the success of the Palestinian leadership's ability to expand the communication with the Israeli community through its public diplomacy and influential individuals and institution in the Israeli community. Also, it depicts the agreement between the official and unofficial mechanisms of using public diplomacy and their ability to promote such method. Finally, it highlights the influence of the program "From People to People" agreed upon in Oslo Accord applied on both the Palestinians and the Israelis measuring the success of the implementation of this program on the ground and the main challenges facing it.

The researcher concludes that since 1974, the Palestinian leadership exerted great efforts despite the controversial opinions of the PLO. However, some Palestinian leaders believed that it was imperative to influence the Israeli public opinion. Also, they believed that the Palestinian version of the story and peace message couldn't be delivered without delivering it to the Israeli community first.

In other words, the Palestinian leadership has achieved a relative success before signing Oslo Accord. In short, this channel of communication has been one of the reasons for signing this agreement between the Israelis and the Palestinians.

Also, it has been found that communication and the Palestinian public diplomacy towards the Israeli community was affected negatively by Oslo Accord that the Palestinian leadership restricted the resolution of this conflict in the official communication channels with the Israelis.

As for “From People to People” program, it hasn’t been an effective tool in resolving this conflict and clearing point of views between the Israelis and the Palestinians as a way to promote peaceful co-existence. Also, it has been found that Oslo Accord couldn’t take away the psychological block in both parties because of the Israeli measures on the ground including settlement expansion, Judaization, confiscation of Palestinian lands, the lock-down policy and electing the far right- wing party in Israel which doesn’t accept the existence of the other.

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Chapter One

The Palestinian Public Diplomacy Towards the Israeli Community

1.1. Introduction

The Palestinians have followed their public diplomacy in order to communicate with the Israeli community as their first attempt has been done by Palestinian national leaders in what used to be called (The National Liberation League)¹ to reach a historic solution preserving the rights of the Palestinians and their identity. As the Palestinian revolution started using this method relatively late, the participation of the national movement started to become global because of the development of the concepts and the increase of their awareness of the nature of this new system and size of the Jewish power in the world. All this led the Palestinian national movement to go over its principles and look pragmatically to the world.²

In late 1960s, this stage expressed the adoption of a democratic country for both Jews and Palestinians co-existing freely and with equal rights. At that period, the armed struggle national movement was considered the only way for the liberation of Palestine.³

In 1974, there was a turning point in the history of the PLO and its policies by the adoption of the “Ten- Point” Program highlighting the role of the PLO in the Palestinian National Council. Furthermore, one of the points of the program stated the legality of the struggle

¹ The Palestinian National Liberation League is a communistic Palestinian organization including the Left party’s intellectuals, Arab workers and political forums established in Fall 1943 such as Arab League against Fascism, *Nadi Sho’aa Al-Amal* (The Club of the Ray of Hope) and people’s club. The main reason for these Arabi clubs to meet is that the communist Jews changed their mind and accepted Zionism’s project about the Jewish homeland leading to the division in the Palestinian Communist Party in 1943.

² Masalha, Osama. *Matha An Lajnat Al-Twasol Ma Al-Mojtama’ Al-Israeli*. Al-Hayat Newspaper. (2018). (In Aabic)

³ Dr. Moammed Eshtaya. *Mawsoa’t Al-Mostalahat wa Al-Mafahem Al-Filistinia*. Dar. Al-Jallil. Amman. (2011). (In Arabic)

of the PLO by any means possible to liberate every inch of the Palestinian land namely armed struggle.

This leads to a change in the power balance in favour of our people that the phrase “by any means possible” means the political and diplomatic methods.¹ Thus, this direction was emphasized in the 13th session of the Palestinian National Council (PNC) in 1977 by confirming the importance of the relation and coordination with the Jewish democratic frontier groups in Palestine and abroad who were against Zionism as a creed and practice. The importance of this confirmation lies in the possibility of communication with Israeli groups which was rejected before. Meanwhile, Mahmud Abbas proposed his slogan of the return of Arab Jews to their countries with establishing channels of communication with them convincing them to return.²

At that moment, the Palestinian leadership realized that it is imperative to look for Palestinian nationalists who could transfer its version of the story after realizing that military actions and Arab assistance alone were not enough to liberate Palestine. Back then, some Palestinians were chosen to show the Palestinian cause to the international public opinion, delivering the message of peace to the world and establishing channels of communication with the Jews.

However, the rejection of some Palestinians of such actions caused the death of Palestinians leading to the increase of the conviction of the Palestinian leadership that dialogue and breaking the psychological barrier in the struggle and informing the Israelis of the Palestinians’ demands was a great opportunity of peace. Finally, the world did not

¹ Ibrahim Abu Atila. Oslo Lam Ta’t Min Faragh Falaqad Sabaqatha Barnamij Al-Noqat Al-Ashr. Al-Hiwar Al-Motamadin. (2016). (In Arabic)

² Wafa. The Decision of the PNC in the 13th Session. Martyr Kamal Junblat Session. Cairo, (1977). (In Arabic)

accept the Palestinians with the slogan of destroying Israel.¹ After that, decisions were taken in the PNCs supporting establishing communication with the Israelis.

Along with Oslo Accord signing in 1993, the communication with the Israeli community did not improve, but it was limited to the official channels of communication having few communal communications left done by the civil society of both the Israeli and Palestinian societies.

In 2012, after the absence of a peace- endorsing government, the rejection of recognizing Palestine as a non- member in the UN and reaching a dead end, there was a need to establish channels of communication with the classes of the Israeli societies. At the beginning, a communication committee was established to do this task as a result of the necessity to clarify the peaceful intentions of the Palestinian leaderships towards peace and achieving the two-state solution along with having good relationships with neighboring countries.

Still, the Palestinian leadership came up with this decision after the change of Israeli attitude towards the Palestinian cause that there was a change in the public opinion after being brain-washed and blinded by the Israeli governments. In other words, the Israeli society was misled, so it was imperative to direct all the Palestinian discourse to the Israeli society.²

Then, there has been an increasing interest by the Palestinian leaders and the political arena with the forms of peaceful and diplomatic struggle. Then, there was an interest in

¹ Ibrahim, Abrash. Ma Bayn Isam Al-Sartawi wa Ahmad Yosef: Aqlaniat Al-Fikra wa Monzalaqat Al-Tatiq, Donia Al-Watan. (2015). (In Arabic)

² Monathamat Al-Tahrir Al-Falastinia. Lajnat Al-Tawasol Ma Al-Mojtama Al-Falastini. Al-Molakhas Al-Tanfithi Al-Moqadam Ela Al-Majles Al-Watani Al-Falastini. (2018). (In Arabic)

the Palestinian public diplomacy focusing on the Israeli society due to its worldwide importance and achievements.

In other words, it has become one of the most influential and sustainable tools of soft power compared to hard power, and a dominant pattern in the present time in light of the spread of the concepts of democracy. In fact, it was not a new concept, but it was brought about to suite the modern age and its challenges. Furthermore, politicians used public diplomacy to win the battle of capturing the minds and hearts of people in order to influence their mind-set and change their stereotypes about something.

Public diplomacy was first used by Edmund Gullion who defined it as the influence on the general point of views and implementation of foreign policies including the dimensions of the international relations beyond the traditional diplomacy and governments' public brain washing.

It also includes dealing with the other groups with special agendas in other countries as well as disclosing foreign policies and their impact on the general policy by communicating with foreign diplomats.¹ The definition of public diplomacy developed in the 21st century after September 11th that it stood out during the reign of the American president George W Bush (2001-2009) having specialized departments in foreign ministries around the world in this field.

Also, Professor Eytam Gilboa considered the role of governments as less important being replaced by non-governmental institutions and international organizations since neo-public diplomacy means direct contact with people around the world in order to influence their mentality and governments. Besides, the development of telecommunication

¹ Cull Nicholas, public Diplomacy: Taxonomies and Histories, the ANNALS of the American Academy of political and social science, (2008).

technology led to the participation of more classes of people leading to the weakness of the control of governments on what is going on. ¹ Similarly, Paul Sharpe defined public diplomacy as the direct process of communication with the people of one of the countries in order to convince them to develop mutual interests and spread its values.²

It aims at publicizing the vision of a specific society by spreading related issues not only by advertisements and public relations, but by multi-channeled communication among institutions, syndicates and factions around the world. This way, governments, individuals or groups can influence on tendencies and public opinions directly or indirectly that their decisions can have a greater effect.³

Since public diplomacy is a relatively recent concept in its current form, this message will help presenting it and its history, development and use in different periods. Also, it will clarify the success of the Palestinian leadership since 1974 in influencing the Israeli society convincing it to adopt peaceful solutions to end this struggle.

1.2. Significance of the Study

This study is the first of its kind to evaluate the efforts of the Palestinian public diplomacy towards the Israeli society in a scientific and methodological wise based on interviews.

Its significance lies in explaining this kind of diplomacy which became essential worldwide alongside official diplomacy for its ability to change the stereotypes people have in their minds. Also, it helps in explaining foreign policies, raising the awareness of societies about their culture, spreading point of views about the Palestinian version of the story, giving decision-makers a background about the success of their policies towards

¹ Gilboa, Eytan, Public diplomacy; the missing component in Israeli foreign policy, (2006).

² Melissen, Jan, the new public diplomacy soft power in international relation, New york, (2005).

³ Sameer, Awad. Al-Diplomasia Al-Ama Al-Filistinia, Majalat Al-Sho'on Al-Filistinia. Adad 256, (2011), Page 19. (In Arabic)

other countries and creating relations with other elites and individuals from other countries.

Furthermore, this study helps to elaborate more on the concept of public diplomacy which lacks Arabic studies in general specifically Palestinian ones since it is a novel and vital topic and one of the demands of this political age.

In other words, it is one of the few Palestinian studies which tackled the Palestinian public diplomacy in general and its relation with the Israeli society. Thus, this study can formulate basic criteria to activate the role of public diplomacy on the one hand and highlight the hindrances facing it on the other hand.

Also, it provides new information about the nature of this issue which will, hopefully, benefit official and unofficial institutions. Besides, it is a call to rephrase a new strategy to use this kind of diplomacy as a way of ideas, values and policies promotion.

Finally, it evaluates the efforts of the PLO and the PNA in its quest to communicate with the Israeli society. In addition, it introduces “From People to People” program agreed upon in Oslo Accord and its activities and implementation challenges.

1.3. Justifications of the Study

The interest in this issue was due to personal and subjective considerations, namely:

1. Personal considerations: As a researcher in conflict resolution and development and the wish to know more about the efficiency of the Palestinian public diplomacy on the Israeli society and its ability to formulate a pro- Palestinian Israeli public opinion. More specifically, it is to determine the extent the Palestinian leadership was able to influence the Israeli public opinion and deliver the message of peace to them.

2. Subjective considerations: the subject matter has been developing in the world-wide diplomacy which became one of the main means of communication with people in order to deliver a specific idea to specific people. This made it an interesting issue among researchers and scholars since it tackles the analysis of the usage of this diplomacy towards the Israeli society.

1.4. Aims of the Study

This study aims to:

- Investigate the level of the success of the Palestinian leadership since 1974 in infiltrating the Israeli public opinion convincing the Israelis to adopt peaceful solutions for the struggle.
- Investigate the motivations of the Palestinian leadership to adopt peaceful solutions.
- Investigate the level of the success of the Palestinian leadership in using public diplomacy to expand communication channels with the Israeli society.
- Recognize the strategies of the Palestinian public diplomacy towards the Israeli community and action plans in this field.
- Recognize the human and material potentials exerted in the public diplomacy towards the Israeli community at two levels, namely: official and unofficial.
- Investigate the agreement and cooperation between official and unofficial institutions in the way of using public diplomacy and its ability to promote non-violent and peaceful methods in the confrontation of the Israeli occupation.
- Determine the shortcomings of using this kind of diplomacy towards the Israeli community.

- Increase the awareness of the importance of public diplomacy towards the Israeli society in order to have more pro-Palestinian groups to resolve the Palestinian cause keeping their rights.
- Recognizing the level of the success of “From People to People” program in taking away differences and encouraging co-existence in one society by breaking the psychological barrier.

1.5. Questions of the Study

This study is an attempt to answer the following questions:

1. To what extent did the Palestinian leadership since 1974 succeed in infiltrating the Israeli public opinion and convince its people to adopt peaceful solutions to end the struggle?
2. Why did the Palestinian leadership adopt peaceful solutions?
3. To what extent did the Palestinian leadership expand its range of communication with the Israeli society through public diplomacy?
4. Have the Palestinian leadership succeeded in using public diplomacy to promote for the policy of non-violent peaceful resistance?
5. To what extent did the peace agreement between the Israelis and Palestinians encourage “people to people” program?

1.6. Hypotheses of the Study

This study is based on a number of hypotheses as the following:

1. Despite the exerted efforts by the PLO since 1974 to establish a channel of communication with the Israeli factions and institutions, the Israeli policies on the ground, security dilemma and the religious discourse contributed in decreasing the successes of the Palestinian public diplomacy.

2. The PA is unable to take over the Palestinian political¹ space due to differences in point of views among the Palestinian leaderships and the absence of national consensus leading to decreasing the achievements of the Palestinian public diplomacy towards the Israeli community.
3. Concerning with the dialogue of “from people to people”, this study hypothesizes that the imperial Zionist discourse contributed in the failure of the dialogue between them at the level of their people.

1.7. Research Methods

This study followed two main methods, namely:

1. The historic method: It is used in this study to depict the historical development of the Palestinian public diplomacy towards the Israeli society.
2. The analytical descriptive method: It is employed in this study for its appropriateness to the nature of this study in terms of analyzing the Palestinian policies and political activities targeting the Israeli society and analyzing the referenda in Israel concerning this issue.

1.8. Tools of the Study

Interviews were employed in this study that the interviewees were related to the subject matter of the study focusing on the elite in this field. Also, they participated directly in establishing channels of communication with the Israeli community’s academics, journalists and politicians.

¹ Political Space: is the vast world in which relations are organized in the world of politics according to political values with the official and unofficial political institutions to achieve the sought goals.

1.9. Limitations of the Study

1. Spatial limitations: the West Bank and the Palestinian Occupied Territories (PoT)
2. Time limitations: this study discusses the period from 1974 until 2018 because it included significant events for the Palestinian public diplomacy.

1.10. Previous Studies

Although public diplomacy has been known for a long time, studies about the Palestinian public diplomacy are rare as far as the researcher knows. There is little literature about historical studies about the historic development of the PLO's point of view about the Israeli society (as far as the researcher knows), but there are many studies about the program of "From People to People" including:

The first study is entitled as "*Al- Doblomasia Al-Ama Al-Filistinia*" by the lecturer in the political science department at Ber Zeit University Sameer Awad.

He explained the most important elements supporting the Palestinian public diplomacy including holding tight to the Palestinian land despite the occupations' attempts. The second one was the existence of the PA its institutions which is an important factor of sticking to the Palestinian land. The third one was the international solidarity of the Palestinians and its rights according to the international law. The fourth element was the Palestinian civil society and its relationships with the pro-Palestinian societies. The fifth one was media strategy which had a great influence in delivering the message of peace.

To conclude, the researcher concluded that the Arab Spring revolutions match the Palestinian one that the experience of Freedom Quarter in Egypt in June 2011 was a civilized phenomenon and a lesson to all nations worldwide including the Palestinian one.

This is due to its importance and the benefit of peaceful resistance against aggression and tyranny which was applicable to what the Palestinians are doing in Belin and Al-Ma'sara.¹

He concluded that the Palestinians are practicing public diplomacy especially when the Kufiyah had become a symbol for objection and oppression resistance. Also, the Palestinian well-known writers and poets people know such as Edward Saed, Ghassan Kanafani and Mahmud Darwish influenced in the development of this concept in the Palestinian case. This study is distinguished with the view of the Palestinians as being able to practice public diplomacy to transfer the Palestinian message worldwide.

This study is a very important one in the area of public diplomacy as it was a term for a new domain in international relations linking the theory with the implementation in the Palestinian case.

The second study is entitled as:” *Al-Diplomasia Al-Ama Al-Filistinia Min Camp David Ela Ejraat Efta Al-Mahkama Al-Dwalia Besha'n Bina' Al-Jidar Al-Israeli*”

The researcher tackled the importance of public diplomacy through elaborating on some concepts and theories projecting those theories on the period from 2000 to 2004 which is from Camp David to the decision of the International Court of Justice about the legality of the Separation Wall.

Also, she found that the Palestinian leadership failed in practicing public diplomacy during Camp David and post Camp David. Furthermore, she thought that the Palestinian public diplomacy needed a new agenda and new staff of decision making in order to lobby on the foreign countries to fulfil the goal of establishing the independent Palestinian state.

¹ Sameer Awad. Al-Doblomasia Al-Ama Al-Falastinia. Mjalat Shon Falstine. Al-Adad. 246. (2011). (In Arabic)

Finally, she recommended that it is imperative to merge the Palestinian public diplomacy with the foreign policies under direct presidential supervision. Also, it was imperative to enhance the Palestinian relations with the foreign reporters and journalists using the Internet. Furthermore, it was necessary to reunite the civil society in the Diaspora, the occupied territories and the West Bank using public diplomacy. Finally, the researcher focused on the importance of the Palestinians in the Diaspora I the foreign countries including academics, wealthy and others due to being familiar with people abroad.¹

The third study is entitled as “*Al-Doblomasia Al-Ama Al- Filistinia BAD Al-Intikhabat Al-Tashriya Al-Thaniya*” by Dalal Bajis.

The researcher talked about the concept of public diplomacy internationally by giving a theoretical frame for the concept and its importance to the Palestinian cause. Also, she mentioned Palestinian indicators using public diplomacy especially in the case of the Islamic factions reaching to Marj Al-Zohor in 1992 in which the Islamic action was done from an internal movement to an international one. Furthermore, she mentioned the required tools for enacting the Palestinian public diplomacy in an attempt to compare it with the Israeli public diplomacy.

The researcher explored the role of Palestinian civil organizations in the 1984 Palestine and in the Diaspora in the support of the Palestinian public diplomacy through showing models of the active organizations of the civil society in spreading the causes of the Palestinian cause during the last decade such as the siege of the president Yasser Arafat, Gaza’s siege and Goldstone’s report.

¹ Mozna Shihab. *Al-Doblomasia Al-Filistinia Al-Ama Min Camp David Ela Ejraat Efta’ Mahkamat Al-Adl Al-Dwalia Bsha’n Bina’ Al-Jidar Al-Israeli*. Ber Zeit University. (2006). (In Arabic)

Finally, she concluded that the Palestinian public diplomacy could achieve its goals in the long run since the Palestinians can have the aimed homeland despite all obstacles. At ¹ the end of the study, the researcher recommended the necessity of establishing institutions for diplomacy training including a special department for public diplomacy. Also, it was imperative to establish audio-visual media department in other language because media is the first line to defend the Palestinian public diplomacy. Besides, it was important to support the operational Palestinian institutions abroad as a way of unifying the Palestinian discourse keeping the Palestinian principles in light of divisions. Finally, she recommended having thorough studies about public diplomacy in Palestine to fill the lack in this field.²

The fourth study is entitled as “*Al-Doplomasia Al-Ama Al-Fiistinia, Al-Riyada Namothajan Lilqowa Al-Naema*” by Shoroq Ibrahim Zeid.

The researcher followed the inductive method by testing public diplomacy theories and project them on the Palestinian situation especially sports considering it one of the means of public diplomacy. This study documented Palestinian sports TV channels in which politics and diplomacy were present.

It started with the theoretical framework for public diplomacy and soft power by exploring international experiences in which sports was one type of politics and public diplomacy. She talked about the history of the Palestinian sports which is an essential part of the Palestinian cause that the Palestinian sport was affected by political events throughout history. Besides, she found that some events supported public diplomacy while others supported soft power paving the way to establishing the independent state.

¹ Dalal Bajis. *Al-Diplomasia Al-Ama Al-filistinia Ba'd Al-Intikhabat Al-Tashriya Al-Thania*. Ber Zeit University. (2010). (In Arabic)

² Ibid, Mozna, Shihab, (2006).

It concluded that the Palestinian sport activities is a diplomatic action per se by implementing the tools of the Palestinian public diplomacy using soft power to achieve political goals. Also, it aims to assure the existence of the Palestinians and their identity in the international community through sports showing the political and diplomatic dimension in their activities but without a unified national strategy. Finally, the researcher explains that practiced diplomacy via sports is random without any scientific or academic basis.¹

The fifth study is entitled as:” *Public Diplomacy: The Missing Component in Israel Foreign Policy*” by Eytan Gilboa.

Professor Gilboa considered that Israel didn’t give any importance for this kind of diplomacy because of its relations with the great nations. Also, the role of the non-governmental organizations and Human Rights organizations in criticizing Israel’s policies. Consequently, giving Israel a bad image in front of the international community.² He talked about the practical steps in order to activate the role of the Israeli public diplomacy and the role of the Israel media in using some terms which harms the social image of the Israelis such as wars, crimes and genocide. Several referenda showed the decrease of the popularity of Israel in Europe.

He also considered using electronic technology as one of the ways of developing public diplomacy in Israel to transfer the image as the Israelis so and establishing specialized centers for this kind of diplomacy.

He divided his study into three sections. The first one was based on theories about neo-public diplomacy. Also, he used the analytical methods in the second part of studying the

¹ Shorouq, Ibrahim Zeid. Al-Doblomasia Al-Ama Al-Filistinia- Al-Riyada Namothaja Liqwa Al-Naema . Ber Zeit University. (2017).(In Arabic)

² Gilboa Eytan, public diplomacy: the missing component in Israel foreign policy, (2006).

Israeli public diplomacy. Finally, the third section included the analysis of the Israeli strategy in its public diplomacy and its flaws.¹

The sixth study is entitled as:” ***Contact and Cooperation: The Israeli –Palestinian People to People Program***” by Lena C Enderson.

The researcher indicated that during the signing of Oslo II agreement in 1995, the people-to-people program was indicated that both sides agreed to develop this program with Norway that the latter allocated a budget for it. It aimed to encourage understanding and cooperation between both parties, but the main challenge was to implement it on the ground.

The researcher clarified that the most important activities of this program were cooperative for the NGOs in both sides and then focusing on projects related to youth, culture, environment, media, dialogue and forums supporting more than 130 projects which should be implemented locally. However, their implementation was full of challenges including limitations on the movement from the Israelis. Also, these activities included building temples of peace for the activists through the forums of the organizations participating and funding in this program.

She explained the impact of peace process on this program which reflected negatively by reported closures of the West Bank and Gaza after Oslo II (1995-1999) which hindered the movement of Palestinian workers in Israel and the West Bank as the issue of entrance permits became a hindrance to workers.²

The seventh study is entitled as:” ***The Power of Possibility: The Role of People-to-People Program in the Current Israeli-Palestinian Reality***” by Shira Herzog.

¹ Ibid, Gilboa, Eytan, (2006).

² Lena C Enderson, contact and cooperation: The Israeli-palestinian people to people program, Fafo institute for applied social science, (2001).

The researcher clarified in the study that the program of “From People to People” didn’t have any impact on the political process between the Palestinians and the Israelis that they were ignored from local policy makers since they were unable to complete two big classes of that society. In other words, they didn’t have enough support in light of the long-term struggle at that time. In light of the lack of trust and reaching dead end, that program lacks a political framework, so it was isolated from both societies.

It showed the urgent need for a legitimate strategy for such long-term struggle that conflict resolution has always been full of hindrances that require solutions and strategies at more than one level. Also, one of the flaws of Oslo II is neglecting peace building efforts which should complete official negotiations though building and support plans from bottom to the top.

Finally, she mentioned that the characteristics of the long-term struggle is its continuity through ages that every side sees his arguments to be sound and opposite the others’ and this leads to violence.¹

The Eight study is entitled as:” *Ehya’ Mashare’ Min Sha’b Ela Sha’b: Al-Tanazol An Mohasabat Israel*”

The researcher confirmed that the actual leap for the program of “From People to People” was after signing Oslo Accord in 1993 which expanded the diplomatic framework to include the Israeli- Palestinian civil organizations seeking to enhance understanding and sympathy between both of them. However, it deteriorated because of Al-Aqsa intifada and the loss of the members of the Far left who supported this project.

¹ Shira Herzog, The power of possibility: The role of people to people program in the current Israeli-Palestinian reality, economic cooperation foundation, (2005).

This framework focused on the importance of the cooperation across borders in order to achieve permanent peace using project to open the door to communications at the local level. However, this didn't apply to the Palestinian cause because they were not fighting each other, but it was a struggle against imperialism.

Also, the term of border is misunderstood because Israel controls the area from Jordan River to the Mediterranean because the Israeli confiscate lands and the Palestinians were dislocated and isolated from others. In other words, the Israeli regime didn't announce any official borders because they were expanding. In short, the project was a tale of two fighting people on their borders.

Eventually, the researcher found that this project should be rejected because it negates the problematic issue between the Palestinians and the Israelis. In other words, it was a race for colonization, so any approved projects should be supported and protected by the International Law and Human Rights to assure its implementation. ¹

The ninth study is entitled as:” *Dialogue in Palestine: The People-to-People Diplomacy Programme and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*” by Nadia Naser Najab.

This study was designed to merge the Palestinians and the Israeli in the “From People to People” program in late 1990s that funders funded it to enhance cooperation and bridge channels of understanding and dialogue between the Palestinians and the Israelis.

The researcher clarified that communication between them in the 1970s and 1980s reached its peak in the first intifada in forms such as marches, demonstrations that both Israelis and Palestinians were brutally hurt by the Israelis. However, after Oslo agreement, this cooperation decreased with the system of permits as a way to limit the movement of

¹ Yara, Hawari. Ehya' Mashare' Min Sha'b Ela Sha'b: Al-Tanzol An Mohasabat Israel. Shabakat Al-Siasat Al-Filistinia. (2021). (In Arabic)

the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This means that Oslo's generation had limited interaction with the Israelis.

To conclude, the researcher assured that the Israeli- Palestinian peace process was supported with good will and reconciliation, but communication was there every time both shook hands such as the moment Arafat shook hands with Rabin at the White House. As for the international observers, this was a meeting point where enemies met to work together in brighter future.

After more than two decades of the isolation of the two societies, building the wall and lock downs of Israel was and still to be the most obvious evidence of the separation between the Israelis and the Palestinians.¹

¹ Nadia Naser Najjab, *dialogue in Palestine: the people to people diplomacy programme and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict*, first published in Great Britain, Bloomsbury publishing PLC, (2020).

Chapter Two

Communicating with the Israeli Society:

Concepts and Theories

This chapter is divided into two sections. The first discusses the concepts of the study while the other discusses the most important theories employed in this study.

2.1. Conceptual Framework: (Soft Power and Public Diplomacy)

2.1.1. Soft Power:

The French writer Victor Hugo says that it is possible to resist invading armies, but it is impossible to resist invading ideas,¹ so countries nowadays seek to use its powers to influence nations and attract them to their culture making those nations their allies without moving their armies. In other words, they depend on marketing their civilization and attract people to it to earn economic and political benefits. In fact, using soft power is not a recent phenomenon, it has been used a long time ago, but it differs from one age to another. In fact, in the 17th and 18th century, economic power formed one of the sources of power while in the previous ones the military power was best possessed. Nowadays, the ability of countries to be victorious diplomatically and military wise is the best victory ever because it is the age of openness to technology making the world borderless. In other words, if countries possessed knowledge in all its forms and invested it to spread it to other countries, it will, definitely, be the most powerful source of power called soft power.²

¹ Raef Khorri. Al- Fikr Al-Arabi Al-Hadith: Athar Al-Thawra Al-Faransia Fe Tawjih Al-Siasi Wa Al Ijtima'e. DAR Al-Saqi. (2013). (In Arabic)

² Karim Abohalaw, Chinas soft power in the age of knowledge (Resarces and Challenges), Tishreen University Journal for Research and Scientific Studies , (2018).

