



Arab American University

College of Graduate Studies

**The Israeli Procedures that hinder the implementation of
Development Plans in the Palestinian Territories**

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Thesis Approval

The Israeli Procedures that hinder the implementation of Development Plans in the Palestinian Territories

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DECLARATION

I declare that this thesis has been composed solely by myself and that it has not been submitted, in whole or in part, in any previous application for a degree. Except where states otherwise by reference or acknowledgment, the work presented is entirely my own.

Iyad AbdAlrahman



8 August 2019

DEDICATION

All the Praise be to Almighty Allah, who has given me the blessing, the strength, the chance and endurance to complete my master degree.

I would like to dedicate this thesis, with my deep and honest esteem, to my commendable and angelic mother, who always supports and gives me all the inspiration in the world.

I would also like to dedicate my thesis to: my beloved wife, who encouraged me and facilitated my academic career despite the difficulties we were going through, my lovely kids whom I wish to be their ultimate example for, all my brothers, sisters, friends and colleagues, and all the Palestinian people, especially those who are in diaspora.

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Abstract

This study aims at examining the implications of the Israeli procedures on the successive Palestinian development plans and the extent to which these plans respond to these procedures. The most important of these were the settlement in the C areas, and control over Jerusalem and Al Aghwar, and the crossings, the seizure of the Gaza Strip, the separation wall, the control of natural resources, the obstacles imposed on tourism, and finally the economic relations between the Palestinian and Israeli sides according to the Paris Economic Agreement.

This study is based on the comprehensive analytical approach to address all of its several aspects and indicators, which will be analyzed and described according to the relationship of the indicators to each other.

The study concluded many results, notably the lack of realism of Palestinian development plans, the inability to respond to the Israeli policies and their failure to deal with them, which led to the inability to plan comprehensively and impede the implementation of strategic projects.

This study provided many recommendations to be taken into consideration when the preparation of future development plans is required. The most important of these recommendations is that the development plans should be realistic adopting budgets which are independent of the Palestinian Authority's one, allocating a reasonable budget for agriculture, dealing with settlement as a case of confrontation which is not mentioned in planning, avoiding generalities, setting a plan in details for each sector through identifying

budgets and time, promoting Gaza Strip in future development plans to miss the opportunity for occupation to separate the West Bank from Gaza, working on finding strategic projects encouraging Al Aghwar population to protect the land, giving Jerusalem a special priority to cut the road of the occupation in completing its Judaization and finally reconsidering the economic relations with Israel getting out of the threat phase to hard work.

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Chapter One

1.1 Introduction

Most world countries are striving to exploit their maximum resources capacity to achieve economic development and promising prosperous future for their people, including those who have been classified to be developed countries of progress and prosperity, even those who needed to attain a minimum development and failed in many circumstances because of resources scarcity and bad management.

Because each rule has its own exceptions, Palestine is at the head of this list. It is a case which is never similar to any other one. Palestine, not like other countries, has limited resources and development hinders more than any country has in the world, Palestine has another distinctive type of tragedy. It is a tragedy of occupation extending more than 70 years. The Israeli occupation has confiscated the Palestinian territories, exploit its resources and hampered the lives of its citizens.

It is a direct occupation that cuts the Palestinian lands into settlements, puts these lands under siege and wars that have made Gaza a disastrous area, in addition to the apartheid wall, which annexed more Palestinian territories to Israel.

After the Israeli occupation in 1967, the Palestinian territories faced a number of transformations that had affected people life and the comprehensive development process. The occupation had always tried to influence and exploit these Israeli policies considering the Palestinian territories to be supportive of its own economy.

Israel uses all the media and propaganda means it possesses to disprove the facts before world's opinion as not they are; To show that it does have the right of making Palestinian territories as a matter of dispute, and hide the true intentions of the occupation and devastate any attempt of promoting the Palestinian economy through confronting Israeli dominance, taking into account that a strong Palestinian economy means an independent Palestinian decision causing separation from the Israeli economy, which leads to an extraordinary loss of the occupying power. (kutbi, 2019)

When the Palestinian National Authority first emerged in 1994 after the signing of the Oslo Agreement, it tried to cope with the economic occupation distortions through working on establishing development plans to promote the Palestinian economy and try to create an economic development that would be an assisting lever for the Palestinian issue, but these plans were definitely shocked by internal and external hinders, including the occupation and its proceeding practices to control C areas, the settlement expansion, the apartheid wall, the continuous domination of the occupation over natural resources, Gaza siege and the restriction on labour freedom approved by the Paris Economic Agreement, and poor governance versus high expectations of these plans.

The perspectives were varied among those who believed that development is possible under tough occupation circumstances, those who see it impossible to apply, and those who assure the persistent need to enhance development in spite of the occupation obstacles. Therefore, in this study I will try to focus on what extent Israeli occupation practices affect the Palestinian development plans, and which ones are possible to achieve economic development under occupation, these questions have been essential for Palestinian

decision-makers, civil society institutions, and international supporters to take into consideration.

1.2 Importance of the Study

The importance of this study emerges from its attempt to answer the most prominent question affecting Palestinian daily life and the oppressive Israeli policies that hinder the Palestinian territories development which is one of the most important pillars of Palestinian community's advancement and prosperity and paves the way to economic renaissance and progress.

According to Palestinian case, the issue of Palestinian economic dimension is one of the most important aspects affecting Palestinian citizen's resilience on his land and ability to confront the last occupation on the earth. Examining the relationship between occupation practices and Palestinian development plans is particularly another important issue of trying to determine the economic occupation cost precisely, defining development hinders and how to face these procedures and reduce their implications, taking into account their consequences when developing prosperous development plans and showing the world what are the hidden occupation impacts on Palestinians' life.

1.3 Study Methodology

The study was based on a holistic approach. The analytical method was used to analyze development theories and development plans in the Palestinian territories.

The study also used the historical approach to track the phenomena to be studied and its origins, such as settlement, in addition to the use of descriptive method to describe the phenomena addressed by the study and develop a comprehensive vision.

The study used interviews to create a comprehensive picture of the topics addressed by the study through decision makers as well as participants in the preparation of development plans as well as workers in related fields.

1.4 The Study's Community

The study was based on a sample of target population which was intentionally selected due to the fact that they occupied positions related to the study and the importance of the jobs they occupy;

Decision makers, experts and participants in the preparation of the development plan were interviewed. In addition, the study also adopted the historical method in tracking the history of development plans and Israeli settlement in addition, the study took benefit from the comprehensive method, through which Palestinian development plans were linked to the Israeli measures.

1.5 Problem Statement

Economic development is a comprehensive and broad concept that needs to combine all efforts and exploit resources to the maximum extent possible to raise the national income level, increase purchasing power, invest in health and education, create job opportunities, and constitute a fundamental pillar of Palestinian people steadfastness.

Since the occupation of the Palestinian territories in 1967, the Israeli occupation has tried to eliminate any possibility of creating a Palestinian entity, has exploited the Palestinian territories and their resources depriving the owners from their land and resources, as the Palestinian Authority came to scene, the need to initiate development plans for promoting Palestinian reality and advancement, Israeli procrastination policies and vision absence hindered any political solution. On the contrary, the brutal occupation procedures and settlements expansion have increased rapidly, the apartheid wall has been built, the closures have increased, Gaza has been besieged and Jerusalem has been Judaized. These facts have to be examined and analyzed in details according to their impacts on Palestinian development plans and Palestinian economy, then the problem of this study can be summarized by the following question:

What are the Israeli economic procedures impeding the development plans implementation in Palestinian territories?

1.6 Objectives of the study

The purpose of this study is to analyze the Israeli procedures in the Palestinian territories and the impact of these procedures on the implementation of the Palestinian development plans to come up with conclusions and recommendations that can be taken into consideration when preparing future development plans.

1.7 Study Questions and hypotheses

The most two important questions that the study presents which can be derived from the study title is:

1. what are the Israeli procedures hindering the development plans implementation in the Palestinian territories?
2. How Palestinian development plans responded to Israeli procedures?

1.8 Study Hypotheses:

Through the above questions, the following hypotheses can be inferred.

First hypothesis

Israeli procedures are the most important obstacles to the implementation of Palestinian development plans.

Second hypothesis

Unrealism of Palestinian development plans because they greatly neglected the obstacles imposed by the Israeli occupation.

Third hypothesis

Development cannot take place under Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories

1.9 Scope and Limitation of the Study

A. Spatial boundaries: The focus will be on the occupied Palestinian territories in 1967, namely the West Bank, including Jerusalem and Gaza Strip.

B. Temporal boundaries: These are the plans and programs of development that have been scrutinized since the arrival of the Palestinian Authority in 1994 with the accompanying Israeli procedures during this period.

C. Topic limits: Israeli procedures in the occupied Palestinian territories and their impact on Palestinian development plans.

1.10 Study Terminology

1. Economic development

Development can be defined as: "The sum of policies taken by a particular society, which lead to increased rates of economic growth based on its own strength, making sure that such growth continues and is balanced to meet the needs of society members and achieving as much social justice as possible. (Mustafa, 2013)

The concept of development illustrates the changes that are taking place in a society in its economic, political, social, intellectual and organizational dimensions, in order to provide all society individuals with a dignified life. (Jamaoni, 2009)

These definitions state that development is a comprehensive process aiming at the society advancement. The economic development is at the center of my study to focus on all economic sectors advancement in the country, which will ultimately affect the added service level and the living improvement that the citizen feels.

The difference between economic growth and economic development

Economic growth focuses on the change in an average quantity of goods and services obtained by an individual, without concentrating on a real income distribution structure among individuals, or the goods and services quality provided.

In contrast, economic development focuses on a structural change in income distribution and production, concerns with the goods quality of and individuals' services provided, and focuses on not only the quantity, but also the type. Generally, development is a process of increasing service production and real average income, and improving living conditions at suitable levels. (Khashib, 2014)

2. Palestinian territories

Occupied territories by Israel in 1967, including West Bank, East Jerusalem (East Jerusalem includes the Al-Buraq wall, the Jewish neighborhood, and the north-western part of the Dead Sea) and Gaza Strip (including the regional Mediterranean waters adjacent to Gaza Strip).

3. The Israeli occupation

Israel's seizure of the remainder of Palestine after the 1967 June War, the West Bank, including Jerusalem and Gaza Strip.

4. Israeli settlements

Every structural gathering is held on the looted Palestinian territory by force. (Zboon, 2014)

5. Paris Economic Protocol

The economic agreement signed between the Palestinian and Israeli sides in 29/4/1994 is the annex to the agreement on the declaration of the principles, a contractual agreement governing economic relations between the Palestinian and Israeli sides. (Oslo Agreement)

6. (C) Areas

They are areas under the full control of the Israeli government, making up 61% of the total West Bank areas.

7. Oslo Agreement

A. Oslo I Agreement 1993

The first Palestinian-Israeli agreement signed by the late Palestinian President, Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin on September 13 of September 1993 in Washington. The agreement was defined by, among other names, the Oslo I agreement and the declaration of principles. It paved the way to secret talks between two delegations from the Palestine Liberation Organization and Israel in Oslo. The agreement, in addition to the concerned parties, has been signed by the United States and the Federal Republic of Russia as witnesses.

The main provisions of the agreement

1. Mutual recognition between the Palestinian and Israeli parties
2. The Declaration of Peace Principles provides for a gradual Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza Strip, elected Palestinian Authority formation with limited powers, and consideration of outstanding issues in not more than three years.

B. Taba or Oslo II Agreement 1995

It was signed in the Egyptian city of Taba between the Palestinians and the Israelis on 28 of September 1995. This agreement was defined as an agreement of the second phase of Israel's withdrawal from the Palestinian territories. Israel has pledged to withdraw from six major Arab cities and 400 villages releasing detainees in Israeli jails at the very beginning of 1996 and giving Palestinian Authority the right of electing 82 members of the Legislative Council.

The Taba agreement divided the Palestinian areas into (a), (b) and (c) to determine government areas of power and areas under Israel's control.(Oslo,1993)

Chapter 2

Theoretical framework and Previous Studies

2.1 Theoretical framework

2.1.1 Economic development theories

The process of development, economic growth and research specializing in economics and development cannot be understood without a full background of economic development theories that have attached to the growth stages and development in the world; the following two tables summarizes the most important theories of economic development. Divided into theories of development before World War II and theories of development after World War II:-

2.1.2 Pre-World War II theories

Table 2.1: Development Theories Before World War II

NO	Theory	Summary of theory
1	Adam Smith's theory	Adam Smith believed that natural law could be applied in economic matters; the economic system is a natural system capable of making a balance automatically, therefore, everyone is responsible for his behavior, he is the best sponsor of his interests, and that there is a hidden invisible hand leading and guiding every individual to the market mechanism, and everyone is looking to maximize his fortune,

		Adam Smith was against the government interference in industry and trade, because it hinders the national economy growth and economic freedom. (Smith, 1776)
2	John Stewart Mill's theory	Stuart Mill looks at economic development as a land having a function containing work and capital, they are production key components, while capital is a former pre-accumulation of Labor output, and the capital accumulation rate depends on an extent to which the labour force is employed in a productive way, the profits earned through hiring non-productive employment which is a transferred income. (Mill, 1848)
3	Joseph Schumpeter's theory	This theory assumes an economy dominated by a state of full competition and equilibrium, in which case there are no profits, no interest rates, no savings, no investments, and no voluntary unemployment. He describes this situation as: cash flow, and what distinguishes this theory is innovations that, from his point of view, improve production, product or new way of production, and create a new organization for any industry, while the creating organizer role is not for the capitalist personality, the organizer is not a person with a high administrative capacity, but is able to introduce a new something, it does not provide cash balances but it diverts its use. Profits here indicate, in a competitive balance, that

		product prices are exactly equal to production costs, therefore, there are no profits. (Schumpeter, 1939)
4	The Keynesian theory	<p>John Maynard Keynes is the Keynesian School founder, he started to build up his theory adopting circumstances differing from the previous ones, the most important circumstance is the Great Depression crisis (the global economic crisis) that hit the World in 1929.</p> <p>Keynes's theory has been more concerned with economic development in developed countries other than developing ones, where Keynes believes that a total income is function of an employment level in any country. (Keynes, 1936)</p>

2.1.3 Economic development theories after World War II:

These theories came to analyze the underdeveloped countries situation; this why developed countries were interested in developing countries to control them.

Economic development theories in this study have been divided into two directions, a trend that analyses the causes of developing countries failure to achieve development and progress (problems and constraints), and the other one that focuses and explores the real factors of growth and development.

It can be argued that development theories are centered on two accesses analyzing the developing countries inability reasons to achieve development, and the other analyzing the factors that lead to growth and development.

The following table gives a summary of the most important development theories after World War II

Table 2.2: Development Theories After World War II

No	Theory	Summary Theory
1	Growth stages Theory: Rostow	This theory is a set of economic stages derived from the development process of the developed countries, where in this theory he tried to put the steps that developing countries must follow to achieve progress, and he summarized them in 50 stages in his book “Stages of economic growth” namely: the stage of a traditional society, preparation stage for launching (takeoff), start-up stage, maturity stage, and abundant consumption stage. (Rostow, 1960)
2	Ben Stein’s theory	According to Ben Stein, developing countries suffer from a vicious cycle of poverty, making them live at a low income level, and growth factors depend on a lowest effort conditioning several existed elements which help to exceed the income-raising factors over the impeding ones. In addition to incentives which are splitted into two types: zero incentives that do not raise national income, their impact on a distributive extent, and positive ones that cause increased national income. (Jarrar, 2018)
		Underdeveloped economies can be developed, according to

3	Nelson's theory	this theory, conditioning that at static balanced income level, at subsistence level, and at a balanced individual income level lead to a saving rate and net investment rate at a low level, Nelson asserts that there are four conditions leading to this trap. (Jarrar, 2018)
4	Big push theory	<p>Its idea discusses a need for a big push or a large intensive programme of a minimum investment formula to overcome the obstacles facing development and cause the economy to be self-grown.</p> <p>Rosenstein and Rodin differentiate between three types of investment ability and external savings, the first is the production function in investment ability, the second is the demand function in investment ability, and savings in investment ability. (Riziq, 2010)</p>
5	Balanced Growth theory	<p>Balanced growth requires a balance between different industries of consumption and capital goods on one hand, and the convergence of industry and agriculture on the other hand.</p> <p>This theory was addressed by Rosenstein and Arthur Lewis to present a new development style which Russia applied to accelerate the growth rate in a short period. (Khashib, culture, 2015)</p>
		This theory takes a different direction from the idea of balanced growth, as investments here are allocated to specific

6	Unbalanced Growth theory	sectors rather than being distributed simultaneously to all sectors of the national economy; its pioneers: Hirschman, who believes that new projects establishment depends on the external savings achieved by other enterprises creating new external savings that could be beneficial to other subsequent projects. (Khashib, 2015)
7	Growth theory for Harrod-Domar Model of Growth	<p>This theory was developed in the 1940s and is considered as an extension of the new Keynesian thought; this economist has tried to present a model explaining the conditions for economic development, has formulated a result of their forming a mathematical relationship as follows $y/y = Is/k$:</p> <p>economic growth rate = National Savings rate/ Capital coefficient</p> <p>If the population growth rate is introduced, the model becomes as follows: $Y/y = S/y-n$</p> <p>I.e. economic growth rate = (National savings rate/capital coefficient) – population growth rate</p> <p>This model is therefore not applicable to developing countries. (Garfield, 2011)</p>
		This theory says that economy consists of two sectors: the traditional agricultural, which is characterized by zero productivity of the labor component, and the urban industry,

8	The Development Theory of Arthur Lewis	<p>to which employment is gradually shifting from a traditional sector, Lewis assumes that this agricultural sector surplus can be drawn without an output loss with high productivity. When a transformation rapidly occurs, it is determined by industrial investment growth rate and capital accumulation of an industrial sector; investment allows the sector profits to increase based on the assumption that investors desire to reinvest their profits making this sector expand and transforming Labor migration from the traditional to the modern sector. (Lewis, 1955)</p>
9	Hollis Chenery Theory	<p>It is a well-known theory discussing development paradigms of third world countries after the Second World War. It assumes that development is a distinctive growth process, its features involve states of the same change, attempt to identify differences among states according to development steps and model, depending on their situational circumstances. There are factors influencing the development process: Government policy, State size, natural resources, state objectives, technology, external capital, international trade. (Chenery, 2014)</p>
		<p>These models are, seen as an extension of new socialist thoughts (Neo-Marxist), regarded as models of structural change considering that underdeveloped countries are</p>

10	The theory of the International Dependency Revolution	<p>besieged by institutional and economic obstacles domestically and internationally. It has gained fame during the 1970s after developing countries were disappointed in their progressive attempts to apply development theories and models that were inappropriate. There are three basic models: A colonial dependency model, development mistaken concept, the development duo hypothesis. (Sharkawy, 2016)</p>
11	New Neo- Classical Revolution theory	<p>The theory discusses that underdevelopment is caused by resources misallocation due to erroneous price policies and third world countries governments' excessive interference in economic activity; the of the neo-classical revolution school pioneers as Balassa Bella, Harry Johnson and Peter Bower say that government intervention in economic activity slows down the economic growth process. (Sharkawy, 2016)</p>

2.2 Development in the Arab World

Development has been one of the biggest problems faced by developing countries and Arab ones, especially after the independence achievement and external occupation elimination of this country, and some countries have been able to improve their economy and development, but Arab countries are still striving to achieve development as developed ones do. The second report of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), entitled "The challenges of development in the Arab States 2011", monitors Arab States development challenges and considers an outlet of the development dilemma of region countries. (Sawy, 2011)

The report considers that the Arab States need a new development paradigm that does not consider stability from a purely security perspective, and does not look at progress from the perspective of goods and services benefit, but rather from the perspective of the intrinsic capabilities through which an individual can live a life of dignity and feel of his real role.

This can only be achieved through a developmental state model, which is not based on rents, nor on primary commodities production, or those of modest value-added goods and services. The developmental state needs real control and accountability mechanisms.

Development challenges in the Arab region.

The report monitors development challenges in Arab region through a range of indicators, the most important of which are:

1. Low humanitarian development indicators

Data show that the period from 1970 to 1990 has led the region to make significant progress in improving human development indicators, but since 1990 – 2007, Arab region compared to other developing regions has fallen on humanitarian development indicators, and this is shown by a rural development failure in Arab world, where 50% of the country's population live, however, agriculture contributes only 15% of Arab countries GDP, which has led to rapid rural migration from the countryside to obtain better services; because this migration is unplanned, it led to the presence of slums and increased loads on basic facilities in Arab cities.

The report argued that the global poverty measure of \$1.25 a day was misleading and did not reflect the reality of poverty in the Arab region, and the report therefore proposed an alternative poverty measurement mechanism that would show that poverty lines varied according to the income levels of each country.

2. Growth without decent work

The region relied on oil for its development performance, which made its development project susceptible to fluctuations in the oil market, as well as the rents nature of the development performance in the Arab countries, Gulf countries or multi- income and least developed countries.

The report monitors the decline in unemployment rates in Arab region in 2010 to a rate of 9.3% compared to 12% in 1990. However, the unemployment rate in Arab states is still higher than in other developing regions, especially among young people and women. The

improvement in unemployment rates in the countries of the region is also due to the acceptance by the labour force of a large number of jobs in the informal sector, which is characterized as inappropriate working conditions.

The report monitors the biggest challenge in the labour area, Arab countries are demanded in 2030 – without the Gulf ones – to provide 92 million jobs, at a cost of \$4.4 trillion, i.e., they require an annual investment volume of about \$220 billion, which is equivalent to 50% of their GDP.

3. Low Value Added

The trade volume of Arab countries as a percentage of GDP rose to an average of 84 percent during the first decade of the third millennium, up from 60 percent in the early 1980s. But the report argues that this rise has not been a positive sign of integration into the global economy, as the report describes the structure of Arab exports as primitive, with oil accounting for 70% of the export structure.

On the other hand, the Arab region is the least industrialized compared to the rest of the world, where the industrial sector contributes 12% to the domestic product, and the services sector to devote the weak value added, including transportation and travel services, which has no tangible effect in the telecommunication services and monetary markets.

4. Water poverty

Most Arab countries--with the exception of Iraq, Sudan and Lebanon--fall below the global water poverty line, estimated at about 1,000 cubic meters annually, and Yemen is one of the

poorest Arab countries in this area, with an estimated per capita of about 100 cubic meters a year. The report monitors the damage extent that countries, in the region, will suffer due to climatic changes through decreasing food production rates, which the region countries need to import. The report also notes the limited investments in Arab countries in fields of water resources management, irrigation development and agricultural productivity.

5. Societal exclusion

The development policies adopted prior to the Arab Spring have excluded of Arab societies large segments from participation, especially youth and women. The report owes an exclusion process to factors combination including: revenues, which enabled the state to formulate a social contract based on state provision of services and jobs for non-participation and accountability, but this contract collapsed at the beginning of the 1980s, when the Arab countries failed to provide jobs and welfare requirements, unless Arab countries work to address the dangers of their exclusion-based development policies, to connect money to power, to handle corruption prevalence, this has deepened the exclusion process in their societies.

Sound economic development problem is the real capital formation, it works according to deliberate plan and programme that aimed at increasing national income at a rate higher than that of the population. The standard of living determines the difference between the two rates. Whenever the population growth rate rose, the rate required to increase real income increased. (Sawan, 1960)

The underdevelopment causes in the Arab countries are due to the internal causes of insufficient capital and population problem, owing to an increase in population that is disproportionate to an increase in income. The illiteracy prevalence and negative values in society, the given nature of the developing country social structure, the passivity of intellectuals and their isolation because of an imbalance, are disadvantages that impede progress, the treatment of this phenomenon by removing all these causes from intellectuals' hearts and minds of to interact with development programs and progress. It is also a reason not to set goals, clear vision of problems, lack of strategic planning and lack of long-term plans.

There are external reasons of developed countries domination, as a result of colonialism, which has subjected the majority of countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America to colonial powers' economic, cultural and political dependence. Developing countries specialize in exporting agricultural or extractive raw materials, most of them rely on a limited number of products (often reaches to a single commodity) as cotton or oil. These exports represent mostly an income shown in their budgets leading to economic structure distortion and growth disruption, senior administrative plans absence, and zero long-term strategic plans for states and individuals, governments and institutions. (Aliwi, 2016)

To summarize, there are many internal and external causes and obstacles of Arab world development, which are different from one country to another because of their own circumstances. Corruption, scarce resources, mismanagement, the effects of colonialism and economic dependence on wars, sectarian strife, poverty spread, illiteracy, desertification phenomenon, and other factors impeding development in the Arab world.

2.3 Palestinian development plans

2.3.1 Introduction

The Palestinian economy since the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories in 1967 until the arrival of the Palestinian Authority in 1994

Up to now, Israel has tried to occupy the Palestinian territories to make the Palestinian economy follow its own; it has pursued economic and trade policies to achieve Palestinian economy total dependence on the Israeli one. It has transformed the Palestinian market into a market of consuming Israeli goods, it has exclusively combated the Palestinian manufacturing sector in Palestinian market, minimized goods imported from abroad and goods that are allowed to be imported, to take advantage of Palestinian low-cost labour; This has deprived the economy of development and made it a dependent one.

