

See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/351686802>

Diplomacy in the Perspective of Peace Building : From Coercion to Dictation (Israel & Palestine)

Chapter · October 2021

DOI: 10.13109/9783666568565.145

CITATIONS

0

READS

299

1 author:



[Dalal Iriqat](#)

Arab American University

38 PUBLICATIONS 72 CITATIONS

SEE PROFILE

Contents

Introduction.....	3
Part One	
<i>Martin Leiner</i>	
The Hölderlin-Perspective and Its Impact on Reconciliation with Refugees	12
<i>Zeina Barakat - Ralf Wüstenberg</i>	
The Urge for an “Empathetic Dialogue”. An Exploration of the Political and Religious Dimension of Empathy	33
<i>Francesco Ferrari</i>	
Between Quest for a <i>Heimat</i> and Alienation. Jean Améry’s Journey after Auschwitz	43
<i>Davide Tacchini</i>	
Migration, the Hermeneutics of the Other, the <i>Reification</i> and Need for Reconciliation in Christian-Muslim Relations in Contemporary Europe	53
<i>Carolina Rehrmann</i>	
The European Refugee Crisis in Germany and Greece. Between National Populism and Humanitarian Action.....	66
<i>Amjad Abu El Ezz</i>	
The European Union Political Involvement in the Middle East Conflict and Middle East Peace Process	90
<i>Tim Bausch – Stella Kneifel</i>	
First Stage: Reconciliation through the Visual and Pop-Culture. Second Stage: A Case Study of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon	111
<i>Dalal Iriqat</i>	
Diplomacy in the Perspective of Peace Building: From Coercion to Dictation (Israel & Palestine)	127
<i>André Zempelburg</i>	
Migration in the Bible and the Quran. An Analysis from a Religious Studies Perspective ..	147
<i>Wietske de Jong-Kumru</i>	
The European Story after the 2015 Refugee Crisis.....	163
<i>Fanie du Toit</i>	
Glimmers of Hope? A Brief Analysis of Selected Civic-Led Reconciliation Efforts in Post-ISIL Iraq	174
Part Two	
<i>Michael D. Berdine</i>	

Grassroots Reconciliation: Case Study of Tucson Arizona (USA)	
<i>Zahra Mustafa-Awad - Monika Kirner-Ludwig</i>	
Digital News and Public Opinion: the Case of Syrian Refugees in Germany	201
<i>Rabah Aynaou - Yamina Hakkou</i>	
Experiences of Transitional Justice in Morocco	214
<i>Ayman Yousef (with Hashem Khalil and Malak Shwaiki)</i>	
Reconciliation and Peace building in Palestine: Perspectives by the Palestinian Civil Society Organizations	225
<i>Muath Al-Zoubi</i>	
Legal Issues Regarding the Global Refugee Crisis: the Example of Jordan	242
<i>Aya AlFaouri - Mohmmad Alshraideh - Martin Leiner - Iyad AlDajani</i>	
Syrian Refugees Information Prediction System (RIPS) in Germany: Applied Digital Humanities	256
<i>Iyad M. Al-Dajani</i>	
The phenomenology of Internet Communication Technology Applications for Social Change Towards Reconciliation: Applied Ethics in Digital Humanities.....	270
<i>Zahra' Langhi</i>	
Libya after Seven Years of Impasse: Prospects of the Transition	294
Editors	306
Contributors	308
Acknowledgements.....	313

Introduction

The essays in this 6th volume of the Research in Peace and Reconciliation (RIPAR) series are the results of the foundation of the A.A.R.M.E.N.A. (Academic Alliance for Reconciliation Studies in the Middle East and North Africa) in Jena in August 2018.

This work, the main focus of which may be summarized in *Refugees and Reconciliation* happens to be extremely topical, in this first quarter of the 21st century. In fact, International migration¹ is a growing phenomenon, both in scope and in complexity, and it affects almost all countries in the world. The United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN-DESA) estimates state that the number of international migrants was around 152 million in 1990 and reached 272 million 2019². Furthermore, it is worth considering that there is as much international migration between less developed countries as there is from less developed countries to more developed ones³. In fact, the the growth of emerging markets and the development of new opportunities, made countries like South Africa or Thailand attractive for migrants, namely, in these two specific cases, from Congo and Myanmar.

In the last 10 years, the number of forced migrants⁴, which includes refugees and asylum seekers, though, has grown much faster than the one of voluntary migrants⁵. Let us think that in 2018 alone 13.8 million people have been forced to flee because of conflict or persecution (that means 37.000 a day). These stats do not include the 41.8 million of Internally Displaced Persons (IDP)⁶.

¹ There is no universally accepted definition for “migrant”, but for the purpose of collecting data on migration, the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) defines the international migrant as *any person who changes his or her country of usual residence* (UN DESA, *Recommendations on Statistics of International Migration*, Revision 1 (1998) para. 32). The UN DESA definition excludes movements that are *due to recreation, holiday, visits to friends and relatives, business, medical treatment or religious pilgrimages*.

² In 2018 UNHCR registered 70.8 million forcibly displaced people, of which 41.8 Million are IDPs, 25.8 Million Refugees (including also the 5.5 Million Palestinians under the administration of UNRWA, the *United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East*) and 3.5 Million Asylum Seekers. https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/publications/populationfacts/docs/MigrationStock2019_PopFacts_2019-04.pdf, accessed April 26, 2020.

³ United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2019). *International Migration 2019: Highlights* (ST/ESA/SER.A/439).

⁴ *A person subject to a migratory movement in which an element of coercion exists, including threats to life and livelihood, whether arising from natural or man-made causes (e.g. movements of refugees and internally displaced persons as well as people displaced by natural or environmental disasters, chemical or nuclear disasters, famine or development projects)*. IOM Glossary of Migration 2019, p. 130, available online at https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/iml_34_glossary.pdf, accessed April 26, 2020.

⁵ The number of refugees and asylum seekers increased by about 13 million between 2010 and 2017 (at an annual average rate of over 8 per cent), while other migrants increased at an annual rate of under 2 per cent between 2010 and 2019. for all these data and stats, see: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs Report, *Population Facts*, September 2019 No. 4/2019, p. 2, available online at https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/publications/populationfacts/docs/MigrationStock2019_PopFacts_2019-04.pdf (accessed may 3, 2020).

⁶ Even IDPs do not have a legal definition, but the United Nations define them as (...) *based on two components: 1) that the movement is coerced or involuntary (to distinguish from economic and other voluntary migrants), and 2) that the movement stays within internationally recognized state borders (to distinguish from refugees)*. While there is broad

Unlike what most of the mainstream European media are reporting on a daily basis, 90% of the refugees in the top 10 countries in the world do not choose Europe as their destination. Only 16% of refugees are hosted by countries in developed regions, and over one third of the whole global refugee population are in least developed countries⁷. Top 6 refugee-hosting countries are: Turkey (3.700.000), Jordan (2.900.000), Lebanon (1.400.000), Pakistan (1.400.000), Uganda (1.100.000), and Germany (1.000.000)⁸. It looks remarkable that Jordan and Lebanon are ranked 2nd and 3rd in the world by number of refugees and Germany is the only European country in the list. Although the number is affected by the many Palestinians who fled to Lebanon and Jordan in the past decades, Lebanon holds the highest rate of refugees per 1000 residents (157), followed by Jordan (72) and Turkey (45).

All this considered, reconciliation studies might be, in the near future, an invaluable source to approach effectively the issues of human mobility and, especially, forced migrations.

In fact, despite its long tradition and its undoubtable effectiveness in reality⁹, reconciliation studies had a long way to go until they discovered refugees. This development has many reasons. One is the ongoing debate on how to define and identify reconciliation in the “real world” in an evident and, if possible, measurable way.

Furthermore, the *idea* of the refugee, although difficult to categorize, given the high number of situations that “produced” refugees and, within these local conditions, the thousands of different cases, is connected to the concept of reconciliation from several different points of view¹⁰.

In contemporary literature, we can find several different definitions of reconciliation, depending on the researchers and the discipline belongs to: political scientists, religious scholars, theologians, or psychologists and researchers from other disciplines give different definitions. One of the most innovative and challenging approaches to the theory of reconciliation is the one embraced by our Jena Center for Reconciliation Studies¹¹ in Jena, Germany.

international agreement about a definition that includes these two core components, interpretations of the definition and practical translations varies from state-to- state. (United Nations Eurostats Manuals and Guidelines, *Technical Report on Internally Displaced Persons, Current Practices and Recommendations for Improvement*, March 2018, p. 15, available online at <https://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic-social/Standards-and-Methods/files/Technical-Report/national-reporting/Technical-report-on-statistics-of-IDPs-E.pdf>), accessed May 3, 2020.

⁷ 67% of all UNHCR refugees come from just five countries: Syria (6.7 Million), Afghanistan (2.7 Million), South Sudan (2.3 Million), Myanmar (1.1 Million) and Somalia (900.000).

⁸ <https://www.unhcr.org/globaltrends2018/>, last accessed February 6, 2020.

⁹ South Africa after Apartheid, Rwanda after the genocide against the Tutsis, and post WWII German-French relationships, just to name a few.

¹⁰ See, Gold, S J – Nawyn, S, *Routledge International Handbook of Migration Studies*, 1st Edition, London, Routledge, 2013.

FIDIAN-QASMIYEH, E ET AL. 2014, VOLKAN 2017, ZITO – MARTIN 2016, Furthermore we have been informed by Ai Weiwei's documentary *Human Flow* (2017) and by several meetings with refugees in Germany.

¹¹ <https://www.jcrs.uni-jena.de>.

JCRS is based on the definition that reconciliation is the creation of *normal* and if possible *good* relationships in the face of wars, civil wars, genocides, dictatorships, apartheid, enslavement, colonialism, and grave human rights violations. It is conceived as a comprehensive approach to find a reconciled peace with good relationships. Those relationships include the ones with the other(s), with your own group, with oneself, with nature and environment, etc. Relationships with transcendence or individual meanings of life are equally important. Reconciliation is a long-term process over several generations that includes many different approaches and practices.

All of these practices are rooted in a worldview and in a concept of the reconciliation process which can be encapsulated by the following elements and basic convictions:

1-An orientation towards the past: the past must be dealt with, if reconciliation is to take place.

2-The importance of truth: the truth must be known and acknowledged by all, including the perpetrators.

3-The importance of conserving the past: the past must be remembered by building museums, memorials, by books written by historians, by archives and by the conservation of the sites of suffering.

4-The importance of guilt: the individual perpetrator has done wrong through his free will. He is responsible and must confess his guilt.

5-The importance of words of apology and forgiveness. Forgiveness demands the verbal expression of guilt and an apology from the perpetrator's side.

6-The importance of empathy: it is vital for the public and also for perpetrators and victims to show empathy and compassion with the victims.

7-The importance of emotions: healing can happen through an expression of emotion.

8-Identity over time: the personal identity of the perpetrator and victim endure and remain stable over time.

9-The acceptance of the perpetrator into the moral community is possible through an accepted apology or/and through punishment including reparations.

10-The importance of a vision of a common future: reconciliation is motivated by the vision of a better future for both partners, when the shadows of the past are overcome and replaced by a new friendly and peaceful relationship. This leads to a new cooperation and provides security for both partners (never again).

11-For religious people, human reconciliation is related to reconciliation with God. In Christianity reconciliation of the world with God (2 Cor. 5:19) is the presupposition of inter-human

*reconciliation, in Judaism inter-human reconciliation is a precondition for the reconciliation with God on the “Great Day of reconciliation (Yom Kippur)” and in the eschatological future*¹².

The contemporary idea of reconciliation, in fact, appears back in the 60s in some of the most prominent theologians of the 20th Century. Both Karl Barth and Jürgen Moltmann’s views of the topic can be considered close to the present idea¹³. We should not forget, though, that in 1914 in Konstanz, a group of Christian theologians founded the *Internationaler Versöhnungsbund* and that, besides Bonhoeffer, Barth and Moltmann, Black Theologians in the US (Roberts 1971)¹⁴ have been groundbreaking in the field. In the 1990s with more or less successful reconciliation processes in South Africa, Rwanda and Northern Ireland, reconciliation became an important topic for other disciplines such as social psychology, law and political science. The limits of more traditional approaches such as Conflict resolution and Transitional justice became clear in *intractable conflicts*, such as Israel-Palestine, the one in Cyprus and in the peace process in former Yugoslavia.¹⁵

The main features of the concept, as conceived today, are related to the non-violent settlement of conflicts but also to the holistic restoration of social relations and the healing of hearts and minds. Therefore it includes, within its deeper core, the concepts of forgiveness, healing, social justice, acceptance of the other, reparation, apology, interdependence, collaboration¹⁶. An interdisciplinary and if possible transdisciplinary approach is essential to the contemporary stage of reconciliation studies because success and failure of the different practices of reconciliation can only be described in a combination of disciplines such as communication, education, economy, geography, history, law, political science, philosophy, psychology, sociology or religious studies. JCRS therefore counts more than 20 professors from all those disciplines.

The one of the Jena Center is based on the concept of “Hölderlin-perspective”. The German poet Friedrich Hölderlin (1770–1843) in his novel *Hyperion*, wrote:

*Reconciliation is in the middle of strife and everything apart finds each other again*¹⁷

¹² Leiner, M *Thinking differently about identity and Harmony – the potential of Asian thinking for Reconciliation: is Reconciliation a topic for East Asia*, in Tolliday, P, Palme, M, Dong-Choon Kim (ed.), *Asia-Pacific between Conflict and Reconciliation*, RIPAR (Research in Peace and Reconciliation) Vol. 3, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 2016, p. 186.

¹³ See Barth K (1961–1967), *Church Dogmatics*, Vol. 4, *The Doctrine of Reconciliation*, London-Edinburgh, T.& T. Clark and Moltmann J (1967) *Theology of Hope: On the Ground and the Implications of a Christian Eschatology*, London, SCM.

¹⁴ See Roberts, D, *Liberation and Reconciliation. A Black Theology*, Philadelphia, Westminster Press, 1971 (second edition, Markynoll, NY, Orbis Books, 1994).

¹⁵ See Aleksandar Fatic, *Reconciliation via the War Crimes tribunal?* Abingdon-on Thames: Routledge revival 2020 (1st published in 2000).

¹⁶ See, among others, **DU TOIT** 2018.

¹⁷ **HÖLDERLIN** 1988, 760, Hölderlin F (1797–1799) *Hyperion oder der Eremit in Griechenland*, Tübingen, Cotta, in Sattler D E (1988) *Friedrich Hölderlin: Sämtliche Werke und Briefe*, vol. 1. Darmstadt, Stroemfeld Verlag, p. 760.

This perspective is the antithesis to a widespread notion in political science, according to which reconciliation is seen as an event that occurs only after the end of the conflict.

The Hölderlin perspective focuses on the factors in a conflict that may potentially pave the way to a possible reconciliation. These factors might be groups that have been involved in the conflict but that do not agree with it, but also individuals or civil society actors who are against the conflict, for personal, moral, economic or other reasons. Although reconciliation is not to be considered as a single event, but as a process¹⁸, impromptu situations, cooperation, sincere, non-staged expression of common feelings, unexpected ceasefires or reactions in a conflict scenario¹⁹, might be significant in the framework of the Hölderlin perspective towards reconciliation. The original meaning of the Hölderlin-perspective is to protest against the short-term-approach proposed by the UN-Agenda for peace in 1992 putting reconciliation only in the end of the process, and all the scholars who have followed it.

The Jena perspective aims to develop a scenario, in which reconciliation and conflict are in a constant relationship, therefore you will never have a condition of full conflict, with no room for reconciliation. Conflict resolution begins when the conflict is still in full swing. This prepares the foundation for a long term non-violent settlement of conflicts, but also for the overall restoration of social relations. Reconciliation Studies is a transdisciplinary and multiscale scientific field that focuses on institutional, political, individual, collective, inter-group, tribal and religious dynamics. This process involves both the post conflict institutions, which bear the responsibility of providing the legal and political framework and tools for an actual reconciliation of the country²⁰ and the civil society, individuals, groups, religious and tribe leaders²¹. In post conflict societies ideas and feelings like trust, forgiveness, healing, acceptance of the other and his/her suffering play, at different levels and according to the cases, prominent roles.

Furthermore, understanding the suffering of the other, through a personal encounter with him/her, helps us appreciate the human dignity that we share despite our differences. This is what needs to be recognized and supported in the midst of conflict, in order to avoid the reminding of continuing animosity²².

¹⁸ See, among others, the works of Joram Tarusarira, Martin Leiner and Mohammed Abu Nimer.

¹⁹ The famous *Christmas Truce*, during WWII, can be considered as one of these cases. For a quick overview of the event, see: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/football/teams/england/10455611/England-v-Germany-when-rivals-staged-beautiful-game-on-the-Somme.html>, accessed April 29, 2019.

²⁰ Let us think of the *Truth and Reconciliation Commission* in South Africa, (1996) and the *National Unity and Reconciliation Commission* in Rwanda (1999).

²¹ See, among others: LEONE 2011, APPLEBY 2000 and ABU NIMER 2003.

²² DAJANI DAUDI – DAJANI DAUDI – LEINER – BARAKAT (ed.) 2016.

As one of its latest and most effective initiatives, the Jena Center for Reconciliation Studies has started in collaboration with several partners in the Middle East, the network of reconciliation studies centers and departments in the M.E.N.A. region.

This activity has sparked, among others, the idea of this book.

The Middle East and North Africa is among the most affected by wars, civil wars, and severe human rights violations on earth. Since the 1990s, reconciliation studies have strongly developed in some centres around the world. However, they still are relatively absent from the academic curricula of universities in the M.E.N.A. region. The establishment and the spreading of reconciliation studies in this area is, therefore, one main goal for the A.A.R.M.E.N.A. (the Academic Alliance for Reconciliation in the Middle East and North Africa) network.

Representatives of 20 universities from Jordan, Turkey, Morocco, Lebanon, Palestine and Egypt, but also from Austria, Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Ireland, as well as spokespersons of the German Research Foundation (DFG) and the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) took part in the A.A.R.M.E.N.A. founding and kick-off conference²³ at the Friedrich-Schiller University in Jena, Germany, in August 2018.

Well known scholars in the field took part in the gathering, among them Mohammed Abu Nimer, chairperson of KAICIID in Vienna, Fanie du Toit, at the time *Chief Technical Advisor for Reconciliation* at the UNDP office in Iraq, John Brewer, author of the famous *Peace processes: A Sociological Approach*²⁴ and Ralf Wüstenberg, one of the most prominent experts on reconciliation in South Africa and after the end of GDR. Together with academics, the conference hosted presentations by practitioners, such as Zahra' Langhi from the WomenS platform for Peace in Libya and a panel was dedicated to the witness of Syrian refugees who live in Thuringia.

The title of the gathering was *Reconciliation and Refugees in the Middle East and North Africa: an Interdisciplinary Perspective*, and the programme also covered topics such as “Refugees and Reconciliation in Media,” “Reconciliation and Education,” and “Religion and Reconciliation.” The German Research Foundation (DFG) and the Ernst-Abbe-Foundation funded the conference.

The idea of this book was born as the chance to publish the proceedings of the conference. Although all the papers presented at the gathering are included, the volume is meant to be more than just a collection of articles.

²³ Among others, even the the former prime minister of Jordan, Adnan Badran, spoke in favour of reconciliation studies and their positive impact on the M.E.N.A. region.

²⁴ Brewer, J D, *Peace processes: A Sociological Approach*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2010.

The subject *Reconciliation and Refugees* is, in fact, topical and in many cases, it still needs to be scholarly researched in the area. Recent international forced migrations from developing countries, especially Sub-Saharan and West Africa, Central Asia (namely Afghanistan, Pakistan) and the Indian Sub-Continent (Bangladesh) towards Europe are a phenomenon that is in continuous evolution and that may affect tremendously the domestic policies (and political scenarios, as well as elections' results) of several EU countries.

The role of reconciliation in this kind of situations is still to be addressed, but what is out of doubts is that refugees are in need of reconciliation from many perspectives. An incomplete list would at least include:

- (1) Reconciliation within themselves, their feeling of guilt for having left others at home and having left their country, the sadness for all they made through, and the elaboration of their traumas (PTSD is extremely frequent among forced migrants, see below),
- (2) Reconciliation between different groups of refugees, maybe fighting on different sides in a civil war
- (3) reconciliation with the hosting societies, that are not very welcoming most of the times,
- (4) with the loss of family members during their trip, or
- (5) with the societies and tribal organization of their country of origin in case of return

Those are just a few examples of the issues in which reconciliation may play a role in human mobility.

The book presents two separate sections, one more theoretical, and the other more experiential and practical.

The first section includes JCRS Director Martin Leiner's paper that introduces the relationships between reconciliation and refugee studies, Davide Tacchini (FSU Jena)'s reflections on reconciliation and Christian-Muslim relations, together with Fanie Du Toit (IJR Cape Town)'s interesting analysis of the possible applications of Reconciliation Studies in Iraq after the end of ISIL. Since Reconciliation Studies include the chance of several multi-disciplinary methodologies to analyze conflicts, in this first section you will also find André Zempelburg (FSU Jena)'s religious studies approach to migration in the Bible and the Qur'an and Francesco Ferrari (FSU Jena)'s contribution about Jean Améry and his experience between quest for *Heimat* and Alienation after being imprisoned in Auschwitz. Dalal Iriqat (Arab American University of Palestine, Ramallah) goes deep into the Israel-Palestine conflict through diplomacy, in the perspective of Peacebuilding and Zeina Barakat (FSU Jena) with Ralf Wüstenberg (Europa-Universität Flensburg) lead the reader through an exploration of the political and religious dimensions of Empathy. The role of the European Union is analyzed in three different but equally interesting and innovative papers by Wietzke de Jong-

Kumru (Europa-Universität Flensburg, *The European Story after the 2015 Refugee Crisis*), Amjad Abu el-Ezz (An-Najah University, *The European Union Political Involvement in the Middle East Conflict and Middle East Peace Process*) and Carolina Rehrmann (FSU Jena) with an interesting article on the Refugee issue in Germany and Greece.

The second section is opened by Michael Berdine's personal experience of reconciliation in post 9/11 Arizona, and includes papers on Transitional Justice in Morocco (Rabah Aynaou with Amina Hakkou, Université Mohammed 1er, Oujda), as well contributions on digital news and new technologies applied to refugees in the West, such as the ones by Zahra Awad and Aya Al-Faouri (University of Jordan) and Iyad Al-Dajani (FSU Jena).

Ayman Youssef (Arab American University, Jenin) analyzes the possibilities of reconciliation and Peacebuilding in Palestine and Muath Az-Zoubi (University of Jordan) explains in detail the current situation of the welcoming of refugees in Jordan. The book ends with an illuminating article on the possibilities of transition in Libya after several years of impasse by Zahra' Langhi.

Davide Tacchini

Zeina M. Barakat

Martin Leiner

Iyad M. AlDajani

Part One

The Hölderlin-Perspective and Its Impact on Reconciliation with Refugees

I. Reconciliation Studies Discover Refugees

Reconciliation studies had a long way to go until they discovered refugees. This development has many reasons. One is the ongoing debate on how to define and identify reconciliation in the “real world” in an evident and, if possible, measurable way. We can distinguish four different approaches to the definition of reconciliation. They are all related to time:

1. The eschatological approach
2. The momentum approach
3. The short-term approach
4. The long-term approach

1. In reconciliation studies as well as in philosophical and religious discourses, there is a tradition which considers reconciliation more like an ideal where full peace, truth, justice, love, and healing are real, and all forms of alienation are overcome. Only in heaven, reconciliation could exist. These kinds of *eschatological approaches* often serve to criticize processes of political reconciliation in the “real world.” Criticizing expressions, such as, “this is not reconciliation” not only indicate a lack of confrontation with the historical truth but also a lasting dominance of injustice. In religious terms, those criticisms consider reconciliation as an eschatological reality. From those eternal and ideal theories, only a critical but not a practical study of reconciliation is possible. However, they have the strength to show how deeply unreconciled human life is. In order to research and measure reconciliation, a different approach is necessary, which does not exclude the phenomena of uncomplete reconciliation from the debate but opens the eyes for small steps forward without ruling them out.¹

2. The *momentum approach* tries to identify moments and experiences of reconciliation: former enemies embracing each other,² (Volf 1996) confessions of guilt, tears of remorse and forgiveness. These moments can take place in personal encounters. What often happens between parents and

¹ In Christian theology, according to 2 Cor 5, the reconciliation of the world is a spiritual reality, which can be experienced because Christians look at the world “kata pneuma” (following the Spirit of God). Idealist, only eschatological approaches, even if they claim to be Christian, contradict the perspective of the New Testament, where reconciliation is considered as already accomplished (2 Cor 5, 18). For a reflected critical and constructive theological reading of political reconciliation cf. also WÜSTENBERG, R.K 2004 *Die politische Dimension der Versöhnung. Eine theologische Studie zum Umgang mit Schuld nach den Systemumbrüchen in Südafrika und Deutschland*. Gütersloh: Chr. Kaiser.

² Cf. VOLF, M 1996 *Exclusion and Embrace: A Theological Exploration of Identity, Otherness, and Reconciliation*. Nashville/TN: Abington Press.

children or lovers after a dispute can also occur between former enemies in a war. Those moments of felt reconciliation touch and soften people's hearts. Even observers get tears in their eyes and goosebumps. They are "experiences of resonance"³ and sometimes come close to what Abraham Maslow described as "peak experiences".⁴

Great moments of reconciliation could be seen in the political sphere during sessions of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission and in symbolic acts, such as the "Warsaw Genuflection" by Willy Brandt, or the mutual visit of the German chancellor Helmut Kohl and the French president François Mitterrand in Verdun where both stood hand in hand at the war cemetery with Thousands of deaths from World War I. Even if some question the authenticity of such public and political gestures, the images become icons of reconciliation, often reproduced and deeply incorporated in the collective memory.

As a scientific approach, outstanding experiences of reconciliation like these may represent powerful images, since they are so distinct from others that they can be identified quite easily both by the people directly involved and by observers. The problem for research is the question of how to be at the right place in those moments and develop criteria to distinguish authentic reconciliation from non-authentic forms.⁵ Like in researches on love⁶ and trust⁷, the *moment* of reconciliation can be a fruitful object for psychology, neurosciences, physiology, and sociology.

So far, however, it has not been explored thoroughly. As reconciliation happens in an unforeseeable way, it mostly occurs far away from laboratory experiments, brain scanners, and blood pressure measuring devices. It is unlikely that people would fill out a twenty-page questionnaire after a great moment of reconciliation. Nevertheless, everybody has such moments in mind. Mainly applied in social psychology are those scientific approaches that focus on the readiness to reconcile, examine such moments, and study whether people are willing to accept such moments to happen.

Those moments of reconciliation have long-lasting effects, but it might be said about them what Barbara Frederikson wrote about love. Reconciliation as a bodily feeling is not permanent. Like the "time scale" of love, the one of reconciliation "is [also] far shorter than we typically think". It is "not lasting [...] [but] forever renewable."⁸

³ Cf. ROSA, H 2016 *Resonanz. Eine Soziologie der Weltbeziehung*. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp.

⁴ Cf. MASLOW, A.H 1964 *Religions, values, and peak experiences*. London: Penguin Books Limited.

⁵ Cf. KODALLE, K.-M 2013, *Verzeihung denken. Die verkannte Grundlage humaner Verhältnisse*. München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, BRUDHOLM, TH 2008, *Resentment's Virtue. Jena Améry and the Refusal to Forgive*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

⁶ Cf. FREDERIKSON, B 2013, *Love 2.0., Creating Happiness and Health in Moments of Connection*. New York: Hudson Street Press.

⁷ Cf. MÖLLERING, G. *Trust, Reason, Routine, Reflexivity*. Oxford/Amsterdam: Elsevier. pp. 105–126: The Leap of Faith.

⁸ FREDRIKSON, B, *Love 2.0.*, p. 6.

This circumstance takes nothing away from the importance of the moments of reconciliation. Like the first kiss of love, the embrace, tears, handshakes, and public apologies are essential for reconciliation. For a change from enmity to amity, they remain crucial and will always be the best friends of photographers and politicians as well.

However, we only focus on one form of moments of reconciliation in media and politics: the warm and dramatic moments of emotional connection between former enemies. From a Christian perspective, researchers like to evaluate such moments according to the elements of the sacrament of penance: *Contritio* (Remorse), *Confessio* (Confession), *Absolutio* (proclamation of forgiveness), and *Satisfactio* (Activities of symbolic reparation). This approach provides a narrow normative framework which can be combined and enlarged with the sequence of embrace as Miroslav Volf (Volf 1996) described it: opening of the arms – waiting – embrace and release; a model which already can be applied to different forms of reconciliation but still remains a model. It is only a pattern of the encounter between individual persons and does not address the many different factors which play a role in reconciliation.

Most processes of reconciliation do not entirely follow the warm and dramatic model. In most cases, there is an interplay between different emotional and cognitive developments as well as practices embedded in a certain context. Important processes happen without direct encounter and highly emotional experiences. Emotions of hatred can change even through reasons outside of the conflict. Such a change can pave the way for reconciliation. The narrative of violence against a person can include new information or be reframed. Victims might see, for instance, that the perpetrator was not free to act, but they followed orders and were expected to obey.⁹ Former enemies might reframe the conflict and consider perpetrators and victims betrayed by others. People might let go of the past and open for a shared future because it is part of the Buddhist religion not to stay attached to the past.¹⁰ The Christian approach of 2 Cor 5 is also based on an overall reconsideration of the world which is seen according to the spirit (kata pneuma) and no longer to the flesh (kata sarka). According to Kol 1, a world with enemies and divisions is reframed as a world of peace united and reconciled in Christ. There might emerge empathy between victims and perpetrators as people take the role of the other. Thus, victims might forgive in a lonely moment of reflection. For Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela, the

⁹ In South African TRC, the discussion of the St. James' Church massacre was considerably influenced towards forgiveness by a community member who told about his experience as a British soldier who had to accomplish orders in Cyprus.

¹⁰ For resources of traditional East Asian Religions for reconciliation, cf. LEINER, M 2016 "Thinking differently about Identity and Harmony - The Potential of Asian thinking for Reconciliation. Is reconciliation a topic for East Asia?" In: TOLLIDAY, PH/PALME, M/DONG-CHOON, K ed., *Asia-Pacific between Conflict and Reconciliation*, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht pp. 183–203.

most intriguing elements lay in recognition and empathy not in forgiveness.¹¹ In any case, recognizing the victim and their suffering can take place even in cases when the perpetrators are dead. Then, members of the subsequent generation could encounter with each other. Children of a next generation cannot ask authentically for forgiveness because they but did nothing, but still they can recognize and deeply empathize. In cases when asking for forgiving and confessing would mean to take distance from a “just struggle”, it is possible to recognize a victim of violence and to say sorry because it happened to you and had to suffer so much. This is the reason why some researchers consider recognition as more important than forgiveness.¹² In any case recognition of the truth and true recognition of the other the way to reconciliation.

Therefore, the great moments of hot reconciliation are surrounded and substituted by a complex reality of moves towards reconciliation.¹³ Considering the particularities of the German language, we can distinguish two primary forms within the moments of reconciliation: forgiveness (German: “Vergebung”), which is based on the accountability of the perpetrator who committed the atrocity, and to forgive (German: “verzeihen”). The word “verzeihen” is cognate to the verb “zeigen”, which means showing in a certain direction. If “vergeben” points to the persons who were perpetrator and victim, “verzeihen” shows into different directions, such as the circumstances, other agents, the effects of education and habitus, misinformation, and propaganda-lies to explain the atrocity and distance the wrongdoer partly from their wrongdoing.¹⁴ In old German language, which we still find in the chapter on *Das Verzeihen* in *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, “verzeihen” means to renounce, to give something up. Pointing to something else can immediately alleviate anger and resentment if there is an understanding that, for instance, a perpetrator was not “free” in their behaviour but under control of somebody else. Another distinction of moments of reconciliation are “hot” and “cold” moments. These two terms distinguish highly emotional moments as hot while moments of distance and reflection are considered as cold.

Without any doubt, the momentum approach is essential for reconciliation studies and needs further development to help us understand many problems of the debates on reconciliation. However, the manifold and complex character of moments of reconciliation, which include longer effects and silent long-term developments, the search for long-lasting peace and healing of relationships between

¹¹ Cf. **GOBODO-MADIKIZELA, P** 2018, “Forgiveness is ‘the wrong word’: Empathic Repair and the Potential for Human Connection in the Aftermath of Historical Trauma”. In: Leiner, M & Schließer, C., eds. 2018. *Alternative Approaches in Conflict Resolution*. London: Palgrave pp. 111–123.

¹² Cf. **KONÉ, C B** 2014 (ed), *Réconciliation ou reconnaissance? Essais sur la dynamique d’entente durable*. Frankfurt/M.: Peter Lang.

¹³ For a description of such processes cf. **FLABPÖHLER S.** 2016, *Verzeihen. Vom Umgang mit Schuld*. München: DVA.

¹⁴ In Greek Tragedy, the guilt aspect is shown in King Oedipus and the aspect of “verzeihen”, which points to other factors and even transcendent ones, in Oedipus at Colonus. In Rwanda and other places, quite often the influence of demons or of the devil is considered the reason for the atrocities. This thinking allows to distinguish the perpetrator from their act and helps reconciliation by acts of “verzeihen”.

former enemies, and the practical difficulties of research led to two different definitions of reconciliation:

3. The *short-term approach*

In the 1990ies, many researchers still based their work on the assumption that reconciliation would be a small and specific practice which takes place quite a time after the end of violent conflict. *The Agenda for Peace* of UN secretary general Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1992) mentions measures of post-conflict peacebuilding¹⁵. Some of those multiple measures mentioned in the agenda, such as cooperative projects and rebuilding of confidence, are elements many scholars consider as typical for reconciliation approaches. The Agenda mentioned “repatriation of refugees” as a postconflict peacebuilding measure. In that time, however, no clear link between refugees and reconciliation has been established.

At that time, the emerging definition of reconciliation was based on the idea that reconciliation is one of many steps from violent conflict to peace. Only after cease-fire (peacemaking) and a certain number of security building measures, such as disarmament, start of institutional reforms, and reintegration of ancient combatants into different positions (peacekeeping), and only after the work on trauma therapies, transitional justice, and political settlement are in its final throes, reconciliation can take place. In cases of intra-state conflict, reconciliation can provide the basis for cooperation in administration, education, or economy and build the foundation for a functioning democratic culture. Reconciliation can include confessions and forgiveness but also phases of organised encounters between the groups as well as mutual understanding and cooperation. If there are laws that create cooperation and mixed leadership between former enemies, social reconciliation, so it was assumed, can proceed.¹⁶

It seems quite convincing that trauma therapy and a certain level of trust and security are preconditions for reconciliation. During a certain phase after violent conflicts, it is more likely that moments of hot and processes of cold reconciliation occur. However, it is evident as well that reconciliation is not limited to that period. Moments of reconciliation happen in the middle of the conflict. The “Christmas peace” between Scottish, English, German, and French soldiers in 1914 is

¹⁵

http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/89-92/Chapter%208/GENERAL%20ISSUES/Item%2029_Agenda%20for%20peace_.pdf p. 825.

¹⁶ One of the mistakes after German reunification has been that there was even no effort to invest into social Reconciliation between former East Germans themselves and between West- and East-Germans. Politicians believed that will happen naturally. Cf. Leiner, M. „Versöhnung in Thüringen - Das Hölderlin Prinzip.“ In: O'MALLEY, M/LEINER, M/SUMME, D/KNOEPFLER, N, eds. 2017. *Thüringen: Braucht das Land Versöhnung?* Würzburg: Verlag Königshausen & Neumann, pp. 13–32.

only one famous example.¹⁷ The activities of doctors taking care of the former enemies also represent the possible peaceful human encounters in times of war.¹⁸ There are personal reconciling encounters, conflicts that affect families and friendships from within¹⁹, common religious beliefs, ongoing economical relations, common respected laws, shared values and sympathies that still exist among people who belong to different sides in a conflict. Moments of embracement and forgiveness, of reframing and “verzeihen” not only take place after a war or after the fall of a totalitarian regime, there are, usually, two tracks, one official, and one secret: the latter is the one in which diplomacy is more active.²⁰

The original and fundamental meaning of the Hölderlin-perspective is to protest against the short-term-approach as brought forward by the UN- Agenda for peace in 1992 and all scholars who adopted that point of view. The Hölderlin-perspective is based on the quotation by German poet Friedrich Hölderlin, who wrote in his novel *Hyperion. Oder Der Eremit in Griechenland (1897/99)*: „Versöhnung ist mitten im Streit und alles Getrennte findet sich wieder“.²¹ „Reconciliation is in the middle of strife and all things separated find each other again”. Hölderlin understood that sentence in the context of his poetic project to overcome the weakness of religious faith in his time and to find reconciliation between the separations which characterize modern life. This particular background in Hölderlin’s dialectical and esthetic vision of reality is not necessarily excluded but not central to what the Jena school calls the Hölderlin-perspective. The Jena school aims to develop a particular vision of conflict which places reconciliation and conflict into a constant relationship. Within this relationship, there never is 100 percent conflict and never 100 percent reconciliation; both are always together. Reconciliation appears in the middle of conflict, or it does never appear. Reconciliation works on the conflict and transforms it into a nonviolent and open treatment of conflict which includes great moments of reconciliation and facilitates enormous steps towards higher levels of reconciliation.

¹⁷ Christmas Peace became famous thanks to the movie “Merry Christmas/Joyeux Noel/ Frohe Weihnachten” by French filmmaker Christian Carion (2005). In one story, the movie shows in condensed form many different events which took place in 1914. Cf. JÜRGS, M 2003. *Der kleine Frieden im Großen Krieg. Westfront 1914: Als Deutsche, Franzosen und Briten gemeinsam Weihnachten feierten*. München: Bertelsmann.

¹⁸ Cf. Palestinian peace activist Mohammed Dajani described the impact of how Israeli doctors treated his father and his mother on his change towards reconciliation with Israel. Cf. BARAKAT, Z 2017. *From Heart of Stone to Heart of Flesh: Evolutionary Journey from Extremism to Moderation*. München: Herbert Utz Verlag, pp. 129–130.

¹⁹ For white South Africans, relationships between brothers and sisters where one was *pro apartheid* and the other against it have been extremely important to open the road for reconciliation: F.W. de Klerk formerly was a conservative Afrikaner, part of the camp of the so called “verkrampptes”, whereas his brother Willem was a well known progressive (“verlichtes”). Cf. DU TOIT, F 2018. *When political Transition Works., Reconciliation as Interdependence*. Oxford: Oxford University Press p. 25. Military chief Constand Viljoen and his brother Abraham is a similar couple of brothers, cf. CRUYWAGEN, D 2015. *Brothers in War and Peace. Constand and Abraham Viljoen and the Birth of the new South Africa*. New York; Random House Struik.

²⁰ Buchenwald concentration camp was such a place of developing ideas for Europe after World War II and the Nazi rule, cf. HIRTE, R., RÖTTELE, H. AND VON KLINGGRÄFF, F., eds., 2011. *Von Buchenwald (s) nach Europa. Gespräche über Europa mit ehemaligen Buchenwald-Häftlingen in Frankreich*. Weimar: Weimarer Verlagsgesellschaft.

²¹ HÖLDERLIN, F. *Hyperion oder der Eremit in Griechenland. Sämtliche Werke und Briefe*. KNAUPP, M., ed. 1998. Vol. 1. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. p. 760.

Thus, the foundation of the Jena approach lays in a long-term-perspective and definition of reconciliation.

4. *The long-term approach*

The next steps came with discoveries which broadened and deepened the concept of reconciliation. On one side, there is the fact that moments of reconciliation happen, and reconciliation processes often start in the middle of the violent conflict. On the other hand, if reconciliation can be defined as the creation of “normal” and, if possible, “good”, relationships after grave incidents, such as wars, civil wars, genocides, and other crimes against humanity²², scholars and practitioners realized that reconciliation is far from being easy to achieve. Reconciliation has to deal with the intergenerational transmission of trauma, stereotypes, resentment, and habitus. Scholars started to study so-called “intractable conflicts”. It was Israeli social psychologist Daniel Bar-Tal, who developed this concept to describe the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and its social-psychological infrastructure.²³ Those researches added further evidence to the need for long-term commitment to transform relationships instead of quick conflict resolutions. Deep-rooted emotions of hatred and fear against the other party, habits, and stereotypes of mistrust and contempt can be used by extremists or by elites who benefit from the conflict to destroy peace-agreements as well as processes of national reconciliation. Examples range from the majority in Colombia voting against the peace process in the 2016 referendum, passing by the failure of the reunification of Cyprus after the referendum in 2004²⁴, and the fight against reconciliation governments and peace initiatives, different governments in Africa, in the Caucasus-region or East Asia. In all cases, ongoing violence, inciting media, and power asymmetries make reconciliation difficult. Those hard realities reveal that reconciliation is significant as a comprehensive process with many elements that should come together to facilitate a shift towards a culture of peace. Conflicts are not intractable by themselves, but in an intractable phase where no conflict resolution or negotiation strategy works. But still reconciliation can transform the conflict until it is unfrozen. Not only the so-called “hard factors,” such as law, economy, and weapons count for reconciliation, but also the “soft factors,” such as culture, media, education, or religious leaders. If peace should be sustainable, a willingness to engage many actors is required. “Reconciliation is an internally complex concept because it refers to a cluster of practices that include (among other things) repenting, restoring, punishing, apologizing, repairing, forgiving, redeeming, forgetting,

²² Cf. LEINER, M. 2018. “Conclusion: From Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation“. In: LEINER, M. & SCHLIEBER, CHR. eds., *Alternative Approaches in Conflict Resolution*. London: Palgrave. pp. 175–185. p. 179.

²³ Cf. HALPERIN, E. & SHARVIT, K. eds. 2015/2016, *The Social Psychology of Intractable Conflicts. Celebrating the Legacy of Daniel Bar-Tal*, 2 vol. Cham/Heidelberg/New York/Dordrecht/ London: Springer Publishing Switzerland.

²⁴ Cf. REHRMANN, C., *Der Zypernkonflikt. Eine sozialpsychologische Diskursanalyse*. London: Springer 2020.

remembering, promising and understanding.”²⁵ More precisely, reconciliation includes an open set of at least eleven elements which show how long and complex the process can be. It is not compelling that all of those eleven elements materialize, but there is no reconciliation process which does not consider several of those elements:

- (1) *Political and legal provisions*, such as treaties of cooperation and clarifications about disputed questions of territory or other contested issues
- (2) Creation of *common security architecture* through disarmament and crisis management and strengthening institutions of cooperation such as OSCE
- (3) *Apologies* and symbolic acts by politicians representing the country to honor all victims as well as *reparations* and other attempts at restoration
- (4) *Cooperation regarding economic, legal, ecological, and international issues, including mutual aid in cases of disaster*
- (5) *Cooperation in civil society*, such as city-twinning or youth and student exchange programs
- (6) *Confrontation with history*, opening archives, museums, and memorials but also
- (7) *Sharing of narratives*, which implies confrontation with individual history through the victim’s right to know and encounters between victims and perpetrators under the aegis of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions
- (8) Intentional strategies, designed to *humanize the image of the other*, to overcome negative stereotypes, build historical dialogue and common schoolbook commissions, and to reform education towards the goal of greater understanding of the other group
- (9) *Modifying the discourse of leaders, the media, and the school books* concerning the other group
- (10) *Individual medical, psychological and social help, including trauma therapies* as well as specific practices for *intergenerational issues* related to reconciliation, such as survivor witness programs
- (11) Elements of *transitional justice, such as trials against perpetrators, Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, reparations, aspects of restorative justice*²⁶

Considering the effects of transgenerational transmission of trauma and hatred, reconciliation takes generations; it can even take centuries in respect to the injustices produced by violence such as colonialism. With this insight, we gradually approach a type of reconciliation theory which is not built on benchmarks and goals to achieve in a particular lap of time. According to Fanie du Toit’s

²⁵ SCHAAP, A. 2005. *Political Reconciliation*. London & New York: Routledge. p. 12.

²⁶ For a similar list cf. LEINER, M., “Thinking differently about Identity and Harmony – The Potential of Asian thinking for Reconciliation. Is reconciliation a topic for East Asia?” PHILIPP TOLLIDAY, MARIA PALME, DONG-CHOON KIM, *Asia-Pacific between Conflict and Reconciliation*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 2016. pp. 183–204. p. 186.

helpful “ideal types” of reconciliation theories, we head even further towards the “agonistic type” which considers reconciliation as a never-ending process.²⁷

Today, many scholars think of reconciliation as a long-term perspective, which can be defined as an “overarching approach to conflicts which focusses on processes of rebuilding relationships. The goal is to create ‘normal’, ‘trustful’ and if possible ‘good’ and ‘peaceful’ relationships”²⁸.

This extension of time for reconciliation to a longterm perspective paved the way for scholars to consider everything which might be a helpful or problematic factor for reconciliation. Sooner or later, refugees had to come into focus. Problems with reintegration of refugees into their original countries provoked the discovery. In 1994, for example, genocide in Rwanda was organized to prevent Tutsi refugees from returning to Rwanda. Another instance occurred in former Yugoslavia where, although the right to return was granted to all refugees after the wars, only about one third returned and stayed in their original cities. Others returned but left because of problems, and some did not even attempt to go back. Poor living conditions, such as insufficient job opportunities and a lack of healthy relationships with the neighbours, were crucial factors.²⁹ Without reconciliation, the return of refugees is difficult and dangerous. A hopeful example is the return of Palestinian refugees to their villages in Israel, where they found secure and supporting conditions to stay. Can it be excluded that similar reactions to those the Hutu extremists showed in 1994 would come from extremist groups in Israel? Based on the observation of difficulties to exercise the right to return, the link between reconciliation and refugees was discovered.

II. Refugees’ Multiple Needs for Reconciliation

A short overview about literature on refugees,³⁰ documentaries, and through conversation with refugees, JCRS researchers found the following needs refugees can have for reconciliation:

1. Refugees need reconciliation with themselves

We can distinguish different issues:

²⁷ DU TOIT, F 2018. *When Political Transition Works. Reconciliation as Interdependence*. London/Oxford: Oxford University Press pp. 167–188.

²⁸ Cf. LEINER M, “Conclusion: From Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation“. In: LEINER, M. & SCHLIEßER, CHR., eds. 2018 *Alternative Approaches in Conflict Resolution*. London: Palgrave. pp. 175–185. p. 179.

²⁹ I owe this insight to Roger Duthie during a meeting in his office in ICTJ in Manhattan.

³⁰ We used GOLD, ST & NAWYN, S 2013, *The Routledge International Handbook of Migration Studies*. London & New York: Routledge. FIDIAN-QASMIYEH, E ET AL. 2014. *The Oxford Handbook of Refugee & Forced Migration Studies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. VOLKAN, V 2017, *Immigrants and Refugees. Trauma, Perennial Mourning, Prejudice, and Border Psychology*. London: Karnak and ZITO, D/MARTIN, E 2016, *Umgang mit traumatisierten Flüchtlingen. Ein Leitfaden für Fachkräfte und Ehrenamtliche*. Weinheim und Basel: Beltz-Verlag. Furthermore we have been informed by Ai Weiwei’s documentary Human Flow (2017) and were informed by several meetings with refugees in Germany.

a. Guilt and shame

Refugees often feel guilty because they left others behind (older persons, such as parents or grandparents in particular). Some may be in dangerous conditions or even die in a war. The simple effect of being a survivor can produce feelings of guilt and shame as described by Holocaust survivors. Interviews with Syrian refugees showed that they are often haunted by a feeling of guilt for letting their responsibilities and country behind. Others feel guilty due to their actions during the war or because of what happened on the journey to their hosting countries. Perhaps they put the lives of their beloved into danger and now have to deal with the feelings and tensions that may occurred between them. Maybe they have been under the pressure of criminal groups and forced to do things they would have never done if they had a free choice.

b. Trauma

In 2005, a clinical study of the University of Konstanz analysed that about 40 percent of the refugees arriving in Germany suffered from Posttraumatic Stress Disorder.³¹ Other studies, with a focus on war refugees indicate even higher numbers. These studies reveal that approximately one refugee out of two has to deal with physiological reactions. Without success, refugees seek healing and reconciliation within themselves after those experiences which have been “too much for them”. Besides Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, forms of depression often occur when people are displaced. They risk becoming perennial mourners. “A perennial mourner daily expends energy to ‘bring back to life’ or ‘kill’ (make futureless) the lost person (or thing).”³²

c. Meaning in Life

Refugees not only lose their homes and jobs, but they also lose almost everything which gave their lives stability and meaning. In the documentary *Human Flow*, Palestinian Dr Hannan Ashrawi states that making a person a refugee is like robbing them from all that gave their lives security and meaning. Quite a similar, Hannah Arendt wrote: “We lost our home, which means the familiarity of daily life. We lost our occupation, which means the confidence that we are of some use in this world. We lost our language, which means the naturalness of reactions, the simplicity of gestures, the unaffected expression of feelings”³³.

³¹ Cf. GÄBEL, U ET AL., „Psychologische Forschungs- und Modellambulanz für Flüchtlinge, Universität Konstanz (2006): Prävalenz der Posttraumatischen Belastungsstörung (PTBS) und Möglichkeiten der Ermittlung in der Asylverfahrenspraxis“. In: *Zeitschrift für klinische Psychologie und Psychotherapie*. Göttingen: Hogrefe. pp. 12–20.

³² VOLKAN, V. 2017. *Immigrants and Refugees. Trauma, Perennial Mourning, Prejudice, and Border Psychology*. London: Karnac p. 19.

³³ H Arendt: *We Refugees*, in J. Kohn – R.H. Feldman „the Jewish Writings“, New York, Schocken Books, 2008, p. 264. available Online at <https://www.jus.uio.no/smr/om/aktuelt/arrangementer/2015/arendt-we-refugees.pdf>, accessed January 25, 2019.

As Abraham Maslow, Erik H. Erikson, and Viktor Frankl developed, security, trust, and meaning in life are fundamental needs for human beings. The way for refugees to find meaning, trust, and security again is stony and troublesome. They now must develop an alternative plan, which often is dissatisfying and not as beneficial as the actual plan they had for their lives. Even if they come to a country with additional opportunities and higher economic performance, refugees often face obstacles and rejection. Syrians who come to Germany, for instance, often feel betrayed since they face bureaucratic impediments, such as disapproval of their diplomas, and that the general situation is far below what they had expected. It happens quite often that somebody who studied law at university is only able to obtain a position in a kindergarten, or a skilled architect has to work as a drawing assistant and will never be able to work as an independent architect in Germany. Reconciliation in the sense of to get reconciled with something unchangeable, mourning about giving up the original life plan is not easy to perform.

2. Refugees Need Reconciliation With the Hosting Society

a) Refugees are often perceived as a *danger* for the hosting society. They are treated with mistrust and suspicion. Refugees are suspected of having radical opinions or being terrorists. Discrimination against refugees by police and bureaucracy occurs in many countries. The lack of citizen rights and recognized passports can be used against refugees; this danger can be framed as a cultural danger. Their way of life seems to endanger the resident population. Therefore, habits of clothing, such as the burqa, have been banned in countries such as France. In cases of polygamy, marriages are not recognized, and families are separated. There are clear benefits to the hosting but often not acknowledged by the population. Such cultural benefits are the introduction of new food and restaurants, other kinds of traditional music with the opportunity of creating mixed culture sounds and new hybrid artistic works, fashion and trends, such as the growing popularity of barber shops in Europe after the arrival of the Syrian refugees, etc.

b) Refugees are seen as a *burden* for the hosting society. Refugees cost money which the state and ultimately the tax paying citizen has to pay. Economist, however, showed that in many cases those sums lead to economic growth and new employment opportunities for the resident population as well. Those opportunities, however, usually grant fewer or even no benefits to lower classes.³⁴ In the long run, the economic activities of refugees often create essential benefit for the entire population. Populist parties, however, conveys the impression that refugees are free riding on the expenses of the resident population.