2.1.1.1. The Development of Soft Power:

Joseph Nye was the one who coined the term soft power in his firm theory as it was parallel to hard power in the post- cold war. ¹However, the first emergence of the theory was in the 20th century by the Italian philosopher Antonio Gramsci in his theory of “Cultural Dominance” in which he explained that capital dominance was through institutions such as schools, churches and newspapers creating a good public image of capitalism in the minds of the public in order to control their minds guaranteeing their allegiance to the capital elite.²

Furthermore, France was the first country using this concept through the cultural impact on the people of its colonies by using education which created a new good image about the French society spreading its language across its colonies.³

Similarly, America and Britain promoted for principles coping with the nature of its economic system in order to serve its interests that liberalism and democracy get along with capitalism and free trade. In fact, the American president Woodrow Wilson used soft power in promoting the principles of peace and Europe’s restructure all over again after the first World War, but this didn’t prevent the eruption of the second World War.⁴ Generally speaking, the real attempt of using soft power was after the second World War through Full Bright program ⁵ for students exchange in 1946 as a means of affecting others’ cultures and dominating their minds. In fact, soft power was used greatly during

¹ Philip, Taylor. Alldoblomasia Al-Ama Wa Makanatha Fe Al-Siasa Al-Kharijia. Majalat Al-Doblomasi. Al-Adad 52. (2010). (In Arabic)

² Gramsci ,A., prison Letters , 1988

³ Mai Mohey Aglan, Soft power, political Encyclopedia, (2019), <https://political-encyclopedia.org/dictionary>

⁴ Ibid, Shira Herzog, (2005).

⁵ Full Bright Program is one of the American students; exchange programs aiming at improving intercultural relations and inter diplomatic and cultural relations between the Americans and the other countries through exchanging students’ skills and knowledge.

the ideological struggle between the capitalist and communist camps and their attempts to influence the other intellectually.¹

Also, Michel Foucault considered soft power as an indirect obligation at the mental level aiming to influence the public opinion in and out of the country. According to this definition, soft power is directed to local community and foreign community in order to control their minds leading to indirect obedience and obligation.²

Furthermore, Foucault³ thought that soft power has many roles and miraculous impact that hard power cannot achieve by using heavy artillery and its technology because soft power sneaks slowly and confidently without causing any enmity or rivalry. In addition, it did not show the real intention behind psychological provocation, mental mind games and ideological invasion in order to influence the public opinion individually or socially.⁴

After the fall of the USSR, the theory of soft power emerged by Joseph Nye which was used by the Americans more frequently by the Americans after the fall of the USSR in order to assure the unilaterality of the system and spread of the values of freedom, democracy and human rights getting rid of fascism.

The indirect interest in using soft power without military intervention is the natural product of the realization of the American elite for its need to have global solidarity without the need of the expensive military power economically and human wise.⁵

¹ Ibid, Shira Herzog, (2005).

² Hussam Matar. Al-Qwa Al-Naema Al-Amerikia Fe Mwajahat Al-Muqawama. Markaz Bahith Lildirasat Al-Filistinia Wa Istratisjia. (2017). (In Arabic)

³ Michel, Foucault: A French professor and philosopher who is one of the most important philosophers of the late 20th century. One of the well-known books is “Madness and Civilization”

⁴ Fadel Al-Omani. Qwatona Al-Nema Selahona Al-Moather. Jaredat Al-Riyad. (2016). (In Arabic)

⁵ Dr. Mahmud Abdullah. Al-Qwa Al- Naema: Raweyat Al-Nokhba Al-Masriya. Markaz Al-Arabi Lilbohoth Wa Al- Dirasat. (2018). (In Arabic)

In 1990, the term of soft power emerged by the American writer Joseph Dye saying that soft power is the means of success in the international policy. In other words, the explained the idea behind strengthening the American interests all over the world in addition to the hard power. He said that the soft power is an influential weapon which achieves aims by convincing the other instead of using hard power.

In other words, in order to get the resources of others, attack its culture leading to political values of submission internally and externally. This way, soft power is turned into one of the major concepts in the literature of social and political science that the equation is hard since it is about how to influence others indirectly. Nye summarized in:” It is more than influencing others, it is convincing them by offering proofs”.¹

Dye defined soft power in its essence as having a great impact on other nations and direct general options based on its social and cultural system instead of depending on coercion or threat. This is called special and public diplomacy which most companies follow.²

Also, he defined it as the ability to have what you need by attracting the other instead of using force. In other words, it is the ability to influence others attitude in order to get the expected results without resorting to hard power. In fact, this is what happened with the USSR when it collapsed from the inside because soft power works within systems.³

Similarly, Robert Gates the former American Secretary of Defense defined it as the ability to determine and direct the attitude of others instead of forcing your will.⁴ However, Michael Eisenstadt, who was the specialized researcher in military and security studies at Washington institute of the Near East, defined it as using words and emotions in a

¹ Joseph Nye, *Soft Power :The Means to success in World Politics*, Perseus books group ,New York, (2004).

² Ibid, Nadia Najjab, (2020).

³ Ibid, Nadia Najjab, (2020).

⁴ A lecture delivered in Kansas University. Published in the website of the American Army on the Internet. March 3rd, (2010) . <http://centcom.ahp.us.army.mil/index2.php?option=com>

strategic campaign of communication in order to form a psychological state of mind for a hostile country to America such as Iran.¹

Concerning the researcher Anna Simons, a Professor of Defense Analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School described soft power as the fourth generation of future wars regarding to the exchange of power scales of the traditional wars and the failure of city mode wars. In addition, it targets people through public diplomacy and strategic communication and information manipulation away from conquering cities and military bases or even use air force.²

Through using soft power, any country can infiltrate other countries by following a set of tools without resorting to hard power which can be by urging other countries to follow the controlling country's political, economic and social system.³ In this field, soft power would be to attract other countries to adopt their model by their full will without being threatened.⁴

Concerning the concept of conviction in the framework of soft power, it doesn't necessarily mean external change, it really requires changing convictions and attitudes and this can be done by promoting their values in other countries.⁵

According to Joseph Dye, every country includes basic elements representing the main sources of power that the main source of power is culture. It reflects a set of values reflecting the society as there are many aspects can be noticed from arts, literature and popular culture high and entertaining.

¹ Michael Eisenstadt, *Dawr Al-Qwa AlNaema Fe Al-Harb AlNafsia Al Iran*. (2010). (In Arabic)

² *Soft-war-smart-war-think-again* //04/www.fpri.org/articles/2012

³ Joseph Nye, *bound to lead: The change nature of American power*, New York, (1990).

⁴ Oxford university press, (2002), Joseph Nye, *The paradox of American power*,

⁵ *Ibid*, Wafa, (1977).

For example, education increases the possibility of the increase of people need to get a higher degree at the technical level being submitted to the legal and moral obligations. In addition, these obligations reflect the culture of the country proposed by the system of values and promotional policy of the country.¹

Furthermore, political values are the second source of soft power including democracy, defending human rights, achieving peace and cooperating with international organizations. All of which add point of control to the controlling country² in case there is a democratic country dealing in the same way with other countries.

Concerning the foreign political governmental policies, they are the third source of soft power that the legal and legitimate criteria of any country contribute in affecting others.

³Furthermore, soft power doesn't necessarily mean taking care of the national interests and ignoring others; if this is determined, the results will be destructive to the controlling country.

When using hard power, the country prepares the troops and threatens with penalties in limited time while using soft power takes a longer time to be constructed. In other words, the human and economic cost of soft power is low if minds are controlled unlike hard power. What distinguishes soft power is that it easily crushed if a country used hard power demolishing all its efforts in building soft power over that country.⁴

There are three main skills which are more important than practicing soft power and attracting people. To begin with, there should be an emotional intelligence which is the ability to control emotions using them to reach others. The second is composing an

¹ Ibid, Nadia Najjab, (2020).

² Ibid, Nadia Najjab, (2020).

³ Ibid, Nadia Najjab, (2020).

⁴ Basil Khadir. Athar Al-Tahawol Fe Mafhom Al-Qwa Ala Al-Alaqat Al-Dwaliya (Al-Sira' Al-Filistini- Al-Israeli Namothaja) Jamiat Al-Azhar. Ghaza. (2014). (In Arabic)

attractive story and the third one is communication skills in using rhetoric and verbal communication. These three skills should be alongside the skills of hard power since they complete each other.¹

The researcher thinks that soft power is an important style used by influential countries to influence minds, win emotions and change people's attitudes. Furthermore, the spread of tolerance and the acceptance of the other with open minded mentality led to the rise of soft power and its styles away from useless old styles. Besides, it became an important tool to increase power and presence since it is based on the public image of the country regionally securing its foreign policy paving the way for more allies.

Concerning the Palestinian soft power, Joseph Dye said: "if Arafat chose soft power as Gandhi and MLK instead of hard power, it would be possible to attract moderate Jews and got the establishment of the Palestinian state". Similarly, Richard Folk² in the 11th anniversary of the death of Edward Saed said that the Palestinians should have continued peaceful resistance in their struggle with Israel.

Both Folk and Dye think that soft power is good to be as a method for the success of the struggle with Israel to take the Palestinian right in establishing the Palestinian state or promote the one state solution.³

As the soft power is important for Palestinians, it will be talked about in details in the third chapter of this study since the researcher thinks the Palestinians need to use this power the most. In other words, the Palestinians neither have a great army nor advanced

¹ <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/18419/joseph-nye-on-smart-power.html>.

² Richard, Folk. An American Jew who is a professor of International Law in Branston University. the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the occupied Palestinian Territory. He was known with being pro- Palestinian.

³ Iyad Shamasna. Tawthif Al-Qwa Al-Naema Lida'm Somod Al-Maqdisiyeen Fe Al-Madina Al-Moqadadsa. Markaz Al-Abhath. PLO. (2018). (In Arabic)

weapons, so it is imperative to go with the flow and use soft power since the Palestinians' issue is fair.

2.1.2. Official Diplomacy

The term diplomacy is originally Greek from "Diploma" and it means an official document issued by power holders giving its holder privileges. As time went on, it was transferred from one language to another in including Arabic which meant the real practice of verbal communication between governments and people.¹ Then, this term developed as a result of the development of the diplomatic practices spread in most of the countries since the 18th century.

Some people use this term to indicate foreign policy while others use it to indicate conflict resolution in a dispute between two countries by negotiation. Others use it to show off their eloquence.

However, specialists in the modern age use it to indicate the process of managing and organizing international relations by negotiations.² Thus, it is the main tool for achieving foreign policy goals to have an influence on the countries in order to get their support via convincing them without using power. In addition to delivering information to governments and negotiating with them, diplomacy means enhancing relations between countries in all aspects and defending their interests and people abroad. Also, it means representing governments in occasions and collecting information about these countries

¹ Ali Hassan Al-Sahm: Al-Doblomasia: Nash'atiah wa Tatworoha Wa itham Al-Hasanat Wa Al-Imtiyazat Al-Doplomasia. Dar Al-Thaqafa Lilnasher Wa Al-Tawzi. Amman. (2011). (In Arabic)

² Fadel Zaki Mohammed. Al-Doblomasia Bain Al-Natharia Wa Al-Tbiq. Wazarat Althaqafa Wa Al Ershad. Moderyat Al-Thaqafa Al-Ama. Iraq. (1968). (In Arabic)

in order to evaluate the situation of their current issues in case there is a possible reaction or future stands.¹

Diplomacy in its modern meaning goes along with the concept of international law being defined as a set of rules, procedures, ceremonies and international institutions which organize relationships among countries, international organizations and diplomate representatives. Furthermore, they serve a higher cause including security or economic policies, having all the countries under one common interest and negotiate political matters and ending them with signing agreements and international treaties.²

One of the main figures in diplomacy who is Harold Nickson defined it as the process of managing and organizing international relations through negotiations in order to settle and organize deputies and ambassadors. Besides, it is the tasks of diplomates since it is not only the art of speech but the art of negotiations in order to reach agreements.³

Also, Pradier Fodéré defined it as the art of representing the government and its interests in foreign countries without violating its rights abroad. Also, it includes managing the international affairs of the country and follow up with the political negotiations according to the given instructions.⁴

Similarly, Dr. Smuha Fawq Al-Ada defined it as a set of rules, international principles and customs which organize the countries and international organizations' relationships

¹ Saed, Mohammed Au Aba. *Al-Doblomasia Tarikhaha , Mo'ssatiha Anwa'ha wa Qwaninaha. Dar Al-Shaima llnasher wa Al Tawzi'*. (2009) (In Arabic)

² Ibid, Mai Mohey Aglan, (2019).

³ Didzic Klavins, understanding the Essense of modern Diplomacy, the ICD Annual Academic conference on cultural Diplomacy: (2011), cultural Diplomacy and international relation: New Actors: New initiatives :New target, Berlin, (2011).

⁴ Ibid, Mai Mohey Aglan, (2019).

and the ways the international laws can be applied through negotiations, meeting, international conferences and holding agreements.¹

In short, it can be said that diplomacy is a political process related directly to managing foreign relations serving their interests since international relations are based on a set of rules and international customs aiming to organize dealing with the specialists of the international law highlighting their duties, rights and privileges.² Also, it is one of the key methods to achieve the interests of the country peacefully as the only and reasonable suppressor for war.³

In the Palestinian case, diplomacy is an exception to the rule that diplomacy is only practiced by sovereign countries since there is not any sovereign Palestinian entity. In other words, diplomacy has been practiced outside Palestine first. Still, it expanded in the struggle stage along with the political and diplomatic work. At that stage, the Palestinian diplomacy achieved great achievements at the level of international relations that it could get support from the Israeli society proving the justice of the Palestinian cause.⁴

2.1.3. The Emergence of Public Diplomacy

2.1.3.1. Historical Background

The first use of the term public diplomacy was on the 15th of January, 1956 by replacing it with popular diplomacy in an article in “Times” newspaper. In that article, there was a criticism of the president Franklin Pierce ⁵ talking about role model, stereotype and treating people well. Also, it was first used in America in “New York Times” newspaper

¹ Smuha Fawq Al-Ada. Al-Doplomasia Al-Haditha. Dar Al-Yaqatha Al-Arabia Lilta'lif Wa Alnasher WaAl-Tarjama. Damascus. (1973). (In Arabic)

² Previously mentioned. (Al-Shami, 2011).

³ Ziad Abdulla Al-Jabouri. Tatwor Al-Doblomasia- Dirasa Tahliliya. Majala Jamea Takrit Lil Olom Al-Insaia. Jamiat Takrit. Adad 9, (2007). (In Arabic)

⁴ Ibid, Mai Mohey Aglan, (2019).

⁵ Franklin Pierce: the 14th Republic American president (1853-1857).

in June, 1871 about a report concerning the Congress's offer of Samuel Cox¹ talking about the hostile secret conspiracies of the Dominican Republic.²

Also, Napoleon Bonaparte used the same term during the invasion of Egypt in 1798 that he brought in with him scientists, archeologists, doctors and other specialists. Besides, he restored services in Egypt by opening roads and bringing in printers in order to enhance the public image of France in Egypt.

Furthermore, he realized the importance of international media in public diplomacy when he established a journal called "Monitor" promoting for its news and traditions. Also, he employed foreign press especially the English and German by controlling newspapers in those countries by using his administrative and diplomatic department.³

During the first World War (1914-1918), the use of public diplomacy was wide describing new diplomatic practices concerning the justification of the country's policies towards its people and addressing other people hostile or friendly.⁴

Then, after the first world War, Turkey got interested in public diplomacy in the reign of Kamal Atatürk (1923-1938) who changed the country and its identity at the European mode.⁵

¹ Samuel Cox: A lawyer and American diplomate (1824-1889) as well as being a republic activist.

² Nicholas J. Cull, *Public Diplomacy: Before Gullion: The Evolution of a Phrase*. USC Center of Public Diplomacy, (2016).

<https://www.uscpublicdiplomacy.org>.

³ Haidar Ahmad Ali Al-Qutbi. *Al-Doblomasia Al-Shaibia Bain Al-Alam Wa Al-Diaya Wa l-Harb Al-Nafsia*. Dar Osama Lilnasher Wa Al-awzi. Amman. 2013. (In Arabic)

⁴ Ibid, Wafa, (1977).

⁵ Jan Melissen, *The New Public Diplomacy Soft Power In International Relation*, New York, (2005).

Thus, in 1928, a reporter for Christian Sites Monitor¹ wrote an article entitled as: "Public Diplomacy Crises" on which he won a prize in press and popular diplomacy assuring the ethical duty for media.²

During the second World War, Franklin Roosevelt (1933-1945)³ established foreign intelligence service which broadcasted the pro-American news in Europe to face the Japanese and German promotion for their culture. In other words, the US sought to influence other foreign nations after the second World War that most of the communication was done via the CIA to fight against the spread of communism and Soviet expansion.⁴

In the 1950s of the last century, there was a vast interest in international intelligence and promotion.⁵ In addition, the concept of public diplomacy was connected with the American Intelligence Agency in 1953 to promote the American culture.⁶ This is done to increase other nations' understanding of the American society and the American government's understanding of other nations' stand towards the American foreign policies.⁷

The beginning of the concept was with the establishment of Moro institute in Tufts University in 1965 that Edmond used this concept to express the honest propaganda as a replacement of vicious propaganda.⁸

¹ Christian Sites Monitor: An American newspapering Boston owned by Christs' Church taking care of the political affairs and religious articles. .

² Ibid, Wafa, (1977).

³ Franklin Roosevelt. The 32nd president of the US. He is democratic and was president for four terms. (1933-1945).

⁴ Ibid, Wafa, (1977).

⁵ Ibid, Wafa, (1977).

⁶ Motaz Abdulfatah. Khaitab Al-Doblomasia AlShabia Al-Amrikyia Tijah Al-Sharq Al-Awsat. Waraq Bahthiya Sadira Min Jamiat Al-Qahira. (2006). (In Arabic)

⁷ Motaz Abdulfatah et al. Al- Doblomasia Al-Ama Al-Amrickia Itijah Al-Alam Al-Arabi. Koliat Al- Iqtisad Wa Al- Olom Al- Insania . Jamiat Al-Qahira. (2006). (In Arabic)

⁸ Ibid, Wafa, (1977).

Ronald Regan's reign¹ have witnessed great expenditure on public diplomacy that it was repeated in the sessions of the Congress. In the 1990s, the use of public diplomacy was common worldwide that Tony Blair established the council of the strategies of public diplomacy.²

After 11/9 event, public diplomacy's interests increased in the US that ideological wars were conclusive against terrorism making public diplomacy the American central cause to enhance the public image of the US. ³In short, American decision makers, journalists and academics concluded that public diplomacy can help overcome hostile feelings of America especially in the Arab and Islamic world.

In addition, 11/9 events made public diplomacy the central issue in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in many countries such as Canada, New Zealand, Argentina and Mongolia because they believed in the importance of soft power in international relations making it one of the tools of the foreign policy and an essential part of it.

It surpassed the nature of the system of the country whether it was democratic and dictatorship; poor or rich that Ethiopia being the poorest country in the world practice public diplomacy.⁴

After the emergence of social media forums, they were used as forums for public diplomacy and a tool to develop relations between the government and the citizens. Also, they contributed in the increase of social strength all over the world.⁵

¹ Ronald Regan: A politician and American actor who was elected as the 40th president of the US. (1981-1989).

² Ibid, Wafa, (1977).

³ Nakamura Kennon and Matthew Weed, US public Diplomacy :Background and current Issues, congressional Research Service, (2009).

⁴ Ibid, Shira Herzog, (2005).

⁵ Harris Britney, Diplomacy 2.0: The future Of Social Media In Nation Branding, Journal Of Public Diplomacy, (2013).

Finally, the American president Barak Obama (2009-2017) used social media sites as a tool to develop relations between the government and the people making it one of the factors of his success. Then, he transferred the policy of the foreign affairs making its main task is to enhance the public image of the US abroad. In other words, Obama sought to expand the range of his popularity to the Islamic world focusing on education, science and economic development by encouraging dialogue with the other to rectify misunderstandings.¹

2.1.3.2. Public Diplomacy

Public diplomacy has been studied in every field in the last century, but politically speaking, it was a tool for projecting the national identity for foreign nations.² This interest has come as a result of attempts to avoid using hard power and its connection with the global economy. In other words, countries which follow soft power or public diplomacy gain more friends than enemies.³

The definition of public diplomacy was not limited to Edmond's⁴ use in the 1960s that he defined it as the general stands that form foreign policies and execute them including the dimensions of the public relations behind the traditional diplomacy. Also, it includes ideas invasion of the other countries and interacting with them to achieve private interests by communicating with diplomats and reporters from other countries.⁵

¹ Michel, Foucault: A French professor and philosopher who is one of the most important philosophers of the late 20th century. One of the well-known books is "Madness and Civilization".

² Sameer Awad. *Al-Doblomasia Al-Filistinia Al-Ama*. Majalat Sho;on Al-Falastinia. (2011). (In Arabic)

³ Watanabe Yasushi, *The Age Of Public Diplomacy*, Nippon Press Center Bldg, Cho University, Japan, (2013).

⁴ Edmund Asbury Gullion was an American diplomat. He served as dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (1964–1978) and "one of the country's most accomplished career ambassadors.

⁵ Joumane Chahine, *Public Diplomacy: A Conceptual Framework*, department of Art history and communication studies, McGill University, Montreal, (2010).

In other words, this concept was developed in the 21st century especially after 11/9 events that Eytan Gilboa considered the role of governments being replaced by non-governmental organizations. Besides, neo-diplomacy means communicating directly with the common people from all over the world in order to affect their mind set. As technology developed, a wider range of people were reached by this diplomacy leading to the weakness of the government because it gives soe power to civil societies.¹

Also, public diplomacy is defined in Edward Djerejian's report² entitled as:” Changing minds and Winning Peace” as delivering values and policies in order to achieve national security by giving people around the world information and influencing them.³

Also, Hanz Tuch defined it as the communicative process with the foreign public in an attempt to find a clear common idea between cultures as a way to achieve special goals through official politicians and members subjectively. Hanz distinguishes between traditional and public diplomacy that the former is the relations between governments and foreign ministers secretly while the latter includes open-mindedness in order to reach the masses.⁴

The preparatory committee of the European Parliament indicated that public diplomacy is the process through which the country seeks to build trust with foreign community in order to go over all official relations which were the core work of the diplomatic work.⁵

¹ Ibid, Gilboa, (2006).

² Edward Peter Djerejian is a former United States diplomat who served in eight administrations from John F. Kennedy to Bill Clinton .He served as the United States Ambassador to Syria (1988–91) and Israel (1993–94), Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan and Deputy Press Secretary of Foreign Affairs.

³ Edward Djerejian, *Changing Minds and Winning Peace: Anew Strategic Direction For U.S Public Diplomacy In The Arab and Muslim World*, page 8, (2003).

⁴ Hans N. Tuch, *Communing with the World, U.S. Public Diplomacy*, (New York: Overseas press, (2009).

⁵ European Parliament Preparatory Action, *Culture in EU external Relation*, European Commission, (2014).

According to Joshua Fouts , the manager of the United States Centre on Public Diplomacy (USC) that public diplomacy means the governmental attempts to reach the public in order to explain its culture, values, attitudes and beliefs through institutions to enhance the public image of governments in the eyes of targeted nations.¹

However, the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office used many aims in the definition of public definition that it defined three stages. The first is short- termed targeting distinguishing the British public diplomacy from the American one. The second one is the medium stage which includes convincing the Islamic world that the British policy is not about civilizations struggle.

Finally, the third stage is human development and fulfilling restoration agenda including facing the accusations of colonization. In addition, it added that the public diplomacy was targeted to the elite while nowadays it is directed to the masses to enhance the image of the West in the minds of the Arabs changing the levels of knowledge and discussing the issue of Islam and the Middle East in the West.²Also, it was a way to construct the needs of other countries in order to rectify misunderstandings looking for common causes among nations.³

In the previous definitions, there are elements and steps forming public diplomacy including subjective and deep reading of the interests of the targeted nations by studying the differences in the content of the message directed to other nations. Similarly, Morgenthau said that if we wanted to think about what other think accurately, the message should be convincing and have mutual interests in order to have a framework of positive

¹ Joshua Fouts, Public diplomacy: Practitioners, Policy makers, and Public opinion, A report of the public diplomacy and world opinion, Washington, (2006).

² www.daralfiker.com/sites/default/files/books-first-chapter.

³ Philip Fiske, Developing EU Public Diplomacy Strategy, European impolitic, (2005).

public opinion by employing mass media and telecommunication technology or even direct calls.¹

On the other hand, no matter differences there are among these definitions, public diplomacy has become an essential part in foreign policy that its activities are necessary to transfer the required message about cultural, social or economic policies in the country and outside it to cope with the national interests.²

In addition, public diplomacy is based on its official diplomacy and serving the political views of the institutions of the country. In other words, it is a way of communication between the government and other countries including all its classes.³

In the age of the neo- public diplomacy, NGOs or private companies and volunteers or even individuals can affect the process of public communication. In other words, it is not only on the government, but also on public diplomacy due to modern technology and how people form networks of relations.⁴

Generally speaking, public diplomacy developed due to the increase in the interest in expanding the channels of cooperation and co-existence between nations. Also, the spread of mass media and news agencies caused a revolutionary technology closed the distance and eased communication. Besides, public negotiations are supervised by people being criticized at the level of the political or international level leading to ease of ideas transfer.

In short, this strengthened relations between the countries through their nations.⁵

¹ Ismael Darwish. Al-Doblomasia AlAma Lildwal Al-Islamia.Majalt Al-Shab. Adad 4, Algeria. (2014). (In Arabic)

www.Ech-Chaab.com

² Mirza Hajar. AL-Tasweeq Al-Iliktroni Abr Al- Facebook Lilbramij Al-Tanmawiya Fe Al-Jazaer. Ma Bayn Al-Itisal Min Ajl Al-Tanmia WaAl-Doblomasia Al-Ama. Kolia Olom Al-Ilam Wa Itisal. Jameat Algeria. (2018). (In Arabic)

³ Ibid, Awad, (2011).

⁴ Atsushi Tago, Public Diplomacy and Foreign Policy, Oxford Research Encyclopedia, (2017).

⁵ Shafiq Abdulraziq Al-Samirae. Al-Doblomasia. Al-Jama Al-Maftoha. Tarablus. (2002). (In Arabic)

Concerning the Palestinian public diplomacy, it was practiced since the 1950s in an attempt to communicate with the Israeli community in order to figure out a humanitarian solution keeping the identity and rights of the Palestinians. After the establishment of ¹ the PLO, it started to play a vital role in public diplomacy with the European groups especially the Left European factions. ²Also, it increased its activities in Africa using economic tools that it depended on students and workers' groups using mass media and cultural products of the folklore as a symbol of resistance against aggression no to mention the role of the Palestinian groups around the world.³ In other words, public diplomacy helped the Palestinians rally support for its just cause⁴ and infiltrate the world's countries to gain their sympathy and solidarity with the Palestinian cause.