The result of these Israeli policies has transformed the Palestinian economy into a service economy that is incapable of producing and generating real development.

Before the coming of Palestinian Authority:

At the beginning of the Eighties, the slogan "Development for Steadfastness" allowed conferences to be held which most local institutions participated in; 1986's conference was to discuss the fund sources, attitudes, and external development plans: the conferences and seminars were launched to crystallize many intellectual trends, the "Resisting development" and the development of A and B areas emerged to protect the people "steadfastness development" development with disengagement. (Jamea W. H., 482)

Development in the Palestinian territories after the arrival of the national Authority in 1994, the leadership responsibility of the development was revive the development concept of in Palestinian territories including rebuilding the Palestinian economy and repairing the Israeli occupation distortions.

The Palestinian government plans aiming primarily at ending the occupation, establishing the Palestinian State, achieving Palestinian territories development, building a sustainable and viable national economy being capable of eliminating economy dependence on the Zionist entity, which was imposed of occupation and thwarted development for decades. However, these plans have been hampered by a series of obstacles preventing them from being implemented, or have changed their priorities to take urgent relief rather than sustainable development process; Moreover, there were other hinders such as the Israeli occupation and its practices, the closure and land confiscation, settlement expansion, Judaization, and of the Crossings and borders control. (Abdullah, 2012)

2.3.2 Development plans in the Palestinian territories:

A. Palestinian Economic Development Programme (1994-2000)

The first attempt to promote development plans in a programme form called the Palestinian Economic Development Programme, 1994 – 2000, which was the first effort to draw up a development plan for reconstructing and rebuilding a Palestinian economy, the costs were estimated by the Economic Department of the Palestinian liberation Organization in Tunisia about US \$11.6 billion; It was based on assumptions and strategies addressing structural distortions and imbalances, widening the Palestinian economy spheres, creating

jobs and reducing unemployment, improving infrastructure, and promoting the export and the housing sectors. However, this programme has not been implemented because of the lack of funding required, and assumptions realism; for example, the strategy of promoting the export sector is impossible since economy is under occupation having no political or economic sovereignty, adequate infrastructure, and economic structure contributing to self-sufficiency in the first place.

The Palestinian Authority also presented a plan for donor countries at Palestinian people economic assistance conference on January 9, 1996, to provide an economic development strategy with important proposals: establishing economic activity in Palestine is based on the free market basis.

This assumption is unachievable because any partial liberated economy cannot be directly self-dependent; It must be based on production public property rather than privatization, Arab and foreign investment encouragement; legal, organizational, and appropriate investment environment provision for and export orientation. This assumption is illogical because any economy before it starts exportation, it must have self-sufficiency or at least a competitive production capacity providing the necessary infrastructure for the development process.

The Palestinian Authority submitted a document to donor states consultative group at Palestinian people assistance conference held in November 1996, a second attempt for implementing the same previous document principles, which included an investment programme for 1997, a list of urgent projects priority essential for a Palestinian

development process valued at 845 million dollars for four main sectors: infrastructure, social sectors, private sector and institution-building; it is notable that previous attempts are not economic programs since the investment program was for only a year, most projects were not ready to implement, the assumptions were unrealistic, and programs were never consistent with comprehensiveness and generality (Nassar, 2011).

B. Development plan (1998-2000):

This plan was set up for three years and was characterized by its political dimension, donor countries and Palestinian ministries participation; the strategies, projects and programs were divided on ministerial and sectoral basis, ministerial division were aiming at pursuing the plan performance, the achievement extent, the objectives usefulness and available resources utilization, while sectoral monitors were disbursing sectors funds which were divided into four items: infrastructure development and natural resource management, institutional capacity development, social services development, and human resource development and productive sectors.

The plan has been contributed by 45 ministries and private sector destinations; it has been divided into several chapters examining economic and social indicators, diagnosing constraints and challenges of economic and social development process, describing the development agenda and its assumptions, presenting national development objectives and public policies to be applied, explaining sectoral development strategies, presenting ministerial development plans, and clarifying ministries and institutions objectives.

The plan indicated the situation of consumption, investment, inflation, international assistance, external trade, health, housing and social conditions. It is based on several assumptions: Operating Gaza airport causes an increase in Palestinian transcontinental trade volume leading to an increase in the trade balance improvement and economic activity, industrial and agricultural production volume, self-sufficiency emphasis, commodities and products export development.

Furthermore, achieving a GDP growth rate of 5%, which will increase the average per capita output by 2%, financial institutions and financial policies development, evolve modern financial institutions, serve the business and investment sector, be aware of laws and regulations role reducing uncertainties about an investment feasibility a clear tax and customs system establishment, supervise the banks and financial institutions, and monitor a foreign currency reserve. It will improve the investment climate, activate the private sector role, develop infrastructure, and promote job-generating sectors and abroad employment.

According to the plan, investments in the first three years were 33%, 35%, 32%, respectively; they were distributed into the main sectors as follows: 53% for infrastructure, 9% for enterprises, 19% for the social sector, and 19% for the investment sector. (Nassar, 2011)

C. Development plan for the years 1999-2003

It was a continuation of the 1998-2000 plan and was based on its hypotheses (application of the Wye River Convention and its annexes, starting operating the Gaza airport and seaport,

reducing pressure on the Palestinian economy, and promoting donor countries' sustainable material and moral assistance. (Khalil, 2008)

This plan focused on four sectors (infrastructure sector, human and social resources sector, production sector, and institution-building sector); it aimed at reforming, developing and building these sectors, creating economic development and increasing the Palestinian Authority capacity to achieve a current budget surplus, depending on the overall Palestinian economic performance, and the donor countries' progressive financial and moral assistance. The private sector plays a vital and effective role in the next five years. (Labad, 2002)

The plan was interested in the infrastructure sector, the largest funding share is 48% of the total plan, and its financial ceiling is estimated at 4.5 billion dollars. (Agha, 2010)

The outbreak of the second intifada in 2000 was the main reason for the plan failure.

d. Emergency and investment plan 2003-2004

The Palestinian people emergent needs have been taken into account for a two year period; this plan has basically aimed at halting Palestinian people economic and social conditions deterioration by maintaining the basic life necessities, taking into consideration reconstructing what israeli occupation has destroyed. The total financial requirements for the plan are: US \$640 million for the coming necessities, plus US \$317 million for active projects and \$175 million for midterm projects, bringing the total plan to US \$1132 million.

(Emergency and Investment Plan: 2003, p. 22-27)

The new needs are funded through three parties: **1.** Assisting donor countries **2.** PA contribution amounting to \$28 million **3.** Concessional and commercial (development) amounting to \$40 million distributed in the following areas:

(1) Emergency humanitarian assistance: US \$448.5 million.

(2) Reconstruction: US \$101.5 million.

(3) institution-building and reform: US \$90.0 million.

The plan addresses many economic and social aspects through creating employment opportunities, health sector development programmes and environmental conservation; such as the water sector, the sewage sector and the solid waste sector, programmes providing humanitarian and social needs for education and other services to protect Palestinian segments affected by the occupation.

The plan was adopted to overcome the difficult situation Palestinian economy suffered after the start of the second intifada in 2002 and the Palestinian cities invasion.

E. Mid-term development plan 2005-2007

Its objectives: -

- 1.** Handling poverty in a sustainable manner.
- 2.** Improving the Palestinian National Authority's governance effectiveness.

To achieve these objectives, a range of national interventions and programmes are required and designed through:

1. Providing social protection through creating employment opportunities, human and health resources development, prisoner rehabilitation, and progressive food and cash assistance.
2. Focusing on human, physical and social capital investment through the strengthening of the capacities of educational and health facilities; road networks, transportation, waste and landfill rehabilitation, and Gaza international airport reconstruction and exploiting its sea.
3. Investing in good governance institutions through government reforms and institution–building process.
4. Creating a necessary environment for private sector growth through industrial zones construction, agricultural lands and private buildings rehabilitation, private sector capacities development and rehabilitating its most suitable assets.

F. Palestinian reform and development plan 2008-2010

The main objectives of this plan are:

1. Safety and Security: Promoting community respect for law and order to provide safety and security environment in which Palestinian people can live and work, a crime-free society without chaos and violence.
2. Good governance: Creating a democratic governance system characterized by citizen participation and respect of law rules, powers and capacities separation to manage their natural resources and provide citizen needed services properly through sustainable, stable

and legal framework, and effective legislative process in which institutions are transparent, accountable and impartial to protect all citizen's rights.

3. Promoting national progress and prosperity: Achieving economic security, stability, viability and self-reliance through creating sustainable employment and an equal resources distribution to reduce poverty and promote individuals and national wealth growth and prosperity.

4. Improving the life quality:

Achieving an increase in financial wealth, improving environmental quality, strengthening interdependence, enhancing cohesion and social solidarity, paying attention to marginalized groups who are important in society, and promoting national culture, identity and heritage.

Preparing the Palestinian reform and development plan for the years 2008 – 2010 is the first step towards a comprehensive restructuring of Palestinian public sector resource management procedures. The successful implementation of this plan therefore requires significant changes in Palestinian National Authority and international donor institutions procedures. Progress of this plan also demands sustainable efforts to build the Palestinian National Authority's institutional potential to prepare and implement further reform and development plans in the future. Finally, the plan successful implementation requires considerable stability in a political, economic and social environment, under which the Palestinian National Authority is working.

G. National Development Plan 2011-2013

Statehood and future building

This plan focused on four sectors: -

A. Governance sector

Striving to strengthen social cohesion, achieving justice and equality among all the people, creating a stable environment strengthening citizens and investors' confidence in a promising future through public institutions promotion, ensuring effectiveness and efficiency by achieving accountability of those responsible for any violations, modernizing the bases and administrative court systems and providing judges and staff with training programmes for the sake of justice and fairness, and increasing the government's flexibility to citizens ensuring that it is accountable for its work and functions.

The governance sector main strategic objectives are:

1. Providing homeland and the citizen with security and safety.
2. Ensuring justice for all citizens and imposing law sovereignty.
3. Modernizing public administration and simplifying its habitual routine.
4. Empowering local government bodies and bringing public service facilities closer to citizens.
5. Achieving financial independence and economic stability.

6. Promoting Palestine existence as an independent and sovereign state in the international spheres.

B. Social development Sector

It includes social services development, an advanced reforming level that guarantees citizens' access to basic services in health and education sectors, to the basic social protection provision alleviating poverty, protecting the most deprived and marginalized groups, encouraging private sector participation and civil society institutions, and to ensure social services integration, inclusiveness and sustainability provided to citizens according to their potential.

Creating more opportunities for women and young people to ensure that they contribute to the society and economy development, maximizing the growth practical benefit, and directing a significant portion of investments towards the education sector to realize the vision of a knowledge-based economy being capable of innovation and renovation.

The governance sector main strategic objectives are:

1. Supporting and empowering citizens and poor families.
2. Preparing children and young people to live a promising life and access the local labor market.
3. Regaining Palestine's position as a center of uniqueness for higher education and scientific research sector
4. Promoting the health of the community and ensuring its sustainability.

5. Preserving national heritage and culture.
6. Empowering women and promoting their public life participation.
7. Improving community health focusing on youth energies to exploit their utmost potential.

C. Economic development Sector

To provide real incentives encouraging the private sector to invest in capital assets and infrastructure needed to build our industrial base and ensure the sustainability of its productivity, launch initiatives to sectors of competitive advantages and high growth capacity, especially the agriculture and tourism sectors.

Economic development sector main strategic objectives:

1. Creating an enabling proper Palestinian environment for investment.
2. Enhancing Palestinian products and services competitiveness.
3. Promoting economic integration and accessing to external markets.
4. Minimizing unemployment and promoting labor market.
5. Promoting the role of the Palestinian society for consumer protection.

4. Infrastructure sector

The public infrastructure provides economic and social development basis. Therefore, it is essential to strengthen the Palestinian public infrastructure providing water, electricity,

telecommunications and public roads in a comprehensive and integrated manner. This will ensure that our people have access to adequate drinking water, uninterrupted electricity they need, telecommunication services they can afford, transportation system and its safe means throughout our country.

The infrastructure sector key strategic objectives:

1. Establishing integrated and sustainable infrastructure networks.
2. Insuring and providing Palestine energy and natural resources.
3. Protecting the environment in Palestine.
4. Maintaining infrastructure networks quality, ensuring that citizens' ability to afford and ensure its long-term safety.
5. Providing adequate and secure housing for Palestinian citizens as required.

H. National Development Plan 2014-2016

State-building and sovereignty embodiment

The National development plan for the years 2014-2016 is the third stage of Palestine national planning, and has four main sectors:

1. Economic development and employment sector.

Establishing more robust rules for an independent and equitable national economy, achieving sustainable development, providing appropriate jobs for citizens and improving their productivity.

2. Governance sector and institution building.

Completing the Palestinian State institutional building on basis of respect for human rights and individuals' fundamental freedom, citizenship rights, including freedom of expression and right to access information, and reassurance of achieving law without discrimination under independent and effective judicial authority, a professional security institution, promotion Government and local institutions effectiveness improving their capacity of providing services, community participation, consolidation and decentralization, in decision-making and public accountability.

D. Protection and social development sector.

Providing sustainable social services that contribute to poverty reduction and enforce social justice among groups and regions, children, women and youth, the old age, and disabled person's protection to empower them in a society protecting its heritage, pluralistic and creative national culture, cohesion and interdependence.

4. Infrastructure sector.

Providing sustainable infrastructure contributing to economic development promotion, independence, social justice and communication among regions and abroad. The plan will guide the performance appraisal procedures preparing the above-mentioned national development plans, and involve a structural framework for evaluating public sector management and implementation policy effectively and efficiently.

The government will define programmes to these sectors through which it has a specific operational and developmental basis for the next three years. The government realizes that it cannot shoulder the burdens and responsibilities of achieving and sustaining a long-term development alone; therefore, it will participate in duties with civil society institutions, non-governmental organizations and its international partners to build up economy foundations ensuring a dignified life for all our people, reducing dependence on social assistance and enhancing investment.

J. National Policy Agenda 2017-2022

Citizen is the First

Palestinian government has prepared this plan since 2008.

This plan is committed to promote citizen service adopting realistic policy and financial framework which retains independence priority through adjusting rationally expenditure to meet possibilities of employing effective available resources to improve our people life.

The national policy agenda is a national vision based on three main themes:

1. The way towards independence.

This includes the following national policies and priorities:

A. Embodying the independent state and ending occupation by escalating national and international efforts of ending it under activating accountability mechanisms.

B. National unity through promoting the concepts of Palestinian land, people unity and the democratic practice embodiment in Palestine State.

C. Strengthening the Palestine state position internationally through its participation in the world system and its bilateral relations.

2. Reform and improve public services quality.

This plan is a new station of Palestine administrative and institutional reform, designed to reshape the way the government deals with citizens enhancing their participation in decision making process affecting life and mechanisms which provide the service needed. It consists of the following national priorities and policies:

A. Government is responsive to the citizen through strengthening local authorities' responsiveness to the citizen and improving the provided public services level.

B. Effective government through enhancing accountability and managing public funds.

3. Sustainable development.

It includes most of the reform agenda adopted by Palestine state to be implemented through five national priorities and nineteen national policies as follows:

A. Achieving economic independence through building Palestinian economy fundamentals creating adequate jobs, providing an appropriate investment environment, and promoting Palestinian industries.

B. Social justice and the law supremacy through reducing poverty, providing social protection for the poor and marginalized people, enhancing citizens ' access to justice, promoting gender equality and empowering women, and caring for the youth as they are the future to come.

C. Good and comprehensive education for all through prompting our children early education, improving enrolment and retention of education, and enhancing education quality leading to employment.

D. Comprehensive quality of health care availability to all through providing comprehensive health care services which in turn promote the Palestinians' safety and welfare.

E. A society capable of resilience and development by providing security to the homeland and the citizen, strengthening law supremacy, providing housing communities with basic needs, ensuring environmental sustainability, promoting agriculture and rural communities, and keeping Palestinian identity and cultural heritage.

2.4 Previous studies

1. A study entitled “Development Strategy in Palestine” published in the Al-Azhar University Journal in Gaza in issue 1 vol 12 by Wafik Helmy Aga and Naseem Hasan Abu Jama. (Jamea W. H., 2010)

This study discussed the Palestinian development concept and employing development importance as a mechanism of ensuring people realization of acquired rights. It discussed development change determining occupational violations responsibility and their successive implications on social and political transformation process. It focused on the strategic development goals, economic development strategy pillars and fundamentals adopted by the National Authority. It addressed strategic development determinants and the development strategy before Palestinian National Authority's arrival. It also discussed the growth plans and programs after 1994. This study covered the development plan 2008-2010 in details. One of the results of this study is that the Palestinian National Authority economic development depends on the private sector interest, both domestic and abroad to invest in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; the Palestinian administration needs to avoid the limited resources distribution dilemma making decisions for development process requirements; the need to create promising privileges for attracting private sector's investment since it will meet the financial needs in the coming future, taking into account a climate availability as a prerequisite to achieve this.

It is necessary to create an encouraging climate for attracting the private sector investment to define the Palestinian development priorities considering the privacy and available fund

sources for gradual retract from the status of dependence on Israeli economy, trade and employment; it should develop the necessary infrastructure to facilitate the development process for the coming phase.

2. Examining the researcher Bilal Mohamed Ibrahim's thesis entitled "Israeli Settlement and its Impact on Political Development in 2010" (Ibrahim, 2010)

The researcher discussed the settlement impact on Palestinian economic activities through tax exemptions for settlers, and loan facilities for establishing plants on West Bank lands to connect the Palestinian economy with the Israeli one to promote the status of full dependency by relocating some Israeli factories to West Bank taking advantage of Palestinian labor low wages; this creates competition for the Palestinian product and controls Palestinian territories through settlement establishment; there are a lot of lands surrounding the settlements unutilized for Palestinian investment, Israel did this to flood Palestinian market with agricultural settlement products, which have negatively affected Palestinian agriculture making its products unable to compete with Israeli-backed one. In addition, Palestinian products movement restrictions, settlements waste impact, especially wastewater on Palestinian agricultural land hindered Palestinian development process. The researcher discusses that three quarters of the Palestinian arable land is under Israeli control, the annexation wall implications, and settlement expansion which has increased the Palestinian territories suffering, for example the results in its early stages were more than 100,000 olive trees cut off and the Wall damaged over 10% of the total agricultural West Bank lands.

The researcher discussed the settlement impact on Palestinian territories water where most of the settlements were built on groundwater reservoirs in Palestinian territories, he describes the hard reality of the water situation in West Bank, where the settler's share of water is three times greater than that of the citizen in Israel and much more than the Palestinian citizen's share, and even the Wall impact on the water in the Palestinian lands, where nearly 90 wells were destroyed in West Bank as well as the wall's control over the West Bank's western and north-eastern aquifers, which are estimated about 507 million cubic meters a year, and he explained water importance in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In this study, the researcher focused on the settlement impact on the Palestinian political development process and the settlement effects in all Palestinian life aspects.

3. A report issued by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics and the Environment Quality Authority in 2014 entitled “Environment and sustainable development in the Palestinian territories”.

The report addressed the sustainable development concept and the differentiation between growth and development. It defined some sustainable development dimensions and the importance of caring for natural resources, which were the sustainable development backbone, the environmental sources depletion is the most important factor hindering sustainable development, perhaps the most important natural source is agricultural land; It illustrates the occupation role using Palestinian territories for settlements, bypass roads, security zones, industrial zones and waste residuals. It determines the challenges of sustainable development in Palestine; it considered the Israeli occupation to be the prevailing challenge of sustainable development in Palestinian territories, where the

occupation seizing large portions of West Bank territories, including Jerusalem and Al Aghwar.

Moreover, the Gaza Strip blockade, the annexation wall, the settlement expansion, Jerusalem isolation and Judaization, the successive wars impact on Gaza strip destroying all life aspects. The blockade policy, closures and restricting movement, lack of control of crossings and borders restricting export and import movement. It argued that there can be no comprehensive development without ending occupation, establishing an independent Palestinian state, which is the most important development requirement and political independence.

4. A group of economists and editors of Dr. Mohammad Ashtayeh composed a book entitled “Blockade of Production Factors” this book focused on the following issues: (Ashtayeh, 2017)

First: Labor and labor market in Israel

The book discusses the increase in Israeli workers number with 13% of the total employees in 2016, the researcher explains the increase risks and its impact on the labor market, the fear of repeating the same scenario of 2000, when the Israeli labor market employed Palestinian workers at the same wages level of Israeli ones, this led to high wages of workers in Palestinian territories, a high cost product, and the inability to compete.

Second: The electricity and renewable energy sector

The researcher accuses the occupation as the main electricity sector development obstacle and the Palestinian land depends on the electricity coming from Israel, which is considered to be expensive compared to that of the neighboring countries, the occupation imposes restrictions on importing electricity from neighboring countries.

Third: agriculture and the blockade of land and water

The researcher explains the Palestinian agriculture decline due to Israeli restrictions imposed on pumping water from artesian wells, its impact on agriculture, the animal, and plant production which affected the irrigated area on the one hand, and decreased animal rearing on the other hand, agricultural products movement restrictions under the pretext of security reasons, the land degradation because of land expropriation increase, and restrictions on the importation agricultural products.

Fourth: Industry and weak competitiveness

Israeli policies of blockade and closures, goods and people free movement restrictions, successive wars against the Gaza Strip targeting industrial facilities leading to hinder International assistance since Palestinian Authority arrival, where the occupation has hindered the National Authority efforts of adopting a comprehensive national economic development policy, thus failing to restructure the Palestinian industrial sector and enhance its competitiveness, which prevented diversification and expansion of its productive base and export.

Fifth: External trade is a one-way road

where Israel has, since its occupation of the Palestinian territories, devoted the Palestinian economy to its own, and forced it to adopt export policies that do not meet Palestinian development needs leading consumption goods formation to be worth 80% of all merchandise imports, goods and individuals movement restrictions under the pretext of security reasons have increased production cost rate, the raw materials delayed arrival to the crossing points, and the catastrophe (Nakba) rise, which gave the Israeli product competitive feature at national product expense; these factors have caused exports decreased to Palestinian imports, an increase in the trade deficit volume, a decline in export movement, and an impact on the industrial and agricultural sector performance.

Sixth: The Paris Economic Agreement (A single custom cover)

The exchange takes place in the Israeli currency NIS in the Palestinian territories making the Palestinian trade a hostage to the Israeli monetary policy, in terms of inflation and exchange rate increasing dependence on value-added tax (clearance), imposed on Palestinian imports and collected by the Israeli side, which accounts for 70% of total public revenues and covers 60% of current expenditures.

The book tried to cover most of the Palestinian economy aspects, its growth and development reasons based on the latest statistics and reports, and made recommendations for the Palestinian economy advancement.

5. Report of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development on UNCTAD's assistance to the Palestinian people, entitled "Developments in the economy of the Occupied Palestinian Territory ". (Trade, 2017)

The report assures that 50 years of Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories (West Bank, including Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip) witnessed a development decline, human potential curbing, the development right denial, the Palestinian economy inability to use one third of the labor force, the high unemployment rate among young people and women, and the settlement establishment acceleration.

The main topics discussed in the report can be summarized as follows:

1. GDP growth should not neglect the reality of the productive base decline and the land and natural progressive loss due to the occupation, and restrictions on production essential inputs increasing production costs, unemployment and poverty which caused investment to reduce.
2. Increasing the Palestinian economy dependence on the Israeli one through occupation, Israel has used most of the Palestinian international trade, and the report gave an example in 2016 when Israel used half of the Palestinian trade, the Palestinian occupied territories share in Israel's trade is about 3%, as it was estimated that Palestinian imports from Israel exceeded exports to Israel by 2.6 billion dollars.
3. The report clarifies that the areas of C are nearly 60% of West Bank, which is under Israel's control and not for the sake of Palestinian production; although it is the only land

connected, and it includes many natural sources creating many jobs especially in the field of agriculture tourism, cosmetics, mining, construction and quarries.

4. The report also discussed the Palestinian economy loss as a result of a Palestinian currency absence depending on the new Israeli shekel, Israel increased the price of the shekel, thereby raising the export tax and subsidizing imports, weakening the Palestinian economy competitiveness, as the price of the NIS exchange rate is determined by Israeli economy need; it is more advanced than Palestinian economy.

5. The report discussed the Israeli occupation cost; World Bank reported that if there were no Israeli occupation, the Palestinian per capita GDP would rise to more than 40% of what was expected today. Another methodology indicated that a per capita GDP in Palestinian occupied territories during 1994-2014 grew at a rate of .01 per cent. The study concluded that if 4.4% of the observed trend were to be developed from 1968 to 1987, when the borders were more open, the real GDP per capita would now be 130 per cent higher than before. The report indicates that this study was issued by the World Bank.