³⁴ Cf. COLLIER P 2013. *Exodus. How Migration is changing our World*. London/Oxford: Oxford University Press.

c) A particular need for reconciliation to heal the relationship between the resident population and the refugees exists in situations after *violent incidents*. Such incidents can occur between refugees and local actors or right-wing extremist. Other instances are political unrest, drug dealing, prostitution, etc. Media often focus on violent incidents and criminal acts perpetrated by refugees. They dramatize them and present the wrong image with regards to statistics. One example for this argument occurred at the end of 2017 when the German yellow press newspaper *BILD-Zeitung* published misinformation about thirty thousand disappeared and hidden refugees in Germany with the result that even more fear towards refugees was spread amongst the population³⁵.

d) Refugees need *reconciliation between themselves*. War refugees often come from groups which are fighting each other in their countries. In the Syrian case, both pro-Assad and pro-opposition refugees came to Germany. German administration separated them regularly in different refugee camps and cities. The problem is that both in Germany and in Syria (in the case of return), persons from both sides of the conflict have to cooperate and live together. Reconciliation policy should already start in the hosting country since a diaspora is a place where radical political views can develop, and people sometimes finance a civil war from abroad as they seek revenge.

e) Refugees need *reconciliation when they return* to their original places. Those who decide to go back to their villages and cities often find their places sharply changed. The former enemy might be still ruling the city, and other people may have taken the land, the house, and even the wives. In such cases, violence against returning refugees can break out quickly. Government as well can act violently against returning refugees but, of course, violence can also originate from returning refugees. Reconciliation would help to create healthy and trustful relationships again.

As this overview shows, at least four of the five dimensions of reconciliation are touched:

- (1) Reconciliation with oneself
- (2) Reconciliation with the other (as individuum and as a group)
- (3) Reconciliation with one own's group, and
- (4) Reconciliation with the sense and limits of live, values and God.

Only the (5.) dimension, reconciliation with nature seems to be not so important. However, Syrian refugees in Germany have to accept the different climate, which sometimes causes unknown health issues, and the different landscape has to be accepted and become familiar in order to feel at home. These five dimensions on reconciliation interact with each other. Other they are supporting each other, sometimes, however, they are in tension.

³⁵ For clarification of facts cf. <https://www.bento.de/today/asylbewerber-verschwunden-bild-nennt-voellig-falsche-zahl-a-00000000-0003-0001-0000-000001812609>.

III. The Hölderlin Perspective

After all those introductory remarks, The “Hölderlin perspective” can be summarized. It starts from the observation that during a violent conflict, there is never the “total war” Josef Goebbels spoke about in his famous speech.

There are always:

- (1) Persons and groups who do not want the conflict for different reasons, such as pacifism, fear for their beloved ones, connections with the other group, economic interests, awareness for the risks of the conflict.
- (2) There are also normative regulations still respected during the conflict, such as international law like the Geneva conventions of August 1864 and 1949 as well as the Hague conventions of 1864 and 1907, finance and trade laws, or cooperations in sport and religious relations, such as rights concerning the hadj.
- (3) There are also common international institutions such as UN, Red Cross/Red Crescent, or WTO or a religious institution, such as the pope, uniting catholic populations even if their states are in a war.
- (4) In the field of mental representations, the people concerned have memories of the horrors of war but also memories of good relationships with the other group as well as hopes and fears of what could happen during war.
- (5) Many wars, such as those in former Yugoslavia or Eastern Ukraine, are so-called “intimate wars.” A common German expression describes them as “*Bruderkriege*” (brother wars) since there are experiences of particular commonalities. Besides that, the universal fact of common humanity unites the people.
- (6) Shared norms of peace and non-violence in religious and other traditions of the people represent criticism of violence in the middle of a conflict.

Many of those realities of reconciliation do not only materialize in touching moments of reconciliation like the Christmas peace in 1914 but also show that there is a reality of deep interdependence between all sides of a conflict. As mentioned before, there are family ties which can be activated, such as the role of brothers in the South African reconciliation process. There are partnerships in trade, personal friendships, and marriages. Fanie du Toit speaks about intimate conflicts in many countries, such as Africa, Northern Ireland, the Balkans, Lebanon, Israel/Palestine, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Iraq, Syria, Colombia, and Ukraine/Russia or Georgia/Russia. During the Second World War in Alsace-Lorraine, one brother may have fought among the Germans and the other among the French. In the Cold War, one part of the family could have lived in Eastern Germany and the other in Western Germany, or in North and South Korea, respectively. They are in fact

“brother-wars,” which divide families, friendships, and colleagues. In many conflicts, there are areas of relatively peaceful coexistence³⁶, which can become models for others. “Enemy groups share a fundamentally and comprehensive interdependent fate, not because of any moral ideal, but because simply as a matter of fact. Their histories intersect and are captured in memories stretching back generations. Moreover, their current fortunes are intertwined, and for better or worse, they face a shared future. People often travel, trade, love, and live across enemy lines in ways that let slip the fact that their interdependence is at least as fundamental to their realities as is the conflict that divides them. Despite radical differences across enemy lines, in perspective, aspiration, and outlook, often these relationships display a remarkable if unacknowledged proximity.”³⁷ Violent conflicts are insofar paradox as they often lead to a strong interdependence of the enemies and the circumstance that both parties become more similar to each other: Both sides in uniform, suffering, fearing of their beloved, killing and dying.

The Hölderlin perspective, which originally is a perspective for research, can become a practical tool for reconciliation. This tool can be useful on the basis of the just mentioned observations. The start of reconciliation is “to have enemies recognize that they are in fact interdependent; and to create conditions for the kind of deep, normative interdependence that reconciliation promises.”³⁸ For a successful implementation, the Hölderlin perspective has a proposition: looking for occasions and persons who can identify the interdependence and long for peace and reconciliation. Typical persons to achieve that insight in the middle of conflict are women, who feel closer to the women of the other side and who are not as much indoctrinated by the ethics of violence as men often are. Other persons who can feel the interdependence are victims who lost family members or have been injured, disabled persons in general and especially if they are deprived by war.³⁹ Further persons can be intellectuals who engage in critical thinking, such as political and religious leaders, or even persons with economic interests. Religious leaders have been prominent in recent discussions on reconciliation because they quite often adhere to a religion which bridges the divide between the opponents and are committed to ethics of peace. Roman Catholic community Sant’Egidio was able to mediate peace negotiations in several countries, such as Mozambique in 1992 and most recently, on January 13th 2020, on South Sudan. Together religious leaders can build local “infrastructures for peace,” which in cases like Northern Ghana could prevent further outbreaks of violence between Muslims and Christians. On a

³⁶ In Israel, the city of Haifa presents itself to a certain extent as such a model. On the Balkans, there were many peaceful multi-ethnic villages before the Yugoslavian war.

³⁷ DU TOIT, F. 2018. *When Political Transition works*. p. 199.

³⁸ DU TOIT, F. 2018. *When Political Transition works*. p. 199.

³⁹ In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, family members of victims have built the organisation „Parent’s circle“ and injured combatants the „Combatants for Peace.“

global level, the “network of religious and traditional peacemakers”⁴⁰ increasingly becomes an essential cooperation, including many religions worldwide. In January 2019, the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions presented an approach which is partly built on the Hölderlin perspective in the text *Religion and Security-Building in the OSCE Context. Involving Religious Leaders and Congregations in Joint Effort*.⁴¹

The approach of the Hölderlin perspective is to strengthen the identified groups and look for other candidates to start reconciliation in the middle of violent conflict. The Hölderlin perspective observes that during violent conflict, the parties often receive tremendous support from international actors. They become partners, receive weapons, benefit from war economies including all the usual criminal practices, such as corruption, extortion, drug, and commodity dealing. They also attract media attention and are considered as the persons responsible for negotiations. According to the Hölderlin perspective, this unjust rewarding of violence should be diminished and corrected by stronger support for vulnerable groups like women, children, disabled people, and senior citizens or intellectuals, who support peace efforts. If reconciliation occurs in the middle of the conflict (also in peaceful countries), the conflict will surround and affect the peace efforts to a greater extent than most people are aware. According to the Hölderlin perspective, the responsibility for the duration and cruelty of conflicts exceed the borders of the war zone. The insufficient work of customs, police, and revenue in the USA and European countries in cases of drug dealing and money laundering that is not prosecuted is one of the direct reasons why violent civil war in Colombia and other places can persist for such a long time. If institutions in other countries had worked correctly, and if international organisations, such as UN or ICC, had taken action in many cases, numerous conflicts would not have been as violent and long as they were or not even started. The direct organisation of guerrilla groups in foreign countries, such as the USA in Central America under president Ronald Reagan in the 1980s, are an extreme example for the rewards for violence countries outside of the conflict can produce. This instance also reveals the high degree of responsibility these countries have for those wars.

The goal of the Hölderlin perspective is not to end the conflict but to transform it. The main problems are direct, structural, and cultural violence as well as the attempts to freeze that violent situation through physical (borders, walls) and cultural (stereotypes transmitted in education) measures. Another aim is to free communication again and foster mutual exchange.

According to the Hölderlin perspective, the motivation for reconciliation can be rational, emotional, ethical, and spiritual. In a *rational* view, interdependence seems a matter of fact. Our fates are deeply

⁴⁰ Cf. <https://www.peacemakersnetwork.org>.

⁴¹ http://osce-network.net/news-details/news/report-on-religion-and-security-building-in-the-osce-context-presented-in-vienna-on-8-january-2019/?tx_news_pi1%5Bcontroller%5D=News&tx_news_pi1%5Baction%5D=detail&cHash=e3e85e3e793eb8af101c18975d343e40.

connected with each other as we are co-dependent in another painful way with cycles of violence, exploitation, mutual mistrust and fear. Co-dependence should become inter-dependence. The benefits of healthy and trustful relationships are apparent on a rational level: economic benefits, freedom to travel, security without too expensive control systems, and years of life for people who have not to enroll in an army and to fight. Scholars in the field of social geography established the concept of global understanding.⁴² This concept aims for the awareness of our global existence and lifestyle, ranging from the clothes we wear, the food we eat, the books we read, the thoughts we think to the challenges of climate change and peace we are facing together. Only by recognizing interdependence and acting together, humanity can master these problems.

From a more *emotional* perspective, there can be feelings of desire to exchange with the enemy group, such as empathy and respect. People can experience the emotional feeling of similarity and proximity. We are all entangled in stories which include the other.⁴³ As every human being represents humanity, no one is complete without the enemy.

Ethically, it corresponds better to the aspiration of living an ethical life if people are not in a situation where they kill, steal, and lie to each other which are elements of every war. One example for an ethical classical text are the Ten Commandments.

Spirituality provides other powerful motivations for reconciliation. If people identify with and may recognize themselves in the enemy, they can integrate their unconscious sides and shadows to grow into a more complete person. Reconciliation helps persons to enlarge their identities to a global and non-dualistic character.

According to the Hölderlin perspective, after reconciliation started, the conflict should transform into a gradually less violent process. Social learning and social change are key elements for this transformation. Within this process, acts of forgiveness as well as “verzeihen” take place, and compromises about different justice claims must be found. Both parties should try to find rules and institutions for a better common and all discuss all the above mentioned eleven practices of reconciliation. After a thorough consideration of these practices, the relevant points should be implemented.

In the inner-state case, reconciliation must find a new social contract. More and more inclusive groups will gather to discuss the society they want to build together in the future.

⁴² Cf. the initiative International Year of Global Understanding with the plan to create no less than seven hundred UNESCO chairs for Global Understanding. <http://www.global-understanding.info> and <http://www.worldsocialscience.org/2018/03/unesco-chair-global-understanding-sustainability>. A. Demirci, et al. (eds.) (2018), *Geography Education for Global Understanding*. New York: Springer.

⁴³ For the concept of entanglement cf. SCHAPP, W 2012, *In Geschichten verstrickt. Zum Sein von Mensch und Ding*. Frankfurt/M: Klostermann.

Three final remarks may clarify the concept of reconciliation according to the Hölderlin perspective more clearly:

During the process of reconciliation, the goal is not always to find the closest form possible of a shared life but to find out together how close the interaction of the former enemies could be. There are the right closeness and the right distance. The partners must decide the level of coexistence. Separation, such as the division between Slovakia and the Czech Republic, can be an act of reconciliation. A two-state solution could it be as well in the case of Palestine. As in private life, separation and divorce are sometimes the right and best solution. These solutions should be executed with respect and fairness and both parties should have the opportunity to reconcile with the inevitable. Reconciliation also includes the acknowledgment of the unrepairable.⁴⁴ It includes mourning and “according to the person” the hope for justice and healing which is beyond our reach. Reconciliation is a long-term project since it is always in the middle of the conflict. It reaches new levels and can look back on achievements, but violence can be reactivated for many decades after the conflict. Reconciliation efforts must not be ended too early and may last for centuries if not forever.

IV. The Hölderlin Perspective and Practical Work on Reconciliation With Refugees

In this last larger paragraph, I want to examine precise steps in work with refugees to fulfill their needs for reconciliation and empower them to become actors in the sense of the Hölderlin perspective. Besides women, religious leaders, disabled people, and intellectuals, refugees can also be important actors for reconciliation. However, like all of them, they can become extremists as well.

In the first step, the Hölderlin perspective means to identify such factors and potential as well as actual actors of reconciliation. It happens quite often that persons and groups who experience violent conflict from a distance are more or less ignored. Since they are not engaged in fighting in the conflict, those people are often displaced and become refugees. Violent actors pressure moderate persons, who refuse to take a stand, on their side, to enroll in armies, and to radicalize. If they refuse to obey, they are often forced to flee their country. Refugees often transform into victims of violence during conflicts. Due to this development, they face the same questions and decisions as all victims: Shall we react by revenge, by resignation, or by reconciliation? Quite often they chose revenge and resentment. In that case, refugees might become the strongest opponents against peace. The good news is that if they refuse to take the position of revenge, refugees can feel the need for peace and reconciliation more than the reasons for the fight. One example is a Catholic group of German

⁴⁴ Cf. FERRARI, F., 2019, “Vladimir Jankélévitch’s “Diseases of Temporality” and Their Impact on Reconciliatory Processes, in: *Contemporary Perspectives on Vladimir Jankélévitch*, eds. M. La Caze, M. Zolkos, London: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 95–116.

refugees from Czechoslovakia, the “Ackermann Gemeinde,” who started a discourse and activities of reconciliation in 1946, early after the Second World War.⁴⁵ Refugees have the potential to become such persons, who are interesting for the Hölderlin perspective.

The second step of the Hölderlin perspective is to describe the factors and (potential) actors for reconciliation. How are they related to the conflict? How do they interact with the dynamic, the factors, and actors of violent conflict? What happens to them during the conflict? A closer look at refugees reveals that those people who are fighting in conflict either consider refugees as an obstacle or something they can use for their purposes. For instance, refugees are for short-time obstacles in case they fill roads and places which are needed for the fighting. Refugees can be used for the following purposes:

- (a) to create-short time obstacles for the army of the other group
- (b) to attract attention and legitimize the own fight
- (c) to motivate own troops to fight
- (d) to overflow neighbouring countries to destabilize and pressure them⁴⁶
- (e) to hide among them to leave dangerous places or to proceed to other places of activities
- (f) to recruit fighters amongst refugees

Refugees often relate passively to the conflict. They flee but take no other action in the conflict. They are rarely heard, and even if they attract media attention, they are displayed as victims or as persons who confirm the fears of host countries, such as when criminal acts are committed by refugees or when fighters and extremists hide amongst them.

The third step of the Hölderlin perspective is to evaluate the roles of the people and factors identified as possible resources for reconciliation. Nowadays, only a few refugees become agents for reconciliation. In their almost passive and silent role concerning the conflict, most refugees are not yet agents for reconciliation.

The fourth step focuses on the needs of refugees and examines whether they can become factors of reconciliation based on those needs.

In fact, each one of those needs of refugees can be a source for reconciliation:

- The refugees’ suffering, losses, and need to reconcile with their past can touch the entire world. Refugees can become witnesses of the horrors of war and violence. They can contribute what they have witnessed to their host societies. To achieve this, there should be an interest in the refugees and their stories in the host society.

⁴⁵ Cf. ACKERMANN GEMEINDE, ed., 2005. *Zukunft trotz Vergangenheit. Texte zur deutsch-tschechischen Versöhnung*. München: Schriftenreihe der Ackermann Gemeinde H. 37.

⁴⁶ Cf. GREENHILL, K.M., 2010. *Weapons of Mass Migration – Forced Displacement, Coercion, and Foreign Policy*. Ithaca/NY: Cornell University Press.

- Being a refugee often means that all meaningful things in life can be lost. This circumstance creates the need to reconcile with oneself. Together with partners in the host societies, refugees can find a new meaning in their lives, such as establishing a new life in the welcoming society, building bridges between the welcoming society and the country of origin, or gaining skills in reconstruction for their own country after the return. Instead of placing refugees in dull and dreary conditions, the search for a new sense in life should start as soon as they arrive in the host country.
- With their lives, refugees make profound interconnectedness and dependence between war zones and host countries visible. They can reveal that the events in the war zone are closely lined to the incidents in the host country.
- Refugees often need trauma therapy, which can be taught and learned by multiple persons and also by refugees themselves. Moreover, there often are feelings of guilt towards the persons and places left behind. Therefore, refugees need reconciliation in relation to their country.
- Being a refugee, people experience similar conditions, even if they were on different sides in the violent conflict. In addition to that, they profit from the exo-experience, a term coined by scholars of the field of reconciliation studies. Since they are in another country, they look to the conflict from a distance and have a better understanding of each other. Both are Syrians in a European country, both refugees who lost their houses, and both try to rebuild their lives. Refugees can play an important role in peace negotiations for their countries. They can become the most important actors for the renewal of individual life and society. Syrian poet Adonis quotes Abu Tammam: “In your exile, your renaissance” or: “Go to exile to renew yourself.”⁴⁷
- When host societies understand the chances they have when refugees arrive, they grow stronger in themselves. To their host societies, refugees provide regularly economic growth, cultural enrichment, and richer human experiences. Of course, the arriving refugees are also challenging for the welcoming society as there will be conflicts of different norms and customs, competition for work and other chances in life. In addition to that, refugees often are traumatised and accustomed to violence. However, even if there are 800,000 Syrian refugees in Germany and among them are murderers and thieves, there are also murderers and thieves among 800,000 Germans. When the population interacts with the refugees, many members of the host society benefit from this connection and learn more facets of ethical behaviour, which strengthens the culture of the welcoming nation.

⁴⁷ ADONIS, 2015, *Violence et islam. Entretiens avec Houria Abedelouahed*. Paris: Éditions du Seuil. p. 15. “Dans ton exile, ta renaissance“ ou bien „Exile-toi afin de te renouveler”.

- Persons in the host country can understand the fears of the refugees better when they enter their country. Two hypotheses are particularly interesting: Refugees could remind locals, particularly the marginalised classes, on their own fragility. Zygmunt Bauman describes the economy of generating fear by media and populist parties in order to protect the existing modern system without finding solutions to overcome marginalisation effectively.⁴⁸ Borders of a state are often symbolically understood like the skin of a person. Therefore, all persons entering the borders are considered to be an existential threat like an intrusion into the body of a person.
- If refugees return to their countries, they could be trained to gain skills and qualification to reconstruct the country and be effective in reconciliation. Refugees who return to their countries can remain bridges for knowledge and economic exchange with the welcoming countries.
- If refugees have conflicts within their families, reconciliation can help to renew family ties when approached with love understanding.
- Being a refugee can lead to a deeper engagement with religion. Thus, refugees can become agents for reconciliation between religions.

Considering those possibilities, needs, and chances of approaching refugees by reconciliation, it is the question of why those chances are so rarely embraced.

The [fifth step](#) of the analysis according to the Hölderlin perspective tries to answer that question. Reasons might be that reconciliation is not known, media and populist parties drive policymakers and institutions working with refugees away from human interest and empathy with refugees. Instead, populist media and politician activate an economy of fear.

[The sixth step](#) reflects on the question of how it could be possible that refugees can become factors of reconciliation. It is of particular significance to connect refugees with other factors and actors of reconciliation after the concept of reconciliation was explained to them.

Finally, we have to reflect on [the seventh step](#): The Hölderlin perspective argues that reconciliation exists in the middle of a conflict which implies that the conflict is not over after a short time. Thus, reconciliation is a long-term project that needs several generations to transform the conflict from violence, misunderstanding, and injustice to a stable and sustainable peace process. This transformation contains that resistance against the destruction of the peace process is established through the social learning and change the Hölderlin perspective aims to achieve.

⁴⁸ Cf. BAUMAN, Z. 2004. *Europe. An unfinished Adventure*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Those ideas can be augmented by many other good inspirations how to work with refugees. They just are a very and abstract short sketch.

V. Last Words: Are We Idealists and Dreamers?

Reconciliation is based on widespread human capacities: Empathy with the suffering of others, a rational insight that alternatives, such as revenge, are devastating, enthusiasm to build a better future, interest to cooperate for economic benefit, curiosity about foreign people and their culture, feelings of interconnectedness. Therefore, the hope that reconciliation becomes a major theme for dealing with refugees seems quite realistic. This hope is shared by the people of the MENA-region and Europe.

The Urge for an “Empathetic Dialogue”

An Exploration of the Political and Religious Dimension of Empathy¹

Abstract

When people think of ‘empathy,’ they usually think of the way that one person cares about the welfare of another. The concept is explored in various disciplines, such as Psychology, Management or Marketing and contains manifold meanings. However, following the state of research, it seems imperative to explore the concept of empathy in the Palestinian context by using the activities of the JCRS as a case study. In this paper, we will also argue for the urgent necessity to consider the terms *empathy* or *empathic dialogue* within their interreligious dimension by examining the contexts of Palestine and South Africa and drawing conclusions for the current refugee crises.

1. Empathy in Current Discourses

“When people think of ‘empathy,’ they usually think of the way that one person cares about the welfare of another.”² The Oxford Dictionary provides a very rough definition according to which empathy implies “the ability to imagine and understand the thoughts, perspective, and emotion of another person.”³ This general definition is close to current psychological research, defining empathy “as the feeling that one understands another person’s emotional state.” In his book *Empathy: A social psychological approach*, Mark Davis suggested that empathy is a more active attempt by one individual to get “inside“ the other, to reach out in some fashion through a deliberate intellectual effort.⁴ Its origin, however, lies in the German aesthetic discourse and stems from the word “Einfühlung”⁵ to be distinguished from the term “sympathy” that had its earliest roots in eighteenth century moral philosophy (Hume, Smith).⁶

Recently published handbooks, explore diverse meanings and interdisciplinary areas of empathy.⁷ Empathy appears in interdisciplinary areas as diverse as psychotherapy, psychology, management or

¹ We owe special thanks to the Von Hügel Institute, St. Edmund’s College, Cambridge, for providing us best possible opportunities to conduct our research.

² D. Scapaletti (ed.), *Psychology and Empathy*, New York: Nova Science Publishers 2011, Vii.

³ *Oxford Dictionary of Nursing*, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2017, p. 58. für die Deutsche Wissenschaft. ford 7th ed 2017, p. 58. ische 141/12 (2016)iencesCT)fterverband für die Deutsche Wissenschaft

⁴ M. Davis, *Empathy: A Social Psychological Approach*. United States: Westviews Press, 1996, p. 5.

⁵ Cf. Theodor Lipps, *Ästhetik*. Teil 1. Leipzig, 1903.

⁶ See for the history of the concept empathy e.g. Davis, *Empathy*, 1–22.

⁷ See for the current state of research, A. Coplan/ P. Goldie (edd), *Empathy. Philosophical and psychological perspectives*, Oxford 2012, ix–XLviii; with a rich list of literature 331–372.

marketing.⁸ It is striking, however, that the concept of empathy is hardly connected with political sciences or religious studies. Political scientist Michael Morell is right to make use of the famous elephant metaphor, “The scholarly and everyday uses of the term empathy often miss different facets of empathy, just as a group of blind people describes an elephant only in terms of the parts they can touch.”⁹ There is indeed a blind dot. In this essay, we argue for the urgent necessity for both exploring empathy in the field of reconciliation studies and introducing empathy, or more precisely, the empathetic dialogue to the field of interreligious studies, which are often closely related to reconciliation studies.

Having identified the blind dot in research, we will acknowledge both, firstly that it seems achievable to transfer ideas from the field of psychology to religion and politics and, secondly, that there have been attempts to make use of empathy in the religious field though not using “empathetic dialogue” as *terminus technicus*.

Psychoanalyst Robert Stolorow, for example, wrote, “If we can help one another bear the darkness rather than evade it, perhaps one day we will be able to see the light.”¹⁰ By listening to the stories about the pain of “the other,” sharing the trauma, and expressing empathy for the suffering other, we may be able to restore our humanity. In her book *The Spiritual Power of Empathy*,¹¹ Cyndi Dale defines empathy as the capacity to share and understand others’ emotions and needs as if they were our own. South African psychologist, Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela, underlines that through a dialogue about our past will finally lead to finding a way of celebrating humanity.¹² David Howe paves the way for a religious stance by arguing that “every single one of the major traditions – Confucianism, Buddhism and Hinduism, as well as the monotheism of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam – have taught that empathy has a spiritual dimension in which our suffering is related to that of others.”¹³ Theologian Martin Leiner also observes compassion in religious terms by applying it to Buddhism. Drawing on Buddhist psychology and its notion of universal compassion, he argues that “compassion is sometimes blocked because people are not aware of the blindness of perpetrators.”¹⁴ In his recent publication, Catholic Theologian Joseph Palmisano introduces the concept of empathy to the Jewish-

⁸ In psychotherapy, empathy is a strategy of transmitting the mood from the patient to the therapist; in the management and especially in the direct management of employees, the motivation, the commitment and the willingness to perform of employees play a central role; in marketing, it is important that the employees in question can empathize with the client’s thoughts and feelings and be able to tailor an offer as close as possible to his - often unspoken - motives and wishes. See in: Scapaletti, *Psychology and Empathy*, 143–166; 257–266.

⁹ M. Morrell, *Empathy and democracy. Feeling, thinking and deliberation*, Pennsylvania 2010, 60.

¹⁰ Cited from P. Gobodo-Madikizela. *Dare we hope? Facing our Past to find a new future*, Cape Town 2014, 40.

¹¹ P. 18.

¹² Pumla Gobodo- Madikizela. *Dare we hope?* p. 34.

¹³ David Howe. *Empathy: what it is and why it matters*. Basingstoke, 2013, p. 149.

¹⁴ Martin Leiner. *Thinking differently about identity and harmony – the potential of Asian Thinking for reconciliation. Is reconciliation a topic for East Asia*, in: Phillip Tolliday/Maria Palme/Dong-Choon Kim(ed.), *Asia-Pacific between Conflict and Reconciliation*, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 2016, pp. 185, 186.

Christian dialogue by exploring the theory and praxis of Edith Stein and Abraham Heschel. He points out that “empathy’s coherence in gathering us together for one another [...] critically extends a hermeneutic of suspicion.”¹⁵

2. Empathy in Religious Studies and Political Reconciliation (South Africa)

However, the concept of empathy needs to be fully explored both in current discourses on political reconciliation or post-conflict resolution and in interreligious dialogue. In this paper, we highlight the connection between both fields by looking at the situations in South Africa and Palestine where politics and religion are intertwined. While Zeina Barakat focuses on Palestine, Ralf Wüstenberg explores the political dimension of reconciliation in South Africa. With Wüstenberg’s recent research about the connection of political reconciliation in South Africa and Germany in the field of Muslim-Christian relations, he attempts to introduce the concept of empathy to the field of interfaith dialogue with Islam, speaking of a need for “empathetic dialogue.”¹⁶ While experiencing and witnessing the dynamics of the hearings of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), Wüstenberg’s emphasis was placed on the political dimension of empathy; in his recent research, his focus is on the interreligious impact of empathy. Ultimately, an empathetic dialogue will yield more than the mere conveying of information. Instead, we discuss authentic perspectives of both parties involved by drawing on our own political and religious experiences .¹⁷

For the following discussion, six aspects of “empathetic dialogue” are crucial:

1. Generally, the empathetic dialogue relates to the discovering of the perception of others. The word itself carries the meaning of feeling with its counterpart (“Einfühlung”). Empathy appears in living together and genuinely attending to another’s perspective over time. It is about „compassion” (from the Greek verb *πάσχειν*). Thus, in an empathetic dialogue, I am exposed to the authenticity of the other, be it religious or political.
2. Exploring the political dimension of “empathic dialogue,” it is interesting to note what happened at the Forum of the South African TRC. Victims and perpetrators were mutually exposed to the authentic way they have experienced the traumatic past. This dialogue allowed to empathize with the other party. Thus, the empathetic dialogue is a precondition for interpersonal reconciliation. The final report of the South African TRC gives evidence for this

¹⁵ J. R. Palmisano, *Beyond the walls. Abraham Joshua Heschel and Edith Stein on the significance of Empathy for Jewish-Christian Dialogue*, Oxford 2012, 142.

¹⁶ Ralf K. Wüstenberg, *Islam ist Hingabe. Eine Entdeckungsreise in das Innere einer Religion*, Gütersloh 2016 (forthcoming english: *Islam as Devotion*, Fortress/Lexington 2019).

¹⁷ See Wüstenberg, *Islam ist Hingabe*.

assumption. In the concluding sections¹⁸ on reconciliation, the compilers of the report state that “reconciliation is based on respect for our common humanity.”

3. Empathetic dialogue within myself: From the South African case, we can learn that empathy is not the only precondition for inter-personal reconciliation but intra-personal reconciliation. Inter-personal reconciliation is between individuals; intra-personal reconciliation¹⁹ occurs within ourselves. The latter describes reconciling with one’s memories, the coming to terms with the painful past. Thus our assumption may prove right: no reconciliation without empathic dialogue within ourselves.
4. Empathy is the seed for tolerance in the field of religion and politics, and it paves the way for rehumanizing both partners of the dialogue. From own endeavors in the field of Muslim-Christian relation, the conclusion is near at hand that basic insides provide the potential for interfaith tolerance. I am not the master of the other’s faith nor my own. Thus, I am tolerant. The more I am Christian, the more I am tolerant of other religions. The more I am Muslim, the more I am tolerant. The more I realize that my faith is God's gift, the more I will accept for the other, that their faith is also given. Truth is a gift, not a possession in need for defence.
5. A religious stance will contribute to political reconciliation: I engage in empathetic dialogue because I am curious. I engage with the other because I would like to get to know the different perspective of faith from him or her and to bring them into conversation with my viewpoint. Curiosity, as I understand it, takes the religious question of truth very seriously. It is God who is absolute and holds for absolute truth claims, not religion, neither Islam nor Christianity nor Judaism.
6. Engaging in Empathetic dialogue can liberate from worries about either religious or political identity; it takes a pluralistic viewpoint. As Palmisano puts it, in a dialogue guided by empathy “we are losing ourselves in the sense of being given-for anew to the process of ‘dis-assembling’ the barriers that prevent us from experiencing the converging ways we are already sharing with one another but do not yet fully realize.”²⁰

¹⁸ *Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa*. Report Vol. 5, Cape Town: CTP Book printers (Pty) 1998, p. 435.

¹⁹ see Ralf Wüstenberg, *The political dimension of reconciliation. A theological analysis of ways dealing with the past in South Africa and (East-)Germany*, Cambridge/Grand Rapids: Wm.B.Eerdmans, 2009. Here I distinguish 1/ intra-personal reconciliation from 2/ the *inter*personal reconciliation, which is the ordinary meaning of reconciliation, namely the reconciliation between victim/survivor and perpetrator, typically based on forgiveness on the side of the victim and apologies on the side of the perpetrator, from 3/ the *communal* reconciliation, which means the reconciliation of a perpetrator within his or her community, typically within the black society, from 4/ the *national* or *political* reconciliation, which is the broader concept of reconciliation typically not requiring moral preconditions for reconciliation such as forgiveness (This dimension of reconciliation is referred to when the final report states that reconciliation does not require forgiveness).

²⁰ Palmisano, *Beyond the walls. Abraham Joshua Heschel and Edith Stein on the significance of Empathy for Jewish-Christian Dialogue*, Oxford 2012, 142.

In sum, “Empathy encourages the cultivation of a *habitus* for ‘tolerance of ambivalence’ and challenges an “organization of experience through feelings of resentment, anger, or fear.”²¹ As Lilly Gardner Feldman summarises, “reconciliation is a goal of healing through the development of acceptance, trust, empathy and a sense of security.”²²

3. Empathy with the past as building bridges for the present – the context of Palestine

The title of the project “Hearts of Flesh – Not Stone”²³ uses a metaphor from the Hebrew Bible where God promises that he „will remove [our][...] heart of stone and give [us] [...] a heart of flesh” (Ez. 36:26). The metaphor, which is significant for Jewish, Christian and Muslim cultures, gives insight into the central questions and points towards empathy in itself. As part of the project, individuals and groups experienced the “suffering of the other.” Students from Palestine, to give an example, were exposed to the suffering of the other through excursions to former concentration camps in Germany. Thirty Palestinian students visited Buchenwald in May 2017 to witness first-hand what the Holocaust has been and to find new tools for reconciliation through empathy.

The educational goal was to move from a stage of denial to a stage of empathy. In the subsequent section, Zeina Barakat will discuss to what extent the second trip affected the students’ perspective, what impressions the trip left on them, and their collective memory. This example demonstrates how witnessing and being on the ground can help to overcome the denial and open tracks for empathy. The moral philosophers of the eighteenth century believed that what they then referred to as a “sympathetic stance” helps us to appreciate the condition of the other, both cognitively and emotionally. There is a need to know the experience of the other and to feel their happiness or pain. Knowledge and experience of the other often leads to compassion which, in turn, can encourage behaviors that are likely to be ethical. No quality of human nature is more remarkable both in itself and in its consequences than the propensity we have to sympathize with others, their inclinations and sentiments, however different they are from our own.²⁴

In this context, “empathetic dialogue” is a metaphoric dialogue. It is not a dialogue in the literal sense of the meaning, which would have required a conversation with Jews that survived the Holocaust. Instead, Palestinian participants visited authentic places that tell stories of the Jewish suffering. The book *From Heart of Stone to Heart of Flesh: Evolutionary Journey from Extremism to Moderation*²⁵, emphasises the educational aspect, namely that the students “learn about the suffering that has helped

²¹ Palmisano, *Beyond the walls*, p. 76.

²² L. Gardner-Feldman, *Germany’s foreign policy of reconciliation: From enmity to amity*, London 2014, 7.

²³ DFG-Project (LE 1260).

²⁴ See Howe, *Empathy*, p. 148.

²⁵ Zeina Barakat, *From Heart of Stone to Heart of Flesh: Evolutionary Journey from Extremism to Moderation* (ta ethika 17), Munich 2017, pp. 215–250.

to shape the historical consciousness of the other side.”²⁶ The thesis, however, proves true that empathy and empathetic dialogue are preconditions for reconciliation on a personal, religious, and political level. As Palmisano puts it in a broader context, “Empathy reaches beyond inner perception and towards transcendence by grounding itself in a world of values.”²⁷

A Palestinian girl on her visit to Buchenwald concentration camp exclaimed spontaneously, “I feel my heart is torn apart while seeing this camp [...] regardless the race or ethnicity, how can a human being do such a cruel act against another human being. How can anyone think of annihilating a whole race?” In this statement, we see the potential of the place to stimulate empathy. Likewise, John Paul Lederach underlines the role of a place in the process of reconciliation by stating that “A place is a specific time and space where certain things come together in the journey.”²⁸ As we see here, empathetic dialogue does not involve only victims and perpetrators. It can also be a dialogue within oneself based on empathetic feelings.

The student went on: “I know they are my enemy, and they are occupying my land for more than seventy years now, and we are still suffering from this ongoing conflict, but still I cannot get that a human being can inflict such pain, suffering, torture, acts of oppression, and killings of various ethnic and political groups in Europe.” As Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela claims, hostile attitudes and enmity “changes” when both parties are exposed to each other “and meet [...] as fellow human being[s]”²⁹. Another student exclaimed that he had mixed feelings of pain and distress to those people who were inside the concentration camps and how much pain they had endured. He orally stated, “We are living in Palestine under occupation, we are suffering on a daily basis, but this experience was significant for me since it restores a sense of humanity and strengthens the hope in a better future.” He asserted also that he is moreover convinced that the Israelis are human beings just like the rest of us “we Palestinians under occupation by Israel, we refuse that any human being should go through what the Jewish people went in Hitler’s time, regardless if one was a Jew or any other race.” Here we see that empathetic dialogue also involves the exchange within oneself and that intrapersonal reconciliation paves the way for interpersonal or even national reconciliation.

Another student at the Buchenwald site shared, “When you see the facts, it is not the same as when you hear about them or learn about them in books.” Yet another student said, “I learned from this trip that the Holocaust was not to exterminate Jews only, there were also other victims of Nazi crimes included Ukrainians, Poles and others, Soviet citizens, homosexuals, and others.”

²⁶ Zeina Barakat, *From Heart of Stone to Heart of Flesh: Evolutionary Journey from Extremism to Moderation* (ta ethika 17), Munich 2017, p. 227.

²⁷ Palmisano, *Beyond the walls*, p. 71.

²⁸ John P. Lederach, *Reconcile. Conflict Transformation for ordinary Christians*, Virginia 2014, 43.

²⁹ See Lederach, p. 62.

In understanding such statements, it is helpful to follow the path laid by David Howe. He argues that in imagining the other, “Prejudice might be reduced if we encourage members of one group, whether defined by sex, race or religion, to put themselves in someone else’s shoes. Some experiments in improving inter-group relations have shown that when individuals in one group are invited to think about and empathize with the experience of people in another ‘out’-group, intergroup prejudice, adverse judgment, bias and hostility decrease.”³⁰

In exploring the political and educational dimension, there is good evidence for the assumption “that empathy helps to accept the abnormal and understand the position of minorities: we learn to respect another person as a human being. Thus empathy can be considered the primary stage of social tact on the way towards humanity.”³¹

Concluding the analyses of the empirical data collected, we can distinguish the following notions of empathy:

1. Like in South Africa, empathy helped the victims to regain humanity. Students rejected essential Nazi doctrines, such as ‘human beings are not created equal’ or ‘some races or religions are better or stand above others.’ A student exclaimed: “I am against the massacres of the Holocaust and the killing of any human being, regardless of their religion, race, color, or belief.”
2. Regarding religious tolerance, Palestinian students, mostly Muslims, thought that the Holocaust was not only a massacre against Jews but against humanity. Most of them were not aware that the victims of the Holocaust included not only Jews but also Christians, Gypsies, the elderly, children, homosexuals, the mentally and physically disabled, politicians, opponents, communists, and other groups.
3. Empathetic dialogue serves as a means of education. The students learned about the Holocaust, once they were exposed to the suffering of the Jews, denial was not an option anymore. Before the visit to the Nazi concentration camp, they mentioned that they were not aware of the appearance of such camps. They declared that seeing the facts of the Holocaust with their own eyes is entirely different than reading, watching TV a movie about it.
4. Empathy with the past as building bridges for the present. When students visited the camp, the present situation in Palestine/Israel came to their mind. They were haunted by their daily status of all kinds of death, torture, humiliation, aggression, and humanitarian abuses. The majority agreed that the Holocaust was a gross injustice to humanity.

³⁰ Howe, *Empathy*, p. 156.

³¹ Mirja Kalliopuska. *Empathy-the way to Humanity*. Durham: the Pentland Press Ltd., 1992, 134.

5. Participants saw themselves as victims of the victims of the Holocaust. This assumption made them realize that just like the Holocaust is unforgettable for the Jews, experiences of occupation are unforgettable for Palestinians. Those who deny the Holocaust are blind, but those who justify the actions of the Israeli occupation are also blind.
6. Students from both trips believed that the Israeli state is based on fear, the fear of having to go through history and its painful memories again. Moreover, the state perpetuates this feeling by its rigid security discourse. Though, this situation is doomed to break, as every brittle object is liable to shatter.
7. Empathetic dialogue proved to be a dialogue within oneself. Students grappled with their own memories of imprisonments, house demolitions, incarceration without trial, land confiscations, administrative detention, solitary confinement, and being held and delayed at checkpoints without legal justification. They wondered: are the Israelis applying what their predecessors faced at the hands of the Nazis to Palestinians? Why are we experiencing so much of what the victims of the Holocaust have experienced? In her book *Forgiveness and Revenge*, Trudy Govier states that it might be virtually impossible for “ordinary people” to feel empathy with such offenders – even though there is, in the end, some basis of common humanity.³²

In sum, being with students all over the trip, two opinions among the participants were apparent. One group of students overcame the denial of the Holocaust and were entirely independent in their thinking. The other group was unwilling to see or accept what has happened. They continued to deny since their experience of pain is too present, and that of the other too far in the past. For this group, the claim by Sara Ahmed proved right, namely that “pain which is often experienced as ‘already there’ is difficult to grasp and to speak about, whether in the event of talking about pain in the past or pain in the present.”³³ For the first group, the statement by Gulaya seems to apply, namely that “Recognition of common pain opens up a space for connecting with the other through an empathetic sorrow.” This move describes an “effective alliance with the other’s sadness without claiming the other’s specific loss as one’s own.”³⁴

Conclusion: No Reconciliation Without Empathy

From the South-African case, we can learn, as Christa Krüger puts it, that empathy plays a crucial role, and that what “was experienced between individuals at the TRC became paradigmatic of

³² Trudy Govier, *Forgiveness and Revenge*, New York 2009, 117.

³³ Sara Ahmed, *The cultural politics of emotions*, New York 2004, 30.

³⁴ G. Caluya, *The aesthetics of simplicity. Yang’s sadness and the melancholic community*, in: *Journal of Intercultural Studies* 27, 1–2, 83–100, 98.

intergroup empathy. The [...] proceedings of the TRC seem to have relied on the empathy that was felt between individual perpetrators and victims, and by the audience, the horrors of the human rights violations were shared.”³⁵ It proves true that “(t)hrough the participation of the listeners, the suffering of the victims is removed, and a new perspective on life (and dignity) is gained.”³⁶ So far, as seen above, empathy paves the way for rehumanizing both partners in a dialogue.

What the Palestinians witnessed on their trip to Buchenwald could be understood as a contribution to intrapersonal reconciliation and the healing of the memories of injustices they experienced. Empathy – both religious and political – was unfolded in statements of the students in Buchenwald. “I imagined myself in this place which made me feel lonely, distressed and upset, waiting to die any minute, standing in this line where I will meet my death. I put myself in the shoe of the other, how can I watch my relatives, or kids, or parents going into the gas chambers?”

We conclude that whereas in South Africa in the 1980s the assumption was, *no reconciliation without justice*; in the 1990s, after the release of Nelson Mandela and the end of apartheid, the demand was *no reconciliation without truth*. For the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict, we claim the need for another condition to achieve the high goal of reconciliation, namely empathy: *No reconciliation without empathy*.

Bibliography

- Ahmed, S 2004, *The cultural politics of emotions*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Barakat, Z M 2017, *From Heart of Stone to Heart of Flesh: Evolutionary Journey from Extremism to Moderation*, UTZ, Munich.
- 2014, “A Palestinian Student Defends her visit to Auschwitz”, *The Atlantic*, April 28, accessed 20 August 2018, <<https://www.theatlantic.com/author/zeina-m-barakat/>>.
- Caluya, G 2006, “The aesthetics of simplicity: Yang’s sadness and the melancholic community”, *Journal of Intercultural Studies*, vol. 27, pp. 83–100.
- Coplan, A & Goldie, P (eds.) 2012, *Empathy: Philosophical and psychological perspectives*, Oxford, Oxford university Press.
- Dajani Daoudi, M [Mohammed], Dajani Daoudi, M [Munther], Leiner, M & Barakat, Z (eds) 2016, *Teaching Empathy and Reconciliation in Midst of Conflict*, Wasatia Press, Jerusalem.
- Davis, M 1996, *Empathy: A Social Psychological Approach*. New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group Westviews Press.

³⁵ Christa Krüger, *Spiral of growth: a social psychiatric perspective on conflict resolution, reconciliation and relationship development*, in: trauma, truth and reconciliation. Healing damaged relationships (ed. Nancy N. Potter), Oxford 2006, 29–65, p. 38.

³⁶ Wüstenberg, *Political Dimension of reconciliation*, p. 324.

- Gardner-Feldman L 2014, *Germany's foreign policy of reconciliation: From enmity to amity*, London: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Gobodo-Madikizela, P 2014, *Dare we hope? Facing our Past to find a new future*, Tafelberg, Cape Town.
- Govier, T 2009, *Forgiveness and Revenge*, London; New York: Routledge.
- *Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa (1998)*, Report, vol. 5, CTP Book printers, Cape Town.
- Halperin, E 2015, *Emotions in Conflict: Inhabitants and Facilitators in Peacemaking*, Routledge, London.
- Howe, D 2013, *Empathy: what it is and why it matters*, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Kalliopuska, M 2017, *Empathy-the way to Humanity*, Pentland Press, Durham.
- Oxford Dictionary of Nursing* (2017), Oxford University Press, Oxford. Krüger, C 2006, “Spiral of growth: a social psychiatric perspective on conflict resolution, reconciliation and relationship development”, in N N Potter (ed), *Trauma, truth and reconciliation: Healing damaged relationships*, Oxford, Oxford University Press pp. 29–65.
- Lederach, J P 2014, *Reconcile: Conflict Transformation for ordinary Christians*, Harrisonburg, virginia: Herald Press.
- Leiner, M 2016, “Thinking differently about identity and harmony – the protentional of Asian Thinking for reconciliation: Is reconciliation a topic for East Asia”, in P Tolliday, M Palme & D C Kim (eds), *Asia-Pacific between Conflict and Reconciliation*, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen, pp. 183–203.
- Lipps, T 1903, *Ästhetik*, vol. 1, Leipzig: L. Voss.
- Morrell, M 2010, *Empathy and democracy: Feeling, thinking and deliberation*, The Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park (PA).
- Palmisano, J 2012, *Beyond the walls: Abraham Joshua Heschel and Edith Stein on the significance of Empathy for Jewish-Christian Dialogue*, Oxford: Oxford University press.
- Scapaletti, D J (ed) 2012, *Psychology and Empathy: Psychology of Emotions, Motivations and Actions*, New York, Nova Science Publishers.
- Wüstenberg, R K 2016, *Islam ist Hingabe: Eine Entdeckungsreise in das Innere einer Religion*, Gütersloh: Gütersloher publishing house.
- 2009, *The political dimension of reconciliation: A theological analysis of ways dealing with the past in South Africa and (East-)Germany*, Cambridge/Grand Rapids: Wm.B.Eerdmans.

Between Quest for a *Heimat* and Alienation. Jean Améry's Journey after Auschwitz

Abstract

Jean Améry's personal and intellectual journey constitutes one of the most profound and tragic testimonies of the necessity and impossibility of reconciliation with oneself after Auschwitz, which find its paradigmatic expression in his quest for a homeland (*Heimat*). As an "eternal stranger" (*ewiger Fremder*), Améry seeks a new *Heimat* in the condition of being a Jew without Judaism, in the profession of being writer and man of the *Geist*, in a French pen name and finally in the German language. An everlasting alienation, the impossibility to feel trust in the world and the destruction of the possibility of saying "We" after Auschwitz, make his quest painfully unsuccessful.

"I was a person who could no longer say 'we', and who therefore said 'I' merely out of habit, but not with the feeling of full possession of my self"

Jean Améry, *Wieviel Heimat braucht der Mensch?* [How Much Home Does a Person Need?]

The Austrian essayist of Jewish origin Hans Mayer, whose *nom de plume* became Jean Améry since 1955, defined himself as an "eternal stranger" (*ewiger Fremder*) (Améry 1980, p. 110), clearly echoing the archetype of the "wandering Jew" (*Der ewige Jude*). His existential path twists and turns through the condition of being a stranger, constantly oscillating between being a "foreigner" and feeling "extraneous". This condition becomes irreversible after his detention in Auschwitz. His journey paradigmatically witnesses that reconciliatory processes (with oneself as well as with one's perpetrator outgroup) have to face perceived extraneity (*Fremdheit*) and alienation (*Entfremdung*). Améry's autobiographical volumes *Unmeisterliche Wanderjahre* [Unmasterly Years of Pilgrimage] and *Örtlichkeiten* [Localities] (Améry 1971; Améry 1980) can be read as an *Entbildungsroman* (a "deformation novel") in two episodes. They contain the story of an invincible alienation, i.e. of an unbridgeable distance between himself and himself, as well as between himself and the other. Améry's biographical narration is driven by his feeling of being misplaced as an outsider (*Außenseiterschaft*). Hence, his quest for a *Heimat* (Brudholm 2005; Schuster 2016) is far from being mere academic speculation. This "homeland" does not merely mean a "fatherland" (*Vaterland*) to him. It represents rather a place where it is possible to perceive a sense of security and trust in the world (*Weltvertrauen*) after Auschwitz. For Améry, the quest for a *Heimat* is, therefore, closely related to the need to feel "at home" (*daheim*), to find shelter against an inhospitable (*unheimlich*) world. The painful outcome, peculiar to an entire generation of German-speaking Jewish intellectuals of the last century, is the feeling of never being at home, especially when one is supposed to be at

home: *Unheimliche Heimat* (Sebald 1991). The radio monologue *Verfemt und verbannt* [Proscribed and Banned] shows how Améry was lucidly aware of this, affirming – in an estranging third person form – the paradoxical possibility of being at home in the condition of not having a *Heimat*: “the same absence of a *Heimat* (*Heimatlosigkeit*) became his *Heimat*. He is not sorry, and he does not wish to be commiserated for this” (Améry 2007a, p. 813). Alienation, a constant perception of extraneity and being “out of place”, becomes the keynote of a life with no home, no trust in the world, no reconciliation with oneself and the other, which Améry tragically ended by committing suicide in 1978.

Human beings can search and hopefully find their *Heimat* in a particular geographical place. For Améry, this place initially was the Tyrolean village of his childhood, Hohenems in Vorarlberg, where a Jewish community has resided since the seventeenth century. In *Wieviel Heimat braucht der Mensch?* [How Much Home Does a Person Need?], the author recognizes that “a new *Heimat* does not exist. *Heimat* is the country of childhood and youth (*Kindheits und Jugendland*). Who has lost it, remains lost (*ein Verlonerer*)” (Améry 1966, p. 82). Like a foreigner on Earth, accepting no compromise nor self-deception, Améry denies the possibility of finding a *Heimat*-surrogate (*Heimatersatz*) elsewhere for those who have lost their place of origin, or better: for those who have been deprived of it by political persecutions. After the Second world war, he could come back to Tyrol, and he actually visited Austria almost every year. He did not wish to reside there, though. Améry shares Vladimir Jankélévitch’s thesis which affirms that whenever it is possible to physically go back anywhere in space, moving towards the place where a journey started, it does not recover the time that is irreversibly gone (Jankélévitch 1974; Améry 2010, p. 11). The past is condemned to remain a foreign country: “there is no return because finding a space never means regaining the lost time” (Améry 1966, p. 72).

Who is acquainted with Améry’s autobiographical writings is aware that the aforementioned country of childhood and youth is anything but a placid, retrospectively mythologized idyll (cf. Améry 2007b; Améry 1980, pp. 7–27) – be it Hohenems, Bad Ischl (where his mother runs a small hotel), Gmunden (where he joined the Gymnasium, without graduating), or even Vienna. Living in the Austrian capital between 1926 and 1938, he was trying, with little success, to express his vocation as writer. Jean Améry, whose name was still Hans Mayer at the time, felt more connected to the dialect, customs and traditions from Tyrol rather than to the Jewish culture and religion. His family of origin is described as the typical expression of a middle-class household, exposed to the risk of proletarianization. At his parental home, they celebrated Christmas and Yiddish was not spoken. His mother Valerie was a “Half-Jew” (*Halbjüdin*), who used to invoke Jesus, Joseph, and Mary. In contrast, his father, Paul Mayer, who was an assimilated Jew and very proud of his family tree, died

at the front during the First World War. In this context, a statement by his son, released in an interview a few months before taking his own life, seems quite harsh: “it is completely indifferent to me where I come from” (Améry 2008, p. 43).