2.2. Theories of the Study

In second section of the study, there are several related theories to struggle and conflict resolution in an attempt to explain the change in the Palestinian attitude towards the Israelis since 1974 as well as explaining the failure or success of the program of “people to people” between the Palestinians and the Israelis.

2.2.1. Johan Galtung's Theory

This theory is employed to explain the change in the Palestinian political ideology since 1974 from structural violence to peaceful violence as well as a change in the Palestinian political discourse.

Galtung introduced this theory in the 1960s of the 20th century introducing theoretical frameworks for peace and struggles. Also, he could offer a triangular model of the

¹ Ibid, Masalha, (2018).

² Rashad Tawam. *Doblomasia Al-Taharor Al-Watani Al-Tajriba Al-Filistinia*. Mahad Ibrahim Abu Laghad Lildirasat Al-Dowaliya. Ramallah. (2013). (In Arabic)

³ Previously mentioned.

⁴ Ibid, Mozna, Shihab, (2006).

struggle of peace and violence considering struggles as a dynamic interactive process based on three elements including behaviour, attitudes and contradictions as each element affect each other. Furthermore, he saw that the agendas of the studies of struggles and peace were farther than preventing them. Instead, they went for finding positive peace in the human community, consequently, settling conflicts require a change in attitude and behaviour.¹

This model has been one of the main models for explaining the stages of any conflict by following the three previously mentioned elements until contradictions in the structural violence is moved to a peaceful stage taking lessons from wrong perceptions and attitudes which require change.²

2.2.1.1. Conflict Triangle

It is a model explaining symmetrical and asymmetrical conflicts by following the triangle of explaining international conflicts. Thus, it consists of three dimensions, namely: contradiction, behaviour and attitude. The first represents the concept of having contradicting ideas while the second represents the actual violent actions by one of the parties causing threat to it. Finally, the third element is the wrong perceptions of one party on the other. ³These dimensions interact with each other negatively leading to either escalating the conflict or living in harmony.

2.2.1.2. Violence Triangle

This triangle consists of direct violence which is the actions or attitudes causing physical, social, environmental or psychological harm or preventing people from getting their

¹ Sami Ibraim Al-Khaznadar. Edarat Al-Sirat Wa Fad Al-Monazat. Markaz Al-Jazeera Lildirasat. Al-Dar Al-Arabia L9lolom. Taba 1. Page 28. (In Arabic)

² Previously mentioned.

³ Johan Galtung, violence/peace/and peace research, journal of peace research, (1969).

needs. The second part of the triangle is structural violence which represent the oppressive procedures including social inequality and social injustice. Finally, cultural violence is the reaction of direct violence depending on hatred or promoting for bad image of the other as well as psychological mobility against the other.

2.2.1.3. Conflict Resolution Triangle

According to Galtung, there are vital variables in this triangle starting from attitude dispute, change of stands and going away from contradicting interests. He distinguished between negative peace and positive peace. The latter is based on overcoming structural violence and cultural violence including ideas about justice and jurisdiction.¹ He also indicates that eliminating direct violence is done through change of attitude and ending structural violence through dealing with structural contradictions and ending cultural violence which changes attitudes.²

2.2.2. Social Identity Theory

It can be employed to explain the failure of “People to People” program or explaining the reasons of the failure of the dialogue between the Israelis and the Palestinians through “People to People program.

The founder of this theory are John Turner and Henri Tijfar. They described the circumstances required to increase the importance of social identity in order to influence social attitude in the social group.

This theory is based on three main central knowledge components. The first is social classification which is the trend of groups to organize themselves in order to understand their social world. The second is the social unification with one’s traditions and social

¹ Soft-war-smart-war-think-again //04/www.fpri.org/articles/2012.

² Johan Galtung, conflict as away of life, new society, London, (1969).

comparison that people tend to compare between their group and the others, based stature and social status.¹

Consequently, social identity is an important part of the concept of the ego resulted from individual's awareness of their values and passion. According to this theory, there are two components for individuals including their psychological identity collective one. The first includes the personal characteristics like being satisfied, psychological characteristics and personal values. However, collective identity is the product of individual's knowledge of his feelings and his feelings towards his group that any relation with the group doesn't have to be personal, but the most important thing is having a sense of belonging to the group.

This way, social attitude of groups can be realized in the trend of the group that classifying groups as losers and winners lead people to prefer their inner group even though there is an absence of conflict with other groups. In this sense, the sense of belonging increase and conflict increase in case of defending it.²

Henri explained that we tend to classify the world into "us" or "them" based on the social classification. In other words, it is the classification of people according to being members in groups biased wise. He thinks that a simple act of any member is enough to distinguish members more than others in the same group. Accordingly, members seek negative aspects in other groups strengthening their values as being members to a certain group. Besides, negative bias among cultures results in racial division and even genocide as in Bosnia and Herzegovina.³

¹ Cynthia Vinney, understanding social identity theory and its impact on behavior, (2019).

² Amani Abosoboh, the role of social Palestinian identity in psychological adjustment following military violence, Pangaea journal, (2020).

³ Ibid, Al- Khazandar.

2.2.3. Settler Colonization Theory

It can be employed to explain the failure of “From People to People” program or explaining that Zionism aims to diminish the aboriginals to be transferred from their land that Zionism can be colonizers seeking to kills the Palestinians.

Also, it reflects colonization exploitation that it aims to take advantage of the aboriginals and get rid of them or even transfer them.¹ Furthermore, it is proven that colonized power focuses on the land instead pf population and the political and economic dependency, so monopolizing natural resources are directed to achieve this goal.²

Settler colonialism is known for its elimination wise relationship with the aboriginals and its temporary relationship with the imperial center as well as its permanent relationship with the colonized land, the ideological discourse, non-affiliate capital as well as the accurate social architecture.³

Some researchers based their studies on the logic of eradication which might not be necessarily physical that they attempted to explain the settler colonialism’s choice to keep the Aboriginals alive. Still, their stay is subject to social, cultural and national change that they would be without any value in the social formation of the new settlers’ society.⁴

In the case of settler colonialism, the relationship with the imperial centre more complicated that the colonials immigrate to imperial countries keeping a good strategy with it until his society does the same or immigrates to a European country keeping

¹ Patrick Wolfe, settler colonialism and transformation of anthropology: the politics and poetics of an ethnographic event, London, (1999).

² Previously mentioned. (Nadia Najad)

³ Waleed Habis, Mafhom Al-Istimar A- Istintani: Nahw Itar Nathari Jadid. 2017. Page 115. (In Arabic).

⁴ Previously mentioned.

strategic relations with an imperial country other than the one, he came from. For example, the case of the Zionists who went out of Eastern Europe who had good relations with Britain as the first homeland.¹

Concerning the colonized land, the British colonization is going back on time to be the king of the new settlers.² For example, the Zionist settlers redecorated Palestine through changing the names, symbols, memories and historic narrations to belong to his.³ The British colony uses racial discourse to show settlers as rightful owners of land while the aboriginals are about to obliterated.⁴

¹ Lorenzo Veracini, understanding colonialism and settler colonialism as distinct formation in intervention, (2014).

² Ibid, Joseph, Nye, (1990).

³ Kamel Henedi. Al-Mahw WA Al-Insha Fe AL-Mashrou Al-Istimari Al-Sahyoni. Majalat Al-Dirasat Al-Filistinia, Adad 96. Page118. (In Arabic)

⁴ Ibid, Joseph, Nye, (1990).

Chapter Three

Palestinian Public Diplomacy Before Oslo Agreement

3.1. Palestinian Diplomacy before 1948 (Diplomatic Conferences and Delegations)

The Palestinian political resistance started before 1917 when some of the leaders in Jerusalem wrote an objection memo to the president of the Ottoman Prime Minister in 1891 asking him to ban the immigration of the Russian Jews to Palestine and banning them to own anything in it. Also, they communicated with a number of Arab leaders to inform them about the risks the Palestinian go through due to Zionist immigration and the establishment of a national homeland for the Jews in Palestine.

Then, in 1913, the first Arab conference was held in Paris including many Palestinian personnel who proposed about the problem the Palestinians suffer from leading to 1917.¹ Only then, the Palestinian masses started to move against the Zionist's aggression through writing articles in the Palestinian and Arab newspapers demanding the Palestinians to move and take action against Zionism by protesting and sending letter of objection. This way, the pressure on the Turks was huge and the entrance of Arab committees and factions in Cairo was possible.

On the other hand, the political movement of the Palestinian leadership started to take a diplomatic form after 1917 that the masses' movement went out asking the Arab leaders to unify their power and lobby on Britain to call off Belfour Promise.

¹ Abdulwahab, Al-Kayali. *Al-Mowjaz Fe Tarikh Falstin Al-Hadith. Al-Moasasa Al-Arabia Lildirasat Wa Al-Nasher Wa Al-Tawzi.* (1971) pp.26. (In Arabic)

In the following year, the Palestinian masses started to form Islamic and Christian societies which was parallel to the Zionist organizations which tried to control the Arab lands. The first real move was in 1919 when the first conference was held in Jerusalem and the committee there decided to send a delegation to work with the Syrian leaders to help the Palestinians.

Also, it was decided to send delegations to Paris to get the French leaders informed about the demands of the Palestinians. Thus, these decisions were the beginning of the Palestinian diplomatic campaign Arab and global wise.¹

Fortunately, Britain allowed a delegation led by Faysal Bin Al-Husseini to represent the Arab demands including the Palestinian ones. Also, it allowed a Jewish delegation led by Chaim Wisemann to represent the demands of the Jewish organization. Wisemann asked to recognise the historic right of the Jews in establishing their homeland in Palestine including Palestine, Eastern Jordan, Southern part of Lebanon and Al-Shekh mountain. During this conference, there was an agreement between Wisemann and Faysal called "Faysal Wisemann agreement.

In mid of the same year, the Palestinian leaderships moved and contacted the Syrian leaderships to join forces against the Zionists in Palestine resulting in the General Syrian conference led by Mohammad Fawzi Basha and with the participation of Palestinian leaderships including Saed Al-Husseini and Ragheb Al-Nashashibi.²

One of the most important decisions in this conference is rejecting all the international treaties which divided the Arab land especially the Sykes–Picot Agreement and Belfour

¹ Talal Abu Afifa. *Al-Doblomasia WA Al-Istratijia Fe Al-Saha Al-Filistinia. 1897-1997*, (1998). (In Arabic)

² Abdul-Kareem Aub Salma. *Kifah Arab Falstin. Manshorat Allajien Al-Filistinin*. (1964). (In Arabic)

promise.¹ Then, in 1920, the Palestinians elected the Highest Islamic Council led by Haj Ameen Al-Husseini that it was the biggest Islamic national institutions in the country.

After this conference, there was a 3rd conference in Haifa assuring that Palestine was included in the Arab Kingdom which Britain promised to recognise. Then, the conference elected the executive committee from the moderate Palestinian high profiled personnel who supervised the execution of the decisions of this conference and contact the British authorities considering it an elected authority.

After the 3rd conference in 1921, this committee met with one of the British personnel and presented a memo accusing the British government to be the God-fathers of the idea of establishing the Jewish state in Palestine as well as presenting demands of establishing a Palestinian national government in Palestine in the Parliament. Besides, they demanded not to separate Palestine from the Arab states cancelling the idea of having a national homeland to the Jews in Palestine as well as stopping the Jewish lands deals. Surprisingly, the British official rejected these demands.² Still, this reply had the greatest impact in the Palestinian leaderships to continue the political struggle on the Palestinian and Arab arena.

Then, in late 1921, the 4th Palestinian conference was held focusing on the previous conferences' decisions. One of the decisions of the conference was sending a Palestinian delegation to Europe to explain the Palestinian cause. While the delegation was in Europe, it met the Syrian delegation holding a conference demanding the full independence of Syria, Palestine and Lebanon. As this conference came in light of the mutual diplomatic

¹ Abdulwahab Al-Kayali. *Al- Mojaz Fe Tarekh Falastin Al-Hadith. Al- Moasasa Al-Arabia Lildirasat.* (1971). (In Arabic)

² *Ibid, Wafa,* (1977).

coordination between them, the Palestinian delegation went to London to contact with the English officials and Arab groups.

This Palestinian delegation made use of this visit to Europe that they visited Rome and met the Pope. Also, they stayed in Geneva to show their demands on the League of Nations. After that, they went Nablus in the 5th conference in 1922 to show what they'd done in the previous period. The 5th conference decisions included opening an ads office in London to bused for the Palestinian cause. ¹ In June 1923, after the 6th conference in Jaffa, they decided to send delegation all over the world to spread the Palestinian demands.

Then, the committee attempted the British committee to study the problem of Palestine, but the latter rejected meeting them. Then, the delegation left to America to explain the Palestinian cause and raise donations for the Palestinian cause. After that in 1924, the delegation visited Switzerland, India, Iraq, Bahrain, Iran and Kuwait to contact with the Arab leaders leading to having an Islamic and Arab solidarity with the Palestinian cause. In early 1925, the 7th conference was held in Jaffa discussing the state in Palestine and then they met the British Minister of the colonies to ask him to call of Belfour promise and stop the Jewish immigration as well as the formation of a unified national government, but these demands were rejected. The Palestinian delegation didn't give up and held a meeting in 1926 between Mills the assistant of the secretary general of the British mandate government and the Palestinian delegation talking about the rejection of the British authorities the demands of the Palestinian delegations.

Then, in 1928, a conference was held led by Mosa Kathem Al-Husseini and 250 representatives of all the areas of Palestine deciding to send a telegram to the League of

¹ Emil Tuma. Jothor Al-QaDIA Al-Filistinia . Al-Amal Al-Kamila. Haifa. 145. (1972)(In Arabic)

Nations asking them to establish a parliamentary democratic rule in Palestine as well as electing an executive committee composed of all the families and classes in Palestine.

Then, in 1929, the delegation continued travelling to promote the Palestinian demands¹ that in the same year a feminine conference was held in Jerusalem to assure the previous decisions of the previous conferences.² They called for a meeting with the higher commissioner to deliver him the demands of the Palestinian women including calling off Belfour promise and stopping the Jewish immigration to Palestine.

However, great protests and clashes between the Jews and the Palestinians occurred all over Palestine in 1929 leading to the increase of popular awareness and sticking to the diplomatic choice. In light of these bloody events, the League of Nations agreed to study the reasons of this struggle by forming a committee to do so.

The committee arrived to Palestine in 1930 and then it issued a report including the ownership of Al-Buraq Wall to the Muslims. Then, the delegation travelled to London where McDonald the British PM met them, but they were rejected. Based on that, the communication was cut between the British personnel and the Palestinian delegation.³

After the repeated rejection of the demands of the Palestinians, the all-out strike and demonstrations started that there was a conference in Nablus asking to stop giving weapons to the Jews. Another conference was held in 1931 in an attempt to found an Arab- Islamic body to stop the Jews' aggression in Palestine that 22 representatives from 22 countries were present as they decided to hold an Islamic conference to develop cooperation among all Muslims around the world. Also, they decided to open branches for a center for the promotion of the Palestinian demands in the Islamic countries as well

¹ Ibid, Wafa, (1977).

² The first women conference that 300 women participated in it from all over Palestine.

³ Ibid, Wafa, (1977).

as electing an executive conference composed of 25 members led by Haj Ameen Al-Husseini and the representatives of the delegations that their first act was to contact the Arab politicians asking them about their opinions.¹

Then, in 1932, another Youth conference in Palestine in which it had been decided to unify the efforts from all the Arab countries to get the full independence.² Then, all sectors worked hard to stand against the Zionists plans establishing *Al-Istiqlal* Faction led by *Awni Abdul-Hadi* who started an all-out campaign against Britain. After that, in early 1933, they met the high commission asking him to protect the Arab citizens, but his answer wasn't encouraging.

This led the faction to call for a meeting for the leaders in Jaffa to plan how to face the state of lack of the cooperation of the British government. It was agreed that they should boycott the receptions of the government and the members of the governmental council at the political and social level as well as boycotting the British and Jewish products at the economic level. In the same year, the Palestinian delegation visited Iraq, India and Iran after calling the Arab and Islamic leaderships in these countries to face these dangers.³

Then, in 1934, another faction was established called *Al-Difa Al-Watani* led by Ragheb Al-Nashashebi and then another one was established called the Palestinian Arab faction led by Jamal Al-Husseini. After that, in 1935, a third faction was established called *Al-Islah* aimed at the independence of Palestine in the Arab unity. Also, the Palestinian communist faction was established after Belfour promise.

¹ Issa Al-Saffari. *Falastine Al-Arabaia Bain AlIntidab Wa Al-Sahyonia*. Matbaat Maktabat FALASTIN Al-Jadinida. Yafa,178. (1937). (In Arabic)

² Ibid, Basil, Khadir, (2014).

³ Ibid, Wafa, (1977).

In 1935, the Islamic conference was held in Jerusalem for Islamic religious men who decided to send a call for the kings of the Arabs and Muslims around the world about the state of the Palestinian cause asking them for help.

On May 1935, the Youth movement held its second conference deciding to form sub-committees for youth all over the Palestinian cities in order to serve the Palestinian cause and promote for it to tighten their relations with the Arab countries.

Apparently, the emergence of the Palestinian factions and the increase of the struggle due to be based on family's support, this led the Palestinian leadership to unify the call and go against the occupation and Zionism. Then, the faction of Al-Kotla Al-Watania held a meeting to unify all the other faction on the table that after the martyrdom of Al-Qassam, the leadership delivered a memo to the high commissioner asking him to form a democratic government in Palestine. Some demands were denied. Instead, the British suggested establishing the Palestinian legislative council which was rejected by the Palestinian leadership.¹

Then, in 1936, the Palestinian great revolution started announcing civilian disobedience and the boycotting of the British authorities. This led to the formation of the Arab High Committee in mid-1936 led by Haj Ameen Al-Husseini and the other leader who led this stage. ² However, in the same year, the high commissioner called the leaders of the Palestinian factions to send their demands to London before the British PM. Unfortunately, there were disagreements about the membership of the delegations leading to the continuity of the revolution and the declaration of general strike.

¹ Ibid, Wafa, (1977).

² Rashad Tawm. Dobomasia Al-Taharor Al-Watani Al-Filistinia. Mahad Ibahim Abu Laghad Lidirasat Al- dwalia. Ramallah. (2013). (In Arabic)

Then, Britain moved in 1937 and issued a report assuring that the solution of the problem of Palestine couldn't be achieved without dividing Palestine into three sections, namely: a fully Arab country inhabited by Arabs, Eastern Jordan and the Jewish state.¹

This report was rejected leading the Arabs to escalate the political and military actions. Concerning the Palestinian leaderships, they escalated the diplomatic actions on the Arab and international arena sending messengers all over the Arab countries to get their solidarity. Also, they sent three delegations to the League of Nations, Bulgaria and Turkey. Consequently, in 1938, Britain cancelled this decision deciding that it was impossible to divide Palestine after this resistance.

Instead, it called for a conference where the Arab, English and Jewish representatives meet, but nothing was decided in favor of Palestine. Then in November 1938, the Egyptian parliamentary committee called for an Arab committee with the participation of representatives of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Yemen and India. They decided to send a delegation to London to deliver the demands of the Palestinians to the PM.²

Then, in 1939, the conference in London was opened with the presence of the British, Arab and Jews in the evening in which the Arabs, Jews presented their demands as Britain offered a settlement to the Palestinian cause. Surprisingly, the British government agreed on the establishment of a Palestinian independent government related to Britain's highest interests. In addition to limiting the Jews immigration on the condition of having a transitional period. But the latter was rejected by both sides.³

After the silence and stability in all the Palestinian areas, the second World War (1939-1945) started and all the diplomatic works stopped because of the arrest of many

¹ Ibid, Nadia Naser Najjab, (2020).

² Akram Zeiter. Wathaeq Al- Haraka Al-Watania Al- Fiistinia 1918- 1939. Moasast Al- Dirasat Al- Filistinia. P 1. 1984. 117. (In Arabic)

³ Ibid, Wafa, (1977).

leaderships and some of them ran out of the country. Then, in 1943, a new league came to the surface called the “Liberation National League”.¹

It was distinguished from the previous bodies that it depended on the people without relying on kings or Arab leaders. In light of the absence of the Palestinian leaderships, the Palestinians scattered, but in 1943 the Arab League decided to add Palestine to its charter considering it a member represented by a Palestinian representative in its sessions who was Mosa Al-Alami.²

The Palestinian delegation asked for the Palestinian demands in its sessions that one of the most important decisions was boycotting the Jewish products sent to their countries.

³ As a result of the decision of opening offices in London and Washington for the Arab League, Al-Alami opened offices in New York, London and Jerusalem. He used a wise plan to communicate with the foreign affairs employees and journalists to influence the people.⁴

After the end of the second World War and the British victory, an American British committee was sent to Palestine to study the political, economic and social status there and the impact of the immigration of the Jews on the Palestinians. Then, a meeting of the Arab League was held in 1946 to consider the report of the committee that it decided to send a complaint to the security Council and the UN.⁵

¹ The League of National Liberation: a communist political party established by Arabs in the Palestinian communist party. Including members of intellectuals. Established in 1944.

² Mosa Al- Alami: A Palestinian lawyer who was trusted by the Palestinian factions. He was chosen to represent Palestine in the League of Nations.

³ Ibid, Wafa, (1977).

⁴ <http://www.marefa.org>.

⁵ Ibid, Wafa, (1977).

Then, the leaderships united under the High Arab Front in Palestine that one of the aims was to reject colonization in all its shapes and form a unified depute government with strengthening the relations with the Arabs, but it dissolved due to disagreements.¹

In 1947, many delegations travelled to London, New York, the Islamic countries and Latin America to contact with the leaders and inform them about the Palestinian demands. It participated in the second conference in London that the Palestinian demands were rejected.

Then, Britain sent a memo to the Secretary General of the UN asking him to show the Palestinian cause in a special session that the Jewish agency represented the Jews while the Arab committee was deprived from that. Consequently, they declared that they wouldn't take part of these discussions, the investigation committee reached Palestine offering its recommendations to divide it into two states, Once the recommendation was declared, the high Arab committee rejected it calling the Arab League to hold an urgent session to discuss this report.

In June 1947, the political committee held its session in London and decided to send a memo to Britain and the US that any solution for the Palestinian cause wouldn't be accepted without the establishment of the Palestinian independent state threatening a state of turmoil in the Middle East and Palestine.²

Then, in the second session of the UN, they decided to divide Palestine making the Palestinians go through a state of demonstrations that the Palestinian delegation participated in the session of the Arab League and decided to put down this decision.

¹ Dr. Khalil Al-Budairi. 160 aman Ma Alharaka Al Watania . Manshorat Salah Al- Din. 1982. 115. (in Arabic)

² Ibid, Wafa, (1977).

Based on what happened, the representative of the US decided to reject this proposal which was a victory for the Arabs and the Palestinian cause.

In early 1948, Britain started to withdraw from Palestine leaving the Jews to take over as it strengthened them and gave them strategic regions and completed the withdrawal on the 15th of May 1948.¹

After 1948, the calamities of the Palestinians continued in an attempt to defend their rights diplomatically, but they were weak compared to the diplomatic power and the military strategic power of the Jews depending on its alliances with the great powers.

To conclude, these political and diplomatic activities began before Britain taking the form of resisting the occupation. This stage was distinguished with the emergence of all shapes of diplomacy against the aggression of the Jews including statements, people's calls for people's and leaderships' support of the Palestinians.

Also, the formation of factions and issuing articles in the Palestinians and Arab newspapers is a kind of diplomacy. The second type is the political call and the delegations with the world in order to explain the Palestinian cause to get international support for it. It can be said that all these forms of diplomacy the Palestinian knew whether they were public or unofficial.

3.2. The Palestinian Public Diplomacy (1948-1964)

In 1948, most Arab countries' armies participated in the Palestinian war which lasted for month with some periods of truce. However, it ended with the Israeli control over most parts of Palestine leading to dispersing the Palestinians and the absence of their national movement for years. Concerning the rest of Palestine, it was divided to the West Bank which was annexed to Jordan and Gaza Stripe annexed to Egypt.

¹ Ibid, Richard, Folk.

The first spark of unity was in Gaza when the Palestinian National Council held a meeting including most of the leaderships including Ameen Al-Husseini. There, the independence of Palestine was announced along with the temporary constitutions and the formation of the government of Palestine.¹

Then, the Arab League became active in Sept 1948 to achieve the project of the establishment of the government of Palestine; most of the Arab countries agreed on this project except for Jordan. This government was important because it assured the necessity of representing Palestine with a government reflecting its identity in the sessions and Arab summits.² Still, this government wasn't good enough to create a durable unified body that their presence was only to do their civil limited tasks.

Furthermore, the Palestinian committee kept its official presence in the Arab League under the umbrella of the head of the government of Palestine Ahmad Helmi, but the works of the government stopped in September 1952.³

There is no doubt that after 1984, there was a recession of national activities, but in the 1950s, there were secret formations, workers' associations, student and women committees as well as cultural and sport clubs which aimed to raise political awareness.⁴ Also, the Palestinians were scattered along the Arab countries being affected by the Arab political intellectualism. In short, the Palestinian cause and the Arab cause are closely related to each other, so it is reasonable to share their political activities.⁵

¹ Ibid, Wafa, (1977).

² Fathy Al- Wahidi. Al- Tataworat Al- Dostoria Fe Falstine. 1917- 1995. Matabi Alhoria. Gza. Palestine. 219- 320. (In Arabic)

³ Ibid, (49).

⁴ Ibid, Wafa, (1977).

⁵ Dr. Mohammed Saed et al. Falatine Wal Alqadia Alfilistinia. Jamiat Al Quds Al Maftoha. (2008). (In Arabic)

Then, in 1952, there was enough awareness that Palestine is not for our citizens who wait the Arab countries to move because they were wrong in hoping that the Arab political parties would do anything. In other words, they had a belief that they should depend on themselves, so they decided to be nominated for the leadership of students' union which is the only body practicing democratic elections. Based on that, students' union was the only body representing the Palestinian public opinion sector called "Students' Union". Consequently, the 9 student nominees for elections called their list "Students' Union" that Yasser Arafat kept his position as the head of the students' union until he finished his studies in 1956.¹

In addition, he participated in students' conferences in Bulgaria, the USSR, Poland and Eastern Germany, so he became well-known worldwide that he had a vast network of connections and alliances. Also, his main mission was to explain the agony of the Palestinians to others keeping his faithfulness to the message that he established the Union of Palestinian Graduates in order to expand his relationships with students' unions around the world after he graduates.² In 1957, the Palestinian Liberation Movement "Fatah" being the first Palestinian movement established after 1948.

The founding meeting was held in Kuwait including a number of Palestinian leaderships; they founded the revolutionary structure of the movement and then the main principles of dealing with national work. The members agreed to establish an independent organization unaffiliate to any Arab regime.³ Finally, the establishment of Fatah paved the way to the

¹ Salah Khalaf. *Falastini Bila Hawiya*. Dar Al- Jalil Lildirasat. Al- Filistinia. 2016. (In Arabic)

² Donia Al- Watan. *Malaf Kamel Hawl HAYAT Al-Raes Yaser Arafat Bimonasabat Althikra 11 listishhadi*. Shoon Filistinia. (2015). (In Arabic)

³ Omar Rashad NASER. *Harakat FATH Al- Ishkalyat Wa A l- Tahadiyat*. Jamiat AlNajah. (2015). (In Arabic)

establishment of “Palestine” magazine aimed to explain the creed of Fatah for people that it was printed secretly.¹

This event was important to be able to go on no matter what happened since they learned from their predecessors’ mistakes when they didn’t give any importance to cooperating with the Jews or part of them since there were workers Jews who lived equally exactly as the Muslims and Christians. All of them lived in Palestine as equal citizens, but there were political factors preventing announcing this intention.²

In 1959, the general students’ union was established in public inviting all Palestinian students all over the world to join this union since they were displaced from Palestine since 1948. Furthermore, in commemoration of the division of Palestine, a conference was held on the 29th of November, 1959 in the presence of foreign and Arab unions that they phrased the constitution and lists of the nature of this union as a political movement. In other words, they worked for the return to their homeland by any means possible.