6. Israeli settlement expansion is the major obstacle of Palestinian financial development and the viability of the two-state solution. The report discusses that settlement population growth is greater than that in Israel, and the non-population growth of the Palestinians in last years, the settlement population has also increased since Oslo agreement. Moreover, the restrictions imposed on the movement of Palestinians near settlements, and uprooting two and a half million fruit trees.

This focus of UNCTAD's report provides a clear perception of the occupation impact on Palestinian economy constrained to rise because of distortions that are difficult to repair.

6. A study titled "Israeli settlements: Catastrophic Implications on the Palestinian Economy", published by a Palestinian center for israeli studies, managed by Dr. Al-Atrash. This study discusses the fact that the Palestinian economy has incurred a high cost since Israeli settlement existence in West Bank, and its exploitation almost 37% of Palestinian resources (including underground ones), create a defect in Palestinian development sources and restrict the production and development possibilities. (Atrash, 2014)

The study attempts to estimate the Palestinian economic loss extent resulting from settlements existence, providing us with annual losses estimation, despite data shortage and the difficulty of separating them from the ones related to the occupation as a whole. The study showed that the damage caused by the settlements affects all Palestinian citizens, various production fields of trade and services leading to imbalances in income distribution and life quality: it focuses on the economic side, and on the cost extent borne by the gross domestic product (GDP).

The study showed that the loss resulting from the settlements existence and the consequent restrictions on the Palestinians ' daily movements, and the natural resources confiscation - without considering their price or economic value- the added value (of all the domestic product compounds and the resulting Labour incomes, which are seen as an economy engine) amounting to a minimum of 10.2% of GDP in West Bank. These losses are divided

into direct and indirect costs with an added value of 153 million dollars in agricultural crops, and industry loss 212.7 million, the tourism sector losses to \$63 million, the construction sector is \$60 million, and the total direct costs amount to 488.7 million annually. The study showed that the volume of labour market indirect losses amounted to 385.3 million dollars at current prices.

According to the study, these estimations are low compared to what is actually happening, since they did not take into account several productive service and commercial sectors; there were complications when considering the data because some occupation settlement's costs must be calculated because they are essential for the study to estimate to avoid exaggeration.

7. Report entitled Israeli settlement in the West Bank 1993-2011 issued by al Zaytouna center for studies and consultations Beirut (Al Zaytouna Center, 2012)

The report is divided into three sections. The first section discusses a historical overview of the settlement during the period 1967-1993, the Zionist philosophy and ideology towards settlement, its beginning and stages referring to statistics of settlers and colonies enumeration in West Bank. The second section is focused on settlement activity during 1993-2011, which divided Israeli settlement volume into West Bank centered on the eastern part (Al Aghwar), the western part (green Line), and Araeel part (trans-Samara), Jerusalem, the settlement straps and outposts.

The final section, it examines the settlement implications on the Palestinian Question political approach, and Palestinian economic, social and environmental development.

The report discusses the Israeli strategy to negotiate the exploitation of the settlement issue to achieve a set of key objectives; the use of settlements as a bargaining means in the hands of the Israeli negotiator; according to the report, the Israeli strategy depends on a set of accesses and pillars as follows:

- A.** Attempting to recognize the mysterious Israeli position of settlement.
- B.** Delaying the settlements removal to the final stages without keeping promises and pledges.
- C.** Working on imposing an Israeli physical and human reality.
- D.** Prolonging the settlement process as long as the final settlement is out of reach.
- E.** Focusing on the settlements importance in Israeli settling projects.

The report discussed the settlement effects on Palestinian economic development and the resulted losses. The report clarified the settlement impact on agriculture, where the occupation lowered prices, controlled water resources and eliminated popular (local) items from Vegetation production: trees, vegetables and cereals. The agriculture infrastructure was also weakened, especially in constructing agricultural streets, allowing Palestinian farmers to access their land, and following the policy of uprooting trees.

In the industrial sector, the losses were reported in the major industrial zones construction for settlements to compete Palestinian products; Israel moved factories from Israel to West Bank regardless of their risks, exploiting the Palestinian manpower at low prices, though

these plants were not subject to Israeli labor laws, the factories failure to abide by the safety standards and industrial security.

In the telecommunications sector, Israel has exploited the settlements to construct towers and relay stations inside the settlements, taking advantages of Palestinian market without paying any taxes.

The report discussed the environmental settlement effects on groundwater contamination and wastewater, as hazardous waste, destroying agricultural lands. It focused on the settlement social consequences as demolishing houses, evicting Palestinians, affecting social media, and hindering Palestinian education.

8. Report of the Independent Commission for Human Rights (Ombudsman Office) entitled "Israeli policies in C area, development obstacles and the Palestinian government interventions in response (plans and challenges) published on the date of 2016. (The Independent Commission, 2016) The report deals with areas classified as C under Israeli control, where all activities in these areas are subject to Israeli special arrangements; it discusses these areas importance since it has the necessary space for expanding in Palestinian population centers, and they contain the largest part of farmland and pasture, undergoing infrastructure road projects, electricity, water, and sewage systems. According to the report, the occupation authorities are preventing Palestinian people from development, exploitation and investment in these areas of the West Bank which have strategic location, natural rich resources such as fertile soil, water resources, stone masonry, mineral salts, gas, oil and tourism wealth.

The report discusses Israel's practices in these areas where it seeks to judaize them controlling and turning them into settlements, military zones, and state territories. This proves that Israel continues to pursue a policy of imposing fait accompli.

It presents a summary of Israeli policies in the "C" areas, affecting the fundamental Palestinian human rights, attempts of the Palestinian Authority intervention as a response and mechanism reducing Israeli policies and practices, and concealing impacts on peace life. It is important to plan for developing projects in these areas, and more importantly, strengthening the Palestinian steadfastness in land, which is a key component of the Palestinian state, facing the progress Israeli systematic practices and violations, the forcible displacement policy, the settlement expansion, settler attacks, and the violation of international law of Human rights and international humanitarian law. Israeli occupation still undermines the Palestinians' right to self-determination, and strengthen its macroeconomic policies development implications destroying the possibilities of national liberation and eliminating the Palestinian presence.

The report discusses discriminatory policies and restrictions imposed by Israel on the residents of Area C in terms of discriminatory construction policies and restrictions on construction. The occupation implements a systematic policy based on achieving its interests rather than the Palestinians ones, namely, settlement, the network of roads, and other services. The Israeli civil administration applies policies of Area C in West Bank managing the area in a manner that discriminates against the Palestinian population and does not take into account their interests and basic rights. The report clarifies the conditions

laid by the occupation for the expansion plans demolishing Palestinian communities carried out on grounds of unlicensed building.

In addition, it discusses the lack of control over resources, where the occupying power controls Palestinian land in the designated areas, impeding development and construction efforts. It controls the largest reserves of land available for Palestinian development and natural resources such as: Fertile land and pasture, tourist sites and rich quarries, especially in adjacent areas to Jerusalem and Bethlehem, and Dead Sea salts and minerals. The occupation authorities exploited the wealth of the lands of C area, except for the extraction of natural gas and oil from the adjacent areas to the other line.

The report discusses the main effects of occupation policies and violations of human rights on the of citizens life in C area, namely, the impact on the right to an adequate standard of living, economic development, and the right to movement and mobility. Violations of the right to education, the educational process, the health sector, adequate housing, a healthy environment, and the right to family reunification.

9. Study in English entitled “The economic cost of the Israeli occupation of the occupied Palestinian Territories” issued by the Applied Research Institute - Jerusalem (ARIJ, 2015) The study is summarized about how that the Israeli occupation of Palestine imposes a huge price tag on the Palestinian economy. Israel restricts Palestinians access to their natural resources, controls Palestinian import and export processes due to its control over borders, hinders the development of many Palestinian industries, and continues to damage Palestinian infrastructure while restricting economic development, especially in C area. This report aims at analyzing Israeli restrictions imposed on the main economic

sectors and resource development in Palestine. It calculates the direct costs of these restrictions and the forgone revenue due to lost development opportunities through the use of economic models.

More specifically, the report measures the direct and forgone revenue losses from: **(1)** the gas marine reserve and fish industry due to restricted control over territorial water near the Gaza Strip; **(2)** the cost of confiscated land in the West Bank; **(3)** the forgone revenue from irrigated agriculture due to access restrictions to Palestinian water resources; **(4)** the cost of Israeli assault on Palestinian infrastructure, including the implications of the Israeli assault on Gaza Strip in 2014 and house demolitions in the West Bank; **(5)** cost of electricity purchased from Israel; and **(6)** the cost of restrictions on movement of goods and people within the West Bank. The report further extends the analysis to include the impacts on Palestinian industries of mining and quarrying, tourism, banking, telecommunications, as well as the costs of fiscal revenue leakage from the Palestinian authority to Israel due to trade agreements and the current clearance system. We found that the total economic cost of the Israeli occupation in Palestine to be around 9.46 billion US dollars, representing almost 74.27% of Palestinian nominal GDP of 2014.

Many of these restrictions have been in place since the start of the occupation in 1967, reflecting an unchanged colonial attitude of Israel, which aims at exploiting the Palestinian natural resources including land, water and mining resources for its own economic benefits. This policy has been coupled by the desire of Israel to prevent any Palestinian competition with Israeli economic interests. This has been summed up by Yitzhak Rabin, while holding the post of Israel's defense minister in 1986 when he stated that "there will be no

development initiated by the Israeli Government, and no permits will be given for expanding agriculture or industry, which may compete with the State of Israel” (UNCTAD, 1986). This has been (and is still) reflected in a series of Israeli obstacles related to customs, transportation and infrastructure which have prevented the development of a competitive Palestinian tradable sector and especially Palestinian trade with non-Israeli partners.

2.5 Discussion of previous studies and knowledge gap

The previous studies reviewed the effects and policies of the occupation on the economic conditions of various sectors in the Palestinian territories. The observations and **the knowledge gap which were not covered by these studies can be summarized as follows:**

1. These studies have mostly commented on the effects of the occupation measures on the Palestinian economy and the different economic sectors, without providing a clear vision of the mechanism to reduce these effects or identify the sectors in which there is a possibility to work or to penetrate.
2. There is no previous study, according to the researcher's knowledge, dealing with the development plans in the Palestinian territories, whether in criticizing these plans or determining their pros and cons. Most of the previous studies linked certain elements with development plans such: The impact of the ability of employment plans to create jobs, and

the impact of the national development plan 2014-2016 on the Palestinian women economic empowerment.

3. In previous studies, according to the researcher's knowledge, there is no comprehensive study of the occupation impact on the Palestinian economy. Most of the previous studies have dealt with one of the occupation effects, and even the studies which dealt with many of the effects of the occupation, they did not include all of its effects and could not provide a comprehensive perception, to those who are interested, of how the Palestinian economy do suffer from occupation.

4. Under the Israeli occupation, the previous studies have not answered the question of the possibility of achieving development and what alternatives or options to deal with development.

5. Previous studies have not presented futural scenarios for the Palestinian economy and how they affect the preparation of development plans next to come.

Study value will add:

In this study, I will provide additions which have not been addressed in previous studies.

They can be summarized as follows:

1. To provide a comprehensive perception of the occupation practices in the Palestinian territories to include all the occupation implications on the Palestinian economy and the different sectors such as health, education, industry, trade and others to give a comprehensive overview of the Palestinian economy's suffering to those who are interested.

2. The impact of the occupation on the Palestinian development plans and the response extent of the development plans to its policies.
3. Analyzing development plans to know what problems these plans face and where they succeed and fail.
4. Make recommendations that future development plans should include to be more effective.

Chapter 3

Israeli measures that hinder the development plans implementation in the Palestinian territories

3.1 Settlement

3.1.1 Introduction

The settlement is an old extending Zionist project based on religious, security, military and economic bases, which are inherently racist and radical, the policy of imposing the status quo through creating numerous and sprawling Jewish groups in West Bank.

It is noteworthy that the occupation seeks to break the current Palestinian demographic superiority barrier in the West Bank for Jewish settlers' benefit, providing them with various types of economic facilities and privileges to encourage them to live in settlements, where Zionism seeks to change the conflict reality by changing military colonialism since 1948 into a conflict between two peoples arguing for living the West Bank. (Sadah, 2017)

3.1.2 Stages of Settlement

The settlements were divided into stages based on the development of the political situation in Israel and the Zionist vision of the settlements.

The following table shows the development phases of Israeli settlements in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967(Khamaisi, 1999)

Table 3.3 :Settlement stages

Phase	Period	No of Settlements	No of settlers	Location	Note on phase
The First phase	1967-1974	11	---	Jerusalem Jordan valley Hebron Gaza Strip	1. This phase began to expand Jerusalem borders to include additional 70,000 dunums. 2. New settlements began to be established in the Jordan Valley, the south of Gaza Strip (Gush Katif), and south of Bethlehem (Gush Etzion). 3. the Gush Emunim movement began to establish colonies in West Bank territories.
The second phase	1974-1977	9	2876	Jerusalem West bank	The Rabin Labor government exploited the October war results in settlement expansion, establishing nine new settlements
					1. Menachem Begin's

Phase III	1977-1981	35	10358	Gaza Strip Jerusalem West bank	<p>arrival on the head of an extremist government was beneficial for a major settlement expansion of establishing 35 new settlements.</p> <p>2. Jerusalem witnessed the largest land confiscation movement.</p>
Phase IV	1981-1986	43	28400	Gaza Strip West bank	<p>1. Begin and Shamir right-wing's progressive control led to the non-stop settlement expansion</p> <p>2. More than half of these settlements have been set up in densely populated areas in Nablus and Ramallah.</p>
Phase V	1986-1988	27	41100	Jerusalem West bank	<p>The coalition formation between the two Israeli major parties was not an impediment to settlement,</p>

					with 27 settlements.
Phase VI	1988-1990	5	11700	West bank	The number of settlers rose to 81200
Phase VII	1990-1992	7	25800	West bank	The head of the extremist Likud government, Yitzhak Chammer, established seven new settlements
Phase VIII	1992-2000		38000	Jerusalem West bank	1. Israeli Governments continued to settle and open bypass roads. 2. the settlement concentrated in specific areas implementing the Israeli final phase vision. 3. This period saw the Russian Jews influx into Israel
The ninth stage	2000-2018		481000	Jerusalem West bank	1. The separation wall construction under a security pretext. 2. Israel's withdrawal from

					<p>Gaza Strip in 2005, where 21 settlements were destroyed and 8,500 settlers were evacuated.</p> <p>3. Settlements held approximately 42% of West Bank territories.</p> <p>4. The settlers number reached 640000, including Jerusalem.</p>
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3.1.3 The settlement effects: The Israeli settlement in the Palestinian territories is one of the most important causes that hinders the Palestinian economy development because of the settlement disastrous effects on the Palestinians' life. The most important settlement implications:

1. Settlements exploitation of the ground

The settlements today extend over 538,127 dunums and constitute about 10% of the West Bank. Moreover, 1,650,376 dunums are the regional councils area of the settlements influence, which include vast areas that do not fall into any urban area of the settlements. Thus, it is under the settlements direct control representing about 40% of the West Bank total area and 63% of C area. (Btselem, 2017)

The Israeli settlements distribution in West Bank various areas can be determined by how the settlements control on the West Bank through identifying settlement axes and belts from follow tables

A.The settlement Axes

Table 3.4: Settlement Axes

N O	The axes	The settlements in this axes	Axis target
1	The eastern axis (Al Aghwar)	The settlement council "Arvut Haarden" (Jordan Valley), which includes more than 15 settlements.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Controlling the eastern groundwater basin. 2. Eliminating the establishing an independent Palestinian state possibility. 3. Preventing geographical communication between the West Bank and Jordan. 4. Eliminating the potential of urban, agricultural and industrial expansion. 5. Preventing Palestinian from accessing to the Dead Sea. (Zaytouna Studies, 2012)
2	The western axis (Green Line)	<p>This axis includes three major settlement blocs, the largest settlement one is in the West Bank in terms of the number of settlers are:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Gush Etzion bloc: 2. Jerusalem Closure: It is the largest settlement group in the West Bank 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Security: It is a settlement wall isolating the West Bank population from the 1948's occupied territories. 2. Economic reasons: The colonies of this axis are located on the largest freshwater aquifers in the West Bank (the western basin) to enable Israel to pump water large quantities for agricultural use while depriving the Palestinian from this water. 3. Expansion reasons: Israel seeks to annex

		3. Modi'in Illit bloc, located between the city of Jerusalem and Ramallah. (Abu Amro, 2010)	the lands which the settlements of this axis are being built on. This axis will also tear down and dismember the Palestinian territories. 4. Political reasons: This axis will obstruct any peace settlement process between the Palestinian side and the Israeli one.
3	C.Ariel (Trans Samaria)	Israel has intensified its settlements along this axis and the nearby areas where 17 settlements have been established, including Ariel settlement, the largest Israeli settlement in the West Bank (Zaytouna Studies C. f., 2012) .	1. It can divide the West Bank into two parts, a northern section comprising the governorates of Jenin, Tulkarm, Nablus, Qalqilya, Tubas and Salfit, and a southern section including the governorates of Ramallah, Jerusalem, Jericho, Bethlehem and Hebron. 2. This axis enables Israel and its settlements to reach quickly and easily to the valley area, and move militarily along this axis at the outbreak of any crisis with the Arab countries.
4	Settlements in Jerusalem	Israel imposed a new reality on the borders of the Jerusalem municipality in 1967, where it increased the area it controlled from 6.5 square kilometers ,before the occupation of the city, to 71 square kilometers, and in 1993 the occupation authorities have	Judaizing the city of Jerusalem and expelling the Palestinian population.

		initiated a new expansion on the edge of the city of Jerusalem, where the area 130 square kilometers. (Zaytouna Studies, 2012)	
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B. The settlement belts

The following table shows the most important settlement belts

Table 3.5: Settlement Belts

NO	The settlement belts	Information of settlement belts
1	Hebron settlement belt	<p>Hebron is considered to be one of the most important areas in which there was a settlement activity, mainly because of religious reasons. Settlement in Hebron 1967 began by seizing some buildings inside the city and turning them into Jewish neighborhoods, aiming at connecting the Jewish neighborhoods and the Kiryat Arba settlement by digging tunnels and constructing roads.</p> <p>established settlements surrounding the city of Hebron beginning with establishing "Kiryat Arba" settlement in 1970 by extremist settlers. The settlement is located at the top of Mount Baten Al Bayar on an area of 6,100 dunums. The settlement was planned to cope ten thousand Jewish families.</p>

		There are links among settlement outposts in the Old City and the Ibrahimi Mosque connecting them with a group of roads and corridors to create a new reality in the area. The number of settlements in the governorate reached 30 settlements and more than 20 settlement outposts. (Abdullah Al - Hourani, 2017)
2	Bethlehem settlement belt	The Israeli settlement in the Bethlehem governorate began immediately after the Israeli occupation of West Bank in 1967. It was the beginning with the Kfar Atsayoun settlement in 1967. After that, the settlements in the governorate spread to achieve Israel's goals in what so-called the Greater Jerusalem. (Wafa Agency, 2018)
3	Ramallah settlement belt	<p>The Ofra settlement was established in 1975 and was the first settlement in the Ramallah area on the lands of Ein Yabrud and Silwad,</p> <p>The settlements are scattered in Ramallah as a cordon around the area, and they have been in Ramallah area since the 1990s; Israel has also focused on completing the settlement belt and confiscating land to complete the so-called Greater Jerusalem Project.</p> <p>According to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, the number of settlers in the Ramallah area reached 123194 and the number of settlements was 26. (Statistics, 2016)</p>

C. The outposts:

The first settlement outpost in the West Bank was established in 1996 with indirect support from the Israeli Government and was intended to seize the Palestinian territories to construct a settlement nucleus aimed at increasing the area of existing colonies, or to be new to planned colonies, although governments The Successive Israeli authorities have not entered into so-called legal settlements, but have provided them with security and logistical cover for their existence and continuity. (Zaytouna Studies, 2012)

D. Israeli bypass roads

The term "bypass roads" began to emerge with the Oslo Agreement in September 1993 referring to the roads established by the Israelis in the occupied West Bank to aim at linking the Israeli settlements to each other and to Israel. Since that time, Israel has stepped up its efforts to increase the bypass roads number in occupied Palestinian territories in 1967 as part of its policy of imposing facts on the ground, which will at the end affect the negotiations outcome with the Palestinians, including establishing a geographical and viable Palestinian state. During the period 1967-2010, the Israeli occupation managed to make 875 km of bypass roads to facilitate the contiguity of Israeli colonies. According to the Oslo Agreement, Palestinians were allowed to use these roads, but after the outbreak of the intifada on 30 September 2009, the Israeli occupation authorities prevented Palestinians from using these roads under the pretext of security reasons. In 2004, Israel put forward a proposed alternative road network scheme that would transform Palestinians from Israeli

bypass roads into a complete separated road network to keep them from the Israeli bypass streets. (Areej Institute, 2010).

Israeli bypass roads are divided into three types:

1. Roads which are subject to absolute Israeli use preventing Palestinians from using them for good.
2. Roads which Palestinians are allowed to use with restrictions, with a permit issued by the Israeli Civil Administration.
3. Other roads for the Palestinians to use which are subject to checkpoints (military roadblocks) and restrictions on their entrances by the Israeli occupation forces.

2. The settlements impact on the agricultural sector

Agriculture is one of the most important Palestinian economy pillars. It is one of the main labor force operators promoting the Palestinian agricultural products ability to compete. The agricultural sector is one of the sectors that negatively affected by the Israeli settlement. The settlement effects on the agricultural sector can be summarized as follows:

A: The settlements are based on land confiscation leading to the agricultural lands and pastoral lands erosion. This has negatively affected the workers number in the agricultural sector leading to low interest in agricultural lands. As a matter of fact, Palestinian youth moved to work in the settlements inside Israel. The interest in the livestock sector, especially grazing, has decreased due to the pastoral lands decline as a result of settlements,

bypass roads, and fear of settler attacks who have used to attacking pastoralists and livestock recently.

B. Cutting down trees and destroying agricultural crops: According to an UNCTAD report issued on 6/9/2016, only in January 2015, (5,600) fruit trees were destroyed to add more than 2.5 million fruit trees uprooted since 1967, including 800 thousand olive trees. (UNCTAD, 2016)

C. Water Control: The settlements were built on the West Bank water basins, this prevented the agricultural sector from using this water and gave priority to the settlements to compete with Palestinian agriculture because of water availability and cheap prices.

D. The amount of wastewater produced by the Israeli settlements in the West Bank is about 40 million cubic meters, which is larger than that produced by the Palestinians. The amount of wastewater produced is 33 million cubic meters, and 90% of the wastewater from the settlements are treated in Palestinian valleys and agricultural lands, such as: Wadi El Nar, east of Hebron, Wadi Qana between Nablus and Qalqilya, and the wastewater flowing from Ariel settlement and a group of neighbouring settlements surrounding it. (Wafa, 2018)

E. Transferring the Palestinian labor force to these areas by increasing the work allowance wages in these areas compared to Palestinian workers in Palestinian factories due to the competitiveness of settlements industrial zones and their labor skillfulness.

4 - Settlements exploitation of water

The Israeli occupation have built settlements on water-rich sites. Studies show that 70 percent of Israeli settlements are located on the eastern reservoir basin in the West Bank, and 45 percent of the settlements are located on very sensitive areas for the recharge of the mountain aquifer in the West Bank. (Wafa Agency, 2018)

The presence of settlements and the increasing number of settlers means the need to provide more water resources, which will be at the expense of the Palestinians, the settlers' control of many water wells and depriving Palestinians from doing so.

I will provide a detailed explanation of the occupation impact on Palestinian water resources during the study.

5. The violence of the settlers affected the Palestinians.

One of the most important effects of the Israeli settlements is the settlers' violence against the Palestinians, which has reached the point of direct impact on their lives.

In his book, *Settler violence and its Impact on the Palestinians*, Nabil Saleh monitors the violence perpetrated by the settlers, the most prominent of which is the forced expulsion of farmers from the land, the threat of shooting and killing, beatings with punching, rifle butts, and sticks, throwing stones and dogs, stealing crops and animals, killing pets, demanding identity cards without authorization, and stealing documents. (Saleh, 2014)

The settler violence effects can be summarized as follows:

1. Direct killing of Palestinians: The settlers have killed dozens of Palestinians since the late 1980s and early 1990s.
2. Cut roads, throw stones and disrupt movement between cities and villages.
3. Grab agricultural land and prevent farmers from reaching their lands, cutting down trees and destroying crops.
4. Control the water springs and prevent Palestinians from reaching them.
5. Spread fear among the Palestinians, which reflected negatively on their movement and the mountains tourism movement.

According to a report by the UN Secretary General, Israeli settler violence against Palestinians and their property continues on a regular basis. According to figures released by United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in 24/10/2014, the number of attacks resulting in injuries to Palestinians or property damage were 304 attacks in 2014 compared to 389 recorded in the same period in 2013. (Human Rights Council, 2014)

The effects of settler violence are a key obstacle to the Palestinian territories development. The direct losses of this violence, indirect losses, including depriving the Palestinians from their land development and attention, and the effects of this violence and the behavior of the settlers on the possibility of any future settlement cannot be ignored. From the frustration and preference of many people not to venture investing their money in any

projects as a result of lack of clarity of vision regarding the situation and developments on the question.