The pages of *Unmeisterliche Wanderjahre* show a lasting contrast between the city (*Stadtschaft*) and the countryside (*Landschaft*), that originates a feeling of inadequacy and a persistent unease, to which Améry’s perception of an unbridgeable distance from the waves of history must be added. Describing this feeling as a sense of deafness and dizziness, the author uses expressions like *Waldeinsamkeit* (solitude of the forest) and *Entfremdung* (alienation) (Améry 1971, p. 16). Such a mixture of perceived distance, confusion and bewilderment does not impede him, however, from recognizing “the slow transformation of the *Heimat* in a complacent enemy country” (Améry 2008, p. 33), which had its fatal moment in March 1938, with the annexation of Austria into Nazi Germany. During his years in Vienna, Hans Mayer knew anti-Semitism better than Jewishness as this iconic observation witnesses: “from Hitler on, I am Jewish. Hitler invented me as a Jew” (Ibi, p. 104). With the Night of Broken Glass it became clear to him how urgent it was to leave Vienna “with the lightest luggage possible” (Améry 2007a, p. 790). Thus, he learned his first answer to the question of how much *Heimat* a person needs: “all the more, the less of it he can carry with him” (Améry 1966, p. 76).

Jean Améry recognized this moment from late December 1938 as a point of no return, as the breaking point with his own *Heimat*. From that moment, his already precarious self-conciliation was torn apart forever. Nevertheless, whereas he left National-Socialist Austria behind himself, he did not deny his Jewish roots nor his beloved wife. With courage, Améry rejects the Aryan citizenship offered to him under the premise that he disowns his wife, Regina (who died in Auschwitz in 1944), and that he denies his Jewish origin. He chose loyalty and “constitutes himself as a Jew” (Améry 2005a, p. 39). In a dramatic and sudden escape, which happened “in great haste towards the unknown” (Améry 1980, p. 32), he secretly crossed the German-Belgian border through Cologne and Kalterherberg. Hans Mayer became not only a migrant but also a refugee, that is, by his own definition, “a human being who wanted or had to abandon their homeland (*Heimatland*) for political, religious, or racial reasons, seeking refuge (*Zuflucht*) from such persecution in a host country” (Améry 2005b, p. 514). Troubles concerning the coexistence with the Belgian population added to the pain for leaving his *Heimat*. He had to face “all the prejudices against migrants in all their small bourgeois ugliness” (Ibid., p. 513) from his Jewish coreligionists in Antwerp. Améry described this tense situation in a passage from *Verfemt und verbannt*, whose words could have been written yesterday:

“Relations with the Flemish population, whose guests we were, barely existed. The inhabitants of Antwerp were very wary towards certain neighborhoods populated by emigrants. Some of them were wearing well-made clothes. Since these migrants could not exercise any activity, they sat for hours in

the cafes in the main street, quarelling. On the one hand, they must have seemed like layabouts to the Flemish, on the other as a virtual threat to the labour market. Concerning the refugees, they simply were afraid of the inhabitants of Antwerp” (Améry 2007a, p. 804).

After the German invasion of Belgium in May 1940, Améry was deported to the internment camps of St. Cyprien and Gurs, in the Pyrenees region. Coming back as a visitor twenty-eight years later must have been an estranging experience for him as he remembers that “the tracks are all gone. Not without horror and a deep fear of death, the visitor thinks: the grass has grown over my past” (Améry 1980, p. 37). In June 1941, he managed to escape and returned to Belgium. There, he carried out resistance activities, distributing a four-page anti-Nazi booklet titled *Die Wahrheit* [The Truth].

The reasons for his choice seem not only of moral value but also identity-related: “I did not want to be arrested by the enemy as a Jew, [...] but as a resistant” (Améry 2005a, p. 43). On July 23 1943, the *Vaterland* in the form of the Gestapo captured him and Améry was interned at Fort Breedonck where he suffered atrocious tortures. Two decades later, he recognized this moment as a total abandonment, which entirely destroyed his trust in the world (*Weltvertrauen*) and led to the full annihilation of his spirit. He writes in the pages of *Jenseits von Schuld und Sühne* [Beyond Guilt and Atonement] that “the one who has suffered torture can no longer feel himself at home (*heimisch*) in the world. The shame of annihilation cannot be cancelled. The trust in the world that collapsed in part with the first beat, but definitely with torture, cannot be reconquered” (Améry 1966, p. 70). With the deportation to Auschwitz-Monowitz, his identity as a human being was reduced to the number 172364. Far from being a “second university” (Belpoliti 1997, p. 179), as Primo Levi affirmed, the *Lager* was an experience of complete homelessness (*Heimatslosigkeit*) for Améry: “in Auschwitz, we have not become wiser, nor have we become better, more human, more benevolent, nor have we become more morally mature. We came out of the *Lager* naked, robbed, emptied, disoriented, and it took a long time before we could reappropriate the daily language of freedom” (Améry 1966, p. 38). The most profound lesson of the concentration camp for him was an irreversible loss of trust in the world and a consequent everlasting alienation.

Only 615 Jews among the 25437 ones, who were deported from Belgium, survived. Few people wanted to hear their stories. The question of starting a “new” life as a free person after the experience of the concentration camp was pressing Améry as well as all the other inmates. Years of peregrinations, which he perceived as an exile between Brussels, Cologne, Zurich, London, and Paris took place. Where to go? “Germany no longer exists. Austria must deny its identity. After twenty years of fascism, Italy has lost its credibility [...] and England does not want to know anything about Europe. For Améry, there is only one country that can help Europe in its rebirth: France” (Heidelberger-Leonard 2004, p. 158). His enthusiasm for France was linked to the figure of Jean-Paul

Sartre and his thesis that human beings are what they do of themselves. This thought gave him unexpected freedom as a gift, i.e. the possibility of a “new beginning” (Améry 1961, p. 40). The future seemed to have become the promise of a new identity, of an invisible *Heimat*. He finally decided to settle down in Brussels where he lived until his death, developing his own literary and essayistic activities. However, Belgium has never really meant “home” for him, but was rather a *Gastland*, a host country, where he resided.

Even if he continues writing in German, Améry was aware that neither Germany nor Austria could be his *Heimat*. He dedicated numerous reflections on his unreconciled feelings towards those countries, that marked his life forever through the National-Socialist dictatorship and persecution. The complexity of Améry’s reflection on this issue is fully developed in *Ressentiments*, probably his most read and quoted text, published as the fourth essay in *Jenseits von Schuld und Sühne*. Many studies have been devoted to Améry’s resentment towards Germany, and it was also his theorization that led the rehabilitation of this feeling as a moral option (Brudholm 2008; Zolkos 2010). He was articulating thoughts in this direction already in spring 1945. At that time, he sketched a *Psychologie des deutschen Volkes* [Psychology of the German people], which was published posthumous. Here, Améry identifies the fundamental trait of Hitlerism with an “education based on the absence of feelings and humanity” (Améry 2007c, p. 509). With a surprising empathy towards his perpetrators, he expresses the fear that the *vox populi* of the whole world, full of hatred, might incite a desire for revenge against Germany. It is probably too much to claim a willingness to reconcile in Améry’s case. Nonetheless, his considerations of strictly rejecting any vindictive thought are remarkable: “we do not believe that the pain that took place can be erased through new pain” (Ibid., p. 502). In the middle of his conflict (Leiner 2018, pp. 179, 180) with Nazi Germany, since the manuscript was conceived in Auschwitz-Monowitz, the author refers to notions such as responsibility (*Verantwortung*) in antithesis to guilt (*Schuld*), as well as punishment (*Strafe*) in antithesis to atonement (*Sühne*). Hence, the title of his most famous book, *Jenseits von Schuld und Sühne*, becomes comprehensible already twenty years before its publishing.

His first trip back to Germany took place relatively soon (in 1952). Améry’s strongest feeling was estrangement as he writes: “a totally foreign (*fremdes*) country, in which nothing seems to remember the Weimar Republic Germany or Hitler’s *Reich*” (Améry 1961, p. 176). So, he bitterly concludes: “What do I have to do with this country? Nothing” (Améry 1971, p. 102). Like many other Holocaust survivors, he perceived a “German amnesia” (Ibid., p. 42; pp. 120, 121), a deliberated absence of critical work on the most recent past and a denial of the same operated by a general bad conscience. Beyond readiness to reconcile and willingness to take revenge, Améry feels resigned, abandoned, and alienated: “it made no sense to resist the new German realities that had erased my past as a naive

inhabitant of the forest, as well as my hopes as an exile. I was in a country that was not only a foreign but also a new one. In all its traits, this country is the future. [...] It is only the future. [...] I felt left behind, abandoned by Germany” (Améry 2005a, p. 44).

Whereas Améry is distant from the cause of the “chosen people” in religious terms, he felt profound solidarity towards the Israeli Jews and the State of Israel in terms of loyalty towards his dead companions of Auschwitz. The Shoah constitutes the event through which he feels and defends him being a Jew (*Judesein*) even without a religious faith (*Judentum*): “for me, being a Jew means to feel in myself the abyss of yesterday's tragedy. [...] I am a Jew, and I refer to the reality and the possibilities synthesized by my tattooed number from Auschwitz” (Améry 1966, 148, 149), Améry will always define his Jewishness as the consciousness of otherness as such: “the constant awareness of marginalization, [according to which] we were different than the others” (Améry 2007b, p. 533). His Jewishness expresses a radical estrangement towards the world, with no possible *Heimat* and the courageous assumption of the consequent solitude and alienation: “with no trust in the world, as a Jew, I feel like a stranger (*fremd*) and alone in the environment in which I live, and I just have to adapt to this extraneity (*Fremdheit*). I have to accept the estrangement (*Fremdsein*) as an element of my personality, to insist on it as an inalienable property” (Améry 1966, p. 151).

While he adopted the French-sounding pseudonym “Jean Améry” and was looking for a new beginning, Hans Mayer continued writing in his mother tongue for German publishing houses. Even if “he met the French language and became a human being for the second time” (Améry 1971, p. 63), he has never succeeded in expressing his world through it. His language always remained German, and his citizenship remained Austrian. His *Heimat*? After Auschwitz, it was impossible for him to find a visible or invisible *Heimat*, through religious faith, belonging to a culture, affiliation to a philosophical school or political engagement. In echoing Viktor Frankl, Améry recognises that the experience of the concentration camp would have been less devastating “if [it could be] inserted into a system of meaning” (Ibi, p. 41). In contrast to the author of *Trotzdem ja zum Leben sagen* [Nevertheless, Say “Yes” to Life] (Frankl 1946), such a meaning that would allow one to insert their suffering in a greater sense seemed unavailable for Améry. Auschwitz taught him that neither the condition as an intellectual nor his body could work as shelters to find a *Heimat*. During the months of detention, his status of intellectual was something that proved anything but helpful to him (Millet 2011); the same applies to his body that withered to a sorrowful material which presages death through the everlasting memory of the torture suffered at Fort Breendonk (Bernstein 2011). In these terrible months, Hans Mayer experienced the abysses of the human condition as well as the vulnerability of any humanism (Wolf 1995).

A fundamental link emerges from the pages of *Verfemt und verbannt* and *Wieviel Heimat braucht der Mensch?*: the one between *Heimat* and identity. The inaccessibility of the interdicted *Heimat* leads to the destruction of personal identity through a process of disintegration of the “I” on multiple levels. It starts with the loss of “a legally valid identity” (Améry 1966, p. 71), when Améry clandestinely crosses the German-Belgian border without any valid document. In Antwerp, changing a few Mark and sending a telegram in basic French are epiphanic moments of estrangement. The mother tongue is lost, and those who perceive themselves as writers, like Améry, cannot but feel “orphan” after a similar loss. In his own words: “my destiny lost its individual tone in those first days. [...] I was not a writer, I was not an intellectual, I did not have a name, a provenance, a family, I did not have a past, and almost certainly not even a future. Who was I? One who crossed an illegal border, one like thousand others” (Améry 2007a, pp. 800, 801). An ascribed identity, which arose between stereotypes and bureaucratic classifications, exacerbated the feeling of alienation. For the Belgian authorities, Jean Améry was nothing but a German (not even an Austrian) citizen: “in those moments we were Germans, because our interlocutors imposed on us the *Heimat* and prescribed us the role to be recited” (Améry 1966, p. 85).

In the first months of his Belgian exile, Améry felt widespread insecurity and anguish towards a wholly other reality. Difficulties in understanding a different country revealed to him all the alienation of the condition of a foreigner: “the only fact that the faces of people could not be deciphered caused fear. [...] Faces, gestures, clothes, houses, words [...] were a sensory reality, but not decipherable signs. That world was without any order for me” (Ibi, p. 79). Améry apprehends that *Heimat* means a link between safety, recognition and trust, a feeling which rises in the “dialectic between knowing and recognizing, between confident waiting and absolute trust” (Ibi, p. 80). According to his experience, the feeling of safety can only exist with the absence of randomness and of extraneous conditions. Trust is needed to overcome alienation, even if trusting is hard if one feels unsafe and exposed to a world which lacks a recognizable order. Améry theorizes that the feelings of security, trust, and the recognizability of the *Heimat* are interconnected. “Like one learns his mother tongue without knowing its grammar, one experiences the *Heimat* environment” (Ibi, p. 81). This environment shapes one’s reference system and mental landscape. It grows and provides security, confidence and, therefore, trust in a person’s orientation in the world. From the other side, warns Améry, to know “only his own place of origin can lead to barbarism, to wither in provincialism . But not having a *Heimat* means being a victim of a lack of order, of restlessness, of dispersion” (Ibi, pp. 80, 81). This latter was Améry’s case.

Like the forbidden *Heimat*, “the old [life] had abandoned us. Forever? Forever” (Ibi, p. 72). When suspending our judgement if a “new life” is possible, a fracture takes place here, a rupture between a

“before” and “after”. The only remedy seems reconciliation, but it is very hard to achieve for Améry, as well as for every human being that has been a refugee or an exile. Améry acknowledges retrospectively that “the past was suddenly buried, and we no longer knew who we were. [...] I had neither a passport nor a past, I had no money and no history” (Ibi, pp. 74, 75). He oscillates between resignation and protest, yearning to return to a confiscated past, which constitutes the whole plot of his life story: “you only see what I am, you do not see what I have been. But also, what I have been determines my self” (Ibi, p. 97). To the loss of the geographical *Heimat*, inaccessible to the exile, follows a retrospective glimpse over his whole past, through a tragic disenchantment: “we had not lost our country: we had to recognize that we never possessed it. What it was about this country and its people was the misunderstanding of our entire existence” (Ibi, p. 84). Belonging to any community of Jewish faith or Austrian citizens, which had always been difficult for Améry, now became impossible. The “past, understood as a social phenomenon, had been revoked by society. In these conditions, it was impossible to keep it as a subjective psychological property” (Ibi, p. 98). If losing the *Heimat* means losing the past, losing the past means losing oneself. Améry’s lesson is tragic and profound: the identity of a human being cannot be separated from their reconciliation with their own past, that is, their history.

In a crucial passage from *Wieviel Heimat braucht der Mensch?* Améry writes: “I was a man who could no longer say ‘we’ and, therefore, only by habit but without the sensation to fully possess himself, said ‘I’” (Ibi, p. 75). The possibility of individual identity is thus finally revealed in its inseparable connection to the participation in the original structure of a “being-with” (*Mitsein*), founded on a mutual entanglement, whose breakup is followed by the loss of the “I”. Through his human and intellectual journey, in his unfulfilled quest for a *Heimat* and in his condition of being an “eternal stranger”, which became irreversible after Auschwitz, Jean Améry teaches us how our identity is never a purely individual fact. Instead, its roots are in our relationships and belongings. This last thesis becomes even more valuable regarding an author like Jean Améry, who suffered throughout his whole life a denial of all forms of identity, and who nonetheless refused any belonging, remaining a person “who will experience not having any *Heimat*. [...] Who will probably continue to be a stranger (*ein Fremder*)” (Améry 1980, p. 14) for evermore.

Bibliography

- Améry, J. (1961) *Geburt der Gegenwart. Gestalten und Gestaltungen der westlichen Zivilisation seit Kriegsende*. Freiburg in Breisgau: Walter.
- Améry, J. (1966) *Jenseits von Schuld und Sühne. Bewältigungsversuche eines Überwältigten*. München: Szczyzny.
- Améry, J. (1971) *Unmeisterliche Wanderjahre*. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.

- Améry, J. (1980) *Örtlichkeiten*. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.
- Améry, J. (2005a) *Mein Judentum*, in Améry, J. *Werke. Vol. VII*. Edited by S. Steiner. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, pp. 31–46.
- Améry, J. (2005b) *Die ewig Unerwünschten. Vorurteile gegenüber Emigranten*, in Améry, J. *Werke. Vol. VII*. Edited by S. Steiner. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, pp. 513–530.
- Améry, J. (2007a) *Verfemt und verbannt. Vor dreißig Jahren – Erinnerungen an die Emigration*, in Améry, J. *Werke. Vol. II*. Edited by G. Scheit. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, pp. 790–814.
- Améry, J. (2007b) *Gasthof zur Stadt Graz*, in Améry, J. *Werke. Vol. I*. Edited by I. Heidelberger-Leonard. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, pp. 521–543.
- Améry, J. (2007c) *Psychologie des deutschen Volkes*, in Améry, J. *Werke. Vol. II*. Edited by G. Scheit. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, pp. 500–534.
- Améry, J. (2008) *Im Gespräch mit Ingo Hermann*, in Améry, J. *Werke. Vol. IX*. Edited by I. Heidelberger-Leonard. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, pp. 43–152.
- Améry, J. (2010) *Über das Altern. Revolte und Resignation*. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.
- Belpoliti, M. (1997) *Primo Levi. Conversazioni e interviste*. Torino: Einaudi.
- Bernstein, J. M. (2011) ‘Amery’s Body: "My Calamity ... My Physical and Metaphysical Dignity"’, in *Jean Améry. Philosophy of Catastrophe*. Edited by M. Zolkos. Lanham: Lexington, pp. 39–60.
- Brudholm, T. (2005) ‘A Confiscated Past. Jean Améry on Home and Exile’, in *The Hedgehog Review*, VII/3, pp. 7–19.
- Brudholm, T. (2008) *Resentment's Virtue. Jean Amery and the Refusal to Forgive*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Frankl, V. (1946) *...Trotzdem ja zum Leben sagen*. Wien: Deuticke.
- Heidelberger-Leonard, I. (2004) *Jean Améry. Revolte in der Resignation*. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.
- Jankelevitch, V. (1974) *L'irréversible et la nostalgie*. Paris: Flammarion.
- Leiner, M. (2018) ‘From Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation’, in *Alternative Approaches in Conflict Resolution*. Edited by M. Leiner and C. Schliesser. London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 175–186.
- Millet, K. J. (2011) ‘Contemplating Jean Améry’s Loss of Transcendence’, in *Jean Améry. Philosophy of Catastrophe*. Edited by M. Zolkos. Lanham: Lexington, pp. 21–38.
- Schuster, M. (2016) ‘A Phenomenology of Home. Jean Améry on Homesickness’, in *Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy*, XXIV/3, pp. 117–127.
- Sebald, W. G. (1991) *Unheimliche Heimat. Essays zur österreichischen Literatur*. Salzburg/Wien: Residenz.

- Wolf, S. (1995) *Von der Verwundbarkeit des Humanismus. Über Jean Améry*. Frankfurt am Main: Dipa Verlag.
- Zolkos, M. (2011) *Reconciling Community and Subjective Life. Trauma Testimony as Political Theorizing in the Work of Jean Améry and Imre Kertész*. New York: Continuum.

Davide Tacchini

Migration, the Hermeneutics of the Other, the *Reification* and Need for Reconciliation in Christian-Muslim Relations in Contemporary Europe

Abstract

Our current identities have been shaped by centuries of migrations, particularly in the case of continental Europe. The importance of migration is pivotal in the three monotheistic religions and its process rooted in all humans. The world is in motion and always has been. This, especially if considered in our relationships with the *other*, it affects heavily how we interact with other people. For a productive dialogue, a person has to consider the *other* in his/her fluid, dynamic identity and avoid that identity freezes. The interlocutor has to be the actual one, not the one somebody imagined. *A person is a person through other persons. None of us comes into the world fully formed. We would not know how to think, or walk, or speak, or behave as human beings unless we learned it from other human beings. We need other human beings in order to be human* (Tutu 2004).

1. Migration

Migration is deeply rooted in human beings; it lies within our dna. People have always moved from one place to another, whether it be physical, practical, or rhetorical, and metaphorical.

Some individuals have the opportunity to experience migration physically during their lifetimes, but even those of us who were born and raised in the same area carry the seed of migration in them.

If we trace back our family trees, there is a hundred percent chance of finding a member that, at some point, came from another part of the world. Our current identities have been shaped by centuries of migrations, particularly in the case of families from continental Europe. Some of the migrants, even in the past, were forced to move from one place to another. Nowadays, more than ever, the issue of forced migration is topical both in academia and the news. If we consider international forced migration and Internally Displaced Persons, the number of forced migrants exceeds sixty million people worldwide.

After the so-called “Arab Spring” and with regards to the number of forced migrants that have approached Europe after 2011, politics have been deeply involved in the topic in the last few years.

Until a decade ago, in the long wave of the dramatic consequences of 9/11, mass media and politics have frequently approached religion by focusing on issues that may seem more controversial and appealing to the public, such as prophecy or conversion. Media and politicians began to address migration as a problem regardless of any religious connection although migration plays a pivotal role in the three monotheistic religions.

Nowadays, we are called upon to face challenges that are, for many reasons, new, unprecedented and extremely stimulating.

Mass migration is the human face of globalization. (Suárez-Orozco, Darbes, Sutin 2011, p. 144)¹

Thanks to the modern means of communication, we now live *local lives in a global context* (Tahara 2015, p. 229–46)²

While there is no precise count, some experts believe New York is home to as many as 800 languages — far more than the 176 spoken by students in the city’s public schools or the 138 of the residents of Queens. (Roberts 2010)³

New York may seem an exceptional example which is too unique to be taken into serious consideration for scholarly research.⁴ However, in schools of many small cities in Germany, Italy, or even Lebanon and Jordan⁵, it happens that more than half of the students are not of local origin. Nowadays, parents of many pupils are often asylum seekers or refugees.⁶

1.1 Migration and Religion

The importance of migration is pivotal in the three monotheistic religions⁷. As we have mentioned above, it may sometimes be physical, practical, or just metaphorical, rhetorical.

In Judaism, the idea of *Exodus*, the migration from Egypt and, as a consequence, the journey to the Promised Land is the origin of the importance of migration in monotheistic religious contexts.

In Christianity, the life of Jesus Christ’s himself seems to be an allegory of a long journey from Nazareth to Jerusalem, and even the travels of Saint Paul stand for unceasing migration to spread the message:

¹ Suárez-Orozco, M M - Darbes T S – Sutin M 2011, *Migration and Schooling*, in «Annual Review of Anthropology», Vol. 40:311–328, Oct. 2011, p. 144.

² Tahara, N 2015, *Conflict of Subsistence in a Multi-Ethnic Community along the Shore of Lake Albert in Uganda*, in «Shitenoji University Bulletin» 61 (2015), pp. 229–246.

³ Roberts S 2010, *Listening (and saving) World Languages*, in The New York Times, April 29, 2010, available online at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/29/nyregion/29lost.html> accessed July 20, 2018.

⁴ <https://www1.nyc.gov/site/planning/data-maps/nyc-population/population-facts.page>.

⁵ See https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statisticsexplained/index.php/Migration_and_migrant_population_statistics#Migrant_population.

⁶ See, among others Westwood, P 2018, Inclusive and Adapting Teaching, *Meeting the Challenge of Diversity in the Classroom*, Second Edition, London, Routledge, available online at <https://books.google.it/books?hl=it&lr=&id=9oNXDwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT14&ots=yjCEarhJMg&sig=NvTDK49XBq0onEO2ljo0u84wJ5k#v=onepage&q&f=false>, accessed September 20, 2018, and Meierkord A, Staring F, Day, L 2017, *Migrants in European Schools*, Publication Office of the European Union, Available Online at <https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/c0683c22-25a8-11e8-ac73-01aa75ed71a1>, accessed February 15, 2019 and *Current Migration Situation in the EU, Report of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights*, available online at <https://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2017/current-migration-situation-eu-education>, accessed February 15, 2019.

⁷ Although Judaism may be more profoundly influenced by the topics of exile and migration.

Go into all the world and proclaim the Gospel to the whole creation. (Mark 16:15)⁸

The apostle's claim is a call to move, to change, to challenge oneself and others.

In Islam, Muhammad, whose *Hijra* (an Arabic term that means precisely “migration”) from Mecca to Medina is so vital that Muslims claimed this event the beginning of their calculation of times (622 AD). The etymology of the word refers to the idea of “moving from one place to another” and to “change your life.”⁹ In their origins, the messages of Christianity and Islam are messages of innovation, change, and reform.¹⁰

2. Dialogue

The process of migration is rooted in all humans. This aspect is essential to consider when people approach each other and mainly when they engage in dialogue. A direct interlocutor as well as their family, friends, and personal history, allow them to better understand who they are according to the well-known *mirror effect*, theorized by the Algerian Sociologist Abdelmalek Sayad in his publication *The Suffering of the Immigrant*¹¹ (Sayad 2004). The relationship with the other shapes a person's identity.

2.1 Interreligious Dialogue and the *Hermeneutics of the Other*¹²

Interreligious dialogue is not a dialogue among people but multicultural identities. Everybody contains several identities, and religion plays a crucial role in shaping and developing culture and identity. The world is in motion and always has been. Today it seems as if it moves faster than ever. For a productive dialogue, a person has to consider the other in his/her fluid, dynamic identity and avoid that identity freezes. The interlocutor has to be the actual one, not the one somebody imagined. It is the role of scholars and teachers to teach the hermeneutics of the other. Identities are fluid, and every time a person meets and talks to another person, both interlocutors change according to their interaction. Even without interaction, identities keep changing through life experiences. When people interact with someone, they do not talk only to the actual person in front of them, but also to all the

⁸ Mark 16:15.

⁹The Latin root of the word (*Migratio*) indicates “change”, “modification,” and “challenge.” It is the opposite of *Conservatio* (“conservation”, “preservation” of your “comfort zone”, but also of the *Status Quo*).

¹⁰ See, among many others, the most recent Cole J 2018, *Muhammad, Prophet of Peace amid the Clash of Empires*, New York, Nation Books, and, although slightly apologetic Khalifeh M 2018, *Islam is the Religion of Justice and Reform*, Columbus, OH, Educational Press.

¹¹ Sayad A 2004, *The Suffering of the Immigrant*, Cambridge, UK, Malden, MA, Polity.

¹² Hermeneutics here is to be considered as the translation of the Arabic word *Ta'wīl*, in the way Naṣr Ḥamid Abū Zayd (1944–2010) used to conceive it. See Abū Zayd N 1990, *Maḥmūd al-naṣṣ: dirāsa fī 'ulūm al-Qur'ān* (The Concept of the Text, a study on the Principles of the Qur'an), Al-Qāhira, Al-Markaz al-Thaqafi al-'Arabi, and Abū Zayd N 1990, *Naqd al-Khitāb al-Dīnī*, Al-Qāhira, Dar al-Thaqafa al-Jadida, recently translated into English by Jonathan Wright: Abū Zayd N 2018, *Critique of Religious Discourse* (Trans. Jonathan Wright), New Haven-London, Yale University Press.

heritage of their family and their own experiences that made them the person they are now.¹³ Society needs a hermeneutical approach that people ought to teach and live. Considering somebody else's heritage, such as their family history, may facilitate interfaith dialogue at any level. Everybody has a multicultural identity. Some people encounter cultural pluralism¹⁴ first hand through their personal experience in life, (e.g. the second generation of immigrants), others do not, at least consciously, but through encounters with other people and personal histories, their identity changes, and therefore cultural pluralism may flourish (Santerini 2008).

In 1990, Cardinal Carlo Maria Martini¹⁵, then Archbishop of Milan, proclaimed a homily entitled "Islam and us, from welcome to dialogue". It was a historical speech and somehow prophetic. Despite being almost thirty years old, some of the homily's passages are still topical today although enormous social changes have occurred during the last three decades. During the early 90s, a great number of Muslim immigrants has arrived in Southern Europe, especially in Italy. This incident raised the question of whether dialog between Christians and Muslims was possible. Twenty-eight years later, after many tragedies and dramatic changes which shook the world to its core, this issue is still topical. Cardinal Martini was also envisaging an evolution in the so-called "Western Islam," a term that was still *ante litteram* in the 90s, that has become topical again, especially in the view of the recently revitalized populist trends.

Will Islam in Europe be secularized, entering a new era of its European integration?

Should the Church give up its announcing the Gospel among Muslims?

Christ taught us all to seek the truth, and that the truth shall set us free.

The Qur'an teaches that the truth is God. Therefore, freedom in the truth is freedom in God, which is freedom of faith.

Within this freedom in God, Muslims and Christians can and should freely share their faith experiences with one another, but without making this an occasion for dawah or mission¹⁶ (Branca 2010 and Tacchini 2011)

In order to create something productive for society, scholars need to refrain from hiding in the shelter of academia. Professors, scholars, thinkers, and artists all over the world risk to live in a kind of meta-world. Of course, some of the most critical discoveries started in protected environments. The most brilliant minds have the chance to express their full potential in these situations in which the most revolutionary ideas may flourish. However, according to the Italian semiotician and writer Umberto

¹³ See above, par. 2 Dialogue.

¹⁴ We refer especially to second generation immigrants. See, among others, Santerini, M, 2008, *Educazione Interculturale e letteratura*, Roma, Carocci.

¹⁵ (1927–2012), Cardinal of the Roman Catholic Church, *Rector Magnificus* of the Gregorian University in Rome, Cardinal Archbishop of the Archdiocese of Milan, President of the European Conference of Bishops. For a brief biography see: <https://www.bethlehem.edu/CMLI/bio>

¹⁶ S.E. Card. Martini, *Noi e l'Islam*, homily delivered in Milan on December 6, 1990 (trans. Davide Tacchini), See Branca P 2010, *Noi e L'Islam, dall'accoglienza al dialogo*, Padova, Edizioni Messaggero, and Tacchini D 2011, *Dall'accoglienza al dialogo. L'omelia del card. Carlo Maria Martini vent'anni dopo*, in Libertà, January 2011, pp. 10–19.

Eco, many important discoveries were invented outside universities.¹⁷ Issues may rise when those thinkers assume or pretend that their safe meta-world works in the same way as what we usually call “the real world”. A scholarly work must match the higher standards of scholarship, but at the same time, it should have some repercussion on society. Scholarship, to be really so, should impact society, sooner or later. In some particular situations, the level of hostility (not only religious) is so high that the aim is to turn two enemies into interlocutors.¹⁸ If dialogue remains only theoretical and impracticable, the process may become useless. To say it with the words of Wilfred Cantwell Smith, although with a different meaning¹⁹: we need a *Reification* (Cantwell Smith 1991) of Christian-Muslim dialogue. Dialogue must be reified in order to be effective. I am convinced of this process even though there are different levels or hypostases of interreligious dialogue to consider as many scholars and thinkers have done in the last decades or even centuries.

2.1.1 Theological Dialogue

It is a dialogue among specialists, theologians, or men and women of religion and not only of faith. The actors of this dialogue frequently hold an “official” position, especially in Christianity and Shia Islam, such as priests, pastors, Mullahs and, in some cases, Imams. It is also a *dialogue of beliefs*, theological doctrines, and philosophical ideas²⁰ (Ayoub 2004). Theologians and people of religion may pave the way and act as trailblazers for the believers behind them. Working on common theological points or “common words²¹” of different religions, they may throw seeds in fertile lands outside universities and conference rooms. One of the goals of productive dialogue is the acceptance by both Christians and Muslims of the other as an equal partner — and not an opponent — in dialogue. This equality should be implied on levels of humanity, dignity, and regarding the claim for religious authenticity²² (Ayoub 2004). In all its aspects, this process implies the admission of both communities. Both Christianity and Islam contain the moral and spiritual resources to guide their followers to the way of salvation, which opens the field to comparative theology. One of the roles of theologians engaged in dialogue is to develop the discipline of comparative theology further.

¹⁷ He expressed this idea during a public lecture delivered in Bologna on September 20, 2013 for the 900th anniversary of the University and for the inauguration of the *Magna Charta Universitatum* (<http://www.magna-charta.org/magna-charta-universitatum>).

¹⁸ See, among others Appleby S 2000, *The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation*, Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham, and Little D 2000 (ed.), *Peacemakers in Action: Profiles of Religion in Conflict Resolution*, Cambridge-New York, Cambridge University Press, and Dubensky J 2016 (ed.), *Peacemakers in Action Vol. II, Profiles in Religious Peacebuilding*, Cambridge-New York, Cambridge University Press.

¹⁹ In his publication *The Meaning and End of Religion* (Minneapolis, MI, Fortress Press, 1991), Cantwell Smith considers *reification* of religious features as a negative evolution of religion in society. We intend to use, here, the verb *to reify* in a positive way. In *Human-Computer Interaction* and *Interaction Design*, in fact, the term is used as *making something material from something abstract*, which is closer to our idea.

²⁰ Ayoub M 2004, *Christian-Muslim Dialogue, Goals and Obstacles*, in *The Muslim World*, I, 2004, pp. 313–319.

²¹ *A Common Word Between You and Us*, www.acommonword.com.

²² Ayoub M 2004, *Christian-Muslim Dialogue, Goals and Obstacles* in *The Muslim World*, I, 2004, pp. 313–319.

Although its origin is relatively recent, even Muslim medieval times, there are sources of local experiences of what would nowadays be defined as comparative theology. Francis Clooney's work²³ is unanimously considered to be the reference for this subject, particularly after the recent development of Qur'anic Studies. Dialogue should neither explain significant differences regarding the teachings about God nor trying to merge one religious group into the other or incorporate both into a single religious tradition. Religious relativism should not be among the goals of productive dialogue. Instead, more projects in comparative theology between Christians and Muslims are necessary. When theology is written together, special attention is paid to the audience, which leads to the development of respecting language, methods, and beliefs of the dialogue partners. A mutual understanding of faith, despite all differences, will be enhanced. One particular area of theological studies is joint research of the Bible and the Qur'an. Reading the scriptures together allows scholars to participate in sessions of joint exegesis. By *interpreting* these scriptures together, valuable insight can be gained not only from the messages of the scriptures but also from how generations lived and experienced these sacred texts. The benefits could be enormous, not only for mutual understanding but also for broadening own views and growing in respect for how God continues to work among all of us.

As far as Islam and Christianity are concerned, common biblical tradition and shared prophets can work as a solid basis to start experiences of comparative theology. The people involved in these projects need to understand that dialogue is a journey²⁴ and that the actors do not know where it may lead. Although comparative theology, as an independent discipline, is still considered relatively new, theology has always been an inherently comparative discipline²⁵ (Renard 2011, p. 4). Since the early 1990s, scholars have been producing studies that can be identified as Comparative Theology²⁶ (Renard 2011, p. 5). Courses on major themes of Bible and Qur'an are taught all over the world, and several publications have been issued on the topic during the last decade, from Cantwell Smith (2005) to John Kaltner²⁷ (Kaltner 2018). Topics like monotheism, creation, revelation, prophecy, ethics, sin and punishment, love, repentance, worship, martyrdom (Ayoub 1987)²⁸, judgment, salvation, and

²³ Clooney F X 1995, "*Comparative Theology: a Review of Recent Books*", in *Theological Studies*, 56 (3), 1995, pp. 521–550, in which he basically analyzes all the published available material at that time, and then

Clooney F X 2010, *Comparative Theology: Deep Learning Across Religious Borders*, Chichester, UK, Wiley Blackwell, and Clooney F X 2010, *The New Comparative Theology: Interreligious Insights from the Next Generation*, London, T&T Clark International.

²⁴ See, among others, the works of David Thomas and Mahmoud Ayoub.

²⁵ Renard J 1998, "*Comparative Theology: Definition a Method*", in *Religious Studies and Theology*, 17.1 (1998), pp. 3–17

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

²⁷ Kaltner J 2018, *The Bible and the Qur'an: Biblical Figures in the Islamic Tradition*, New York, T&T Clark.

²⁸ Ayoub M 1987, *Martyrdom in Christianity and Islam* In R. T Antoun, R.T., Hegland, Mary E., *Religious Resurgence: Contemporary Cases in Islam, Christianity, and Judaism*, Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 1987, pp. 67–77.

even redemption (Ayoub 1983)²⁹ may be analyzed through a comparative approach. The comparative theology addressed in this paper must be considered as a constructive theology distinguished by its sources and ways of proceeding. Moreover, it differs from the comparative approach by its foundation in more than one tradition³⁰ (Renard 1998, p. 4). In order to be comparative, the discipline, in its methodology, should bridge historical theology and systematic theology³¹ (Tracy 1987 and Nicholson 2005). The recent idea of scriptural reasoning³², which places scriptures in the focus of the conversation, follows this comprehensive approach to comparative theology with a particular focus on the practical side and the impact on contemporary society³³. Scriptural reasoning has developed in structured study groups with an own methodology according to which each participant or group choose a special theme or issue from their community and a short passage from the scriptures. Afterwards, members of different communities meet in small groups and discuss the passages, sometimes with the help of a mediator. Creation, life on earth, death, and the relationships between science and faith are among the topics that have been discussed during the last few years.³⁴ Similar experiences have been occurring for decades in different areas of the world, mainly at the local level between neighboring communities.

2.1.2 Everyday Life Dialogue and Perception

At a lower level, the so-called “everyday life dialogue,” which mainly applies to the people on the ground, is more genuine, more spontaneous, and touches the borders of intercultural dialogue.

Interreligious dialogue is most effective when it springs from the experience of ‘living with each other’ from day to day within the same community and culture³⁵ (Pope John-Paul II 2001)

It is the dialogue of concerned neighbors with their adjacent churches and mosques, who work together and live on the same street. This type of dialogue is strictly connected with issues of social justice, environment, teenagers in mixed public schools, and a host of other issues.

²⁹ Ayoub M 1983, *The Idea of Redemption in Christianity and Islam*, in “*Mormons and Muslims*”, Salt Lake City, Spencer J. Palmer Publisher’s Press, 1983, pp. 105–116.

³⁰ Renard J 1998, *Comparative Theology (...)*, p. 4.

³¹ On this specific issue see Tracy D 1987, *Comparative Theology*, in “Encyclopedia of Religion”, 16 voll, (vol. 14, p. 454), New York, Macmillan, and Nicholson H 2005, *A Correlational Model of Comparative Theology*, in “*The Journal of Religion*” (*The University of Chicago Press*), Vol. 85, No. 2 (April 2005), pp. 191–213.

³² Scriptural Reasoning (SR) is a tool for interfaith dialogue where people of different faiths come together to read and reflect on their scriptures. Unlike some forms of interfaith engagement, it is not about seeking agreement but rather exploring the texts and their possible interpretations across faith boundaries and learning to ‘disagree better’. The result is often a deeper understanding of the others’ and one’s own scriptures as well as the development of strong bonds across faith communities. SR is now practiced globally, including places affected by religion-related tensions and conflict (www.scripturalreasoning.com).

³³ See <http://www.scripturalreasoning.org> accessed April 25, 2019.

³⁴ <http://www.scripturalreasoning.org/science-and-faith.html>.

³⁵ Pope John Paul II in his speech at the Omayyad Great Mosque in Damascus, Syria, on May 6, 2001, www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/speeches/2001/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_20010506_omayyadi_en.html.

The common prophetic moral and spiritual heritage can help the children of all three families of Abraham to come together and face the problems of the modern world. Through their synagogues, churches, and mosques, they should strive for the common good of society together. The dialogue of life is an active concern of citizens with problems of living together in one free and democratic country. The products of theological dialogue, although profoundly influenced by politics, mass media,³⁶ and major issue of perception should help to shape this dialogue in the long term.

The so-called “Mirror Effect” (Sayyad 2004), is a vital part of the comparative approach.

A person can define, and, therefore, shape and change his/her own identity only in the mirror of the other. Daily-life dialogue should then, at least to a certain extent, be free from ideology and prejudice. On the contrary, the effect contains the massive potential of having an impact of political, ideological and exploitable information. Nowadays, the perception of an event, a situation, or a minority affects people more deeply than the actual situation. In this respect, educated citizens, specialists, and public scholars may effectively play a role. It is essential that the work in this field is carried out in a careful and attentive manner since scholars bear responsibility for the outcome. Every student of a theological class may become a seed which, hopefully, will contribute and help to change the world. By teaching, scholars provide information to the students as well as tools to gain more knowledge. In addition, academicians should focus on debating with their students and be conscious that they can also learn from them.

It is extremely important to deepen the faith of Muslim and Christian women and men by sharing the personal faith of the other. The ultimate purpose of this dialogue is to create a fellowship of faith among the followers of Islam and Christianity. This goal may be achieved by sharing one’s faith with the other through worship, spiritual exercises and the existential struggle in God³⁷ (Irfan 2007).

The Qur’an promises those who strive in God that He will guide them to His ways, which are the “ways of peace.”³⁸ (Qur’an 29:69 and 5:16)

Considering the quotations, the perception of the other affects the actual relationships somebody has with them. As a basis for the beginning of productive dialogue, people must start speaking with the particular, special, and unique other they have in front of them. In the case of Christians and Muslims, this means not to engage in dialogical activities based on what they think to know or understand about the religion of the other. In other words, people should avoid relying too much on the stereotype they have of the other as a precondition for acceptance. Instead, they should listen and learn before they advance towards the sacred precincts of each other’s faith. More practically speaking, Muslims must

³⁶ On the contrary, in case of human rights violations where mass media may play a prominent role.

³⁷ Irfan A O 2007 (ed.), *A Muslim View of Christianity, essays in Dialogue by Mahmoud Ayoub*, New York, Orbis Markynoll, p. 68.

³⁸ Qur’an 29:69 and 5:16.

not seek to explain Christianity solely based on what the Qur'an and subsequent Islamic traditions say about it but should try to understand Christianity from the perspective of Christian sources and terms. Similarly, Christians must not interpret Islam, especially its sacred scripture, by applying their own understanding of the divine economy of salvation. They should take the Islamic worldview and its divine plan for the attainment of forgiveness, salvation, and bliss in the hereafter seriously.³⁹ How people perceive and judge each other is a fascinating but controversial issue. As Julia Kristeva has proven in her essay *Strangers to Ourselves* (Kristeva 1988), every human has a dark side, has a part of the *other*. Unless people accept this side within themselves, they cannot accept *others*⁴⁰ (Kristeva 1988).

For an actual dialogical approach, a person has to be strong in his/her convictions, e.g. in his/her faith, and remain open to the other⁴¹ (Thomas 2017). Changes in perception occur since age-old models and paradigms of representing the other are replaced by direct interaction. The images which Christian and Muslims have had of each other had remained rather static for a long time. However, these images have started to change during the last centuries, and even more frenetically throughout the last decade. The post-colonial period and, especially, the twentieth century, has shown the beginning of a new era in Christian-Muslim relations. However, much remains to be done to avoid "orientalist" approaches, which, unfortunately, are still active in Western societies. Furthermore, with the recent increase in populist and nationalist governments, elected in 2017 and 2018, some positions and ideologies, that seemed overcome, dangerously resurfaced. Recent examples for this development are US President Trump's Muslim Travel Ban⁴², Italian Ministry of the Interior Matteo Salvini's anti-immigration policies, and Hungarian prime minister Orbán's public speeches. The incidents of 9/11 led to a new direction to this process of which the outcome is not yet known. Times are changing at breakneck speed, which has never been experienced before. The effects of the contextual changes of modernity are an additional factor which influences religious thoughts. Modernity is a challenge for any religion, not only for Islam.

2.1.3 Interreligious Dialogue and Islam in Contemporary Western Europe

A social definition of religion is an offering to its adherents of specific interpretations of reality⁴³ (Charfi 2008). Therefore, the issue of *secularization* is another element which Islam and other

³⁹ The idea of being able to share feelings and points of view with the other and the enemy is an important passage through the path to reconciliation and forgiveness. On these topics see, among others, the works of Martin Leiner and of his Jena Center for Reconciliation Studies, of Joram Tarusarira and Mohammed Abu Nimer.

⁴⁰ Kristeva J 1988, *Etrangers a nous mêmes*, Paris, Fayard.

⁴¹ Thomas D 2017 (ed.), *Routledge Handbook on Christian-Muslim Relations*, London, Taylor and Francis, p. 5.

⁴² The Executive Order 13769, *Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States*, issued on January 27, 2017 included Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Syria and Yemen. For an overview of the events, see: <https://www.aclu-wa.org/pages/timeline-muslim-ban>.

⁴³ Charfi, A 2008, *La pensée islamique, rupture et fidélité*, Paris, Albin Michel.

Western religions have to face. What happened in both cases is the re-proposition of the post-French Revolution period when the Islamic world realized that it could not ignore the non-Muslims any more⁴⁴ (Moussalli 1992 *et al.*). The Second Vatican Council⁴⁵, was a breakthrough in the rather inflexible position of the Catholic Church since Islam had been depicted as a partner of the Church in a pluralistic world for the first time.

Now the sphere or abode of Islam is the homes and hearts of the people of the ummah. Similarly, the house of the Christian faith is the church, the hearts, and minds of its members⁴⁶. (Ayoub 2004)

Millions of Muslims are now citizens of Western Christian majority or Secular countries, and many Muslim majority countries have an equal number of Christian citizens. Particularly in the West, Islam is no longer the religion of strangers but the religion of next-door neighbors. Muslims share neighborhoods, schools, workplaces, hospitals, and even burial grounds with Christians.

More than 300 million Muslims, or one-fifth of the world's Muslim population, live in countries where Islam is not the majority religion⁴⁷. (Pew Research 2009)

Thanks to the nation-state model, the *Umma*⁴⁸ can now, more than ever before, transcend all ethnic, cultural, geographical, and national boundaries. Moreover, where Muslims live in minorities in developed Western countries, they have more liberty to experiment with new ideas and actions than their confreres in their countries of origin. Thus, they can help the *Umma* to find its rightful place in the modern world.

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the globalizing message of Islam encounters includes the conditions for a complete realization of a project that begun more than 1400 years ago and was re-dynamized by several movements in the first half of the twentieth century. A new form of argument of a contextual type is to be applied to an old project, the globality of Islam, in order to reinforce its relevance⁴⁹ (Maréchal 2009)

In the last decades of Muslim literature in the West⁵⁰ (Ramadan 2009 *et al.*), *Shūra* (consultation) became constitutionalism, *Ijmā'* (consensus) became public opinion, *Maṣlaha* and *Istiṣlah* (public

⁴⁴ See, among others, Moussalli, A 1992, *Radical Islamic Fundamentalism: the ideological and political discourse of Sayyid Qutb*, Beirut, American University of Beirut Press.

⁴⁵ From now on, simply "Vatican II".

⁴⁶ Ayoub, M., *Christian-Muslim Dialogue, Goals and Obstacles*.

⁴⁷ *Mapping the Global Muslim Population: A Report on the Size and Distribution of the World's Muslim Population*, "a new study by the Pew Research Center's Forum on Religion & Public Life", 2009. Available online at <https://www.pewforum.org/2009/10/07/mapping-the-global-muslim-population/>.

⁴⁸ The religious Muslim worldwide community.

⁴⁹ Maréchal B 2009, *The Muslim Brothers in Europe, Roots and Discourse*, Leiden-Boston, Brill, p. 133.

⁵⁰ See the Works of Tariq Ramadan, Abdellahi Ahmad An-Na'im, Mohammed Abed al-Jabri, Burhan Ghalioun, Nasr Hāmid Abū Zayd, Mohammed Arkoun, Tareq Modood, Nader Akkad, H.E. The Grand Mufti Emeritus of Bosnia and Herzegovina Mustafa Cerić and others, among which, a not (yet) well known Egyptian Scholar, Wā'il Fārūq, who is currently teaching at the Catholic University in Milan, Italy.

interest) became the *seeking of the common good* and, therefore, social justice and equity in the government but also utilitarianism, *Bay'a* (allegiance) became close to universal suffrage while *Ijtihād* (interpretation) became freedom of thought.

These contemporary innovative views of classical Muslim concepts are acts in the path to reconciliation between Muslims and non-Muslims in Europe⁵¹. It is essential to consider these aspects when dialogue is approached. Most of the scholarly production about Christian-Muslim relations post 9/11 seems either strictly methodological or interwoven with a pious attitude. Since people seem to be strangers to themselves, a first step always involves acting honestly with oneself before engaging in dialogue.⁵² If people understand themselves, their tradition and identity, which is shaped by the those of the other, they may be able to understand the other and try to be productive in dialogue⁵³.

A person is a person through other persons. None of us comes into the world fully formed. We would not know how to think, or walk, or speak, or behave as human beings unless we learned it from other human beings. We need other human beings in order to be human⁵⁴ (Tutu 2004)

Bibliography

- Abū Zayd, N 1990, *Maḥmūd al-naṣṣ: dirāsa fī 'ulūm al-Qur'ān* (The Concept of the Text, a study on the Principles of the Qur'an), Al-Qāhira, Al-Markaz al-Thaqafi al-'Arabi.
- 2018, *Naqd al-Khitāb al-Dīnī*, Al-Qāhira, Dar al-Thaqafa al-Jadida, 1990, English Translation, *Critique of Religious Discourse* (Trans. Jonathan Wright), New Haven/London, Yale University Press.
- Appleby, S 2000, *The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation*. Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham.
- Ayoub, M 2004, *Christian-Muslim Dialogue, Goals and Obstacles* in The Muslim World, Vol. I, pp. 313–319.
- 1983, “The Idea of Redemption in Christianity and Islam”, *Mormons and Muslims*, Vol. 34, 1983, pp. 105–116.
- Branca, P 2010, *Noi e l'Islam, dall'accoglienza al dialogo*, Padova, Edizioni Messaggero.

⁵¹ See above.

⁵² Kristeva J 1988, *Etrangers a nous mêmes*, Paris, Fayard.

⁵³ This attitude towards dialogue and *the other* is also at the core of Ubuntu philosophy and of the theory of reconciliation as interdependence. Among the many publications available on this topic, see: Broodryk J 2007, *Understanding South Africa: The Ubuntu way of living*, Pretoria, Ubuntu School of Philosophy. Specifically about reconciliation as interdependence, see Du Toit F 2018, *When Political Transition Works: Reconciliation as Interdependence*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

⁵⁴ Tutu, D M (Archbishop) 2004, *God has a dream: A vision of hope for our time*, Rider, London, p. 21, quoted here in Woke B 2015, *Storying Ubuntu as a Rainbow Nation*, in “Verbum et Ecclesia” 36 (2), 2015 pp. 1–8., available online at <http://www.scielo.org.za/pdf/vee/v36n2/01.pdf>, accessed April 25, 2019.