Then, it started to represent the Palestinians worldwide in several occasions taking the responsibility of explaining the Palestinian cause through the conferences and forums which played a vital role in highlighting the Palestinian cause at all levels. This led to the recognition of students’ union by Arab and international institutions mainly the Arab League.³

Then, in the 1960s, the organizations and Palestinians bodies started to highlight the Palestinian personality working on increasing its power to reclaim what was taken from Palestine in 1948.⁴

¹ Ibid, Mai Aglan, (2019).

² Ibid, Mai Aglan, (2019).

³ Khalid Abdulla. Mafhom Alp Dawla Fe Al Fikr Al Siasi Al- Filistini Al- MOaser 1988- 2012. Jamat Al- Azhar. (2013). (In Arabic)

⁴ Ibid, Wafa, (1977).

After that, in 1960, there was a diplomatic and political movement by the founders of Fatah including Yasser Arafat and Khalil Al-Wazir that they visited Libya being the main supporter of Fatah.¹

Fortunately, in 1962, a committee of experts affiliated to the Arab League determined the form of the Palestinian entity gathers all the Palestinians that it should have specific areas such as military, political and media, but Jordan's objection and the disagreements with other Arab countries led to its oblivion.²

On the 13th of September, 1963, the Algerian president approved opening Fatah's office in Algeria to practice its activities serving the Palestinian cause. Specifically, this stage was the most important stage in Fatah's history because other countries such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Libya did the same thing opening the way to Fatah to communicate with liberation movements in Asia, Africa, Latin America, China, Vietnam and Cuba partly due the efforts of Abu Jihad.

For example, their office in Algeria helped Fatah reach the Arab and international level that it was able to get an invitation to China allowing it to open its office there. Also, Abu Jihad was able to raise funding for Fatah from the areas where there were most of the Palestinian workers and students' leaders around the world. This led to the enrollment of new members to Fatah.³

Generally speaking, until 1964, the Palestinian diplomatic work was confused and disabled with the absence of an official reference. In addition to the Arab interventions in decision making, the blurry entity representing the Palestinians reflected on the Palestinian issue especially the refugees' cause. In fact, when the UNRWA was

¹ Anas Salahat. Dawr Aldoblomasia Fe Al -Tatbeer Fe Mawaqif Al- Itihat Al- Orobi 2005- 2013. An-Njah . (2013). (In Arabic)

² Dr. Jamal Abu NAHL. PLO. DAWRA TADRIBIA Fe Al- Tathqif Al- Siasi. (2015). (In Arabic)

³ Yahya Khalaf. Fath Fe Sanawatha Al- ola. Marhalat Al- Tasis. Abu Jihad AlJaazaer.

established in 1950, the Palestinian cause was dropped in 1952 from the schedule of the UN's general assembly.¹

3.3. Palestinian Diplomacy (1964-1974)

The emergence of the Palestinian factions, the development of the national movement, the inability of Arab factions to achieve the required goals and the dissolution of the Arab unity between Egypt and Syria led to the belief of the Palestinians to take charge with the Algerian help. Furthermore, this made many local and regional factors go with the united work towards establishing the Palestinian independent entity. In 1963, Ahmad Al-Shuqairi was assigned as the representative of Palestine in the Arab League after Ahmad Helmi Basha being entrusted to form a delegation to the UN to defend the Palestinian cause.

Then, in 1964, Arab Cairo summit was held concluding it with the statement of solidarity with the Palestinians' right to be liberated from occupation that Al-Shuqairi was assigned to name it. Consequently, he started tours and calls with the Palestinian groups in order to formulate the Palestinian charter and basic system of the PLO. Then, they decided to hold a Palestinian conference and form a preparatory committee for the conference from all over the Arab countries.²

Then, in 1964, he held the first Arab conference in Jerusalem declaring the establishment of the PLO and the Palestinian national charter which was amended after four years.³ After that, many PLO's institutions were formed based on a state that the Arab summits

¹ Ibid, Nadia Najjab, (2020).

² Hakam THIab. Fasel Al- Amal Alwatani Wa Daeroha Fe Al Niadal Al-Taharoi Lilshab Al-FALASTININ. Jam. Alquds. (2009). (In Arabic)

³ Ibid, Wafa, (1977).

supported the formation of the PLO assuring its representation of the Palestinians all over the world.¹

It is apparent from the previously mentioned that after a long fight, the Palestinians could come together overcoming the attempts of getting rid of their identity by establishing the PLO representing them in the international events.

In the same year, Fatah completed its preparations for a revolutionary military action in the occupied territories without any planning as a complementary struggle against the Israeli occupation. At the same time, the PLO was trying to keep the recognition of the Palestinians on the map.²

Then, the 1967 defeat and the increase of the Palestinian factions' power, there were internal efforts obliged Al-Shuqairi to resign to open the way to Yahya Hamouda to take over as the head of the executive committee. In the meanwhile, the national charter was amended as well as the basic system of the PLO. A year later, the victory of the Fida' Palestinian fight at Al-Karama, Hamouda started his calls with the other factions to get in the fight that they attended the 5th session of the PNC on February 1969. That was a glorious moment when Yasser Arafat was elected as the head of the executive committee winning the voices of the majority of Fatah.³

It has been proven that revolution is the best way to express people's demands because the PLO remained a prisoner to the stands of the regimes while revolution had military and non-military methods being able to launch initiatives which were necessary to keep on their fight.⁴

¹ Ibid, Smuha Fawq Al-Ada, (1973).

² Mahmud Abbas. Tariq oslo Sahrikat Al- Matboat Litawzi Wa Al NASHER. Beirut. T 1. (1994). 17 (In Arabic)

³ Ibid, Nadia, Najjab, (2020).

⁴ Ibid, Nadia, Najjab, (2020).

In the Palestinians leaders' minds, the idea of establishing the independent democratic state in which Jews, Muslims and Christians live equally. This start was the spark for the political solutions of the status quo.¹

The handover of the leadership to the PLO, its foreign relations were united within the speciality of the political department of the PLO as the central administration of foreign affairs. In doing this, Fatah benefited from its former diplomatic experience in its presence on the international conferences on the behalf of students' union especially in the 1960s students' revolution.

The Palestinian diplomacy (1964-1974) was the embodiment of the marketing of the revolutionary work or popular diplomacy that it depended on students' and workers' cells as a main carrier of the artistic and cultural product of the Palestinians. Also, Palestinian groups all over the world approved the PLO that the democratic environment of Lebanon as well as its location helped the PLO make international calls more freely.²

Also, the Palestinian diplomacy played a vital role in the international arena in explain the Palestinian cause getting more solidarity from more than a hundred country including the USSR, the communist countries and the NAM countries as well as other European countries. These relations could establish diplomatic, political and economic relations with many countries that the PLO agreed with many African countries on agricultural and industrial projects such as Madagascar and Somalia.³

At the international level, 1969 was a turning point for the Palestinian cause in the UN that after its absence from the schedules of the UN assembly's sessions for 17 years,

¹ Ibid, Smuha, Al-Ada, (1973).

² Ibid, Nadia, Najjab, (2020).

³ Ibid, Wafa, (1977).

resolution (2535) acknowledged the rights of the Palestinians and then in 1970 the PLO representatives were invited to the UN to discuss Palestinian issues.

As known for Algeria, it supported sending representatives from the PLO to work in offices of the Arab League in its session in 1971.¹ Then, the PLO opened its office in Tokyo and Beijing in 1973 after Arafat's visit to Moscow in 1968.²

Thus, the PLO sought through its research center and its offices to highlight the Palestinian cause and then the offices of the Arab League and some embassies of the world would publish these papers at a larger scale.³

In the 1970s, it was hard to convince people with the justice of the Palestinian cause due to the new use of diplomacy compared to the Israeli diplomacy use in 1948 which wiped out the rights of the Palestinians at the European and American arena. Despite all that, the Palestinian diplomacy could face this diplomacy in the European and African arena to get support from many countries.⁴

In 1971, the PLO started to follow other kinds of struggle especially in the 8th session of the PNC that armed struggle is the main but not the only way of resisting the occupation.

On the contrary, other forms should go alongside the armed struggle.⁵

After that, in 1973 war, negotiations for permanent peace in the Middle East began by holding Geneva international convention under the supervision of the US and the USSR.

Unfortunately, the PLO was not invited and this led to the war and many political changes in the attitude of the PLO from adopting a new strategy.

¹ Ibid, Nadia, Najjab, (2020).

² Mohamed Salim. Al- Siasa Al -Sinia Aza Al- Qadaya AlArabia. Al-Majala Lithaqafa. 38. 12. In Arabic)

³ Ramzi Al- Nwaja. Al- Ada Al- Doblomasi Fe Tazzi Al MAWQIF Al Dwali AlqDAIYA Lajen. Jamat Al- Aqsa. 2016. 87. (In Arabic)

⁴ Ibid, Wafa, (1977).

⁵ Ibid, Nadia, Najjab, (2020).

It is clear from the previously mentioned that the Palestinian diplomacy didn't benefit from this period because it didn't benefit from the diplomatic experience before the establishment of the PLO. In other words, their first years was to retrieve the Palestinian identity more than having a diplomatic achievement.

The Palestinian diplomacy in this stage was affected by the previous stage that it embodied the revolutionary spirit using new cells of students and workers keeping the rights of the Palestinians to decide its fate. In other words, they succeeded in delivering their message to the world that there are Palestinians who struggle to get their rights.

3.4. The Palestinian Diplomacy. (1974-1986) (A Change in the Palestinian Political Reason)

While looking at the political decisions of the Palestinian national councils, it is noticed that the first political goals of the establishment of the PLO is reclaiming the rights of the Palestinians and the establishment of the Palestinian state on the whole space of Palestine. In other words, considering that Palestine is part of the Arab world and the Arab nation, there has been a change in 1968 when the PNC accepted the establishment of the democratic state of Palestine.

This way, the PLO changed its mind about the rejection of the presence of the Jews in Palestine due to gaining more approval by the worldwide opinion and the political powers and factions. This change of mind was because the PLO found that the Arabs relinquished the Palestinian cause and that revolution cannot free Palestine by on its own. Also, there was a realization that it still needed the funds of the Arabs as well as their political and diplomatic support.

Furthermore, the Palestinians found themselves alone in the political arena after the Arabs disagreements, so the Palestinians found themselves going to the peaceful option along with the negotiations with Israel. It was clear that the PLO which supported the armed

struggle became rejected by America and Israel and by other Arab countries secretly. Thus, it was obvious that taking over Israel needed well-equipped armies working under the umbrella of a strategic ally as the world wouldn't allow taking over Israel.¹ This led the PLO to change their strategy.

When we talk about the change in the Palestinian strategy, it is important to talk about October war in 1973 which lost the Palestinian revolution its confidence of the full liberation of Palestine through armed struggle. In other words, this war proved the inability of Israel to get rid of Israel and reclaiming the occupied lands in 1967 by going to war. Here, it is not about the power of Israel, but it is for international considerations and the nature of the depth of the relationship of the US making this war and the Arab regimes more realistic in their view of the struggle with Israel. They exploited their defeat to detach from the Palestinian cause and give up all their responsibilities towards it by going to the peaceful choice directly.

This way, the Palestinian revolution realized what was being planned, so it moved into two directions, namely: avoiding the attempts of marginalizing it locally and internationally by empowering its existence in Lebanon. The second is softening its political views or its political discourse by sending letters in public and secretly to retrieve the half solutions or stages policy.²

As time passed, the old members of the PLO emerged as having the major roles in scouting the possibility of communicating with Israel. One of those is Mahmud Abbas (Abu Mazen).³

¹ Sameer Yousef Hassan Al-Fikr Al-Siasi Al-Filistini. Bain Al-Kifah Al-Mosalah Wa Altaswiya. 1964- 2010. AlQusd. 59. (In Arabic)

² Ibrahim Arash. Al-Hiwar Alp Motamadin. Ldawalat Falastinian Fe Al-Mawathiq Al Watania. A 2200. (2008). (In Arabic)

³ Mohammed Hasanin Haikal. Al-Mofawadat Al-Siria BAIN Alaab Wa Al YAHOD. Salam Al-Awham. DAR Al-horouq. Cairo. 1996. 53. (In Arabic)

Abu Mazen says in his journal “one day, I read a flash news in a local newspaper saying that the Jews of the Arab countries represent half of Israel. This flash news aroused my curiosity and asked how the Arab countries provided Israel with half of its population, what their relationship with the Western Jews was like. I had so many questions which I couldn’t answer! I had to start over and read the hidden secrets of Israel. Since 1970 until 1977, I published two books about the Jewish immigration from the Arab countries and the Western countries and the relationship of Israel with America. The second one is peace proponents in the Israeli society.”¹

In the meanwhile, the Palestinians sought to secure meetings with the Israelis, so he urged the representatives of the PLO in Palestine to move fast in this direction especially communicating with the Communist Israeli Faction and Mats Abin which were secretive. Still, the main goal behind this move was to find powers to lobby on the Zionist government in order to make understanding easier for both. In the meanwhile, the PLO amended its charter to legalize these meetings that it agreed on the 10 points programs in its 12th session in 1974. That program stated the establishment of the Palestinian authority on any part of the Palestinian land.

This change in the point of view of the leaders of the PLO demands a change in the used vocabulary that instead of using “armed struggle is the only way of liberating Palestine” became “became one of the liberation tools, but not the only one. ²This is considered a transformation from structural violence to structural peace according to Johan Galtung’s theory.

¹ Ibid, Smuha, Fawq Al-Ada, (1973).

² Ameen Mustafa. Itisalat Sirya Arabia Sahyonia. 1918- 1993 DAR Al- Waseela Lilnasher Wa Itawzi. 1994. 117. (In Arabic)

Also, Abbas called for two slogans, namely: demanding the Arab countries to ask for the return of the Jews who came from them or to them and communicating with the Israelis to gain a channel of dialogue with them to reach peace.¹ Indeed, the Palestinian communication with the Israelis expanded that Dr. Isam Al-Sartawi led these communications by meeting the secretary general of the Israeli labor party Ariele "Luba" Eliav and the secretary of HaOlam HaZeh magazine and other Left personalities.²

This step was highly praised in the PNC by the Arab regimes who held a summit at Rabat and considered the PLO the only legitimate representer of the Palestinians considering this an Arab level privilege. This step paved the way to the Arab regimes to propose a political settlement without being embarrassed. Also, it was blessed by the international community that the general assembly of the UN assured that the Palestinians are an essential part in any settlement of the Palestinian cause.

Consequently, this led to considering the PLO an essential participant in the UN assembly that in the same session, Arafat was received welcoming the peaceful solution with open arms. He said his well-known quote: "I have holding a branch of olive in one hand and the rifle of fighter in the other" which summarized his strategy's transformation from armed to peaceful resistance.³

In this period, the third world countries and its organizations such as the African Unity, the Islamic Conference, the Non- Aligned Countries were with the Palestinian cause. Also, the USSR and the communist countries understood the stands of the Palestinian revolution as well as other western countries' stands towards the Palestinian cause.⁴

Abu Mazen was in Beirut indicating his new- old theory in points:

¹ Ibid, Smuha, Fawq Al-Ada, (1973).

² Ibid, Nicholas, J cull (2016).

³ Ibid, Moammed, Eshtaya, (2011).

⁴ Ibid, Ziad, Abdulla Al-Jabouri, (2007).

1. The Palestinian revolution should understand its enemy and didn't have to deal with it as one body since there are western Jews (Ashkenazim), eastern Jews (Sephardim) and the Arab Jews who came from the Arab countries.
2. There are Israeli institutions who believe in peaceful co-existence with Arabs.
3. The disengagement agreements of Al-Sadat with Israel under the patronage of Kissinger regardless their consequences, peace talks were in Israel.

Abu Mazen called for his ideas in Beirut, but the civil war in Lebanon and the entrance of the Syrian army to Lebanon made it hard for him that the Palestinian activities due to the Syrian siege. This was in favour of Abu Mazen since the PLO didn't want that, so he started scouting for new possibilities of communicating with the Israelis paving the way to a further step after getting out of Lebanon.¹

From here, he started to communicate with the Israelis, but in order to keep it close to the legislative representative of the Palestinians, the executive committee decided to meet the representatives of the communist Israeli party "Rakah" in 1977.²

Then, in the same year, the PNC held its 13th session executed by Isam Sartawi that all the Palestinian factions attacked him that some of them are in Fatah. In fact, these calls were approved by the PLO after signing decision (14) of the 13th session stating the importance of the relationship and coordination with the democratic Jewish forces in the occupied territories and outside it against Zionism".³

This way, these calls became legitimate since they were agreed upon by the PNC, however, most Palestinians didn't accept it without understanding the reasons behind such step. In fact, there were two motivations for such move, that there are Jews who

¹ Ibid, Samuel, Cox, (1824-1889).

² Dr. Mahmud Abbas. HAithi Alp Itisalat Limatha. Ramallah Falastine. (2011). (In Arabic)

³ Ibid, Smuha, Fawq Al-Ada, (1973).

were with peace calling themselves “Peace Now “movement that this movement had many thoughts about peace and peaceful process.

Also, there were the Andalusian Jews who lived in the Arab countries, Turkey and Bulgaria. Contacting them since 1977 created a bridge of peace between the Palestinians and the Jews mentioned before opening an extra option for the PLO.¹

Also, Abu Mazen gave his orders to the offices of the PLO with the approval of Arafat to start communicating with the Jews according the decision of the PNC highlighting that those Jews should have good intentions towards peace with the Palestinians.

The repercussions of these calls were terrible that some Palestinian extremists were assassinated in order to stop this call with the peaceful Israelis Sometimes, the Israeli intelligence also did the same in order to prevent this contact with the Palestinians. One of the assassinated Palestinians due to these calls was Raof Al-Qaisi (the director of the PLO’s office in Paris); Saed Al-Hammami (the director of the PLO’s office in London); Iz Al-Din Al-Qalaq (the director of the PLO’s office in Paris”.²

These continuous assassinations of the managers of the PLO offices everywhere led the PLO to look for protection for its managers starting with King Hassan who was pro-peace with the Israelis since he paved the way to the Egyptian- Israeli talks. Also, he visited Jerusalem as Al-Sadat did to communicate with the Israeli. In short, with or without assassinations, the PLO followed the advice of the king and the Egyptian president and went on with its decision.

The Palestinian- Israeli talks in Egypt provided a sense of security. On the other hand, Al-Sadat did so in order to control the limits of these talks to have power to lobby on the

¹ Ibid, Smuha, Fawq Al-Ada, (1973).

² Ibid, Samuel, Cox, (1824-1889).

PLO and strengthen his relations with the US. Also, he wanted to deepen the disagreements between the PLO and Syria which was on the centres of resistance against his policies towards Israel.¹

In that period, Cairo arranged for a secretive contact between the representative of the PLO the manager of its office in Cairo (Saed Kamal) and Dr. Steven Kohen who was a Jewish researcher in the Jewish studies centre in New York. The first meeting between them was in Alexandria in order to communicate with the American Zionist movement to expand these communications further. Also, the PLO wanted to communicate with more Jewish groups to influence the American decision to open direct communication with the PLO, but the American secretary of state was sent abroad to the American commissions to ban contacting the representatives of the PLO.²

In 1981, the representatives of the PLO in Cairo met Al-Sadat who advised them to talk to the Jews in America if they wanted to settle this conflict giving them the name Steven Kohen (the head of the American Jewish committee) who worked directly with Howard Squadron (the national spokesman for American Jews).

Still, this advice was not a surprising one since there were two channels of communication in America including Palestinian businessmen who are politically capable and the communication with Bruno Kreisky who is an Austrian council playing a great role in the Egyptian- Israeli peace process. He was able to put things straight since he was not biased to anyone as he was in contact with Simon Perez (one of the leaders of Israeli Labor Party), Teddy Kollek (the mayor of Jerusalem). He was the man for achieving what they

¹ Ibid, Samuel, Cox, (1824-1889).

² Ibid, Samuel, Cox, (1824-1889).

wanted because he realized that he cannot achieve peace without resolving the Palestinian cause.¹

In 1978, Dr. Isam Sartawi met Kreisky in Vienna in an attempt to consider the PLO a member in the international communism. The latter dealt with the Palestinian representative without any conservation that he arranged for many meeting in Europe and with Jewish personnel. Then, Abu Ammar visited Austria and Kreisky arranged for several meeting with communist leaders including Willy Brandt.²

Al- Sartawi had believed in this policy that he didn't only meet European Jews, but also opposing Jews including Uri Avnery (the editor of an Israeli journal), the retired general Yahshfat Harkabi (a former director of intelligence) and Binyamin Ben-Eliezer (an Israeli Labor party member).

Al-Sartawi contributed in contacting all the previously mentioned that he lived in Paris in order to do his contacts freely since there was a greater margin for him there.³ This call of peace was also successful due to General Mattityahu Peled who resigned from the army after the 1967 war to become an Arabic language teacher in Tel Aviv University where Peled met Uri and Eliav who kept in contact with the PLO for a long time.⁴

Then, Yasser Arafat met the representatives of the Israeli frontiers in Prague one with the head of the organization and the other was the secretary general of the Israeli communist party.⁵

Signing Camp David had the greatest effect in convincing the opposers of the idea that the Palestinian leadership attempted to get an approval from the PNC that in the 15th

¹ Ibid, Samuel, Cox, (1824-1889).

² Ibid, Samuel, Cox, (1824-1889).

³ Ibid, Samuel, Cox, (1824-1889).

⁴ Ibid, Smuha, Fawq Al-Ada, (1973).

⁵ Ibid, Nicholas, J cull, (2016).

session in 1981 and 16th in 1982, the PNC assured the decision of the PNC in 1977 which opened the way to the Palestinian diplomacy to open channels of communication with the non-Zionist Jews.

These decisions had the greatest effect on the Jewish group in America considering it an important step to open communications with the PLO. The PLO tried to influence American decision makers and tell them that it was with peace. These developments embarrassed the US and other European countries who refused to contact the PLO, but Sweden called the Palestinians and the Jews to meet on its lands.¹

In 1982, after the invasion of Lebanon, Arafat held a meeting with frontiers such as Uri and Arnon reviving the spirit of peace through these channels leading the direct talks.² Similarly, Khaled Al-Hassan, the chairman of the Foreign Affairs of the PNC in 1982 suggested a project called “Ideas for Discussion to Resolve the Conflict” that he called for the withdrawal of Israel from the lands occupied in 1967 and referring to the UN resolutions. Of course, this approaches the projects the PLO rejected which recognizes Israel and relinquishes lands occupied in 1948 and this was a great change in the political mentality.³

Then, Arafat realized that after being out of Lebanon, the stage of armed struggle which started in 1965 and strengthened by Al-Karama battle in 1968 was done or almost done. The Vietnamese and Algerian models were his inspiration that Nabil Sha’th was trying to stop the invasion in Washington through Security Council and the general public opinion of the Americans and the West. On the other front, Arafat represents indirect

¹ Saleh Sroro. Adoblomaisia Al- Filistinia Tihjah Al- QUA Al- Moathira Fe Amaliyat Al-Salam Month Oslo, Beir Ziet. 2002. 72. (In Arabic)

² Ibid, Nicholas J cull, (2016).

³ Sawt alfath: tatawor Al- Fikr Al- Siasi Lada Fath Month Al- iNtilawa. (2017). (In Arabic)

negotiations stage with the American secretary of state through the Saudi and Egyptian ambassadors which was called “Regan’s Project”.

Despite they were in different places, Sha’th was in constant contact with Arafat that the former informed Arafat with the death of Noam Goldman who was a brave Jew defying the Israeli invasion. He took Sha’th’s permission to ask the heads of the municipalities in the West Bank to offer their condolences on his behalf including Ilias Faraj, Mustafa Al-Natsha AND Rashad Al-Shawa.¹

Also, in later 1982, during the preparations of the sessions of the PNC after getting out of Beirut, Al-Sartawi expressed his opinion frankly and said that it was time to make communication with the Israelis official since 1977 decision was not enough. It is worth noting that this was said in public for the first time in the sessions of the PNC.

After the strong opposition of Al-Sartawi, Arafat had to put him under permanent residency in Tunis and then allowed him to go back to France where he could do it baldly. In general, the source of that courage was Arafat that in 1983, it was decided to go back to communicate with the Israelis in reference to the 1977 decisions. This new decision deleted “outside Israel” which meant communicating with peaceful Jews and the opposition in Israel itself.

After that decision, Al-Sartawi realized he could move without any restrictions, but after his presence of an international communist conference, he was assassinated two meters away from Simon Perez². Furthermore, this was confirmed in the PNC 17th session in Amman in 1984 that the council overcame anti-Zionism phrase replacing it with dialogue

¹ Nabil Shath. Min Beirut Ela Falastin. Dar Alshoroq. Cairo. 2019. 12. (In Arabic).

² Ibid, Samuel, Cox, (1824-1889).

with the Israeli forces for the best interest of the Palestinians and the believers in the Palestinian state.¹

After the end of the 16th session of the PNC, Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad) visited Hungary to talk about the decisions of the PNC explaining the one about the forces of the Jews. This suggestion liked the Hungarians telling Abu Iyad immediately that there was an Israeli delegation coming to Hungary as a chance for a meeting for both. It really happened and the results showed the necessity of holding peace between the for the best interest of both.²

In that period, the PLO took advantage of the relationship of the Palestinian businessman Hasib Al-Sabbagh and Georg Schwartz who became the secretary of state of the US. This relationship was the result of the contribution of Al-Sabbagh in a company headed by Schwartz. In addition, the former sends messages from the PLO about the Palestinian cause. Then, he thought he could establish a channel of communication between him and his friend Schwartz. However, the latter asked him to keep it official freezing their personal relationship until further ado. Then, the former advised the PLO to contact Richard Murphy the assistant of the secretary of state of the Middle East.³

After the silence of the assassination of Al-Sartawi for more than two years, the channels of communication returned, but they depended on more than one person so that the experience of Al-Sartawi wouldn't be repeated. Then, in the period (1986-1987) the PLO was active in more than five channels with individuals from Israel having these with the approval of the PNC. This step contributed in giving the leaderships in the occupied ⁴

¹ Salah Al- Din et al. Al- Madakhil Ela Al-Qadiya Al- Filistinia. Dar Al-Basheer. Amman. Markaz Dirasat Al- Sharq Al -wsat. 1997. 112. (In Arabic)

² Ibid, Smuha, Fawq Al-Ada, (1973).

³ Ibid, Samuel, Cox, (1824-1889).