6. Settlement impact on the environment

The settlements effect is not to leave any aspect of Palestinian life without causing negative and catastrophic effects wherever one looks. One of the settlement effects is the settlements waste, including untreated or completely untreated wastewater, where the proportion of untreated wastewater from settlements to Palestinian lands amounted about 34%.

Moreover, solid waste is buried in unsafe ways, as polluting substances seeping into groundwater, constructing sewage plants on underground water tanks and leaking hazardous materials from these settlements industrial areas to Palestinian territories.

Israel has gone even further, shutting down many toxic and dangerous plants in Israel and transferring them to industrial settlements in the Palestinian territories.

The settlements and their waste impact on Palestinian territories environment threatens agricultural land and livestock as well as the spread of mosquitoes carrying diseases all over areas where the wastewater infiltration into the restricted areas cannot be cultivated because of these wastes and pollution .

7. Exploitation of settlements on forced displacement of Bedouin communities

In order to establish more settlements and to create a geographical contiguity among the settlements, the occupation forcibly displaced Bedouins, and perhaps the last attempt of occupation was to displace Khan al-Ahmar residents, an interview with Mr. Qasem Awad,

general director of publishing and documentation at the Colonization and Wall Resistance Commission, Mr. Awad reported that there is an existed plan for the Bedouin communities forced displacement , and when he was asked about what this scheme is and its objectives, Mr. Awad stated that it is a plan of forcible displacement planned by Israel a decade ago called the "repositioning plan", targeting the planned Palestinian pastoral Bedouin communities residing along the axis From East Jerusalem to east Jericho and south Elizaria . The number of targeted gatherings is about 48, with a population of 7670 Palestinians, the majority of them are children, and the plan includes the Bedouins displacement in three regions, namely the mountain area, the Nuimmeh region and the Fasayel area. (Awad, 2018)

The occupation authorities began work on the infrastructure construction at the site near the Abu Dis landfill, the site of a mountain, which is one of the new isolated sites proposed by Israel.

With regard to the suffering targeted groups, Mr. Qasem explained that this scheme led to a severe shortage of adequate housing, both healthy and environmentally, the occupation authorities do not allow to provide suitable life in the target area of infrastructure services (roads, water, electricity) and social services of health and education, the occupation prevent residents from accessing to grazing areas with many excuses and pretexts; the Bedouin communities also live under occupation actions continuous threat of demolition notices of land and property confiscation.

The occupation authorities also allow settlers to attack the population and their property in the targeted areas and allow for the settlement expansion acceleration in the area at the expense of the local population. As for the objectives of this scheme, Mr. Awad summarized these goals as follows:

1. Applying forced displacement of the Bedouin population residing in the targeted areas.
2. Emptying the area extending from East Jerusalem to the Jordan Valley of its Palestinian population.
3. Closing the main road, extending from Anata to the Jordan Valley eastwards and Al-Ezariya to the south, in the face of the Palestinians.
4. Contributing in implementing an isolation plan of Jerusalem from the rest of the West Bank, "Plan E1"
5. The scheme allows the creation of a settlement expansion to extend from Jerusalem to the Dead Sea.
6. Israel's control over an area of high geographical, security and political importance.

What about the effects and consequences of this scheme, Mr. Qasem Awad clarifies the scheme effects are many matters, including:

1. Hindering Palestinian state establishment.
2. Cutting off the West Bank lands and divide it into cantons and ghettos.

3. Emptying the land classified as C in accordance with the Oslo agreement of its inhabitants and displacing them in specific enclaves which are easy to control.

4. The plan will eliminate the Palestinian presence in the Territories classified as C, especially on the Bedouin communities residing on the outskirts of the eastern border of Palestine from Jordan.

5. Depriving the Bedouin population from their traditional life, preserving their economic and social heritage.

3.2 Security control and direct occupation of the Palestinian territories

3.2.1 (C) Area control:

Introduction

Referring to Oslo interim agreement signed in September 1995 between the PLO and Israel, the Palestinian territories were divided into three areas:

(A) Area:

It is the area of 1.005 kilometres, of 18% of the total West Bank, and under full Palestinian control (securely and administratively).

(B) Area:

It is the area of 1.035 kilometers, of 18.3% of the total West Bank under Palestinian administration control and Israel does have the security control.

(C) Area: It is an area under the full Israeli government control, constituting 61% of the total West Bank having vast potential for the urban, agricultural and economic development. Israel is practicing full control of planning and building and prevents the Palestinians from doing so. Approximately 70% of this area -about 42% of the total area of West Bank. Israel imposes this prohibition through naming vast tracts as state lands, surveyed lands, firing zones, nature reserves and national parks, annexing them to the settlements powers and regional councils; or through applying many restrictions on lands located between the Separation Wall and Green Line that are held by Israel. (B'tselem, 2017)

C Area population is estimated at 300,000 Palestinians living in hundreds of districts, which is more than 61% of West Bank, including East Jerusalem. It is comprised of thousands of dunums, whole villages or parts of them, historical sites and external and bypass roads. Since it is under Israeli control, Israel is placing physical and strict restrictions on the Palestinians movement. The inhabitants of these areas live in 532 residential communities including 240 are communities and villages located in Area C with a population of 67,000 People. 70% of C area is located within the boundaries of the Israeli settlements councils, and its owners are prohibited from using and developing them. (Ahmad, 2016)

The effects on Israel's control of the C area as Shown in the following table

Table 3.6: Effects of Israel's control of the C area

NO	Sector	The impact
1	Agricultural sector	<p>A. Israeli settlement exploitation of C area is concentrated in the Jordan Valley and the northern part of the Dead Sea, where settlements control 85% of the most West Bank fertile land, where abundant water and climate provide ideal conditions for flourishing agriculture to produce 40% of Israeli dates exports. (Shabita, 2018)</p> <p>B. Controlling agricultural land under various pretexts as state property and closed military zones.</p> <p>C. Seizing water in these areas and determining water well withdrawals lead to stifling the agricultural sector.</p> <p>D. Demolishing agricultural facilities for they had been built without a permit.</p> <p>E. Bedouins displacement living in these areas affecting the livestock sector.</p>
2	Construction sector	<p>1. Demolishing houses under the pretext of not having building license, according to official occupation authorities data, there are over 11,000 demolition orders pending out of a total of 14,087; 2,802 of them have been implemented against Palestinian buildings. (United Nations, 2015)</p> <p>2. The structural expansion scheme of Palestinian residential communities in C area is subject to Israeli Civil Administration approval, which refuses to expand the structural plans of these clusters except in very rare cases.</p> <p>3. C area residents are prohibited from expanding the infrastructure or roads to their land where more than 70%</p>

		<p>of these communities are not connected to an adequate water network.</p> <p>4. The occupation prohibits hospitals and schools establishment except in villages for which the Civil Administration approves a master plan at the time, where only 16 out of 180 villages have master ones. (Ahmad, 2016)</p>
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3.2.2 Control of the city of Jerusalem:

Jerusalem is one of the most cities occupied throughout history because of its special sanctity; the eastern part of the city was occupied by the Israeli occupation forces in 1967, it has witnessed the occupation that forged the monuments of the city, displaced its inhabitants, and considered it the Zionist state capital. Since the beginning of its occupation of Jerusalem, Israel has tried to isolate it from its Palestinian surroundings and has pursued a policy of taxation and failure to grant construction permits to Palestinians, and land confiscation and what so-called absentee property.

Among the most prominent sectors affected by the policies in Jerusalem are the following:

A. Housing sector

The demographic occupation policies in Jerusalem can be summarized as explain in follow table

Table 3.7: Demographic Occupation Policies in Jerusalem

NO	The procedure	The impact
1	<p>Practicing several measures to restrict housing, including attempts to expel the Palestinian people through:</p> <p>(Quds info, 2018)</p>	<p>A. Building law</p> <p>This law is designed to serve the Jewish population and to reduce the population growth in Jerusalem, it imposes very difficult conditions such as: obtaining a land ownership certificate for those who want to build; this condition is extremely difficult for those who hardly ever possess this certificate.</p> <p>B. Structural plans for Jerusalem neighborhoods</p> <p>the occupation authorities determined the number of floors and building height and this scheme is a fundamental problem attached to the impossible construction law</p> <p>C. Failure of obtaining building permits</p> <p>The number of unlicensed Jerusalem buildings is approximately 15,000, and the number of permits granted to Jerusalemites does not meet the need for housing purposes. The application of building law is more stringent with Jerusalemites than Jews, and the building permits cost ranges from 52-30 thousand dollars, which is considered to be a financial distress and economic problems which Jerusalemites suffer from.</p> <p>D. Demolishing houses</p> <p>This procedure results from the occupation policy of refusing to give building permits focusing on unlicensed homes. The number of demolished houses in Jerusalem nine years ago amounted to 456, and the occupying authorities concentrated on whose houses</p>

		<p>were repeatedly demolished to carry out more demolition.</p> <p>E. Land expropriation</p> <p>Formed the main category of legislation intended to consolidate expropriation for lands that has not been recorded in the conducted census by Israeli authorities.</p> <p>F. Classifying Palestinian land as green areas</p> <p>7,000 dunums were classified as green areas, land for services and roads, leaving only 9,000 dunums earmarked for construction purposes.</p> <p>G. Withdrawing Jerusalem residents cards:</p> <p>The occupation authorities in 1967 granted the Jerusalem residents permanent residence cards allowing them to reside and work in Jerusalem, which are the blue Jerusalem identity cards which were renewed once every 10 years with the approval of the Israeli Minister of Interior, and the occupation authorities have worked on withdrawing them from Jerusalem residents expelling them from Jerusalem; it withdrew these from 13,155 Jerusalem residents to deprive them of the housing and residence rights.</p>
2	Mass displacement	<p>A. Demographic blocs' fragmentation:</p> <p>Transforming all Palestinian neighborhoods in Jerusalem into houses group surrounded by outposts where it has become difficult to find a Palestinian gathering, which is today Israeli settlements with Palestinian houses.</p> <p>B. The Separation Wall:</p> <p>Third of the Jerusalem residents are now outside the</p>

		<p>boundaries of the apartheid wall and municipality as it was planned; according to official figures approved by the Palestinian National Authority, 130,000 Jerusalemites living Outside the wall, they live in the neighborhoods of Kafr Aqeb, al-Zaeem, Shu'fat Camp, Ras Khamis, the al Salam suburb and Al Ram, most of their residents are Jerusalemites, were deported from the Holy city to remove as many Jerusalemites as possible and reduce the Palestinians percentage. (Zayed, 2018)</p> <p>C. The settlements expansion were at the expense of the Palestinian territories neighboring Jerusalem hindering Palestinian communities' expansion.</p>
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B. Commercial sector

Jerusalem commercial sector suffers from the Israeli obstacles imposed on the commercial sector which can be determined by the following table

Table 3.8: Obstacles of the commercial sector in Jerusalem

NO	Obstacles	impact
		<p>1. Jerusalem economy lost its ability to achieve the components of its consumer and productivity success</p> <p>2. Jerusalem products do not have the right of marketing outside the city, even inside Israel, because of imposing high tax policies on these products.</p> <p>3. the Jerusalemites are forced to buy produced settlements goods on the cost of national ones as a means of indirect support for settlement products.</p> <p>4. Israel seeks to disengage the Jerusalem economy</p>

1	<p>Preventing Palestinian goods from moving in and out Jerusalem</p>	<p>from the areas of the Palestinian Authority and to link it with the Israeli economy to force Palestinians to voluntarily abandon the city and leave them in accordance with the policy of "opposite attraction" prohibiting Palestinian agricultural or industrial products from moving in Jerusalem, imposing high taxes on Palestinian products, promoting the idea of decline in economic status, where it suffers from a recession which led to large economic bankruptcy of many economic institutions, closing many of them and demanding others to register themselves as Israeli companies, this affects Jerusalemites' life, unemployment, poverty and low income levels increase. (Jaafar, 2013)</p>
2	<p>Taxes: Jerusalemites have associated with Israeli regulations and laws since 1967's occupation, the most important of them is the public and municipality taxes; these are taxes and fees that force the Jerusalemite citizen and</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. A. Income tax: It is for joint stock companies that are 38% or for individuals who have overcast the tax revenue for the merchant's income. 2. B. Operator tax: 8% of any employer or worker salary paid by the operator. 3. National Insurance: The employer and the share paid by him for his employees. 4. Health Insurance: The employer and his share of his employees' health insurance. 5. The pension fund, the savings and compulsory compensation for the employer and the share paid by the employees. 6. Welfare tax: It is equivalent to two weeks' salary for its employees. 7. (VAT) Value Added Tax: It is now 16.5% of the

	<p>the merchant as follows:</p> <p>(Abu Alsaud, 2013)</p>	<p>sales value.</p> <p>8. Commercial signs tax: It depends on the commercial area of the business.</p> <p>9. Property taxes: If it owns a building or shop.</p> <p>If we look at the total of these taxes, we will find them ranging from 40-55% of the merchant's total income. Certainly, the merchant always feels the weight of this tax burden, since all our Jerusalem merchants do sense the tax obsession in their life and dreams.</p>
3	Other factors	<p>The issue of lifting rent protection, an Israeli law, issued in 2003, has led owners to raise rents on tenants, even there was an economic and commercial recession in the city. Although the Chamber of Commerce solved a number of these problems and made a fair estimation of the rent allowance, some owners resorted to the Israeli courts, which brought in expert Israeli appraisers who underestimated their rent without taking into account the arab markets weakness, the basis for the determining the rental according to the law of owners and tenants in Israel's booming commerce</p> <p>al areas. High- rate unemployment in Jerusalem is another factor that weakens commercial activity, now about 12.7, thus reducing the available funds for people to buy and affecting the Jerusalem merchant sales.</p>

C. Education sector

The number of students in Jerusalem is approximately 40,000, 50% of them are studying in the schools of the occupation municipality in Jerusalem, 24% receive their education in private schools, 13% receive their education in the schools of education and AWQAF schools, and 15% of total students are studying in UNRWA schools and some new unrecognized ones. (Education in Jerusalem, 2018)

The main problems affecting the education sector in Jerusalem because of occupation as explain in follow table

Table 3.9: Main problems affecting the education sector in Jerusalem because of occupation

NO	The problem	The impact
1	School buildings and classrooms	<p>1. The difficulty of providing suitable land for school establishment purposes is limited by the land classification in Jerusalem (as a green land) which is prohibited of building by the laws of the occupation authorities.</p> <p>2. The difficulty of obtaining building permits from the concerned committees in the Jerusalem municipality.</p> <p>3. Confiscating construction land planned for establishing a schools in jerusalem. Therefore, no new schools have been built in Jerusalem according to development requirements of educational needs and most schools in Jerusalem have been expanded or rented.</p> <p>4. D. Resorting to rent buildings as a practical</p>

		<p>solution, although these buildings do not comply with accepted school specifications as an educational institution.</p> <p>5. The classrooms shortage in Jerusalem schools and their small space led to the inevitable result of overcrowding with students; this prevents from providing a good educational environment for students, and limits the schools absorption for students year after year, where the percentage of students increases in the school year from 5-8%. A study by the Ministry of Education showed that about 41% of schools suffer from this problem.</p> <p>6. The majority of Jerusalem schools lack regular maintenance and progressive renovation.</p>
2	Educational process	<p>1. The multiple educational supervising bodies which is the most serious problem facing the education sector, which means the educational reference absence, which is supposed to set the philosophical vision or the educational strategy that must be adopted in schools, which paves the way for the occupation to interfere in upbringing and guiding young people to serve their interests and goals.</p> <p>2. The occupation authorities control and intervene in the education sector and its curriculum in East Jerusalem.</p> <p>3. Targeting the Arabic language: The Israeli Ministry of Education is deliberately undermining the Arabic language and trying to obliterate it making the curriculum contain spelling</p>

		<p>mistakes, and replacing the classical language with the colloquial dialect.</p> <p>4. The Israeli government threatens to change the Palestinian curriculum and even judaize the educational curriculum in arab schools.</p> <p>5. Teachers' qualification:</p> <p>Poor school budgets, fixed funding sources, irregular salaries, inadequate financial situation of schools, and many teaching competencies absence to the schools of the Israel Ministry of Knowledge because of low salaries and living level creating qualified teachers shortage, low level of academic achievement among students.</p> <p>6. School truancy:</p> <p>The schools in Jerusalem recorded the highest truancy rate among Palestinian schools, despite the lack of accurate statistics, all studies have shown that the problem has deteriorated and got worse over time spreading social deviance and child labour.</p> <p>(Education in Jerusalem, 2018)</p>
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D. Agriculture sector

Israeli practices taken against the agricultural sector in Jerusalem can be summarized in isolating farmland behind the wall, preventing farmers from reaching it and confiscating the necessary water for irrigating crops.

E. Health sector

The problems affecting the health sector in Jerusalem results from Israeli actions which can be summarized as follows:

1. The health services providers' multiplicity:

There are six bodies responsible for the health sector in Jerusalem, which are the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees, non-governmental organizations which operates 20 centers, the Palestinian Ministry of Health outside the city's borders, the charitable sector consists of the hospital of al-Makassed Islamic Charitable Society Hospital Jerusalem, Eye hospital, private sector centers and Israeli National Insurance.

2. Most, if not all, emergencies are deprived from accessing hospitals in Jerusalem to receive emergency health services from injuries and accidents. This is due to the fact that the Israeli occupation forces prevented ambulances from entering without prior permission. This is not possible practical, since these cases cannot be postponed until the necessary permits are issued, and the limited permits granted are checked.

3. Health services discrimination provided to the Palestinians and their Jewish counterparts.

4. Jerusalem hospitals are subjected to Israeli laws in terms of licensing and control.

5. Upon the completion of Jerusalem siege and closure, the imposing compulsory Israeli health insurance on Jerusalem residents, and integrating them with israeli health insurance services, increasing Jerusalem hospitals burden, which emphasized that their work must comply with the Israeli health insurance system imposing the Israeli Ministry of Health

policies on the doctors of Jerusalem, and the health staff who are in need to obtain Israeli permits to work, leading to hinder many doctors, nurses and health staff from working in Jerusalem, and weakening medicine fields to practice their duties as it should be particularly in Jerusalem . (Jadallah, 2013)

6. The separation wall and the expansion of Jerusalem's perimeter isolate a large part of the Jerusalemites who are outside the city increasing the isolation of Jerusalem and its citizens outside the city, making it difficult for them to access health, social and economic services.

F. Tourism Sector

These impacts on the tourism sector in Jerusalem can be summarized as follows: -

1. The impact of settlement activity on the Jerusalem urban appearance.

The colonial activities of successive occupation governments were reflected in the physical appearance of the Holy city, which lost much of its glamour as an original Arab city in all its meanings.

The systematic Israeli aggression on this side clearly affected the traditional urban pattern and began to be replaced by new patterns that do not reflect the historical and archaeological realities of this city; establishing settlements around the city has largely distorted this unique eastern urban style, through spreading and preparing modern residential areas for Jewish settlers; the impact of this urban nature and its related confiscation of land, the demolition of Arab houses and the establishment of new settlements in a different urban style negatively affect the tourism activity in Jerusalem in

various ways, particularly many tourists visit the holy city to enjoy its unique urban style that reflects the historical and religious harmony of the city. (Hammad, 2018)

2. Impact of settlement activity on hotel activity sector

The political aspect is a major obstacle to hotel activity, not only in Jerusalem, but also in all Palestinian territories, where they suffer from political instability, which is the most incentive for private investment, the uninterrupted Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories, and its successive practices of hindering persons and goods movement in Palestinian territories having killed the spirit of the investing initiative. The non-peaceful orientation of the current Israeli government and the activation of the Zionist view aimed at seizing the Palestinian territories, and the private sector's fear of investing in the hotel construction, as a result of these phenomena, there has been no improvement in the transparency of the tourists movement from and to Palestine and across its various regions, which negatively affected the optimistic look of the entire tourism activity.

3. Employing tourism to Judaize Jerusalem and legitimize settlement

Israel is working on developing archaeological sites and tourism projects for the purpose of legitimizing settlements in the city of Jerusalem, while the Palestinians are absent from the historical profile that is being promoted to visitors.

3.2.3 Control of Al Aghwar

Israel's control over the West Bank borders in Al Aghwar which is considered to be its only outlet for the outside world after Israel's occupation of historic Palestine. Israel exploited

the Al Aghwar under this pretext. It accounts for 25 percent of the West Bank, most of which Israel controls as military areas or settlements.

The occupation controls 400 thousand dunums of Al Aghwar under the pretext of its use as closed military zones, or 55.5% of the total area of Al Aghwar. The Palestinian population is prohibited from carrying out any agricultural, urban or any other activity in these areas; the occupation has established 90 military sites in Al Aghwar since its occupation in 1967. (Hadf News, 2018)

Al Aghwar is the Palestine food basket because of its climate, land fertility and water abundance, where the water basin in Al Aghwar is one of the largest water basins in Palestine. The development obstacles imposed by the occupation on this region are:

A. Controlling water resources in Al Aghwar region

B. The occupation applied policies and methods in Al Aghwar for its own good practicing many actions that contribute to the strangulation of the agricultural sector, which can be summarized as follows:

- 1.** Control most of the water in that area depriving the Palestinian farmers from expanding and producing their new crops varieties.
- 2.** Establishing military roadblocks in Al Aghwar destroys some of these products or leads to low quality before their arrival to Palestinian market.
- 3.** Tight laboratory testing of the Palestinian product, which impedes its access to markets.

4. The Israeli farms support has made hardships for the Palestinian agricultural product to compete with the Israeli one.

5. Under the pretext of security, the occupation prevented certain types of fertilizers and pesticides from arrival, affecting the agricultural sector in Palestinian territories in general and Al Aghwar in particular.

6. The closed military zones have deprived farmers from using large areas for grazing, leading to a decline in livestock in those areas.

Israel insists on controlling the Palestinian valley under the pretext of security and refuses to negotiate on Al Aghwar and its future as final solution issues, however, Israel has other ambitions in Al Aghwar because of its fertile farmland, water availability and Dead Sea exploitation.

The greatest advantage is the fact that it is a warm natural area that can be exploited for cultivation along the year, its soil fertility, and its water sources availability. It is located on the most important aquifer in Palestine. Al Aghwar is the West Bank quarter, with 50,000 citizens, including Jericho; 2% of the total West Bank Palestinian population.

Al Aghwar is about 280 thousand dunums; that is, 38.8% of the total area of the marsh area; the Palestinians use 50,000 dunums of land; the settlements use 27,000 dunums of its farmland. In fact, 50% of the total agricultural area is located in the West Bank with 60% of the total vegetable production. (Haddad news, 2018)

3.2.4 Control of crossings points and borders

The States control over their crossings as one of the most important features of sovereignty and one of the tools to determine its trade relationship with the outside world. The Palestinian case, Israel controlled all Palestinian territories crossings after its 1967's occupation; this does hinder the Palestinian economy advancement.

The effects of Israel's crossings and borders control can be illustrated as follows:

A. Controlling individuals' movement

Israel applies a travel ban to prevent Palestinians from using its airports or ports to travel abroad, the only way for the West Bank residents is to travel to Jordan via the Allenby Bridge, which is located 5 km east of Jericho. Even this Israel exploits its control over the crossing checking points to prevent many of the West Bank residents from travelling, often under the pretext of security reasons, the prohibition is sometimes applied to force Palestinians to deal with it. Many citizens do not know that they are prohibited from travelling until they are informed on the crossing bridge. According to the Palestinian police, 1641 were prevented from travelling via the Karama Crossing in 2017. According to the Hurriyat Center, 8742 Palestinians were banned from travelling. (B'Tselem, 2017)

The effective authority lack on the Allenby Bridge according to the Israeli nomenclature created a new problem that many wanted persons escape from Palestinian Authority across the 90th Street via Allenby Bridge and most of them are judicially wanted on a financial charges.

In addition to the West Bank, the Gaza Strip residents have access to the West Bank through the Erez passageway, whether these citizens wish to travel abroad or remain in the West Bank, such as patients and merchants. Israel requires those who wish to travel from Gaza residents across the West Bank to write a pledge not to return after at least one year after the heightened security check. In most cases, Israel refuses to grant permits to the Gaza Strip residents to visit the West Bank, whether for treatment or other.

The study results of The Coalition for Accountability and Integrity (AMAN) showed that the Palestinian Authority Treasury lost 160 million shekels, which the occupation does not turn to the Palestinian Ministry of Finance as revenues of crossings and borders collection which Israel earns and controls. The difference between what turns to the Palestinian side from the crossings fees from the period 01/01/2008 to 03/01/2012, only over 160 million shekels, except for the period between 1995 and 2013.

B. Controlling goods movement

When Israel controls the crossings and the Palestinian borders, the Palestinian economy is considered to be as a hostage in Israel's hands, which determines the goods size and type allowed into the Palestinian territories, and hinders the trade movement as a result of Israel's control over the crossings as follows:

1. Restrictions on dual-use goods

Israeli authorities imposed restrictions on importing or transferring dual-use goods into the West Bank and Gaza, creating a serious obstacle to Palestinian trade and reducing the entire business process prospects.