- Broodryk, J 2007, *Understanding South Africa: The Ubuntu way of living*, Pretoria, Ubuntu School of Philosophy.
- Cantwell Smith, W 1991, *The Meaning and End of Religion*, Minneapolis, MI, Fortress Press.
- Charfi, A 2008, *La pensée islamique, rupture et fidélité*, Paris, Albin Michel.
- Clooney, F X 1995, “Comparative Theology: a Review of Recent Books”, *Theological Studies*, vol. 56, no. 3, pp. 521–550.
- 2010, *Comparative Theology: Deep Learning Across Religious Borders*, Chichester, UK, Wiley Blackwell.
- 2010, *The New Comparative Theology: Interreligious Insights from the Next Generation*, London, T&T Clark International.
- Cole, J 2018, *Muhammad, Prophet of Peace amid the Clash of Empires*, New York, Nation Books.
- Dubensky, J (ed.) 2016, *Peacemakers in Action, Profiles in Religious Peacebuilding* Vol. II, Cambridge-New York, Cambridge University Press.
- Du Toit, F 2018, *When Political Transition Works: Reconciliation as Interdependence*. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2018.
- Westwood, P 2018, Inclusive and Adapting Teaching, *Meeting the Challenge of Diversity in the Classroom*, Second Edition, London, Routledge, available online at <https://books.google.it/books?hl=it&lr=&id=9oNXDwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT14&ots=yjCEarhJMg&sig=NvTDK49XBq0onEO2ljo0u84wJ5k#v=onepage&q&f=false>.
- Irfan, A O (ed.) 2007, *A Muslim View of Christianity, essays in Dialogue by Mahmoud Ayoub*, New York, Orbis Markynoll.
- Kaltner, J 2018, *The Bible and the Qur'an: Biblical Figures in the Islamic Tradition*, New York, T&T Clark.
- Khalifeh, M 2018, *Islam is the Religion of Justice and Reform*, Columbus, OH, Educational Press.
- Kristeva, J 1988, *Etrangers a nous mêmes*, Paris, Fayard.
- Little, D (ed) 2000, *Peacemakers in Action: Profiles of Religion in Conflict Resolution*, Cambridge-New York, Cambridge University Press.
- Mapping the Global Muslim Population: A Report on the Size and Distribution of the World's Muslim Population*, “a new study by the Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion & Public Life,” 2009. Available online at <https://www.pewforum.org/2009/10/07/mapping-the-global-muslim-population>.
- Maréchal, B 2009, *The Muslim Brothers in Europe, Roots and Discourse*, Leiden-Boston, Brill.

- Meierkord, A, Staring, F, Day, L 2017, *Migrants in European Schools*, Publication Office of the European Union. Available Online at <https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/c0683c22-25a8-11e8-ac73-01aa75ed71a1>.
- Nicholson. H 2005, “A Correlational Model of Comparative Theology”, *The Journal of Religion*, vol. 85, no. 2, pp. 191–213.
- Renard, J 1998, “Comparative Theology: Definition and Method”, *Religious Studies and Theology*, vol. 17, no. 1, pp. 3–17.
- Report of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, available online at <https://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2017/current-migration-situation-eu-education>.
- Roberts, S 2010, “Listening (and saving) World Languages”, in *The New York Times*, April 29, available online at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/29/nyregion/29lost.html>.
- Santerini, M 2008, *Educazione Interculturale e letteratura*, Roma, Carocci.
- Sayad, A 2004, *The Suffering of the Immigrant*, Cambridge, UK/ Malden, MA, Polity.
- Suárez-Orozco, M M, Darbes, T S, Sutin, M 2011, “Migration and Schooling”, *Annual Review of Anthropology*, vol. 40, pp. 311–328.
- Tacchini, D 2011, “Dall’accoglienza al dialogo. L’omelia del card. Carlo Maria Martini vent’anni dopo”, *Libertà*, January, pp. 10–19.
- Tahara, N 2015, “Conflict of Subsistence in a Multi-Ethnic Community along the Shore of Lake Albert in Uganda”, *Shitenoji University Bulletin*, vol. 61, pp. 229–246.
- Thomas, D (ed) 2017, *Routledge Handbook on Christian-Muslim Relations*, London, Taylor and Francis.
- Tracy, D 1987, “Comparative Theology”, *Encyclopedia of Religion*, vol. 14, New York, Macmillan, p. 454.
- Tutu, D M (Archbishop) 2004, *God has a dream: A vision of hope for our time*, Rider, London.
- Woke, B 2015, “Storying Ubuntu as a Rainbow Nation”, *Verbum et Ecclesia*, vol. 36, no. 2, pp. 1–8.

The European Refugee Crisis in Germany and Greece

Between National Populism and Humanitarian Action

Abstract

Considering the two main crises Europe had to face in the last decades (the economic and the refugee crises) through the lens of academic papers, representative media debates (both as primary and secondary sources) and political statements, this paper will critically discuss the diverse perceptions of “Europe” and the concept of “refugee” in order to show relativity, contingency and vested interests of allegedly universal conceptions that legitimize belonging and exclusion.

It will, then, give a short outline of the mutual accusations between Germany and Greece in the financial crisis, and proceed with an *en detail* analysis of how Germany’s and Greece’s internal discourses in the refugee crisis have been more and more polarized and captured by populist voices and how both crises resemble one another discursively in their tendencies of stereotyping and *othering*, and of blending out human needs and questions of solidarity.

„Being a refugee is much more than a political status. It is the most pervasive kind of cruelty that can be exercised against a human being. By depriving a person of all forms of security, the most basic requirements of a normal life, by placing that person at the mercy of sometimes inhospitable host countries that do not want to receive the refugee, you are forcibly robbing this human being of all aspects that would make human life not just tolerable, but meaningful in many ways.” – Dr. Hanan Ashrawi, head of the PLO department of culture and information

“The humanitarian side is very, very important. You must always hold onto humanity. The more immune you are, that’s very, very dangerous.” – Dana Firas, princess of Jordan

Both statements to be found in Ai Weiwei’s rewarded documentary „Human Flow“ (2017)

Europe today – as cultural entity, political union and growing market – is quite far away from the above cited world of upheaval, displacement, war, insecurity and depravation. Risen from the ashes of the Second World War, from the sixties on and particularly since the nineties it has been hailed and perceived a unique project of transnational engagement, political vision, civic progress and economic prosperity. *United in diversity*, has been one of its most popular slogans.

Within the last decade, however, two crises have disturbed Europe’s seeming serenity and unity, triggering fierce disputes over two interwoven topics: The economic and the *refugee crisis*. While the former evolved from the economic strains starting in 2008 and the consequent bailout programs for particularly Southern European countries, the latter followed the influx of refugees from primarily Syria in 2015.

En miniature both crises reflect Europe's inherent contradictions and basic challenges with regard to identity, solidarity and common action. They brought to the surface new cleavages and long lingering basic questions: Who belongs to Europe? Where are its borders? What is Europe in the first place? A transnational civic project or an exclusive, ethnic space of *fatherlands*? And after all: Who is entitled to being helped and where are the limits of solidarity?

This is more particularly evident in the disputes going on between Germany and Greece ever since Greece's imminent bankruptcy in 2008. The financial dispute between both European countries has been unprecedented in racism and aggression. It blatantly reveals the challenges and limits of the EU's political and economic integration. Moreover, both countries have played an exceptional role in the second crisis: While Germany admitted the biggest number of refugees with almost one million in 2015, Greece is the country on whose soil most of them passed.

As shall be discussed in this paper, the populist disputes triggered by the economic crisis *between* both countries resemble the populist discourses of exclusion, blame, threat and othering of the *refugee crisis* as manifest *within* both countries. This is visible in the discursive frames that resulted from both crises and in turn were instrumental in shaping the new realities and legitimizing respective political actions, while little by little ousting humanity.

Based on a reflection of these discourses through the lens of academic papers, representative media debates (both as primary and secondary sources) and political statements, first, I will critically discuss the diverse perceptions of "Europe" and the concept of "refugee" in order to show relativity, contingency and vested interests of allegedly universal conceptions that legitimize belonging and exclusion.

Second, I will give a short outline of the mutual accusations between Germany and Greece in the financial crisis.

third, proceed with an *en detail* analysis of how Germany's and Greece's internal discourses in the refugee crisis have been more and more polarized and captured by populist voices and how both crises resemble one another discursively in their tendencies of stereotyping and *othering*, and of blending out human needs and questions of solidarity.

As I will illuminate, the case of Germany displays a decisive shift towards dehumanization dominated by the right-wing populist party AfD (*Alternative for Germany*) and the movement PEGIDA (*Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the West*), while in Greece dehumanizing discourses have given profound rise to the right-wing extremist voices of *Golden Dawn* within a broader context of social indifference and political incapacity to deal with the hot humanitarian questions. Both climates have paved the way for justifying policies of exclusion as visible in tightened deportation, enhanced cooperation with EU-bordering states in containing the refugee flow to Europe, and the

criminalization of NGO-rescue ships, such as *Lifeline* and *Sea Watch*, that filled in the gap of organized political endeavors in saving people from drowning in the Mediterranean.¹

Notwithstanding these broader tendencies of public opinion, both countries have displayed a broad range of first-aid state measures and civic action for empowerment and integration of refugees. I will conclude with a short comparative outline of these measures in order to show the potential for a broader political and social vision of community that on a larger scale could counterweigh Europe's centrifugal forces.²

Conflicting ideas: Europe's crisis discourses on finance and refugees

Times of crisis and conflict, and their manifestations in discursive collisions over contested realities, often urgently reveal what otherwise remains invisible or appears as "normal" and without alternative. From (social) psychology, to political and cultural studies much scientific research related to conflict analysis has been done with the aim of both grasping and deconstructing the very essence of seemingly self-evident conceptions such as *identity*, *nationality* or *gender* and their role in crisis. Deconstructing these conceptions means questioning their alleged naturalness, show how conceptions are contested, and evolve, respectively change over time as a product of prerogatives of interpretation, power relations and related interests.

The three above-mentioned conceptions (as many others) can be considered crisis phenomena, because people rarely think about their relevance, if they are not threatened or contested and because they often derive their power from differentiation (*us versus them*). In other words, it might not be until one suffers a severe identity crisis or is being threatened by a majority in his self-image that one realizes that an identity exists. What is more, one of the most powerful manifestations of identity is the negative one – a self-understanding based on differentiation from the *other*. Nationalism, for instance, could evolve into a world governing ideology, primarily because it could very successfully allure the masses through powerful sentiments of *othering* (*uniting against the common enemy*) and the idea of a primordial homogeneous, and noble national identity (see Anderson 2016 or Smith 1999). As Hobsbawm (2012, p. 234) aptly puts it, almost all nations that came into being in the 19th and 20th century were born out of war. For the last centuries, world politics, albeit in different shapes, have been based on such powerful dualities, as *West* versus *Orient*, freedom, liberalism and progress

¹ See the current controversial debates on Carola Rackete, captain of *Sea Watch 3*, that was arrested in Italy after docking her ship with about 100 rescued persons onboard in Lampedusa, despite a ban for non-governmental rescue vessels put into effect by far right-wing Italian internal minister Salvini; <<https://www.standard.co.uk/news/world/carola-rackete-court-lifts-house-arrest-order-on-migrant-rescue-captain-arrested-in-italy-a4180831.html>>; <<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/29/sea-watch-captain-carola-rackete-arrested-italian-blockade>>.

² The latter is closely connected to what Martin Leiner in his reconciliation theory calls the "Hölderlin Perspective". It is based on the assumption that reconciliation does not necessarily have to start only after the end of conflict, but to the contrary at its height (Leiner & Flämig 2012, pp. 7–20).

against authoritarianism, backwardness and (religious) fanaticism. National identities, in this sense, have been built on the pleasant and reassuring feeling of belonging and moral superiority and gained significant momentum by being united against a real or imagined other that defies or threatens one's own values. In this sense, (differentiation from) the other is essential for recognizing the self. Imagine for instance, that there was only one single world-nation: A national identity would hardly exist.

The same is true for gender. *Heteronormativity*, for instance, is a scientific term deployed by a gender-sensitive approach to show that heterosexuality is defined as *normal* by a majority's sex identity. It is the collision of differing conceptions through deviation from that norm (e.g. by the LGBTQ) that reveals the underlying social prerogative. But this collision, evidently, causes conflict. This is particularly true on an *intra*-group level (*within* the same group or community). LGBTQ-minorities often painfully experience discrimination and pressure to assimilate, while their mere presence is often received as unpleasant or even disturbing for a majority. The more intense the real or perceived conflict between the two, the higher the impulse of united opposition against the other will be (see Rehrmann 2019, chapter 4).

In this sense, often enough it is minorities – be that ethnic, religious or sexual – that reveal the normative power of a majority; and it is the sphere of contention and debate that illuminate the neuralgic points of societies with their existing hierarchies of norm and deviation.

Similarly, the European crises have brought to the surface diverse and colliding prerogatives of interpretation over what Europe is or ought to be. First of all, references to “Europe” have always been somewhat fuzzy in their connection to diverse political and economic ideas. These ideas, such as de Gaulle's *Europe of Fatherlands* – signifying a union of cultural and ethnically diverse nations – or slogans such as “united in diversity” and “community of values” show a spectrum of inclusive political and cultural ideals aimed at strengthening the European Community's *raison d'être*, while paving the way for its enhanced political integration and the creation of a single market in the treaty of Maastricht (1992). Both crises have ended this positive fervor and motivated nationalist debates of internal (from other European countries and Non-European minorities) and external (from Non-European countries) differentiation based on new cleavages and new conceptions of Europe, internal blame games, othering and racism. Thus, little by little Europe's positive founding myth was upstaged, unmasking the ever-existent simmering tensions between civic, (multi-) cultural and (exclusively) ethnic understandings of community.

It was initially in the economic crisis that the idea of a community of solidarity received its first devastating blow, while what before the fall of the iron curtain had been an East-West cleavage became a North-South rupture with Mediterranean countries – most severely Greece – suffering from

economic stagnation and an enormous debt load.³ While economists racked their brain about how to keep the economic wildfire expanding from Europe's South at bay, (populist) media in the North introduced new contemptuous conceptions such as *transfer union* or *union of liability* and the stereotype of the lazy, incompetent Southerner that waisted Northern aid funds. That marked the first step into what became an aggressive blame game between donor and recipient states. It was due to Germany's leading role in the bailout policy that it exceptionally triggered anti-German resentment in Portugal, Spain, Italy, Cyprus or Ireland that found a yellow-press reflection in analogies to its national-socialist past.

While, typically enough, *Euro Bonds* have never been realized, inner-European relations have suffered severe and sustainable fractions. Thus, the initial idea of a *community of values* with its positive associations of justice, and inclusion was replaced by negative associations of allocation battles and cultural difference.

This appears to be also blatantly visible in today's media discourses on refugees throughout Europe, as they indicate an alarming growth of nationalist, populist and also right-wing-extremist voices that display a harsh re-nationalization based on othering, discrimination and exclusion. While the war in Syria and the rising numbers of casualties in the Mediterranean were catapulted into European headlines after a picture of drowned toddler Alan ("Aylan") Kurdi's body went viral (Fotopoulos/Kaimaklioti 2016, pp. 266) the opening of the German borders in summer 2015 by chancellor Angela Merkel marked a flare of humanity with almost one million refugees received only in 2015. However, the political climate along with public opinion within Germany quickly shifted, reflecting the broader European discourses and state's practices aimed at limiting the influx of unwanted people into their territory. Here, European states either openly defy international and European law by building up fences and borders claiming security threats (as the particularly the case in Eastern Europe), or they try to adjust inconvenient realities by re-naming and re-framing categories and human needs. On that note, refugee discourses throughout Europe have been evolving around the re-definition of „safe countries of origin“ or new terms, such as „economic migrant“ that are increasingly used to diminish the number of people entitled to protection as opposed to those that are „only“ seeking for better living conditions (see Barnett 2017, pp. 150–151). In view of such a volatile atmosphere it seems not surprising that several attempts by the European commission to enforce a common benchmarks in asylum politics, ensuring a fair burden sharing, equal social standards for refugees, including medical care, legal protections, access to the job market and fast proceedings of asylum applications, has failed on a large scale (Jakob 2016, Pro-Asyl 2013). Also an attempt on chancellor Merkel's part to

³ For in-depth analysis on the evolution of the cleavages between East and West to North and South see Fligstein et. Al 2012, Eder 2014, Kylstad 2010, Ker-Lindsay 2007).

enforce a quota system for refugee admittance throughout the EU met with fierce opposition from primarily the *visegrád* states. Czech Republic's president for instance warned that if refugees were admitted Czech women would be soon all covered in Burkas (Kalantzakos 2017, pp. 20). German newspapers report anti-Merkel-demonstrations amidst the staging of bearded men swinging ISIS-flags while screaming „Allahu Akbar“ as a harbinger of what might come, if refugees are admitted. Not surprisingly, Vladimir Handl from Prague University states that what in Germany is represented by populist AFD in his country appears to be mainstream opinion (ZEIT 2018). Both in the Czech Republic, as well as in Poland according to polls only 2–4% are willing to admit refugees (ZEIT 2018). Thus, while particularly Eastern European countries randomly closed their borders, the European periphery and beyond most severely hit by the economic crises is also the one carrying the burden of pressing humanitarian and legal questions. Eventually, Europe's periphery has turned into a region of borders and fences that – as political experience and science has proven to be a worldwide phenomenon – has become a haven of desperate temptations and organized crime (Markwardt 2018; Landeszentrale für Politische Bildung Baden-Württemberg 2018).

What the questioning of these seemingly unchangeable realities reveal, is that also the concept “refugee” relates to the above-mentioned dimensions of construction, crisis, and exception: For it is far less universal, than its daily use might suggest. Mirroring connotations, interpretations and ideas captured in European media discourses today, common associations related to the concept “refugee” might provoke a chains of interrelated notions, such as *Syria, South-East Asia, Sub-Sahara Africa, poverty, failed states, autocracy, civil wars, crime, trafficking, Islamism, developing countries, poverty, influx, danger, foreign culture, backwardness etc.* However, deconstructing these seemingly self-evident conceptions (that is deconstructing what is commonly perceived as a natural, static and clear-cut depiction of reality) reveals that this is but a reflection of historic contingencies and vested interests. Today, the lightheaded use of the term „refugee“ can be perceived in fierce media debates all over Europe and beyond in what has become a battleground over definitions and competing interests.⁴

⁴ This phenomenon, one can say, has accompanied the concept's evolution right from the start. Who would remember today that the term as legal category did not exist prior to World War I, and back then was only limited to Russians fleeing the Bolsheviks (Barnett 2017, p. 156). It was only after the devastating upheavals of WorldWar II that it became a somewhat universal category that applied according to the Geneva Convention of 1951 to persons fleeing their country of origin out of a „well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion“. Still, the definition had a fundamental blemish, since it only applied to those individuals having fled „[a]s a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951“ (Geneva Convention, pp. 14), because Western states were worried of including into their newly established sphere of obligations the masses of people outside Europe that were forced to flee their country of origin. It was only until 1967 that at least the legal definition was freed from its timely (and local) limitation (Barnett 2017, p. 156). Yet, when it comes to applying it, it seems, short reckonings make long friends, for states – particularly in times of crisis – will seek multiple strategies to refrain from their legal and moral responsibilities. In his astute analysis tracing the evolution of „the refugee“ as legal term Worster (2012, p. 94) puts

Today, triggered by what is commonly called the European refugee crisis and its temporary climax with almost one million people in existential need crossing the Mediterranean from Turkey to Greece only in 2015 (Ulusoy/Battjes 2017, p 4), it appears to be exactly this tension over which disputes regarding political and moral responsibilities have erupted within the EU – disputes that seem as the second most fundamental threat to Europe’s cohesion following the repercussions of the economic crisis of 2008. For disputes evolve around a redefinition of concepts, borders, community, and belonging, accompanied by increasing pleas for a return to national interests and a gradual ousting of humanitarian questions (if they had ever been an honest concern of wider European populations) by increasingly sharp voices framing the influx of people to Europe as a threat to its political, economic and cultural status quo and the humanitarian claims as *non-bona fide*.

The German-Greek Crisis: Exclusion and *Othering*

As visible in the above mentioned, the European economic crisis brought about unforeseen and unprecedented debates that can be seen as the prelude to the era of reinvigorated nationalism and aggressive populism. It paved the way for all sorts of new cleavages employed particularly by populist parties and national media fueling the idea of *the people* fighting against the *contrived Brussels elites* or, as the case may be, the *diligent hard-working Northerners/Westerners* against the *corrupt, culturally backward Southerners*. This, in turn, gave impetus to centrifugal forces of nationalist spirit directed against a political and economic union that for decades had been perceived as alluring successful project of prosperity, freedom and common values (for an analysis of European populism see Durant et. Al. 2013).

in a nutshell the ever-existent tension between humanitarian maxims and state interests: “The Refugee Convention is one of the cornerstones of the larger human rights system for protecting vulnerable persons and yet it is also a very narrow instrument, protecting a very specific group of persons. This duality is reflected in refugee protection generally where, on the one hand, states appear to believe in a moral, humanitarian imperative to protect individuals seeking refuge, yet, on the other hand, they are reluctant to permit entry to all those persons falling under their responsibility. When we consider the contemporary definition of refugee, and how customary international law may supplement the definition of refugee, we see this same division of interests. If we were motivated strictly by human-centered interests, we would find a broadening of the definition, although perhaps with limited state compliance. If we were motivated strictly by state-centered interests, we might find a narrowing of the definition, although perhaps abandoning desperate individuals truly in need.”

The manifestations of these debates are very obvious in two countries and their relation particularly: Germany and Greece. The two



Figure I: From the German press against Greeks: Cover and further page from (German Focus) titled „Cheaters in the European family“ depicting the



Figure II: From the Greek press against Germans: Two pages from „Hitler’s Spirit“ (Greek Fokus) and the front page of Democracy Newspaper depicting Machalos

countries’ relations within Europe – having been a symbol of successful post-War reconciliation – have dramatically deteriorated since 2008, when Greece’s imminent bankruptcy initiated an international bailout plan under the auspices of the so called TROIKA (European Commission, IMF and European Central Bank). The credits granted to Greece and on a smaller basis also to Portugal, Ireland, Italy and Spain that had been severely affected by the international crisis (all of them together interestingly enough, often to be

found under the acronym of *PIIGS*), caused the above mentioned shift of discourse with growingly fierce disputes. Between Germany and Greece this turned into a populist, partly openly racist blame-game with German “yellow” press drawing on stereotypes of the Greek as lazy and incompetent, while some Greek press depicted Germany as of timeless fascist and merciless spirit (see Bickes et. Al 2012 and figure I and II). German *Bild-Zeitung* and other media echoing political circles fiercely demanded the exclusion of Greece from the EU-zone to protect the „honest, hard-working Northerners“ from Southern dissipated lifestyle – a claim reiterated in the refugee crises, when Greece was accused of not properly securing Europe’s Southern borders (see for instance a collection of *Bildzeitung*-articles, Bildblog 2018). These populist discourses have been instrumental in suffocating the empathic and differentiated reporting on the Greek crisis and its effect on the life quality of a broad percentage of the Greek population, while legitimizing a harsh bailout policy towards Greece that has been criticized by political observers and economic experts as catastrophic for both European cohesion and the Southern country’s sovereignty and stability.⁵ As a consequence, Greek media reactions to TROIKA measures since then reflect a profound alienation and resentment with Germany

⁵ See: Bickes et. Al; <<https://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2014-12/cdu-griechenland-neuwahlen>; <https://www.sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/europaeische-schuldenkrise-griechenland-hat-in-der-eu-nichts-zu-suchen-1.1284315>; <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/fluechtlingskrise-griechenland-droht-ausschluss-aus-dem-schengenraum-a-1073877.html>>.

and Europe as a whole, as the term “Europe” little by little has come to be understood as synonymous to a lack of solidarity, respectively a downright inimical intervention from the EU’s central organs into internal affairs.⁶

Refugee Discourses in Germany: From Humanitarian Action to Right-Wing Populism

Many parallels to these worrying developments can be perceived in the European „refugee crisis“ that indicates in the first place the more than one million people fleeing from prosecution and war, natural disasters and poverty from the Middle East, South Asia and (West) Africa in 2015 (Mercy Corps 2016). Again, the case of Germany, though or exactly because it is exceptional in the amount of refugees received, and its related policies of long-term integration, seems representative. What German media afterwards called a caesura refers to a shift from a primarily humanitarian attitude and concerted action to growing skepticism, as reflected in respective media.

After almost a million refugees passing the borders to Germany in 2015 (these numbers sank to about 280 000, 180 000 in 2016/17), German-wide about eighty admission centers were established with hundreds of people in each waiting for the processing of their applications. Roughly a bit more than half of them have been approved so far (2018). However, life quality in these asylums particularly of women, elderly, handicapped, children and unaccompanied minors have been widely considered as critical. Studies and opinion polls of Berlin *Charité* and UNICEF reveal that asylum seekers widely criticize a lack of privacy and back medical care in the shelters, as well as a general lack of psychosocial support. While those, whose chances for family reunion are minimal, also severely suffer from loneliness and uncertainty.⁷ Fortunately, many of these centers empty little by little or are being shut down as more and more people are being accommodated in private housing and receive financial as well as technical assistance to enter the job market. Since 2015, the German government has paid about 60 billion Euros comprising board, accommodation, and language training (Landeszentrale für Politische Bildung Baden-Württemberg 2018). Drawing on the report of Germany’s integration ministry (BMBF) on long-term measures for (primary, secondary and university) education, professional and (practically oriented) language training and social integration, a broad spectrum of

⁶ For a selection of representative media articles see: <<http://www.kathimerini.gr/767056/opinion/epikairothta/politikh/h-eyrwpaikh-enwsh-h-ellada-kai-h-krish>>; <<http://www.kathimerini.gr/755250/article/epikairothta/politikh/ta-tria-megalytera-la8h-ths-troikas-sthn-ellada>>; <<https://www.newsbeast.gr/financial/arthro/3032268/valter-baier-adiki-ke-paralogi-i-politiki-tis-troikas-stin-ellada>>; <<https://rproject.gr/article/i-politiki-tis-troikas-stin-ellada-na-kleveis-ton-elliniko-lao-kai-na-dineis-ta-hrimata-stis>>. For a popular scientific publication written by Greek foreign minister Nikos Kontziás in 2013 depicting Europe/the EU in historical perspective as an unfair arena of economic exploitation of the weak – particularly by Germany, and excessive bureaucracy titled “Greece as colony of debt. European Empire and German Dominance [Ελλάδα αποικία χρέους. Ευρωπαϊκή Αυτοκρατορία και γερμανική πρωτοκαθεδρία] see <<https://www.politeianet.gr/books/9789601649665-kotzias-nikos-patakis-ellada-apoikia-chreous-222823>>; <<http://www.tovima.gr/2015/01/31/politics/nikos-kotzias-thewritikos-twn-proedrwn-me-oplo-ton-makiabeli/>>.

⁷ <www.unicef.org; <<https://female-refugee-study.charite.de/>>.

political action in cooperation with institutions, NGOs, companies and associations has been taken. It ranges from the obligatory “integration course”⁸, and a variety of free online language programs offered e.g. by the Goethe Institute and *Deutsche Welle*, to professional government-led trainings. It furthermore comprises internship orientation and provisions of job opportunities for skilled workers, youth and free lancers through a broad network comprising all sorts of companies as well as financial support for them, when they hire refugees. Germany’s federal employment agency draws a positive balance for 2018 with 300 000 refugees being sustainably integrated into the job market (BMBF 2017).⁹ These actions were reflected in a broad awareness and empathy towards the plight of particularly Syrian refugees within media (see e.g. reports of *Spiegel*, *Welt*, *FAZ* or *Süddeutsche Zeitung* on Germans receiving refugees at Munich Central Station in 2015 or popular *Heute Show* where Syrians were invited to sing, and numerous documentaries tracing their fates), as well as in private, civic or Church initiatives that complement the government’s measures under the auspices of the federal office for migrants and refugees (BAMPF)¹⁰. Countless initiatives range from asylum granted by the Church to protect people from deportation (though, recently invalidated by judicial decision)¹¹, community level music and artistic projects, legal assistance, intercultural women’s groups, private language courses, as well as special assistance to minors, elderly and handicapped persons.¹²

⁸ This is a course that aims at conveying basic language skills, as well as an insight into German politics, culture and history.

⁹ <<http://www.unternehmen-integrieren-fluechtlinge.de/>>; <<http://www.join-now.org/>>; <<https://www.aus-und-weiterbildungssallianz.de/AAW/Navigation/DE/Home/home.html>>; <<https://www.sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/bundesagentur-fuer-arbeit-immer-mehr-fluechtlinge-finden-einen-job-1.4098989>>.

¹⁰ See for instance the empathic and human media reports to the first and biggest wave of refugees in September 2015, reflecting people’s broad first aid measures at: <<http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/fluechtlinge-am-hauptbahnhof-muenchen-erschloepfung-und-zuversicht-a-1051656.html>>; <<https://www.zeit.de/politik/2015-09/zuege-ungarn-fluechtlinge-bayern-muenchen>>; <<https://www.sueddeutsche.de/muenchen/ankunft-der-fluechtlinge-in-muenchen-teddybaeren-zur-begrueessung-1.2629856>>.

¹¹ See <<https://www.kirchenasyl.de>; <<https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/kirchenasyl-107.html>>.

¹² For a German-wide network of civic and communal initiatives see <<https://www.tagesschau.de/fluechtlingsprojekte/>>. ; Two intercultural initiatives in Berlin appear as representative for successful long-term cooperation and integration projects: The Berlin-based non-profit-association *Über den Tellerrand*, established in 2013 with a network comprising 30 cities brings together refugees and locals in cooking-culture-and-music-events, and runs a mobile kitchen throughout Germany to promote intercultural exchange, break down stereotypes and psychological barriers and raise awareness for the personal stories of refugees. The author talked to many of these young visionaries with and without refugee background that see their encounters and projects within the broader frame of facilitating intercultural relations and European cooperation.¹² The second project – outstanding in symbolism – is a long-term refugee home called *Sharehouse Refugio* in the heart of Berlin Kreuzberg, an intercultural quarter of the German capital, funded by the city of Berlin. There, people sought refuge live, work and cooperate with locals in what has become a vibrant place of political thought, theater projects, arts presentations, poetry slams, tandem in various languages, assistance in legal and practical questions of managing daily life in Germany and common projects with other minorities. Both initiatives strive for the enhancement of democratic and civic participation, and intercultural learning. As such, they are much more than charity organizations, but initiatives for a better and eye-level living together that draw on bigger visions of equality and empowerment. In view of the general political climate they appear to have a pivotal role as counterweight, even though or exactly because a significant percentage of public opinion does not seem to be in their favor.

Notwithstanding these fortunate tendencies in politics and on the ground, there has been both a broader shift in public opinion based on a growing skepticism regarding the long-term integration success of refugees and migrants, as well as a right wing-populist and extremist capturing of the



debate. Here, both migrants and refugees are increasingly being depicted a social burden and cultural risk. Concerns have evolved into an increasingly aggressive debate governed by right wing populists and „concerned citizens“ (*besorgte Bürger*) in the aftermath of the incidents

of Cologne on new year’s eve (see figure III).

Figure III: Picture depicting the covers of leading newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung and a popular news magazine Focus with the colonial and racist motive of a light female body being harassed, stained as the case may be, by dark male hands. These depictions followed an outcry of public

Politics reacted to the new realities with declaring a growing series of states on the Balkan and the Maghreb as secure – thus denying the right of applications from citizens of these countries ex ante,

speeding up application processing and facilitating deportation. A fierce coalition dispute had shortly before broken out over the question of establishing *transit centers* outside Germany (Landeszentrale für Politische Bildung Baden-Württemberg 2018).

Interestingly enough, AFD that had mushroomed up only some years before instrumentalizing resentments on almost only one topic – the transfer of money to undeserving European “crisis states” – has now almost exclusively and most successfully focused on propagating security and cultural threats stemming from the uncontrolled influx of refugees – particularly Muslims. It’s closely connected populist German movement PEGIDA is a case in point.

The rising wind blowing from the right seems to have caused a serious shift in the discourse on refugees. Angela Merkel’s exceptional „Wir schaffen das“ (*We’ll make it!* – now turned against her in various mocking attacks) has been slowly displaced by a growingly anaesthetized (rationalistic), legalistic (hyper-lawful) and brutal (fiercely exclusive) discourse that tends to make appear normal



Figure IV, depicting two young men that try to pass the border fence in Ceuta (Morocco). It is obviously not meant to motivate empathy but

and without alternative what in earlier times would have met with opposition for being inhumane. In Germany, this started with AFD infiltrating into the debate in the tried and tested populist way (of saying something that causes a stir of indignation,

then denying one had meant this but calculating on the fact that, still, it's "in the world") the ultimate possibility of using guns to defend the border against external invaders. These developments are further aggravated by the appallingly high number of attacks against refugee homes, comprising arson, explosives, vandalism, assaults and harassment by right-wing extremists. More than 3500 of these have been counted for 2016, 2000 for the following year (Welt 2018). As a consequence, recent discourses in Germany have been governed by terms such as *upper limit (Obergrenze)* and *detention centers*. What was formerly discredited with notions such as *fortress Europe* and protests against *Frontex'* border policies, now seems more and more beyond reproach (Ullrich 2018). The sad climax is visible in the criminalization of NGO-rescue boats that are impeded of calling at a port. Summer 2018 witnesses rescue boat *Lifeline's* captain in court for „illegally“ entering Maltese waters after having rescued more than 200 humans from drowning (FAZ 2018) while PEGIDA-members at a public gathering mobilize against *Lifeline* and its endeavors with a chorus of voices scanning „go drown, go drown“ – which means nothing less than „die“ (PEGIDA 2018). These misanthropic statements do not come out of the blue. They have been kindled by and in turn actively kindled the proliferation of a discursive frame that depicts refugees as mostly illegal and potentially dangerous intruders occupying public parks with camps and endangering Europe's wealth (Schlümer 2015, see figure IV). Europe's colonial past and present day economic (particularly armament, agrarian and fisheries) politics' impact on mass flight and migration are obviously not part of this frame. Finally, summer 2018 found Germany with a serious governmental crisis caused by German foreign minister Horst Seehofer's polemic against Merkel's policy of open borders. He repeatedly threatened her with a constitutional challenge pleading for unilateral national actions within an „axis of the willing“ that is aimed at facilitating the detention and the readmission of refugees either into the country first receiving them within the EU or directly into their home country (BENTO 2018). Bilateral agreements between chancellor Merkel with Greece and Spain show the impact of the right onto the coalition government (BENTO 2018). As Ullrich (2018) aptly puts it, this is a downright reversion of victim and perpetrator:

„Even the chancellor now speaks of the need to safeguard European borders. [...] Lately Austria undertook a border guard exercise making even use of a combat helicopter. People in need are thus being represented as invaders, that Europe may defend itself against – in fact has to. Suddenly, we are the people in need – distortion of reality, conversion of values, Nietzsche laughs in his grave“ (translated from German by the author).

Meanwhile, only in 2017 more than 3000 people died in their attempt to cross the Mediterranean Sea (Markwardt 2018), while Europe faces the dilemma of threatening its moral image, while shielding from further influx at all costs. On that note, Germany has been leading in closing the 2017-treaty with Turkey to secure its shores, as well as bringing forward shady deals with EU-neighboring

countries such as Libya, and thus tolerating the evolution of violent coast guard policies and the establishment of detentions centers, where people are being held under absolutely inhumane conditions (Info Migrant 2018; Kauffmann 2017). Also the latest attempt of the June 2018 EU-council to impose a common policy of admittance and economic burden sharing has failed. While the 2017 agreement earmarks an increased cooperation with EU-neighboring states in limiting illegal entrance to Europe and grants further monetary assistance to Turkey, it fails to establish a binding ratio of refugee admittance (European Council 2018). Thus, it seems safe to say, that a broader frame of danger, and othering has gradually ousted the focus on the respective group's humanitarian needs.

Refugee Discourses in Greece: Between civic action, political failure and right-wing extremism

The consequences of a broad failure of European cooperation and pressing humanitarian, legal and ethical questions in the refugee question within an increasingly unfavorable political climate, are also visible in Greece. As opposed to Germany, Greece is primarily a transit country. 82% of the more than one million refugees that reached Europe in 2015 have first stranded on Greek islands (Sekeris/Vasilakis 2016, p. 3) before continuing their way to primarily Germany. Its peak was reached in 2016, when Greece also turned to be the country with the highest amount of asylum applications and the biggest share in unaccompanied minors. So called "hot spots" were established on the Greek islands Lesbos, Chios, Leros, Kos, Tilos and Simi and later on the mainland to shelter them (European Parliament 2017, 13–44). Even though the grand majority of refugees did not stay on Greek soil with more than 5000 refugees per one million citizens in 2017 Greece still leads the European statistic followed by Cyprus and Luxemburg, while Slovakia and Poland are at its lowest end (Landeszentrale für Politische Bildung Baden-Württemberg 2018). The cost of hundreds of thousands of refugees passing the country has been estimated to have reached a 3 % of Greece's GDP with an annual amount of about 675 million (Kalantzakos 2017, p. 6). This situation has not thoroughly changed: Since the closing of the Balkan route the number of permanent refugees rised to 60 000, including 14 000 on the islands (UNHCR 2018, Human Rights Watch 2017, p. 2). Furthermore, the EU-Turkey agreement, which was based on paying Turkey a good deal of money (up to now more than 6 billion Euros) so that it would make sure no more people would pass the Mediterranean illegally, has significantly lowered their influx through the sea. For each "illegal" refugee readmitted to Turkey one Syrian refugee would be resettled to the EU. With the entry into force of the agreement the shelters on the Greek islands turned into detention centers. What is officially declared as a deal aiming at depriving the smugglers of their business incentives and thus protecting the lives of people daring to cross the sea, is really a desperate attempt from EU-governments to shield from further influx at any price. This price though appears as extremely high, for many readmitted refugees are reportedly

held like criminals in „removal“ and detention centers not being granted minimum rights (e.g. to see a lawyer), forced to sign papers they don't understand, and eventually being deported to other countries or their country of origin. Thus, with its deal the EU has tacitly accepted the violation of basic human rights – an alarming sign (Ulusoy/Battjes 2017, pp. 5–6).

Nevertheless, Greece's reaction to the refugee crisis seems mixed, being a reflection of broader state inefficiency, counterweighed by courageous municipal and civic action. Both has to be analyzed against the backdrop of – as opposed to Germany – its severe economic decline, turbulent times witnessing the changes of governments and emotional referenda on the TROIKA's bailout policies and – as in Germany – the rise of the extreme right. While as in Germany, Greeks – particularly the islanders close to Turkey – displayed tremendous empathy and solidarity in providing first help, with the Greek coast guard rescuing thousands of people from sinking boats (74 000 only in 2015), the climate towards refugees has been more and more captured by right-wing concerns on security and culture. Though, in comparison to Germany violent incidents against refugees are practically inexistent (Christodoulou/ Abou-Saleh 2016, p. 89). Furthermore, there is a perception of cultural closeness with the Arab world based on historic as well as recent economic (business), religious (clerical), educational (university) ties that apply particularly to the Syrian people. As polls underline, 60% of Greeks have helped refugees actively with clothing, medical assistance etc., while sympathy is disproportionately high (up to 90%) in the group of people that have themselves a refugee background (Kalantzakos 2017, p. 4–22).¹³

The first wave of help and empathy cannot hide the fact that the potential for both short term-assistance and long-term integration of refugees is impeded by severe shortcomings in respective policies resulting from extensive and inefficient bureaucracy, poor coordination among government, municipalities, NGOs and volunteers and decreasing international interest, that is: financial support (Glada 2016, p. 3–6). Furthermore, internationals, political activists and humanitarian volunteers alike appear broadly pessimistic as to the Greek majority's at best indifferent attitude towards equal opportunities and social care for refugees and migrants.¹⁴

This is obvious in the up to now desperate situation of most refugees “bottle-necked” in Greece in the camps: “We see that with the lack of support for Greece, and the fact that more and more people

¹³ Approximately 1.5 million Greek refugees resulted from the Greco-Turkish War (1919–1922), 700 000 from Greece's civil war and tens of thousands followed the tensions in the “troubled triangle” (Greece, Turkey and Cyprus) within the course of the 20th century. These developments have left Greece, whose population between 1920 and today has been growing from only about 5,5 to less than 11 million, with a broad and diverse landscape of trans-national and inter-ethnic memory. These memories, though also contested and suppressed to fit into the dominant, monolithic national narrative of clear boundaries and “pure” ethnicity has favored a significant percentage of Greek's trans-national affiliation – and: solidarity.

¹⁴ Information based on a series of open interviews with UNHCR-representatives, and humanitarian NGOs in Athens in July and August 2018.

are gathering in Greece, the system is breaking down again”, says Eva Cosse from Human Rights Watch (Al Jazeera 2018). Christodoulou and Abou-Saleh’s (2016, p. 90) comment on the general situation of refugees in Greece seems a case in point:

“Combined loss of home, status and very often culture, in association with loss of relatives and especially children, and exposure to anxiety and traumatic experiences very often lead to loss of meaning and hope, as well as upheaval of personal identity. Various reports have shown that in addition to their physical, emotional and traumatic experiences, refugees confront poverty, hostility and racism, and experience changes in family functioning and living conditions as well as low social support and isolation.”

Representative surveys prove that 30% of refugees – particularly those in the camps – suffer from PTSD (Ibid.), while reports draws a bleak picture of their general situation speaking of a “lack of basic standards for human dignity in the camps, increasing homelessness in cities, social tensions, and a worsening outlook for protection and security” (Glada 2016, p. 2).

Despite significant funding by the EU for administering the camps both on the island and on the main land, the overall living conditions have been reported as poor with residents suffering from overcrowdedness and bad response to their basic needs and security. Greek daily *Kathimerini* has called the camps a “health time bomb”, while there have been reports on furious riots and even a camp put on fire by its residents protesting against their living conditions (Human Rights Watch 2017; Kalantzakos 2017, p. 13; Fotopoulos/Kaimaklioti 2016, p. 270).¹⁵

While some of these issues, such as the lack of privacy, education, and prospects for professional training might be regarded as particularly related to life in the camps, they are also powerful indicators of the long-term challenges to these people’s sustainable and successful integration – something highly questionable taking into account Greece’s broader political and social problems. There have been general efforts for integration facilitation of registered refugees though language courses, and employment services. In 2016 a new asylum law was passed aimed at accelerating applications. Theoretically, all people granted international protection enjoy all rights and freedoms of legal third

¹⁵ Human rights and health organizations reports drawing on surveys and interview with particular attention to more vulnerable groups underline the above citation. Mercy Corps’ (2016, pp. 8–14) interviews with youth reveals their stress stemming from their general uncertainty, their urge to continue education, their disappointment with what they describe as “careless diagnosis” in health issues “regardless of symptoms”, about young women worrying about their safety reporting on gender based violence in the camps and how they feel isolated from society. The situation is even worse when it comes to the identification of traumatized and disabled people that need particular attention and assistance. As Human Rights Watch reports there is no special training, neither awareness raised to identify those individuals, who might suffer from either not always immediately recognizable mental issues, such as autism, ADHS or learning weaknesses affecting children, and physical symptoms of stress and anxiety, such as sleeplessness, loss of appetite, panic attacks or suicidal thoughts, to wounds not properly taken care of and physical disabilities that constitute a severe burden to accessing facilities or being part of social life: There is report of deaf Amin (24) who lives in the camp of Lagkadikia and does not leave his tend because his hearing devices are broken. An older woman in a wheel chair is unable to use the shower facilities, and a man with severe walking problems due to burnings is being denied special care (HRW 2017, pp. 1–10).

country nationals, they are allowed to look for private housing, have free access to the job market and may receive minimum monetary assistance. Yet, implementation appears insufficient due to Greece's broader weak employment policies and bad labor market conditions. Until 2017 half of the 60 000 applications are still pending. From the other half only about 10 000 thousand have been granted refugee status or subsidiary protection (European Parliament 2017, 12–43).

On that note, a significant number of endeavors aimed at short-term assistance and long-term social integration are international or private: To alleviate the people's living condition who are still waiting for their final approval UNHCR runs the currently biggest accommodation project, called ESTIA. In cooperation with the government and municipalities it has so far managed to accommodate 40 000 people in houses many of which had been empty due to the economic crisis. However, refugees are not allowed to settle there for more than one year. Since Greece does not offer any social housing program for people in need, permanent residence would cause stir in the broader population (UNHCR 2018). Other private initiatives, such as the philanthropist Radcliffe Foundation in cooperation with the Greek Ministry of Integration established housing for 800 refugees in an abandoned factory in Thessaloniki (the *Elpída* Factory, see Radcliffe Foundation 2018).

Yet, the question of long-term and sustainable social integration of the people granted asylum, remains the biggest challenge. Although short term support and expertise of NGOs, such as Oxfam or Doctors without Borders, is most vital in targeting crisis contexts, it is well established grass-roots initiatives that provide this long-range perspective. Here, the positive fact that NGOs taking care of minorities and socially deprived have been established on a wider scale with the advent of the economic crisis means that refugee assistance can rely on already existent networks, local expertise and international donor's requirements.

One of these initiatives is the “Solidarian Movement” risen years ago from the economic recession. Based entirely on volunteers, it provides medical and food care, as well as legal aid and shelters for Greeks and non-Greeks most severely stricken by the crisis. Members of the movement broke into the old „City Plaza Hotel“ and a School (both empty) to established a cooperative. As opposed to the camps where refugees are passive recipients with no participatory rights or obligations and independent from state assistance, there refugees from different national backgrounds are now living and working together maintaining the place in a self-organized way. As Kalantzakos (2017, pp. 15–16) most aptly points out:

“‘Solidarians’ are not simply volunteers. They are part of a movement that imagines the formation of another kind of society. They are concerned with the growing alienation particularly in a large city like Athens which has resulted in the breakdown of social ties and sense of community. (...) Nonetheless, the ‘solidarian’ movement is another reflection of how the difficulties in Greece have in some segments of the population given rise to an alternative

paradigm to passivity, offering engagement as an alternative to inaction and alienation and stirring strong feelings and conversations about social justice under increasingly more global and economically difficult circumstances.”

A series of diverse civic initiatives share the idea of eye-level contact, empowerment and solidarity. They reach from well-established women’s networks, such as Melissa, where second-generation migrants assist refugee women in sensitive legal issues and provide a shared space for cultural activities, to one of the Europe-wide biggest NGOs for homeless with psychological issues. The latter is called *Klimaka*. Established in 2000 it aims at providing particularly psychological support to homeless people, providing shelter, recreation, cultural events, and individual medical support to all people that reach out for their help to facilitate – where needed – their rehabilitation and reintegration into society. In cooperation with other civic initiatives and governmental circles *Klimaka* also engages in the psychological care for refugees.¹⁶

In their work and vision all these initiatives are similar to the presented German ones. They both hint to the structural shortcomings of Europe’s politics and societies that first loomed large in the economic crisis – justice, solidarity, inclusion and eye-level cooperation – and open up new paths of social care. As in Germany, this seems even more important since there is a growing negative sentiment towards migrants and refugees in the media and the public encompassing – as polls prove – up to 70% of the population (European Parliament 2017, p. 14). This negative sentiment is said to have been fueled by left wing SIRIZA’s open-border policy and initial unwillingness to differentiate between (political) refugees and (economic) migrants (Kalantzakos 2017, pp. 10–11). Moreover, the concern that international support and attention could shift away from their own economic plight, along with fear of labor competition and additional fiscal burdens has further aggravated respective sentiments (Sekeris/Vasilakis 2016, p. 2). Particularly public health care seems to be overstrained by both crises with severe problems of service and medical supply (Kotsiou et. Al. 2018). This is reflected in various news articles and the social media. Here, for instance a picture that went viral in social networks is a case in point: It shows a big lettered announcement in a medical office reminding the patient that an electrocardiogram will be free of charge only for Syrian refugees. The picture is subtitled with the sentence: “The harshest form of racism is being foreigner in your own country”.¹⁷ Another article referring to a general hospital in Lesvos deplores that the influx of refugees has posed a serious threat to the medical care of the local people. Furthermore, it states, refugees would return to the hospital repeatedly attempting to get classified as emergency in order for them and their families to get permission to leave for Athens (Nea Lesvou 2018). Both articles clearly show the mingling of vital personal concerns and cultural alienation, while at the same time they illustrate how the

¹⁶ See <http://www.klimaka.org.gr/>.

¹⁷ <http://www.facebook.gr>.


repercussions of the economic crisis together with a lack of effective action in the *refugee crisis* provide fertile ground for anti-immigrant sentiments. This seems also the broader message of a report that focusses on the tensions between refugees and locals in the Lesvos camp of Mória. This camp has repeatedly been called by authorities and internationals a threat for public health. While i.a. recounting attacks against refugees by right-wing extremists, vandalism of a memorial for the drowned and the installation of a huge concrete cross at the beach symbolizing the Christian character of the island, it states that the circumstances do not make a tension-free coexistence of islanders and refugees too easy. It particularly criticizes the humanitarian NGO *Mediterranean Co-Existence and Cooperation* (“Συνύπαρξη και Επικοινωνία στο Αιγαίο”) who demanded the removal of the cross for symbolic reasons. The NGO’s position is assessed as dangerous political correctness in favor of refugees, blaming it of the same rhetoric as president Tsipras, who in the past had been fiercely attacked for his critical stance towards exclusive Greek nationalism and the ethno-religious prerogatives of interpretation over history and community. The article closes with an implicit warning, referring to the irritation tourists showed when boats arrived next them on the beach (Sourelis 2018). While this juxtaposition seems as the utmost loss of humanity, it also connects to the aforementioned concerns of the broader economic effects of the *refugee crisis*. Eventually, reports on the latest agreement of the European Summit of 29 June 2018 echo the resentment with what is perceived as a lack of EU-solidarity and a fair burden-sharing as visible in the discourses of the economic crisis. While the 2016 EU-Turkey agreement has effectively cut down the number of refugees arriving on Greek shores, the overall assessment of the EU’s current role towards Greece is rather negative: It stresses that particularly Germany, Austria and the Visegrád-states could effectively enforce their interests in avoiding a binding ratio, while the broader Southern periphery with particular regard to Greece is seen as left with an unproportioned burden (Dalianis 2018; Greek News 2018; To Pontiki 2018).

What is far more worrying, though, is the political instrumentalization of the fear of cultural alienation and the practice of othering implicitly and explicitly visible in the cited articles. As in Germany and along with resentments kindled since the beginning of the economic crisis against the “privileged”, fear and resentment vis-à-vis refugees and migrants have most successfully been exploited by the populist and extremist right with landslide success. While German AfD can be called a reservoir of conservative and disillusioned with a significant far-right percentage, Greek Χρυσή Αυγή (“Golden Dawn”) is clearly an extreme right-wing party, whose leader openly expressed his adoration for Adolf Hitler. Being practically inexistent ever since it came into being in 1980 as a movement and 1993 as a party (in parliamentary elections of 2009 it gained 0, 29% of the votes) it skyrocketed with the advent of the economic crisis. 2012 national elections pushed it into 9,4% making it third power and

2014 European elections to alarming 21,2%. With anti-establishment and anti-immigration and aggressive slogans it has been particularly appealing to younger people, despite of its organized militarist groups and skinhead subcultures having repeatedly attacked political opponents and refugees and its party leader Nikolaos Michaloliakos being in jail after the politically motivated assassination of left-wing rapper Pavlos Fyssas by Golden Dawn members in 2013. It fiercely draws on ethno-national topics such as FYROM, Turkey as the arch enemy or migrant communities that are all seen as threatening the security, ethnic purity, economic prosperity and, as the case may be, political-territorial integrity of the nation. Ever since the turn of the century it could take growing advantage of the problems in Athens center that due to profoundly inadequate immigration policies during the last decades has become a social flashpoint with high criminality rates and the ghettoization of migrant groups (Sakellariou 2015; Kalantzakos 2017, p. 8–9). Greek Golden Dawn MP Ilias Kasidiaris (Kasidiaris 2015) – formerly gained popularity after he hit communist MP Liana Kannelli on air in a political debate – addresses parliament in 2015 in an accusation of the government, Germany and Europe, that shows the mingling and similarity of economic and refugee discourses and as such the dangerous power from extremist voices profiting from fears and the lack of European solidarity:

“As long as this country is being betrayed, as long as this country is being sold-out, we will raise the tone in our voice and say the truth. Here, at this time, there exists a racism against the Greek citizens. There is a government that wants to turn Greece into a ghetto of illegal immigrants [...] that wants to make the Greek a minority in this country. [...] He [prime minister Alexis Tsipras, C.R.] should ask all those who betray this country [...] who make decisions at the expense of Greece. They´ve worshiped the German financial oligarchy, because as you very well know, Merkel is the one, who imposed, playing the game of the German industrialists, the start of the flows of illegal immigrants through Greece, so that they go to Northern Europe. And today they are transforming Greece into what Tsipras said, a storage house” (Kasidiaris 2015¹⁸; taken from English subtitles).