⁴ Ibid, Samuel, Cox, (1824-1889).

territories to contact Israelis and develop these relationships to include hostile parties for the PLO in order to understand their position.¹

3.5. The Most Important Channels of Communication in the Period (1980-1989)

- The first channel was the one run by Abu Mazen with a Far-Left groups including the (List of New Communism); Shulamit Aloni (the head of Meretz); the Israeli journalist Uri Avnery; the Palestinian writer who had the Israeli nationality, Emil Habibi. Still, these efforts were void due to the Likud party who was controlling the political scene in Israel that most of the participants were Lifts whose influence was marginal.
- The second channel was a secret one arranged by the American secretary of state George Scholtz between Dr. Waleed Al-Khaldi (A Palestinian professor at Harvard) and the former foreign minister Abba Eba. The former wrote the memo of their first meeting that both were academic and like philosophy and discussion.
- The third channel was between Saed Kamal (the representative of the PLO) and Israeli official and unofficial visitors in Cairo. The Egyptians asked the PLO to recognize resolutions 338-242 and cast away terrorism. ²
- The fourth channel was led by Palestinian businessmen who lived in European capitals especially Paris and London. They didn't participate directly, but their representatives did that for them keeping the interests of some Arab countries. This meeting was with Israeli officials such as Efraim Sneh and the Israeli Health Minister in Rabin's government Shulamit Aloni the deputy of the Israeli PM in Rabin's government.

¹ Ibid, Wafa, (1977).

- The fifth channel was done by Bassam Sharif who was a close counsellor of Abu Ammar who -in 1987- sent a memo with brave solutions for the Israeli- Palestinian conflict mentioning a reference to the readiness of the PLO to recognize the existence of Israel.

Also, there were individual attempts to open other channels that the representative of the PLO in Geneva Nabil Al-Ramlawi asked to meet Ezra Wiseman in Geneva. In addition, the manager of the Israeli flight company tried to arrange for a meeting between Palestinian personnel and the Israeli ambassador in Cairo Eliyahu Ben-Elissar. Besides, the PLO was following up the results and discussing them with the leadership. ¹ Still, the Israeli media was misleading including the Israeli Right party. It was the hindrance of these meetings especially after the issuing of the decision in 1986 in the Keenest to ban any meeting or else imprisonment will be the punishment.

In 1986, a meeting occurred in Romania considering this one of the main communications between the Israelis and the Palestinians that it was a great meeting between the delegation of the Israeli Left led by Latif Douri and the delegation of the PLO led by Abdul- Raziq Al-Yahya in public.

It aimed to defy the decision of the Keenest which punished any Israeli contacts a member in the PLO. ² It considered this step as the first step of many to the mutual recognition of Israel and the PLO. Al-Douri indicated that he travelled with the delegation to have a conversation with a Palestinian thinker.

¹ Ibid, Samuel Cox, (1824-1889).

² Dr. Ziad Abu Haija. Min THakirat Morasel. Wafa. (2012). (In Arabic)

He considered that the conference was successful since 150 representatives of mass media covered the meeting and broadcasted it to the world assuring the agreement with the PLO to hold an international conference with the participation of all the parties.¹

It turns from these communications that they were not against the will of the participants that the goal was knowing what the other party was thinking about. Indeed, after a short public meeting, new leads about new secretive meetings under the supervision of European countries. Ezra Wiseman commented that he should talk to the PLO in a good manner instead of picking people to meet from the PLO.²

Also, in that period, specifically on the 4th of July 1987, there was a channel with Likud in the occupied territories in the house of Moshe Amirav who was the relative Shamer with the presence of Salah Zahiqa and Sari Nusseibeh from the Palestinians in order to talk about the best solution of the Palestinian cause.

Further, David Shalom suggested in his book “Terror and Hope” the establishment of the Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza led by the PLO. Furthermore, Amirav, Shalom and Al-Husseini agreed to promote for this idea with the PLO and Herut party. Then, these suggestions were presented to Al-Husseini by Nusseibeh and Zahiqa in the first meeting in order to pave the way to the second meeting in Abu Dis in Nusseibeh’s house with the presence of Amirav, Shalom and Al-Husseini. Then, the third meeting with in the institute of Arabic studies with the presence of new Keenest members. Then, in the fourth meeting the agreement was phrased based on the discussion between the leaderships proposing the case of Amirav to Geneva to be discussed with Arafat.³

¹ Ibid, Ziad, Abdulla Al-Jabouri, (2007).

² Ibid, Ziad, Abdulla Al-Jabouri, (2007).

³ Omar Mahmud Shalayel. Al-Mofawadat Alsiryia Fe Oslo. Donya Al-Watan. (2005). (In Arabic)

The last meeting was in a hotel owned by Al-Husseini family that Amirav told them that this paper was prepared to be delivered to important members in the delegation of the government heading to Romania. It was supposed to be taken to Arafat, but the arrest of Al-Husseini prevented that as well as banning Amirav from travelling to Geneva because it wasn't approved by Shamer.¹

In this sense, the Israeli media said that the Palestinian members inside the occupied territories who contacted with the Israelis whose role was to transfer messages between Jerusalem and Tunis. Eventually, the official meeting was inevitable without mediation. In the meanwhile, Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad) said that the Palestinian delegations met Zionists after the approval of the PLO's leadership. In other words, no communication could be done without the approval of the PLO.²

In that period, Raz's member visited the PLO in Tunis in 1987 knowing that it was secretive based on his request and for reasons related to his party. Then, there were many secretive meetings highlighting that both had an intention to announce a meeting, but the PLO didn't approve the statement of the meeting.³ In addition, the Knesset member Yale Taliban who attended Paris meetings with clear aims from the Israeli side. These aims were guaranteeing that Israel knew about any meeting about the Arab- Israeli struggle and listening to the European opinions about it as well as knowing the change in the PLO concerning peace with Israel.⁴

It is obvious that those meetings increased that it can be said that the majority of the European capitals witnessed meetings, so it is possible to call this stage the stage of meetings.

¹ Ibid, Smuha, Fawq Al-Ada, (1973).

² Ibid, Ziad, Abdulla Al-Jabouri, (2007).

³ (Ibid, Ziad, Abdulla Al-Jabouri, (2007).

⁴ Ibid, Ziad, Abdulla Al-Jabouri, (2007).

The Israeli scholar Aryeh Deri those communications as being the result of psychological and national interests meeting. Also, the psychological barrier which prevented such calls smashed through the presence of Al-Sadat to Jerusalem.¹ It was believed that the PLO wanted to achieve the settlement which contributed in taking away the psychological barrier between the Palestinians and the Israelis that it was obvious in the meetings before signing Oslo.

3.6. The Palestinian Public Diplomacy and the 1987 Intifada

There were many influential events leading to the intifada including the Palestinian resistance got out of Beirut in 1982; the Palestinian leaderships' distance from the confrontation line with the occupied territories; holding an urgent Arab summit in Amman in 1987 and the absence of the Palestinian cause from it for the first time. Consequently, the Palestinians felt that it was necessary to move the battle to the occupied territories to resist the occupation and give the Palestinian cause its values ever again.

This intifada came as a coronation of the Palestinian national struggle which affected the Israeli negatively making them think seriously about the Palestinian cause and try to find a solution for this predicament.

Thus, the scenes of the Intifada which was described as the war of the stones became an influential message to the whole world. In other words, in a few weeks, the whole world was talking about the Palestinian cause to the extent that the world expressed its sympathy towards the Palestinians. Surprisingly, this changed the Israeli propaganda which imagined Palestinians as terrorists. Still, a centre affiliated to the Israeli army in 1988

¹ Mustafa Al- Husseni. *Alliwaat Wa LAhiwarat AliSRALEIa Wa Alfaslastinia*. 1989. 20. (In Arabic)

stated that the intifada needed a political solution not a military one knowing that Rabin was the minister of defence at that time.¹

In other words, it shook Israel socially, politically and economically that the Israelis were surprised by this intifada. Consequently, the Israeli parties were divided into two sections, namely: the Likud and religious parties and part of the labour party who demanded using force against the Palestinians and rejecting negotiating with them. However, the Lift parties and peace movements demanded having negotiations with the Palestinians and stopping the use of violence against them. In fact, 51 peace movement called for peace with the Palestinians making a positive international opinion showing Israel as a state practicing violence. Nationally speaking, it increased the national awareness in Palestine and abroad empowering the status of the PLO and making Israel have settlement with the Palestinians.²

The Intifada had a great impact on the Israeli society that peace movements asked to withdraw from Gaza and the West Bank as if there were a reverse immigration from Israel to Europe and other places out of Israel.³

After the first year of the Palestinian intifada, the PLO presented a new peace initiative based on the decisions of the PNC in its 19th session in Algeria in 1988 stating the necessity of establishing the Palestinian state next to the Israeli one based on 1967 borders according to resolution (242).

This initiative was a great turning point in the Palestinian political creed and in the strategy of the phased plan including establishing the Palestinian state on the West Bank

¹ Al-Mawsoa Al- Filistinia. Al- Intifada 1987.2013.

² Palestinian Encyclopedia. 1987- 2013.

³ Ibid, Wafa, (1977).

and Gaza (a final solution) and holding tight with the political struggle option without armed struggle as a means to achieve the Palestinians strategic goals.¹

Then, the PNC adopted the peaceful Palestinian attack and the political initiative with the approval of the majority and the announcement of the independence unanimously. The PNC considered itself as the highest legislative authority which defends the Palestinians' rights.

The intifada caused a lot of pressure in Israel since the great change in the thought of the PLO that it recognized resolutions (242) and (338) accepting the establishment of the Palestinian state on the 1967 borders. Consequently, most of the Arab countries welcomed this decision in addition to more than a hundred countries including America, but it preferred mentioning denying terrorism. At that time, Arafat was supposed to give his speech in the UN headquarter in New York, but America refused to give him the visa and then the session was moved to Geneva where denying terrorism was mentioned. Then, America decided to contact the PLO in Tunis at the level of its embassy there.²

The impacts of the PNC's decision on the Jewish groups in America which started to contact the PLO with the help of the Swedish government who hosed the dialogue between them. This embarrassed the American administration, so it found that it was essential to urge the leaders of the Jewish groups in America to contact the PLO in an attempt to know their next steps.³

In the same period, in the 5th conference of Fatah held in Tunis in August, 1988, a special point was added concerning communicating with Israelis. The decisions of the executive

¹ Mohamad Eshtya. Mawsoat Al- Mostalahat Al- filistinian. Al- Markaz Al- FILISTINI. 2009. 341. (In Arabic)

² Dr. Mahmud Abbas. Al-Masera Al- Siasia Fe Al Sharq Al- Awsat, UAE. 2001. 8. (In Arabic)

³ Ibid, Smuha, Fawq Al-Ada, (1973).

committee of the PLO and the central committee of Fatah concerning keeping on communicating with the Israelis was recognized.

In other words, it stated keeping on the dialogue with the Israeli democratic powers which refused the Israeli occupation and stood with the Palestinian rights including the right of return and the right of self- determination as well as establishing the Palestinian independent state. Also, it stated recognizing the PLO as the legal representative of the Palestinians.¹

That period witnessed a series of meetings between the Israelis and the Palestinians including the 1988 meeting in Cairo between the previous representative the PLO in New York Zohdi Tarazi, Latif Al-Dori and Moshe Amirav. The next one was in 1989 when Shamer asked Ahmad Al-Tibi to meet Palestinian officials to inform them about the draft of his project during the elections. Then, Shamer asked Amirav to meet Faisal Al-Huseini in prison in 1989. Then, in the same year, Shamer and the PNC member Ibrahim Abu Laghad and Edward Saed met in Washington opening the way to European governments to host meetings such as Italy, Canada, Switzerland, Norway and Milano. In Milano, there was a meeting between Yasser Abd Rabo and the head of the Citizens' Rights movement Ratz. In addition, there was a meeting in Ottawa between the former head of the Mosad with Afif Safiya the representative of the PLO in Amsterdam as well as Nusseibeh in 1967.²

As these communications developed in this period, there was a meeting with the advocate Jamil Al-Tarifi and the President of the Israeli government Shamer in July 1989 in which Al-Tarifi had to announce it after media leaks. He added that this meeting was a respond

¹ Ibid, Wafa, (1977).

² Ibid, Nicholas, J cull, (2016).

to the unified leadership's call adding. He told Shamer that the Palestinians were like any other nation having the choice to choose who represent them willingly. They chose the PLO as their representative. Surely, he sent a detailed report of the meeting.¹

Most of the Palestinian personnel communicated with the Israeli based on a request from the leadership of the PLO considering it the legislative representative of the Palestinians. Fortunately, the manager of the office of the president of the government *Joseph Bin Ahron* that the president intended to expand those meetings to achieve this initiative.²

Some Palestinian personalities from the occupied territories played a vital role in bridging the gap between the Israeli and the Palestinians such as Faisal Al-Husseini who started his calls since 198. While he was in prison, the Israeli coordinator of the Israeli activities visited him being asked by Rabin to do so to ask him a number of questions about the situation in the occupied territories. Then, he played an important role in the negotiations with the American personnel visiting Jerusalem.

After releasing him, he met a group Israelis that in 1989 he met the Israeli Minister of Finance Yossi Beilin and Efraim Sneh who was the former head of the Israeli civil administration. Then, he met the head of Shniwi party as well as Sari Nusseibeh, Dr. Hanan Ashrawi, Ghassan Al-Khatib, the journalist Saman Khorri and Dr Mamdoh Al-Aker.

These meetings were opposed in the Palestinian arena especially the Palestinian opposition which warned any official against having any meeting with any Israeli official. After a while, these communications returned that Al-Husseini met the Israeli minister of justice as well as his meetings in Tel Aviv in the headquarter of the labor party.³

¹ Ibid, Nicholas, J cull, (2016).

² Ibid, Nicholas, J cull, (2016).

³ Ibid, Nicholas, J cull, (2016).

Also, Gebril Al-Rjoub played a vital role as well that he helped the Israeli journalist Ouzi Mahnaimi to meet Arafat in Tunis by the request of Ahmad Al-Tibi not to mention that Jews have never been to Tunis with the presence of Gebril Al-Rjoub and others. This journalist met Arafat before Madrid conference.¹

Then, the Palestinian leadership realized that it was dealing with a complex situation, but the main goal was to achieve the Palestinian national goal in freedom, independence. In light of all that, the PNC phrased its national program reminding the world that peace was part of the independence charter and the national program.

At that moment, the Israeli society was divided depending on the party and the political and military personnel in Israel. Studying these alliances required direct communication and following up with what the Israeli media was publishing.² Also, the Arab Knesset member Abdul Wahab Al-Darwasha founded an Arab party in Israel called “The Arab Democratic party” which played the role of the mediator between Labor party and the PLO. At that time, the Likud party was close to be a partner in the government, so Al-Darawsha visited Tunis more than once before taking Rabin’s permission or any Israeli official to guarantee his protection. In the 12th of April, 1989, he got to Tunis having a political project with different points that it was apparent from the points they were Rabin’ project. He also sent a full statement about the general analysis of the situation of Rabin and Labor party in the Israeli authority.³

At that time, that idea was launched from Jerusalem by Hana Saniora to Tunis to hold a Palestinian- Jewish- American conference at Colombia university in New York about the road to peace that Al-Fajr Al-Maqdisia newspaper and New Outlook newspaper should

¹ Bassam Abu Sharif, Ozi. Afdal Al- Ada. Al-Saqi Linasher. 2010. 150. (In Arabic)

² Ibid, Wafa, (1977)

³ Ibid, Nakamura, Kennon and Matthew, Weed, (2009).

publish it as well as peace friends in America and the American Council of Palestinian Affairs. The Palestinian delegation included Nabil Sha'ath, Faisal Al-Husseini, Edward Saed, Afif Safia and others. However, the Israeli delegation included Yossi Sarid, Shulamit Aloni and others as this was the first meeting on the American soil.¹

In the meanwhile, Abu Mazen was bridging relations with the Eastern Jews that some of them were yearning to their homelands. Also, the Palestinian diplomats in Paris helped him do that that some of the members were Moroccan Jews including Simon Benton who met Abu Mazen's team in Paris and worked with them in peace building. His group contributed in preparing for Toldeo's meetings in Spain that this city was chosen because it was a model of Islamic, Christian and Jewish co-existence. In that meeting, 40 Eastern Jews from Israel were present as well as the councilor of the Moroccan King. This meeting lasted 3 days which was considered a historic achievement for Abbas in bridging relations with Eastern Jews.²

In this stage, Israel was trying to stop the Intifada by using force against the Palestinians, but it failed as the international support for the Palestinians increased. However, the Israeli support decreased due to suppression actions against the Palestinians. In the meanwhile, the Israeli peace groups and Labor party groups began to understand the justice of the Palestinian issue and the necessity of giving them their rightful rights.

Then, on the 27th of September, 1990, there was a meeting at Jerusalem where a group of Palestinian officials including Faisal Al-Husseini and other peace movement agreeing on the necessity of supporting the Palestinian initiative and get to peaceful agreement by holding an international conference attended by the PLO. Also, the mayor of Jerusalem

¹ Ibid, Wafa, (1977).

² Ibid, Wafa, (1977).

Teddy Kollek said that peace in Jerusalem won't be without having political talks with the Palestinians. Similarly, on the 11th of December, 1990, the Knesset member Yossi Beilin called for the establishment of the demilitarized Palestinian state in Gaza and apply self-rule system in the West Bank as well as annexing the lands of the West Bank to Palestine. Then, after reaching peace with Iraq, Syria and Jordan, his plan was shown that Yossi's plan was advanced to the Palestinians.¹ In 1991, the world witnessed the dissolution of the USSR making the USA the most powerful force in the world leading to making Israel a strategic ally in the Middle East.

Also, the Gulf war had its greatest influence on peace process in the Middle East which was represented by Madrid Peace conference.² Fortunately, this initiative was welcomed by the Palestinians as well as the leaders of the PLO, but the leaders of the PLO insisted on meeting a delegation from the 1948 lands although some of the Palestinian leaders objected to this suggestion.

Then, a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation was formed at the end of the Gulf war that about 400,000 Palestinians were forced to leave the Gulf fostering about a million and a half Palestinian who became below poverty line. In short, the Gulf war had catastrophic results on the Palestinians, but the Palestinian negotiations meant a light of hope internationally and regionally that the Palestinians returned to be recognized.³

Madrid conference ended by launching a second round of negotiations between Israel and Palestine, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon to get to permanent peace except for Palestine which will have a transitive self-rule leading to the negotiations of the preeminent status. Then,

¹ Ibid, Wafa, (1977).

² Khaled Ayyad. *Siyasat Al-Wilayat Al-Motahida Tijah Amalyat l-Salam. 1973-2013. Jamiat Al-Sahrq Alwsat. 2014. 40. (In Arabic)*

³ Dr. Mahmud Abbas. *Mobahathat Al-Salam Al-Filistinia. AliSRELIA. Bailasan. RAMALLAH. Falastin. 2011. (In Arabic)*

there was a disagreement of the place and time of the second round, but then it was determined in Dakar that the term “Jihad against Israel” was deleted. As a result, China and India recognized Israel while the EU assigned an official representative in Palestine whose main office was in Jerusalem.¹

The results of the negotiations in Washington were to fix the Palestinian path and expand the circle of friends and allies along with taking away the leverage which prevents the Arab countries negotiate with Israel and reject peace with the Palestinians.² After the failure of the official negotiations between them, Washington opened a secretive channel in which Oslo was signed in 1993.

In this stage, Amirav failed in his attempt that he did so after many consultations with the Likud’s leaders. This meant that these meetings were not rejected by the Likud. Here, the Palestinian leadership started to look for other way to communicate with the Israeli’s worst enemies Ariel Sharon.

At the beginning, there were preliminary talks one of the Palestinians had with his brother in Israel to catch up with one of the managers of intelligence. Then, they met in Tel Aviv that the first contact with Sharon was on the 6th of June 1992. After the leak of the news, Sharon met the Palestinian telling him that any meeting with any Palestinian in America will not happen.³

In early December, 1992, there were many talks with Likud members who were close to Sharon, they agreed to meet the Palestinians in one of the European capitals until it happened in Rome in the Palestinian ambassador’s house in Rome.

¹ Ibid, Wafa, (1977).

² Mohamed Nofal. AL-Inqilab: Asrar Mofawadat Al-Masar Alfalastini Al-Isaelis (Madrid-Wadington) DarAl-Shoroq 1996. 246-255. (In Arabic)

³ Ibid, Nakamura, Kennon and Matthew, Weed, (2009).

Then, on the 10th of April, 1992, Saed Kanan met a very important Israeli official who was close to Rabin delivering the message of the Palestinian leadership that the PLO was pleased with the electoral program of the Labor party. It only wanted to arrange for a high-profile meeting without any leaks of these communications.¹

On the 15th of November, 1992, Hassib Al- Sabagh met with Henry Sigman delivering the message of the PLO requiring easing the mission of the Palestinian delegation. Furthermore, he indicated the positive role of the American Jews in peace building. After months of Oslo channels, a number of Israeli officials asked for meeting Abbas, but the latter refused because he knew that Rabin's government wanted to know how tight the PLO sticks to Oslo Channel. Also, they wanted to know Abbas's wish to communicate with Rabin or decision makers in Israel. Still, the PLO supported the idea of having communications within Oslo channel only.²

On the 25th of July, 1993, Ahmad Al-Tibi got to Tunis and met other Israeli officials and Palestinian officials that he held verbal messages between them. He played a great role in the meeting of Abbas and Wisemann as well as his meeting with Haem Ramon the closest friend of Rabin. Al- Tibi's name had become a symbol for the backdoor channel because of the repetition of his name by anyone Arafat explains the Israeli- Palestinian Principles Declaration.³

It is worth mentioning that Oslo channel of communication was not official, that the PLO opened it with two academics who are Yair Hirschfeld and Ron Fredrik along with the Norwegian researcher Terry Larson who was interested in the Palestinians' situation in the Palestinian occupied land. Here, the talks took secretive nature in Norway on the 20th

¹ Ibid, Nakamura and Matthew, (2009).

² Ibid, Nakamura and Matthew, (2009).

³ Ibid, Nakamura and Matthew, (2009).

of January, 1993. While negotiations official in Washington were reaching a dead end, Oslo channel advanced a lot to the extent it got to an official draft of the basic principles between the PLO and Israel.¹

¹ Ori Savir. Hikayat Oslo Min Alf ElaYa. TARJAMAT Bin Aqily. Dar Al-Jalil. Amman. 1998. 910. (In Arabic)

Chapter Four

The Palestinian Public Diplomacy of the PLO and the PNA Towards the Israeli Society After Oslo Agreement

1.1. The Palestinian Public Diplomacy of the PLO and the PNA Towards the Israeli Society After Oslo Agreement

After the participation in peace process and signing agreements between the Palestinians and the Israelis, the Palestinian forces neglected the mission of working in the Israeli society and enhance their relationships with the Israeli peace forces.¹ Furthermore, peace Israeli forces thought that peace way was paved and could overcome all the obstacles in the way. However, it turned out that the degree of the development of the political thought in the Israeli society didn't get to the degree of achieving a real historic reconciliation between the Israelis and the Palestinians and this needed the efforts of all the parts in this process.²

Calls with the Israeli influential parties continued after Oslo focusing on the Right parties in Israel in an attempt to win their support or give them minor role in the process. Thus, in August 1997, Abbas met Sharon from Likud party in an attempt to change something in that man. Also, he met the member in the Likud Shetreet and the leader of Shas eastern movement in the same year.³ In these meetings, Abu Mazen defended on the Palestinian cause that he considered his meeting with Sharon part of this aim. He added that there were necessities to negotiate with the opposers of the Palestinians' goals and deny their

¹ Mamdoh Nofal. *Hasad Alpsalam Fe Ashr Sanawat. 1991-2001- 2001.*

² *Ibid*, Mamdoh, Hasad, 1991-2001- 2001.

³ *Ibid*, Waafa, (1977).

existence since this dialogue only applied to having two opposite point of views in order to convince them with our point of view or lessen their point of view about us.¹

On the 14th of December, 1998, the PNC's session was held in Gaza and decided to cancel all the articles denying the right of Israel for existence and approved cancelling the articles which called for getting rid of Israel. In short, they amended all the articles violating the signed agreements.² This is considered a transformation from structural violence to structural peace according to Johan Galtung's theory.

1.2. The Change of the Israeli Society Towards the Right Party

Israel has witnessed many political, demographic and social changes which hindered reaching the final settlement that most of the Israelis turned to the Right party especially in the 2000 elections in which the Right party got a high percentage of the votes. Referenda indicate that the Israeli society was pushing hard to the Far- Right party which worked against finding solutions to the Israeli- Palestinian struggle.

One of the Engineers of Oslo Ron Pondak, who was the administrative manager of Perez peace centre, wrote about the failure of Oslo saying that Netanyahu ruled from 1996 to 1999 without having an agreement based on international resolutions. Then, Barak ruled from 1999 to 2001 without any development in the situation.³ In addition, a referendum conducted in 2002 by Asher Arian under the patronage of Gampy Centre for Strategic Research in Tel Aviv. He also found that the Israeli society was going towards the Far- Right party to the extent that the percentage of Israelis thinking about the possibility of resolving this conflict by peace decreased to 26% in 2002; 30% in 2001 and 68% in 1999.

¹ Ibid, Waafa, (1977).

²Dr. Ahmad Rifae. Yasser Arafat Fe Thakirat Al-Tarikh. MAKTAB Shon Al-Fikriya. 2006. 134. (In Arabic)

³ Ron Pondak. Min Oslo la Taba. Sairora MOnqatia. Silat Awraq. Tarjamat Mohammed Ghanem. Al- markaz Al- Falstinin Lildirasat. Madar. 2002. 11-13. (In Arabic)

Also, the percentage of the opponents of Oslo agreement decreased as well that it reached 35% in 2002; 58% in 2001 and 70% in 1999.¹

It is worth mentioning that in the second intifada in 2000, the increase of the intense of the confrontations between the Israelis and Palestinians and assigning Sharon as the new PM in Israel (2001-2005), led to the decrease of the proponents of peace process and increased the opposers of peace in Israel. In other words, the Israelis were convinced that Oslo agreement was the reasons for this security catastrophe. This strengthened Sharon that he worked hard to destroy everything resulted from Oslo as if he guaranteed the support of the Israelis to all his plans.²

In fact, a referendum in Israel in May 2001, showed that 31% of the Israelis said that the Intifada pushed them to change their votes from Left to Right reaching (8%) of the whole populations.³ This indicated that through the years after the intifada, most Israelis turned to the Far- Right party giving up peace process with the Palestinians and its issues including Jerusalem, settlement and refugees.

It should be noted that the role of the Israeli media was great that it affected the public and international opinion in order to deform facts that the main reason for the Palestinians to have the intifada was their desire to use violence instead of negotiations. Also, part of this propaganda was that it was a strategic decision and not because of the Israeli procedures on the ground. Also, the Palestinian culture encourage hatred in return of the Israeli tolerance. These websites showed Israel as being in a self-defense situation.⁴ In

¹ Asher Arian. *Alp Inziah Nah AlYamen*. 2003. W MA Qablaha. Silsilat Awaraq. RAMALLAH. 2003. 16. (In Arabic)

² Subhi Aseela. *Al-RA Alam-Altahawol Naho Alyamen*. Markaa Ahram. Cairo 2008. 143. (In Arabic)

³ Markaz Ahram LILDIRASAT aLiSTRTIJIA. *Taqrir AlAhram Al-Istratigi*. 2003- 2004. Cairo. (In Arabic)

⁴ Ahmad Rafiq Awad. *Loghat Al- Khitab Al-Ilami Al- Israeli: Ameliyat Al Sour Alwaqi Namaothaja*. MAktab Al- Shon Al-Fikriya. Harakat ath. 2006. 67-68. (In Arabic)

short, the Israeli media made the Israelis hate the Palestinians more than before making the Israelis more Right than Left.