The data showed that one of the prominent import obstacles was the restrictions establishment, refusing to allow many kinds of goods to access or enter West Bank and Gaza strip, where Israel prevented Palestinian merchants from importing these goods under the pretext of security reasons, or allowed them to access under conditions and restrictions. It causes delay and extra expenses for the Palestinian merchant and leads to the imported goods futility. This fact pushes the Palestinian merchant into two alternatives to buy these goods from an Israeli merchant (mostly settlers) and transfer them to the Palestinian Authority areas in an embedded manner (where Israel closes eyes when that happens), the second is to find an alternative to these goods which are not restricted, in this case the merchant is forced to deal with goods that are either inferior or harmful to the health and environment or cost a lot. (Palestinian Shippers Council, 2014)

2. Restrictions imposed in the field of transportation

Convoy system:

When Palestinian trucks enter Israel from west bank or Gaza, they must obtain special permits, which are rarely granted to merchants, and Gaza Strip trucks must go out with a convoy system and Israeli escort them until the shipment port. This limits the trade process due to the lack of permits, a material and moral burden on the merchant, and the Palestinian goods competitiveness loss whose prices are rising over the normal ones. Palestinian trucks follow the system of unloading and downloading goods at the crossing point gate for Israeli security, which requires waiting for long hours under the sun, which destroys and spoils

goods especially agricultural products, in addition to the exorbitant costs which the Palestinian merchant incurs.

Palestinian merchants are prohibited from using passenger planes for cargo, as in the case with the Israeli merchant, because they are cheaper and travel in all directions, unlike shipping planes, which add new burdens to the Palestinian merchants and this breaches Paris Agreement according to reciprocate. (Ministry of National Economy, 2005)

3. Restrictions on security checks

Israel's security policy is to tighten the procedures at the crossings, leading to destroy goods and to raise the cost. One of these measures is using sharp tools which destroy products, especially the agricultural ones, where they deliberately destroy the packaging, which in turn leads to the goods destruction. Moreover, the goods exported from the Gaza Strip are subjected to inspection: the first is at the Karni crossing and the other at the cargo crossing.

4. Restrictions on the clearance of goods

A. Israeli customs do not recognize the European-Palestinian agreement, which exempts Palestinian imports from custom costs. Therefore, the Palestinian merchant must either bring his goods according to the Israeli-European agreement and this will delay the importation or pay for all that is owed to the Israeli custom department.

B. The Palestinian merchant should sign on a pledge at all the crossing points certifying that his goods will only be sold in the Palestinian Authority's areas. Such a pledge is not

signed by the Israeli merchant, and this is a clear breach of the Paris Protocol of goods free movement between the West Bank and Israel.

C. Palestinians are not allowed to follow shipments directly into Israeli ports and airports, but through an authorized Israeli agent to carry out clearance fees.

D. Customs assessment: The price provided for in the statement is often reassessed and carried out randomly and without reference to real standards, and the cost raising rate causes higher prices for imported goods.

5. Limitations in the Israeli standards requirement: The imported Palestinian goods must have a "Tech" certificate, i.e., the Israeli specifications approval for letting the goods in. This brings a major obstacle to trade as:

A. Israeli specifications are higher than international standards and are often difficult to obtain.

B. Israeli specifications do not take into account the Palestinian market requirements. The Israeli specifications do not recognize the European or American examination certificate, but the examination must be done at the Palestinian Standards Institute at the importation time, which adds additional expenses to the Palestinian merchant, the examination fees are relatively high and postpone the clearance process.

C. The examination results of the Palestinian side take a long time, may reach months, while the Israeli merchant gets his results within days.

In many cases, the Palestinian merchant is pushed to import through an Israeli dealer to avoid all the previous hinders.

6. Restrictions on which countries are allowed to import

The Palestinian merchant is not allowed to import from countries that do not have diplomatic relations with Israel, especially some Arab countries, from which imports may be cheaper than other countries.

In a statement of Dr. Mohammad Ashtayeh, head of the Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction (PECDAR), the annual Palestinian treasury losses exceed 300 million dollars due to lack of control over the border and crossings. (Ashtayeh, 2016)

3.2.5 Military barriers and iron gates

The Israeli army is currently establishing 48 permanent military checkpoints and encircling with soldiers inside West Bank. 28 of these checkpoints are in front of the Green Line. The Israeli army also maintains 12 permanent checkpoints in Hebron.

In addition, there are seven control and watchtowers built by the Israeli army, through which soldiers monitor the population movement without any intervention. In some cases, these checkpoints are fortified by soldiers or closed to passers-by.

The Israel defense army also maintains hundreds of obstacles, such as placing concrete blocks or tunnels that prevent residents from leaving or reaching their towns. (B'Tselem I, 2017)

Moreover, the iron gates in the villages' entrances become large prisons. Iron gates and military barriers are challenges facing the Palestinian economy. They hinder the movement of individuals and goods and hinder the movement of patients, students and parents, thus affecting all aspects of Palestinian economic and social life.

3.3 blockade of the Gaza Strip

Israel has imposed a suffocating blockade on the Gaza Strip since 2006 after Hamas won the legislative elections; this blockade increased after Hamas had taken control of the Gaza strip in 2007, imposing a land, air and sea blockade on the strip.

Gaza strip is located in the south-west of Palestine, in the form of a narrow strip in the southern region of the historic Mediterranean coast of Palestine, and its name is from its largest city, Gaza, the second largest Palestinian town after Jerusalem.

The strip covers an area of 360 square kilometers, 41 kilometers long and 6 to 12 kilometers wide. It is bordered by the state of Israeli occupation to the north and east and the Mediterranean to the west, while Egypt is bordered by the south-west.

The Gaza Strip did deeply suffered from the wars of Israel in 2008, 2012 and 2014. Today, Gaza is a major prison in which its people suffer from difficult economic conditions; the percent of poverty, unemployment, the disruption of electricity, and pollution of water have increased. The following is an illustration of the main Siege consequences of the Gaza Strip:

1. Unemployment

The blockade which has been imposed on the Gaza Strip since 2006, coupled with successive wars on the strip, led to a catastrophic rise in unemployment, a destruction of many industrial facilities preventing the export of agricultural and other products from Gaza, the Individuals free movement, and the bringing many goods and products into Gaza. In addition to the separation between Gaza and the West Bank, and the inability of the public sector to absorb new employees into high unemployment rates making Gaza strip as one of the world's most high unemployment rates.

A human rights study issued by the Al Mezan Center for Human Rights showed that unemployment rates in the Gaza Strip rose to 46.6%, among youth (60%) and among women (85%). (Al Mezan, 2018)

In a World Bank study summarized that the persistence of the restrictions regime imposed by Israel, and the continuous internal separation between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, is not expected to revive the private sector activity, and the real growth rate of gross domestic product is expected to be between 1.7% - 1.9% from 2018 to 2020. This level of growth indicates a decline in the average per capita real income by more than 2% and an increase in the unemployment rate to 35% by the year 2020. (Bank, 2018)

The persistence of an increasing rise in unemployment threatens to create a real catastrophe. It is stated that unemployment is the root of all difficulties and a waste of the young people energies, who are the basis of the economy development and advancement.

2. Poverty

According to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, the poverty rate in Gaza Strip was 53%, while the extreme poverty was 33.8%. (Statistics, 2018)

This percentage illustrates the tragedy of Gaza Strip, with more than half the population of the Gaza Strip are poor, and according to UNRWA about 80% of families depend on food assistance. Recent UNRWA data indicate that more than 300,000 refugees in Gaza live below the extreme poverty line and are unable to meet their basic nutritional needs. (UNRWA, 2018)

The successive blockade of Gaza Strip and the consequent rise in unemployment as a result of the disruption of vital production sectors, coupled with the pressure on UNRWA by the occupation and USA administration are pushing Gaza strip to an unknown fate, as the majority of Gaza strip population are refugees, and the increase in the population density exceeding 5000 per square kilometer and the higher average number of families, all of these factors make Gaza Strip a disaster area in which development plans are not feasible, but they need rescue plans to reduce the percentage of poverty and unemployment.

3. Water

According to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, only 11% of the population of the Gaza Strip have a safe source of drinking. (Statistics, 2018)

According to the latest tests carried out by the Environmental Quality Authority for the situation of the Gaza Strip shores, 73% of the beaches are highly contaminated because of

the flowing of more than 110,000 cubic meters of untreated wastewater due to power outages, according to the World Health Organization, swimming in sewage contaminated water causes upper respiratory infections, eye and ear infections, nasal and skin cavity, and gastrointestinal infections for those who swallow this water while swimming. Only 4% of the municipalities' wells in Gaza Strip are permitted to be used by the World Health Organization (WHO), and these figures indicate that the Gaza Strip suffers from a water quality disaster. (Authority, 2018)

The water situation in Gaza is disastrous, where pollution reaching more than 98%, and the coastal aquifer is the renewable source of water through rainwater, but the water consumption rate is three times higher than that of renewable water. (Environment, 2013).

Water is the lifeblood of human societies, and some thinkers and economists argue that future wars will be on water sources, and water is one of the most important bases of development.

4. Electricity Sector

One of the most complicated crises affecting Gaza's life is the electricity. The start of the crisis began in 2006 when Israel bombed the only power plant in Gaza Strip, leading to a complete halt to that plant. Despite partial repair of the plant in 2009, Gaza still suffers from a severe electricity crisis. Gaza Strip relies on three main sources of electricity:

A. Power plant: It can provide maximum output capacity of 70 megawatt if all generators are running.

B. Israeli power lines which can provide up to 120 megawatt.

C. Egyptian lines that can provide up to 23 megawatts of energy, these lines are heavily affected and need permanent maintenance.

According to the Gaza electricity distribution company, Gaza strip's needs of the electric power currently stands at 450 megawatt, of which 120 MW is available (26.7%). Only as the deficit reached 330 megawatt (73.3%). The effects of the electricity crisis in Gaza are as follows:

1. Health sector: The Ministry of Health has been forced to reduce its diagnostic and supportive services, due to the worsening of the electricity crisis and the severe shortage of fuel for operating hospital generators, and the electricity crisis has led to the closure of some hospitals and health centers for more than one time.

2. The water sector: Water cuts for periods of up to four days in many areas. According to the Coastal Municipalities Water Utility (CMWU), the continuation of the crisis is bad for reducing the works of water wells and pumping stations to 60% and desalination plants to 80% of their capacity. The electricity outage for long periods affects water supply to homes causing difficulties of pumping water to the higher floors, in the event of water availability, due to the inability to operate the pumps.

3. Sewage Sector: The power outage has had negative effects on sewage services in Gaza strip. This has led to water pollution in many areas. Municipal Water Utility has not been able to treat the wastewater before it is pumped into the sea water. Sewage can never be treated within 4 or 6 hours of the availability of electricity safely, in addition, the cessation

of sewage water pumps leads to a rash of sewage in the streets causing a health distress and diseases

4. Education sector: The suffering of students, especially high school students, is due to the power outage for more than 12 hours. The power failure also makes it difficult to communicate among schools, directorates and the ministry of Education, especially in computerized programs, bulletins, instructions, preparation, printing exams and operating the ministry building and directorates.

5. Industrial and commercial sector: The worsening crisis of electricity led to the work deterioration in the industrial establishments relying on the production mechanism of electric power, the commercial establishments reduced its working hours; this led to higher prices due to the high cost resulting from using alternative methods to obtain electricity.

6. Agricultural sector: The interruption of electricity stopped the work of hundreds of water wells, the lack of water for irrigation damaged many crops, keeping agricultural products in refrigerators until they are exported or distributed is a notable difficulty, and the continuous interruption of electric current on livestock, poultry and fish in all stages of breeding, production and consumption is another difficulty.

The worsening electricity crisis in the Gaza Strip affected all aspects of life in a direct and indirect way; the psychological and social damage, and the human losses because of using alternative methods to provide a source of lighting and heating; this makes electricity unresolved problem in Gaza because of the blockade which was imposed on the Gaza Strip 10 years ago.

5. Industry Sector

The industrial sector is one of the most important bases of development at present. It is one of the most active sectors of the labor force. The industrial sector in the Gaza Strip suffers as the other sectors do. The problems that the industrial sector suffers from, as a result of the siege imposed on the sector, can be summarized as follows:

A. About 90% of the industrial establishments in Gaza Strip depend on raw materials imported from Israel or abroad across the Israeli border. The continuous closure and the prohibition of entry of some raw materials disrupt many industrial establishments.

B. The disruption of bringing industrial machinery and spare parts to factories led to many industrial establishments closure.

C. Most of the brick factories are idle as a result of the significant reduction in the cement coming into the strip.

D. Destruction of the furniture industry which was employing a large number of workers preventing it from exporting or bringing raw materials.

E. The destruction of the sewing sector which employed a large number of workers as a result of the export moratorium period.

F. Destruction of many industrial facilities as a result of destroying wars targeting population of Gaza strip.

The economic development without the existence of a strong industrial sector, which is capable of operating creatively, is merely an attempt that will not lead to anything. The

targeting of the industrial sector in Gaza is either by direct means or by preventing the import of raw materials and the export of industrial products will lead high unemployment and investment to escape from this sector.

6. Agriculture Sector

Gaza Strip is famous for some agricultural crops that were considered to be one of the most important branches of the agricultural sector, which is the cultivation of ground berries, flowers, and other types of vegetables and fruits. The siege of Gaza strip has devastating effects on the agriculture sector which can be summarized as follows:-

A. Preventing the export of agricultural products only at a limited extent leading to a decline in the number of workers and lower prices of agricultural products because of the high supply and low purchasing power of the population.

B. Preventing those who to invest from bringing fertilizers and pesticides to Gaza strip, which have affected agricultural productivity.

C. The fishing space in the Gaza Sea has been minimized affecting negatively fishermen's incomes and providing fish at an acceptable price.

D. The power deficit resulted in the inability to draw water from wells, which affected the ability to irrigate crops and led to a decrease in the area of cultivated land.

E. The collapse of the poultry sector as a result of low prices and poor purchasing power of Gaza citizens led to the debts accumulation of poultry farmers and their reluctance to continue work in this sector.

F. The success of the agricultural sector is one of the most important pillars of the national economy and the continuous blockade of the sector makes the development of the agricultural sector almost impossible.

G. In addition to the above mentioned sectors, the construction sector suffers from major problems as a result of preventing construction materials from being brought except in a limited way and on the head of them are cement and iron leading to the decline of the reconstruction process because of the Israeli wars; the inability of the construction sector to keep up with the increase in the numbers of the population led to a fictional rise in apartment prices in the Gaza Strip.

7. Tourism Sector

The closure of the border with the Gaza Strip has stopped the tourism sector for good, as a result the contribution of the tourism sector of Gaza Strip to the Palestinian national income has become zero.

3.4 Separation Wall

3.4.1 Introduction

On June 23, 2002, following the al-Aqsa Intifada, Israel began construction of a wall along the Green Line to prevent Palestinians from entering into Israel on the pretext of security reasons (according to Israel's claim, but the truth was not so).

The wall was built to form a border barrier in most areas of an electronic fence that cut roads on both sides of the fence and extended barbed wires and dug channels. The width of

this obstacle is about 60 meters. In areas such as Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Qalqilya and Tulkarm, Israel constructed a concrete wall of 8-9 meters in height and a total length about 70 kilometers.

The barrier route is 712 kilometers - including its parts which were still under construction as planned. That is, the length of the wall is more than double the length of the green line of 320 kilometers. If Israel completes the construction of the separation wall along the entire specified route, it will deduct 526,677 thousands dunums of West Bank land - constituting 9.4% of the total area of the West Bank - including the areas annexed by Israel and the Jerusalem municipality. ((B'Tselem), 2017)

In September 2017, Israel completed construction of approximately 65 % of it, according to data from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). The route of the wall is approximately 460 km and there is another 53 km of the track under construction (approximately 7.5%) and an additional 200 kilometers. (B'Tselem), 2017)

Specifications of the wall

The width of the wall is between 60 and 150 meters in some locations. This area includes buffer zones along with streets on both sides of the wall for the occupation to use creating a separation distance, where the height of the wall is 8 meters.

The wall consists of:

1. Barbed wires.
2. The trench reaches four meters deep, has the same size of width, and aims at preventing the vehicles and pedestrians from passing.
3. Road for police cars.
4. A soil road covered with sand to reveal the traces.
5. Electrical fence with concrete wall up to 8 meters high.
6. Double paved road for monitoring patrols.
7. Observation towers equipped with cameras and sensors.

Completing the separation wall is expected to isolate 733 square kilometers of Palestinian land that will be inside the wall and thus be under the occupation. It will also isolate about 200 kilometers from Al Aghwar, which is the Palestinian food basket and the main source of food. It is the area on the eastern side of Palestine. The Wall runs through eight Palestinian cities with 180 neighborhoods. (The Palestinian Information Center, 2018)

3.4.2 The effects of the Separation Wall

1. Impact on daily life and movement freedom

The wall passes through the West Bank, meaning that it will affect the life of 210,000 Palestinians living in 67 West Bank villages and towns. 13 regions of 11,700 Palestinians will find themselves in the area between the Green Line and the Wall. The existence of a

double wall, another wall that is in depth for the separation wall, will create a security belt area, which will make 19 population groups inhabited by 128,500 Palestinians trapped in isolated areas and outposts. It is estimated that about one million Palestinians in the occupied territories will lose their basic rights due to the Wall, as thousands of them will have to obtain special permits from the occupation to continue living and moving from their homes to their lands. (The Palestinian Information Center, 2018).

The Wall will make separation among some communities, some of them are on east of the wall and others on west, separating families from each other and preventing the residents of the eastern part of the wall from visiting their relatives or accessing freely to their agricultural land except through special permits and gates in the wall.

According to a report prepared by the National Information Center in Information Service indicating that the Wall will isolate 126 Palestinian population gatherings, and the population of other 47 communities is 18,396 people, who will be trapped between both main and secondary walls. (National Information Center, 2004)

2. Impact on the agricultural sector

The agricultural sector is considered to be one of the most affected sectors as a result of the construction of the Separation Wall as follows:

A. Expropriating tens of thousands of fertile farmland dunums

Some 229,000 dunums of agricultural land were razed and 238,350 dunums were uprooted. In 71 villages, farmers will be separated from their land behind the Wall. These lands contain 701,000 fruit trees, olives and other trees. (National Information Center, 2004).

B. The farmers' inability to access to their lands

Following the construction of the wall, Israel isolated tens of thousands of dunums of agricultural land on west of the wall and restricted the farmers' access to their land, where they were required to obtain permits which were subject to many conditions; such as a lack of security reasons. The applicant for the permit, who does not own the land, is required to prove that the family kinship with the owner of the land as a certificate of legacy, a lease or documents certifying that he works in the land as a worker. What is more complicated is the number of gates and what times they allow Palestinians to pass taking into consideration that some gates have become seasonal.

Israel considers about a quarter of all applicants in the region "prohibited to enter their territory" as "security suspects". This prohibition is considered to be a violation of International document on economic, social and cultural rights. Article 6: The occupying state shall respect the right to work and livelihood of the inhabitants of the occupied territories. There are only five agricultural gates open to the movement of farmers out of the 12 gates identified in the notification of the permit system. The freedom of farmers' movement is restricted through opening the gates two or three times a day, not more, and most times not more than an hour and a half a day. These restrictions increase difficulties on the work of the agricultural sector. (B'Tselem, 2004)

C. The inability to bring agricultural equipment and tools into the land west of the wall, where Israel prevents farmers from having agricultural equipment needed to look after the land such as agricultural tractors and the leaflets, which impede the ability to do so before getting the permission format to insert them.

D. Control of water which led to the isolation of groundwater, spring water, and wells used to irrigate the plantations.

3. Demolition of houses

In a report by the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the occupied territories in 2008, Israel demolished about 166 houses located close to the route of the Separation Wall, according to civil administration data show that demolition was applied to additional 754 homes. This is to eliminate the possibility of urban expansion of some communities adjacent to the wall. (B'Tselem, 2008)

4. The impact on the industrial and commercial sector

These effects can be summarized as follows:

A. Direct destruction of commercial and industrial establishments.

B. Lower sales, especially for citizens inside the Green Line.

C. The difficulty of transporting products inside the governorates and to Israel as a result of the meticulous inspections of the Israeli crossings established along the wall, thus increasing the economic cost.

D. Increasing the trade deficit between Israel and the Palestinian territories as bringing Palestinian products and goods to the Israeli market requires special permits, security procedures that increase the Palestinian product cost, while the Palestinian market is open to the Israeli product.

5. Impact on education and health sectors

Many students have been deprived from accessing to their schools, which has affected the educational process in many schools, including East Barta'a, Umm al-Rayhan, Al-Faruq, Jenin, Tulkarm, and the Ras Tira School in Qalqilya.

According to a survey conducted by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), 3.4% of the Palestinian population in the communities affected by the Wall dropped out of education because of insecurity and the wall of annexation and expansion, (5.3% live west of the wall and 3.1% live east of the wall), 26.0% of Palestinian residents who left school in communities affected by the wall have left school because of the poor economic situation of their families (31.7% west of the wall, 25.2% east of the wall).

The results of the survey also revealed that 81.5% of the Palestinian families in the communities affected by the wall, who have individuals enrolled in higher education, took alternative ways to reach the university or college attempting to overcome the difficulties they face (81.1% east of the wall) and 81.6% of the students were forced to leave the university for several days due to the closure of the area (77.9% west of the wall and 81.6% east of the wall).

In the health sector, the wall has had a significant impact on the healthy conditions of the Palestinian population living west of the wall; access to health centers and hospitals east of the wall is sometimes impossible, as Palestinian villages west of the wall do not have any medical services.

A survey conducted by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics showed that 43% of the families surveyed reported that there was an obstruction of ambulance traffic, which was carried out by roadblocks erected on the separation wall. 69% of the families in the respondents could not pay treatment expenses, due to the economic difficulties they faced. (WAFA, 2018)

6. Impact on Manpower

The construction of the Wall has left many workers out of work in Israel, where iron gates and crossings have been established and they are prohibited to enter until special permits have been obtained. In many cases, Israel refuses to grant such permits at the pretext of security prevention, in addition to the frequent closures of these crossings.

The isolation of agricultural land on west of the Wall has led many workers to lose their jobs as a result of Israeli arrogance and lack of access to work in this sector. The construction of the Wall has led to a decline in the commercial situation in some areas, which has led many workers to accept either reduction in their wages or work-leaving.

7. Impact on tourism and antiquities sector

The Apartheid Wall has caused a genuine harm of the tourism and antiquities sector, including archaeological sites and the tourist movement; reports indicate that the wall will swallow many Palestinian historical sites, especially in Bethlehem, Jerusalem, and Hebron. Dozens of archaeological sites were also annexation victims due to the wall wrapping around Jerusalem, which allowed the occupation authorities excavation teams to conduct urgent techniques, which did not comply with the scientific norms of the archaeological work; the site (Sawanat Salah) located east of Abu Dis, and the perimeter of the Bilal bin Rabah Mosque, the Islamic cemetery, exposed to these procedures.

The Israeli Wall and procedures also separated the cities of Bethlehem and Jerusalem from the other governorates of the country, the two cities, which are the main tourist attracting landmarks in Palestine. The gold site located north of Jenin, which has relics from the Roman and Byzantine period. The wall also caused a faltering of tourist movement among cities in the north and south, especially the cities of Nazareth, Ramallah, Nablus and Jenin, the isolation of the Jericho and the Dead Sea. In addition to the annexation and destruction of dozens of archaeological sites, most notably the ancient water springs, and the archaeological ruins in the area of Husan, west of Bethlehem. The Israeli closure of Jerusalem and Bethlehem has also reduced the tourist movement in Bethlehem; Thousands of Palestinian families have lost their economic income, especially as 65% of families in Bethlehem depend on their income from tourism. (Wafa, 2018)

3.5 Control of Palestinian Resources

5.1.1 Water control

The effects of the occupation on the water sector in the Palestinian territories can be summarized in three aspects:

First: Control of water sources

Following Israel's occupation of the rest of the Palestinian territories in the 1967 war, its forces took full control on Palestinian water resources, issuing a number of military orders, the first of which was before the end of military operations on the 7th of June, 1967. All powers over water in the West Bank West Bank and Gaza Strip were under the Israeli military governor's supervision, who issued a series of military orders including:

1. Order No. 92 dated 15/8/1967, which provides a water officer, appointed by the Israeli courts, with full powers to control all water matters.
2. Order No. 158 of 19/8/1967, which demands that any new water structures must be strictly prohibited without an Israeli permit, and the water officer shall have the right to refuse any license without giving convincing reasons.
3. Order No. 291 of 1967, which stipulates that all water sources in the Palestinian territories became the property of the State in accordance with Israeli law in 1959.
4. Military Order No. 948, which requires that every citizen in the Gaza Strip must obtain the Israeli military ruler's approval if he wants to implement any water project, in addition to the orders No. 457, 72, 715, 77, 1336, 91.