Underneath the English subtitled Youtube-video capturing this scene, hundreds of users hail Kasidiaris as a hero, while comments such as “The man who will make Greece great again”, “This brave man will have a special place in Heaven. Respect from Sweden”, “We need this guy in the



United States”, respectively, “in Slovenia” shows his international appeal in what we see as the current, and deeply worrying European and US-American shift towards right-wing populism. With both crises being symptomatic for a lack of general solidarity and empathy, and the growing instrumentalization of

¹⁸ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GHF_2sfs6bk>.

disillusionment, resentment and ignorance, the interconnected discourses in Germany and Greece reflect *en miniature* the crossroads Europe is facing today. One can only hope, they will bring about more visionary actions for a Europe of humanity and inclusion, than paving the way to exclusion, dehumanization and othering. After all, reminding oneself of the contingency and relativity of discursive terminologies and seemingly “natural” cleavages of “us” and “them” might help in the re-humanization and empathy with people in need. A drawing by German caricaturist Klaus Sttuttmann, who won the German 2017 caricature price, ironically depicts this contingency and the interweaving of economic and refugee crisis.

Bibliography

Scientific and media articles, monographs and authored documents

- Anderson, B 2016, *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, revised ed, Verso, London/ New York.
- Dalianis, B. 2018, „EU agrees on migrants: The damages for Greece that is not even granted further monetary assistance“ [Συμφωνία ΕΕ για μετανάστες: Οι ζημίες για την Ελλάδα που ούτε καν εξασφάλισε επιπλέον χρήματα], Available from: <<https://www.protothema.gr/politics/article/801096/sumfonia-ee-gia-metanastes-oi-zimies-gia-tin-ellada-pou-den-katafere-oute-na-exasfalisei-epipleon-hrimata/#.W50V7z-JRFw.facebook>> [Accessed: July 24th 2018].
- Hobsbawm, E. 2012, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780, Second Edition: Programme, Myth, Reality*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Kalantzakos, S 2017, “A paradox in today’s Europe? Greece’s Response tot he Syrian Refugee Crisis”, in: *The Jean Monnet Papers on Political Economy* 15, pp. 1–28.
- Barnett, M. 2017, “Social Constructivism”, in: Baylis, J., Smith, S., Owens, P. (ed.), *The Globalisation of World Politics. An introduction to international Relations*, 7. Edition, Oxford, Oxford Univ. Press, pp. 148–165.
- Bickes, H.; E. Butulussi, T. Otten, J. Schendel, A. Sdroulia & A. Steinhof 2012, *Die Dynamik der Konstruktion von Differenz und Feindseligkeit am Beispiel der Finanzkrise Griechenlands: Hört beim Geld die Freundschaft auf? Kritisch-diskursanalytische Untersuchungen der Berichterstattung ausgewählter deutscher und griechischer Medien*, München, Iudicium.
- Durant, I., D. Cohn-Bendit, M. Hirsch, G. Schwan, J.-M. De Waele, M. Hastings, N. Levrat, G. Moschonas, T. Pappas 2013, *The Rise of Populism and Extremist Parties in Europe*, Brüssel, The Spinelli Group.

- Eder, K. 2014, The EU in Search of its People: The Birth of a Society out of the Crisis of Europe, in: *European Journal of Social Theory* 17:3, pp. 219–237.
- Fligstein, N., A. Polyakova, W. Sandholtz 2012, European Integration, Nationalism and European Identity, in: *Journal of Common Market Studies* 50:1, pp. 106–122.
- Fotopoulos, S. & M. Kaimaklioti 2016, “Media Discourse on the Refugee Crisis: on what have the Greek, German and British press focussed?”, in: *European View* 15, pp. 265–279.
- Kauffmann, H 2017, *Schande über dich, Europa – Tausende Menschen sterben im Mittelmeer und die EU ist schuld daran*, 14. September 2017, Available from: <https://www.huffingtonpost.de/heiko-kauffmann/fluechtlinge-europa-mittelmeer_b_17971298.html> [Accessed: August 28th 2018].
- Kotdiou, O.S., Kotsios, P., Srivstava, D., Kotsios, V., Gourgoulianis K.I. and Exadaktylos, A.K (2018), Impact of the Refugee Crisis on the Greek Healthcare System: A long Road to Ithaca, in: *International Journal of Environmental research and Public Health* 15:8, pp. 1790–1808.
- Kylstad, I. 2010, “Turkey and the EU: A ‘New’ European Identity in the Making?”, in: *LEQS Papers* 27, London: London School of Economics, pp. 1–29.
- Ker-Lindsay, J. 2007, *The European Union as a Catalyst for Conflict Resolution: Lessons from Cyprus on the Limits of Conditionality*. Working Paper Series 1. Helen Bamber Centre for the Study of Rights, Conflict and Mass Violence, London: Kingston University.
- Leiner, M. & S. Flämig 2012, “Reconciliation in the Middle of Dispute. Introduction to the Series”, in: Leiner, M. & S. Flämig (ed.), *Latin America between Conflict and Reconciliation*, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, pp. 7–20.
- Markwardt, N. 2018, „Festungen aus Illusionen Je stärker Staaten auf ihrer Souveränität bestehen, desto schneller schwindet sie. In der Debatte um Flüchtlinge offenbart die Abschottungspolitik ihr größtes Dilemma“, in: *Zeit Online*, 20. July 2018, Available from: <<https://www.zeit.de/kultur/2018-07/fluechtlingspolitik-abschottung-seenotrettung-moral-politik-essay>> [Accessed: July 29th 2018].
- Rehrmann, C (2020), *Der Zypernkonflikt: Eine sozialpsychologische Diskursanalyse [The Cyprus Conflict: A Socio-Psychological Discourse Analysis]*, Springer, Berlin.
- Röhling, M. & K. Hölter, „Seehofer stellt seinen ‘Masterplan’ vor – und will von SPD-Absprache plötzlich nichts mehr wissen“, 10 July 2018, Available from: <<http://www.bento.de/politik/angela-merkel-und-horst-seehofer-die-wichtigsten-entwicklungen-im-asyil-streit-zwischen-cdu-und-csu-2517481/>> [Accessed: July 29th 2018].

- Sekeris, P.G. & Ch. Vasilakis 2016, “The Mediterranean Refugees Crisis and Extreme Right Parties: Evidence from Greece”, in: *MPRA Munich Personal RePEc Archive Paper* No. 72222, Available from: <<https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/72222/>> [Accessed: July 30th 2018].
- Smith, A. D 1999, *Myths and Memories of the Nation*, Oxford, Oxford Univ. Press.
- 2009, *Ethno-Symbolism and Nationalism: A Cultural Approach*, New York, Routledge.
- Sakellariou, A. 2015, “Golden Dawn and its Appeal to Greek Youth”, in: *Perspective Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung*, Available from: <<http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/athen/11501.pdf>> [Accessed: August 3rd 2018].
- Samiotis, S. 2018, „Bosánio [Hostipal] ‘clogged’ from the amount of migrants“, in: *Nea Lesvou*, Available from: <<http://nealesvou.gr/quot-fracare-quot-to-vostaneio-apo-toys-metanastes/>> [Accessed: July 29th 2018].
- Schümer, D. 2015, „Europa ist eine Festung – und muss das auch bleiben“, in: *Die Welt*, 18 May 2015, Available from: <<https://www.welt.de/debatte/kommentare/article141026268/Europa-ist-eine-Festung-und-muss-das-auch-bleiben.html>> [Accessed: July 29th 2018].
- Strickland, P., *Refugees in Greece hopeless as Europe eyes more returns, While Europe tightens restrictions on refugees, asylum seekers in Greece say there is no future in the country*, 18 July 2018, Available from: <<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/07/refugees-greece-hopeless-europe-eyes-returns-180712210255913.html>> [Accessed: July 28th 2018].
- Sourelis, P. 2018, “NGO demands removal of Christian cross from a Lesvos beach on the grounds that it bothers heterodox people” [ΜΚΟ ζητά «αποκαθήλωση» του σταυρού από παραλία στη Λέσβο γιατί ενοχλεί τους αλλόθρησκους], Available from: <<https://www.protothema.gr/greece/article/821114/mko-zita-apokathilosi-tou-staurou-apo-ti-lesvo-giati-enohlei-tous-allothriskous/AMP/15.09.2018>> [Accessed: July 29th 2018].
- Ulusoy, O. & H. Battjes 2017, “Situation of Readmitted Migrants and Refugees from Greece to Turkey under the EU-Turkey Statement”, in: *VU Migration Law Series* 15, pp. 1–42.
- Ullrich, B. 2018, „Was es mit uns macht, was wir mit ihnen machen. Die Flüchtlinge in Gefahr, die EU im Festungskoller – 15 Thesen zur Wende in der Asyldebatte“, in: *Zeit Online*, 18 July 2018, Available from: <<https://www.zeit.de/2018/30/fluechtlingspolitik-asylpolitik-integration>> [Accessed: July 29th 2018].
- Worster, W.T. 2012, “The Evolving Definition of the Refugee in Contemporary International Law”, in: *Berkeley Journal of International Law* 30:1, pp. 94–160.
- Zajonz, D. 2016, „Die Flüchtlingsquote lässt sich nicht erzwingen“, in: *Zeit Online*, 26 August 2016, Available from: <<https://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2016-08/angela-merkel-tschechien-polen-besuch-fluechtlinge/komplettansicht>> [Accessed: July 29th 2018].

Internet documents, websites and unauthored newspaper-articles

- Bildblog 2018, Kritisches über deutsche Medien seit 2004, Available from: <<https://bildblog.de/tag/pleite-griechen/>> [Accessed: July 29th 2018].
- Bundesministerium für Integration und Flüchtlinge (2017), *Darstellung der Maßnahmen der Bundesregierung für die Sprachförderung und Integration von Flüchtlingen*, Available from: <https://www.bmbf.de/pub/BReg_Broschuere_Integration_Fluechtlinge.pdf> [Accessed: August 5th 2018].
- Critical Review of Media Covers after New Year's Eve in Cologne <<http://www.migazin.de/2016/01/12/nach-koeln-kritik-titelseiten-focus/>> [Accessed: August 6th 2018].
- Daily Mail, *Greeks brand Germans 'Nazis' for driving through painful cuts and 'taking control of their economy' 2012*, 15 February 2012, Available at: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2101614/Greece-debt-crisis-Greeks-brand-Germans-Nazis-taking-control-economy.html>> [Accessed: August 4th 2018].
- European Council 2018, European Council 28-29/06/2018. Main results, Available from: <<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/european-council/2018/06/28-29/>> [Accessed: August 3th 2018].
- Info Migrants, *Migrants start fires at Attica camp in Greece to protest transfers*, 28 March 2018, <<http://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/8330/migrants-start-fires-at-attica-camp-in-greece-to-protest-transfers>> [Accessed: August 3th 2018].
- „'Lifeline'-Kapitän: Seehofer gehört vor Gericht“, in: *FAZ Online*, 16 July 2018, Available from: <<http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/lifeline-kapitaen-reisch-seehofer-gehoert-vor-gericht-15693468.html>> [Accessed: August 3th 2018].
- LPD – Landeszentrale für Politische Bildung Baden-Württemberg, *Flüchtlinge in Deutschland*, Available from: <<https://www.lpb-bw.de/fluechtlingsproblematik.html>> [Accessed: August 3th 2018].
- Mercy Corps 2016, *Don't forget us. Voices of Young Refugees and Migrants in Greece*, Report by the Norwegian Refugee Council and Mercy Corps, Available from: <<https://www.mercycorps.org/research/dont-forget-us-voices-young-refugees-and-migrants-greece>> [Accessed: August 3th 2018].
- Papadimitriou J., *As EU looks away, Greece looks for places to house refugees*, 5 April 2018, Available from: <<http://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/8469/as-eu-looks-away-greece-looks-for-places-to-house-refugees>> [Accessed: July 28th 2018].

- Papadimitriou, J., *Refugees in Greece face freezing conditions in camps*, 18 January 2017, Available from: <<http://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/7013/refugees-in-greece-face-freezing-conditions-in-camps>>.
- PEGIDA-Demonstration in Dresden on 25 June 2018, Available from: <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0yHeYiFEaHM>> [Accessed: July 28th 2018].
- Pro Asyl 2013, *EU-Asyl-Paket: Neuregelungen der Asyl-Richtlinien und –Verordnungen. Erste Einschätzungen von PRO ASYL*, <https://www.proasyl.de/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/PRO_ASYL_EU_Asympaket_Wesentliche_AEnderungen_Juni_2013.pdf> [Accessed: August 3th 2018].
- Slogan-Archive Bildzeitung 2013, Available from: <<https://jasminrevolution.wordpress.com/tag/bild-zeitung/>> [Accessed: August 4th 2018].
- Stuttman, K. (2016) „This World’s Plight“, Available at: <<https://www.stuttman-karikaturen.de/karikatur/6017>> [Accessed: July 28th 2018].
- To Pontiki 2018, Does the agreement on the refugee crisis put Greece in danger? [Απειλή για την Ελλάδα η συμφωνία στο προσφυγικό;], Available from: <<http://www.topontiki.gr/article/280702/apeili-gia-tin-ellada-i-symfonia-sto-prosfygiko>> [Accessed: August 5th 2018].
- UNHCR *Estia, Stories*, Available from: <<https://estia.unhcr.gr/en/category/stories/>> [Accessed: July 28th 2018].
- UNHCR, *Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees*, Available from: <<https://cms.emergency.unhcr.org/documents/11982/55726/Convention+relating+to+the+Status+of+Refugees+%28signed+28+July+1951%2C+entered+into+force+22+April+1954%29+189+UNTS+150+and+Protocol+relating+to+the+Status+of+Refugees+%28signed+31+January+1967%2C+entered+into+force+4+October+1967%29+606+UNTS+267/0bf3248a-cfa8-4a60-864d-65cdfce1d47>> [Accessed: August 4th 2018].
- „Rund 2200 Angriffe auf Flüchtlinge im vergangenen Jahr“, in: *Die Welt*, 28 February 2018, Available from: <https://www.welt.de/newsticker/dpa_nt/infoline_nt/brennpunkte_nt/article174035437/Rund-2200-Angriffe-auf-Fluechtlinge-im-vergangenen-Jahr.html> [Accessed: August 6th 2018].
- The Radcliffe Foundation, *Elpida*, Available from: <<https://radcliffefoundation.org/project/elpida-home/>> [Accessed: July 28th 2018].
- Youtube 2015, Ilias Kasidiaris, *You won’t turn Greece into a ghetto of illegal immigrants*, Available from: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GHF_2sfs6bk> [Accessed: August 1st 2018].

The European Union Political Involvement in the Middle East Conflict and Middle East Peace Process

Abstract

This paper will focus on the developing political positions of Europe towards the Conflict and the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The goal of this research is twofold. Firstly, it aims at providing a narrative of the developing policies and the role of the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Union (EU). Secondly to “un-pick” this narrative to identify the main determinants of that role. These determinants are identified as: a) the divergent interests and identities of the member states, b) the relations of member states towards the U.S and *vice-versa*, c) the inclination of Israel to resist a European political role, and the preferences of some member states to protect Israel’s interests, and d) the hindrances caused by the institutional structures and mechanisms of the EPC/CFSP in presenting a unified, coherent and independent political role. The research concludes that the relevance of realist interpretations of EU foreign-policy making suggests that the development of a (limited) European political role in recent decades has been more a consequence of functional spill-overs and external environment than the supranationalist integration within the EU.

Introduction

“The Europeans will be unable to achieve anything in the Middle East in a million years.” Henry Kissinger.¹

The European policies towards the conflict in the Middle East and towards Palestine, in particular, can not be considered without reference to domestic, regional, and international factors within the EU. The European Political Cooperation (EPC) and its successor, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFPS), are the outcome of the interaction between these broader determinants. In this paper, I argue that four determinants have shaped the EPC /CFSP policies towards the Middle East: First, the divergent interests and identities of the European Economic Community (EEC), the European Union (EU) members and their consequent differing political stances towards the conflicting parties. Second, the Europeans’ individual and collective Transatlantic relationships. Third, Israel as a determinant in shaping European policies towards the region and its political involvement in the Middle East through its resistance to a European political role and its ability to draw on particular relations with some member states to sustain that resistance. Finally, the institutions of the EEC/EU

¹ Kissinger, H, Quoted by Musu, C. (2010). *European Union Policy Towards The Arab-Israeli Peace Process; The Quicksands of Politics*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 1.

interacted with each to produce specific policy directions, and member states could exploit these interactions to circumvent European constraints when it suited them.

Impact of divergent interests of the EU members on the European Policy towards the Middle East.

The different national interests of the EEC/EU member states reduced their ability to do more than declaring of policies towards the Middle East, which, over the years, has amounted to slightly more than a broad shift towards support for a negotiated settlement. Nonetheless, for Israel, this led to a swing in favour of the Arabs. Doing anything more, even at the behest of the determined French, will lead to essential problems, such as differential relationships with the United States. Moreover, tensions that came from small EEC/EU states which are eager to resist the domination by larger states, and finally, the problems that would stem from a more integrated implementation process in terms of undermining the shared preferences for an inter-governmental approach to foreign policy. In short, collective foreign policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict and its parties was constrained by the two areas of conflict: frictions between member states and disputes between member states and the European Community. Europe remains too divided to play a more decisive role. While EU member states are in broad agreement about the desired outcome of a final settlement, they continue to be divided over specific steps in the peace process and their support for the Palestinians and Israelis. The EPC/CFSP seems paralysed by the tension between the national interests and agendas of the member states. As a result of intergovernmentalism, and specifically the need for unanimity in the central decision-making bodies, the EPC/CFSP are a victims of endless negotiations about the conflicting national interests of member states. The right of each member state of the EEC/EU to veto any decision that does not meet their interests, priorities, or agendas, inhibits proactive policy-making and keeps Europe's foreign policy profile to a minimum. The intergovernmental approach, which propels member states to focus on national rather than collective interests, exacerbates the dispute between the differential interests of the member states. Moreover, since efforts to promote their national interests through the EU policy-making process are likely to be obstructed by member states with opposing interests, they are often prompted to initiate their own foreign policy initiatives outside of the EU framework. The European treaties endorsed this policy proliferation, which allows the member states to initiate their own policy as long as they do not harm or contradict the general trend of the CFSP. However, this strategy weakens the EU diplomatic role on the international stage and creates confusion among peripheral partners at the same time. The various contradictions and conflicts between interests, agendas, and priorities of member states could be witnessed in the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) meetings. These meetings mirror the conflicts between large and small members, between the 'old' and 'new' Europe, the rich and the poor, the

realist and the moralist, the interventionist and the anti-interventionist (or neutral), the original six and the latecomers, the insiders and the outsiders, the federalists and the intergovernmentalists, the Atlanticists and Mediterraneanists.² In these meetings, each European state belongs to several groups simultaneously in which they intermittently oppose certain countries on selected issues while seeking alliances with others. Similarities are interwoven with dissimilarities, and some countries do not easily fit into any of the categories mentioned above. How a political community defines its interests not only depends on objective material factors, such as geography, size and wealth but also on a range of subjective normative considerations. These considerations include the identity of a community, historical experience, patterns of economic interdependence, political culture, cultural links with the outside world, dominating moral and ethical values, perceptions of justice, a shared belief of common goods and the conviction of the existence of distinctive features for a political community.³ These factors are linked to the perception of where the threats to Europe come from. While Germany considers the threats of instability coming from the ex-Soviet Union or terrorism, the Mediterranean member states locate the threat in illegal immigration from North Africa and the Middle East. The tension between member states is not only about national interests but also about differing visions of Europe or rather their understanding of the European role. It is apparent how strongly each member state envisions a different reality of the European Union's interests and role in the world. Even though the EPC/CFSP rests on a "shared European identity, which has evolved gradually over the last few decades",⁴ According to Kochnev Europe has no single, unique identity since "Europe is the home of a pluralistic society, coexisting and interacting with one another."⁵ There is a consensus that the foreign policy of any country is heavily influenced by national identity, which inevitably appears through internal societal pressures on decision-makers. Since national interests and identities are contingent and socially constructed, most member states of the EU reflect and inject their identities, which are amalgamated constructions of shared history, cultural norms, values, language, ethnicity, political culture, religion and perceptions, transforming into verbal translations about expected foreign policy behaviour and action orientation within the CFSP.⁶ Adrian Hyde-Price emphasises that identities "shape the definition of national and European interests and thereby constitute an important

² Zielonka, J. (1998). *Explaining Euro-paralysis: Why Europe is Unable to Act in International Politics*. New York: St. Martin's Press. p. 57.

³ Tonra, B., & Christiansen, T. (2004). *Rethinking European Union Foreign Policy*. Manchester: Manchester University Press. p. 120.

⁴ Tonra, B., & Christiansen, T. (2004). *Rethinking European Union Foreign Policy*. Manchester: Manchester University Press. p. 120.

⁵ Kochnev, Y. (2007). *Identity, Nationality and Citizenship in a Democratic Society*, Council of Europe Summer University for Democracy. Retrieved from http://www.coe.int/t/dgap/sps/report_2007_en.pdf. Access date: July 20, 2010.

⁶ Tonra, B., & Christiansen, T. (2004). *Rethinking European Union Foreign Policy*. Manchester: Manchester University Press. p. 120.

influence on foreign policy behaviour.”⁷ Broader foreign policy approaches, particularly regarding European integration, are closely linked to the sense of identity in foreign policy. This phenomenon is the reason for ideological competition at EU intergovernmental conferences since the position of each member state tends to reflect its own conception of the model political community.⁸

Although EU states share a high contemporary general propensity for joint action, the EPC/CFSP represents a multiplayer mix of identities, values, and ethics, each with the belief that its explicit perceptions and values must be acknowledged and prevail and dominate the institutional framework at best.⁹ According to Christopher Hill, the EU’s lack of influence over education and the diverse historical experiences of member states play a significant role in weakening the common identity of European foreign policy.¹⁰ The multiple identities of the EEC/EU countries contributed to the stimulation of disunity among EEC/ EU members. EU member states fear that creating a collective European identity would be at the expense of their national identity. In order to protect relevant distinctiveness, sacrifices to create such a collective European or international identity are consistently made. When it comes to the different ‘models’ for Europe, some member states, such as Germany, perceive it as being a civilian or ‘soft power’ and rendering it primarily with peacekeeping and trade, whereas others, such as France, look at the EU as a superpower equivalent to the U.S. and aspire to increase its role in the world. The concept of civilian power can be summarised as an international actor which influences the global system by using economic, financial, and political means instead of military power and promotes the ideals of democracy, human rights, and economic growth through the cooperative use of non-military means.¹¹ The superpower or realist approach, in contrast, may engage the opposite side. Due to this conflict of perception, the EU still lacks a firm identity as a geopolitical entity and consequently misses a shared understanding of common global interests.

Although member states agreed on the need for the Union to exercise a role in the region of the Middle East or the shores of the Mediterranean, these countries lack the necessary vision for this role: its shape, nature, extent, and quality. Although the vast majority of EU members share the same opinion about the “proper” policy, there are often different views on how to approach the conflict in a unified manner.¹² According to a speech delivered by Dominique Moïsi, the former Deputy Director of the

⁷Hyde-Price, A. (2004). Interest, Institutions and Identity in the Study of European Foreign Policy in Christiansen, T. and Tonra, B (Eds.) *Rethinking European Union Foreign Policy*, Manchester: Manchester University press. p. 108.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Smith, M. E (2004) Toward a Theory of EU Foreign Policy Making: Multi-level Governance, Domestic Politics, and National Adaptation to Europe's Common Foreign and Security Policy. *Journal of European Public Policy* 11 (4) 740–758.

¹⁰ Hill, C. (1996) (Ed.) *The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy* London: Routledge. p. 8.

¹¹ Kurikkala, F.op.cit., p. 251.

¹² Persson, G. op. cit., p. 23.

French Institute for International Relations (IFRI), the dilemma of member states towards the Middle East seems determined by the political stance of the key member states, explicitly Germany, the United Kingdom, and France:

“The EU can only succeed in the Middle East if the French are sometimes prepared to annoy the Arabs if the Brits are sometimes prepared to annoy the Americans and the Germans are sometimes prepared to annoy the Israelis”.¹³

The voting behaviour of the member states in the UN is another example of the divergent interests of the member states in the Middle East. On July 1, 1997 at the UN General Assembly, the vast majority of member states agreed upon a common position calling on Israel to avoid changing the status quo at Har Homa in East Jerusalem. However, Germany abstained from the vote.¹⁴ German policy was against the central fundamental European policy on this matter, whereas the EU considered all Israeli activities in east Jerusalem illegal, an obstacle to peace, and against international law.

These elements contributed to the paralysis of the EU’s capabilities to form a CFSP in the region. Since the EU Member states have not demonstrated a unity of purpose and action in respect of the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP), the formulation of any common policy is hindered by the question of how each member state can attain its own interests in the process despite the geo-strategic importance of the region.¹⁵ As a result, the EU’s policy often represents the lowest common denominator. Alfred Pijpers supports the statement above by arguing that the desire of the EU to play a political role in the Middle East through its collective presence has its price. He adds that “the constant need to find a compromise among a few dozen states with strong national traditions has led to a lot of ambiguity.”¹⁶ Taking the main players and founders of the EU, Germany and France, as an example, the consensus and advanced arrangement between these two members remains is “a basic precondition for many important European initiatives and therefore serves as an indication for the limits of European consensus.”¹⁷ The vast majority of EU members still look at the Middle East and their own foreign policy in purely national terms and have national interests or policy preferences in the region. These methods may “conflict or compete with their European Community partners’ interests and policies”.¹⁸

¹³ Cited by Everts, S. (2003). *The EU and the Middle East: A Call for Action*. London, Centre for European Reform. p. 18.

¹⁴ Levi, I. op, cit.

¹⁵ European Union Committee, House of Lords (2006). op. cit., p. 13.

¹⁶ Pijpers, A. (2007). *The EU and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict: the limits of the CFSP. In Military Transformations and Peace Support Operations: Current Experience, Future Development and Possible Implications for the Israel-Palestinian Conflict Theatre*, Jerusalem: Hebrew University. p. 34.

¹⁷ Behr, T. op. cit.

¹⁸ Laipson, E. (1990) Europe's Role in the Middle East: Enduring Ties, Emerging Opportunities Middle East Journal Vol. 44, No. 1 (Winter, 1990), pp. 7–17.

Impact of the Tension between EU Collective and Individual Member State Policies

The main reason behind this conflict is that the member states have the freedom to pursue their foreign policy and goals outside of the EU framework as long as their policies do not contradict mainstream EU policies. This right is emphasised through the Constructive Abstention article, introduced in the Amsterdam Treaty. The treaty states that “If member states abstain, they are not obliged to apply the EU decision; but they must accept it, in a spirit of solidarity.”¹⁹ These policies may not harm the EU Policy directly, but they might lead to confusion, frustration, and contradictions since several member states have periodically utilised that right and initiated new proposals and policies in order to solve the conflict in the Middle East. This right weakened the European role and stance in the Middle East. Ben Soetendorp argues that the “common policy has not prevented [ed] some member states, and France in particular, from practising their own diplomacy in the region when their national views reached beyond the common denominator.”²⁰

Pijipers further shows how France and the other three large EU member states persistently send envoys to the region as if the EU presidency or the foreign policy coordinator no longer exist.²¹ The Spanish peace initiative in November 2006 was another clear example of European dualism and duplication of the political representation of the European Union. Soon after Israel invaded the Gaza Strip in November 2006 through the ‘Autumn Clouds’ Operation, the Spanish government, led by Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, in cooperation with France and Italy initiated a new peace plan for the conflict in the Middle East. During a press conference, Zapatero emphasised that the three countries aim to act together since they share the same values, interests, morals, and visions about the Middle East with particular regard to Palestine.²² Although the founders of the peace plan tried to promote it as an EU plan, the trilateral initiative was immediately rejected by Israel, who argued that there had been no prior coordination between European and Israeli diplomats. Since Washington refused to support the initiative twice, the project eventually diminished into political insignificance. During the December 2006 European Council meeting, the presidential conclusion minutes have not even mentioned the initiative.²³

¹⁹ Quoted in Levi, I. (2006). *The EU policy in the Middle East; Problematic Nature and Potential Role*. (Doctoral dissertation, Hamburg, 2006) Retrieved from <<http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:gbv>18-28566> p. 86. Access date: July 28, 2011.

²⁰ Soetendorp, B. (1999). *Foreign policy in the European Union: Theory, History and Practice*. London: Longman. p. 113.

²¹ Pijipers, A. op. cit.

²² Eldar, A. and Issacharoff, A. (2006, November 18th). Spanish FM: Peace plan withheld for fear of Israeli rejection. *Haaratez Newspaper*.

²³ Gianniou, M. (2007). The Policies of the Mediterranean EU Countries towards the Israeli- Palestinian Conflict: Leaders or Followers? In The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP): Perspectives from the *Mediterranean EU Countries*, Crete: Rethimnon.

The Second Determinant: European Transatlantic Relationships

It seems evident that the EU and US special relationship erodes the effectiveness of EU policies towards the Middle East. Thus, it is essential to consider the relationship between both actors in analyses of European policy towards the Middle East. In theory, both share common objectives in the region regarding the promotion of peace, stability, and economic development.²⁴ However, the question remains as to what is the best way to advance peace. The position of the US has developed over time. Until the 1960s, America's geographical distance allowed a degree of detachment from Middle Eastern affairs, contrasting the physical proximity and direct involvement of the EU states, that of the former colonial powers, Britain and France, in particular. In the 1950s, for instance, both countries avoided overly close ties with Israel in order to enlist Arab assistance in the containment of Soviet expansion. However, after the launching of the MEPP, the US showed no interest in supporting or promoting a European role at the Madrid conference for many reasons: firstly, the US believed that the European involvement would "complicate the negotiations process between the conflicting parties." Secondly, the US preferred to "keep the MEPP in its own hands."²⁵ As Doug Bereuter and John Lis argue, Europe partnered with the US against the Soviets, but a united Europe was only in America's interests as long as it was perceived a partner and not a counterweight to US influence on the Middle East.²⁶

Although Europe enhanced its capacity as a diplomatic actor in the Middle East through the CFSP in 1992 and became the leading donor of the MEPP, the role of the EU continued to be limited to the economic role and aid, while the US remained the dominant external political force in the Middle East.²⁷ During the George Bush era, the US has shown a lack of interest in the Middle East except for adopting a Road Map to convince the Arabs to participate in the war on Iraq, while the Clinton administration considered the European role in the MEPP as strictly secondary and unnecessary in contrast to their economic role. Dennis Ross, who has led the US peace efforts in the region during the Clinton administration repeatedly declared the EU and the parties that "any mediation in the conflict was a US responsibility."²⁸ Additionally, Ross' team has never recognised that the EU's special envoy had or should have had a role in mediation, and refused to acknowledge this role as

²⁴ Burghardt, G. (2006, December). The European Union's Transatlantic Relationship. Paper given at the College of Europe EU Diplomacy. Retrieved from www.coleurop.be/file/content/studyprogrammes/ird/research/pdf/EDP%202006%20Burghardt.pdf. Access date: November 22, 2008. p. 3.

²⁵ Musu, C. op. cit., p. 44.

²⁶ Bereuter, D. K., & Lis, J. J. (2003). Broadening the Transatlantic Relationship. *Washington Quarterly*, 27, 147–162. p. 149.

²⁷ Gomez, R. (2003). *Negotiating the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Strategic Action in EU Foreign Policy?* Aldershot, Hants, England: Ashgate, p. 124.

²⁸ Patokallio, P. op. cit. p. 33.

something comparable to their own.²⁹ From their viewpoint, the special envoy was useful for “information gathering and sharing but not for consultation, let alone joint negotiation.”³⁰

However, it is unfair to blame the US for the European absence from the MEPP. Several states, including Germany, Britain, and new EU members, have not been interested in further European political engagement in the Peace Process. Instead, they prefer to complement the role of the US in the process. This vision is not limited to the member states but also concerns EU officials and institutions. For example, the former European External Commissioner Patten emphasises that “the EU intends to continue to work closely with th US as competitors, but as partners.”³¹ The former Special Envoy to the MEPP, Miguel Moratinos, shares his view by stating that “the Europeans do not want to interfere in the MEPP negotiations between the parties for the sake of appearing as another mediator [...]. We simply cannot confront the United States, and we do not want to undermine the peace process.”³² In another interview, Moratinos stated “my role is complementary to the U.S. It has to be so. My role is not about competing for influence but in striving to help MEPP.”³³ According to Christopher Hill, the Europeans are even more opposed to the US position of the Arab-Israeli conflict, but they keep their concerns “behind the diplomatic doors.” He relates this policy to the “fear of being perceived as ‘soft’ on terrorism, and of raising the spectre of appeasement, an accusation which Israel and its supportes frequently throw at Europeans together anti-Semitism.”³⁴

The Third Determinant: The European–Israeli Relations

Member states’ historical relations with the conflicting parties in the Middle East, particularly in the cases of Germany and the Netherlands due to their role in the Holocaust and EPC declarations during the 1970s and 1980s, have played a significant role in determining the European policy towards the Middle East. This history and the policies have created strong opposition from Israel towards any European attempts to extend the role of the EU from payer to player. Some critics believe that Israeli attitudes towards the European Community’s involvement were the most influential and harmful factor in limiting Europe’s role in the Middle East since the EU engagement often meets scepticism by consecutive Israeli governments. They argue that even if the Europeans unify their voices and

²⁹ Ibid. p. 33.

³⁰ Ibid. p. 33.

³¹ Patten, C. (1999, October 6th). *European Commissioner for Foreign Policy Affairs Speech at the European Parliament Plenary Session*. Retrieved from <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/99/123&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&uiLanguage=en> Access date: July 12, 2011.

³² Moratinos, M. (1999, October) *EU Special Envoy to the Middle East, Speech 99*.

³³ Quoted in Gomez, R. (2003). *Negotiating the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Strategic Action in EU Foreign Policy?* Aldershot, Hants, England: Ashgate. p. 130.

³⁴ Hill, C. (2004). Renationalizing or Regrouping? EU Foreign Policy Since 11 September 2001. *Journal of Common Market Studies* 42(1) 143–163. p. 153

interest, the Israelis will not open the door for them to become involved in the region's conflict.³⁵ Joseph Alpher believes that the Holocaust and the political stance of the Europeans towards Israeli wars "make it difficult for Israel to trust Europe and allow it to play a major role in the MEPP."³⁶ Besides, he accuses the European member states of focusing more on their economic interests than on the security concerns of Israel.³⁷ According to Israel, Europe's pro-Arab positions during the 1970s and 1980s have "encouraged Israel and the U.S. to exclude the European Community from peace negotiations, reducing its opportunity to act."³⁸ The Israeli government expressed a hostile response to most of the European declarations. The mistrust between Israel and Europe has continued during the 1990s. For instance, The Madrid Conference is a clear example of the rejection of the European involvement in the MEPP. During the preparations for the Madrid conference, the Israeli government were reluctant towards European participation in the peace conference. Although the Europeans insisted on collective EEC participation in the conference, the twelve European governments acted as individual partners. This individual behaviour irritated the US and weakened the European Community's presence.³⁹ The Wye River negotiation in October 1998 is another example of Israel's unwillingness to acknowledge the EU's status as a political actor in the Middle East. Here, Israel denied the European Special Envoy of the MEPP, Moratinos, access to the negotiation table, which, according to Kurikkala, was "naturally humiliating to the biggest donor which wished to play a more prominent mediatory role."⁴⁰ The Israeli Government indicated that the role of the European Community from Israel's perspective is only to facilitate and help the countries of the Middle East to come together and conduct direct negotiations, but by no means should the Community impose the terms of a peace process. In sum, Kurikkala believes that as long as Israel and, to a certain extent, the US are unwilling to provide the EU with a place at the negotiation table, the Union remains a politically inactive participant in the region when it comes to the substantial high policy question.⁴¹

The Fourth Determinant: the Mechanism of the CFSP and the European Role in the MEPP

The EU policy towards the Middle East and Palestine, in particular, is a victim of the dualism within the EU system, the proliferation of structures, multiple players, actors, and agents involved in the CFSP formulation. The institutional constraints of the EU and the institutional limitations of its dual

³⁵ Lyons, K. op. cit., p. 25.

³⁶ Alpher, J. (1998). The Political Role of the European Union in the Arab-Israel Peace Process: An Israeli Perspective *The International Spectator*. Available at: < www.ciaonet.org/olj/iai/iai_98alj01.html. Access date: April 22, 2011.

³⁷ Ibid. p. 73.

³⁸ Ibid. p. 73.

³⁹ Musu, C. op. cit., p. 56

⁴⁰ Kurikkala, F. op. cit, p. 198.

⁴¹ Kurikkala, F. op. cit. p. 186.

system of foreign affairs have an impact on Mediterranean policy. This impact seems highly negative since the institutional restrictions of the system transform the EU into a “clearing house” of different interests rather than a unitary actor with defined objectives and strategies.⁴² Jörg Monar emphasises that due to the Union’s lack of single governmental structures and central authority of a nation-state actor on the international stage, its policy on the Mediterranean depends on interest constellations that vary over time and the capacity of the institutional setup to “merge these interests into decisions corresponding with the European Commission and/or the CFSP framework.”⁴³ He concludes that the process of decision-making is slow, almost paralysed, and often reduced to the lowest common denominator among the member states’ interests.⁴⁴ Besides, the intergovernmental approach within the the European Council ⁴⁵declares the problem-solving style of decision-making the primary method of formulating policies towards the OPTs and the conflict.

Dualism in the European Representation

The structures before the Lisbon Treaty authorised the of the EU’s presidency to represent the EU CFSP, assisted by the High Representative for the CFSP. This authorisation created a dualism in the EU representation in the Middle East since both The Presidency and the High Representative competed to represent the EU. Consequently, this dispute affected the EU’s ability to conduct a coherent, unified foreign policy since each of the EU actors delivers different answers to the same question. Most criticisms were directed to the former High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy⁴⁶, who sometimes ignored the regulations of the EU. In an interview, he declared: “I do whatever I want [...] I pursue my own agenda. I don’t have to check everything with everyone [...] if you ask for permission, you would never do anything.”⁴⁷ EU’s participation in the Quartet is an example of the dualistic representation in the Middle East. Several European actors are

⁴² Monar, J. (1998). Institutional Constraints of the European Union's Mediterranean Policy. *Mediterranean Politics*, 3 (2) 39–60. p. 50.

⁴³ Monar, J. (1998). Institutional Constraints of the European Union's Mediterranean Policy. *Mediterranean Politics*, 3 (2) 39–60. p. 50.

⁴⁴ Ibid. p. 50.

⁴⁵ The European Council (informally EUCO) is a collective body that defines the European Union's overall political direction and priorities. It comprises the heads of state or government of the EU member states, along with the President of the European Council and the President of the European Commission. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy also takes part in its meetings.

⁴⁶ The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy is the chief co-ordinator and representative of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) within the European Union (EU).

⁴⁷ Dijkstra, H. (2011). EU External Representation in Conflict Resolution: When does the Presidency or the High Representative Speak for Europe? *European Integration Online Papers*. 15, Article 1. Retrieved from: <<http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2011-001a.htm>>. p. 4. Access date: June 23, 2011.

included in the Quartet⁴⁸, such as the presidency of the EU, the EU High Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana, and the European Commissioner for External Relations, Benita Ferrero-Waldner.⁴⁹

While the role of the European Commission Technical Assistance office in Ramallah was limited to co-coordinating, managing, and monitoring the extensive EU assistance programme towards the Palestinians, the responsibilities and roles of the European delegation to Israel dealt with the six main fields of politics, economics, projects, information, culture, and science.⁵⁰ Both delegations lacked political competence in the representation of the European Commission which. Hence, this commission also failed to establish political competence and influence within the CFSP since the member states have the right to initiate and conduct policies outside of the EU/CFSP framework, provided that these policies do not contradict or harm EU approaches.

The techniques with which the EU treats the conflict reflects the contradictions and problems caused by the CFSP mechanism both in terms of duplication of the diplomatic representation and in terms of the clash in interests and views between the member states towards the conflict and its collaborators. Concerning the representation, the war witnessed dualism in the EU representation. During this time, there have been two separate European diplomatic missions in the Middle East, aiming to stop the violence and mediating regarding a cease-fire in Gaza Strip. The first delegation was the Czech government and a group of EU ministers, the “troika”, which included the EU High Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana, the European Commissioner for External Relations, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, and the French Foreign Minister, Bernard Kouchner. The Czech Foreign Minister, Karel Schwarzenberg, who held the presidency of the EU at the time chaired the European delegation. The leader of the second delegation was French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, who estimated the duration of the EU presidency until the end of the term on December 31, 2008. Both delegations met separately with Israeli and Arab leaders in Jerusalem, Ramallah, and Cairo, intending to end the violence. However, the dual representation caused severe confusion within the EU and in the Middle East. Despite the lack of objectivity from the European Commission towards the French initiative, anxieties could be kept down as long as the message of the EU was preserved and delivered. However, the Czechs were not pleased according to a statement by Czech Prime Minister, Mirek Topolánek, in which he described the task of Sarkozy as a useful contribution to resolve the conflict but stressed

⁴⁸ The Quartet on the Middle East or Middle East Quartet, sometimes called the Diplomatic Quartet or Madrid Quartet or simply the Quartet, is a foursome of nations and international and supranational entities involved in mediating the Israeli–Palestinian peace process. The Quartet comprises the United Nations, the United States, the European Union, and Russia. The group was established in Madrid in 2002, recalling Madrid Conference of 1991, as a result of the escalating conflict in the Middle East.

⁴⁹ Tocci, Nathalie. 2013. "The Middle East Quartet And (In)Effective Multilateralism". *The Middle East. Journal* 67 (1): 28–43. doi:10.3751/67.1.12. doi:10.3751/67.1.12.

⁵⁰ European Union Delegation in the Ramallah (2009). *The European Union and the Peace Process*. Retrieved from http://www.eeas.europa.eu/mepp/index_en.htm. Access date: July 23, 2010.

that the French president does not represent the European Union. To calm the anger that Sarkozy's visit caused, the French diplomats legitimised his visit as that of co-chair of the Union for the Mediterranean area, a position he had proposed to establish in 2007. Such a position was then founded in Paris in July 2008 with a co-chair for the Egyptian President, Hosni Mubarak. The political statements of both delegations caused confusion and revealed that the EU leaders contradicted one another in their messages, regarding their stance towards the conflict, and the role of Israel. While the Czechs supported Israeli strikes on Gaza, describing them as "more defensive than offensive," the mere act of iterating this statement sparked anger within the EU and its member states. A British diplomat, for instance, said that the communication had not been coordinated in advance between the Czech Republic and other EU partners.⁵¹ This incident allowed observers to interpret the situation as if France did not have confidence in the Czech Republic's ability to deal with such a delicate task.⁵²

The Tension between the Member States and the EU's Main Institutions

This section demonstrates the tension between the member states and the European institutions and how these tensions affect the EU's role in the MEPP and EU-Palestinian relations. The appointment of the special envoy in 1996 provided the EU, for the first time, with a single interlocutor for dealing with other regional actors in an attempt to reduce the difficulties and inconsistencies of the CFSP due to the rotating EU Presidency system.⁵³ However, the new post also added another actor to the multiplicity of EU actors. The special envoy had to face several problems related to the structure of the CFSP and that its responsibilities might conflict with others within the EU institutions. According to Costanza Musu, the new position was "marred by the very nature of its mandate which, though formally quite broad, does not include the possibility of committing the member states to any step which has not been previously agreed upon."⁵⁴ Stephan Stetter supports this argument by stating that "the main problem is what message has to be presented since such an individual cannot move without the full support of member states due to reduced speed."⁵⁵

Although the member states of the EU are willing to be involved in the Middle East conflict and aspire to a stronger, more coherent, consistent, and credible role of the EU in the MEPP, their reluctance to move beyond an intergovernmental framework denotes a deliberate policy to curtail the role of Union officials, personnel, and representatives through complex conditions, legislation, regulations and

⁵¹ Penketh, A. (2009, January 5th). EU Ceasefire campaign marred by internal discord, *The Independent* Retrieved from <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/eu-ceasefire-campaign-marred-by-internal-discord-1225796.html>. Access date: July 27, 2010.

⁵² *European Voice* (2009, January). Ministers head to Middle East in effort to Secure Gaza ceasefire. Retrieved from <http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/2008/12/ministers-head-to-Middle-East-in-effort-to-secure-gaza-ceasefire/63526.aspx>. Access date: July 22, 2010.

⁵³ Musu, C. op. cit., p. 15.

⁵⁴ Ibid. p. 12.

⁵⁵ Stetter, S. op. cit., p. 155.

procedures. The purpose of such multifarious mechanism is to protect the member states interests in the domain of the foreign policy. The power of veto is utilised as a way to impose these regulations on their counterparts in an effort to achieve agreements. The appointment of the EU special envoy to the Middle East Peace Process, whose primary responsibility is to fill the gap between the interests of the European ministers and provide a continuous approach of the EU, is a clear example of the assumption mentioned above. During the negotiations of the special envoy's mandate, Berlin informed its European partners that it would only support the appointment of Mr Moratinos if certain conditions were fulfilled.⁵⁶ Müller claimed that the Germans imposed three conditions for an acceptance of the new position. First, and most important, Germany argued that there had to be a guarantee that Mr Moratinos' mandate would not interfere with bilateral negotiations. Second, they expected that his role would not compete with the role performed by the US. Finally, it had to be determined that the special envoy would not engage in mediating activities without the prior request of both parties to the peace process.⁵⁷ The way that the member states treat the EU representatives for the Middle East has exacerbated the problem and, as a result, hindered their roles in the region. After evaluating the role of the Middle East envoy, Kurikkala claims that the member states deliberately weakened the EU's role in the Middle East by "creating tension between the High Representative of the CFSP and the EU Special Envoy to the Middle East (EUSR)."⁵⁸ The position of High Representative lacks political weight, which diminishes its opportunities to influence the different positions of the member states. This circumstance is a result of the restrictions that the member states imposed on the EUSR.⁵⁹

Several additional factors contributed to the strengthening or weakening of the relationship between the member states and the special envoy or the High Representative of the CFSP. The capacity and resources of the member state which holds the presidency of the EU are one of the main determinates that shape these relations. According to Kurikkala, larger member states were generally assessed to be less dependent on the Special Representative and the Council Secretariat to prepare and report for the presidency and to gain information and visibility.⁶⁰ This situation has developed due to strong presidencies, such as France and other more considerable EU member states, which have a vast web of embassies with a relatively high level of human resources in order to obtain the most up-to-date information from the region through their diplomatic representations. Small countries, in contrast, provide more space to Moratinos and his team.⁶¹ The upgrading of the European-Israeli relation in

⁵⁶ Müller, P. (2007). *op. cit.*, p. 16.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.* p. 16.

⁵⁸ Kurikkala, F. *op. cit.*, p. 198.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.* p. 179.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.* p. 160.

⁶¹ *Ibid.* p. 166.

April 2008 is a clear example of the differences between the policy of the member states and the policy of the European institutions. On December 9, 2008, the EU's twenty-seven Foreign Ministers unanimously approved upgrading relations with Israel.⁶² The Czech Foreign Minister, Karel Schwarzenberg, maintained that "upgrading EU-Israel relations would be good for the Palestinians, as well [because the] EU would be better placed to get Israel to ease conditions in Palestinian areas and Palestinians would benefit economically from more EU-Israel trade."⁶³ The European Parliament and the European Commission rejected this action. The former EU External Relations Commissioner, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, told reporters in Brussels that "good and trustful relations with Israel are essential in order to make our voice heard, though it was not deemed a good time to increase the current level of relations."⁶⁴ The interference of Ferrero-Waldner in "high politics," particularly on such a sensitive issue as the upgrading of European-Israeli relations, displeased the member states. As a resultant appeal, they convinced the EU's External Relations Commissioner to stop interfering in European Council policies since it is beyond the European Commission's mandate.⁶⁵ The decision to upgrade EU-Israeli relations also opposed the European Parliament (EP) which suspended its vote on whether or not to upgrade EU-Israel relations in the wake of increasing unrest around Israeli settlement building policies, violations of Palestinian human rights, and the continued Gaza siege on April 12, 2008. Regarding this decision, the former Vice President of the European Parliament, Luisa Morgantini, stated that "it is time for the Israeli Government to stop considering itself above the law and start respecting it."⁶⁶

As mentioned earlier, the Middle East and its peace process reflect the divergent interests of the member states. One of the clearest examples in this regard is the open letter that ten Mediterranean EU members wrote to Tony Blair, the former special envoy of the Middle East Quartet. In this letter, which was published in *Le Monde* on July 10, the ten foreign ministers declared that "the Road Map has failed" and "the overly strict conditions we have habitually imposed as prerequisites for the resumption of the peace process have only made the situation worse."⁶⁷ The ministers clarified that the "negative appraisal compels us to change our approach. Above all it allows us to broaden our outlook. It's Europe's duty to say this to its Israeli and Palestinian friends." The ministers believe that

⁶² Ravid, B. (2008, December 9). EU votes to upgrade Israel relations despite Arab lobbying. *Haaretz Newspaper*.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Selig, A. (2009, April 24). EU official: Time not right to boost ties with Israel. *The Jerusalem Post* Retrieved from <http://fr.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost/JPArticle/ShowFull&cid=1239710772296> Access date: October 11, 2010.

⁶⁵ O'Donnell A. & Marina, C. (2009). Europe in the World Part II: Relations with the Southern Neighbours. Paper presented at Bringing the Policy Back In: A Substantive Agenda for the New Union, Birmingham University.

⁶⁶ Morgantini, L. (2008). Israel Is Not Above the Law - The European Parliament Suspends the Vote on the Upgrade of EU - Israel Relations. Brussels: European Parliament.

⁶⁷ *Le Monde* (10 July 2007) Open letter to Tony Blair from the ten Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Mediterranean members States of the European Union Released by the French Embassy in the U.K. Available at: <http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/10-Mediterranean-EU-States-foreign.html>. accessed on 12. May 2011.

the political solution in the region has to engage negotiations “without prerequisites on the final status, even if it means acting in successive phases.”⁶⁸ Firstly, the political stances of the Mediterranean members expressed in the letter show the differences between the policies of the EU, which supports the Road Map and participates in the Quartet, and the policy of several members who express their dissatisfaction with the EU policy towards the Middle East outside the frames and institutions of the EU. Secondly, the paper shows how the member states act independently and challenge the official positions and policies of the EU towards the MEPP and conflicting parties when these members feel that the EU can not meet their interests.