The Israeli mass media manipulated the Israeli mentality in order to isolate the Intifada in the framework of violence, terrorism and riots directed to Israel by the Palestinians. In other words, the Israeli media insisted on pretending that intifada was planned in order to assault the Israeli soldiers describing the Palestinian as the assaulter while the Israelis were the assaulted. This method was followed in every war using the Israeli media picturing the Israelis as victims who needed protection, so it gave excuses to the Israeli soldiers to have any desired reaction.¹

The years of Intifada affected the solidarity of the Israeli society that the percentage of divisions among religious and seculars; Ashkenazi and Savardem decreased. The Israeli Right Party employed this in order to get more supporters who give a high importance to security. In other words, the choice of the Right Winged governments in Israel would only be as a result of turning into the Right-wing party.²

1.2.1. Factors of Turning the Israeli Society into A Right-Wing Society:

The Israeli society witnessed many changes after 2000 internally and externally leading to the public direction of Israel to the Far- Right party.

1. Internal factors including:
 - a. Security: Security had a great importance for the Israelis especially after Oslo which was agreed upon all over Israel. In other words, Israelis were worried about the security threats which closed the distance between the Far- Right and

¹ Adnan Abu Amer. Al- Ilam Al-Isreali W Alintifda. Dirasa Fe Al-Ada Al-Elami AlEsreali Lahdath Intifadat Al-Aqsa. 2014 (In Arabic)

² Rani Al-Agha. Al-Tawajoh Al-Israeli NAWH Al-Yamen Wa Atharoho Ala Qadiyat AlQuds. 200-2011. Jamiat Al-Azahr. Gaza. 85.

the Left parties. Their political discourse was united due to the importance of security for both leading the Israelis to choose a strong government who could offer peace and security represented by the Far- Right party. ¹

- b. The economic factor: The economic factor was one of the most influential factors in the political movement in Israel especially in the turmoil of the Israeli economic change in the mid-1980s and early 1990s.

The Israeli economy witnessed a great development after the launch of the settlement helping Israel to gain economic benefits especially by normalizing its relationships with many Arab and international countries. Unfortunately, this was worn out quickly after the failure of the settlement and the intifada leading to the drop of the Israeli economy. In fact, the Israeli central bank estimated the losses with about 12 billion NIS.²

The damaged classes in the Israeli society held hatred to the Left parties after relinquishing defending the interests of these classes and not minding turning the Israeli economy into a free-market. This led people to vote for the Far- Right parties' class-based. ³

- c. The demographic factor:

The Israeli society witnessed in the last quarter of the 20th century demographic transformations contributed in leading the Israelis to the Far- Right parties for its visions of the solution of the struggle. These changes were represented with the immigration of about one million Russian immigrants to Israel weakening the

¹ Maher Al-Sharif. Qarn Ala Alsira aLaRABI. Asahthoni. Hal Honak Salam. Dar Al-Mada Lithaqafa W Al nasher. 2011, 167. (In Arabic)

² Dr, Imad Jad et al. Al- Intikhabat Al- Israelaia. 2003. Alamn Awaln. Markaz Al-Dirasat Al-SIASIA. 2003. 234 (In Arabic)

³ Hussein Jaber. Athar NATHAEJ Al-Intakhabat 2003. Bain Amalia Al;ITaswia bain Aljanibain Al-Falastinin Wa Al- Israeli. Jamiat Al-Njah, 2011. 70, (In Arabic)

Ashkenazim to which the Left parties come from and strengthened the Far- Right (Sephardim, Russian immigrants, religious orthodox and settlers). Despite these differences, they met in distrusting Arabs and enmity to Oslo and their hatred to the Left parties.¹

- d. The religious factor: The religious factor played a great role in driving the Israeli society towards extremism especially in light of the increasing importance of the role the religious parties have in Israel.

The power of the religious parties increased electorally due to belief transformation of the Israeli society which affects the direction of the factional media to the religious ones as a reaction to disappointments and rejection to Left parties. Also, the religious opinions of the Rabbi and his control of the Israeli society led to extremism leading to the strength of the Far- Right parties after the failure of the settlement and the eruption of Al-Aqsa intifada.

2. External factors:

The external environment was one of the main variables leading the Israeli society towards extremism and the increase of the power of the Far- Right including Al-Aqsa intifada, the failure of the settlement as well as the American support in Bush's era concerning the Iranian threat to Israel.

To begin with, Al-Aqsa intifada formed an important turn in the settlement that it left deep effects on both the Israeli and the Palestinians leading the Israeli to go to the Far- Left parties. This obliged the Palestinians to use the resistance and execute operations in Israel

¹ Maher Al- Sharif . Kayf Enzah Al-Mojtama AlIsreli Nahw AlyAMEEN Al- Motashaddi. Majalat Aqadia AlFalastinian. 84. Mosasat AlpDirasat Alfilistinia. Beirut2010. 98 (In Arabic)

leading to a threat to their security.¹ In other words, lack of personal security led the Israelis to go extreme and turn into the Far- Right.

After 11/9 attacks in 2001, this led the Americans to adopt the Israeli vision that Sharon's government succeeded in convincing Bush's administration to wage its war towards the Palestinians which was basically against terrorism. This meant that Arafat was Ibn Ladin of Israel, consequently, the Christian Right American supported Israel and refused any proposal for the Palestinians to establish their own state.

In fact, this extreme fascist reality in the Israeli institutions was the result of the wishes of the Zionist American lobby which funded the campaigns of Israel.² This meant that that the American support was for extremism.

Concerning the Iranian nuclear threat, the Far- Right parties used that file in order to create a state of terror as a way to get more votes. It can be a security threat to Israel which was a motive to move to extremism.³

With the rise of the Far- Right parties and the marginalization of the Right parties, this led to the change of the discourse to the ideology of the Far- Right which called for getting rid of the two-state solution and neglecting initiatives calling for the end of the occupation. However, all these were according to social, racial and religious variables which developed through ages in Israel.

Internally speaking, the possession of the control of the country was to the Left parties, but the Far- Right fortified the Jewish state asking for turning the Palestinian enmity into

¹ Ibid, Hans N. Tuch, (2009).

² European Parliament Preparatory, Action, Culture in EU external Relation, European Commission, 2014.

³ Ibid, European Parliament Preparatory Action, (2014).

a violent attitude.¹ After many years from Oslo, the Israeli society turned into extremism with freezing peace process as well as neglecting the signed agreements.

In addition, the Far- Right parties realized after 2012 when the UN recognized Palestine as a non-observer member, there appeared the need for achieving peace following the peaceful program of 1988 and the peace process in Beirut in 2002 in order to live side by side with the Palestinians. In other words, both countries lived in blinded societies by media especially the Israeli one which blinded the Israeli from the existence of a Palestinian partner for peace.²

In this scene and after years of communicating with the Palestinian leadership, there is still a belief in the importance of communicating with the Israeli society in order to transfer the message of the Palestinians. This comes as a way to give responses enough to develop concepts of peace for everyone based on the justice of the rights of the Palestinians and their right of freedom and independence. This is done by living side by side with the Israelis in harmony and peace.³

1.3. The “People to People” program

1.3.1. Introduction

In a study of conflict resolution, peace-making is related to the efforts of the diplomates in order to stop violence through guaranteeing cease- fire and agreements’ signing. However, there is a need for efforts changing the nature of the relations between the

¹Dr. Abdulalim Mohammed. Alyamin Al- Israeli Al- Jadidi. Al-Asbab Wa A-Tadaeyt. Al-Ayn Al-Ikhbariya, (2019). (In Arabic)

² Lajnat Al-Tawaso Ma Al-Mojtama AlIsraeli. Al- Mawqif Al- Falstini Min AlqADAYA Al - Jawhariya. PLO. Ramallah. 2019. 12-13. 3 (In Arabic)

³ Ismael Darwish. Al-Doblomasia AlAma Lildwal Al-Islamia.Majalt Al-Shab. Adad 4, Algeria. (2014). (In Arabic).

disputing parties and building long-termed peace. “People to People” program can be classified into peace building efforts.

The diplomacy of “People to People” can be deliberate border-crossing interactions based on communicating with groups of people in order to achieve public interests affecting the foreign policy.¹

The main idea of this project was imagined by Dwight Eisenhower who freed the arrest camps in the second World War and then came the president of the US in 1953. At that time, the idea of peace through understanding was formed and kept growing until the Cold War when President Eisenhower decided to take courageous steps by establishing this program on the 11th of September, 1956. It was founded in light of the American Intelligence Agency as a personal diplomatic program. In order to guarantee its success, this organization couldn't be run by the government. Instead, people should run it with people. Then, it turned into an NGO in 1961 that the president thought he wanted a peaceful world without the interventions of the government.²

1.3.2. “People to People” Program between the Israelis and the Palestinians

Despite the rise of enmity between the Israelis and Palestinians, they contacted each other in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In addition, in the 1970s, this situation increased the possibility of resolving this conflict through channels of communication in order to find space for the non-officials to discuss the options of resolving the conflict that the political solidarity joined attempts during the intifada of 1987.

In 1988, the Israeli journalist Gershon Baskin published an advertisement in three Palestinian newspapers calling the Palestinians who agree with the two- state solution to

¹ Kadir Ayham, A typology of people to people diplomacy, center on public diplomacy, (2020).

² <https://ptpi.org/about-the-history-of-people-to-people-international>.

call him. After the meeting, the Israeli- Palestinian centre for research and intelligence was established under the Palestinian- Israeli leadership. Also, it was one of the organizations that was active during the first intifada.¹

Along with the announcement of the principles between the Israelis and the Palestinians (Oslo 1), the struggle reached a historic point where there was a mutual recognition of each other. In other words, during Oslo I and II, the Palestinians, the Israelis as well as the Norwegian mediators were worried about the hostile relationships between the two nations and how to get approval on the legitimacy of the peace process.

Such peace process was for easing communication and cooperation that both the Palestinians and the Israelis agreed in the “People to People” program to encourage understanding the cooperation between the two nations. In other words, a special budget was allocated for this program making it the symbol of the cooperation of the two civil communities after Oslo.²

Oslo II stated the importance of communication and dialogue in order to enhance public discussion and removing blocks of interaction between the two nations. Furthermore, it sought to construct the basis of cooperation in a neutral environment allowing officials and people to communicate with each other putting their disagreements aside based on the belief that non- political communication changes negative stereotypes about the other and enhance peace and trust building. This was for expanding the support group for a negotiable solution for the Palestinian- Israeli struggle and empowering the marginalized classes.³

¹ Michel Jawrek. Tahder Al-Salam. Bina Al-SALAM Al-Israeli Al- Filistini. (2012). (In Arabic)

² Ibid, Masalha, (2018).

³ Ibid, Nadia, Najjab, (2020).

This program goes back to 1994 when Uri Savir, the general manager of the Israeli foreign ministry and one of the negotiators in Oslo, creating an environment where the Palestinians and an Israeli can have a peaceful dialogue.¹

The main focus in this program was establishing cooperation and communication between the two nations presuming that this can build bridges of understanding in order to reach peaceful agreement. Furthermore, the main concern was to change the pattern of relations of the two nations that only people can build peace not politicians. It was supposed to be done at different levels, but mobility was at different levels of media in order to create a better image about the other as a way to assure a civilian participation in peace process.²

1.3.3. Supporting and Executing “People to People” Program

The Norwegian government funded this program as one of its initial initiatives, but then the range of donors expanded to include other funders such as the EU, the USAID, but these funders put special terms in order to continue their fund.

According to the sixth appendix of Oslo II, at the beginning of establishing the program, the Norwegian Foreign Affairs Ministry asked the FAFO institute and Oslo studies centre to take over the administrative tasks. Also, the Norwegian government helped in the formation of the permanent cooperation committee represented by both sides colliding the activities, cooperative projects and other activities under the supervision of the Palestinian, Israeli and Norwegian authorities. Also, this committee consisted of NGOs in order to plan events between the two states to support having equal opportunities

¹ Hanssen-Bauer, ‘The Israeli-Palestinian People-to-People Program: The FafO Model of People-to-People’, paper presented to the *Helsinki Workshop, 2000 on Evaluating Israeli-Palestinian Civil Society Cooperative Activities*

² Ibid, Masalha, (2018).

especially in the financial part and the political content of the project making sure it didn't object any specific goals.¹

The program was run by both agreeing on the projects together. Despite it was a non-governmental program, it was object to official follow up.² The number of the Palestinian NGOs Israeli and Palestinian was registered in order to guarantee a set of criteria including that the proposed project's cost didn't exceed 20000. Also, it should be jointly executed locally. Finally, this allocated finance was to enable NGOs to participate in the projects and being able to invite the presenter in categories including youth, dialogues, study circles for elders, environment, culture and schools twinning.³

It was expected that those projects would enhance dialogue and improve relationships between them if they were executed by Israeli- Palestinian institutions. Also, it was expected to increase the public's knowledge of peace process through education or encouraging public discussion.

In 1996, a set of categories of cooperative projects for NGOs were determined focusing on the youth, culture, media, communication, environment, dialogue and forums and supporting 130 projects in that period. They were supposed to be executed in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Israel. After all this, nothing was effective once both sides went to the struggle field where pre-Oslo practices were still practiced. However, the situation was cooperative, there were challenges due to restrictions bound by both sides.⁴

¹ Ibid, Nadia, Najjab, (2020).

² Ibid, Endresen.

³ Ibid, Hansen Bauer.

⁴ Lena Endresen and Gilen Signe. "Consultations and Consensus: Implementing the Israeli-Palestinian People-to-People Programme", *Development: The Journal of the Society for International Development*, No3, (2000).

1.3.4. The Impact of Oslo on “People to People Program”

The recognition manifest from each side was a turning point in Oslo accord since it would be a complete peaceful transformation which would change their relationships if the political process didn't take another turn by the political leaders.

The absence of strategy was due to lack of support from the bottom up to the top; it was imperative to compensate the failure of the Palestinian and Israeli political leaders in the official negotiation process. In other words, they failed to turn these agreements to a real thing on the ground.¹

Concerning the main activists in the program, they were the victim of unexpected events that they thought the current struggle wouldn't affect it and the second that it would mobilize people to work together.

In fact, the trap of the opposition added negative developments especially in the case of settlements, but some main players misused the funds presented to the program.² Despite the high hopes of the activists of the program, such programs didn't have any effect on the political process that international and local decision makers ignored it completely.

The main flaw in the political process was ignoring peace building efforts which might have completed official negotiations through supporting the top. However, disputes were stronger in light of the nature of the struggle between the Israeli and the Palestinians at different strategic levels. One of the characteristics of this conflict was that it extended to generations focusing on issues such as rooted identity with existential nature. Also, it was

¹ Shira Herzog, *The power of possibility: The role of people to people program in the current Israeli-Palestinian reality*, economic cooperation foundation, (2005).

² *Ibid*, Shira, Herzog, (2005).

full of violence that they didn't forget the other human flaw.¹ Any well-rounded person about the Palestinian- Israeli struggle would say that it had been going on for centuries.

Societies which live such lengthy struggles, cope with it that the psychological, physical and mental circumstances at the belief level helped them cope with such tremendous pressure based on security, harm and negative stereotypes from the other.²

In the case of the Israeli- Palestinian struggle and in light of the local and international developments which obliged leaderships and societies to be dragged towards pragmatism and mutual acceptance. Social beliefs remained the same based on the national identity of every party, so legitimacy should be added to Oslo to enable leaders to express their vision peacefully and honestly.³

1.3.5. The Implementation of the “People to People Program”

Periodic killing of peace process in general affected the program and the implementation of its activities that political violence was one of the hindrances for advancing in negotiations. In other words, it took other forms such as building settlements, lock down and Gaza's siege since 1994 as well as the Palestinian operations in Israel in 1996.

They led to stopping the political process in 1999 when the Israeli government agreed on Oslo by its own understanding through settlements' expansion and turn abouts in Gaza and the West Bank. These were threats to political stability and peace process in addition to other methods such as bounding Palestinians' movements and force them to get permissions to get to Israel.

The permissions issue was a hindrance to the programs' activities since they were rejected sometimes. In other words, permissions were unpredictable for the Palestinians in the

¹ Ibid, Shira, Herzog, (2005).

² Daniel Bartel, stereotypes and prejudice in conflict, 2005, p62.

³ Ibid, Shira, Herzog, (2005).

projects. Sometimes, they didn't participate due to the Israeli procedures, the following table explains the days of lockdown of the West Bank and Gaza since 1995- 1999.

1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
102	118	77	26	16

Despite this table shows a decrease in full lockdowns, the system of travel permits was a psychological, political challenge for them since the Israelis give their citizens privileges due to having power. In that period, many Palestinian NGOs banned their members from participating in these activities because they were a breach for the peace agreement.¹

Also, there was a difference in power in both sides that the Palestinian NGOs were weak while the Israeli ones were strong since Israel had the power to control things in this program's activities. Furthermore, the Israeli NGOs had funding sources and the freedom to do anything unlike the Palestinian ones. This was not one of the aims of the participated NGOs participating in the program.²

There were challenges facing the implementation of this program such as translating the cultural material to a hierarchic organization and establishing the activities of the program in the perceptions of both parties was a great challenge due to political issues and the absence of mutual vision to the settlement of the struggle.³

Also, it became a means of domination and control through taking away the legitimacy of the Palestinian stories about struggle making the Palestinians feel minor. In other words, there were differences in understanding the basis of coexistence and human expansion that these meeting hid legitimacies and took them from others.⁴

¹ Ibid, Shira, Herzog, (2005).

² Ibid, Masalha, (2018).

³ Ibid, Masalha, (2018).

⁴ Ibid, Mozna, Shihab, (2006).

In addition, confiscating lands, settlement expansion, building the separation wall, putting check points and the system of permits¹, using violence made the lives of the Palestinians a living hell.²

Besides, mass punishment and displacement in the Israeli prisons and the separation of the Israeli discourse from reality agreed with its ideology in the elimination of the Palestinian existence and negating its presence by wiping out their identity.³

The problem with living under the Israeli occupation is that it is endless that there are 13 million settlers living on occupied lands while the aboriginals cry for help to demand their rights with the possibility of merging them together since religion is above everything for the Jews.⁴

Other challenges of the implementation of the program were not being supported by the Palestinian society since the Israelis criticized the refugees issue discussing that the past cannot be mentioned. What gives them advantage is their look to the future of their society and culture. (This is what the social identity theory says).⁵

In the end, the strategy of “people to people” should be an original component for any peace process that it is obvious in cases such as Northern Ireland and Africa. Still, the Israeli- Palestinians struggle didn’t give a chance for this strategy to be effective in resolving this struggle. Thus, during Oslo talks, politicians didn’t give enough attention to the shared issues among people and the bottom-up support and this means a lack of trust and unilateral moves. In short, this strategy lacks a supporting political framework.

¹ Nadia Najjab and Ghassan Khatib, the first intifada, settler colonialism and 21st century prospects for collective resistance, the middle east journal, number 2, (2019).

² Ibid, Nadia and Ghassan, number 2, (2019).

³ Idelogia Al-Elam Al-Israeli Fe Taghtiyat Al-Shan Al-Falstinin. Markza Aljazeera lildirasat. (2018). (In Arabic)

⁴ Ibid, Mozna, Shihab, (2006.)

⁵ Ibid, Mozna, Shihab, (2006).

Chapter Five

The Communication Committee with the Israeli Community

5.1. Introduction

A communication committee was formed to communicate with the Israeli society abiding with the decision of the Palestinian president Mahmud Abbas during the meeting of the Palestinians leaderships on the 4th of December, 2012. This decision was issued after a week from the UN's decision to recognize the Palestinian state with Eastern Jerusalem as its capital on the borders of June, 1967. as it considered it as a non-member observer state in the UN. Because it had a positive impact on the Israeli public opinion, some campaigns were a provocation against the Palestinian causes, consequently, this committee was formed.

In other words, the political and intellectual and political engagement with the Israeli community with all its classes became an urgent need in order to make change in the Israeli public opinion exactly as happened in India, Algeria, Vietnam and South Africa living under occupation.¹ It was considered an extension of the previous activities started in the 1970s, but it was led by the member of the central committee. Nowadays, FAR-Right parties are leading campaigns aiming to defame the Palestinian stands which was the motivation behind the formation of this committee.²

In the 7th conference held on the 29th of November, 2016, Fatah considered the communication committee as one of its delegations as was recognized in the session of the PNC in Ramallah in 2018.

¹ Lajna Al-Tawasol Ma Almojtama Alisraeli: AlItaqir Alshamil Fe Al-Majlis AlmarkziFe Dawrati 28 2013-2017. PLO. Ramallah. (2018). (In Arabic)

² Ibid, Emil Tuma. Jothor Al-QaDIA Al-Filistinia (1972).

5.2. The Message of the Committee to the Israeli Committee and its Vision of the Solution

This committee aimed at reaching a fir solution in the Middle East depending on the establishment of the Palestinian independent state with considering Eastern Jerusalem as its capital on the borders of the 4th of Jun, 1967 based on implementing resolution (194). It sought to confirm that the recognition of the state of Palestine issued in the UN didn't negate peace process. On the contrary, it saved the two-state solution which was destroyed due to settlement expansion and the denial of all the international decisions of peace processes.

Also, it explained the benefits of Israel and its people in case of achieving permanent peace with the Palestinians since peace is a mutual interest strategy for both parties at the end. In addition, it sought to introduce the Israeli society to the Palestinian one to inform them that there were variation of people including moderate and extremists as the Israeli society.¹

In addition, the tasks of the committee include affecting the Israeli public opinion and gain more support for the two-state solution through lobby groups on decision- makers in Israel urging them to agree with the Palestinian leadership instead of their destructive policy. Also, it depicts the changes in the Israeli society and analyses data deeply along with presenting visions about the Palestinian stand from the Israeli affairs. Besides, it shows the deception of the Israeli decision- makers and making it go according to an unreasonable program.

This committee uses various mechanisms to achieve their tasks including using media to deliver the message such as designing a website in Arabic, English and Hebrew a well as

¹ Lajnat Altwasol Alshaeml. Tqrir Shamil 2013-14. PLO. (2014). (In Arabic)

communicating with the Israeli websites and establish a broadcast in Hebrew publishing the Palestinian new to the Israelis.¹

Other methods used by the committee included holding courses and forums with the classes of the Israeli society individually or collectively allowing whoever understands the way of addressing them in order to explain the Palestinian situation and inform them about the misery of the Palestinians and the bright aspects of living in the Palestinian society. Finally, it employs culture to deliver the message that the Palestinians are people as the others and deserve to live freely with dignity, so it employs artists or even actors who affect the Israeli public opinion to deliver that message.²

5.3. The Targeted Categories

It worked hard to target the activists of the political parties in Israel who opposed or agreed with the end of the occupation, but the main focus was with the opposers including former Knesset members and Israeli politicians as well as economists and Israeli businessmen from the Russian immigrants and Americans who influence the Israeli sectors especially during elections.

Also, it targeted Eastern Jews from African or Arab countries including Iraq, Syria, Yemen, North Africa, Ethiopia, Iran and Turkey. In addition, it targeted the Israeli youth and women no matter their political, social or religious background as well as women, intellectuals, artists and doctors in the Israeli society. It also targeted the Palestinian leaderships in Israel which are affiliated to the supreme Arab committee and the Arab parties in Israel as well as the Arab keenest members.³ In short, it addressed all the classes of the Israeli societies.

¹ Johan Galtung, violence/peace/and peace research, journal of peace research, (1969).

² Ibid, Johan, (1969).

³ Ibid, Johan, (1969).

It followed the principle of studying the Israeli society and determine the parties to communicate with regardless their political since the committee aimed to target all the classes of the Israeli society including opposition and proponents. In short, it intended to participate a larger number of Israelis since communication cannot be productive without having a crowd especially in light of the increase of the power of the Far- Right parties in Israel.¹

The committee planned a clear media strategy that it organized consultations meetings with many Israeli journalists and then met Russian- speaking group to communicate with Russian speaking Jews. Also, it made sure that its members participate in the activities of the executive committee of the PLO, the central committee, the revolutionary council, the leaderships of the various factions or national activities, the national and legislative council, Christian and Muslim religious men, businessmen as well as the representatives of the organisations of the civil society in order to make the Palestinian message loud and clear.²

In order to implement the results of the meetings, the committee formed groups of members who determine the best way of political engagement with the facilitators of the Israeli society. In other words, there is a team of consultants from Arab Israelis who work daily to fulfil the needs of the committee by doing the administrative work and archiving all the data about the sectors of the Israeli society to ease communicating with them.³

5.4. The Activities of the Committee Towards the Israeli Society

The committee held many individual and collective meetings with governmental and non-governmental institutions; political and academic personnel; businessmen; writers;

¹ Ibid, Johan, (1969).

² Ibid, Johan, (1969).

³ Ibid, Johan, (1969).

journalists and religious men. These meetings resulted in a change in their way of thinking about the Palestinian cause with focusing on the political solution according to the program of the PLO. It listed the parties which went to elections determining the names of the members of the Keenest who won in the election in order to choose the most influential ones to communicate with them.¹

The committee addressed the Israeli society through its media about the importance of mutual work in order to succeed for the best interest of both determining its message as a response to the Israeli questions about the right of return, the Palestinian political program, the various stages of the Israeli- Palestinian negotiations and the reasons of the failure of the political solution. This goes with the clarification of the reasons of the failure of reaching an agreement which previous governments failed to achieve which is ending the Israeli occupation.

Also, businessmen participated in their own initiatives especially the initiative of breaking the impasse² which was adopted by many businessmen in Israel and Palestine in order to find a way to break this impasse of the political process. It had a great role in increasing the understanding of the Israelis that 40% of the Israeli businessmen participated in this initiative.

If this delegation went to Netanyahu telling him about the right of their Palestinian partners who have the right to be partners in making a future different from the past and far from wars and fighting. Furthermore, using that in the meetings assured the role of the private sector in making decisions considering them partners in peace making.³

¹ Ibid, Johan, (1969).

² **Breaking the Impasse** (BTI) is an advocacy group consisting of Israeli & Palestinian business leaders. BTI's aim is to urge the Israeli government and Palestinian Authority leadership to reach a peace agreement based on the two-state solution.

³ Ibid, Johan, (1969).

The researcher thinks that businessmen couldn't penetrate or achieve anything in their quest to convince the Israeli businessmen that some of them changed his mind due to their inability to influence politicians and opposers. Also, some leaderships refused the idea and attacked them.

It executed its activities in the Israeli environment at the horizontal level in order to recognize the factions, powers and personnel in Israel and then moved to the vertical level as the following:

- Peace and democracy forces in Israel:

They are the alliances of peace at various levels since their program is close to the Palestinian national program as well as adopting the basics of fair solution for the struggle. Some of them are from the first generation who hold peace and struggled in their societies in order to outcast the occupations' policy recognizing the right of the Palestinians to establish their independent state. In addition, the committee focused on the role of this generation that it met and honoured them including the former Keenest member Uri Federi who visited Arafat in his siege in Beirut. The other one is Latif Al-Dori who was the first to discover Kuf Qasim massacre and since then he called for the freedom of the Palestinians.