The Israeli procedures in controlling over the water sources explain in the follow table

Table 3.10: Israeli Procedures in controlling over the water sources

NO	Israeli Procedures	Region
1	Israeli violations of the shared surface watercourses	A. Israeli violations of the rights of the Palestine State in the course of the Jordan River basin. B. Israeli violation in the basin of the Tiberias Lake. C. Israeli violations of Palestinian rights in the West Bank seasonal waterways D. Violation of Palestinian water rights in the Gaza valley basin E. Violation of Palestinian water rights in the Dead Sea Basin
2	Israeli Violations of Palestinian Rights in Common Aquifers	A. Western Basin B. Northeast Basin C. Eastern Basin D. Coastal aquifer E. Carmel Basin

Second: Israeli risks to water consumption and decrease

Israel consumes Palestinian water in the West Bank and Gaza Strip excessively without taking into account the water balance between annual feeding and annual consumption. Israel also uses 85% of the water in the West Bank aquifer, which is equivalent to 483 million cubic meters and another 10 million of the Gaza Strip. These quantities cover 25% of Israel's water needs. Israel's excessive consumption of Palestinian water has led to a sharp decline and imbalance between the annual feeding of the aquifer and water daily use.

Third: Israeli risks to water pollution

The excessive pumping of groundwater has increased salinity in the aquifer, such as the water leak of the upper the high salinity system to freshwater areas. Studies indicated that an increase in salinity over that is internationally recommended (50 mg / L) in 27.2% of the West Bank. In addition, nitrates pollute many water sources. In Tulkarm, the percentage of water saved by nitrate pollution is only 27%, while in Qalqilya it drops to 23%. Nitrate levels are higher than 50 mg / L in 14% of wells water. At the end, the percentage of water contaminated with alkaline layers reaches 85%.

The proportion of salts of the Jordan River reached 5,000 ppm, up from 600 ppm in 1925. Chloride has increased to 1365 mg / L in the Jericho area during the last 20 years after it was 24 mg/L.

3.5.2 Quarries and gravel

The decision to build six quarries in the West Bank is the first of the Israeli civil administration's work in this direction, and many quarries were subsequently built. After closing many quarries and the depletion of the stock, which was accompanied with the settlement expansion in the West Bank, to increase the work of stone extraction and the gravel production, and the flow of stones from the West Bank of quarries controlled by the "civil administration" to contribute to the revival of the market construction and architectural one.

In a testimony of a civil administration officer, "Israel was generous in operating the quarries. The quarry was decided to do its activities by the civil administration without the

need for tenders. It also used quarries to extract stones in the West Bank to build settlements and to meet 80% of the Israeli needs in the field of construction. (Shehab, 2015)

The quarries built in the occupied Palestinian territories through which the Israeli economy is making cheap profits and cost without polluting the areas where Israelis are in, and without constant noise that disturbs them because of their proximity to populated Palestinian areas. Ten quarries in the West Bank produce 44 million tons of building materials, and the bulk of these products go to the Israeli market leading to a net income of the Israeli economy.

There are seven Israeli military bulldozers operating in the vicinity of Hebron Governorate, built on approximately 3,500 dunums of its land which is classified (C) Area, which is under Israeli control. The first is the "Schaffer Crusher", which was established in 1948 in 300 dunums of Surif area, the latest was the Kisan Crusher, which was established on the Sa'ir town with an area of 120 dunums, the largest of which is "Kfar Giladi" in the Al-Dhahiriya area, covering an area of 1230 dunums.

The director of the Environment Authority in Hebron Bahjat Jabarin points out that "these crushers are distributed as follows: three in the area of Al-Dhahiriya, and one between Doorra and Ethna, and one in each of Beit Oula, and Surif, and the seventh in the region of Sair".

The Environment Authority estimates that the volume of natural resources depleted by the seven quarries of all their productive types amount to 1,240,000 tons per month, an estimated \$ 134 million a year, only of Palestinian natural resources, from Hebron alone. In

the context of using heavy equipment, tools and explosives, and in the absence of restrictions and control, these facilities are a direct threat to the citizens' lives, as in the Saïr area, where the bombings in the "Kisan Crusher," is not far from the citizens' homes more than 150 meters to cause cracks in their homes and wells, regardless of the dust and the remnants effects of the extraction and manufacturing process, especially that part of these crushers followed by asphalt and concrete plants destroying agricultural lands and natural pastures, polluting groundwater, and a series of endless negative effects. (arab48, 2018)

The Israeli occupation prevents the Palestinians from opening new quarries at a time of encouraging Israeli companies to do so. According to the director of the Palestinian Institute for Applied Research, Dr. Gad Ishaq, he has estimated that the Israeli companies loot \$ 570 million of stone and marble a year. (Pal info, 2015).

In a report to UNCTAD, the losses resulting from the Israeli confiscation of the construction stone in (C) Area were estimated at about \$ 900 million a year, about 7% of the gross domestic product. (UNCTAD, 2016)

3.5.3 Oil and natural gas

In the Gaza Strip, a natural gas field was discovered off the Gaza coast in 1998; however, no gas has been extracted from this field. It is expected that Palestine would begin to produce gas from the Gaza field in 2017, and there is a preliminary agreement to extract this gas with the British company "British Gas".

As a result, the occupation is causing the Palestinian economy to lose about \$ 4 billion annually due to the prevention of natural gas extraction from the Gaza Strip shores. Some

experts also believe that one of the most important reasons behind Israel's destructive war on the Gaza Strip, and its insistence on perpetuating the blockade, is its greed in the Gaza gas field, or the Palestinian use for its vast gas wealth, quality development at all economic and infrastructural levels, and most importantly, the release of dependence on the Israeli economy.

In the West Bank, an oil field was discovered in the Rantis area (west of Ramallah), but Israel is exploiting this field and pumping 800 barrels per day away from the Palestinian National Authority, thus robbing these Palestinian rights. This area is located near the western border of Ramallah and is close to the armistice line of 1948, and Israel began selling from the oil field, which was called 'glory 5' between 2010 and 2011. (The storage is estimated at more than 1.5 billion barrels of oil in this field, and 182 billion cubic feet of gas, the total value of which is estimated at more than \$ 155 billion.

Israel has done its best to search for oil along the Green Line between Qalqilya and Ramallah since 1992. There is an Israeli plan to dig forty wells, including 26 wells to extract oil and gas together, and the rest to extract oil only, and there are maps showing the locations of these wells and the extension of the actual field to the West Bank as confirmed by international studies. (Shehab, 2015)

3.5.4 Fishery Resources

Gaza Strip has been subject to a comprehensive sea blockade, which has had a major impact on the fishery resources and fishing sector. Despite the fact that the Gaza Strip has a 45-kilometer coast extending from north to south of the Gaza Strip, Israel has imposed

blockade on the sea, and even the Gaza port was destroyed only since the Al-Aqsa Intifada, and the Israeli naval boats did not stop pursuing them.

The decline in the number of fishermen from 10 thousand fishermen to about 3,400, and 2,000 workers in jobs related to fishing, such as the boats manufacture and maintenance, lost their livelihood, and 95% of them relied on international aids, and the deterioration of the amount of the average fishing storage declined from 3,650 tons in 1999 to 1,938 tons in 2012, which means that Israeli restrictions cause a loss about 47% of fish wealth annually. (Shehab, 2015)

3.5.5 Wealth of the Dead Sea

World Bank sources estimated that if the Palestinians were allowed to use only their natural resources in Dead Sea minerals, they would earn an annual income of \$ 918 million, distributed as follows:

\$ 624 million in potash extraction, \$ 276 million in bromine extraction, Dead Sea mud. Several Israeli companies have also been granted concessions for the exploitation of the Dead Sea mud, and have set up the company on the West Coast, Including the West coast of the West Bank of the Dead Sea, which is 45 km long, has approximately 50 cosmetic production plants, and the annual income of this company has been estimated at \$150 million in addition to the extraction of salts. (Mustafa, 2016).

3.6 Paris Economic Agreement (Paris Economic Protocol)

3.6.1 Introduction

This agreement was signed on 29/04/1994 and this protocol establishes the contractual agreement governing the economic relations between the Palestinian and Israeli sides. This agreement will cover the West Bank and the Gaza Strip during the transitional period. It is the economic annex to Oslo Convention which was signed between the two sides on 13/09/1993.

Some economists consider this agreement having negative implications which are responsible for affecting the economic conditions in the Palestinian territories, restricting the Palestinian economy and deepening the reality of Palestinian economy dependence on the Israeli one. Although this agreement is a case like the Oslo Convention, it should have been a five-year interim agreement ending in May month of 1999, but it still stands for the time being.

3.6.2 The main obstacles imposed by the Paris Economic Agreement on the possibility of the Palestinian economy growth and development

The Palestinian researcher Mohammed Khader Quresh in his article “The Palestinian economy and the Paris Economic Agreement” in the Arab Ambassador Newspaper on 31/3/2016 clarifies an important summary of the main obstacles imposed by the Paris Economic Agreement on the possibility of the Palestinian economy growth and development. They can be summarized as follows: (Quresh, 2016)

1. The Palestinian economy cannot deal, import or export from countries where Israel does not have political or commercial relations or at war with, so this convention deprives it from dealing or associating with some 48 countries in the world whose goods may be cheaper and better than Israeli ones.
2. The Palestinian economy cannot deal or expand the export and import of the services sector requirements (electricity and telecommunications) without the Israel prior consent. Practically, Israel prohibits the private sector institutions from importing, installing or transferring the equipment necessary for producing the electricity and telecommunication network without its consent. It continued to disrupt the introduction of equipment for a cellular telecommunications company into the Gaza Strip and did not agree to provide third-generation devices to Palestinian companies. Although Palestine has its own international number among world countries, it is possible for any caller from outside Palestine to contact with any number in Palestine through the Israeli international number as well.
3. All crossings, borders, foreign investment, and trade and individual movement to and from Palestine are fully controlled by Israel.
4. Palestinian foreign trade is fully subjected to Israeli standards and specifications, investors, importers and exporters alike cannot deal with any goods that are not applicable to Israeli specifications.

5. The limits of the production base expansion are restricted and confined to the “ A ” and “ B ” areas, whereas it is prohibited for investors and the private sector to extend their production and commercial activities to “ C ” area which is about 62 % of the West Bank.

6. The establishment and construction of seaports or airports or the so-called the economy facilities infrastructure are prohibited. All goods that are exported and imported through Israeli ports and airports are under Israeli authorities control and there is always an inspection at crossings and bridges in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

7. The Palestinian economy is prohibited from dealing freely with Jerusalem, producing, exporting and importing goods, as this is applied to the rest of the occupied cities of Palestine in 1948. The importance of this point stems from the fact that the governorate of Jerusalem contributes to approximately 15 % of the Palestinian GDP.

8. Palestinian foreign trade is subject to a single custom envelope with Israel, which affects the products prices in the domestic market. Imported goods into Palestine have the same situation, customs and taxes as those levied on Israeli imports. The seriousness of this comes from the fact that there are significant differences in the standards of living and incomes between Israel and Palestine, which are reflected in the poor purchasing dealings, consumption and sales movement in the Palestinian market, and thus in the overall economic development process.

9. Israel collects customs revenues of goods directly and keeps them before transferring them to the Palestinian Authority treasury after 3 % deduction for tax and management

fees. In many cases, these funds are frozen and rejected to be converted under different pretexts which have no legal basis.

10. Palestinian foreign trade is restricted not only by Israeli specifications and standards but also by quantities. Palestinians are not entitled to import sugar, rice, oil and other food items over a certain ceiling that is discussed every six months by the sub-commission.

11. The Paris Economic Agreement is entirely devoid of any provision giving Palestinians the right to re-export goods, and there are many mechanisms to follow for doing that.

12. Palestinian imports and exports are subject to highly complex security and customs procedures, which delay trade flow with the world making them cost a lot in terms of the amount of money and take a long time for goods to reach their final destination, which drives businessmen and merchants to import and export to and from Israel only avoiding the extraordinary complexities of Palestinian foreign trade. Israel has devoted methods, customs, procedures and rules to import and export operations that have made it very difficult for Palestinians to turn to other countries to import or export goods, which has affected the values of Palestinian imports and exports from and to Israel comparing with other countries.

It is not surprising that, after all, the average Palestinian imports from Israel are 68 %, while the proportion of Palestinian exports to Israel is about 90 % for the period from 1996 to the end of 2014.

13. All the disadvantages of the Israeli economy, especially inflation, are turned directly into the Palestinian economy without the presence or availability of the possibility of reducing them or their implications.

14. The failure to agree with the occupation authorities to obtain the share of Palestine in what is known as the Seignorage of Shekels in the Palestinian territories, which is the return or revenue obtained from the issuance of the Israeli currency. Studies have estimated it at about \$ 60 million as an annual average until 2009, and another estimation says its value is over \$ 80 million as an annual average. This deprives the Palestinian treasury from having estimated between 1200 - 1600 million dollars, from 1995 until the end of 2014.

15. Setting ceilings for what the Bank of Israel can accept from the shekels, including the commercial banks operating under its authority, on the grounds that there are money laundering operations taking place in the Palestinian territories.

16. False growth based on an inaccurate scale (per capita income and growth rate of GDP) cannot be applied to Palestine since it is under occupation and not an independent sovereign state. International institutions have taken this measure and promoted it, promising the success of the "economic solution" away or in isolation from the political and national solution. In fact, this has caused huge differences and major imbalances in the income structure, which has gradually increased from 1 to 30, leading to the deterioration of the status, and even affected the Palestinian middle class on the political and economic situation.

Chapter Four

Results and discussion

4.1 Discussion

A. Development Theories and the Palestinian Reality

When return to development theories and try to link it to the Palestinian situation, the economic development theories that came after World War II to analyze the situation of underdeveloped countries, which focused on two directions, the first analyzes the reasons for the failure of developing countries to achieve development and progress and the other analyzes the factors that lead to growth and development.

Although the Palestinian situation is unique, the Israeli occupation is now an expansionist occupation based on denying the other and depriving him of his rights, However, despite the difficulty of linking development theories to the Palestinian economy as a result, when analyzing development theories, the most important theories close to the Palestinian reality are

1. Big push theory

Its idea discusses a need for a big push or a large intensive programme of a minimum investment formula to overcome the obstacles facing development and cause the economy to be self-grown.

investors and providing the right environment for them, which will reflect positively on the Palestinian economy by providing job opportunities and reducing unemployment.

This requires considerable effort due to the obstacles imposed by the occupation.

2. The theory of the International Dependency Revolution

This theory holds that the underdeveloped countries are surrounded by a set of institutional and economic factors, both domestic and international, which impede development.

According to this theory, the dependence of the countries of the ocean to the countries of the Center makes the process of achieving development impossible.

This theory applies to the Palestinian reality, where Israel is besieging the Palestinian economy and making it dependent on it.

According to this theory, development is achieved through the establishment of equal economic relations between the countries of the ocean and the Center countries, which means that the success of any development in the Palestinian territories requires the establishment of equal economic relations between Israel and Palestine.

B. Israeli procedures and development plans in the Palestinian territories

As mentioned in Table 3 its shows that the Palestinian development plans were largely ambitious, which was not helped by the Israeli measures mentioned Previously.

It is necessary to link between Israeli procedures in the Palestinian territories and the extent of the Palestinian development plans' response to these procedures reaching the real impact

of these procedures on the development plans; I will link each of the procedures of the occupation, relate this to the development plans to know the effect of this action on these plans, how these plans dealt with the impact of these procedures and what is required in the future. The most important of these procedures:

First: Settlement

The Israeli settlement today is an obstacle of any real development in the Palestinian territories. The most important points of the settlement can be summarized in the Palestinian development plans as follows:

1. All development plans included the term sovereignty over the Palestinian territories, which the settlement had made impossible to achieve. Sovereignty in the context of settlement is a distant dream. The settlement cut off the Palestinian lands, isolated the city of Jerusalem, and the worst is that sovereignty is now in the hands of the settlers, who are separating the south of the West Bank from its north.
2. The development plans talked about the infrastructure development and services improvement, which are difficult to achieve under the settlements, especially in those areas adjacent to the settlements, where they prevent the expansion master plans of villages and cities; they prevent any work of infrastructure in these areas.
3. Most development plans focused on the advancement of the agricultural sector, which is difficult to achieve under the existed settlements which control the best agricultural land in the surrounding territories, the establishment of some settlements on the main aquifers so

that Israel could produce its settlement agricultural products which are competing with Palestinian ones.

4. Development plans focused on the promotion of the environment, which cannot be achieved in the context of the settlement that is blowing its poison in the Palestinian territory.

5. The development plans dealt with the issue of the Palestinian citizens' safety, which try to make the settlers stay away from them. Settlers today attacked the citizens, threw rocks at their cars, and even the possibility of killing and burning the citizens who drive their vehicles on the main roads, which made personal safety particularly dangerous in the communities surrounding the settlements.

6. The development plans addressed the advancement of Jerusalem, which suffers from the settlements that isolated them from the rest of the Palestinian territories and stole its land.

7. The development plans have talked about attracting investments, which is difficult to achieve in light of the fact that settlements and settlers impose a situation of instability that does not encourage investors to enter the Palestinian territories.

The observer of Israel's system of government knows that the settlers and their representatives have become the ruling force in Israel and the successive governments in Israel are seeking for getting their consent, as the settlers have become an electoral force attracting the Israeli parties with its various orientations.

The actual ruler today in the Palestinian territories is the settlers, who are closing the roads and enjoying the goods of the Palestinian territories, with the support of successive Israeli Governments that have considered the settlements as a fait accompli policy which they are imposing to disrupt any political solution to guarantee their security and economic interests in the Palestinian territories, perhaps one of the most important effects of the settlement is the elimination of any future solutions to the settlement and the inability to attract investors to the Palestinian territories as a result of closing the political horizon

According to the latest data, the number of settlers has quadrupled since Oslo Agreement to 834 thousand after it was 252 thousand settlers in 1993, assuming the continuation of the current situation, the number of settlers will approach one million and half settlers in the next ten years. There is an attempt to instil the spirit into the settlement and settlement plan, which was initiated by former Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, whose goal is to settle 2 million Jews in the West Bank.

According to the interviews conducted for the purposes of this study, Dr. Mohamed Ashtayeh, Chairman of the Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction, PEC DAR and Professor Qasim Awad, Director General of Publishing and Documentation in colonization and wall resistance commission, the future indicators are more pessimistic to continue settlement and seizure of more land.

The successive development plans have been unable to deal with settlements either by halting or limiting them or reducing their catastrophic effects. The continuation of settlements at their current pace means stealing more land and placing West Bank and

Jerusalem under the control of settlers who have become influential in choosing successive Israeli governments.

Second: Security control and direct occupation of the Palestinian territories

A. Control of C areas

Most of the Palestinian development plans dealt with the C areas of particular importance, especially as they constitute 62% of West Bank and the deficiencies in addressing these plans for C areas can be identified as:

1. Development plans talked about developing C areas in general without going into the details and mechanisms of developing these areas.
2. The development plans did not monitor the budgets for the development of these areas.
3. Development plans did not address the development of C areas under Israeli control and obstacles.

C areas that are 62% of the West Bank and inhabited by about 350,000 Palestinians; these areas contain the basic groundwater storage and the key of development, according to Dr. Mohamed Ashtayeh, the development plans concentrated in A areas and neglected many areas such as the Jordan Valley and the H2 area which represents half of Hebron.

The failure to develop a comprehensive development vision for the C areas, how to promote them economically, develop the various sectors in these areas, support the resilience of their people and provide adequate budgets, and the lack of complementarity

between the support of international institutions for these regions and cooperation with local councils made development plans incapable of creating any progress in these areas.

The neglect of C areas in Palestinian development plans threatens the Palestinians' ambition to establish their own state. These areas are two thirds of the West Bank and make the Israeli threat to annex them possible, so these areas need to capture the largest proportion of development plans through promoting detailed objectives to work, in these regions, in the partnership with international institutions, civil society institutions, private sector institutions and local bodies through supporting agriculture, road construction and practicing pressure on occupation to expand the structural plans of local communities, build hospitals and schools, establish Industrial areas, assert land property and drill wells to make these areas a lever for the Palestinian economy.

B. To control the city of Jerusalem;

Jerusalem is the center of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It was the major victim of the Judaization projects that Israel began after the occupation of the rest of Palestine in 1967. The Palestinian National Authority gave Jerusalem a great importance and considered the successive development plans of Jerusalem to be of special importance because of the weakness of the potential and the closure and preventing the Palestinian Authority institutions from working in Jerusalem.

Because of the importance of Jerusalem, the Palestinian government cooperated with Al-Quds University and the Al-Quds Unit in the Presidency to prepare the strategic plan for the sectoral development in Jerusalem for the years 2018-2022 funded by the Islamic

Development Bank, which is composed of several countries, the main contributor is Saudi Arabia. This plan is a step in the right direction. The former plans have been dealt with Jerusalem in general without setting budgets or methodologies, but these plans remain a hostage to the Israeli decision because it is controlling over the ground, but this does not preclude working in any sector that can be worked on and can strengthen the steadfastness of the people in Jerusalem.

Strengthening Jerusalem's people steadfastness needs development plans that are capable of penetrating the Israeli barricade and have large budgets to provide the Jerusalemites with the potential for their building, steadfastness, education and promoting a culture of affiliation and internationalizing the issue of Jerusalem.

C. Control of Al Aghwar area

According to Dr. Mohammed Ashtayeh, the Palestinian development plans neglected Al Aghwar area. This means neglecting the Palestinian food basket and neglecting about a quarter of the West Bank.

Israel has isolated Al Aghwar area, where Israel controls more than half of it as military areas, the demolition and displacement of Bedouin communities in these areas. The neglect of this area containing fertile agricultural land means increasing settlement expansion and deepening the Israeli vision of keeping it under control in any existing political solution, which means depriving Palestinians in the West Bank of their only outlet on the outside.

Israel has predominated Al Aghwar area; Israel controls more than half of it as military areas demolishing and displacing Bedouin communities in those areas. Neglecting Al

Aghwar area, which contains fertile farmland, means increasing settlement expansion and deepening Israeli vision, which involves keeping the area under Israeli control in any political solution, which means depriving Palestinians in the West Bank from their only outlet to abroad.

The advancement of its region needs a comprehensive development vision that will restore this region as a tourist and agricultural area containing natural resources, especially those found in the Dead Sea; the interest in Al Aghwar area and placing it at the top of development priorities makes it a lever of the Palestinian economy.

D. Control of crossings and borders

The successive development plans did not present any solutions or a vision to end Israeli control on the Palestinian crossings. This means that the Palestinian economy will remain in the hands of the Israeli will. Israel controls the movement of individuals and identifies persons who are allowed to travel. Those who are prohibited from traveling are in a large prison; Palestinian sovereignty over the crossings is not existed. I will talk about the subject of the goods movement in the section relating to the Paris Economic Agreement and trade relations with Israel.

E. Military barriers and iron gates

Over 500 military checkpoints and iron gates spread throughout the West Bank which is considered to be disassembled making some communities live miserably. The successive development plans did not determine the mechanism of dealing with these barriers and gates or alleviating the suffering of the affected population. The West Bank has lost its

freedom of goods and individuals movement and suffered from the rise in the production cost, the investors' reluctance to invest in areas that suffer particularly from the barriers and gates, and the repercussions that affected health and education.

Surrendering to occupational actions makes this a fait accompli that we live; we need this issue to support the steadfastness of the affected citizens and uncover the practices of the occupation, which did not provide any clear perception of the treatment mechanism of the development plans.

Third: The siege of Gaza Strip

Despite all the development plans for the Gaza Strip, the result is almost zero. Although there is a separate plan drawn up after the Israeli war on the Gaza Strip in 2014, entitled National Plan for Early Recovery and Reconstruction of Gaza, it still lives in miserable conditions. The unemployment rate in the Gaza Strip rose to 54%, the poverty rate increased to 65%, the economic growth rate was 0.5% and the number of hours of power outages has reached more than 20 hours a day.

The Gaza Strip is heading towards a catastrophe, from the pollution of drinking water and the spread of poverty to the loss of hope. This is due to the Israeli siege and the internal Palestinian division. Any development plan that does not address the issue of division and mechanisms to face the Israeli siege will be born dead.

Gaza Strip today needs more than important development plans; Gaza needs a plan to keep itself alive, reduce unemployment, provide potable water and electricity, revive agriculture and fishing, and breathe life into the industrial sector so that the economy in Gaza can

return to contribute to economic growth. According to Professor Basil Deek, Gaza contributes to 15% of the Palestinian Authority's general budget and spends approximately 50% of it. The end of the internal division and the lifting of the siege on the Gaza Strip is the second most important purpose of any plan is to pull the Gaza Strip from drowning.

Fourth: The Separation Wall

According to Mr. Qasim Awad, Director General of Publishing and Documentation in colonization and wall resistance commission, the length of the separation barrier is 712 km - including the constructed, under construction and planned parts. That is, the length of the wall is more than double the length of the green line of 320 km. If Israel completes the construction of the separation wall along the entire specified route, it will deduct 526,677 dunums of West Bank land - constituting 9.4% of the total area of the West Bank - including the areas annexed by Israel and Jerusalem municipality.