The European Council refused to receive and publish a report prepared by a group of European diplomats in Jerusalem and Ramallah about Israel’s unilateral measures in Jerusalem. This example not only shows the conflict in policies between the EU institution’s agendas, but also the extent to which member states of the Council of Europe seek to avoid direct criticism of Israel. Solana explained to the ministers that European influence over Israel would be largely compromised if the report were to be published. Besides, Jack Straw, the former British Foreign Secretary, announced the decision by explaining that several states considered that the proximity of elections in the region made it improper to publish this text.⁶⁹ The report, which has since been published by the Guardian newspaper, emphasises that “there is thus clearly a consistency in the acts of the Israelis, having nothing to do with questions of security, in fact, nothing other than the continuation of the colonization of OPTs⁷⁰”. The EP, in turn, criticized the European Council and considered the act of not publishing the report “a political scandal,”⁷¹ contrary to the calls of the EU to the expansion of Israeli settlements in the Palestinian territories which undermines the objective of a two-state solution with the Palestinians. While the European Council focuses on supporting the MEPP between the Israelis and the Palestinians, which might lead to stability and security, the European Commission emphasises reform and aid as a precondition for peace, which seems to contrast human rights issues and democracy, the main goals of the European Parliament. The tension between the three institutions is at the core of the issue that hinders the European efforts and role in the MEPP as well as development, aid, democracy promotion, and institutional reforms.

Stephan Stetter analysed the role policies of the European Parliament (EP) towards the European Migration and Middle East policies. He found that that the marginal role of the EP in the CFSP mechanism within the cross-pillar institutional setting has often prompted the EP to focus on voicing harsh criticism about the substance of EU policies in both areas and consequently on developing an

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Crapo, H. (2006, January 2). The European Union conceals a policy of Annexation. *Humanite* Retrieved from <http://www.humaniteinenglish.com/spip.php?article36>. Access date: September 2, 2010.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Ibid.

alternative policy agenda.⁷² The main focus of these alternative agendas were areas of democracy promotion and human rights. The European Parliament used its power in 1998 when parliament blocked the conclusion of free trade agreements with Israel. The EP was not satisfied with the EU policies towards the Middle East region. On an institutional level, the EP linked the weak role of the EU in the Middle East to the intergovernmental mechanism of the CFSP.⁷³ Moreover, the EP considered the mechanism and the institutional setting in foreign policies as largely insufficient and argued that EU decision-making is blocked by the intergovernmental nature of its foreign policy, which is the reason for the Union not yet being successful in playing a credible role in the Middle East.

Conclusion

Reviewing the history of EU collective foreign policy-making towards the Arab-Israeli conflict and the MEPP leads to the following conclusions: Firstly, the discussion above supports a great realist understanding of European Common Foreign policy-making. EU members come to the EU negotiating table with pre-determined interests that reflect their identities and domestic preferences. An intergovernmental approach still dominates the process of the decision making and, therefore, policy tends towards the lowest common denominator which can be reached through bargaining. The EU member states may primarily share the same view about the conflict, but they differ on the “proper” policy towards the parties/countries involved in the conflict. Reasons for this circumstance are partly historical and specific to individual member states, partly a result of their perceptions of current self-interests, and partly a result of differing visions of the true nature of any European role. As a consequence, there is a gap between European ambitions and performance. Every single element of the EPC/CFSP is the outcome of a cumbersome and bureaucratic process, involving compromise-building between the members themselves, the European Commission, and the European Parliament. The outcomes of these negotiations reveal that, although the member states have their own pre-defined interests and identities, EU membership and the processes of socialising and interacting with other member states on the European level have an impact on the perceptions of these interests and can alter them. Thus, constructivist arguments can help identifying whether interest and identity are fixed. Member states feel obliged to consider the interests of the EU when they formulate their own foreign policies. Thus, there is an element of Europeanisation in this regard instead of mere supranationalism. Greece, for example, altered its policy towards Israel and recognised it as a result of the pressure from the European community. Likewise, Germany re-orientated its foreign policy

⁷² Stetter, S., *op. cit.*, p. 159.

⁷³ *Ibid.*

and supported all the key European foreign policies and declarations, such as the London Declaration (1977) and the Venice Declaration (1980) that supported the Palestinian right to self-determination.⁷⁴ The constructivist approach also contributes to explaining aspects of the EPC/CFSP foreign policy in this case. Governments of member states are not immune to “pressure from below” when they formulate their perceptions of national interest, which they then project into the common foreign policy negotiation process. For instance, during the oil crisis in 1973, the French public opinion was deeply concerned with the rising oil prices. This aspect played a significant role in adjusting the French position towards launching the Euro-Arab Dialogue.⁷⁵ Similarly, public sympathy for Israel plays a substantial role in determining Germany’s policies towards the region. These factors contribute to our understanding of the role of “identity” at the national level. The role of the EU in the Madrid conference⁷⁶ and its multilateral track can be explained through the functionalist liberal theory where economic cooperation will spillover into political issues. During the conference the EU managed to utilize and transfer its own experience with regional economic and political integration. There is a belief within EU Participants that multi-sectoral cooperation will enable the conflicting parties in the Middle East to set aside their political differences. The negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian National Authority benefitted from the increasing role and involvements of Solana, the EU Special Representative Miguel Moratinos and Marc Otte, and the EU envoy for the MEPP. Moratinos, in particular, played an essential role in mediating an agreement between Israel and the Palestinians regarding the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Hebron. This incident implies elements of the increasing role of the EU institutions in the CFSP. Such a position supports the functionalism where the European Commission and EU persons, such as Solana and Moratinos, play an important role in the peace process. By analysing the CFSP players, elements of neo-functionalism, which advocates supranationalism in the CFSP, can be noticed. The roles of the HR, the EU special envoys in the MEPP, and the European Commission increased with regards to the European aid and technical assistance. They sent electoral observers and supported the Palestinian police force and the role of the EP by advocating human rights issues which support the argument that the CFSP contains some supranational elements.

The functional/supranational theoretical approach proves to be unsatisfactory when it comes to the particular case of the CFSP provisions with particular regard to the high politics of the EPC/CFSP which are determined through declarations and statements. This disappointing approach has two reasons. First, EU members only announced these declarations via consensus decision-making.

⁷⁴ Müller, P. (2011). *op. cit.*, p. 10.

⁷⁵ Bicchi, F. (2007). *European Foreign Policy Making Towards the Mediterranean* New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 12.

⁷⁶ The Madrid Conference of 1991 was a peace conference, held from 30 October to 1 November 1991 in Madrid, hosted by Spain and co-sponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union.

"Second, the roles of the supranational actors are limited to implementing the CFSP. This policy is determined by the member states of the European Council, which installed the principles and general guidelines of the European foreign affairs. Thus these responsibilities do not amount to decisive political interventions. The union's prestige increased through the assigning of a special envoy. However, this assignment was in line with the policy of the member states to appoint representatives in the absence of collective agreement on strategies. In sum, from the commencement of the creation of the EPC at the end of the 1960s until 2009, the inherent problems of the European foreign affairs have remained the same. The issue of intergovernmental orientation remains, and the intergovernmental nature of the CFSP is a central element for the understanding of the European foreign policy behaviour in the Middle East.

Bibliography

- Ainley, K & Brown, C 2009, *Understanding International Relations*, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan.
- Allen, D & Pijpers, A 1984, *European Foreign Policy-Making and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
- Allen, D, Rummel, R, & Wessels, W 1982, *European Political Cooperation: Towards a Foreign Policy for Western Europe*, Oxford, Butterworth-Heinemann.
- Alpher, J 1998, "The Political Role of the European Union in the Arab-Israel Peace Process: An Israeli Perspective", *The International Spectator*, vol. 33, no. 4, pp. 77–86.
- Amirah Fernández, H, & Youngs, R 2005, *The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Assessing the First Decade*, Madrid, Real Instituto Elcano de Estudios Internacionales y Estratégico.
- Archer, C 2000, *The European Union: Structure and Process*, New York, Continuum International Publishing.
- Baylis, J, & Smith, S 2005, *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Behr, T 2008, "Enduring Differences? France, Germany and Europe's Middle East Dilemma", *Journal of European Integration*, vol. 30, no.1, pp. 79–96.
- Bereuter, D, & Lis, J 2003, "Broadening the Transatlantic Relationship", *The Washington Quarterly*, vol. 27, no. 1, pp. 145–162.
- Bicchi, F 2007, *European Foreign Policy Making Toward the Mediterranean*, New York, Palgrave MacMillan.
- Bindi, F M 2009, *The Foreign Policy of the European Union: Assessing Europe's Role in the World*, Washington, Brookings Institution Press.

- Brauch, H G 2003, *Security and Environment in the Mediterranean: Conceptualising Security and Environmental Conflicts*, New York & Berlin, Springer.
- Bretherton, C & Vogler, J 2002, *The European Union as a Global Actor*, London, Routledge.
- Burnham, P, Lutz, K G, Grant W, & Layton-Henry, Z 2008, *Research Methods in Politics*. Houndmills & Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan.
- Calleo, D P 1978, *The German Problem Reconsidered: Germany and the World Order, 1870 to the Present*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Calleya, S C 1997, *Navigating Regional Dynamics in the Post-Cold War World: Patterns of Relations in the Mediterranean Area*, London, Dartmouth Publishing.
- Cini, M & Pérez-Solórzano Borrágán, N 2010, *European Union Politics* (3rd ed), Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Cram, L 1997, *Policy Making in the European Union: Conceptual Lenses and the Integration Process*, London, Routledge.
- Cronin, D 2010, *Europe's Alliance with Israel: Aiding the Occupation*, London, Pluto Press.
- Dijkstra, H 2008, "The Council Secretariats Role in the Common Foreign and Security Policy", *European Foreign Affairs Review*, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 149–166.
- Eldar, A & Issacharoff, A 2006, "Spanish FM: Peace plan withheld for fear of Israeli rejection", *Haaratez Newspaper*, November 18.
- European Union Centre of North Carolina 2008, *Europe's role in the Palestinian- Israeli conflict European Union Policy Area: Middle East Peace Process*, North Carolina, European Union Centre of North Carolina.
- Everts, S 2002, *The EU and the Middle East: a call for action*, London, Centre for European Reform.
- Gianniu, M. 2007. "The Policies Of The Mediterranean EU Countries Towards The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Leaders Or Followers? In The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP): Perspectives From The Mediterranean EU Countries,". PhD, University of Crete.
- Gianniu, M 2009, *The EU and the Middle East Conflict European and the Israeli Palestinian Conflict: An Overview*, Istanbul, EKEM.
- Ginsberg, R H 2001, *The European Union in International Politics: Baptism by Fire*. Lanham, Md, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Gomez, R 2003, *Negotiating the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Strategic Action in EU Foreign Policy?*, Aldershot, Ashgate.
- Hill, C 1996, *The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy*, London, New York, Routledge.
- Hill, C 2003, *The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy*, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, Palgrave MacMillan.

- Hill, C 2004, "Renationalizing or Regrouping? EU Foreign Policy Since 11 September 2001", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 42, no.1, pp. 143–163.
- Hyde-Price, A 2004, "Interest, Institutions and Identity in the Study of European Foreign Policy", Christiansen, T & Tonra, B (eds), *Rethinking European Union Foreign Policy*, Manchester, Manchester University Press.
- Monar, J 1998, "Institutional Constraints of the European Union's Mediterranean Policy", *Mediterranean Politics*, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 39–60.
- Moratinos, M 1999, *EU Special Envoy to the Middle East, Speech 99*, Gomez, R 2003, *Negotiating the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Strategic Action in EU Foreign Policy?*, Aldershot, Ashgate.
- Moravcsik, A 1993, "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalism Approach", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 31, no. 4, pp. 473–524.
- Moravcsik, A 2001, "Despotism in Brussels-Misreading the European Union", *Journal of Foreign Affairs*, vol. 80, no. 3, pp. 114–121.
- Morgantini, L 2008, *Israel Is Not Above the Law: The European Parliament Suspends the Vote on the Upgrade of EU-Israel Relations*, Brussels, European Parliament.
- Musu, C 2010, *European Union Policy towards the Arab-Israeli Peace Process: The Quicksands of Politics*, London, Palgrave Macmillan.
- Persson, A 2009, The transformation of just peace: EU and the Middle East peace process. *Proceedings of the JAD-PbP Regional Seminar*. Jerusalem, Palestine.
- Pijipers, A 2007, *The EU and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict: the limits of the CFSP. In Military Transformations and Peace Support Operations: Current Experience, Future Development and Possible Implications for the Israel-Palestinian Conflict Theatre*, Jerusalem: Hebrew University.
- Smith, M E 2004, "Toward a Theory of EU Foreign Policy Making: Multi-level Governance, Domestic Politics, and National Adaptation to Europe's Common Foreign and Security Policy", *Journal of European Public Policy*, vol. 11, no. 4, pp. 740–758.
- Soetendorp, B 1999, *Foreign Policy in the European Union: Theory, History and Practice*, London, Longman.
- Stetter, S 2003, "Democratization without Democracy? The Assistance of the European Union for Democratization Processes in Palestine", *Mediterranean Politics*, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 153–173.
- Stetter, S 2004, "Cross-Pillar Politics: Functional Unity and Institutional Fragmentation of EU Foreign Policies", *Journal of European Public Policy*, vol. 11, no. 4, pp. 720–739.

Tonra, B, & Christiansen, T 2004, *Rethinking European Union Foreign Policy*. Manchester, Manchester University Press.

Zielonka, J 1998, *Explaining Euro-Paralysis: Why Europe is Unable to Act in International Politics*, New York, St. Martin's Press.

First Stage: Reconciliation through the Visual and Pop-Culture

Second Stage: A Case Study of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon

Abstract

With regards to pictures in a conflict go, pictorial offers of reconciliation should be promoted already during a conflict by simultaneously eliminating or minimizing stereotyping (according to the Hölderlin Perspective). We argue that the permanence of pop-cultural discourses has a tremendous impact on human consciousness. We bolster our thesis by explaining conditions, mechanisms, and the social meaning of images. On this basis, we develop the conceptual connection between reconciliation and visibility to cover both the potentials as well as the pitfalls. We are not concerned with visual discourses in general, but we are dealing with everyday discourses developed in everyday cultural products, in our case, primarily murals. We chose the visual discourses of the exiled Palestinians in Lebanon for our case study for which we use the data gathered during several field research trips in 2015 and 2016. The Arab-Israeli-conflict is particularly complicated and complex. Accordingly, this paper does not attempt to present a comprehensive solution. With the emphasis on the visual, we rather seek to shed light on an often overlooked part of the conflict.

1. Introduction



Some of the refugee camps in Lebanon are, against common expectation, very colorful places with large murals adorning the streets. They depict green meadows, Jaffa-oranges with the Dome of the Rock rising from behind the hills, while somewhere else one can spot a small boy with bristly hair gazing into the distance, his back turned to the viewer. His name is Handala, named after a desert

plant with a bitter taste. The atmosphere in this mural seems darker with the Dome of the Rock appearing on the horizon in the far distance. The walls are alive; they communicate with the viewer, send messages and form thoughts.

The American art historian W.J.T Mitchell (2005) emphasizes the cognitive effect of the visual. Here, the distinction between pictures and images in the English language is particularly helpful. Whereas a “picture” is a material representation, an “image” alludes to the scene formed in our heads. Images influence our inner visual world. It is not by chance that, when thinking of Paris, many people conjure up picture of romantic streets and the Eiffel Tower. A postcard-like scene appears in our minds. Based on Edward Said’s concepts (2003) it can be assessed that cinematic material was instrumental in shaping the Western idea of the Near and Middle East (Carta 2011). As a consequence of this development, a rather violent picture of the "Orient" emerged, a blockbuster in the head.

According to W. J. T. Mitchell (2005), pictures create images. The processing of physical pictures can, therefore, be seen as a tool for conflict management. As we know from social psychology, images, such as in the form of self-images and images of the other, play an essential role in conflictual contexts (Tajfel/Turner 1979).

The question of timing is essential in conflict resolution. Some approaches argue that there exists a sort of “burnout” to a conflict (Zartman 2001). Given that the “psychological baggage” (Thompson 2001, p. 565), such as stereotypes, tends to increase during a conflict, approaches to reconciliation should not only be made after the fact but should occur along the way. The Jena Center for Reconciliation Studies (JCRS) stands for such an approach with the Hölderlin perspective (Flämig/Leiner 2012).

With regards to pictures in a conflict go, this theory implies that pictorial offers of reconciliation should be promoted already during a conflict by simultaneously eliminating or minimizing stereotyping. We argue that the permanence of pop-cultural discourses has an tremendous impact on human consciousness. [We bolster our thesis by explaining conditions, mechanisms, and the social meaning of images.](#) On this basis, we develop the conceptual connection between reconciliation and visuality to cover both the potentials as well as the pitfalls.

We chose the visual discourses¹ of the exiled Palestinians in Lebanon for our case study for which we use the data gathered during several field research trips in 2015 and 2016. In terms of methodology, we pursue the approach of early critical German peace- and conflict studies. Consequently, civil society as a genuine setting of conflict and peace receives special attention. On

¹ “Visual culture” is a common term in the academic world (see Mirzoeff 1999, Potter 2007, Langbehn 2010). From ethnology, however, we know that the concept of culture is afflicted. The notion of the cultural is often accompanied by the connotation of the immutable and a certain naturalization is suggested. Moreover, the cultural is a term that is not easy to operationalize. This fact is visible in the many and contradictory definitions of culture. The concept of culture in the colonial era has also been corrupted (see Langbehn 2010).

that note, we are not concerned with visual discourses in general, but with the visual-discursive side of popular culture which **we understand to be the demarcation line to elitist high culture**. In other words, we are dealing with everyday discourses **developed** in everyday cultural products, in our case, primarily murals. **Party posters, state emblems and the like have been deliberately excluded because we do not consider them as part of the popular culture**.

Indeed, the Arab-Israeli-conflict is particularly **complicated and complex**. Accordingly, this paper does not attempt to present a comprehensive solution. With the emphasis on the visual, we rather seek to shed light on an often overlooked part of the conflict.

2. The Palestinian Diaspora: Between Deracination and Hope

“We live in camps, a place where the Palestinian is labeled as a refugee, sometimes as a trouble maker, sometimes as a terrorist and so on and so on [...] Plus, the situation in Palestine has its effect on our daily life. You can feel the pain, when massacres or captivities happened, when kids are being tortured or anything from the matter”.²

Palestinians look back on more than a century of migration and over six decades of displacement. The establishment of the Jewish state in 1948 created the Palestinian refugee question, which remains unsolved to this day (Khashan 2003, pp. vi–vii). For many Palestinians, their daily experience is one of having neither a homeland nor a place where they feel at home. Throughout the past century, moving around and living in various locations away from Palestine has been a distinctive feature of Palestinian life (Hammer 2005, p. 2). Nowhere has the presence of Palestinian refugees been more contested than in Lebanon, where the government actively sought to prevent their permanent integration and settlement (Knudsen 2009, p. 51). We will first commence with a short overview of the situation of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon for establishing our chain of reasoning.

When the first Arab-Israeli war started in 1948, 700.000 Palestinians had to flee their country. About a hundred thousand of them crossed over into Lebanon and gradually moved into fifteen makeshift camps operated by UNRWA³. The refugees remained politically passive up to the 1960s, but their presence was politicized and polarizing within Lebanon. There was no refugee or asylum law in the country, and this resulted in refugees being stereotyped as particular types of “foreigners”, mainly stateless foreigners. This process had widespread negative implications for the Palestinian refugees as they were deprived of the benefits of citizenship, health care, higher education, and suffrage. Moreover, their access to work were denied (Knudsen 2009, pp. 52 f.).

² The sentences printed in cursiv characters are statements of the sample material which we amassed during several field research trips in 2015 and 2016. This will be indicated in the following with Own Research Data (ORD).

³ The UN General Assembly established 1949 the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). UNRWA provides assistance to eligible refugees but offers **no protection**. In Lebanon, the lack of legal protection was extraordinary: Palestinian refugees were deprived of civic rights and remained “stateless foreigners”.

The PLO leadership was able to conclude a controversial agreement with Lebanese authorities in November 1969. The so-called ‘Cairo Agreement’ provided administrative autonomy to the camps, lifted the ban on employment and authorized Palestinian attacks on Israel from Lebanese soil. During the Lebanese civil war, Palestinian Refugees played an important role. Following the bloody War of the Camps (1985–1987), the Cairo Agreement was one-sidedly repealed by the Lebanese cabinet in May 1987. In effect, this amounted to a repeal of all of the Palestinian privileges under the Cairo Agreement, just as the civil war was nearing its end (Knudsen 2009, p. 55).

Currently, there are over 504.000 Palestinian Refugees registered at UNRWA in Lebanon (UNRWA 2016). They reportedly continue to face acute socio-economic deprivation and legal barriers to human rights and remain excluded from key aspects of social, political and economic life with no right to own immovable property. The refugees, moreover, suffer from limited access to public services, such as health and education, limited job opportunities, and restrictions regarding specific professions (UNHCR 2016, p. 2). Despite the abrogation of the Cairo Agreement in 1987, which kept the Lebanese army from entering the Palestinian refugee camps, the military does not generally exercise control over the camps. As a result, the camps are in the hands of different Palestinian factions. Competitive factions oftentimes rule different camps. “The camps are reported to be generally characterized by a climate of instability, physical threats, sporadic fighting and limited access to safety and justice” (UNHCR 2016, pp. 2 f.).

This historical background and the socio-political situation of Palestinian Refugees led to the formation of an identity which lies somewhere between deracination and hope. Thus, the Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon are an appropriate example to illustrate the social importance of the visual in the context of conflict. In the public cityscape of Beirut, the Lebanese capital, there is little evidence of the existence of a Palestinian diaspora despite the city comprises more than 450,000 people, accounting for at least 10 percent of the total population.

3. The (Visual) Discourses of the Palestinian Diaspora in Lebanon

After this brief overview of the socio-political background of exiled Palestinians, the focus now lays on the corresponding discourse of images on the basis of murals. **This is because these Murals can be understood as the discursive flipside of the socio-political situation.**

Our epistemological interest in a nutshell:

The analysis of visual (dimension of sense/meaning) discourses (range of effect), which has evolved in popular culture (subject area).

The visual discourse conducted through murals by Palestinians in Lebanon is composed of various collective symbols. By collective symbolism, we mean the social entirety of pictures, images, and

word images (e.g. metaphors). This culturally specific ensemble is characteristic of the worldview of the respective subjects and their subsequent actions (Jäger 2012, p. 55).

Intersubjectivity and communitization develop out of these collective symbols. The corresponding ensemble of pictures, images, and linguistic images thus form a common frame of reference through which a collective identity emerges.

But even for the description and interpretation of the alleged other, there exist specific figures of discourse. For instance, Edward Said (2003) pointed out how the so-called “Orient” became a simplifying and powerful figure in European and North American discourses. This example unveils the "dilemma of stereotyping" (Pickering 2001, p. 22). On the one hand, discourses structure social reality through reductions (fields of speech and visibility). On the other hand, there is a danger of an epistemological constriction, especially by stereotyping through Othering.

3.1 The Palestinian Master Narrative

Discourses are multimodal. We are not concerned to negate the word and language dimension but reflect on the *additive* effect of images. Already Foucault highlights the inextricable relationship between word and image in his remarks to René Magritte's famous painting *La trahison des images* (*Ceci n'est pas une pipe*).

Many of the Palestinian murals are also subject to a multimodal configuration. Often, the picture composition contains verses or pictorial quotes by the Palestinian resistance writer Mahmoud Darwish. Despite all the attention given to the image, language continues to have a constitutive meaning for our consciousness; or to say it in the words of Immanuel Kant: "Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind" (Kant 1781, p. 51). Along these lines, we combine the Palestinian master narrative with the mural discourses. Philip Hammack⁴ defines master narratives as:

“Dominant scripts which can be identified in cultural products and discourse (e. g., media, literature, film, textbooks). These scripts contain collective storylines that range from a group’s history to notions of what it means to inhabit a particular social category.“ (Hammack 2010, p. 178)

According to this definition, master narratives are crucial in the process of identity formation. They develop through cultural products, such as murals. Here, the sphere of popular culture comes into view. Storey (2014, p. 20) states that “[...] *Popular culture is always defined, implicitly or explicitly, in contrast to other conceptual categories: folk culture, mass culture, high culture, dominant culture,*

⁴ Philip Hammack reconstructed the overall narrative framework (master narrative) of Palestinian and Israeli youth based on empirical research. Although Philip Hamack was less concerned with exiled Palestinian youths, we can validate many of his findings. The master narrative created a larger narrative framework to an, in other respects, very fragmented Palestinian community.


working-class culture.” If we take civil society seriously as a setting, it is advisable to draw a line between it and the elite.

3.2 Popular culture

Critical literature offers a myriad of different, and at times competing, approaches to popular culture, often orienting towards the lines of extremes (from *romanticization* to *demonization*) (Storey 2014, pp. 27–31). We situate the visual discourse of murals within the subject area of popular culture. In our view, the dimension of popular culture often met with contempt by an elitist Homo Academicus in scientific circles. Just because rap music, for example, does not cater to the taste prevalent in academic circles, does not reduce its value as a medium that has developed a significant amount of political force. Moreover, popular culture is oriented towards civil society rather than the political-administrative level; and what would reconciliation be without the participation of civil society?

As part of our approach, we understand popular culture as an ensemble of cultural products (music, street art, clothing, etc.), which is not only accessible to the elites but also to the general public, and unfolds its political impact because of its subtle omnipresence (permanence), thus, widely reaching and touching civil society.

3.3 Topography of the discourse



The illustration above displays the most striking motives and symbols within this mural discourse. The elements can be combined with each other while the master narrative ensures the necessary social coherence. Thus, the combination of individual elements can lead to different narrative threads. The Handala, for instance, is often throwing a stone or holding a key up in the air. With regards to our

image-based interviews and a reference to the master narrative, this particular semantic space is explained as follows:

The Palestinian master narrative embodies four essential components: 1.) deprivation and expropriation of the mystified land, 2.) resistance, 3.) existential insecurity and a sense of threat/danger, 4.) the delegitimization of Israeli identity and the non-recognition of historical claims to the land (Hammack 2010).

The subsequent sections present the forms in which the master narrative manifests itself not only linguistically but also figuratively. The different manifestations of the Palestinian master narrative refer to their respective scheme by using hashtags as in the following example: **Statement XY (#manifestation of a component of the Palestinian master narrative).**

3.3.1 The Key

“The key is something material, I know. But we don’t have the key only in our houses. We have the key deeply in our hearts. Every Palestinian is a key to his homeland because only the Palestinians fits to Palestine.”(ORD)

A key is a form of tangible proof of ownership. Many Palestinian families own one. Frequently, a monumental version of the key is placed in central locations within the camps. When the Palestinian families left their villages, they locked their doors behind them, hoping for a quick return (#facet of the lost homeland). However, since return remained out of the question, the key has been passed down from one generation to the next (#resistance + #existential precariousness of a perceived memocide).

3.3.2 Palestine - A Paradise

“I can see the green spaces, all types of trees and flowers and vegetables and fruits...in every house there's gardens, or fields ... and the heritage in its every aspect, the monuments. The sea, even though I have a phobia of swimming; but when I get back I will get into the water, the clean water, I might even learn how to surf”(ORD).

The murals often display Palestine as a particularly green and fertile land (#mystified land). Palestinians identify with plants, such as the olive branch or wheat. The stem of a wheat plant never wilts and when cut off, it loses its seed whereupon new plants can grow (#resistance). The precarious parameters in Lebanon strengthen the perception of fertile Palestine. The relationship between Lebanon and Palestine is often described by contrastive pairs of adjectives. When life in Lebanon is cramped, it is open in Palestine. When Lebanon acts passive, Palestine is alive. The precarious situation in Lebanon is thus projected inversely onto the imagined picture of Palestine.

3.3.3 Symbols of Statehood

„May I introduce myself? They call me the coinman, because I've always an old Palestinian coin in my pocket. When I was a kid and forced to leave Palestine, I took this little coin with me. Nowadays the Jews say, that there was no Palestine. But how can I then have the old Palestinian coin?"(ORD).

The Palestinian map (excluding Israel) and the Palestinian flag symbolize the statehood of Palestine (#delegitimization of Israel's claim of ownership). These symbols have developed as a reaction to colonial discourses in which the founding of the state Israel is often legitimized with the lack of state structures during the British mandate.

3.3.4 The Keffiyeh

„The peasants used to put it, in a way that doesn't hide their faces, but when the revolutionists start to put it, they changed the way, and started to hide their faces as a help and to protect the revolutionists and so they can hide among them when the occupation's army looks for them"(ORD).

The keffiyeh is probably the most widely known symbol of Palestinian identity. A Fatah operative told us in an interview: "When I was in South Africa, everyone knew that I was Palestinian. And that made me proud." The scarf already became important in the conflicts between Palestinian settlers and the British colonial power. Occasionally, the pattern of the keffiyeh is also used to decorate entrances or furniture. It was Yassir Arafat who made the scarf world-famous. In addition to the aspect of identification, as shown in the quote above, the scarf is also a symbol of #resistance and armed struggle.

3.3.5 The Dome of the Rock

“It is a symbol of Jerusalem, the Capital of Palestine.”

“But also the Aqsa mosque is so important and holy for the Palestinians and not just the Muslims Palestinian people” (ORD).

The Dome of the Rock performs a dual function. On the one hand, it is a religious symbol since Muhammad is said to have set out from there to ascend to the heavens. On the other hand, the symbol refers to Jerusalem and its affiliation with Palestine (#delegitimization of the Israeli identity). Many lines of conflict converge in Jerusalem and Jerusalem itself is considered a symbol of the Arab-Israeli-conflict. There is an intense desire associated with the Dome of the Rock and Jerusalem.

3.3.6 The Stone

“To throw stones is not only a physical thing. It's also pretty symbolic because it means that we fight with every means” (ORD).

The stone is a symbol of #resistance, which gained particular importance during the first Intifada (the Rebellion of the Stones). It, moreover, symbolizes the asymmetrical nature of the conflict as the superior, armed enemy, faced with an opposition resorting to slingshots.

3.3.7 Handala

“And we will not see his face, until we go back to Palestine, then he will look to the world from inside Palestine [...]. Handala represents every Palestinian. He is me, he is every refugee and fighter for Palestine even inside Palestine” (ORD).

Handala, a refugee boy of approximately ten years of age, appears in many drawings by the Palestinian cartoonist and caricaturist Naji al-Alis since its debut on 13 July 1969. He does not wear shoes, and his clothes are in rags, covered with patches. The viewer can only see his back. Like a compass, he is facing Palestine. The story goes that he will only turn around when the Palestinians have returned from exile to their homeland. In the original version, his hands are crossed behind his back. In other portrayals, however, Handala often carries something in his hand, such as the key or a weapon.

4. Pictures → Images: Conditions, Mechanisms, and Social Relevance

Using the symbols outlined above, we now proceed to explain the specifics of pop-cultural visual discourses. We are particularly concerned with the transformation from pictures to images and primarily focus on the genesis of *collective* images. For that reason, we abstract preconditions and mechanisms from our empirical studies before we classify the identified conditions and structures within the social context of our study. On this conceptual basis, we finally induce the connection between reconciliation and visibility. The points elaborated in this paper are illustrated by using (image-based) interview passages and by means of the Palestinian collective symbols.

4.1 Contextual conditions of the Genesis of Collective Images

„When I talk about the meaning of the pictures and symbols you chose, I talk in the name of Palestinians and in my name, in my daily life”(ORD).

Conflicts between different collectives, for example, between ethnic or religious groups, often strengthen the in-group. After all, solidarity is of particular tactical importance in this context. This form of strategic collectivity often leads to a relatively stable discourse with a few veto players. Outsiders to this collective discourse are usually under intense social pressure. Referring to pictorial discourses, the stability of the discourse promotes the permanence and thus the evidence of the images. After all, in homogenous communities, there are fewer competing images to be found. The existing images have a strong effect in such a context (without competition).

For the patterns and symbols, a certain authenticity of the pictures and a general acceptance is necessary. The mechanisms leading to acceptance are outlined in the following chapter. A simple form of the symbols enables reproduction. Hence, the symbols can be transferred to a broader spectrum of media.

With regards to the effectiveness of the pictures, it is conducive when elites support them. Darwish has promoted the romantic portrayals of Palestine through his poetry, and Arafat has helped to make the keffiyeh a political symbol. In other words, elites are authoritative. However, a genesis of collective images without the support of elites would be conceivable in circumstances, such as violent upheavals or revolutions.

4.2 Mechanisms

“A mechanism is a set of interacting parts – an assembly of elements producing an effect not inherent in any one of them. A mechanism is not so much about ‘nuts and bolts’ as about ‘cogs and wheels’ - the wheelwork or agency by which an effect is produced.” (Elster 1989, p. 78)

The question as to which *cogs* and *wheels* are instrumental in the transformation process of images into collective images imposes itself at this point. Subsequently, we identified four transformative mechanisms.

4.2.1 Orientation through Identification

“When I visited Lebanon, I felt even more Palestinian compared to in Jordan” (ORD).

Identifying with a picture fosters its transformation into an image. Identifying with human-like figures, such as Handala, is much easier than it is with objects, such as the key. The illustrator al-Ali gave his figure not only a visual shape but also a biography. Most Palestinians in Lebanon were born in exile and therefore share the same fate with Handala. Identification equires cultural connectivity. The master narrative sets the necessary cultural framework for identification. **Once identification has occurred, the respective point of identification provides direction and orientation.** The direction of Handala’s gaze is adopted and promotes the development of a collective image through the eyes of Handala.

4.2.2 Evidence through Emotional Sensemaking

“We suffer, we suffer a lot. But we still fight. Like wheat, we never lower our head. One day we will return” (ORD).

Fantasy is a form of emancipation. The imaginary has the potential to overcome ontology. If pictures are associated with longings and hopes, an individual will accept the semantics associated with it (images). The basic conditions in Lebanon reinforce this effect. Pictures of desire become models of

resilience. Relating to literature and the utopian world of imagination, Ernst Bloch (1976) identified "The Principle of Hope". **There, we find evidence of the creation of meaning.** As the last consequence, an emotional bond is formed, and the pictures become part of a collective world of imagination (images). Evidence through emotional sensemaking is a special form of identification.

4.2.3 Ritualisation

"I know in western eyes these are just objects. But for me they are holy" (ORD).

Ritualisation is constitutive in this process of transformation, a mechanism also found in other disciplines within the social sciences. For example, Jan Assman indicates the necessity of ritualised memory practices for the creation of collective memory. In turn, Jürgen (Link 2006, p. 15) states that rituals produce normality. The fact that some of the identified symbols, such as the key and the keffiyeh, are everyday objects facilitates ritualization. The keffiyeh is worn in everyday life, and monumental keys are located in marketplaces or widely exhibited in living rooms. These objects comprise symbols. The key, for instance, becomes part of a certain liturgy with corresponding effects of subjectivization. This ritualisation creates permanence, which, on the other hand, provides evidence. Since ritualization is a collective practice, it supports the emergence of the shared image.

4.2.4 Mimesis

"Sure, the murals reminds us to fight every single day until we return" (ORD).

Once the admission into collective consciousness has succeeded, whether it be through a process of identification or emotional creation of meaning, it is then solidified by ritualization, the moment when mimesis comes into effect. Mimesis is assumed to be the imitation of what is shown. The subjects assimilate to the contents presented and thus make the discourse a fact. This action-theoretical perspective authorizes the image. In the words of Michel Foucault (2013, p. 240), "the picture becomes the regime of truth". This regime of truth is accompanied by an accepted world of imaginations which arises from the image. The mechanism of mimesis combines discourse theory with action theory. The pictures materialize through the actions they inspire and thus strengthening their sphere of action. The throwing of a stone confirms the image and emphasises its transformative potential to become a collective image. Mimesis can be understood as a particular form of ritualization. Through the embodiment of what is presented, the image is continuously solidified and reproduced.

4.3 Social Relevance of Images in a Conflict Context

"It is as though we are stranded. But there is no beach, no harbor. We are in-between"(ORD).

Out of the synergy between context, conditions and mechanisms emerge a configuration for the formation of collective images. But how relevant are these images in the context of conflict? The living conditions of Palestinians are diffuse. They are neither Lebanese citizens nor do they have solid prospects of return. The fact that most Palestinians long for a land they will never be able to experience intensifies this diffuse nature.

The visual discourse structures these living conditions. Handala, for instance, illustrates this fact very well as it becomes a performative component through the process of mimesis. For the Palestinians, it is of paramount importance since it alludes to the historicity of their existence as well as their anticipated future in Palestine. Handala combines three aspects of time: past, present, and future. He brings the loss of homeland to mind, represents dissatisfaction with the present through his averted posture, and influences the perspectives and actions of Palestinians. The intolerable present becomes bearable since the meaning has been created. The symbols thus fulfill a resilient function.

The Palestinians fled to a different land wherefore the Palestinian diaspora is highly fragmented.

“When I met my friends from Jordan, we had almost the same thoughts and feelings, the same suffering, the misery of displacement from our country and living in the camps which have the same identity in every country a Palestinian exists in. Even though I heard that they are not allowed to put pictures of martyrs or stuff like that... but when it comes to the visual art, it has the same meaning and messages. We all want to go back to Palestine and where we know we will be in shaa Allah living with dignity” (ORD).

The symbols provide a common meaningful structure, and the simplicity of the symbols facilitate opportunities for reproduction.

There are also generational differences within the Palestinian community. In the course of postmodernism, new types of identification have been offered to young Palestinians. The key, however, bridges this generational gap and forges a bond across demographic groups. The key is transferred from the generation who were forced to leave their lands and homes in Palestine to the new generation who should and will work on freeing Palestine and getting back home.

5. Reconciliation through the Visual. Snares and Potentialities

“The delight of building peace? Like fishing, it is the pursuit of what is elusive, but attainable, a perpetual series of occasions for hope.” — John Buchan, see also Lederach 1997:6

The concept of contingency is central to many constructivist arguments. However, a reference to possible variabilities and variations is not sufficient. **In contrast, denominating conditions and mechanisms together with their embedding into a social context draws a more wholesome picture.** The subject area we chose is visual discourses that manifest in the form of murals. By shedding light onto popular culture, our studies reveal that this subject area should not be underestimated in providing evidence of the life and condition of all parties involved.

In addition to ethical objections, rational arguments contest late handling of conflicts – the later the procedure, the greater the “psychological baggage” (Thompson 2001, p. 565). In consequence, reconciliation becomes more difficult.

Crucial for reconciliation are inter-collective benchmarks that form interfaces between diverse systems of identity. Since pop-cultural discourses are embedded into structures of daily life, they are highly effective. Unfortunately, such inter-collective benchmarks do not receive a great deal of academic attention. However, analyses focusing only on distinguishing features reinforce dividing effects. What may not work in realpolitik, succeeds surprisingly often in popular culture. One example is the probably most famous Lebanese singer Fairouz. Although there is still noticeable tension between the religious factions in Lebanon today, Fairouz has managed to unite them in music by offering lyrics that activate and induce passion across the board – from Palestinians to Christians and even to the Hezbollah. Another example is the band Yemen Blues which combines Jewish and Arabic musical influences.

“All too often peacebuilding efforts focus on processes of institution-building or on holding formal elections. A result is a top-down approach that risks imposing a particular notion of a Western and liberal understanding of peace.”
(Bleiker/ Premaratna 2010, p. 377)

With regards to intractable conflicts, perceptions are significant for the process of devising solutions. Having a long tradition, master narratives can be considered the basis of worldviews and are often firmly anchored in any given society. Therefore, continuous processing via images is recommended. The mechanism of identification shows that in order to unfold their imaginary impact, pictures ought to be compatible with the respective cultural system. It is more appropriate to install fewer new collective symbols than to modify existing ones. Although this does not hold for the context of reconciliation, the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement (BDS) illustrates this logic. The logo of the BDS Movement features Handala, a beam-balance in his hand, as a symbol of (lacking) justice. This example demonstrates how individual symbols are modified and result in the emergence of new narrative threads. The beam-balance as a symbol of justice belongs to the circle of Western collective symbols. Both, Handala and the beam balance, are entangled with each other. The odds that this picture becomes evident both among the Palestinians and Western activists is comparatively high due to its ability to connect it to the respective cultural systems of representation.

Within the scope of reconciliation processes, it is therefore necessary to find common points of reference in order to enable a collective symbol to develop into an inter-collective symbol. However, connectivity to systems of representation alone is not sufficient. It is crucial to consider other mechanisms, such as the creation of meaning. As the “psychological baggage” (Thompson 2001, p.

565) increases in civil society, it often correlates with a growing need for satisfaction. In this context, a possible meaning becomes apparent which is based on needs.

If the expression of an inter-collective symbol restricted, its ritualization becomes a necessity. Within the scope of reconciliation through commemorative culture, we are aware of this aspect. Mutual stagings emphasizing the inter-collective aspect encourage evidence. Ultimately, mimesis unfolds, and members of a society begin to embody the newly-shaped inter-collective structures of meaning. However, the genesis of such inter-collective benchmarks also requires the necessary preconditions. Dynamics in the visual discourse evoke dynamics of images and thus dynamics of thought. Findings from social psychology emphasize the importance of human interaction as a fundamental condition in the reduction of stereotypes (Allport 1954, Wagner et al. 2006). As interaction increases, the likelihood of prejudice decreases. Aesthetic convergence is not a panacea but a helpful tool.

Neglecting the visual dimension is comparable to the inspection of a car. The lights are tested, the horn works fine, the tire-pressure is satisfactory and the oil is refilled. It is only once the vehicle is put in motion, however, that the lack windshield washer fluid is noticed. The ride is technically possible but without clear sight.

Bibliography

Allport, G W 1954, *The nature of prejudice*, Cambridge, UK, Addison-Wesley.

Bleiker, R & Premaratna, N 2010, "Art and Peacebuilding: How Theatre transforms conflict in Sri Lanka", in O Richmond (ed), *Peacebuilding. Critical Developments and Approaches*, Basingstoke, Palgrave, pp. 376–392.

Bloch, E 1976 *Das Prinzip Hoffnung* Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp.

Carta, S 2011, "Orientalism in the Documentary Representation of Culture", *Visual Anthropology*, vol. 24, no. 5, pp. 403–420.

Elster, J 1989, *Nuts and Bolts for the social science*, Cambridge, UK, University Press.

Foucault, M 2013 *Schriften zur Medientheorie*, Frankfurt am Main Suhrkamp.

Hammack, P L 2010, "The cultural psychology of Palestinian youth: A narrative approach", *Culture & Psychology*, vol. 16, no. 4, pp. 507–537.

Hammer, J 2005, *Palestinians born in Exile: Diaspora and the Search for a Homeland*, Austin, University of Texas Press.

Kant, I 1781, *The Critique of Pure Reason*, n.p.

Khashan, H 2003, Foreword, in S Haddad 2003, *The Palestinian Impasse in Lebanon: The Politics of Refugee Integration*, Brighton and Portland, Sussex Academic Press, pp. vi–vii.

Knudsen, A 2009, "Widening the Protection Gap: The Politics of Citizenship for Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon, 1948–2008", *Journal of Refugee Studies*, vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 51–73.

- Koller, V 2005, "Critical Discourse Analysis and Social Cognition: Evidence from Business Media Discourse". *Discourse & Society*, 2005, no. 2, 199–224.
- Kress, G 2010, *Multimodality: A Social Semiotic Approach to Contemporary Communication*, London, Routledge.
- Jäger, S 2012, *Kritische Diskursanalyse: Eine Einführung*, Münster, Unrast-Verlag.
- Langbehn, V M (eds) 2010, *German Colonialism, Visual Culture, and Modern Memory*, New York, Routledge.
- Lederach, J P 1997, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in divided societies*, Washington, US, Institute of peace press.
- Leiner, M 2018, "Conclusion: From Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation", in M Leiner & C Schleisser, *Alternative Approaches in Conflict Resolution*, Basingstoke, Palgrave.
- Leiner, M & Flämig, S 2012, "Reconciliation in the Middle of Dispute: Introduction to the Series", in M Leiner & S Flämig 2012 *Latin America between Conflict and Reconciliation*, Research in Peace and Reconciliation, no. 1. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, pp. 7–20.
- Link, J 2006, *Versuch über den Normalismus: wie Normalität produziert wird*, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
- Linke, G 2010, "Visuelle Metaphern und die Konstruktion des Orients in neueren amerikanischen Filmen", in M Junge (ed), *Metaphern in Wissenskulturen*, Wiesbaden, Springer VS, pp. 141–171.
- Mirzoeff, N 1999, *An Introduction to Visual Culture*, London and New York, Routledge.
- Mitchell, W.J.T. 2005, *What do Pictures Want? The Lives and Loves of Images*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
- Pettigrew, T F & Tropp, L R 2006, "A meta-analytic test of intergroup contact theory", *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, vol. 90, no. 5, pp. 751–783.
- Pickering, M 2001, *Stereotyping: The Politics of Representation*, Basingstoke, Palgrave.
- Potter, R A 2007, *Arctic Spectacles: The Frozen North in Visual Culture 1818–1875*, Seattle, University of Washington Press.
- Said, E 2003, *Orientalism*. New York, Vintage Books.
- Senft, G 2009, "Phatic communion", in G Senft, J O Östman & J Verschueren (eds), *Culture and language use*. Amsterdam, John Benjamins.
- Senghaas, D 1995, "Frieden als Zivilisierungsprozeß", in D Senghaas (ed), *Den Frieden denken*, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, pp. 196–223.
- Storey, J 2014, *Cultural Theory and Popular Culture: An Introduction*, Harlow, UK, Pearson Longman.

- Tajfel, H & Turner, J C 1979, *An integrative theory of intergroup conflict: The social psychology of intergroup relations?* Monterey, CA:Brooks/Cole, pp. 33– 47.
- Thomson, W R 2001, “Identifying Rivals and Rivalries in World Politics”, *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 45, no. 4, 557–586.
- UNHCR 2016, The Situation of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon, *UNHCR* online, <http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/56cc95484.pdf>, accessed on 12 September 2018.
- UNRWA 2018 Palestine Refugees, *UNRWA* online, <https://www.unrwa.org/palestine-refugees>, accessed on 12 September 2018.
- Wagner, U, Christ, O, Pettigrew, T F, Stellmacher, J & Wolf, C 2006, “Prejudice and minority proportion: Contact instead of threat effects”, *Social Psychology Quarterly*, vol. 69, pp. 380–390.
- Zartman, W. 2001, “The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments”, i *The Global Review of Ethnopolitics*, vol. 1, no. 1, pp., 8–18.

Diplomacy in the Perspective of Peace Building: From Coercion to Dictation (Israel & Palestine)

Abstract

In his 6th December 2017 illegal announcement on Jerusalem, Trump had judged previous Presidents of the United States of America for making false assumptions and for adopting failed and unsuccessful strategies; moreover, he claimed that he was correcting their failures by recognizing Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. This paper introduces to coercive diplomacy and demonstrates how Trump's administration took the US 3rd party role in the Palestinian/Israeli peace process from a coercive perspective into a dictatorial one by unilaterally imposing change on the status quo. This paper will further demonstrate how dictations disqualified the American administration from playing an effective 3rd party mediation role.

Introduction: From Coercion to Dictation

Over the past two decades, the world has witnessed increasing hopes for a peaceful solution regarding the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. During the last decades, however, a peacefully negotiated deal has become more difficult. Many well-intended efforts for reconciliation have failed. In July 2000, the most significant talks about the Palestinian-Israeli conflict were held at Camp David, U.S., bringing the final status issues to the negotiating table, in presence of Arafat, Barak and Clinton. The parties of the summit did not achieve a deal, and since then, violence and instability have escalated in the region. Questions have been raised of whether the Palestinians are to be blamed for not accepting the so called Camp David offer or the Israelis for their increasing demands and coercive diplomacy. Also the role the Americans has been criticised for not acting as an honest mediator. By explaining coercive diplomacy in the subsequent section, I point out that the application of this theory is not compatible with the role of an honest mediator unless both parties would be treated with certain negative conditions, which was not the case in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict; while Palestinians were being continuously coerced, the Israelis were rewarded.

Zero-sum thinking of the conflict led to the belief that coexistence is impossible. There were, however, international influences through British and later American policies as well as Arab support in the subsequent attacks after the expiry of the British mandate and the establishment of the state of Israel. In 1948, the state of Israel was created. The initial borders were expanded in the Six-Day War in 1967. Events continued to escalate and develop until the year of 1991 brought a new approach of dealing with the conflict through diplomatic offices. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 and the end of the Cold War introduced a unipolar world order led by the Americans. Indeed, the Iraq

invasion of Kuwait in 1990 brought instability to the Middle East and provided the need for a regional settlement. The invasion had deep effects on Palestine especially with the thousands of Palestinians who were forced to leave Kuwait after Arafat publicly announced his support with Saddam Hussein at the time, diplomatically speaking, the PLO and Arafat were weakened by the war. After more than four decades of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the dispute reached a new phase in 1991. Differences would no longer be settled through force and violence but diplomatic means. The preamble of the 1993 Declaration of Principles states that it is time for both Israelis and Palestinians to put an end to decades of confrontation and conflict.

When violence erupted in the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in September 2000, the reason for these events traces back to the failure of the Camp David summit two months earlier. The Israeli and American administrations, which were playing the role of the mediator, concluded that the Palestinian refusal to the proposed paper at the summit was the reason behind the deadlocks. Various debates arose about these talks, discussing different angles and questions. Whose mistake was the failure of the summit? What was proposed in the paper? To what extent are these talks important as a foundation for any future deal? In my previous research on the Camp David summit, titled *Limitations of Coercive Diplomacy*¹, I examined the events that led to the Camp David talks, the summit meeting itself, the main people involved as well as the techniques of negotiation and coercion, and the consequences of the final failure at several levels. In my study, I focused on the strategies of negotiation theory, such as coercive diplomacy, and whether it is successful or not. I moreover illustrated to what extent the mediators crossed their limits by abandoning their impartial role and by becoming interveners instead. The study concludes that any future agreement will be based to a certain extent of what was discussed at the Camp David summit. My previous analysis suggests an appropriate revision of the American mediating approaches and reconsideration of the Israeli policies towards Palestinians. After selected coercive diplomacy approaches have been conducted in the mediation process between Israel and Palestine at the time of the Camp David talks, the negotiations ended with a disengagement plan known as the “Sharon unilateral separation plan.”² The study demonstrates that in dealing with the Palestinians, the weaknesses of the American-Israeli approaches ultimately undermined the possibility of positive outcomes. How the American mediators were involved in their war against terror after the attack of September 11, 2001, is another aspect of the study since these events seemed to have prevented the Americans from further commitment in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.³

¹ *Limitations of Coercive Diplomacy: Camp David 2000, a case study* is a research study that I had conducted for the purpose of obtaining my MA degree from Westminster University/ London in 2004.

² The Sharon withdrawal from Gaza was not coordinated with the Palestinian National Authority.

³ David W. Lesh, *The Middle East and the United States*, West View Press, 3rd edit. 2003, pp. 260–263.

The study on the limitations of coercive diplomacy aims to avoid similar negotiation experiences in the future. Moreover, it provides a greater understanding of ways to avoid future escalation. In this paper, I argue that Trump is no different in being biased. With regards to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, he acts like a coercing dictator and does not fulfil the role of a mediator. This behaviour becomes apparent in Trump's declarations on Jerusalem. By following Trump's resolutions, the US administration acts beyond any conciliation and tries to impose rather than negotiating peace. On the December 6, 2017, Trump judged previous Presidents of the United States of America for having failed with their assumptions and strategies in the Middle-East conflict. Moreover, he claimed that he is correcting their failures by recognizing Jerusalem as the official capital of Israel.⁴

Through all of these years, presidents representing the United States have declined to officially recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital. In fact, we have declined to acknowledge any Israeli capital at all. But today, we finally acknowledge the obvious: that Jerusalem is Israel's capital. This is nothing more, or less, than a recognition of reality. It is also the right thing to do.⁵

The announcement declared to open the path to peace, but it is more likely to have the opposite effect. In this paper, I demonstrate to what extent previous U.S. Presidents failed in their assumptions and strategies towards the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, addressed in Trump's speech. By relocating the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem without consulting the Palestinian partners, the Trump's administration introduced a change of the status quo of Jerusalem.⁶ With the date of the relocation on May 15, 2018, Trump's administration chose the seventieth anniversary of the *Nakba*, the catastrophe of 1948 when many Palestinians were forced to flee from their homes and seek refuge in camps as a consequence of the Israeli military occupation of Palestinian land.⁷ The *Nakba* led to the creation of an entire system of oppression, racism⁸, and apartheid. In the ongoing conflict, it is difficult to characterize the Israeli system of dealing with the Palestinians. The occupation of land occurs in the form of settlements and involves elements of apartheid where the use of new ring roads, for instance, is restricted to Israelis. The Palestinians experience violations of human rights on a daily basis. Tragically, the consequences of the Nakba are still present for many Palestinians since the military occupation of land continues in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem.