- Keenest and political parties' members:

The Keenest represent the platform of the internal and external policies of Israel that it is natural to begin with it. Furthermore, many individual and collective meetings with Keenest members in Ramallah, the Keenest or in the headquarter of one of the factions. The committee succeeded in attracting many Keenest members from different factions that the Labor parliament member Helek Bar coordinated what he called "The cluster of the parliament members agreeing with the Arabic peace initiative".

Also, it targets youth members from the Israeli factions who belong to Chas urging them to reconsider their views about the Palestinians in order to contribute in ending the internal battle of the leadership of their factions. In other words, the young generation grew up on the stereotypes of the enmity of the Palestinians, so they should listen to the youth for themselves.¹

- Former political and security leaders:

It includes a huge number of politicians and security men who were serving in the army, intelligence and Mosad serving in different positions in the government or parliament. However, they are still active politically that their motive was their desire to be separated from the Palestinians because they are afraid on the demographic nature of their state. One of those addressed were the extremists whose dialogue was tough, still it could reach an agreement with some of them in order to change their way of thinking convincing them with the two-state solution.

- Ethnic groups:

This group includes the Jews belonging to ethnic origins including immigrants from the Arab countries to Israel or the Kurdish immigrants, Russian immigrants from the USSR and others who were contacted discovering that they are still clinging with their original culture especially the Arab ones that some of them introduced themselves as Arab Jews.

- 1948 Arabs:

The committee considered the 1948 Arabs a significant part of the resistance against the Israeli policies towards the Palestinians. It broadcast their meetings in all fields since they are united. This unity was effective in clearing misunderstandings about the Palestinians leading to communicating with the Druze who have been in the Israeli institutions for a

¹ Comprehensive report to the Central Council at its twenty-eighth session, 2013-2017.

long time without any rights. Thus, they served against the national interests of their people, but they received the message of the committee positively that a peace conference was held in Yarka own for all the proponents of the two-state solution. The main aim behind that was to make them a basic component of peace making.¹

- Open meetings:

The normal Israeli citizens played an important role in the activities of the committee that it met them in their own houses “houses meetings” inviting their acquaintances and friends to get to meet Palestinians face to face. This was the first time Israelis meet Palestinians to get informed about the Palestinian position about what the Israeli media is broadcasting as well as the two-state solution. These meetings were confirmed that the Palestinians have rights and national roots in this country that they kept repeating “This is the first time we listen to Palestinians face to face”.

- Active women movement and activists:

There are parts of the popular movement in Israel representing a large group of women who work silently in their contact with the committee that they called themselves “Women making peace”. Most of them didn’t agree with the two-state solution, but they didn’t like the current situation asking both leaderships to have a pact of peace between them.

- Meetings with foreign politicians and activists:

The committee contributed in widening the circle of the international interest in its activities in Israel by inviting foreigners to participate in political discussion with Israelis. Sometimes, the Palestinian foreign department and the communication committee coordinate that. In fact, there were two visits in 2017 from China and Ireland that their

¹ Ibid, Johan, (1969).

foreign ministries invited Palestinian and Israeli delegations including Keenest members and Israeli activists to dialogue to save the two-state solution.

5.5.The Challenges of Communicating with the Israeli Society

The communication committee achieved much in the Israeli grounds that many Israelis changed their minds about the Palestinian cause, Still, it faced a number of challenges including:

- Issuing decisions stating the restriction of the movement of the head of the committee as well as its leaders and members. Also, the Israeli authorities banned many Israeli delegations from getting to Ramallah either to meet the president or meeting members of the committee.¹
- The refusal of some of the Palestinian classes to work with the committee because of their despair from making change in the mentality of these extremists in Israel. Another reasons might be their fear from the activities of this committee which looks like normalization relations with the Israelis. Furthermore, many Palestinian figures criticized it especially the BDS which considered its presence encouraging others to meet Israelis without any political restrictions.²

Some people criticize its work for reasons related to transferring misleading information about the Israeli community showing to the world that they want peace. Also, it shows that we can bargain on their role in peace making. While met people are insignificant in the Israeli society, many are convinced that we don't need Israeli meetings to know our stand even though our media is unable to do so. Furthermore, the BDS called for stopping these meetings because the Israelis violate international agreements. Thus, these meetings

¹ Ibid, Johan, (1969).

² Adil Shadid. *Tilika Al-Lajna Al- Filistinia Litwasol Ma Al- Mjtama Al- Filistini*. AlArabi Aljadid. (2020). (In Arabic)

break the state of enmity with the Israelis encouraging other Palestinians to communicate with the Israelis directly whether it was for trade or in context of normalization.¹

¹ Ibrahim Abrash. Al- Filistinion Wa Al- Israelsion Sira Maftouh Wa Tawasol Mahtom. Walakalt Sma Al- Ikhbariya. (2020). (In Arabic)

Chapter Six

The Palestinian Leadership Vision of Public Diplomacy Towards the Israeli Society

6.1. Introduction

The Palestinian leadership realized the importance of the diplomatic movement in order to highlight the just of our cause and prove the rights of the Palestinians as well as gaining the international and Arab support for the Palestinian cause in Israel since the establishment of the PLO in 1964. It could gain international sympathy for the Palestinian cause as well as the sympathy of the Israeli society. In other words, the armed struggle was not the only followed strategy, but it focused on peaceful solutions to reclaim the Palestinian rights.

The was presented by following all kinds of diplomacy ranging from proposing peaceful initiatives, proposing new solutions such as the Palestinian peace initiative in 1988 as well as having international meetings with many personnel and political leaderships.

In this context, the Palestinian leadership led by president Mahmud Abbas established channels of dialogue with the Israeli society implementing the decisions of the PNC since 1974 until nowadays. This was done to solidify the culture of permanent peace in the Israeli mentality. However, this idea was objected by a number of Palestinian leaderships, consequently, a number of Palestinians were assassinated by the opposing groups. Still, for the importance of these calls, in 2012 a committee was formed to communicate with the Israeli society becoming one of the institutions of the PLO.

This chapter seeks to get to know more about the Palestinian leaders' vision of the public diplomacy towards the Israeli society that it highlights the main reasons for adopting such peaceful options in the struggle. Also, it clarifies to what extent the Palestinian leadership

succeeded since 1974 in making change in the Israeli public opinion convincing it with adopting peaceful solutions for ending the struggle. In addition, it tackles to what extent the Palestinian leadership could succeed in promoting the non-violence and peaceful resistance policy through these channels and through public diplomacy. Finally, the followed Palestinian strategy in communicating with the Israeli society as well as the challenges and hindrances faced in this communication.

It is noticed that this chapter was completed from interviews done by the researcher with related interviewee including a number of the members of the communication with the Israeli society, Palestinian leadership personnel, Palestinian politicians as well as a number of journalists interested in this topic.

6.2. Methodology

The nature of the content in this study led the researcher follow the qualitative methods to collect data from the interviews with the elite because it gives a great flexibility in understanding phenomena in their context. Here, there is an importance for using qualitative method which is deducing the facts and field data through concepts and theories. Also, it helps sharing this study with the targeted sample as being experts in explaining this reality. This leads us to results which are not presumed before because the aim is to understand these phenomena and the problematic issue about it to come out with conclusions.

Interviews are done to collect data either face to face or via email to whom hard to reach. Rolling snowball was used by communicating with one person to get to the relevant people to the main issue here. They helped the interviewee talk about their experience in this filed and evaluate them with new ideas.

Yes/ no questions were avoided focusing on the questions which build confidence between the researcher and the interviewee in order to get as much information as possible. The research was no biased as all his propositions were taken objectively that these interviews were recorded after taking the permission of the interviewees.

The main focus is on the elite experts who have enough information about the subject matter that they contacted the Israeli community directly (the members of the committee) as well as academics, journalists, politicians and experts in the field.

Specific questions were asked in the interviews covering the vision of the Palestinian leadership in its communication with the Israeli society. Some of the questions are general while there are other specific questions determined by the interviewee, position and background experience. This sample included 17 interviewees.

Most of the interviewees were conducted in the West Bank that interviewees from Jerusalem and Gaza were out of reach. In some cases, the interviewees asked the researcher to stop the recorder that some information was unpublishable.

The time for every interview was normally one hour, but some interviewees asked for open time until all questions are answered. Other interviewees didn't give the researcher enough time to interview them, so their interviews were short (30 minute- long) and that was not enough to get information. In certain cases, the interviewees were reported about the interview, but once interviewed, they refused to answer any question explaining that answers were sensitive.

The researcher didn't have any problems with having appointments with the interviewees as they cooperated from the first call as a result of the interest in the topic of the study.

Some of them asked the researcher to attend the defence of the thesis and tell them about the date because they wanted to publish it and hear its results and recommendations. Also,

some interviewees offered to help the researcher in anything needed to get things done, but some were hesitant to give information.

Travelling in the West Bank was one of the challenges that the researcher lives in Jenin and sometimes it was hard to visit Palestinian cities due to Israeli strict procedures. In addition, after March, 2020, COVID-19 added another challenge for some interviewees due to health reasons.

6.3. The Reasons of Adopting Peaceful Solutions for Conflict Resolution from the Point of View of the Palestinian Leadership

In the mid-1970s, the voices calling for peaceful solutions rose reflecting on the policies of the PLO and its decisions. In fact, in 1974, the PLO adopted a new political program known as “The Ten Points Program” which had stages of achieving the goals of the solution of the Palestinian cause. This meant recognizing the establishment of the Palestinian state by liberating any pieces of land. Such a new beginning in the policies of the PLO in terms of the transition from struggle resistance to peaceful resistance.

This change in the methods of the PLO led to the Arab recognition in Rabat summit in 1974 the PLO as the legal representative of the Palestinians putting an end to the Palestinian internal division paving the way to the freedom of moving to the representation in the international arena. In fact, Arafat participated in the UN’s session in the same year addressing the whole world in his historic speech after which the PLO became the non- observing member in the UN based on resolution (3237). Based on this new situation, the PLO’s situation developed at the international level that many diplomatic offices and embassies were opened in most countries of the world.¹

¹ Ahmad Sakhir. *PLI bain marahil Al-Kifah*. Ftah. Maktab Al-Shon Al fikriya. (2009). (In Arabic)

These changes were momentarily that there were reasons for such dramatic change including factors related to the organization itself and its intention to change its course as well as regional, Arab or international factors in that stage.

Furthermore, Fatah proposed the idea of establishing a democratic state living with the Israeli in peace in 1968, but the democratic state was meant to be on the whole space of Palestine. However, this idea was rejected by Israel and the US. This proposition remained on paper until October War 1973.

1973- war created military balance between the Arabs and Israelis which led to an international political movement with new data indicating the possibility of having a political settlement of the Arab- Israeli struggle based on the UN council's resolution. Also, it led to An Arab- Palestinian movement preparing the PLO for achieving political gains and delivering an acceptable political discourse. In short, this war was one of the reasons of the Palestinian change towards settlement and changing the political discourse.¹

Furthermore, Adnan Al-Damiri was one of the motivations for shifting to the peaceful solution that there weren't any possibilities for military solution especially after getting out of Jordan after black July between the Jordanian army and the Palestinian forces. When the PLO chose armed struggle, this expressed a stage in the Palestinian struggle.² Then, the continuation of the political development had to be done by communicating with the Israeli forces in 1977. Then, Mr. Ashraf Al-Ajrami described the decision taken then by a stage of the realization of the Palestinians leadership that the solution won't come without any settlement with the Israelis as well as the great important of the

¹ Khled SAFI. Al-Kayania Alfilistinia 1948-1993. Akadiia Alidara Wa Alsiasa Lidirasat Alolya (2006).

² A personal interview with Mr. Adnan Dhamiri, General Political Commissioner of the Palestinian Authority, Ramallah, 11/12/2019.

influence on the Israeli public opinion to create positive stereotypes about the Palestinian cause.¹

However, Mr. Ibrahim Abrash described that period as a period of the deterioration of the Arab relationship especially after the events in Jordan and the exile of the Fidae's from Lebanon in the Lebanese Civilian War. This made the Palestinian leadership make the kind of change that supports its struggle against the Israeli occupation.²

This decision was taken by the communications of Isam Al-Sartawi with a number of Israeli personnel which took a legal protected natural according to PNC's decisions.

The experiences of other countries in resisting the occupier didn't only take one form, on the contrary, they followed many methods including diplomatic, political, media and military forms making one of these methods more preferable than the other.³ Here, Hussein Al-A'raj said that the Palestinian revolution realized the importance of learning from others' experiences when the Vietnamese moved the struggle to the American cities through demonstrations asking for the American withdrawal, so they became a lobbying force. Also, the Algerian revolution penetrated the French society and formed a public opinion against the French existence in Algeria.⁴

In 1982, the PLO lost the most important military base after their exit from there that it was trying to find a political solution keeping it in the political arena. Fortunately, the Arab summit in the same year adopted the Saudi Crown Prince Fahd Bin Abdul- Aziz which was approved by the PLO. Then, communications between the Palestinian

¹ Personal interview. Mr. Ashraf Ajrami A member in the Committee of Communication with the Israeli. Ramallah. 11.6.2019.

² Interview via email with Mr. Ibrahim Abriah. A writer and Analyst. Gaza. 4.7.2020.

³ Ibid, - Nakamura and Matthew, (2009).

⁴ Personal introduction with Mr. Hussein Al-Araj. A member in the Committee of Communication with the Israeli, Jenin. 7.6.2020.

leadership and some Israeli personnel started to be done under the patronage of *Al-Hamaem* party.

One of the Palestinian politicians said that the regional changes after the Israeli- Egyptian peace and the change in the balance of the powers led Palestinian to stick to the peaceful solutions as a message to the world of their wish to make peace as well as the rifle of the resistance.¹ It was a message the world that the Palestinian revolution was a liberal civilized movement believing in the other and supporting peaceful options along with having a strong belief in communicating with the Israelis.

These fast events coincided with some Palestinian field arrangements in the Lebanese arena that there was a renegade party from Fatah leading to internal Palestinian struggle which was fed by regional forces. This led to the second exit of the Palestinians increasing the wish for peaceful settlement that it contacted the Egyptian regime again. It was obvious that the regional influence was strong on the organization's policies.² After that, indications of directing efforts to the peaceful option were obvious in the 19th session in Algeria in 1988 where the Palestinian independence was declared under the UN's general assembly's resolution of the division of Palestine (181) and the National Security's resolutions (242) and (338) as the base of negotiations.³

Then, at the end of 1987, the Palestinian Intifada occurred unlike any Arab or international expectations that a month before the Intifada, the Palestinian cause wasn't on the interest list of the Arabs, but the intifada changed their beliefs addressing the world that the Palestinian cause cannot be ignored by any means possible leading to the changes

¹ An interview with a politician. Jenin. 3.4 2020.

² Osama Abu Nahl. *Maseera Altaghayorat W Atharoha Ala Monathamt Atahrir Min AINASHA Ela Oslo Dar Aljondi.* (2012). (In Arabic)

³ Rabe' Mohammed Abdul Aziz. *Al- Hiwar Al-Amriki Al- Falstini: Al- Doblomasia AISiray Waa L Itisasalat Al Falastinia Al- Israeliia.* Dar AlJalil Lilnasher Wa Al dirasat Wa Al Abhath. Amman. 1995. 22. (In Arabic)

in stands by all the countries interested in the Arab- Israeli struggle that should be finished.

One of the Palestinian politicians described the first Intifada as the changer of the stand of the Israeli forces calling for opening channels of communication with the PLO realizing that there wasn't any military solution to stop the intifada that a political solution should be figured out.¹

The research sees that one of the reasons for the Palestinian change to peaceful solutions was the possibility of the development of the Israelis' military potentials and the increase of its external support leading to increasing its military power as well as the demographic factor as a result of the increase of settlement in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Eventually, this change in the methods of the PLO led to signing Oslo I peace agreement in 1993, but this was not only for negotiation, it came as a result of the accumulations of political events such as the intifada of 1987, the defeat of the communist camp, the Gulf war as well as the communication with the Israeli local and international peace forces.

6.4. The Extent of the Success of the Palestinians in Influencing the Israeli Society

The study of the history of the world's revolutions proved that they penetrated the enemy's societies, but there was still a flaw in the power balance in favour of the occupation. In addition, they tried to penetrate their societies peacefully by asking for their rights in a humanitarian way especially after the announcement of the General Principles of Human Rights and the non-violent leadership of Gandhi in India as well as the peaceful resistance of MLK and Mandela in South Africa.

¹ An interview with one of the Politicians. RAMALLAH. 2.1.2020.

The Palestinian revolution is not an exception since the Palestinians tried to penetrate the Israeli society when the Left communist thoughts were common in Israel. Here, Abu Mazen used that to solve the Palestinian cause peacefully within the Israeli society especially after the 10 points program in 1974. Also, the Palestinian leadership realized that a support front should be formed in the Israeli society in order to have a peaceful settlement of this struggle.

The questions remaining is to what extent did the Palestinian leadership succeed in creating a supportive public opinion to the Palestinian's rights in the Israeli society?

6.5. Communication Channels Before Oslo

By analysing the conducted interviews, most of the interviewees think that the Palestinian leadership succeeded partly in opening channels of communication with the Israeli society, but this partial success was one of the reasons for the close relations between them and signing Oslo peace agreement in 1993.

Abbas in his book "These Communications, why?" confirmed that Oslo agreement was not coincidental or as a result of the American negotiations. ON the contrary, it was as a result of the PLO's communication with the Israelis locally and internationally leading to the turn to the peaceful option which fulfils coexistence and peace.¹

Ashraf Al-Ajrami said that the Palestinian leadership achieved a partial success and the communication with the Israeli parties led to closing the relationships leading to the approach to the two-state solution. Still, there wasn't any Palestinian political policy in the dialogue. Instead, they were only some initiatives by Palestinian personnel with the agreement of the PLO. However, there was opposition to this decision accusing it with

¹ Ibid, - Nakamura and Matthew, (2009).

normalizing relations with the Israelis leading many people to refuse to work in this initiative.¹

The Israeli communist party was one of the Israeli parties with which the PLO held most of the meetings with because it was the only one declaring its approval for establishing a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza alongside Israel. Furthermore, in 1987 in Hungary, there was a meeting between the Palestinian delegation of the PLO led by Abbas and the Left-Wing Israeli delegation. Eventually, a mutual statement was issued to establish the Palestinian state which was one of the successes of the Palestinian leadership in establishing channels of communication with the Israeli society.

Elias Zananiri thinks that the internal dialogue in Israel about the point of the continuity of this occupation on the one hand and the two-state solution on the other hand. This dilemma was due to the Palestinian penetration of the Israeli society over the last five years after adopting the 10- Point program which leads to the establishment of the PNA over any liberated lands in Palestine.²

The supervisor of all these channels of communication was Abbas considering him the godfather of this idea which led to the necessity of knowing the Israeli society from the inside to neutralize it.

Tawfiq Al-Tirawi confirms that during the rule of Abbas of the communication with the Israeli society, he partly achieved the delivery of the Palestinian message to the Israeli society.³

One of the examples of the channels of communication before Oslo, the channel which was run by Abbas with the Left- Wing party as well as the channel of Waleed Al-Khaldi

¹ Ibid, Abdulwahab, Al-Kayali, (1971).

² Interview with Ilias Zanabiri. A member in the Committee of Communication with the Israeli. Ramallah. 5.7.2020.

³ Interview with Tawfiq Al-irawi. A member in the central Council of Fatah. Wed. 14.6.2020.

(a professor at Harvard university”. Other channels included the channel of Saed Kamal (the Palestinian ambassador in Egypt) who met Israeli officials as well as the channel of Bassam Abu Sharif in Tunis.

Despite this partial penetration of the Israeli society, Mr. Ilias Zandiri said that it was possible for this penetration to be deeper causing a great dispute in Israel. It would be possible to happen deeper in 1974 if Arafat said in his historic speech that he was on the behalf of the Palestinians after recognizing the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian. Also, if he said that he came to ask the UN to fulfil its obligation to establish the Palestinian state. If Arafat knew about the division decision which gave the Jews 55% and the Palestinians 45%, it was possible to talk about a political solution plausible for everyone.¹

The research thinks that the Palestinian leadership succeeded in opening channels of communication before Oslo that they had a great role in the continuity of the leaderships’ resistance until the forbidden dream became allowed and recognized by the Israeli government.

6.6. Focusing on Official Diplomacy Neglecting Public Diplomacy after Oslo

After signing Oslo agreement, the communication with the Israeli parties continued that the Palestinian leadership focused on communicating with the Far- Left Wing parties who disagreed with them. Even after signing the agreement, this was not an easy task since Rabin’s assassination and the rise of the Far- Right Wing parties rose to the government, this led to more extremism and lack of belief in the Palestinians’ rights.

¹ Ibid, Emil, Tuma & Jothor, Al-QaDIA Al-Filistinia, (1972).

This assured that communicating with the Israelis after Oslo was not really successful despite there were voiced supporting the Palestinian rights based on religious or humanitarian point of view, but they were not effective on the Israeli policy.

Mr. Hadi Hassan assured that in that stage, there was a change after Oslo agreement that the square of peace including Mertz represented 19 seats, but after the operations of bombing the Israeli buses, the Far- Right use that to provoke others on the Palestinian leadership. Consequently, this distorted the message of the Palestinians in the communication channels.¹

Mr. Waleed Al-Omari described the Palestinian operations targeting Israeli civilians during Oslo agreement (1993- 1996) which were done in the Israeli cities as weakening factors of the pro-Palestinian propaganda as the Far – Right used this as an excuse to be hostile to the Palestinians.²

In the meanwhile, some saw that after the establishment of the PNA, there was an expanded dialogue but it started wrongly that the main program was not to raise the Israeli awareness in the “People to People” program. Also, it wasn’t based on the hypothesis that there was a grave need to change the Israeli public’s mind. In short, it was chaotic and haphazard.

The research saw that after Oslo, channels of communication were ignored replacing them with the official ones only that some NGOs used these talks about replaced the PLO. Things remained the same until the Palestinian leadership decided to form a communication committee to communicate with the Israeli society. This step was an organized step.

¹ Interview with Mr. HadiHassan. A member in the Committee of Communication with the Israeli. 9.6.2020.

² Interview with Waleed Omari. Via email A The Manager of Al- Jazeera. 20.8.2020.

Despite that, there were some points of view of some of the interviewee stating that the Palestinian leadership since 1974 couldn't achieve any real penetration for the Israeli community even in the period of the rule of the Likud, and Rabin. On the contrary, the settlement was because of the Palestinian intifada of 1987. Razi Al-Nabli thought that communication policy led the Israelis to extremism in the mid of a real absence of real struggle in the internal agenda in Israel.¹ In short, there wasn't any penetration of the Israeli public opinion that the Israeli society was divided into one who doubt the intentions of the Palestinian leadership and the ones who judged their defeat as the main motivation for their communication.

6.7. The Palestinian Public Diplomacy and its Success in Establishing Communication Channels with the Israeli Society

The continuous victory of the Far- Right party embodies its control over the Israeli society and this assures that the Palestinian leadership didn't succeed in expanding its range of communication in the Israelis society. Furthermore, it is true that the Palestinians exerted all efforts, but extremism got greater in this society. Basically, this attempt was a wise choice to establish communication channels in this ideological and religious society, but the Israelis didn't consider the Palestinians as peace partners but as enemies who should be dominated without any kind of rights.

One of the leaders of Fatah said that no matter how wide was the circle of communication with the Israeli society, it would be aimless to do so since Oslo's failure leads to keeping the idea of the supreme control of the Israelis without having any chance of co-existence between the Palestinians and the Israelis.²

¹ Ibid, Wafa, (1977).

² An interview with one of Fatah's leaders. (Not permitted to mention his name). 20.6.2020.

The Israeli society suffers from media blackout that the Israeli media distorts the truth and convinces them that Palestinians are demons and that there isn't any Palestinian peace partner. This aimed to guarantee their control over the Palestinian territory making the two-state solution an impossible mission.¹ Furthermore, the Palestinian diplomacy failed because of the lack of qualified media political personnel that the Palestinian message needed the support of the Palestinian media to be directed to the Israeli society. In other words, this is not restricted with news, but it should be developed to address others in their language and way of understanding.²

The researcher thinks that mass media didn't have any role in explaining the necessities of raising the awareness of people in the Israeli society of the local situation of the Palestinian society. In other words, it wasn't employed to penetrate the Israeli society addressing it in its own language.³

After signing Oslo agreement, the change in the aims and priorities of the Palestinian leadership led to neglecting public diplomacy channelling all communication through the official channels. Here, using public diplomacy to was restricted to rights and humanitarian institutions. As Mr. Nabil Sha'ath confirmed that after Oslo communications with the Israeli society was weak that talks with the Israeli authorities became through the official diplomacy.⁴ In other words, it lost its ability to change the Israeli society.

¹ PLO. A member in the Committee of Communication with the Israeli. The Palestinian stand from essential cases. 2019. 13.

² An interview with a journalist. Ramallah. 13.8.2020.

³ Ibid, Wafa, (1977).

⁴ An interview with Nabil Shath The counselor of the president and the former foreign affairs minister. 26.6.2020.

Mr. Adil Sadid assured that the Palestinian leadership failed in establishing channels of communication using public diplomacy that it was restricted to Left parties and security officers who served in the West Bank and Gaza.¹

The researcher thinks that the expansion of the communication in the Israeli society depends on the security situation that when there is not any violence, the violent nature decreases and vice versa.

6.8. Palestinian Public Diplomacy and the Policy of Non- Violence:

Peaceful resistance has become the common topic in the Palestinian community nowadays reminding themselves with Gandhi's experience against the British colonization and the African experience against the segregation system. In the case of the Palestinian cause, peaceful resistance was not on the table, but most Palestinians suggested armed resistance as in 1987's intifada and the second one in 2000. These events weakened talking about peaceful resistance.

Then, after the decrease of the momentum of armed resistance and the massive killing of the Palestinians by the Israelis, the Palestinian leadership was obliged to seek peaceful options and break the impasse to assure the Palestinians' right of resisting the Israeli occupation. Basically, the PNA led by president Abbas adopted peaceful resistance in order to practice pressure on Israel by peaceful popular lobbying in order to influence the international community. This was done to drive the international community to reactivate the option of peace to ease the Israeli position and get more support for the Palestinian cause.

The led to the Palestinian division and the weakness of the Palestinian leadership asking it to ask for the independence of the Palestinian state. As Netanyahu rose to rule the Israeli

¹ An interview with Adil Shadid. an Israeli writer. Hebron. 12.7.2020.

government, everything stopped because he didn't believe in the Palestinians as peace partners.¹ The Question here is whether the Palestinian leadership succeeded in promoting for the policy of non-violence in the Israeli society.

Adnan Al-Damiri explained what happened that he said that we cannot see results for the promotion for this policy especially in the period of Netanyahu because of the propaganda of the Far- Right in the Israeli society. Concerning the Palestinian situation, it is immature to mix regular war from Gaza and popular resistance especially in the development of the Israeli weapons used in destroying Gaza and the West Bank in 2002. After the war on Gaza, the Israelis said to the world that they were facing a regular army not peaceful resistance.²

This racial stereotype about the superiority of the Israeli and the inferiority of the Palestinians prevented the Palestinian leadership from penetrating the Israeli community despite its non-violent propaganda.

Mr. Ibrahim Ibrash that Israel didn't fight the Palestinians because they wanted their own state by following violence, but because the Israeli Far- Right didn't recognise their existence. Consequently, the peaceful discourse and public diplomacy didn't influence most of the Israeli society even if there was a global reaction.