Mr. Qasim Awad added that Israel had done so through the Wall that it had separated the population from their lands in 150 Palestinian communities in the West Bank, including agricultural and grazing lands. These lands were locked between the wall and the Green Line. Thus, in the face of thousands of Palestinians, Israel closed access to their land and denied their use of them. It is true that along the wall, Israel has made 84 gates that the Palestinians can cross theoretically, but these gates do not actually allow Palestinians to reach their lands behind the wall, but are intended to create a false image suggesting that life continues normally.

The separation wall has added burdens to the suffering of the Palestinian people and economy. Despite the successive development plans for the wall, the resort to the international community, and the decision of the International Court considering the construction of the wall to be against the international law, Israel is continuing to build the wall, 9% of the West Bank. Although the development plans promoted support for the steadfastness of those affected by the Wall, this support is negligible. Most farmers are unable to cultivate their land, and some of the villages, that were economically benefiting before the wall because of openness to the interior lands, have a declining economy, unemployment has risen as a result of the inability to work in Israel unless obtaining permits and security approvals are a prerequisite.

The future development plans are required to develop detailed mechanisms on how to remove this wall or limit its implications through resorting to the international community, strengthening the steadfastness of citizens and farmers, and providing proper budgets that do set goals and put mechanisms.

Fifth: Control of Palestinian resources

Control of water sources

Israel realized earlier in the Arab-Israeli conflict the importance of water and worked hard to occupy the West Bank and Gaza to control the water sources. It issued an order in the early days of its occupation of the West Bank, which made all water sources in the Palestinian territories a state property. The Israeli settler's share in the Palestinian territories has become between 400-800 liters per day compared to 40-50 liters per Palestinian

citizen's one, in addition to the water which is polluted as a result of the wastewater that the settlements pump into the Palestinian territories.

Despite the awareness of the importance of water in the Palestinian development plans and the development of some solutions and treatments with the establishment of some wells, the future does not bode well in the field of water, and perhaps these signs began to appear as most of the residential communities, especially in the summer, suffer from the water interruption for days due to Israel control on water.

The problem of water needs quick intervention and practical plans that are applicable, based mainly on pressure on the occupation to increase the water share of the Palestinian lands taking into consideration the population increase, digging the underground wells where possible, cooperating with the specialized institutions to help the people in digging wells to collect rain water and exploiting water springs, dealing right with the water pollution of the settlements and the remnants of the farms, and decorating an agenda of the water situation in a Palestine with the help of experienced people to be ready if there is any political process with Israel.

(B) Quarries and gravel

According to Azmi Haj Muhammad, Director of Policy at the Palestinian Ministry of Economy, as a result of the Israeli measures in C Area, the number of new quarries is reduced to 31 ones during 2018 (except in December 2018). Currently, Palestinian quarries in the West Bank produce only a quarter of the quantity of stones produced by Israeli ones.

Not only did Israel steal the land, but it was robbed of what was on the ground, as today's occupation assesses dozens of stones quarries in the West Bank and uses them primarily for the construction of settlements, not to mention the catastrophic effects of these quarries and crushers on the Palestinian environment.

Successive development plans have not succeeded in making any breakthrough in this area through the economic exploitation of the Palestinian territories and the missed opportunity for the occupation to steal Palestinian stones.

C. Oil and natural gas

The gas field was discovered in Gaza in the late 1990s, estimated nearly at \$ 4 billion and capable of covering the needs of the Palestinian market for 15 years, has not been exploited yet as a result of the Israeli measures in the first place and the Palestinian division in the second one.

The development plans did not address the possibility of exploiting this field and the effects that it could have on improving the Palestinian economy and assisting in the implementation of these plans, that future development plans must include the mechanism of exploiting this field and achieving revenues in the development process, especially in the Gaza Strip.

Development plans have also been neglected. Israel has stolen oil from the Rantis field, from which Israel pumps about 800 barrels of oil per day, not to mention the economic loss of this theft, but the lack of action in this area increases the occupation's theft of Palestinian resources.

D. Fish wealth

The fish sector in the Gaza Strip is suffering from the Israeli blockade. Although the Oslo Agreement set a distance of 20 nautical miles, the distance allowed for fishing now is, Israel after the Oslo reduced this distance to, 12 miles and sometimes in 3 nautical miles, which negatively affected the lives of approximately 5000 fishermen and some of whom were killed by the Israeli navy; forcing Israel to return to signed agreements would improve the deteriorated economic situation in the Gaza Strip.

E. Mineral wealth and the Dead Sea

Hundreds of millions of dollars losses of the Palestinian economy as a result of Israel's control of the Dead Sea, and development plans did not address these losses, how to take advantage of the Dead Sea and its wealth, its impact on the Palestinian economy and the employment of the labour force. Neglecting the issue of the Dead Sea enshrines Israel's policy of imposing fait accompli and denying Palestinians their rights, therefore, future plans should not ignore these possibilities, which together may constitute a difference in the Palestinian economy and provide the resources necessary for development.

Sixth: The Paris Economic Agreement and trade relations with Israel

It can be said that the economic relationship between Israel and the Palestinian territories as a dependency relationship where the occupation has made the Palestinian economy dependent on the Israeli one. This economic relationship can be summarized as follows:

1. Paris Economic Agreement

According to Dr. Mohammad Ashtayeh, the Paris agreement was killed and it is not only an economic agreement, it is an economic agreement encapsulated by a political security agreement and was killed by Israel with security measures, closures and roadblocks, as well as the failure of the Palestinian Authority to implement all provisions related to the Paris agreement, since the Paris agreement gave us margins that we didn't invest; Dr. Mohammad Ashtayeh adds that Paris Agreement is a temporary agreement that ends in May of 1999, and we keep following the fait accompli, which began to deteriorate as it is now. The security and political agreement could have given us a broad margin of economic agreement in terms of increasing A area, the expansion of B areas and the transformation of some areas of C to B means increasing investment, construction of buildings and expansion of cities, the issue has become more complicated as Israel has killed all the agreements and it will not do what it must do. Unfortunately, Paris agreement has nothing but the set-off system.

Regarding the amendment of the agreement, he said we asked France as sponsor of the economic agreement to compel Israel to abide by the agreement and exclude Israel's commitment to the agreement.

Based on the current situation and on what Dr. Mohamed Ashtray said, the Paris economic agreement connected the Palestinian economy with Israeli one and this interim agreement was supposed to be amended or built a new agreement, but Israel exploited the fait accompli as usual; the development plans did not address the Paris economic agreement

except for the 2008-2010 plan, which means that the development plans surrendered to the Israeli fait accompli.

The impact of this agreement on the Palestinian economy can be summarized as follows:

1. According to Dr. Mohamed Ashtayeh, there is nothing left of the Paris Economic Agreement but the set-off system. Basel Al-Deek adds that the Palestinian Authority pays about NIS 20 million per month for the Israeli side for collecting these sums. Israel does not provide concrete service in this respect but for clearance and computer fees. The other problem is designing the set-off bill, which contains only the amount and the goods without identifying the specifications of these goods, in addition to deducting tens of millions of shekels from the clearance for electricity and treatment bills without showing invoices.

Israel controls over the clearance funds to blackmail and push the Palestinian side to follow its policies, perhaps the most recent what we are witnessing these days; the deduction of clearance funds causes deducting the salaries paid by the Palestinian Authority to the martyrs and prisoners and affecting the possibility of paying employees' salaries and the same thing to services provided in different areas which are at stake. This will lead to a decline in economic growth in the Palestinian territories affecting the entire economic cycle.

Halting Israel's control of clearance funds, manipulating the issue of unfair deduction from clearance and lowering the proportion that Israel take for collecting the set-off would lead to increased revenue for the Palestinian Authority, which could invest in development programmes that are capable of making a progress in some sectors.

2. Israel do not recognize of the agreements between the Palestinian side and some countries, which deprives the Palestinian side from many advantages that allow to import and export products that meet the needs of the Palestinian market.

3. The issue of the unified customs envelope means that the Palestinian citizen pays the same percentage of the customs paid by the Israeli citizen despite the large differences in the average income. In addition, the importation from the Israeli side means that the customs will go to Israel, even though the final end of the goods is the Palestinian territories.

4. Imposing a quota system means that Israel is the one who determines the quotas that the Palestinian side is allowed to import without taking into account the Palestinian need and deepens the Palestinian economy dependence on the Israeli one.

5. The complicated Israeli security measures for inspecting Palestinian goods and demanding requirement of Israeli specifications have increased the cost of Palestinian goods and their inability to compete.

According to Professor Basil Al Deek, the Palestinian losses due to trade distorted relations with the Israeli side is estimated at 320 million dollars annually.

The Paris economic agreement has deepened the wounds of the Palestinian economy having lost the ability to influence the economic process; it is impossible to talk about economic independence, even if it is relative, without amending this agreement to suit the Palestinian situation and the development programs that development plans seek to achieve.

Addressing economic crises and developing the pace of development requires the full sovereignty of the State over its lands and economy through controlling the crossings, developing appropriate monetary policies, applying the freedom of foreign trade and having the ability to produce goods serving the state and its interests.

Israel has exploited the Paris economic agreement to deepen the dependence of the Palestinian economy and even went further to blackmail the Palestinian side, perhaps the biggest witness to this is the seizure of tax revenues that Israel collects for the benefit of the Palestinian side, known as the clearance system (set-off) which Israel has seized more than once to subdue the Palestinian side.

The Paris economic agreement, in its current form, constitutes a major impediment to real development in the Palestinian territories, imposing restrictions that make a Palestinian economy supportive of non-existent development.

4.2 Results

According to the study of the indicators we mentioned earlier and the interviews the researcher concluded the following:

1. Economic development cannot be achieved under current Israeli procedures for a number of reasons, most importantly:

- A. Impeding the implementation of strategic projects
- B. The largest number of people in the cities are not allowed to build houses or whatever in the Palestinian countryside, which goes in line with the Israeli plan (the greatest possible land and the least possible population).

2. Lack of realism of Palestinian development plans for many reasons and most importantly:

- A. Inability to plan comprehensively.
- B. Lack of funds for these plans and their dependence on unguaranteed external assistance
- C. There is no mechanism to evaluate these plans and determine the extent to which these plans achieve their objectives
- D. The low participation rate in the preparing these plans although the participation in the preparation of the latest plans has been expanded, it has omitted important sectors, including local bodies and councils.

E. Development plans are far from people who are motivated to participate in achieving these ones, which the vast majority of people know nothing about.

3. The inability of development plans to respond to Israeli actions in the Palestinian territories and their failure to deal with them. The most important of these measures are:

A. Settlement: they failed to stop, reduce, or support the steadfastness of the areas which they suffer from.

B. Development plans have only talked about the advancement of C areas without putting in place detailed and implementable mechanisms or talking about allocating budgets to this subject, although these areas are 62% of the Palestinian territories.

C. Development plans have not achieved any significant progress in Gaza Strip, instead of taking benefit from the potential of Gaza, it has become a burden on the Palestinian economy; the situation is catastrophic, and it can be said that it is difficult to develop any development vision for Gaza under internal division.

D. Jerusalem has remained in the general framework of development plans without elaborating a detailed plan for it, but it has remained incapable due to the occupation.

E. Development plans did not adopt a clear policy on the lack of control over the crossings and borders, the implications on trade policy and the inability to influence the economic process.

F. Development plans overlooked the issue of natural resources and their importance in making a progress in the development process, perhaps the most important of which is the gas issue in Gaza Sea, and the continuous denial of Palestinians' rights in the Dead Sea.

G. Despite the importance of the issue of water; its impact on daily life, industry and agriculture, however, development plans have not developed a comprehensive vision to reduce Israeli control over water.

H. Development plans have merely talked about the wall and supported the steadfastness of the communities in which they are suffering without achieving anything on the ground.

I. The development plans neglected Al Aghwar area despite its importance and what it can add to the Palestinian economy.

J. Development plans did not contribute to exploit tourism to improve investment and the economic situation

K. The development plans did not provide any perception of the possibility of disposal or amendment of the Paris Economic Agreement, which is concerned with the current situation; the Palestinian economy remains subordinate to the Israeli one despite the structural differences between them; Israel continued to consider Palestinians as customers for its economy because 100% of electricity It comes from Israel and 80% of the water is controlled by the Israeli company Makrout.

L. It is very clear that the future trend of political development (if no dramatic change) will shrink the space of ability of the Palestinian authority to implement Its development plan .

M. The impact of the Israeli internal political development will effect the expansion of the settlements and the land confiscation.

N. The lack of evaluation and tracking system for the development plans made the measurement of performance indicators very difficult.

O. It has been realized that the data required for evaluating the impact of the various plans and programs in a direct practical method is not available. These plans and programs are still under development. Some criteria were adopted to delineate whether the plans and programs are concerned with the poor and to what extent would the expected results contribute to poverty eradication.

4.3 Recommendations

1. Realistic development plans through

- A) Independent budgets for development plans separated from the PA budget
- B) Involving the private sector and civil society in the preparation of plans and the use of their potential and experience
- C) Involving local government bodies in preparing development plans and identifying the needs, especially in the areas threatened by the settlements and C areas.
- D) Developing detailed plans for each aspect of the development process, which in its entirety constitute the master plan.
- E) Development plans should focus on strengthening steadfastness, protecting the land and allocating a reasonable budget for agriculture.
- F) Evaluating development plans and identifying successes and failures.
- G) Avoiding generalization and the development of a detailed plan for each sector to work determining budgets and time.
- H) Focusing as much as possible on establishing strategic projects.
- I) Convening an international conference and mobilizing financial and political support for these plans.

2. The plans include a mechanism to confront settlements, preserve the remaining land, support the steadfastness of the citizens on their land, and deal with the settlement as a case of confrontation and not a reality in the planning.
3. Giving priority to C areas in the implementation of projects, the construction of the road infrastructure, and non-recognition of the Israeli fact that planted in the mentality of the Palestinian citizen that these areas and encourage the promotion of housing in the countryside
4. Insisting that realistic plans for Jerusalem are feasible.
5. Promoting Gaza Strip in all sectors to avoid the opportunity of occupation to separate the West Bank from Gaza Strip
6. Building creative plans to face Israel's continuous control of water resources.
7. Taking a great interest in Al Aghwar area and its potential to improve the Palestinian economy, since its problem is the shortage of the population, so it is necessary to find projects that attract people to protect the land so that these projects can lead to urban, agricultural, industrial and touristic development in this region.
8. To find the necessary mechanisms to reactivate the Gaza gas field and what it can constitute as a source of income that contributes to achieve the development objectives.
9. Claiming Palestinian rights in the Dead Sea and not giving in to the Israeli fait accompli.
10. Reconsidering economic relations with Israel, especially the Paris Agreement because there is no development under this dependency relationship.

11. regular Evaluation and tracking system for Development plans is very essential
12. Harmonizing the available budget with development plant is a big need
13. In Order to increase the socioeconomic and political impact of the development plans budget reallocation from security forces to the economic and social sectors should be done.

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Appendix1

1. Interviews

A. Interview with Dr. Mohamed shtayeh the Chairman of Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction Dated on 21/01/2019

First question: How can the amendment of Paris Economic Agreement be a lever for the Palestinian economy?

The Paris agreement was not just an economic agreement, but an economic agreement with a political security agreement. Israel had killed the Paris agreement with security measures, closures and barricades. Israel had thus killed the Paris agreement. In addition, the PA failed to implement all of the agreements. For example, according to Paris Economic Agreement, as the largest israeli importers, we import electricity, oil and cement. They constitute 50% of the imports from Israel. The Paris Agreement does not prevent us, for example, from importing oil from Jordan or Egypt.

Second question: Do you believe that Israel will not obstruct such a move (importing oil from abroad)?

At the beginning of the agreement in 1994 or 1995, it was possible to import it from abroad and say that we want to import this from Arab countries. Israel will not be able to prevent us from doing so at the same time, but it can now block and even today if we want to do that, Israel won't stop that. Some importers, for example, including the Investment Fund import cement. Briefly, Paris Economic Agreement gave us margins which we did not invest in.

Second, Paris Economic Agreement is based on the premise that the freedom of goods and individuals movement between the Palestinian Authority and Israel, where the movement freedom does not exist and is one-sided since this is a part of a security and political agreement; Because these agreements were supposed to be temporary ones and to end in May 1999, and we have continued to do the same, as is the case now, a fact that has begun to deteriorate. Moreover, if there is nothing left of the Paris Economic Agreement, only one thing is the clearance system.

The security and political agreement gave us a broad margin for the economic agreement in the sense that there should have been a redeployment to (A) area from 18% to 23%, as well as the expansion of the (B) area and the conversion of some of the areas of (C) to the areas of (B), and some areas (B) transformed into areas (A) increasing investments, establishing buildings and expanding cities, and this did not happen, Israel's actions, in this context, have killed the political, security and economic agreement, and therefore the issue is not that the PA did not do what it should.

In conclusion, the Paris agreement limited the relationship with Israel by a customs envelope and returned to the customs unions. We assume that the goods entering Israel end in the city of Ramallah. Any goods entering the Palestinian territories may end in Israel, but Israel has turned things into one direction. We have a share that we do not get because Israel's actions vanished any agreement possibility to leverage the Palestinian economy.

Third question: What are the Palestinian options in the event of Israel's refusal to amend the Paris Protocol, as the Authority demanded to amend the Paris Agreement in the recent period?

We have told the French that Israel is not committed to the implementation of the agreements and since Israel is not committed to these ones, we also will not commit and ask the French, since they are sponsors of the Paris Agreement, to compel Israel to abide this agreement. We exclude Israel's commitment to the economic agreement because that means Israel's commitment to the political agreement.

Fourth question: What is the Israel's expected response if the PA stops dealing with the Oslo Agreement outcomes?

We must work on a broad strategic change, including strengthening the national product, boycotting Israeli goods and Israeli shekels, going to the encrypted currency, importing cement, boycotting Israeli companies and importing oil. This needs to pay a tax that requires the unity of PA and the people, and bridge the gap between them by providing education and health. 11% of the budget is allocated to health, compared with 6% in Jordan and 5% in Egypt.

Fifth question: Do you think that the development plans raised the ceiling of their expectations in presence of the occupation, and are they considered, as some accused them, to be a shopping tool for donors?

Unfortunately, the development plans are unrealistic and you plan and you don't have the money in your pocket. These plans remain ink on paper, as there are some that represent

half of Hebron H2 aspects that are not covered by the plan, for example, where are Jerusalem and Al-Aghwar area from the plan and region, the overall plans are a requirement for donors, but the index is irrelevant and we do not control the input of the production process, we do not control the land, water or technology etc.. The communication, for example, we are still on the 3g and the world is heading to the 5g. Inductive development plans deal with the index and not as detailed plans implementable from A to Z, for example, which plan will bridge the gap between PA and people and is there a participation of people in the preparation of the plan where the participation of people means that people adopt this plan as their blueprint? Yet, most people did not participate and did not read it; it is important that the plans are realistic, the spirit of participation is high, doable and has funding. Their priorities are clear and we are in a situation that the plans must not be concentrated in (A) area, people must open horizons such as opening a road in the (C) area works to revive this area, where Israel can prevent construction but does not prevent agriculture, therefore, it is the responsibility of the Ministry of Public works to establish roads, the Ministry of Agriculture to provide seedlings, and universities students to volunteer.

Sixth question: Under the control of the Israeli right to the political scene in Israel, do you see any prospect of a political solution in the near future?

Unfortunately, there is no political horizon under Netanyahu's government, or successor to Netanyahu or Trump, and at this point we have to go in two directions. Improving our conditions, our home and the second side to promote the resistance that has been called the resistance of our people on land and to respond to the attacks with more hold on to the

ground in my view, this equation is to be worked out until the departure of American President Trump in terms of promoting resistance, strengthening the productive base of our economy, boosting the national product and confronting Israeli goods, which gives people confidence in the official institution.

Seventh question: Do you think that the authority is capable of creating development in the light of its inability to cover current expenditures and the decline in international assistance?

As funding declines leading that plans are rolled back, they are more dependent on donor funds and are provided to donors, so as donor funds decline, there is a decline in projects and sometimes a decline in projects that are a priority for us, such as water, which is a priority in the lives of people and schools. As well as Jerusalem and Gaza as a priority, and the promotion of national product priority; The size of the Palestinian priorities is enormous and the potential is very simple.

Any plan, no matter how ingenious it is, if there are no possibilities, it cannot be taken into force, and these plans must be realistic. For example, I do not want to talk about Jerusalem in the plan and that I know that I cannot work in Jerusalem, it is important for the plans to be realistic and implementable and have a partnership of people in the drafting. This is the point.

Eighth question: Where are the development plans in view of the worsening situation and the rise of Israel in the Palestinian territories?

Unfortunately, Israel is making its actions day by day, and the Israeli society is heading towards the right, so until the next Israeli elections, Israel will act in the Palestinian currency in the sense of increasing settlements, confiscating land, attacking people and uprooting trees, and the occupation will revive its system, civil administration and undermine power; Our strategy likes to be a port on one thing which is to enhance the resilience of people, the resistance.

Ninth question: Where is Gaza from development plans?

We have prepared a plan for reconstructing Gaza after the 2014 war and part of it has been done, but as a result of donor failure and conditions of division, the situation in Gaza is getting worse.

B. Interview with Mr. Mahmoud Ataya, director general, Policy and Reform Unit, Office of the Prime Minister. Dated on 06/01/2019

First question: Is there an assessment of the development plans?

For the time being, for the 2016-2022 plan, there is no evaluation but a follow-up to the plans, as the evaluation is done at the completion of the plan, to follow up on the implementation of the plans and whether there are any changes to the plan or any of its items.

Second question: Do the plans change with the change of government?

No fixed plans were answered according to its time frame.

Third question: Do you think that these plans are ambitious for the Palestinian reality?

He said that these plans are ambitious and when we rely on realism, the vision is melancholy where this question was raised during the preparation of the national policy agenda, as the occupation remains on our land and the question is, do we surrender to the reality and stand for nothing, as the plans are realistic and ambitious as the endeavor of this. The plan is to confront the occupation in parallel with development wherever we have an opportunity. We are still under occupation and are working in tandem to achieve development whenever we have the opportunity.

The national policy agenda has followed the policy of sectoral strategies, for example, to achieve equity by identifying the current situation and the status to be reached, where the agenda works with sectoral strategies and balancing the results of the strategic framework, where they work together as an integrated whole.

If you just read the policy agenda , you will find it ambitious and not sufficiently concrete, for example, the plan referred to the equality of the woman as the equality strategy of reinforcing the identified areas, where we will work to achieve equity and budget programs determining what we want to do within a framework of results and goals.

Fourth question: What does the last plan "the national policy agenda" differ from previous plans?

Previous plans were prepared by the Ministry of Planning after submitting proposals and strategies by the different ministries and the current plan (National policy agenda is to be out of the sectoral framework as the previous plans mostly focused on basic sectors, namely

infrastructure sector, economic sector and social sector, the national policy agenda tried to be more comprehensive in terms of issues concerning to the nation as a whole, where ten priority issues were identified and different from previous plans in terms of participation, where the national policy agenda was more comprehensive, with both the government and the private sector participating with civil society; The government has elevated this agenda by identifying a number of key issues and putting forward 30 national policies, in light of which the various sectors will work and integrate to achieve these policies.

In addition to the different national policy agendas from previous plans in terms of time and political level of the plan approved by the government and sectoral variation, this plan focuses on the citizen in contrast to previous plans that focused primarily on building the institutions of the State, when the agenda focused on completing institutional building, it will serve the citizen and promote social justice and equality ,enhance the resilience of the citizen and empowerment, perhaps the name indicates the agenda expresses that citizen is the first.

According to its period, he stated that the duration of the national policy agenda differ from that of previous plans; The previous development plans were usually three years through which the preparation of the next plan was initiated after a year and a half, which is not enough to judge the policies, procedures and their effectiveness where they need for a longer period where 6 years will be suitable for a midterm evaluation, where there are 3 years of work to modify and revise what will be made during the following three years dealing in terms of adding any updates.

Fifth question: who's in charge of planning?

The planning was divided after the Ministry of Planning and Finance merged into two sections:

The first Section: Sectoral planning and coordination of strategy preparation under the supervision of Ministry of Finance.

The second section is responsible for the document that directs the preparation policy of sectoral strategies and it is subordinate to the Prime Minister.

It is responsible for the preparation of national development plans where the preparation of sectoral strategies becomes part of the realization of these plans.

Sixth question: How effective are development plans under occupation?

Where we are given space by the occupation we are making a notable difference, but the areas where the occupation imposes restrictions we cannot work in, such as the economy and the environment, we cannot do anything as a result of the occupation measures, but education, for example, this can make an environment in which we have the opportunity to work.

Here are two things, the first is to seek control, such as the (C) areas, and I cannot say that we can do nothing, as we work with international partners and the United Nations to improve these areas and bridge the development gap between the C and other regions, where occupation cannot be used by some as an excuse for not working in these areas; Some international institutions can operate in areas where the PA cannot work.