⁴ <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-trump-jerusalem/>.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Distinction between *Verständigungsfriede* (peace by mutual consent) and *Diktatfriede* (imposed peace).

⁷ The Nakba represents a series of collective tragedies which resulted in the destruction of at least five hundred villages and the forced displacement of 70 percent of Palestinian people.

⁸ Nation State Law is an explicit evidence for those practices of racism as the law gave right only to Jewish people of Israel neglecting the rights of all Arab, Muslim, Christian or Druze communities in Israel. <https://knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/BasicLawNationState.pdf>.

Moreover, the Israelis have disregarded the numerous UN resolutions that guarantee the rights of the Palestinians people to establishing their own sovereign state of the 1967 borders, including East Jerusalem as the capital and the Palestinian identity of Jerusalem. I claim that Trump's act was illegal since it breaks the 1995 interim agreement and, more specifically, article seven of the peace agreement. As internationally agreed, the precarious situation of Jerusalem is a Palestinian-Israeli issue. The final status should be determined by the involved parties alone. Trump's act, therefore, is entirely unilateral. His declaration also violates all UNSC & UNGA resolutions that guard the Palestinian rights in 1967 lands and the occupied parts of Jerusalem, naming resolutions nos. 242⁹, 267¹⁰, 298¹¹, 476¹², 478¹³ and 2334¹⁴.

In this paper, I will further address how dictating disqualified the American administration from playing the third-party mediation role. Former U.S. Presidents might have made wrong assumptions or applied wrong strategies as Trump mentioned in his announcement, but none of his predecessors has ever rejected the role of the American administration as a third-party mediator accepted by both the Israelis and the Palestinians; this is no longer the case.

1. A Theoretical Framework

1.1 Mediation & Coercive Diplomacy

To undertake an analysis of the efforts that are intended to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the first step is a review of the strategies and methods that can lead to unexpected consequences instead of a resolution. Mediation is experiencing phenomenal growth as a dispute resolution mechanism. The mediator interacts with the parties involved to help them recognize that their problem is not a dispute between “right” or “wrong” and the “good” vs “bad.” The major task of a mediator is to lead the dispute resolution process by developing an understanding among the antagonized parties.¹⁵ The mediator also has a transformative role by helping the parties contemplating possibilities and opportunities in the process of finding a solution none of the involven has considered before.

President George W. Bush points out that, from an American point of view, the goal for the mediator is to establish party autonomy in order to strengthen the parties’ capacity for resolving their problems

⁹ UNSC Resolution 242 in 1967, <https://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/0/7D35E1F729DF491C85256EE700686136>.

¹⁰ Res 267 in 1969, Status of Jerusalem [https://undocs.org/S/RES/267\(1969\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/267(1969)).

¹¹ UNSC Resolution 298 in 1971, on Status of Jerusalem.

¹² Resolution 476 in 1980, Status of Jerusalem preserving Palestinian rights at http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2334%282016%29.

¹³ Resolution 478 in 1980, Status of Jerusalem preserving Palestinian rights http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2334%282016%29.

¹⁴ December 2017, marked the first year anniversary since passing UNSC Resolution 2,334 illegalizing settlements; this explains the commitment of 128 GA member states that refused the decision and declared it illegal or unacceptable and abstained from moving their embassies to Jerusalem. For UNSC 2334 resolution in 2016, please see http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2334%282016%29.

¹⁵ Julie Macfarlane, *Rethinking Disputes: The Mediation Alternative*, Cavendish Publishing Limited, 1997, p. 303.

or developing an agreement without depending on external professionals or mediators.¹⁶ Unlike Bush, Bill Clinton's belief was that a mediator should advance his own proposals and interpret as well as transmit each party's proposals to the other.¹⁷ Coercive diplomacy is only one of several tools that states can employ in seeking to restrain or resolve international conflicts. However, The American-Israeli use of coercive diplomacy did not succeed in reaching a final agreement in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. It is significant to examine the American-Israeli policies towards the Palestinians within the internationally accepted peace framework based on Resolutions 242, 338, coercive diplomacy has been the most popular foreign policy tool of American and Israeli authorities ever since the Americans took the leading 3rd party role.

It is important to note that Arafat had advised to have a pre-negotiating session before the Camp David summit to ensure some success for the summit.¹⁸

Although the theory of coercive diplomacy already appeared in the 1970s (Alexander George), there is a need to develop this theory further and apply it to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, coercive diplomacy was never applied to the negotiations peace process in the Middle East. It was found that linking coercion to negotiation is of crucial importance as it explained the several failures that took place; moreover, coercive diplomacy is active out of the negotiating framework; this mechanism is active in negotiations and as a foreign policy option, this was clearly illustrated in the Palestinian/Israel case since 1991.

“Coercive diplomacy presents a demonstrative manner in controlled increments to induce the opponent to revise calculations and agree to a mutually acceptable termination of the conflict.¹⁹”

This definition for coercive diplomacy is close to the carrot and stick approach as a non-military political strategy for resolving or reconciling a conflict of interests together with the opponent.

In his work *Arms and Influence*²⁰ of 1966, Thomas Schelling talks about “diplomacy of violence,” in reference to coercive diplomacy but Richard Goodwin, a former policy adviser of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, expresses criticism. Goodwin claims that systematic theory is impossible to apply since a decision maker acts without knowing all relevant facts and is uncertain of how other political actors perceive them in any situation. Alexander, Hall, and Simons disagree with Goodwin in their publication of 1971. They argue that Goodwin misunderstood the nature of “systematic

¹⁶ George W. Bush, Rab Bush, and Folger, JP, *The Promise of Mediation: Responding to Conflict Through Empowerment and Recognition*, San Francisco, 1994, pp. 229–249.

¹⁷ J. G. Merrills, *International Dispute Settlement*, 3rd edit. Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 27.

¹⁸ Akram Hanyeh, *The Camp David Papers*, Al-Ayyam Newspaper, Ram-Allah, August 2000.

¹⁹ George L. Alexander, David K. Hall, and Simons E William, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, Little, Brown and Company, 1971 p. 18.

²⁰ Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1966.

theory” due to the belief that it seeks to provide detailed and confident prescriptions for decision makers concerning actions that may arise.

By advancing the theory of “the missing component,” Dean Acheson argues that problems will be solved as soon as policymakers discover the “missing component.” The art of finding the missing component lies in being aware of all potential elements in a particular situation and determining whether new increments would make a critical difference. The use of coercive diplomacy is a risky decision since judgments are made under multiple uncertainties, inadequate knowledge, and the pressure of the situation. Therefore, coercive diplomacy should be flexible in following the national interests of the coercing power.²¹ This strategy is inadequate for a short-term practice of power in order to achieve political objectives. Moreover, coercion diplomacy is often employed in a limited, selective manner which frequently results in threats. The strategy of coercive diplomacy calls for using just enough force to demonstrate resolution in order to protect well-defined interests and present the credibility of one’s determination to use even more power if necessary.²²

Coercive diplomacy as part of the negotiating process did not attract authors on the conflict, the modern era, attempts to theorize coercion have developed an abstract character, focussing on game theory and bargaining. By relying on historical experiences, authors linked bargaining to coercion rather than using coercion as a material for further developments of the theory. As a result, modern theorists had to rediscover many things that were known to policymakers in an earlier era.²³ In my study, I link coercive diplomacy to negotiations on the basis of recent experiences that enable me to identify the key variables of the theory and to formulate them in a comprehensive way.

1.2 The Carrot and Stick Approach

The feasibility of this strategy depends on whether one relies solely on negative sanctions or whether one combines threats with inducements to achieve their objectives. The first version does not provide the use of the carrot as well as the stick. It only offers face-saving gestures to the opponent.²⁴ This theory ignores the possibility that, in any given situation, coercive diplomacy may be facilitated by certain concessions to an opponent as part of a “quid pro quo” that secures one’s demands.²⁵ The carrot and stick approach adds a dimension of coercive diplomacy to the levels of negotiation and

²¹ Ibid, p. 15.

²² This strategy, however, is viable only under certain conditions and is quite challenging to implement successfully since it highly depends on the context. Many risks and unexpected consequences may erupt. Although the theory of coercive diplomacy is not hard to understand, an explicit definition is crucial. Unfortunately, the now oversimplified theory is hardly anywhere systematically articulated but deemed an important strategy for statecraft and diplomatic theories.

²³ Ibid, p. 22.

²⁴ George, *The Limits*, Ibid, p. 25.

²⁵ Ibid. means an advantage given in exchange for another.

bargaining. In such a strategy, the carrot can be anything the target of coercion values. The process of negotiating is far too complex for any theory to capture all possible intricacies of negotiations. Considering the distributive bargaining style as a zero-sum game, one party gains at the expense of the other. What Diana Tribe calls the cooperative approach is a situation in which each party makes concessions in the anticipation that the opponent will reciprocate. The parties will then proceed to compromise solutions.²⁶ John Nash also developed an axiomatic model of bargaining for the cooperative model.²⁷ When a group expects a reward for their increased contributions, according to the theory of productivity bargaining, an expected win-win outcome may result in a lose-lose situation. Without the combination of the opportunities, the political will of the leaders, and the facilitation of the mediators, it is hard to pre-estimate any possibility for peace. “You can’t do it without the leaders and you cannot do it with the leaders and without the negotiators.”²⁸ Gilead Sher insists that negotiators can work and agree on almost everything, but when it comes to decision making, the leaders take responsibility. Sometimes leaders made secret deals and then try to persuade their respective sides to accept them. Achieving an agreement among the opponents is problematic. Too many concessions can lead to a destabilized position of the leader and may result in their death.²⁹ The Palestinian president, Arafat³⁰ did not want to follow in the footsteps of those who have been murdered for their calls for peace, such as Yitzhak Rabin,³¹ Israeli Prime Minister, who was assassinated by an Israeli fundamentalist after signing the Oslo agreement in 1995. The same fate shared Folke Bernadotte, Count of Wisborg and appointed U.N. mediator in Palestine. A radical Zionist movement assassinated him in Jerusalem after his first report. Coercive diplomacy, therefore, needs to be distinguished from mere coercion itself since it includes additional levels of bargaining, negotiating, threatening, and agreeing on compromises. It becomes harder for the more powerful party to formulate the *carrot and stick* strategy due to the opponent’s reluctance to do what is demanded. Americans and Israelis underestimated this point when they did not expect the Palestinians rejection. The defending power must therefore consider the opponent’s motivation to resist what is demanded of him. The central question of coercive diplomacy is how a threat alone or combined with inducement persuade an opponent to comply with demands.

²⁶ Diana Tribe, *Negotiation: Essential Legal Skills*, Cavendish Publishing Limited, 1993, p. 5.

²⁷ Roth E Alvin, *Game-Theoretical Models of Bargaining*, Cambridge University Press, 1985, p. 1.

²⁸ Interview with Gilead Sher “the Israeli chief negotiator”, Jerusalem, January, 2004.

²⁹ David Rees, and Christine Porter, *The Skills of Management*, Thomson learning, 5th edit, 2001, pp. 350–351.

³⁰ Yasser Arafat, President (from 1996) of the Palestinian Authority, chairman (from 1969) of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

³¹ Yitzhak Rabin, Israeli Prime Minister 1992–95; signed Oslo accords with the PLO.

2. Case Study (Camp David 2000)

2.1 Foreword to the Israeli-Palestinian Camp David Talks 2000

For two weeks, Israelis and Palestinians ate, drank, walked, and laughed together in the process of finalising a peace deal at the Camp David summit, far from the eyes of media and critical forces within their own communities. The two sides were brought together by Bill Clinton, whose team created the framework of what became known as the failed Camp David talks. Previous negotiations via secret channels led to the failure, we are referring to the Stockholm channels, which will be examined under the Swedish track. Madeline Albright, the U.S. Secretary of State, invited both sides to the Camp David summit to negotiate the final status issues. In June 1996, the final status negotiations were first discussed during Prime Minister Shimon Peres' government in Taba negotiations. Benjamin Netanyahu, former and current Israeli Prime Minister, succeeded Peres in 1996 and refused to meet Arafat, which put the final status on hold for three and a half years. When in 1999 Barak won the election, he made the Syrian track his priority. Thus, the final status negotiations were not further explored until April 2000.

2.2 The Swedish Track

During much of April and May 2000, several meetings were held between representatives of the Palestinian and Israeli side.³² These meetings led to the preparatory talks for the Swedish track. The leaders of both sides appointed a Palestinian-Israeli team,³³ which tried to facilitate negotiations by removing some issues from the agenda. The decision on these issues was left to the leaders. Thus, a soft approach was adopted.

In three long weekends, as Gilead Sher later observed, a mandate was practically exploited, and this was what the leaders who were in Stockholm brought to Camp David where Arafat and the other members of the Palestinian team had no idea about the promises which were discussed in Sweden.³⁴ Instead of an approach to the final status issues (territory, borders, settlements, Jerusalem, the old city, refugees, and security arrangements), there were discussions over breaking down Jerusalem into pits and pieces and to swap more lands in the West Bank. Sandy Berger, the national security adviser for Clinton, went to the Middle East two months before the summit to discuss the Beilin-Abu Mazen understandings of 1995.³⁵ Although Abu-Mazen rid himself of any responsibility regarding these

³² Former Palestinian Prime Minister, Abu Ala, and current President and former Palestinian Prime Minister, Abu Mazen, met former Israeli Minister of foreign affairs, Shlomo Bin Ami, and former Israeli Minister of Tourism, Amnon Shahak.

³³ Arafat appointed Abu Ala, Hasan Asfour, Mohamed Dahlan, and Khaled Sallam. Barak appointed Gilead Sher and Shlomo Bin Ami.

³⁴ Interview with Gilead Sher, the chief Israeli negotiator during Barak's administration in Jerusalem, January 4th 2004.

³⁵ During an Interview with Abu Mazen, the former Palestinian Prime Minister, Ram-Allah, August 14th 2004, Abu Mazen said: "Israelis and Americans insist that I took part in these understandings but that is not true."

understandings, they may be considered, to some extent, as the basis for Camp David. The issues discussed in Stockholm already were explored at Camp David. The outcome of the Swedish talks was similar to the Clinton proposal that came five months later. Like any other Israeli leader, Barak thought that the expectations and ambitions of the Palestinians were limited and assumed they would be satisfied with an offer of maximum 86 percent of the land.

Since nothing was published about the Swedish track, this paper argues, that Barak's ambitions were probably based on the information he received from the Palestinian team in Sweden. Abu Mazen agrees with my doubts that the Palestinian team approved the Israeli demands which were presented later at the summit. Right after he stopped the Stockholm channels which were kept secret. Barak urged Shlomo Bin Ami to inform his Palestinian counterpart about his ideas. He refused to reveal his intentions unless a trilateral summit would be held in the USA.³⁶

By the end of day one, the refugees' committee³⁷, the security and borders committee³⁸, and the Jerusalem committee³⁹ had been established with the consensus of the two leaders. Janine Higgins emphasizes that in the third stage of mediation, when the barriers to resolution are removed, the mediator can encourage the parties to defer areas of disagreement and proceed to another point.⁴⁰ On the third day of the summit, Albright notified some delegates that the American team intended to present a paper, which evaluates points of agreement and disagreement between the disputed positions.⁴¹ The Palestinian delegation rejected the paper the Americans proposed and responded with letter, stating that the proposal contradicts the terms of reference of the peace process. It was suggested, for instance, to postpone the question of Jerusalem, which was against the demands of the Palestinian delegation: "We reject any ideas or papers that do not address the issue of Jerusalem and the Palestinian delegation will leave Camp David immediately."⁴² The Americans quickly responded with Clinton declaring "The paper is null and void."

Abu Ala expressed the Palestinians' disappointment about the American support of the Israeli ideas and expressed his concerns about the role of Clinton to Albright: "The man who was in the office is not the US President, he is a mediator, and he is not neutral." As a result, Clinton altered his attitude, and started to eat and joke with the Palestinians in order to express equity.⁴³

³⁶ Interview with Abu Ala, the Palestinian Prime Minister, Abu Dis, Jerusalem, July 8, 2004.

³⁷ Headed by Nabil Shaath and Abu Mazen.

³⁸ Headed by Abu Ala, Mohammed Dahlan and Hasan Asfour.

³⁹ Headed by Yasser Abd Rabu and Saeb Erakat.

⁴⁰ Macfarlane, *Ibid*, p. 364.

⁴¹ The paper is based on observations during the committee meetings held between the two disputed sides with the mediation of the Americans.

⁴² Quotes from the Palestinian chief negotiator's personal minutes (Saeb Erakat) on the Camp David summit.

⁴³ Interview with Abu Ala in Abu Dis, Jerusalem, July 8, 2004.

The time of Clinton's departure to attend the summit of the industrial countries in Okinawa, Japan, was getting closer. For Clinton, the Monica Lewinsky scandal, which seriously endangered his presidency, was turned into a win situation through his determination, excellent communication skills and the ideal economic situation he brought to the USA. Peace in the Middle East became like a golden trophy Clinton dreamed of winning. With the advice of Albright, Ross, and Berger, Clinton believed he was capable of achieving a solution at Camp David, something the whole world had failed to accomplish. The Clinton Administration did not want to admit defeat when they received a letter by the Palestinians on the morning of Wednesday the 19th at Aspen (Clinton's cabin), indicating the end of the road. Therefore, Clinton started to lure Arafat with statehood, telling him that "There will be a Palestinian state recognised by USA and Israel." Arafat responded:

Thank you, the state of Palestine has existed since the days of the British mandate, and even if most of its territories were occupied still, the legitimacy of its existence is present in the UN resolutions.⁴⁴

2.3 Coercive Diplomacy at Its Best

What then followed was the gradual implementation of coercive diplomacy. Due to the failure of promising the Palestinians statehood, the Americans tried to convince them to accept the deal by offering support and incentives. Moreover, Clinton promised substantial financial support from the G-8 members for any agreement between the sides. This offer seemed satisfying and would cover the reconstruction of the Palestinian infrastructure and provide compensation for the destruction.⁴⁵ Here, the Americans started to use the carrot and stick approach. In their role of the mediator, the Americans presented an extensive financial aid package in the form of a sugar-coated threat. The Palestinians thanked the Americans for their kindness but urged them to focus on the main issues first. The Americans then resorted to another form of coercive diplomacy when Clinton spent two days with pushing Arab leaders to pressure Arafat. He tried to present a positive image of the summit and assured his interlocutors that significant progress was already made, but he also asserted that Arafat rejected generous solutions regarding the Jerusalem question.⁴⁶

Since the Palestinians were aware of Clinton's strategy, Nabil Shaath also communicated regularly with the Arab leaders and international parties to inform them about the incidents at the summit.⁴⁷ The Israelis stayed in contact with powerful members of Israeli politics and influential American Jews. Coercive diplomacy was very clearly witnessed when Clinton threatened Arafat to personally

⁴⁴ Minutes for Saeb Erakat, the chief Palestinian negotiator.

⁴⁵ Interview with Prime Minister Abu Ala', Abu Dis, Jerusalem July, 8 2004.

⁴⁶ Interview with Akram Hanyeh, Ram Allah.

⁴⁷ The list included "Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Russia, Algeria, United Arab Emirates, Syria, Lebanon, and the European union representative."

wash his hands off the peace efforts, but Clinton remembered that he could not arrive at the summit in Japan with disappointment and failure behind him.

As a result of Clinton's departure, Barak isolated himself for two days in his cabin, Dogwood, where he only met Danny Yatom or Gilead Sher. Abu Ala suggests three possible interpretations of Barak's isolation: Barak's antisocial behaviour might have been a way to express his disappointed expectations. It is also possible that his isolation was a negotiating technique to pressure the Palestinians in order to reach a deal. On the other hand, Barak is known for his ethnocentric individualistic personality.⁴⁸

2.4 No Responsibility for Refugees

The meetings at Camp David were held on a bilateral basis since each party talked to Clinton as the mediator. No serious trilateral discussions were scheduled. Clinton did not even seem aware of the refugee problem. Abu Mazen explained that this problem refers to those Palestinians who were forced to leave their homes during the war in 1948. According to United Nations statistics, 950,000 people were involved in this expulsion. The Palestinians' demands regarding the refugees were passed through Clinton as follows:

- The right of every Palestinian refugee to return home in accordance with UN resolution 194.
- Establishing mechanisms to implement this right, by starting with the return of refugees from Lebanon due to their miserable living conditions.
- Recognition of the right to return and the mechanism, followed by compensation.

At Camp David Israel tried to absolve itself of responsibility for the creation of the refugee problem and its solution. Nevertheless, the Israelis were prepared to allow a gradual return of thousands of refugees over several years within, what they called, "family reunification" and for "humanitarian reasons." Moreover, they expressed a willingness to establish an international compensation fund that would also recompensate expelled Jews from Arab countries.

Thus, the Israelis used coercion with regards to the refugee issue when they tried to distance themselves from responsibility. With the Trump administration, we are witnessing dictations towards the Palestinians; when Trump decided to cut aid on UNRWA, he automatically ignored the entire refugees issue. The Palestinian response is clear, the issue of refugees is a serious final status issue and no peace deal can ever be concluded without a just and fair solution based on Res. 194 is reached.

⁴⁸ Minutes of a meeting between Barak and Abu Mazen on the 11 June 2000, as Abu Mazen states, Ross had a statement speaking about Barak "*he is a man who believes that he could do everything by his own and that his trust of anyone does not exist.*"

2.5 The Holy City: Is Jerusalem off the Table?

Israel annexed East Jerusalem after the war in 1967. Settlements led to the city's isolation from the West Bank. Barak intended to persuade Arafat to waive most of East Jerusalem in exchange for civilian control over some of the populated Arab neighborhoods of the city. However, Barak was not willing to give full sovereignty over any part of the old walled city, which is highly regarded by millions of Muslims, Christians, and Arabs, since the Palestinians and the PLO have been considering Jerusalem as their future capital for a long time. Regarding the issue of Jerusalem, the Americans were dedicated to reaching a final agreement, although they did not develop any concept. On the first day of the summit in a meeting with Erakat and Arafat, Clinton said: "I do not know how to solve the Jerusalem issue." The essential part of the role of a mediator is to encourage the parties' confidence in the reconciliation procedure to restore their trust and energy for the negotiations.⁴⁹ Therefore, Clinton's statement must have been disappointing for the Palestinian side. These incidents reveal that the summit was inadequately planned and prepared. However, after a series of meetings, a final proposal regarding Jerusalem was laid out:

- A committee of the Security Council and the Moroccan King would grant the state of Palestine "sovereign custody" of the Haram (Dome of the rock), while Israel would retain "residual sovereignty."
- The Muslim and Christian quarters of the old city would belong to Palestinian sovereignty. The Jewish and Armenian quarters would be under Israeli sovereignty.
- The Palestinians would have functional jurisdiction in what was called the internal neighbourhoods: Musrarah, Wadi Al Joz, Sheikh Jarrah, Ras Al Amoud, Al Tour, Al Suwanneh, and Salah el-Din Street.
- Palestinian sovereignty would extend to the external neighbourhoods of Jerusalem.
- A special regime would be adopted regarding the old city.

Clinton urged Erakat to present this proposal to "his leader," but Erakat answered immediately: "I can give you the answer now," he continued "President Arafat instructed me not to accept anything less than Palestinian sovereignty on all areas of Jerusalem occupied in 1967, and at the forefront, Al Haram Al-Sharif."⁵⁰

Clinton, nonetheless, insisted on his request, and Erakat returned to the Birch cabin to read the proposal to the president and his delegation. The Palestinian participants were now certain that the United States adopted the Israeli position regarding Jerusalem. At 1:00 a.m., Erakat read out the

⁴⁹ Eillen Carroll, and Karl Mackie, *International Mediation: the art of business diplomacy*, Kluwer Law International, 2000, p. 78.

⁵⁰ For detailed division of Jerusalem, see the map in the Camp David proposal for the old city.

Palestinian's response to the proposal and the whole summit. In this letter, the Palestinian delegation valued President Clinton's efforts and expressed their hopes for continuing the negotiations. They, moreover, emphasized the importance of international law and UN resolutions as the basis for any agreement.

2.6 The Honest Mediator: Coercion Vs Dictation

A mediator should loosen the tensions which might have developed in the course of a dispute and create an atmosphere that supports further negotiation.⁵¹ In contrast, the Americans deviated from that mediating technique by taking the side of one negotiating partner instead leading both parties to an agreement.

William Quandt comments on Camp David:

In the light of the difficulty of resolving the issues in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it required more than friendly persuasion. A real restructuring of incentives through active mediation and the use of the carrot and stick was needed.⁵²

Actions do not always speak louder than words. After those long exhausting moments the negotiators had experienced at Camp David, Clinton met Arafat to tell him that if he refuses to sign the deal, bilateral relations would be frozen, the Congress would stop any support allocated to the Palestinians, and the United States would withdraw from the peace process. "If you do not answer affirmatively to this proposal, it will be proof that you are not interested in real peace. In such a situation, Ehud Barak will declare war on you and we will support him."⁵³

Arafat replied to Clinton's threat:

If anyone imagines that I might sign away Jerusalem, he is mistaken. I am not only the leader of the Palestinian people, but I am also the Vice-President of the Islamic conference, and I also defend the rights of Christians. I will not sell Jerusalem. And I will not allow for a delay on discussions on Jerusalem, not even for a minute. You say the Israelis moved forward. They are occupiers. They are not being generous: they are not giving from their pockets; they are giving from our land. I am only asking that UN resolution 242 be implemented. I am only speaking about 22% of Palestine, Mr. President.⁵⁴

⁵¹ Merrills, *International Dispute Settlement*, 1998.

⁵² Quandt, *Ibid*, p. 376.

⁵³ As cited in Tanya Reinhart, *Israel/ Palestine: how to end the war of 1948*, Seven Stories Press, 2002, p. 212. Coated from Ma'ariv, January 4, 2001.

⁵⁴ Conversations quoted from the personal minutes of the Palestinian chief negotiator Saeb Erakat.

Clinton: You have what is reasonable and what you can live with. You can establish "a sovereign presidential compound" for you and the Palestinian state next to Al Aqsa mosque.

Arafat: So there will be a small island surrounded by Israeli soldiers who control the entrances. This is not what we ask for. We are asking for full Palestinian sovereignty on Jerusalem occupied in 1967.

Clinton: You did not present anything. The Israelis took initiative regarding Jerusalem.

Arafat: Do you want to attend my funeral? I will not relinquish Jerusalem and the holy places.

Clinton: I respect your steadfastness; you are a believer.

In an interview on Israeli television on July 28, 2000, Clinton expressed his support for Barak again and warned Arafat not to think of a unilateral declaration of statehood. He, moreover, threatened to consider a transfer of the American embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.⁵⁵

The Americans abandoned the summit by announcing its failure. Clinton continued to blame Arafat for the failure. In his recent book, Clinton claims that “Arafat made a historical error.”⁵⁶

Conclusions

Both sides of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process need enthusiasm and a realist approach to reach a compromise. After realizing how disastrous the situation is, a zero-sum game will not lead to a solution. Mediation is ineffective in situations where any solution requires one side to abandon its primary objective for which they receive comparatively little in return. The gulf between the Palestinian and Israeli positions is not too wide to be bridged, but mediation is subjected to the same limitations as other means of dispute settlement. Mediation can be as effective as the parties wish it to be.

Therefore, a well-timed frame of mediation should be preferred and considered over an open negotiating peace process in order to avoid wasting more time and energy. There must be greater independence of American decision making. Previously, they were not strict enough with Israeli settlement politics. The American administration is not the ideal mediator for the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations since America is considered to be the major ally for Israel. *The Associated Press* reported:

In a major policy shift, the US told the Security Council that it will only consider Middle East resolutions that explicitly condemn Palestinian terrorism and call on both sides to pursue a political settlement.⁵⁷

Therefore, it is time for an international consortium, a multi-party group, acting as a third party collectively to guarantee unbiased and more neutral approaches.

Most of the peace talks were too general while others lacked in clarity and details. A permanent status agreement should not be a document that declares vague political principles. Instead, a comprehensive instrument that spells out details, modalities, maps, and timetables with a scheduled end of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict must be developed. By taking the “final status issues,” namely the Jerusalem and refugee questions, off the negotiation table, the Trump administration expanded the coercive diplomacy approach of the Clinton administration to an even more biased level of dictation since the threats were not only verbally suggested to the Palestinians but also imposed as new facts

⁵⁵ Quandt, *Ibid*, p. 367.

⁵⁶ Clinton’s response in an interview with Al Arabiyeh TdecIV channel, on Wednesday, June 30, 2004.

⁵⁷ As cited in Dishonest Broker, p. 203; reported in *The Associated Press* on July 26, 2002.

on the grounds. Lastly, the role of the international community must have a stronger effect. Explicit and useful international implementation guarantees must back the Permanent Status Agreement in order to work efficiently.

The non-success of reaching an agreement at Camp David was the result of the improvised American-Israeli strategies imposed on the Palestinians. Although no agreement was achieved at Camp David, any further negotiations would be based on these talks. This clearly was the case at Taba summit. Studying the initiatives that arose after Camp David prove its importance as a foundation for any possible deal.

Both the Palestinians and Israelis faced sacrifices. When abstaining from an inch of the occupied land is an enormous compromise for the Israelis, returning the promised land, where the Israeli people lived two thousand years ago, seems impossible. On the other hand, the Palestinians have lived in the entire land until 1948. They were driven out of their homes, tortured, lost rights and property, and became refugees all over the world. With the foundation of Gush Shalom, an Israeli human rights organisation, the Palestinian side agreed to renounce 78 percent of their parents' homeland. This agreement was a great compromise since they acknowledged the state of the occupier with over three quarters of the land.

The second half of the 1990s was marked by a conflict between old enemies and efforts to bring peace to the world's troubled spots. The Middle East peace process suffered a series of delays and breakdowns. There was still hope that a final agreement would be reached. Israel withdrew its forces from southern Lebanon in 2000, and later that year, Clinton arranged a summit at Camp David between Barak and Arafat. Despite far-reaching concessions on both sides, the summit was not successful. Meanwhile, Ariel Sharon, the new Likud party leader, visited the Temple Mount "Al Aqsa Mosque" in Jerusalem and thus emphasized Israeli sovereignty over the city. This symbolic act sparked Palestinian protests and the worst violence in the region within decades. As the fighting intensified, Barak came under increasing domestic pressure and called an early election. Sharon's victory in February 2001 signaled a more cautious Israeli approach to the peace process. Instead of waiting for an American/Israeli or international peace plan, Arafat and the Palestinian National Authority embarked on a process of political reform that would help them formulate a one-vision for any deal as it was clear that there existed a number of Palestinian voices especially with the overlap between the Palestinian Liberation Organisation on one hand and the Palestinian National Authority on the other.

Although Clinton announced that the summit ended without an agreement, at least the core issues have finally been discussed at the highest level. During all his speeches with regards to the summit,

Clinton did not use the term 'failure', therefore, despite the use of the term "failure," we find no failure at those talks. The parties agreed that some progress was made on the challenging issues of Jerusalem, settlement, borders, refugees, and security. The summit at Camp David opened the final status files, but the real progress was made in secret negotiations after the summit in Jerusalem, followed by the Clinton parameters. The most significant progress regarding the final status issues was, however, reached in Taba. If the talks would have been perceived as mere negotiating rather than decision making, Camp David could have achieved a lot more than it did.

Recommendations

This year, the Middle East has witnessed great senior diplomatic visits. Not only did most of the international delegations include Jerusalem into their tours, but also regional capitals on their way to the holy land. Considering the statements and news after those visits, it is obvious today that Netanyahu is lobbying for a regional settlement. The question of what kind of a regional settlement he intends remains.

Additional threats from Iran undermine the efforts towards a final peace settlement between Palestine and Israel. Any peaceful settlement can only be executed in consideration of international law and UNGA & SC resolutions 242, 338, 2334, 194, etc., which are reference for the peace talks that started twenty-six years ago in Madrid. Reflecting those diplomatic efforts and the signing of the Oslo Accords in Washington twenty-five years ago, two essential circumstances cannot be ignored:

1. The Two-State Solution

All international actors repeat and reconfirm their commitment to the Two-States solution. The Israeli state is already recognized at large since 1948 and it is important to clarify that the PLO, the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people had recognized Israel since 1993.

Nowadays, the hope for the two-state solution is diminishing regarding the continuous settlement expansions. Thus, the establishment of a Palestinian state on the 1967 borderline seems impossible.

Although the Israelis have repeated their commitment to a peaceful settlement, neither the Prime Minister nor his ministers or any Israeli official would dare to acknowledge the state of Palestine or the right of self-determination for the Palestinian people on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as the capital. To conclude, leaders on both sides, as well as the international community, failed to deliver the promises and aspirations that arose with the announcement of the peace process. After twenty-five years of advocating for the two-state solution, the loss of hope will only lead to extremism and violence. Therefore, it is long overdue for all parties involved to demonstrate their commitment to this solution by recognizing the Palestinian state. If they proceed to ignore the Palestinian statehood, the Palestinians will continue to live within the Israeli state where they face racist

treatments on a daily basis. By passing the Jewish Nation-State Bill by the Knesset in 2018, the one state Israel granted rights only for Jews and neglected the rights of any other minority.⁵⁸ It is crucial to note that the bill didn't specify the borders of the Jewish state but includes the West Bank and lands as part of the Jewish state of 1967.

2. A Regional Settlement

Following Netanyahu's shuttle diplomacy efforts all around the globe, it is evident that he is lobbying for a regional settlement that accommodates his interests. Israel is putting every effort possible to convince the whole world that a Middle Eastern alliance against Iran, which they consider the origin of terror and fear in the region, is the best solution that would lead to peace in the region, ignoring the need to settle the Palestinian/Israeli conflict as a first step.

It is worth mentioning that in 2002, the Arab League proposed the Arab Peace Initiative, which was an attempt for reconciliation between all Arab states and Israel in return for an independent Palestinian state, based on the borders of 1967 with East Jerusalem as the capital (in reference to UNSC resolutions and a fair and just solution to refugees and lands). The self-rule under the Palestinian Authority that we witness today in Palestine is no longer sustainable. The Israelis continue to confiscate land to expand illegal settlements⁵⁹ while the international community remains silent with no action to deter the Israeli policies and military orders. If Netanyahu insists on refusing the practical two-state solution, he leaves the peace process with two options: one state with two political systems that would lead to a situation close to apartheid which will not be accepted by Arabs or Palestinians. The other option is a democratic state for all people within the one-state solution which is not in the interest of the Israelis. Netanyahu's regional approach is dangerous since it focuses on the exclusion of Iran from the Arab/Israeli peace process. With this strategy, he tries to persuade world leaders that if this alliance establishes, peace will flourish.

In contrast, this paper proposes a new regional approach to the conflict that is inspired by the Arab Peace Initiative. It is recommended to start with the identification of the borders of Israel and acknowledging the state of Palestine with the borders of 1967 as agreed internationally. According to the Arab Peace Initiative, this regional approach will guarantee Israel peaceful and normalized relations with the Arab neighbours and bring security to the region. Reaching a fair and just resolution to the Palestinian/Israeli conflict would then open the door for more regional reconciliation efforts of other disputes. If states will not act soon, the one-state solution seems to be a last resort. This process should then include a democratic state with equal rights regardless of religion or race.

⁵⁸ Almost two million Palestinians are citizens inside Israel and the law neglects their citizen rights. <https://knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/BasicLawNationState.pdf>.

⁵⁹ Illegality of settlements in guarded in numerous UN resolutions and lastly UNSC Res. 2334.

Finally, one might disagree with some of what the paper tried to illustrate. However, it is too early to write a definitive history of every aspect of these talks. Indeed, it is urgent to learn the lessons from recent history. Therefore, such lessons are drawn from plausible objective interpretation of this case study, and as Jacob Burckhardt points out: “the true use of history is not to make men more clever for the next time but to make them wiser forever.”⁶⁰

Bibliography

- Hanyeh, A 2000, ‘The Camp David Papers’, *Al-Ayyam Newspaper, Ram-Allah*, August, p.
- Iriqat, D 2004, *Limitations of Coercive Diplomacy: Camp David 2000, a case study*, London.
- Lesh, D W 2003, *The Middle East and the United States*, 3rd edn, West View Press.
- Rees, D & Porter, C 2001, *The Skills of Management*, 5th edn, Thomson.
- Tribe, D 1993, *Negotiation: Essential Legal Skills*, Cavendish Publishing.
- Carroll, E & Mackie, K 2000, *International Mediation: the art of business diplomacy*, Kluwer Law International.
- Alexander, G L, Hall, D K & William, S E 1971, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, Little, Brown and Company.
- Bush, G W, Bush, R & Folger, J P 1994, *The Promise of Mediation: Responding to Conflict Through Empowerment and Recognition*, San Francisco.
- Macfarlane, J 1997, *Rethinking Disputes: The Mediation Alternative*, Cavendish Publishing Limited.
- Merrills, J G 1998, *International Dispute Settlement*, 3rd edn, Cambridge University Press.
- Alvin, R E 1985, *Game-Theoretical Models of Bargaining*, Cambridge University Press.
- Reinhart, T 2002, *Israel/ Palestine: how to end the war of 1948*, Seven Stories Press.
- Schelling, T 1966, *Arms and Influence*, New Haven, Yale University Press.

Interviews conducted



- Interview with Gilead Sher, chief Israeli negotiator during Barak's administration in Jerusalem, January 4, 2004.
- Interview with Abu Mazen, former Palestinian Prime Minister, Ram-Allah, August 14, 2004.
- Interview with Abu Ala, Palestinian Prime Minister, Abu Dis, Jerusalem, July 8, 2004.
- Personal minutes of Saeb Erakat, Palestinian chief negotiator, on the Camp David summit.

⁶⁰ Quoted in *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, p. 251.

Camp David July 2000


Israeli Proposal for the Palestinian State at Camp David II

Published in 'Le Monde Diplomatique', December 2000



<http://www.nad-plo.org/images/maps/jpeg/campdavid.jpg>

Projection of the West Bank Final Status Map presented by Israel, Camp David, July 2000



http://www.passia.org/palestine_facts/MAPS/wbgs_campdavid.html

Migration in the Bible and the Quran

An Analysis from a Religious Studies Perspective

Abstract

The purpose of this study is to analyze the portrayals of migration by means of examples of the fundamental narratives of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Since migration is mostly perceived as negative, namely as either a humanitarian crisis or a threat to the socio-economic and political well-being as well as a threat to the cultural heritage, I will show that migration is overall understood as something positive both in the holy scriptures and in the history of the above-mentioned religions. For them, migration paves the way for security, prosperity, peace and offers an abundance of potential for the socio-economic and cultural development of the hosts.

Introduction

Migration and flight are two strongly growing topics in modern academic research,¹ especially since the aftermath of the so-called “Arab spring” in 2011 and the millions of refugees coming from Africa and the Middle East to Europe.² Being a scholar of religious studies, I am interested in historical and contemporary scholarship on religion related to migration. As Jacqueline Maria Hagan points out, a “growing number of studies in the Africa-EU and Latin America-US migratory systems have demonstrated the central role of religion in the decision-making and journey stages of the migration undertaking (Hagan 2013, p. 261).” At the same time, migration “also transforms institutional religious practices in communities of origin” (Hagan 2013, p. 261). However, according to Hagan, this field focuses mainly on the question of “how religious institutions help immigrants face the challenges of adaptation to a new land” (Hagan 2013, p. 263). Since I am not a specialist in migration research, my aim with this paper is not to contribute to the highly specialized research debate but to analyze portrayals of migration employing a few fundamental narrative examples of the three monotheistic religions prevalent in Europe, (North) Africa, and the Middle East. It will be necessary to determine whether perceptions of various narratives concerning migration of individuals or of entire groups are presented differently than it is often the case in today’s Western societies and

¹ The distinction between flight and migration and the highly difficult concept of forced migration q.v. (Ther 2017: 17–18). According to Ther, flight always occurs under (direct or indirect) coercion and under the use of force or the threat to use it. Direct coercion implies the involvement of weapons or physical assault. Indirect coercion means that people fear violence and badly deteriorated living conditions.

² The sheer mass of people is beyond imagination. Approximately half of the Syrian population has fled. According to UNHCR 6.3 million Internally Displaced People (IDP) within Syria and another 6.3 Million people left Syria (<https://www.uno-fluechtlingshilfe.de/fluechtlinge/zahlen-fakten/>) – before the war Syria had twenty-one million inhabitants (Ther 2017: 294f.). At the end of 2017, UNHCR counted 68.5 million people fleeing worldwide.

therefore evaluated in differing ways. Even from a religious studies perspective, the discourse on the historical authenticity of these narratives of migration does not necessarily need to be examined here. Instead, it is crucial that they are a historical or at least meaningful (*sinnstiftend*) facts for a significant part of the world's population, particularly for members of a religious denomination in Europe, Africa and the Middle East.

To begin with a few remarks: The term *migration* as used here is derived from the Latin word "migrare." In combination with different prefixes, this word produces several derivations, such as "immigrare" (to immigrate or to move in). However, in Roman historiography, this term is barely used to describe spatial population movements. The Romans only use it, "if they want to describe the spatial patterns of nomads."³ According to Oltmer, in antiquity, this issue referred to sedentariness and nomadism, which are as it were the two parts of states of people in which they lived. While sedentariness had a positive connotation as a civilizing norm, nomadism was either the form of life of the non-civilized, the so-called "barbarians" (from the Greco-Roman perspective), or the long-surmounted preform of the own civilization. Therefore, migration "emerged as an objectified paradigm of fear of regression and decline" (cit. apud Oltmer 2017, p. 9f.)⁴. Until today, this negative connotation of the term "migration" is dominant. According to Oltmer, migration is often understood

as the result of crises, catastrophes and deficiencies [...], and its consequences as a threat to security, prosperity, and social and cultural homogeneity. Migration thus appears as a risk that urgently needs restrictive political provision and follow-up care.⁵

Considering the perspective of religious narratives, I argue that migration must often be understood as a result of crises, catastrophes, and deficiencies. The consequences of migration, at least from the perspective of those affected, namely migrants, has been assessed as a success story or should be assessed as such.

Another remark is about the question of *why* becoming a migrant? According to migration research, migration in general as the motif of migration is dependent on multiple impulses, such as economic, social, political, religious and personal, which are "in different constellations with different

³ My translation according to Jochen Oltmer (2017: 9): "Wanderungen von Individuen und Familien sind kaum jemals Gegenstand antiker literarischer Texte, in aller Regel geht es um Bewegungen großer Kollektive. Antike Autoren gebrauchen »migrare« meist, wenn sie die räumlichen Muster von Nomaden beschreiben wollen."

⁴ My translation according to Oltmer (2017: 9f.): "Dieser Sachverhalt verweist auf die dichotomische Vorstellung der Antike von Sesshaftigkeit und Nomadismus: Sesshaftigkeit galt als zivilisatorische Norm, Nomadentum einerseits als Lebensform der nicht-zivilisierten Barbaren andererseits als längst überwundene Vorform der eigenen Zivilisation. Migration trat »als vergegenständlichtes Paradigma der Furcht von Regression und Niedergang« auf."

⁵ My translation according to Oltmer (2017: 12): "Bis in die Gegenwart wird Migration häufig als Ergebnis von Krisen, Katastrophen und Defiziten verstanden und ihre Folgen als Gefahr für Sicherheit, Wohlstand sowie gesellschaftliche und kulturelle Homogenität. Migration erscheint damit als Risiko, das dringend der restriktiven politischen Vor- und Nachsorge bedarf."

weighting.”⁶ This argument also applies mostly to the examples below. As a historical and cultural contrast to the religious narratives, I give a brief outline of the situation of humans before they became sedentary.

1. 1-Hunter-Gatherers: Migration as a Normal Condition

Nowadays, most people live in apartments or houses of which some are dozens or even hundreds of meters high. Those houses are parts of villages, towns, cities or even mega-cities like Tokyo-Yokohama with nearly 40 million inhabitants. But only for the last nine to ten thousand years, *Homo sapiens* have been living in village- or city-like structures. Jericho in modern-day Palestine or Çatalhöyük, which means something like “fork hill”, in modern-day Turkey are two of the oldest known settlements. The latter was probably not only the first mega-city (Cunliffe 2015, p. 43) but also culturally dependent on the oldest so far discovered temple structure Göbekli Tepe. The people from Çatalhöyük built the first settlements and later cities like Çatalhöyük because they already had built temples or centralized sanctuaries (*Zentralheiligtümer*) like Göbekli Tepe. Archaeologists have not found a single wooden house at Göbekli Tepe and therefore assume the site to be a temple or sanctuary. Göbekli Tepe consists of more than ten so far known pillar structure monuments like Stonehenge but roughly seven thousand years older. The diameter of the biggest building is thirty meters. Hunter-gatherers built the site with some pillars up to five meters high and weighing up to seven tons. (Harari 2014, p. 100; see also Schmidt 2000, pp. 46–49; see also Cunliffe 2015, p. 43). So how are early settlements and later mega-cities like Çatalhöyük related to Göbekli Tepe? The single crop *Einkorn* wheat, which is a domesticated form of wheat, was found just thirty kilometers from Göbekli Tepe. I agree with Israeli historian Yuval N. Harari, who assumes a connection between the site and the domesticated crop. (Harari 2014, p. 101; see also Schmidt 2001, p. 48).

It’s likely that the cultural centre of Göbekli Tepe was somehow connected to the initial domestication of wheat by humankind and of humankind by wheat. In order to feed the people who built and used the monumental structures, particularly large quantities of food were required. It may well be that foragers switched from gathering wild wheat to intense wheat cultivation, not to increase their normal food supply, but rather to support the building and running of a temple. In the conventional picture, pioneers first built a village, and when it prospered, they set up a temple in the middle. But Göbekli Tepe suggests that the temple may have been built first, and that a village later grew up around it. (Harari 2014, p. 101; see also Schmidt 2001, pp. 48–49)

⁶ My translation according to Oltmer (2017: 22): “Migrationsentscheidungen unterliegen in der Regel multiplen Antrieben. Meist sind wirtschaftliche, soziale, politische, religiöse und persönliche Motive in unterschiedlichen Konstellationen mit je verschiedenem Gewicht eng miteinander verflochten.”

Before the sedentism of humankind (*Sesshaftwerdung des Menschen*), which has taken place during the last ten thousand years, hunter-gatherers traveled the earth. Although it is still disputed how old *Homo sapiens* is, there is a strong agreement as to when they left East Africa and spread into Arabia, namely seventy thousand years ago. They came from the Middle East to East Asia sixty thousand years ago, over the Caucasus to Eastern Europe some forty-five thousand years ago, from there further to the west, from East Asia to Australia at the same time (45.000 B.C.E.), and finally over the Bering Strait to Alaska sixteen thousand years ago. Two thousand years later, *Homo sapiens* reached what today is the east of the USA, and after another two thousand years they conquered South America (Harari 2014, Chapter 1, Map 1). This development implies that since the so-called “Cognitive Revolution” during the last seventy thousand years, *Homo sapiens* traveled the world as hunter-gatherer 85.71 percent of that time. It was not before the *Agricultural Revolution*, that *Homo sapiens* settled, a circumstance we nowadays consider as “normal.” This development seems to be a success-story but in actuality it is not. Due to nutritional changes, humans consumed fewer vitamins, minerals, and “substantially less protein,” as Reza Aslan states (2018, p. 62). “No wonder that in most ancient agricultural societies, at least one out of every three children died before the age of twenty” (Aslan 2018, p. 62) In order to illustrate that the transition from hunting to farming was a bad bet, Aslan adds:

Surveys of ancient human skeletons show just how brutal the transition to agriculture was. Farmers were more susceptible than hunters to anemia and vitamin deficiency. They caught more infectious diseases and died younger. They had worse teeth and more broken bones, and they suffered from a host of what were fairly novel ailments, such as slipped discs, arthritis, and hernias. In fact, skeletons unearthed in and around the Ancient Near East indicate that in the first few thousand years of the Neolithic Revolution, humans lost an average of six inches in height, largely as a result of their inadequate diet. (Aslan 2018, pp. 62–63)

Considering contemporaneous studies in archaeology and anthropology, *Homo sapiens* did neither enter paradise through sedentism, nor found themselves in the Garden of Eden.

In monotheistic religions, there is a difference between being settled and the process of settling down in the future. On the one hand, it all begins in the Garden of Eden as the starting point of biblical tradition and, therefore, relevant to Rabbinic Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. On the other hand, one of the most crucial themes in the religion of Ancient Israel and its three succeeding monotheistic religions is to go somewhere and settle. Settling is often ordered by the divine. Those moments mark turning points in both the religious narrative and the actual (religious) history.

2. A Time Without Migration: Two Human Beings in a Steppe

In the narrative of the religion of Ancient Israel, God has placed humans in one place only once. (אישׁוּ). God, YHWH, formed man from the dust of soil and blew in his nostrils the spirit of life. And

the man became alive (Gen 2:7; וַיֵּצֵר יְהוָה אֱלֹהִים אֶת־הָאָדָם עֹפֶר מִן־הָאֲדָמָה וַיִּפַּח בְּאִפָּיו נִשְׁמַת חַיִּים וַיְהִי (הָאָדָם לִנְפֶשׁ חַיָּה). The material is from a not mentioned place. The text remains entirely unspecific here which did not seem problematic for the authors or editors of the Hebrew Bible. Notable is that God literally formed man and that he is alive. The abstract noun *'adāmāh* probably did not mean sandy but fertile soil, which in the socio-cultural context of the ancient Middle East indicates loamy soil. From a Hebrew-Biblical perspective, Adam (*'ādām*), the first human being, was red or more likely red brown; until today, the color red (*'adōm*) derives from the soil, *'adāmāh* in the Hebrew language.

After God formed man, he placed him in a garden in Eden. Eden (*'edān*) is a Sumerian loan word with the meaning of “steppe”, a rather inhospitable place where man can hardly live. At least, he would not lead a carefree life. The life of the man whom God formed, and who was different from the beasts which God also had formed, could not have lived a fulfilled life in Eden. Amidst a vast steppe, God planted a garden and led him, the man, into this garden (Gen 2:15) to work and protect it (לְעִבְדָּה וּלְשַׁמְרָה). Then God decided for the man (not the man himself) that it was better not to be alone (Gen 2:18) but among the animals no helper for Adam could be found (Gen 2: 19-20). Thus, YHWH builds a woman from one of Adam’s ribs. “And the man said: This, at last, is bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh; she shall be called Woman because she was taken out of Man” (Gen 2:23; וַיֹּאמֶר הָאָדָם זֹאת הַפֶּעַם עֵצָם מֵעֲצָמַי וּבֶשֶׁר מִבְּשָׂרִי לְזָאת יִקְרָא אִשָּׁה כִּי מֵאִישׁ לִקְחָהּ זֹאת). This is the beginning of the story of man, at least according to a tiny elite of a certain small people. However, this people became pretty successful considering that its religious branches count nearly a total of four billion people today.