The idea of peaceful resistance needs many factors to achieve its goals one of which is the existence of a unified Palestinian leadership and linking the followed strategies with a comprehensive plan. In addition, Mr. Waleed Al- Omari said that one of the reasons for the failure of the promotion for peaceful resistance was the lack of the Palestinian unity.³

¹ Dr. Ayman Talal Yoself. Al- Moqawama Alshabia Alfلسطينيا. Namthaja Almawaqi Wa Ishkalyat. Markza Abhath PLO.

² An interview with Adnan Adamin. The High commissioner of and the spokesman for the Police forces. Ramallah. 11.12.2019.

³ Ibid, Abdulwahab, Al-Kayali, (1971).

In the point of view of the Israelis, following armed resistance was considered terrorism in the point of view of the Far- Right to provoke others against them.

In other words, there was a contradiction in the agenda of Fatah since the establishment of the PNA as stated by one of Fatah's leaders. He proceeded that this weakened the way of convincing Israel that there was a change in them. Also, Hamas launched rockets on Israel to cut this communication on the Palestinian leadership.¹

Raising the awareness of the Palestinians of the peaceful resistance as a strategic choice requires a Palestinian diplomatic movement on a large scale in order to get the international and the Israeli society's sympathy.²

This choice is the strongest weapon used against Israel at the international, regional and local level since it promotes for the official plans of the PNA.³ Hadi Hassan describes the extent of the success of the Palestinian leadership to promote for peaceful resistance in the Israeli society as being a failure since it didn't work in the Israeli society. Also, Fatah's contradictions distorted sending a unified message.⁴

The researcher thinks that the Palestinian leadership couldn't cope with the promotion of non-violence in the Israeli society that since Abbas led the PLO, he criticized armed resistance and urged them to move to peaceful one. Most of the factions stuck to this plan, but nothing changed in the Israeli society, but it became more extreme. Consequently, the Palestinian leadership is advised to prepare a plan for the promotion for this policy in the Israeli society in an organized way in order to take advantage of all the Palestinian human

¹ Ibid, Amani, Abosoboh, (2020).

² Yousef Salem.Tafel Dawr AlDoblomasia Alfilistinia litaziz Makana Almoqawama. Markaz Al-Falastinin. Masarat,. 2018. (In Arabic)

³ Ibid, Wfa, (1977).

⁴ Ibid, Wafa, (1977).

resources as well as getting out of the corner of the scattered ununified national agendas of the Palestinians factions.

6.9. The Palestinian Strategy in Light of the Absence of a Unified Vision

Over the years of the Israeli- Palestinian struggle, the lack of strategic planning in the moves of the Palestinian leadership led to disastrous results starting from losing human resources in subsided struggles leading to having casualties and destroying houses and properties without achieving any achievements. As a result, many efforts were gone in vain due to the lack of strategies uniting the Palestinians and their capabilities in Palestine and out of it and between the diplomatic efforts and the political work.¹ Currently, with the failure of the negotiations option and the absence of the armed struggle as well as the weakness of popular resistance and the existing regional complications, the Palestinian leadership found itself in a difficult situation where it didn't have any available option. This is due to the lack of agreed upon Palestinian strategies as well as the strength of the Zionist program in the Palestinian land, the Palestinian leadership became unable to deal with the Israelis for the previously mentioned reasons.²

In this atmosphere, the imbalance of powers forced the Palestinian leadership to infiltrate the Israeli society that without this step, the mission of the leadership was hard due to the Israeli refusal to deal with them as partners of peace. What is required was planning a clear strategy defining the work of the committee which includes professional national experts who know about the Israeli society in order to avoid the void meeting as the ones before.

¹ Abdul- Ghani Salama. Al- Istratijia Alfilistinia, Markaz AlAbhath Limonathamat Al-Tahrir Al-Filistinia. (2020).

² Ahmad Al-Ouri , Falastine R'ya Estratijia Siasatahu Sinaryohat Al-Holol Al- Matroha Wa Al-Siasat Al- Filistinia Al- Matluba, Al. Markaz Al -Filistini Lilabhath AlSiasat W Al Dirasat Al-Istratijia, Masarat, (2017).

The member of the communication committee Hussein Al-Araj said that the communication committee started to put a strategy to create pressure groups in order to affect the Israeli elections to be able to determine who's best to rule.¹ These groups would lobby to secure peace and coexistence for example the 1948 students rallied a huge group of people at the election day to choose new leaders for them. However, Al-Ajrami also added that there is a strategy to get to every Israeli house through the internet and social media.

The Palestinian best interest requires penetrating every house according to a specific and clear strategy corresponding to a plan, but as Al-Ajrami said there aren't enough resources to serve this strategy despite the existence of the strategy.² This weakness is due to the lack of directed Palestinian media to the Israelis explaining the agony of the Palestinians. Hadi Hassan also said that there are strategies based on the Arab peace initiative in an attempt to reach all the classes of the Israeli society, but other factors affect the credibility of the message.³

The Palestinian determination on the success of the committee of communication with the Israeli society is enlisted under the option of settlement because this is the only option for the Palestinian leadership after the increase of the power of Israel. Despite replacing public diplomacy with official diplomacy, the former will remain original as the committee of negotiations not because it worth trying, but because this is the only option for the Palestinian leadership.⁴

¹ Ibid, Abdulwahab, Al-Kayali, (1971).

² Ibid, Abdulwahab, Al-Kayali, (1971).

³ Ibid, Abdulwahab, Al-Kayali, (1971).

⁴ Interview with Razi Al-Nabulsi. (Via Email) A researcher in the Israeli Affairs. Masarat. Ramallah. 5.7.2020.

Ibrahim Abrash described this stage that the decision of the leadership since the beginning considering the committee affiliated to the PLO, it lacked a precise strategy.¹

The researcher thinks that communicating with the Israeli society despite the existence of a committee for that business is hindered a lack of clear strategy and unified call from everyone in the PLO due to the Palestinian division.

6.10. Communicating with the Israeli Community: Challenges and Hindrances why font size changes????

The idea of communicating with the Israeli community is not a new idea that it was suggested before the formation of the committee in 2012. It started in the 1990s since Abbas was in charge of organization and mobility in Fatah. He has always believed in peace and political settlement realising the importance of communicating with the Israelis. Based that, many Palestinians were assassinated because they were communicating with the Israelis by the opposition despite deciding it in the PNC. Furthermore, the PNC decided to start communicating with the non-Zionists and then in 1991 in Madrid conference the borders between the Israelis, Zionists and non-Zionists faded away that communication became with all Israelis. Still, some of the members didn't approve that step despite the full agreement on its legality by the PNC and this was one of the challenges of communicating with the Israelis since the beginning.²

Since 2012, both Palestinians and the Israelis reached a dead end, so the Palestinian leadership formed a committee to do so in the 1990s to gain the rights of the Palestinians in having their independent state with Eastern Jerusalem as its capital on the border of

¹ Ibid, Abdulwahab, Al-Kayali, (1971).

² Ibid, Nakamura and Matthew, (2009).

1967. Still, this committee faced and still facing hindrances in the Palestinian society and the Israeli one.

6.10.1. Challenges at the Level of the Israeli Society

Israel is ruled according to the principle of fear making since it planted fear in the Israelis that Palestinians are terrorists whose mission is to kill the Israelis. Consequently, the Palestinian demands are shown as terroristic.

Mr. Hadi Hassan confirmed that one of the main challenges facing communication was the deliberate defamation of the Palestinians by the Far Right that the Israelis are convinced that peace with the Palestinians is not peace at all.¹ Consequently, this dramatic shift to the Far-Right led to the closure of any way to reach to the Israeli society's mentality because it turned into gangs of settlers who kill and burn children.

In other words, the Israeli leadership succeeded in affecting the public point of view of the Israelis by isolating the Arabs in the 1948 lands from what is going on in the West Bank from attacks of settlers and the army. Similarly, Waleed Al-Omari said that the success of the Israelis was crowned by the isolation wall that the Israelis don't know anything behind the wall since it is a military zone.²

This led to isolating the mentality of the Israelis in the Israeli societies that most of them are with the army and its actions against the Israelis and this is apparent throughout history.

³ This is also reflected on the right of return ⁴ that Mr. Ori Devis described that the Zionist parties in the Israeli parliament and the non-Zionist make sure not to implement the right

¹ Ibid, Wafa, (1977).

² Ibid, Abdulwahab, Al-Kayali, (1971).

⁴ Sara Al-Qudwa. Altatrof Wa Al-Onsoria Dakhil Al-Mjtama Alisraeli DAERAT Shon Al-Lajen. PLO. (2019). (In Arabic)

of return.¹ In short, as long as the Zionist practice and mentality dominant in Israel, all Israelis agree on rejecting the right of return.

The researcher thinks that the continuity of the control of the Far- Right who is clutching with his religion giving religious accusations for all its crimes as well as the weakness of the Lift- Wing parties represent a great paradox between belonging, collective memory, the roots of this struggle and the possibilities of settlement. Also, these pressures in the internal political system led to fear as the drive to many Israelis not to talk to any Arab or his leadership.

6.10.2. Challenges at the Palestinian Level

As the communication committee was formed based on Abbas's decision in 2012 and agreed upon in Fatah's central council and in the 7th conference of Fatah in 2016 to communicate with the Israeli to find supporters who recognize the rights² of the Palestinians in Israel. Still, part of Fatah opposed it because they saw it was a kind of normalizing relations with the occupation. Consequently, they should be convincing in order to change the stereotypes stuck in the minds of the Israelis.³

Here, Al-Damiri said that one of the most significant challenges was the collective mind of the Palestinians which formed a stereotype about the struggle and its parties being far away from reality.⁴ In other words, we have to know the aims of struggle since struggling for freedom is sacred and its tools.

¹A personal interview with Seri Davis. THE Deputy of the General Commissioner of Fatah's political affairs. Ramallah 26.1.2019.

² The Committee of the communication with the Israeli society: A comprehensive summary presented to the PNC in the 34th session. (2018).

³ Riyadh Awwad. Al-TAWASOL mAaL-Mjtama AliSRAELI. Shatharat. DoniaAl- Watan. (2020). (In Arabic)

⁴ Ibid, Al- Khazandar.

Furthermore, the Palestinian leadership should have come up with new methods to enhance peace culture before opening the channels with them trying to create an Israeli awareness of the Palestinian cause and the suffering of the Palestinians. This reflected on the results of the Israeli election that Al-Araj thinks that the Palestinian society is narrow minded in terms of understanding the importance of the role of the committee in our struggle against the occupation.¹

As long as these challenges belong to the Palestinians, the Palestinian division between Gaza and the West Bank should be mentioned that his administrative and political division caused pressures on the Palestinian system that the interest in the Palestinian cause decreased due to having two different political systems.² Here, there is a divided discourse without unified reference that Tawfiq Al-Tirawi the member in the central council of Fatah that division is one of the main challenges that there isn't any unified opinion or message.³

Also, many classes of people don't accept communicating with the Israelis for their conviction that it is against the BDS and whoever communicates with them is normalizing relationships with them.

Factionally speaking, the refusal of some Palestinian factions to communicate with the Israelis is because they considered it one of the tools of normalization.⁴ For example the PFLP considered this act as a defamation of our struggle and giving an excuse to the Arab

¹ Ibid, Abdulwahab, Al-Kayali, (1971).

² Omar SHABAN. Tadaeyat Al-Inqisam Alfalsitni. Al Almashro alwatani. MARKAZ Al-Abhat PLO. (2020).

³ Ibid, Emil, Tuma, (1972).

⁴Ibid, Wafa, (1977).

countries to normalize their relations with the Israelis.¹ Fatah's member Al-Ajrami assured that the absence of factional agreement is a great problem.²

Concerning Hamas, the insistence of the president that keeping the communication committee violates the national consensus that it is rejected because it encourages others to normalize their relation with the Israelis.³

Also, the Palestinian initiative considered these meetings which started in 2012 as being suspected and should be re-evaluated. It considered these meetings as a waste of time and without any results in favour of the Palestinian cause.⁴ Besides, Twfiq Al-Tirawi held the responsibility of the consequences of this committee and the campaign against it to the PLO and the central council of Fatah together since they knew the consequences and were silent.⁵

Also, the decision of forming this committee was taken by Abbas without consulting the central council of Fatah⁶ and this confirms the disagreement in Fatah since it was directed to some people.⁷ Furthermore, what happened in Fatah was to set the scores of some members at the level of the regions that Fatah's branch in Jenin stated that participating in the parliament of peace in Tel Aviv is a sign of free normalization with the occupation and a conspiracy against our people.⁸

¹AIQUDS a-Arabi. Lajnat Altawaso ma Almojtama Al-Israeli. Mostamron. Altatheer Ala Alyameen. 25. 2.2020. (In Arabic)

² Ibid, Abdulwahab, Al-Kayali, (1971).

³ A statement for the spokesman of Fatah, Hazem Qsim. 25. 2.2020.

⁴ Hussein Abu Awwad. 8 years with the committee of communicating with the Israelie. Aljidal Yatatham. Shabakat RAYA. (2020).

⁵ Al-Quds AlArabi. Committee of communicating with the Israeli community. Mostamiron fe amalina wa nahmil Thawabit alnonathama wa mohamitona Al- Tatheer Ala Alyameen Al Israeli. 25.2. 2020.

⁶ Ibid, Emil & Jothor (1972).

⁷ Ibid, Abdulwahab, Al-Kayali, (1971).

⁸ <https://nn.najah.edu/news/Geneen/16-2-2020/289590> .2021-2-10

The other challenge is as Al-Ajrami mentioned that the Palestinian media is absent and didn't define the committees' function.¹ Also, the way media deal with the issues of the Palestinian cause is below average because of the division of the Palestinian media. In other words, we don't have a unified media which penetrates the Israeli and Western media translating the crimes of the Israelis in order to speak to the Western mind in their own way.² Also, Al-Ajrami assures that saying that the Palestinian media is based on reaction and this is bad for the committee having a media without a vision.³

Still, the members of the communication committee that the Palestinian media doesn't give it enough space to cover their activities and highlighting the importance of the committee to get better results.

In the end, the researcher thinks that the committee is still facing great challenges in the Palestinian society that it was better to promote itself in the society and then to the Israeli one in order to clarify the idea behind it.

Also, the researcher sees that it still needs human resources to understand the nature of the Israeli society and its divisions without depending on former ministers since they are unacceptable to their societies.

Concerning the Palestinian media, the researcher thinks that media ministry should enhance the messages to the Israeli audience in order to introduce the importance of communicating with the Arabs in order to support the Palestinian cause.

The other challenge according to the researcher is the institutions supported with European bodies which communicate with others without the permission of the committee defamed it.

¹ Ibid, Abdulwahab, Al-Kayali, (1971).

² Ahmad shaheen, Dawr Alilam tijah AlqadiyaAlfilistinia w Alyat Altadamon Alalamy Elamian Ma Alshab Alfalastinin . Donia Alwatan. (2015). (In Arabic)

³ Ibid, Abdulwahab, Al-Kayali, (1971).

It is concluded that the Palestinian public diplomacy succeeded in penetrating the Israeli public opinion and establishing channels of communication with them before Oslo 1993. They had a role in closing the distance between the Israelis and the Palestinians. In short, this method will bring the hopes of the Palestinians to the table.

6.11. Conclusion

This study is an attempt to evaluate the extent of the success of the Palestinian leadership in communicating with the Israeli community and creating an atmosphere assisting the Palestinian demands (1974-2018). It is clear from this study that despite the modernity of this terms in international relations, it was used before the PLO was established that it used culture, media, students' union and others to form a public opinion supporting the Palestinian cause.

Before Nakba, Palestinian personnel were chosen to represent Palestine and form societies that delegations were formed to go around the world and open diplomatic offices to report their rejection to Belfour's promise and demanding their Palestine's independence.

After Nakba, the national movement was absent that the Palestinians tried to form the government of Palestine, but it failed to have a full recognition. Consequently, there was a full-scale students' movements raising the awareness of the Palestinian students that their message was highlighting the Palestinian issue around the world.

In 1964, the PLO was established that many offices were opened to it around the Arab countries and in the UN. Its role was to represent Palestine at the international level. Then, after 1965, Fatah movement was established that it was active in the Arab and foreign countries to the extent that it had offices in many countries in the world. Revolutionary diplomacy was its means of communicating with people that one of the main members

was Yasser Arafat who contacted with official leaders of the 3rd world holding the message that the aim behind fighting Israel was to establish the Palestinian state.

In 1969, the PLO was recognized as a democratic state including Jews, Palestinians and Christians in order to get the international support. Due to regional and international changes, the PLO realized that it should be politically acceptable following the peaceful solution. At that stage, there were members in the PLO who searched for a way to contact people from Israel in order to find forces to practice pressure on Israel.

Then, the PLO amended its charter that in 1974 agreed on the 10 points program which stated establishing the Palestinian state on any free part of Palestine. Here, the armed struggle was one of the methods of liberation not the only one. Then, the Arab countries recognized it as the only legal representative of the Palestinians in the international arena. Also, the UN assured the presence of the PLO in any session including a decision about Palestine, but after a few meetings with the Israelis by Isam Al-Sartawi who was in charge of that file, the PLO approved the importance of coordinating with frontier Jews in Palestine and out of it.

However, it was opposed by some members in the PLO that Isam Al-Sartawi paid his life for it. However, the project continued to open offices to facilitate the meetings with the Israelis.

After Oslo, public diplomacy was neglected replacing it with the official channel only, but the hostility of the two people was a source of concern since the Far-Right was ruling Israel. Still, this program couldn't remove all the challenges facing its implantation including the psychological barrier of the nature of the struggle despite the funding of the funders. After the eruption of the intifada in 2000 and the Israeli procedures on the

ground, the Israelis went to the Far-Right that communication efforts went in vain. Still, the Palestinian leaders formed the committee of communicating with the Israeli society.

6.12. Results and Recommendations

6.12.1. Results

The results of this study can be summarized in the following:

1. Public diplomacy was the former version of the official diplomacy that there was not any government talking on the behalf of the Palestinians. Consequently, the Palestinians created alternative tools for international representation including choosing Palestinians from prestigious families who can travel with the Arab, international along with politicians. It was known during the British Mandate until Nakba 1948 that it was called the diplomacy of the delegations.
2. After Nakba, diplomatic work was chaotic and weak in the absence of unified project in addition to the Arab interventions in the Palestinian decisions and not having an independent state.
3. The period of the 1950s was distinguished with students' unions which participated in international students' conferences establishing a huge network of friendships to whom the Palestinian cause explanations are addressed.
4. The PLO employed public diplomacy after its establishment by using culture, students' unions to get the international support that there are leaders whose words and stands are known to the world such as Yasser Arafat and Edward Saed.
5. The PLO adopted the idea of political settlement in the 12th session of the PNC in 1974 by agreeing on the 10 points program after which the whole world supported the Palestinian cause.

6. Communicating with the Israelis was legalized in the 13th session of the PNC despite its strong opposers and being assured in the following sessions.
7. Businessmen living in Europe played a vital role in opening channels of communication with the Israelis.
8. The period of the 1980s witnessed many meetings between the Israelis and Palestinians in most of the capitals of the world even in Arab countries which was called the stage of meetings.
9. During the first intifada in 1987, Palestinians from 1948 lands played a vital role in bridging the gap between the PLO and the Israelis that they moved based on orders from the PLO.
10. The Palestinian leadership succeeded in establishing channels of communication in the Israeli society before Oslo which had important role in reaching an agreement.
11. After Oslo, channels of communication became official. Societies' communication was replaced by "people to People" program" agreed upon in Oslo.
12. People to people program couldn't break the psychological barrier between the two parties since it didn't achieve co-existence between Israelis and Palestinians due to the Israeli procedures including closures, assassinations and others.
13. The PNA neglected the communication with the Israeli society because it thought that a peace agreement is enough to end the struggle between them.
14. After the second intifada and the end of the communication between them, Palestine was recognized as a non-member observer state, it was necessary to talk to the Israeli society directly, so the committee of communicating with the Israeli society was established.

15. The Palestinian leadership couldn't promote for the non-violent policy despite adopting it since Abbas became president of Palestine and the PNA because of lack of coordinated program unified among all Palestinian factions.
16. There is a lack of Palestinian strategy in dealing with the file of communicating with the Israeli society despite the existence of a specialized committee, but the division prevented it.
17. The Palestinian media didn't give the committee the required space to explain the nature of its work and its goals.
18. President Abbas was the first to adopt peaceful resistance that it supported it in facing the Israeli occupation in order to practice pressure on it since it is the only way to get out of the factional differences. This is done by agreeing on a unified program that allows everyone to take part in it.

6.12.2. Recommendations

The researcher recommends the following:

1. Achieving goals at the Palestinian national level including reclaiming the national unity, trying to agree on a unified political program, including all the Palestinian factions which support peaceful resistance and trying to unify the Palestinian geographic areas under one message to the Israeli society.
2. Promoting the idea of communication with the Israeli society in the Palestinian society in an attempt to distinguish between communication and free normalization to the occupation.
3. Having a space in the Palestinian media addressing the Israeli public opinion in order to introduce the committee of communicating with the Israeli society to them.

4. There is a grave need to make change in the public opinion of the Israelis through specialists and academics who know it well and its social system along with having a detailed plan of delivering message to them.
5. The Palestinian leadership should consider planning a complete national plan based on a clear unified strategy in communicating with the Israeli society
6. It is necessary to keep communicating with the Israeli society especially the Left parties who believe in peace even if it was for a limited percentage because the struggle with Israel is not only military, but we should determine a multi-dimensional strategy including communicating with the Israeli society and unify the message to it.
7. Working on peaceful resistance because it is a strong tool through which pressure can be done if we had a solid belief in its importance and role in reaching our voices to the Israelis.

Appendices

- The decision of the PNC in its 12th session in 1974: “The PLO fights by any means possible mainly armed struggle to liberate the Palestinian land and establish the independent PNA which fights to liberate every inch of the Palestinian land and this call for a change in the power balance in favor of our people”.
- The decision of the PNC in its 13th session in 1977: “the importance of coordinating the forces with the Jewish democratic frontiers struggling in Palestine and out of it against Zionism as a belief and practice”.
- The decision of the PNC in its 15th session in 1981: “The PNC confirms the positive role of the democratic and frontier Jewish forces who oppose Zionism and its practices in the occupied territories. They recognize the PLO as the legal representative of the Palestinians with all their rights including the right of return and the right of self- determination, so the council condemns a communication with the parties follow Zionism as a practice and a belief”.
- The decision of the PNC in its 16th session in 1982:” Communication with Jewish forces as an assertive reference to the political declaration in the 13th session , on the 12th of March, 1977 calling the executive committee to move in this direction suiting the best interest of the Palestinians”.
- The decision of the PNC in its 17th session in 1984:” assuring the decision number 14 from the political declaration issued by the PNC in its 13th session calling the PNC’s executive committee to study the cooperation with the pro-Palestinian forces who believe in our right to establish an independent state on the national soil”.
- The decision of the PNC in its 18th session in 1978, :” developing the Palestinian relationships with the Israeli democratic forces who believe in the struggle of the

Palestinians against the expansion of the Israeli occupation. Also, they support the right of return, the right of self- determination and recognizes the PLO as the sole legal representative of the Palestinians. Also, they condemn the Zionist attempts by the imperial American administration to invite Jewish immigrants to come to Palestine inviting all honorable people to stand for them”.

- The decision of the PNC in its 19th session in 1988:” At the time when the Council is watching with great concern the growing power of fascism and Israeli extremism and the escalation of its public calls to implement the policy of extermination and individual and collective expulsion of our people in their homeland, the Council calls for intensifying work and efforts in all arenas to confront this fascist danger, and at the same time expresses its appreciation for the role and courage of The Israeli peace forces in confronting and exposing the forces of fascism, racism and aggression, and in their support for our people’s struggle and valiant uprising, and in their support for our people’s right to self-determination and the establishment of their independent state.
- The decision the 5th conference of Fatah in 1988:” continuing the dialogue with the democratic forces which refuse the Israeli occupation and stand with the rights of our people including the right of return, the right of self- determination and establishing the Palestinian independent state as well as recognizing the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinians”.

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الملخص

بحثت هذه الرسالة موضوع الدبلوماسية العامة الفلسطينية اتجاه المجتمع الاسرائيلي، وبيان المراحل التي مرت بها هذه الدبلوماسية، وتم اتباع النهج الوصفي التحليلي لملائمته لهذا الموضوع، اضافة الى النهج التاريخي لتوضيح التطور التاريخي لهذا المفهوم بشكل عام، وتطور المفهوم في الحالة الفلسطينية بشكل خاص.

وتهدف الرسالة الى معرفه مدى نجاح القيادة الفلسطينية منذ ان تبنت النهج السلمي في التأثير على الراي العام الاسرائيلي واقناعه بتبني خيارات سلميه لإنهاء الصراع، واهم الاسباب التي دعت القيادة الفلسطينية لتبني النهج السلمي في الصراع الفلسطيني-الاسرائيلي، اضافة الى معرفه الى أي مدى استطاعت القيادة الفلسطينية من خلال استخدام الدبلوماسية العامة توسيع نطاق التواصل مع المجتمع الاسرائيلي من خلال الافراد والمؤسسات المؤثرة داخل المجتمع الاسرائيلي، ومعرفه مدى التوافق في الجهود الرسمية والغير رسميه في اليات استخدام الدبلوماسية العامة ومدى القدرة للترويج لهذا النهج , اضافة الى معرفه مدى تأثير برنامج من شعب الى شعب الذي اقره اتفاق اوسلو على المجتمعين الفلسطيني والاسرائيلي. ومدى نجاح تطبيق انشطت هذا البرنامج على الارض والتحديات التي واجهها.

توصلت الرسالة الى ان القيادة الفلسطينية ومنذ العام 1974 بذلت جهد كبير لهذا الملف بالرغم من معارضه بعض القيادات داخل منظمه التحرير لهذا التوجه، ولكن ايمان بعض القيادات بضرورة العمل بهذا الاتجاه دفعتها للمواصلة للتأثير على الراي العام الاسرائيلي. وادركت القيادة الفلسطينية في انه لا يمكن الرواية الفلسطينية ورساله السلام الا من خلال اوصول الرسالة للمجتمع في اسرائيل بدايتا، حيث حققت القيادة نجاحا نسبيا قبل توقيع اتفاق اوسلو، وكانت هذه القنوات احد اسباب توقيع الاتفاق بين الفلسطينيين والاسرائيليين. وخلصت الدراسة ايضا الى ان التواصل والدبلوماسية العامة الفلسطينية اتجاه المجتمع الاسرائيلي تأثرت سلبيا باتفاق اوسلو، حيث حصرت القيادة حل الصراع

في إطار القنوات الرسمية مع الجانب الاسرائيلي. وتوصلت الرسالة ايضا فيما يخص برنامج من شعب الى شعب انه لم يكن اداه فاعله في حل الصراع وتقريب وجهات النظر بين الطرفين والترويج لفكره التعايش السلمي بينهم، وان اوسلو لم يستطع ان يزيل الحاجز النفسي لدى الطرفين. وتوصلت الرسالة ايضا ان سبب هذا الفشل تمثل في الاجراءات الإسرائيلية على الارض من توسع في الاستيطان والتهويد والاستيلاء على الاراضي الفلسطينية وسياسه الاغلاق للمناطق الفلسطينية وايضا توجه المجتمع الاسرائيلي نحو اليمين المتطرف الذي لا يقبل الطرف ولا يقبل وجوده