We cannot stop talking about development under occupation, since the development dimension can enhance the resilience of people and strengthen their presence to end the occupation, since the relationship between development and occupation is a question that will remain.

Seventh question: Is development planning a donor shopping tool?

According to Professor Mahmood in some stages of time and especially in the 1990s, the planning and its dimension approach were different as the dependence on donors was essentially a plan to put them in the form of where their funds were disbursed as desired; Plans mention an educational process evolving institutions which differ before and after 2008 for what is counted as the maturity in the use of concepts, where some ministries become dispense with experts and work their own plans; We work to make development plans a document directing our work of developmental and investments both internal and external, and strengthen the proximity of the institution of the citizen and serve the people.

Eighth question: What is the planning mechanism?

The ministries are working on the development of their own plans, which are integrated with the general plan, as the process is complementary; The Ministry develops its vision and prepares its strategy for three years, all of this is reflected in the national policy agenda, sometimes the process is counterproductive from the top to down where the treasury asks the ministry to follow a particular direction, for example, that the Government requires education to be in a certain direction must be responded to as the process is reciprocal

between the government's vision, the national vision and the ministry's vision at the sectoral level.

C. Interview with Mr. Azmi Al-Hajj Mohammed, director general of policies at the Palestinian Ministry of Economy, dated on 11/02/2019

First question: What are the most prominent Israeli violations of the Palestinian economy?

The most prominent Israeli violations of the Palestinian economy can be summarized as follows:

1. Closing and destroying industrial facilities where the Israeli occupation continued the demolition and closure of economic installations, including industrial, commercial and service establishments, during the year 2018 the closure and destruction of more than 25 economic institutions in the West Bank, and the confiscation of some industrial equipment and machinery, causing direct losses in millions of shekels. The occupation also prevented the establishment from any economic establishment in the classified areas (c) and the confiscation of the mechanisms operating there, such as quarries and crushers, which deprived the Palestinian economy from significant opportunities, especially as they were uninhabited areas and could be more easily invested, Like what happened with the legend company of the ready-made cement in Hebron, where all the equipment of the factory were confiscated. The occupation also continued to close more than 400 shops and the central vegetable market in the old City of Hebron, because of the presence of outposts in this town, causing the loss to the owners of these shops and their loss of their source of livelihood.

2. Controlling over economic resources, which is the failure to provide the governorates with sufficient quantities of water, causing a major crisis for the owners of water-dependent industrial facilities, such as food factories, stone saws, construction materials factories and cattle farms in the Hebron Governorate, whose reputation of raising the largest number of cows ' heads in Palestine. An amount of up to \$28 million a year was deducted from the clearing funds, on the pretext of the water drainage of the stone saws to the flow of wastewater into the Be'er Sheva area, withdrawing the entry permits for these owners, preventing their products from accessing to the market through the crossings as it happened in last February of the previous year, and threatening them again later. Israeli control over large rich lands in red sands and stones preventing industrial plants from being constructed, and drilling water wells to extract groundwater. As a result of the Israeli actions in the area "C " , the number of new licensed and refurbished stone quarries decreased to 31 in 2018 (except December 2018), and currently, Palestinian quarries in the West Bank produce only a quarter of the stones produced by Israeli ones..

3. Impeding the goods movement in terms of import, export, raw materials and products marketing, where the Israeli Government's obstacles to Palestinian goods cause higher costs, the cost of transportation from the port of Ashdod to the Almentar crossing, which does not exceed 50 km exceeding the cost of transporting Goods from the popular China up to the port of Ashdod, which cost about 2500 NIS per container, while from the port of Ashdod for the Almentar crossing up to 20,000 shekels, the transportation cost is added to the price of the item, the high cost of freight in Israeli airports, where the cost of 1 kilogram to 3 Dollars on the Palestinian product, while the Israeli product cost no more than \$2 per

kilogram, and neglecting the Palestinian merchandise for long hours on the runway, which causes damage or decreases the quality, and some of the filling centers have fresh local herbs and to keep their fresh products and avoid their corruption, they are sold to Israeli companies for fear of any delay at the crossings, leading to a lower profit margin.

The occupation also prevented Palestinians from bringing necessary raw materials into industrial processes on the pretext of dual-use (e.g. acids, fertilizers, chromium) used in food, precious metals, leather tanning and agriculture factories, forcing manufacturers and farmers to use alternatives at a higher cost and the lower quality of the finished product. The occupation also prevents factory owners and merchants from transporting products to Israeli ports or merchants except through designated crossings and using Israeli trucks and not Palestinian ones , forcing factory owners to unload goods more than once, which increases the cost and exposes the goods for damage.

The occupation also led to the delay in the entry of imported goods through ports, on the pretext of security check- up and other reasons, causing loss for factories and importers, and Payment of land use allowances. Israeli custom department never recognizes the European-Palestinian Convention, under which it exempts Palestinian imports from customs. The Palestinian merchant must also sign, at all crossings, a pledge that his goods will be sold only in the areas of the Palestinian National Authority; On the contrary, the Israeli merchant does not sign such an undertaking, therefore, the area for the sale of products is greater than the merchants of the Palestinian people. The goods are only entered in accordance with Israeli specifications, although they are compatible, they are prohibited

from being sold on the Israeli side, and the Palestinian authorities are not allowed to follow shipments directly into Israeli ports and airports.

4. Competition with settlement products

There is a fierce competition between the Palestinian national product and the Israeli settlement one, especially in the dates and fresh herbs sector. The products of the Israeli settlements are also not subject to any sanitary control, and most of the settlements' products bear forged trademarks of international brands and agencies to attract the Palestinian consumer to these ones. During the work of the Ministry of National Economy to regulate the internal market and Consumer protection, the value of 550,000 shekels in the products of the Israeli settlements were seized during the year 2018 (except December 2018). Mr. Azmi adds that the Palestinian market is very important for managing Israeli exports in general and settlement exports in particular, where World Bank figures and studies indicate that Israeli settlement exports to the Palestinian territories amount to about \$500 million a year, and the areas that were occupied by Israel in 1967 (East Jerusalem, the colonies and the Golan) with about 4% of Israel's gross domestic product (GDP), 7.9 % of public consumption and 4.5 % of Israel's total investment.

Second question: What are the obstacles imposed by the occupation on the commercial relationship between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip?

There are many measures imposed by the occupation to hinder the movement of trade between the West Bank and Gaza, namely the imposition of permits on Palestinian trucks that want to enter Israel from the West Bank or Gaza, and few are granted such permits.

The occupation is also delaying Palestinian commercial trucks for several hours at the crossings, under the sun as a result of imposing a system of loading and unloading goods on security pretexts, causing damage to Palestinian goods, especially agricultural products. In addition, the security check is strict on the goods and most of the time the products are damaged.

Third question: In the light of the progressive Israeli threat to detain the set-off funds, many people are required to boycott Israeli products if they take this step. Can this boycott have realistic results?

To be realistic most of the Palestinian exports go to Israel if Israel responded by boycotting Palestinian products, the impact on the Palestinian economy would be greater as a result of the Israeli economy's ability to absorb shocks as well as the lack of a Palestinian alternative to most Israeli products. Moreover, Israel will disrupt and delay the entry of raw materials into the Palestinian territories.

D. Interview with Mr. Qasim Awad, Director General of Publishing and Documentation in colonization and wall resistance commission, dated on 12/12/2018

First question: How many settlements and settlers are in the West Bank and Jerusalem?

According to our latest statistics, the number of settlements and outposts is 515, and the settler population has reached 834000, up to the month of September this year 2018.

Second question: How much land does the settlements have?

This area today is estimated to be 500,000 dunums and the problem is controlling and preventing citizens from exploiting their land in the areas around the settlements.

Third question: There is a plan to displace the residents of al-Khan al-Ahmar. What is for? What is the scheme purpose?

It is a plan of forced displacement, planned by Israel a decade ago, which was renamed the "Repositioning Plan". The scheme targets Palestinian pastoral communities residing along the axis from East Jerusalem to Jericho East Elizaria the south, and the number of targeted gatherings is about 48, and their population 7670 Palestinian citizens, most of them are children, the plan includes the displacement of Bedouins in three regions: The Jabal area, the Nuimmeh region and Fasayel.

The occupation authorities began work on the construction of the infrastructure at the site near the Abu Dis landfill, the site of the Jabal, which is one of the new isolation sites proposed by Israel.

With regard to the objectives of this scheme, Mr. Awad summarizes these objectives with the following:

1. Forced displacement of the Bedouin population residing in the targeted areas.
2. Emptying the area extending from East Jerusalem to the Jordan Valley of its Palestinian population.
3. Closing the main road from Anata to the Valley East Elizaria south to the Palestinians, and allocating the road to the movement of settlers freely.

4. Contribution to the plan implementation to isolate Jerusalem from the rest of the West Bank "E1 scheme"

5. The scheme allows to create a settlement extension from Jerusalem to the Dead Sea.

6. Israel's control over an area of high geographical, security and political importance

Fourth question: What are the implications and consequences of this scheme?

The implications and consequences of this scheme can be summarized as follows:

1. Preventing the establishment of a Palestinian state.

2. The canonization of the West Bank into the cantons and ghettos.

3. Emptying the land classified as C, in accordance with the Oslo agreement, of its inhabitants and displacing them in specific enclaves easy to control.

4. The plan will eliminate the Palestinian presence in the territories classified as C, especially the Bedouin communities residing on the outskirts of the eastern border of Palestine from Jordan.

5. Depriving the Bedouin population from practicing their traditional life and preserving their economic and social heritage, and depriving the Palestinian economy from a large part of meat and dairy products.

Fifth question: Where are the Israeli settlements heading in the Palestinian territories?

Unfortunately, there is an attempt to breathe the spirit into the settlement plan, which was initiated by former Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, aiming at settling 2 million Jews in the West Bank.

Sixth question: How much area did the separation wall include in the Palestinian territories?

The length of the wall track is 712 km-including the completed sections, which are under construction and those under planning. That is, the length of the wall is more than twice the length of the 320 km of Green line. If Israel completes the construction of the separation wall along the entire specified route, it will deduct 526,677 dunums of West Bank land — which forms 9.4% of the entire area of the West Bank — including the areas annexed by Israel to the Jerusalem municipality's flat.

Seventh question: What are the effects of the separation wall on residential communities?

What Israel did by the wall was that it had separated the population from their land in some 150 Palestinian communities in the West Bank, including agricultural and grazing lands, as they were trapped between the wall and the Green Line. Thus, Israel has deprived thousands of Palestinians from reaching to their land and to their use. It is true that, along the wall that has been completed, Israel has made 84 gates that Palestinians can cross-theoretically, but these gates do not actually allow free access to the lands behind the wall, indeed, they have been intended to create a false image that life continues to be normal.

Sometimes the civil administration allows the entry of other family members or farm laborers to issue ' work permits ' to them. However, it does so according to its secret criteria, which does not take into account the different needs of each farmer, nor the changing conditions each year required for crop care.

The path of the wall cuts through the Palestinian space, separating adjacent communities from their lands, undermining their resilience and threatening their very existence, crippling every possibility to develop them in a way that makes them viable. The wall is thus deepening the process of annexing these territories to Israel. In some places, this fragmentation reduced the Palestinian presence in areas that were kept isolated on the west side of the wall, as in the population enclaves which the occupation created. The construction of the wall also restricts the trade relations that have arisen over the years between Palestinian towns bordering the green line.

E. Interview with Mr. Basil Al-Deek, director of Information Technology, Ministry of Finance The Palestinian Customs Department, dated on 10/03/2019

Fifth question: What is the nature of the trade relationship between the Palestinian territories and Israel?

What governs the trade relationship with the Israeli side is the Paris economic agreement and there are many issues; The most important is the fifth point in the Paris economic agreement that talks about taxes, customs and specifically the issue of the customs cover, which means that there is a collateral of Israel to apply one tariff in the sense that fees and taxes are unified as they are in Israel; If we analyze the issue, these taxes and fees are based

on the Israeli economic situation and do not take into account the disparity between income in the Palestinian territories and that one in Israel, which means that all the inclination is in the interest only for the Israeli side.

Second question: Is the Palestinian side able to enter into agreements with the world?

Israel is making various agreements, while Israel does not recognize the agreements signed by the Palestinian side, where we have made many agreements with the European Union, Turkey, Russia, China and Jordan, for example, the Agreement on trade facilitation with the Arab world assumes that there is no fees for Importing goods but Israel imposes fees on merchants.

Third question: Are there any specific amounts lost by the Palestinian economy as a result of the distorted relationship with Israel?

Yes, there are many areas where we lose such value-added tax and customs, which are the Palestinian People rights , for example, the fees that are paid at the Karama crossing, according to the agreement, 26 dollars are taken evenly between the two sides on the first 750 thousand passengers, when this number increases, there is to be an increase of \$2 per passenger, for the Palestinian side, this means 14 for the Palestinian side and 12 for the Israeli side, for the time being, Israel lifted it to 42 and they still hold the Palestinian side to the old percentage of \$26 dollars in general, the estimated amount of the distorted trade relationship with Israel is estimated at 320 Million a year.

Fourth question: What are the obstacles Israel imposes on Palestinian goods?

Unfortunately, the cost of Palestinian goods is rising because of Israeli measures at the crossings and the borders, delays and the transfer of Palestinian goods for security checks, while Israeli goods are not subject to security checks and there is a speed of clearance, which gives competitive advantage to Israeli goods.

Fifth question: Are there examples of losses as a result of the unequal relationship with the Israeli side?

Yes, for example, if you buy a Samsung washing machine or refrigerator with VAT and a purchase tax from the Israeli market, I practically lose the customs fees on this item, and what I get is VAT only, although the agreement stipulated that the fees would be paid on the final goods estuarine, but the Israeli side says that the fees are paid on the final customs declaration, and this is still a point of contention between the two sides, and we import many goods from Israel to which the foregoing applies.

Sixth question: Are there any solutions to the previous issue concerning the importation of goods from Israel?

We try in the first instance to persuade the private sector to import directly to avoid loss, but the Palestinian trader is sometimes allowed to import from Israel, for example, if the merchant needs goods within two days, it is preferable to buy them from the Israeli merchant to meet the market need; We have worked through the Council of Ministers imposing additional fees to reduce wastage and protect our products; We have been talking

about five to seven items for which additional fees are imposed, but we failed in this case due to lack of authority at the crossings.

Seventh question: What are the problems with the clearing bills?

We look at the amount in the clearing bill because it does not contain contents, it does not give you the ability to evaluate the goods they may contain a description of wood, for example, and there is no classification of the species; As a matter of fact, they do not give precise details of the assessment.

Eighth question: What are the solutions from your point of view?

Firstly, the issue of belonging should be devoted to the first search for the Palestinian commodity, in addition to fighting the goods of the settlements, which the PA has tried to do.

Ninth question: Have we managed to combat settlement products and can goods be brought into Israel and re-supplied to the Palestinian territories on the grounds that it is a main product?

It can be said that we have succeeded to a large extent, as there is a list of companies operating in the settlements, in addition to confiscating the goods of settlements that are seized in the market, but there is still some circumvention by some companies to put the “manufacture in Israel “on some products.

Tenth question: Is the boycott of Israeli goods feasible?

The answer is difficult because there are Palestinian products exported to Israel, the fact that the raw materials enter through Israel, and to prevent certain items from entering the Palestinian territories, forcing the Palestinian merchant to buy them from the Israeli market, the difficulty of competitiveness as a result of the high cost of Palestinian goods, and income disparity between the Palestinian territories and Israel.

Eleventh question: Israel makes 3% of the total clearing tax, do you think this ratio is fair?

This topic was discussed among the topics where at the beginning the authority's revenues were approximately 70 million shekels and the 3% constituted approximately 2.2 million shekels, but now the revenue is close to 600 million shekels, which means that Israel takes approximately 20 million shekels a month for intangible service, that is in the sense that they collect the clearing allowance and computer fees, for example, oil carriers are for private sector and are placing oil revenues according to the revenue that is subject to the clearing system: There is a proposal for the EU to reduce the percentage to .05%. And we do not know if the Israeli side will respond to this, particularly, when it is taken into consideration that Paris economic agreement was over 20 years.

Twelfth question: is the clearing tax collected applied in Gaza especially after the split?

Gaza contributes 15% to revenue and consumes approximately 50% of the budget.

F. Interview with Mr. Sabri Humaidan, coordinator of tourism data and statistics at the Palestinian Ministry of Tourism, dated on 9/12/2018

First question: What is the impact of the Israeli occupation on Palestinian tourism?

With regard to the impact of the Israeli occupation on Palestinian tourism, it can be summarized in a number of points in the following form:

1. The Israeli occupation does not comply with the provisions on tourism in the economic protocol of Paris, especially with terms concerning (tourism companies and their licensed agencies by any party having equal access to facilities with a tourist characteristic at the border crossing points and departures, according to the regulations of the supervising authority) where Palestinian tourists guide are not allowed to enter the Israeli-controlled tourist sites, while their Israelis counterparts are allowed to enter any tourist site under the Palestinian National Authority control.

2. The Israeli occupation control over the land, sea and air crossings which the Palestinian National Authority cannot somehow control these ones and verify the on the one hand, and its inability to manage the statistical calculations associated with tourist arrivals, which affects the ability to implement the strategic planning associated with the development of Palestinian tourism on the one hand, and its inability to grant visas to delegations and tourists wishing to come, thereby reducing the number of tourists going to the Palestinian territories.

3. A large number of countries still prohibit their citizens from traveling to the West Bank or staying in it for unsafe situation, which negatively affects the number of visitors to the Palestinian territories or staying in its hotels.
4. The military checkpoints at the Palestinian cities entrances, which hinder the movement of tourists between the governorates, which affects the tourists' movement and their residence period in the Palestinian territories.
5. The closure of Bethlehem for many periods especially in the periods associated with Christian religious holidays, which prevents tourists from entering Bethlehem, in addition, Nablus is still closed to citizens and tourists for a long time, which affected its economy and the tourism movement.
6. The conditions imposed by the Israeli authorities on the Palestinian tourist establishments in Jerusalem are very complex, not imposed on their Israeli counterparts, as they practice racial discrimination against the Palestinian establishments, particularly the property tax (Arnona) and the provision of facilities and compensation to Palestinian institutions.
7. Closing the border with the Gaza Strip has stopped the tourism sector, as the contribution of tourism sector in the Gaza Strip to the Palestinian national income has become zero.

Second question: How did the occupation encourage the phenomenon of antiquities theft and illegal trafficking in archaeological materials?

The Israeli occupation encourages illegal excavations and trade in archaeological materials. The occupation policy has stimulated the search for archaeological materials. The Israeli occupation has witnessed a significant increase in the volume of smuggling and illegal trafficking in the Palestinian territories and the damage done to the Archaeological sites. This activity has reached to an alarming threshold.

It is no secret that the decline towards the absence of law, the protection system collapse in the occupied territories and the economic pressure on citizens are rooted in the occupation itself.

Statistics from the post-1967 Department of Antiquities show that thousands of archaeological sites have been looted. Since 1967, thousands of archaeological artefacts have been transported from the occupied Palestinian territories in contravention of domestic and international law. A large part of the archaeological material was transported by the official Israeli authorities themselves. This includes archaeological materials transferred from the Palestinian Antiquities Museum in Jerusalem. According to statistics, the volume of trading is up to 100,000 pieces a year, most of which are diverted abroad. Smuggling and illegal trafficking in cultural property have also recovered at the regional level. The policy of occupation has also spurred the creation of a class of intermediaries, smugglers and merchants of antiquities who engage in illegal activity without a license.

Third question: What are the effects of the separation Wall and settlement on tourism?

From 1967 up to now, Israeli settlements in the Palestinian territories have directly affected more than 900 sites and landmarks through the settlements structural scheme in the West Bank, and today this figure became more notable through the wall construction from the west, where preliminary statistical data indicate the following:

- (1) 2167 sites and milestones will be located behind the wall, i.e. 18% of total locations.
- (2) A total of 296 basic sites, namely, Khirbets (ruins), hills, and old towns, i.e., 15% of all the basic locations in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, are in place.
- (3) 1871 is archaeological landmarks, or 19% of all archaeological monuments in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem.
- (4) 263 sites and landmarks where excavations have been carried out by Israelis and foreign missions will be behind the wall, constituting 62% of the total locations where excavation works took place.
- (5) 37 main sites have been directly affected by the construction of the wall, and have been destroyed or removed after limited excavations by Israeli archaeological crews.

This deprives the Palestinian territories from these archaeological and touristic sites, which will adversely affect the movement of tourism and the conversion of these places for the most part to Israeli tourist areas.

Fourth question: How much are Palestine's tourism losses resulting from Israeli actions?

No one is aware of how the tourism importance backs the economy, as tourism is the largest contributor to local production in some countries, and Palestine is considered to be a first-class tourist state where it possesses all the ingredients of the site, history, nature and religious places, but the land suffers from occupation; The Palestinian people as a result of the occupation's control over the crossings, borders and other measures, that we mentioned earlier, also suffer from this. Unfortunately, there is no study gives an estimate of the amount lost by the Palestinian economy as a result of the occupation's obstruction of tourism, but if the opportunity for tourism is granted, it will be one of the economy pillars.

Appendix 2: List of Tables

Israeli Demolition Orders in Areas c

Total number of demolition orders	14.087
Number of demolition orders carried out	2.802
Number of pending demolition orders	11.134
The number of demolition orders is ready for execution	570
Applications for Licensed Palestinians Approved 2010-2012	%1.5
Demolition orders targeting buildings located on privately owned Palestinian land	%77
Forbidden Construction of Palestinians in Areas C	%70
Areas strictly restricted to build in it	%29
Areas in which Palestinians are allowed to build	%1


Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs - United Nations 2015

**Number of houses demolished and people who lost their homes, including minors,
from 2006 to 30/11/2018 With the exception of East Jerusalem**

Year	Houses were demolished	People lost their Houses	Minors have lost their Houses
2018	78	230	114
2017	100	363	201
2016	274	1,134	591
2015	125	496	287
2014	144	722	392
2013	175	528	270
2012	98	526	274
2011	150	814	385
2010	85	387	184
2009	28	218	62
2008	44	276	160
2007	47	267	126
2006	49	225	78
Total	1397	6186	3124


**The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied
Territories B'Tselem 2018/12/12**

Appendix 3: Maps



Scheme E1

Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs



Settlements in the West Bank

Peace Now website

الملخص باللغة العربية

تهدف هذه الدراسة الى دراسة تأثير الاجراءات الاسرائيلية في الاراضي الفلسطينية على خطط التنمية الفلسطينية المتعاقبة ومدى استجابة هذه الخطط لهذه الاجراءات، حيث تم دراسة اهم هذه الاجراءات الاسرائيلية والمتمثلة بالاستيطان والسيطرة على مناطق سي والسيطرة على مدينة القدس والاغوار بالاضافة الى السيطرة على المعابر والحدود والحواجز العسكرية بالاضافة الى حصار قطاع غزة والجدار الفاصل والسيطرة على الموارد الطبيعية بالاضافة الى المعوقات التي تفرضها على السياحة واخيرا العلاقات الاقتصادية بين الجانب الفلسطيني والاسرائيلي والتي نظمها اتفاقية باريس الاقتصادية.

اعتمدت هذه الدراسة على المنهج الشمولي التحليلي للتطرق الى جميع جوانب الدراسة، والذي يعتمد على مؤشرات عديدة سيتم تحليلها ووصفها وتحديد علاقة المؤشرات مع بعضها البعض.

وقد خلصت هذه الدراسة الى العديد من النتائج من اهمها عدم واقعية خطط التنمية الفلسطينية بالاضافة الى عدم قدرة خطط التنمية على الاستجابة للاجراءات الاسرائيلية في الاراضي الفلسطينية واخفاقها في التعامل معها مما ادى الى عدم القدرة على التخطيط الشامل واعاقة تنفيذ المشاريع الاستراتيجية.

وقدمت هذه الدراسة العديد من التوصيات الواجب اخذها عند اعداد خطط التنمية المستقبلية ومن اهم هذه التوصيات ان تكون خطط التنمية واقعية من خلال الموازنات المستقلة عن موازنة السلطة وتخصيص موازنة معقولة للزراعة والتعامل مع الاستيطان كحالة مواجهة وليس امر واقع في التخطيط بالاضافة الى البعد عن العموميات ووضع خطة تفصيلية لكل قطاع سيتم العمل عليه بتحديد الموازنات والوقت كما انه يجب النهوض بقطاع غزة في خطط التنمية المستقبلية لتقوية الفرصة على الاحتلال في فصل الضفة عن غزة والعمل على ايجاد مشاريع استراتيجية جاذبة للسكان في منطقة الاغوار لحماية الارض كما اوصت الدراسة باعطاء القدس اولوية خاصة لقطع الطريق على الاحتلال في استكمال تهويدها واخيرا اعادة النظر في العلاقات الاقتصادية مع اسرائيل والخروج من مرحلة التهديد الى العمل الجدي.