The story of Adam and Eve continues with the occurrence of a snake. According to the Bible, male-female communication is not always characterized by mutual understanding, but for whatever reason, the snake and Eve found a common communication level. Eventually, Eve took the fruit from the tree of knowledge of good and evil (עֵץ הַדַּעַת טוֹב וְרָע) and ate it, which was a prohibited action by God. She shared the fruit with her companion, which exposed them to the wrath of God. Interestingly, Gen 3:17–19 gives a full biblical version of what the *Agricultural Revolution* is supposed to mean for Adam, the prototype of man:

To Adam he said: “Because you have listened to the voice of your wife and have eaten of the tree of which I commanded you, ‘You shall not eat of it,’ cursed is the ground because of you; in pain you shall eat of it all the days of your life; thorns and thistles it shall bring forth for you; and you shall eat the plants of the field. By the sweat of your face you shall eat bread, till you return to the ground, for out of it you were taken; for you are dust, and to dust, you shall return.”

And as God had announced it, so it had to happen. “And God – YHWH – send him from the Garden of Eden to work the soil from which he was taken (Gen 3:23).” Thus, Adam had to leave his peaceful home, the paradise on earth which God created for him. He could have been settled down and grown old in this fruitful garden in the steppe, but since he fell victim to the mentioned circumstances, he lost the only home he knew. Thus, Adam was not only the first man but also became the first migrant. Regardless of a positive or negative connotation, Adam's migration laid the foundation for humans to colonize the world.

3. The Successful Migrant

Although he is not the first in the long list of biblical migrants, Adam is *the* prototype of the successful migrant. God learned his lesson from the incident at the Garden of Eden. Unlike Adam, Abraham (*'abrāhām*), who is still known as Abram (*'abrām*), was not directly taken from somewhere, not uprooted and put into a place that was foreign to him. Instead, he received an order that is unparalleled in its clarity and further reinforced by its poetic style in which it is shaped (Gen 12:1-3):

ויאמר יהוה אל־אברם לך־לך מארצך וממולדתך ומבית אביו אל־הארץ אשר אראך
ואעשך לגוי גדול ואברכך ואגדלה שמך והיה ברכה
ואברכה מברכיו ומקללך אאר ונברכו בך כל משפחת האדמה

YHWH said to Abram (i.e. Abraham), ‘Go forth from your country and your kindred and your father’s house to the land that I will show you. And I will make of you a great nation, and I will bless you and make your name great so that you will be a blessing. I will bless those who bless you, and him who dishonors you I will curse, and in you, all the families of the earth shall be blessed.’

Abraham followed God’s order and left Haran (*hārān*), an ancient city in modern-day Syria, and went to the land of Canaan (*kānā’an*) what now is Israel-Palestine. It was not the first time Abraham migrated from some place to another. Following his father to Haran, he left his hometown Ur (*'ūr*), another ancient city located in the south-east of modern-day Iraq, together with his wife and his nephew (Gen 11:31). By the time Abraham received the order to leave his father’s house, his father had already passed. Thus, the responsibility for the family was now in Abrahams’ hand. Leaving one’s place could have been a dangerous venture. Arriving in Canaan, Abraham chose not to settle but to continue his way south, passing Sichem and Bethel. According to the Hebrew Bible, there was a famine in what today is Israel-Palestine. From today’s perspective, it seems as if there was a humanitarian crisis probably caused by ecological problems. Since Abraham was not only responsible for himself but also others, the only option he saw was migrate further southwards until he finally reached Egypt.

There, Abraham was finding himself surrounded by a different people (he a Semite, they Egyptians) with a different culture (his Mesopotamian and Canaanite, theirs Egyptian). Since he spoke a Semitic language, maybe Akkadian, he was not able to understand their native tongue, Middle Egyptian. Moreover, the local law did not protect Abraham as he was a foreigner, and thus he decided to conceal the fact that Sarai, later known as Sarah, was his wife; she pretended to be his sister in public. For having such a beautiful “sister” and after bringing her to the Pharaoh, the Egyptians rewarded him richly with sheep, oxen, donkeys, servants, camels, gold, and silver. By taking responsibility for himself and others and probably following his survival instinct, Abraham became a rich man after an exhausting journey and finally even gained his wife back (Gen 12:14-13:2). However, since the Egyptians refused to naturalize Abraham, he left Egypt to the north and returned to what later became the Holy Land. He finally settled close to Hebron in Mamre, which is located in today’s West Bank (Gen 13:18). Abraham never got back to Ur, his birthplace and home of his youth, nor to Haran, where his father brought him and he stayed for many years, nor did he ever return to Egypt, the place of his prosperity. Nonetheless, every stage of his journey made him who he was. Life-threatening circumstances led to fortune and freedom and created the basis for a people and several cultures.

The question of whether Abraham is just a character of an ancient narrative or was an actual person is not essential. It is an undeniable historical fact that two nations, the descendants of Ishmael and Isaac, nearly four billion religious people and three different cultures, feel connected to this successful migrant (cf. Hollenbach 2016: 449).

The narrative of Abraham’s migration confronts the reader with many crucial aspects of migration in general from the perspective of the migrant: homelessness, uprootedness, hardship because of famine, and the fear for being persecuted for what belongs to the migrant or is connected to him. Thus, even Abraham’s dishonesty is a consequence of being a migrant regardless of his responsibility for lying to the natives. However, his story also reflects the chances and positive effects of migration: survival, economic and ethical development, as well as emergence, development, and transformation of cultures that can arise when people come into contact with each other.

4. An Exodus of a People as a Time Transcending Collective and Individual Liberation Experience

One of the most important migration narratives in human history and definitely the most important one in Ancient Israel and Jewish religion is the so-called “Exodus” of the Israelites from Egypt towards the promised land.

After 430 years of hardship and slave labor (Ex 12:40), the God of the Ancient Israelites revealed himself to Moses (*mošeh*), an Egyptian-born Hebrew with an Egyptian name, and assigned him a critical mission (Ex 3:16-18):

לך ואספת את זקני ישראל ואמרת אליהם יהוה אלהי אבותיכם נראה אלי אלהי אברהם יצחק ויעקב
לאמר פקד פקדתי אתכם ואת העשוי לכם במצרים
ואמר אעלה אתכם מעני מצרים אל ארץ הכנעני והחתי והאמרי והפרזי והחוי והיבوسی אל ארץ זבת חלב ודבש
ושמעו לקלך ובאת אתה וזקני ישראל אל מלך מצרים ואמרתם אליו יהוה אלהי העבריים נקרה עלינו
ועתה נלכה נא דרך שלשת ימים במדבר ונזבחה ליהוה אלהינו

Go and gather the elders of Israel together and say to them, ‘The Lord, the God of your fathers, the God of Abraham, of Isaac, and of Jacob, has appeared to me, saying, “I have observed you and what has been done to you in Egypt, and I promise that I will bring you up out of the affliction of Egypt to the land of the Canaanites, the Hittites, the Amorites, the Perizzites, the Hivites, and the Jebusites, a land flowing with milk and honey.”’ And they will listen to your voice, and you and the elders of Israel shall go to the king of Egypt and say to him, ‘The Lord, the God of the Hebrews, has met with us; and now, please let us go a three days’ journey into the wilderness, that we may sacrifice to the Lord our God.’

According to the biblical narrative, Moses went together with his brother Aaron (*’aharon*), the future first high priest of Ancient Israel, to the Pharaoh to declare God’s decision. In response, the Pharaoh imposed an extra burden on the people in order to punish them. What follows is well known and often used and interpreted differently in modern media, namely the ten Plagues of Egypt: 1) water turned into blood, fish died; 2) frogs; 3) mosquitos; 4) gadflies; 5) livestock disease; 6) boils; 7) fiery hail; 8) locusts; 9) darkness and 10) the death of the firstborn. In the aftermath of the plagues, the Pharaoh allows the Israelites to leave Egypt (Ex 12:31). Thus, they embarked on a forty-year journey to the foreign and already inhabited land Canaan, the land once promised to Abraham by God. As in the case of Abraham’s exodus from Egypt, the Israelites are not leaving Egypt empty-handed (cf. Ex 12:35f.).

The migration of the Israelites was an exhausting endeavor. As soon as they left the shore of the Red Sea, there was a lack of drinking water (Ex 15:23), which happened again later in the desert (Ex 17:1–3). After approximately six weeks on their journey through an inhospitable environment, they suffered from starvation (Ex 16:1-3). Thirst and hunger, which also led to severe tensions amongst the Hebrew migrants, were not the only threats they had to face on their way to freedom and a peaceful new home. They were also confronted with life-threatening persecutions by other people (Ex 17:8). According to the biblical narrative, the Israelites were fortunate that God always saved them from all dangers; but who would have instead of God? Interestingly, they were not entirely relying on this God of their fathers on whose behalf Moses spoke to the people. They relied on one man only: Moses. As soon as the situation worsened, the people’s anger turned against him (Ex 15:24; 17:2) and sometimes against his brother Aaron (Ex 16:2).

The question of whether the migration or Exodus of the Israelites from Egypt to the promised land can be considered a success story must be answered with both yes and no. The Israelites managed to

leave Egypt but suffered thirst, hunger and have been threatened by other people. Those who once embarked on this journey to freedom and peaceful new home, died on this journey and never reached the promised land Canaan. Their descendants inhabited the land, but this was also not a peaceful process.

But if the ancients would have perceived that Exodus as a rather tragic story or history of their ancestors, it probably would have long been forgotten or even never been told. During the Passover Seder until today, it is custom that the youngest capable child raises four questions. Each of them starts with the following phrase: *מה נשתנה הלילה הזה מכל הלילות*/Why is this night different from all other nights? What distinguishes the night from all others are four trivial things, namely: 1) eating unleavened bread (*maṣṣāh*) while for the rest of the year, it is common to eat leavened (*ḥameš*) as well as unleavened bread; 2) eating only bitter herbs (*mārōr*) while for the rest of the year they eat all kinds of vegetables; 3) dipping in vegetables twice while for the rest of the year this is entirely uncommon and 4) eating reclined while for the rest of the year some eat sitting others reclining. What sounds as if the adults want to make a fool out of the child, is, in fact, the expression of a deep truth: none of these trivial things could be done if our ancestors had not migrated back then. The people nowadays are able to do what they do because their ancestors did what they did. Eating the bread refers to the circumstance that the ancestors had nothing, eating bitter herbs commemorates the severeness of the migrant's hardship. By dipping twice, people realise that they now can take what they prefer from the abundance, and the act of eating reclined symbolizes the feeling of not suffering from whips and shackles anymore. People have been slaves and are free now. On the one hand, people remember the migration of their ancestors – remembering (זכור) is an integral part of Rabbinic Judaism. On the other hand, every single Jewish person from the youngest to the oldest can identify with the narrated experience. Metaphorically, everyone becomes a slave who leaves Egypt during Passover; every single Jewish person becomes a migrant at least for one night.

However, there is more to the custom than the time transcending collective and individual liberation experience. From the experience of once being enslaved and now free, the Hebrews derived two important commandments connected to each other by its message of strong ethical value. Both are attributed to God. The first of these two commandments is part of the Book of Exodus:

וגר לא תלחץ ואתם ידעתם את נפש הגר כי גרים הייתם בארץ מצרים

And you shall not oppress a sojourner. You know the life/soul of the sojourner, for you were sojourners in the land of Egypt (Ex 23:9).

The argument for this commandment, as well as for the following, is *a posteriori* its connection to a certain experience the ancient Israelites had unwillingly to make: to be a sojourner and to be oppressed because of it. The Book of Leviticus contains the second commandment:

כאזרח מכם יהיה לכם הגר הגר אתכם ואהבת לו כמוך כי גרים הייתם בארץ מצרים אני יהוה אלהיכם

You shall treat the stranger who sojourns with you as the native among you, and you shall love him as yourself, for you were strangers in the land of Egypt: I am the Lord your God (Lev 19:34).

What arises from Ex 23:9 and Lev 19:34 is the research-relevant question of what these commandments mean for modernity, for the Jewish people, and the state of Israel as the Jewish state. For example, Rabbi Josef Telushkin interprets Lev 19:34 as an exhortation to the Jews, not just the ancient Israelites, “to love the non-Jews who live among them in peace” (Telushkin 2009, p. 267). As in the example of the Passover Seder, the addressees of these commandments not only willingly and consciously identify themselves with those Hebrew slaves in Ancient Egypt but also are already identified with them. Ex 23:9 and Lev 19:34 points out: you have been a slave, you suffered because of slavery, you will not treat the stranger or sojourner like you have been treated. Therefore, Hollenbach is right, when he emphasizes that “this normative identity, as presented in the law [...] of the Hebrew Bible, calls the Jewish people to exercise special responsibilities towards displaced persons” (Hollenbach 2016, p. 450). The expected response towards this imposed responsibility by the Israelites in the past and the Jews until today is, of course, to make sure that the sojourners will be treated significantly better in the land or state of Israel than the Israelites have been treated as sojourners in a foreign land.

5. The Holy Family Takes Refuge in Egypt

According to the Gospel of Matthew, in the days of the reign of King Herod, roughly more than two thousand years ago, wise men from the East come to Jerusalem in search for the King of the Judaeans (*βασιλεὺς τῶν Ἰουδαίων*). “When Herod the king heard this, he was troubled, and all Jerusalem with him” (Mt 2:3; *ἀκούσας δὲ ὁ βασιλεὺς Ἡρώδης ἐταράχθη καὶ πᾶσα Ἱερουσόλυμα μετ’ αὐτοῦ*). King Herod contrives a perfidious plan: he tries to convince the Wise Men from the East to find the child and inform him afterwards about the boy’s whereabouts, ostensibly to worship the child himself.⁷ In fact, Herod is in fear of a political competitor. According to the Gospel of Matthew, Jesus is more than just a simple competitor; he is the rightful heir to the throne of David and, therefore, a severe threat to the legitimacy of Herod’s reign. Following the narrative of the Gospel of Matthew, divine intervention guides the wise men to leave the Holy Land without informing Herod about the whereabouts of the boy. After Herod’s plan to obtain information the Wise Men from the East fails, he pursues his intention to murder every boy under the age of two. Also, Joseph, the husband of Maria, the boy’s mother, receives divine order to leave the Judaeen town of Bethlehem, in modern-

⁷ As far as I am concerned, Hollenbach (2016: 451) over-personalizes this fact by calling the new born boy by his name, Jesus or more likely in Aramaic Jeshua (*Ješūa*).

day Palestine, to Egypt where once the tribes of Israel took refuge from famine (Gen 41:55-42:5) long before Moses led them out into the wilderness towards the promised land.

Joseph, Maria, and the boy stay in Egypt until King Herod died. Then, Joseph receives another order to take Maria and the boy back to the land of Israel (Mt 2:20; *καὶ πορεύου εἰς γῆν Ἰσραήλ*). The angel in Joseph's dream continues as follows: "for those who sought the child's life are dead."

Joseph, who is still in fear of King Herod's offspring Archelaus, took Maria and follows the angel's order but moved to Nazareth (Israel) instead of Bethlehem (Judaea). This decision leads to the conclusion that the experience of being forced to relocate left a scar inside Joseph, which made it impossible for him to return home. Therefore, he remained uprooted from his homeland and had to settle or take refuge somewhere else. From a cultural point of view, compared to his most probable experience in Egypt, he was not a foreigner in (ancient) Israel, but for the Judean natives he was a stranger at least for some time.

6. In the Beginning: A *hiğrah* in the Desert

When, according to the Islamic tradition, during the last ten days of Ramadan (*ramadān*) in the year 610 CE, the Arabian merchant Muhammad (*muḥammad*) receives his first revelation in the so-called "Night of Decree" (*laylatu l-qadr*), one might think this is the beginning of Islamic history. However, instead of 610 as the first year of their calendar (1 AH, i.e. Anno Hegirae/After Hiğrah), the chroniclers of Islam chose 622 CE as the origin of the Islamic "history of salvation."

Compared to other religions, this decision seems extraordinary. Jews, following the Ancient Israelites, started to count years with the creation of heaven and Earth (Gen 1:1) while Christians started with the birth of Jesus Christ, who, according to the major branches, is God's revelation to Israel and the world. Surprisingly, the Islamic chroniclers did something entirely different. Neither did they start with the creation of everything, nor with the birth of their prophet or the beginning of God's revelation to Muhammad in the year 610 CE. Instead of the listed events, the early Muslim chroniclers decided on migration (*hiğrah*) as the groundbreaking origin. Muhammad and his early followers went to Yathrib (*yatrib*), an oasis-like federal state 340km north-west of Mecca (*makkah*) and later only known as Medina, the city of the prophet (*madīnatu n-nabī*). Aslan describes Yathrib's socio-economic and political structure in the 7th century CE as

"a loose federation of villages inhabited by farmers and orchardists, tillers of the earth. It is nothing like the bustling, prosperous city the Emigrants left behind." (Aslan 2011, p. 51; see also Berger 2016, p. 120). And as "a thriving agricultural oasis thick with palm orchards and vast arable fields, most of which were dominated by some twenty Jewish clans of varying sizes. Unlike the Jews who had settled throughout western Arabia (the Hijaz), most of whom were immigrants from Palestine, Yathrib's Jews were mostly Arabs who had converted to Judaism" (Aslan 2011, pp.

53–54; on the origin and presence of Jews and the Judaism of the converted Arab tribes q.v. the excellent work of Moshe Gil [1999, pp. 145–166]).

Why had Muhammad and his followers to migrate in the first place? Without going into detail about the actual conflict between Muhammad and the leaders of his tribe, the Quraysh (*qurayš*), the dispute between the two parties was evitable. The older and leading Quraysh rejected Muhammad's teachings and strict monotheism. They disbelieved in the resurrection of the dead. And what was even worse to them, according to the new teaching "the fathers would have to endure everlasting punishment for their lack of gratitude to God after their resurrection for one day" (Berger 2016, p. 116). In pre-modern agricultural and tribal societies, the idea that the fathers could be on the wrong path was considered scandalous (Berger 2016, p. 116). By turning the system upside down, it is apparent that Muhammad's teaching and movement, though not yet a fully developed religious system, was not the answer to the crisis of society, but the crisis itself (Berger 2016, p. 118).

For a period of time in the 610s, there was a compromise regarding the structure of the divine order with Allah (*'allāh*), the God who stands higher (*'allāhu 'akbar*) than others, on top and three goddesses (al-Lāt, al-'Uzzah and Manāt), known as the *gharānīq*, the cranes, as subordinates. The worshipers of Allah, who was already praised by the non-Muslim Quraysh and other Arabs, and the devotees of the three goddesses could worship together (cf. Berger 2016, p. 117). However, with the revelation of the so-called "Satanic Verses" (Sura 53:17-23), the compromise, now understood as Muhammad corrupting whispering from Satan, ended. Muhammad's perspective on divine truth made a new compromise and reconciliation between the Qurayshite majority and Muhammad's early community impossible. Muhammad became a political enemy of the Quraysh', the most powerful tribe in the region. At the same time, he was, however, protected by his powerful uncle Abu Talib. After the death of his powerful uncle, who protected Muhammad, and the loss of his rich wife Khadija, Muhammad and his companions became publicly persecuted, and thus they had to flee from Mecca.

By the time Muhammad arrives in Yathrib, there is a blood feud between the two largest Arab tribes, the Aws (*banū 'aws*) and Khazraj (*banū ḥazrağ*). Both parties, supported by different Jewish clans, are not able to solve the conflict by applying the law of retribution. As a consequence, this federal-state-like system is about to break into two parts. When Muhammad seeks refuge in Yathrib, the tribes find a wise man (*ḥakam*) with strong reputation in the migrant. He has no alliance with either side and as a *shaykh*, he only represents his "clan", not the Quraysh of whom he descends but the clan of migrants (Aslan 2011, p. 54–56; Berger 2016, p. 120–121). As an arbiter, Muhammad most likely achieved to appease the warring parties. He probably negotiated pacts of non-aggression between the Aws and Khazraj and their allies (Berger 2016, p. 121). However, Yathrib was not yet Medina and

Muhammad not its leader. Although Muhammad was forced to migrate and still under persecution, the much stronger parties took him seriously, and he achieved to calm the feud, which must be considered a tremendous success – imagine a refugee, shortly after arriving in a socio-economically and politically different environment, and able to speak the native language, would arbitrate between conflicting (political) parties. Muhammad’s extraordinary achievement in the seventh century CE paved the way for his political advancement, and after the Battle of Badr 624 CE for the Constitution of Medina (Aslan 2011, p. 56). Previously in this paper, I labeled Abraham, in Arabic *ʾIbrāhīm*, a successful migrant, Muhammad is the historically proven example of a successful migrant.

Of course, Muhammad and his companions went through severe hardship. However, their migration seems a story of success. Thus, it is significant to consider the question of how the Qurʾān as the earliest Islamic source deals with migration and the situation of migrants. In the following, I will summarize the perspective which the Qurʾān offers regarding migration and being a migrant. The connotation of the migration of the prophet and his followers is entirely positive. According to Surah 2:218, the status of the migrants (*muhājirūn*) equals those of believers or people who fight on the path of God (*fi sabīli llāhi*). Those people can expect God to forgive and be merciful to them. He will lead them to the gardens of God (Surah 3:195; see also 8:72; 59:8), which, according to the Qurʾān, is the place of humans’ afterlife. There, they will be rewarded. Those “who have emigrated for God’s sake after they have suffered injustice” can also expect rewards in this life, although to a lesser extent (Surah 16:41). Not only are the migrants rewarded, but also those who help them and provide shelter. They are considered to be true believers (Surah 8:74; q.v. 9:20.100.117; 16:110; cf. 8:75; 24:22).

Being a migrant in the sense that one had to migrate in order to stay on God’s path is also a sign of sincerity of faith and not just lip service. Therefore, a person should not call one of those a friend who has not left Mecca yet (Surah 4:89). The narrator of the Qurʾān implies that the loyalty of the one who remains is stronger with the enemy, who still reigns over Mecca, namely the Quraysh, and not as strong with the early Muslims. Interestingly, one verse (*ʾayah*) of the Qurʾān (Surah 60:10) refers to the testing of belief in women, who come as migrants to the addressees (the believers). “God knows their faith very well. If you then recognize her as a believer, do not send her back to the unbelievers.”⁸ Drawing a proper conclusion out of this verse is difficult. It might be the case that women who later migrated from Mecca to Yathrib were considered less sincere in their belief since they might have been corrupted by their non-Muslim husbands or families.

⁸ My translation according to Hartmut Bobzin (2017: 497): “O ihr, die ihr glaubt! Wenn gläubige Frauen als Ausgewanderte zu euch kommen, so prüft sie! Gott kennt ihren Glauben sehr genau. Wenn ihr sie dann als Gläubige erkennt, so schickt sie nicht zu den Ungläubigen zurück.” (Oh you, who believe! If believing women come to you as emigrants, check them! God knows their faith very well. If you then recognize her as a believer, do not send her back to the unbelievers.)

In general, the Qur'ān strongly recommends migrating instead of staying in a hostile territory (Surah 4:97):

Behold, to those who repudiate themselves, the angels say, when they have called them away, "How have you been?" They say, "We were oppressed in the land." They say, "Was not God's earth far enough so that you could have emigrated?" But those – their haven is hell. What a bad destiny!⁹ (*'inna llaḏīna tawaffāhumu l-malā'ikatu zālimī 'anfusihiḡ qālū fī-ma kuntum qālū kunnā mustaḏ'afīna fī l-'arḏi qālū 'a-lam takun 'arḏu llāhi wāsi'atan fa-tuhāḡirū fīhā fa-'ulā'ika ma 'wāhum ḡahannamu wa-sā'at maṣīran*)

Moreover, if migration is the only way in order to protect oneself and one's relatives, it is not just strongly recommended but also promised to find refuge somewhere on earth. If migration tragically leads to the migrant's death, the (sincere) migrant can, according to the Qur'ān, certainly count on God's reward, who is portrayed as forgiving and merciful (Surah 4:100; q.v. 22:58):

Who emigrates in the path of God, finds many refuges and wide space on earth. When one leaves his house, emigrates to God and his messenger, and then death overtakes him, his reward is with God. God is ready to forgive, merciful.¹⁰ (*wa-man yuhāḡir fī sabīli llāhi yaḡid fī l-'arḏi murāḡaman kaṭīran wa-sa'atan wa-man yaḡruḡ min baitihī muhāḡiran 'ila llāhi wa-rasūlihī ṡumma yudrikhu l-mautu fa-qad waqa'a 'a'āḡruhū 'ala llāhi wa-kāna llāhu ḡafīran raḡīman*)

7. Final Remarks

Nowadays, migration is considered primarily negative. From the perspective of the refugees or migrants, it is often solely seen as a humanitarian crisis, which unfortunately it often is. From the perspective of the people to whom the migrants are fleeing, migration is frequently considered a threat to their socio-economic and political well-being and cultural heritage. By reflecting these conditions, it is all the more astonishing that the most significant and influential narratives or stories of migration in the so-called "Holy Scriptures" and history of monotheistic religions, which I discuss in this paper, give an overall positive understanding of migration. In all cases, the migrants wanted to escape from hardship, and they all succeeded in one way or the other. They succeeded, because they either had divine protection, which could be understood as theological exegesis of either historical events or stories narrated from generation to generation. Another reason why they succeeded are the people, in most cases alien to them, who helped and supported the migrants. In all cases, migration was not a journey to discover oneself, but finally led to something new and/or a better life. The migrants have

⁹ My translation according to Bobzin, (2017: 82): "Siehe, zu denen, die gegen sich selber freveln sprechen die Engel, wenn sie sie abberufen haben: «Wie ist es euch ergangen?» Sie sprechen: «Wir waren unterdrückt im Lande.» Sie sprechen: «War Gottes Erde denn nicht weit genug, so dass ihr hättet auswandern können?» Doch jene – ihr Zufluchtsort ist die Hölle. Welch schlimmes Schicksal!"

¹⁰ My translation according to Bobzin (2017: 82f.): "Wer auf dem Wege Gottes auswandert, der findet im Land viele Zufluchtsstätten und weiten Raum. Wenn jemand sein Haus verlässt, auswandert zu Gott und seinem Gesandten, und ihn dann der Tod ereilt, so obliegt seine Belohnung Gott. Gott ist bereit zu vergeben, barmherzig."

prospered economically and culturally, they escaped persecution, saved their lives, and found a new home that was more peaceful than the original. Moreover, they gained (political) influence and power. Considering the previously discussed cases, migration is never the end to a story. In contrast, it is the beginning, or at least seen as the beginning, of something new and beneficial for the people affected. Migration offers abundance of potential for socio-economic and cultural development of the hosts. Sometimes, the migration of just a few people even entirely changed human history.

Bibliography

- Aslan R 2011, *No god but God. The Origins, Evolution, and Future of Islam*, New York.
- 2018, *God: A Human History of Religion*, London 2018.
- Berger, L 2016, *Die Entstehung des Islam: Die ersten hundert Jahre*, Munich.
- Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften (ed), *Corpus Coranicum*,
<http://www.corpuscoranicum.de/>.
- Bibelwissenschaft.de, in Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft (ed):
Biblia Hebraica Stuttgartensia (online): <https://www.bibelwissenschaft.de/online-bibeln/biblia-hebraica-stuttgartensia-bhs/lesen-im-bibeltext/>.
Novum Testamentum Graece (28th ed.; online): <https://www.bibelwissenschaft.de/online-bibeln/novum-testamentum-graece-na-28/lesen-im-bibeltext/>.
English Standard Version (online): <https://www.bibelwissenschaft.de/online-bibeln/english-standard-version/bibeltext/>.
- Bobzin H 2017, *Der Koran*, 2nd ed, Munich.
- Cunliffe B 2015, *By Steppe, Desert, and Ocean: The Birth of Eurasia*, Oxford.
- Gil M 1999, “The Origin of the Jews of Yathrib”, in F E Peters (ed), *The Arabs and Arabia on the Eve of Islam*, in L I Conrad (ed), *The Formation of the Classical Islamic World*, vol. 3, Aldershot/Brookfield, pp. 145–166.
- Hagan, J M 2013, “Religion on the move: the place of religion in different stages of the migration experience”, in S J Gold/S J Nawyn (eds), *Routledge International Handbook of Migration Studies*, London, pp. 260–268.
- Harari, Y N 2015, *Sapiens: A Brief History of Mankind, London 2014* (German edition: *Eine kurze Geschichte der Menschheit*, 13th ed, München).
- Hollenbach, D 2016, “Religion and Forced Migration”, in E Fiddian-Qasmiyeh/G Loescher/K Long/N Sigona (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies*, Oxford, pp. 447–459.
- Oltmer 2017, *Migration: Geschichte und Zukunft der Gegenwart*, Darmstadt.

Schmidt, K, Göbekli T 2000, “Southeastern Turkey: A Preliminary Report on the 1995–1999 Excavations”, *Paléorient*, vol. 26, no.1, pp. 45–54.

Telushkin, J 2009, *A Code of Jewish Ethics: Volume 2 – Love Your Neighbor as Yourself*, New York.

Ther, P 2017, *Die Außenseiter: Flucht, Flüchtlinge und Integration im modernen Europa*, Berlin.

UNHCR: <https://www.uno-fluechtlingshilfe.de/fluechtlinge/zahlen-fakten/> (Dec 7th, 2018).

The European Story after the 2015 Refugee Crisis

Abstract

The way Europe is dealing with the refugee crisis is resulting in more deaths in the Mediterranean Sea and the Sahara desert and in the growth of the far right. Not just Italy's right-wing administration has put a restrictive asylum policy and tougher border security at the top of political agenda: countries around Europe have turned to far-right populism to pursue such policies. The populist surge feeds on and fuels anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim sentiments while praising Europe's Christian heritage. As a Christian theologian this calls for critical self-reflection.

Introduction

In 2012, the Norwegian Nobel Committee awarded the Nobel Peace Prize to the European Union. Notwithstanding the "grave economic difficulties and considerable social unrest" the EU underwent at the time, the award expressed the Committee's wish to focus on the EU's "most important result: the successful struggle for peace and reconciliation, democracy and human rights" (NNC, 2012). In its announcement, the Committee praised the EU and its forerunners for the stabilizing role they had played for over six decades, helping "to transform most of Europe from a continent of war to a continent of peace" (ibid.). The term reconciliation is referenced multiple times: the EU achieved reconciliation between Germany and France; the EU strengthens reconciliation in the Balkans. In sum: the 2012 Nobel Peace Prize celebrated the work of the EU as "fraternity between nations" (ibid.). Significantly, the EU received the Peace Prize amid the economic crisis that had erupted in 2008. The fraternity between nations was put to the test. Could it be that the crisis exposed a fundamental lack of solidarity? Was it possible that this absence of solidarity had remained hidden during times of economic growth, but that it had now burst, along with the financial bubbles? (Sassatelli, 2017, p. 1). Through the lens of this loss of solidarity, the 2012 Nobel Peace Prize presented itself as an opportunity for institutional leaders to reconcile conflicting narratives within the European Union, and to forge fraternity anew. In other words, the award was a prime moment for EU institutional leaders to enact and evoke a new sense of unity and solidarity in Europe.

For my reading of the EU leadership's statement on the Nobel Peace Prize I use postcolonial lenses based primarily on the work of Edward Said. After a brief discussion of these lenses, [I will use them and argue that the joint statement on the award by then EU presidents Van Rompuy and Barosso invigorated a familiar, cohesive European narrative.](#) I will complement this dominant narrative of the EU as a success story of peace in Europe since WWII, with other perspectives. Omissions, negations, and interrelations will be brought to light. I will reflect on the recent refugee or border crisis as the

latest solidarity crisis in the EU and a mirror for self-reflection. How does the European story as told by EU institutional leadership hold up in the face of the refugee crisis? If we look in the mirror of the refugee crisis as a crisis of solidarity in the EU, what remains of the European story and what requires change? With reference to scholars from the humanities and social sciences, to church leadership, to activists and journalists, I will argue that at least after the refugee crisis the European story that was awarded the 2012 Nobel Peace Prize has lost credibility and that it beseeches replacement.

Postcolonial Lenses

The work of Palestinian-American culture and literary critic Edward Said has been foundational for the interdisciplinary field that carries the label ‘postcolonial.’ That field, which is not uncontested (cf. esp. decolonial theorists, e.g. Grosfoguel (2011) and Mignolo (2000)), studies European colonial and imperial rule and its continuing effects. It starts from the premise that imperial power and authority are founded not only upon political, military, and economic power, but also upon knowledge. To Said, especially nineteenth-century European imperialism depended upon largely unopposed ideologies and forms of knowledge affiliated with (the will to) domination, i.e. upon “the idea of having an empire” (Said, 1993, pp. 10, 69f., 80, 82, 225; de Jong-Kumru, 2013, pp. 5–6, 41, 165).

European imperialism did not take one homogeneous form of absolute imposition of power and knowledge upon other peoples. It took many forms at separate times and in various places. Nor did it always proceed according to plan: imperial culture met with counter-colonial resistance, which also took many active, or more subtle forms. Colonized peoples both (partially) appropriated imperial culture, and drew upon indigenous, local and hybrid practices to erode its power. In the course of the twentieth century, independence movements throughout the world saw European, and especially Britain’s, imperial power being dismantled. Yet the cultural and economic influences of empire are not easily undone. The balance in power is shifting only slowly (de Jong-Kumru, 2013, p. 6; Ashcroft, 2006, p. 1; Young, 2003, p. 4).

To Said, ‘the voyage in’ is a sign of hope for ‘adversarial internationalization’ in an age of continued imperial structures. The voyage in is “the conscious effort to enter into the discourse of Europe and the West, to mix with it, transform it, to make it acknowledge marginalized or suppressed or forgotten histories” (Said, 1993, p. 260f.). The term refers to a countermovement of the colonial ‘voyage out’ (cf. Woolf, 2018 [1915]). Said enjoys the ‘disquieting’ appearance in Europe of various people and their works from ‘the Empire.’ Their very presence challenges familiar metropolitan understandings of the world and its history (Childs, 2008, p. 34). In the voyage in, intellectuals from the global South are ‘writing back to the center’ in opposition to Western constructions of the world (Rushdie, 1982).

In Said’s understanding of the voyage in as a countermovement, lies the key to the postcolonial lenses used in this essay. These lenses adapt Said’s “contrapuntal reading strategy”: the dominant

European narrative, as told by EU leadership, is ‘read together’ with other perspectives on Europe, and with the so-called refugee crisis. A contrapuntal analysis is retrospective and heterophonic. It seeks to contribute to ‘the activity of conserving the past’ (Said, 1983, 22; de Jong-Kumru, 2013, 39). Reading contrapuntally implies including voices and realities that are, consciously or unconsciously, excluded or suppressed (de Jong-Kumru, 2013, 66). Through the use of postcolonial lenses, possible omissions, negations, and interrelations of the European story will thus be brought to light.

The European Story of Peace and Prosperity Since WWII

What, then, is the familiar, cohesive, institutional European narrative? In short, it is the dominant self-identifying narrative of the EU as a success story of peace in Europe since WWII. I will complement this story with other perspectives. Omissions, negations, and interrelations with other, suppressed or forgotten narratives will be brought to light.

In their joint statement on being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012, José Manuel Barroso, then President of the European Commission, and Herman van Rompuy, then President of the European Council, declared that it was a ‘tremendous honour’ to be awarded the Peace Prize:

This Prize is the strongest possible recognition of the deep political motives behind our Union: the unique effort by ever more European states to overcome war and divisions and to jointly shape a continent of peace and prosperity. It is a Prize not just for the project and the institutions embodying a common interest, but for the 500 million citizens living in our Union. At its origins the European Union brought together nations emerging from the ruins of devastating World Wars – which originated on this continent – and united them in a project for peace. Over the last sixty years, the European Union has reunified a continent split by the Cold War around values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights. These are also the values that the European Union promotes in order to make the world a better place for all. The European Union will continue to promote peace and security in the countries close to us and in the world at large. We are proud that the European Union is the world’s largest provider of development assistance and humanitarian aid and is at the forefront of global efforts to fight climate change and promote global public goods. This Nobel Peace Prize shows that in these difficult times the European Union remains an inspiration for leaders and citizens all over the world. (EC, 2012)

The difficult times the EU presidents are referring to in the last sentence of their speech, hint at the fact that their praise of the European project as a peace project, an ideological project, is only part of the story. Apart from ideology, the EU also has a materialistic drive. The two danced together – until the financial crisis. By the time of the award, the EU – as an economic project – could hardly be associated with reconciliation. Its member states compete in a *race to the bottom*: who offers businesses the lowest tax rates, the lowest wages, the most flexible working conditions? After the debt crisis, especially Greece has become a showcase for how quickly a developed country’s living standards can be brought down, how quickly social benefits can be reversed and to what level ‘Brussels’ and ‘Berlin’ can side-line national democracies, with disastrous consequences: high

unemployment rates among the youth, rising suicide numbers, impoverishment of the elderly, and barely functioning hospitals. Not to mention the rise of right-wing extremism. This is also the reality of the EU: rising tensions between north and south, east and west, rich and poor, the left and the right. Reassuringly, a military conflict between EU member states remains unthinkable. But other than ‘peace’, the claims of bringing ‘reconciliation, democracy and human rights’ as gifts from the Union to its members, or neighbouring countries, let alone ‘the world at large’, do not go unchallenged (cf. Haegens, 2012).

On a closer look, even as a peace project, the success story of the EU is partial at best. If the EU, from its origins, was a joint effort to shape a continent of peace – motivated by a determined ‘never again!’ after WWII, the Holocaust, and 52 million deaths – then its success story ignores that Europe has *not*, in fact, been free of war and conflict since WWII. As the EU praises itself for its peace-bringing mission, it most notably ignores the wars its members waged in their offshore territories, against its formerly colonized countries. The Netherlands, for example, has fought Indonesia’s independence in a war that started right after WWII, in 1945, and that lasted until 1949. Not only is this war ignored, it is officially referred to in the Netherlands as “the police actions” (*politioenele acties*) to this day. In addition to the colonial wars, the EU’s success story of peace and prosperity ignores the war in former Yugoslavia, and particularly the failures of UN battalion *Dutchbat* to prevent the Fall of Srebrenica and the massacre of thousands of Bosnian Muslim men. To be sure, at the time of the Nobel Award, the EU presidents did not yet foresee the ongoing war in the Ukraine that would break out in 2014, nor the dubious role the EU would play in its escalation, nor the Russian annexation of the Krim, nor the downing of flight MH17. Yet, in any case, to praise European peace since WWII is misleading in its denial of European involvement in many wars and conflicts since 1945, also on European continental and overseas territories.

To continue, the EU presidents in their statement explain that the EU has unified post-Cold War Europe around *values* of ‘respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights’ – and they stress how gladly the EU promotes these values all over the globe, ‘to make the world a better place for all’. As proof of how their institution carries out this mission, the presidents mention with pride that “the European Union is the world’s largest provider of development assistance and humanitarian aid” and that it is “at the forefront of global efforts to fight climate change and promote global public goods.” In this statement, the presidents betray a *hierarchal way of thinking*, in which a benevolent EU is helping the rest of the globe improve, by letting all people share in their unique values. The presidents evoke the image of a superhero who’s making the world a better place, providing development aid and fighting climate change. The presentation of the EU’s role in the world as a heroic mission is reminiscent of the colonial myth of

the white man's burden. It fails to consider the role of the EU and its member states in *creating* global inequalities and climate change.

The European Refugee Crisis

In a documentary on the *Sign of the Times*, Agnes Abuom, a Kenyan representative from the World Council of Churches (WCC), speaks to Europe's role in the world (*Sign of the Times*, 2018). The WCC, like the EU, was founded right after WWII, in Amsterdam, on the rubbles of the war, in 1948. At the time, it united white, male Christian leaders around a wish for inter-Christian dialogue as a beacon for peace. Over time, it has come to unite Christians from all over the world, reflecting the fact that Christianity's centre of gravity has long shifted from the North to the South. Over time, Christians from the South have changed the WCC's agenda, confronting its original eurocentrism with issues and concerns from other contexts.

In *Sign of the Times*, Abuom points out that Europe's failure to pay attention to its own role in the generation of problems around the world, is symptomatic of how limited human memory is. She finds that Europe forgets *their* migration to the rest of the world, their role in creating the problems and not wanting to solve them properly. One such problem that has come to dominate the news in Europe since 2015, is the so-called refugee crisis. It refers, as we know, to the sharp rise in the number of people who came to Europe to seek asylum. Already the term refugee crisis reveals a panicky overreaction: why speak of a crisis when 3 million people claim asylum in an EU that is home to 500 million people? Sure, the arrival of those people was chaotic, and thousands of people died on the way. People are still dying on the way. But the term crisis is misleading if it were to imply that the European Union is incapable of dealing with the reception of three million asylum seekers in an organized manner. If Turkey can host over 3.5 million refugees, there is probably no reason why the European Union couldn't handle a similar number (UNHCR Turkey, 2017). Daniel Trilling insists that there is just one, obvious reason: the EU prioritizes security rather than the protection of vulnerable people (Trilling, 2018, Introduction, para. 9). Seen in this light, the European refugee crisis is in fact a border crisis (ibid., para. 10).

In September 2015, the picture of Syrian toddler Alan Kurdi's lifeless body, washed up on the shore of Bodrum, Turkey, shocked Europe, evoked empathy and sparked a sense of urgency. Under the slogans 'refugees welcome' and 'wir schaffen das' (*we can do this*), Europe *finally* responded to the exodus of refugees, mainly from Syria. Why did this boy drown, like so many before him, and after him? we might ask. It is because Europe has closed down safer, legal routes. The EU tries to prevent asylum seekers from crossing its borders however they can: by making it impossible to claim asylum at overseas embassies; by penalizing transport companies if they allow people to travel into the EU without the correct documents; by signing treaties with its neighbours, like Turkey, so that they will

stop migration to the EU. And within the EU, the Dublin agreement forces asylum seekers to apply in whatever country they reach first, effectively leaving them stranded in the poorest EU countries (Trilling, 2018, Introduction, para. 6).

In 2015, it took a picture of a toddler washed up ashore for European leaders to act. Yet the response was not to (re-)open legal routes for asylum seekers – be it migrants or refugees, as Jacques Derrida (1988, p. 21) argued, the difference made between them is not just abstract or inconsistent, but also hypocritical and pervers – to keep them safe. People still needed to risk their lives to reach European shores from Turkey or from northern Africa, across the Mediterranean. Thousands died. It was a chaos that only temporarily put the Dublin regulations out of order so that people could reach the north-west of Europe.

Now, three years later, pictures of drowning children no longer appear on the front page of any major newspaper. Official reports reveal that numbers of arrivals from the Mediterranean have dropped drastically, yet death rates have gone up (UNHCR, 2018). Thousands of asylum seekers are stranded indefinitely in Greece. According to Europol estimates, ten thousand migrant children have gone missing in Europe (Merriman, 2016). Pan-European gangs are targeting minors for sex abuse and slavery (Townsend, 2016). Toddlers who die of hypothermia or drowning on the Mediterranean with their mothers, remain anonymous numbers in reports. The only answer to refugees' shared complaint: 'nobody here knows who I am', writes Hannah Arendt, is fame: "and it is true that the social chances of the famous refugee are improved just as a dog with a name has a better chance to survive than a stray dog who is just a dog in general" (Arendt, 1958, p. 287 fn. 2).

As I write this article, EU member states are seeking more deals with countries across the Mediterranean, to pressure them into blocking the routes to Europe, despite evidence of torture and abuse in Libyan detention centres, despite reports of mass expulsions from Algeria into the Sahara Desert (Townsend, M., 2016). Italy is closing its ports to humanitarian ships with migrants and refugees rescued from the Mediterranean. The Visegrad countries are refusing to cooperate in the redistribution of asylum seekers across the EU. Countries like the Netherlands and Sweden deport men, women and children to Afghanistan, a country listed as the second most dangerous place on earth in the 2018 Global Peace Index. In bilateral deals, humanitarian aid is provided in return for blocking migratory routes to the EU (cf. the latest deal between Germany and Niger, the poorest African country, as reported in: Zeit Online, 2018). Through the prioritization of security over the protection of vulnerable people, the right of asylum – "the only right that had ever figured as a symbol of the Rights of Man in the sphere of international relationships" (Arendt, 1958, p. 280 fn. 2) – is effectively being abolished.

As the Red Cross has stated: “Migrants who have left or fled their homes are frequently viewed in terms of sheer numbers and a potential source of insecurity. Yet, the securitisation of borders, criminalisation of migration, resort to detention as a deterrence measure, do not prevent people from starting a journey, creating greater hardship and suffering. As conflicts rage and secure channels to reach safe ground become scarcer, migrants will continue to turn to the few options they are afforded – however risky these may be. The risks people are ready to take are somehow proportional to the threats they are fleeing” (ICRC, 2017). Daniel Trilling agrees that “Border defences often produce or exacerbate the very problems they purport to solve, by forcing irregular migrants to take more dangerous routes, often with increasing reliance on people smugglers, which in turn encourages states to crack down further” (Trilling, 2018, Introduction, para. 8). It is a vicious cycle, which refutes the myth that just because the number of migrants reaching the EU has dropped so dramatically, the ‘refugee crisis’ is now solved.

Agnes Abuom points to the ongoing crisis and the future challenge of climate refugees. In order to convince the ‘safe havens’ of the urgency of climate change, also for them, she warns that “it does not matter whether you build walls or not. Human beings are so ingenious, they’ll find ways of climbing over the walls or under the walls. So,” she insists, “the appeal we are making is climate justice. We want climate justice in order to have an equal life that is just; economic, ecological life that is life-giving, not life-threatening.” Importantly, with this appeal for climate justice, Agnes Abuom does not challenge the EU policy of prioritising security rather than protecting vulnerable people. She does not appeal to human rights and the duty to uphold those. She does not confront high-income countries with their role in creating climate change and their obligation to deal with the consequences. She rather appeals to European self-interest as she predicts that no matter how enhanced the external borders of the EU may be, they will be breached – and, thereby, she is trying to convince the EU that it *has to* contribute to climate justice. She is not appealing to empathy. Her call for active solidarity differs from the classic definition of solidarity as a noble ethics of choice, of ‘not wanting one’s happiness to co-exist with other people’s suffering’ (Marcuse, 1969, p. 14). She is predicting the destruction of the false sense of peace and prosperity through other people’s suffering, a suffering from which they will seek refuge in Fortress Europe.

Personal Reflections

My freedom of movement within the EU is made possible by the Schengen agreement. It is built on the increased militarization of the external frontier of Fortress Europe. In my experience, it also relies heavily on my white skin, especially since passport checks at borders within the Schengen zone were re-introduced after the so-called refugee crisis. Such ‘random’ or ‘routine checks’ by border police do not happen to me. I am not perceived as a possible security risk. That is my experience of being

white in Europe. I never have to prove my innocence, it is assumed. Even if white people have plundered and murdered for centuries. Even if we were to encounter more terrorists like Anders Breivik. I do not expect to be held accountable. If I talk Dutch in Germany, people often tell me I sound cute. I am aware that people who speak Turkish or Arabic may receive a different response. I can just walk into any shop and start checking and touching things; no one will fear I will steal them. I do not feel that I have to smile or make a joke about myself to put people at ease. If I were to drive an expensive car, I will not worry about being pulled over by the police to check how I got it. If I were to be assigned a rental home in the midst of housing shortages, I will not worry about my neighbours doubting my rights to live there. I can live wherever I like. I can proclaim that Christianity is a religion of love – no matter what evil has been, or still is committed in its name. I do not expect it to reflect on me the way a terrorist act committed in the name of Islam anywhere reflects on Muslims everywhere. As a white person, I experience that I can demand from others what is not demanded from me. I can profit from my white privilege without having to defend myself, not to the majority, nor to minorities. *Les profiteurs du système, ils sont les autres.*

The European Story and the Refugee Crisis

European societies are struggling to preserve peaceful coexistence among different social groups. There is a rise in right-wing extremism and factions fuelling the white fear of refugees, asylum seekers, and Muslim citizens. In this situation, interreligious dialogue is important to stimulate active peacebuilding. As Agnes Heller, a Hungarian-Jewish philosopher, rightly warns us: “The greatest danger is indifference, not being aware that there is a danger in Europe. When you *see* the danger, you can do something against it. The greatest danger is not wanting to know where one lives, what our past is” (*Sign of the times*, 2018)

Seventy years ago, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was embraced. It was praised for uniting the world in a vision of justice. Today, Western politics is about building walls and closing borders. To quote Agnes Heller again: “We live in a dangerous world, but the world used to be always dangerous. We believed that it is not dangerous, which was a misconception. We believed that we are going to have a better and better world each and every year and each and every decade, but that was a misunderstanding of history. The whole concept of progress was a misunderstanding of history” (*Sign of the times*, 2018). This Western concept of history as progress is the guiding principle of the founding narrative of the European Union, which reads that it is a success story of peaceful coexistence since WWII. A look through postcolonial lenses highlights that Europe has, in reality, been involved in many wars and conflicts since WWII, and the values it proclaims to hold dear stand in sharp contrast with its members’ policies of prioritising security rather than protecting the most

vulnerable. The dominant European narrative, as told by EU institutional leadership, therefore, is bound to crumble in the face of the reality of our intertwined histories and interdependent lives.

Now, how is the dominant European narrative transformed through the use of postcolonial lenses? As Monica Sassatelli (2017, p. 10) argues, there is not just a moral virtue, but a necessity for European institutional leadership to tell a new story. It is not just better to tell a new story, it is essential. If there is no new story, Europe no longer has a story.

Władysław Bartoszewski (2001, p. 34) insists that the new European story must be based on solidarity. This is especially true if we interpret both the financial crisis and the refugee crisis as crises of solidarity. With the postcolonial lenses that were borrowed primarily from Edward Said, we have seen that a richer European story, one that is retrospective and heterophonic, no longer ignores or suppresses the ongoing legacy of European colonialism and imperialism. A new European narrative includes that past in its plot, as an expression of having reconciled Europe with its colonial past. This includes a process of reconciliation with diversity, with coming to terms with how ‘the voyage in’ is related to that colonial voyage out whose legacy continues in the overlapping experiences and intertwined histories of ‘the West and the rest’ (Said, 1993, pp. 72, 114, 233, 260f., 384; de Jong-Kumru, 2013, pp. 1, 45).

Conclusion

In this essay I have argued that, especially after the refugee crisis, the EU success story of peace and prosperity, as it was told by EU presidents around the 2012 Nobel Peace Prize, has lost credibility and that it beseeches replacement. The success story of European unification, that it has brought peace and prosperity since WWII, will end if it is built on the premise that the very things that the EU has brought to an end – through reconciling European nations after two world wars, bringing peace and prosperity to most of Europe – exist only in the past or in other places, or that they otherwise can be deemed irrelevant to a focus on the EU.

In the context of the financial crisis that started in 2008, the 2012 Nobel Peace Prize presented EU leadership with an opportunity to tell a new story of solidarity in Europe. Instead, the dominant European narrative of peace and prosperity since WWII was retold. A reflection of this dominant European narrative in the mirror of the refugee crisis reveals what it omits and negates: the overlaps and relations with past and ‘other’ histories, which EU borders, no matter how fortified, will not keep out. In fact, the ‘voyage in’ has already and irreversibly brought diversity to Europe. After reconciliation between Germany and France, after reconciliation in the Balkans – both of which were explicitly rewarded by the Nobel Committee – the European Union can now contribute to the reconciliation among Europeans of all cultural, religious, sexual, racial and ethnic backgrounds. In

the face of clashing narratives, especially if they present themselves as irreconcilable, this is not an easy task.

Bibliography

- Arendt, H., 1958 [1951]. *The origins of totalitarianism*. London: George Allen and Unwin.
- Ashcroft, B., Griffiths, G. and Tiffin, H. eds., 2006 [1995]. *The post-colonial studies reader*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Bartoszewski, W., 2001. Vision and potential: For a new direction in European integration. Speech at the Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 25 July 2000, in: *Above Divisions: Selected Speeches and Interviews, July–December 2000*, Warsaw: Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- Childs, P., 2008. *Modernism*. London: Routledge.
- de Jong-Kumru, W., 2013. *Postcolonial feminist theology. Enacting cultural, religious, gender and sexual differences in theological reflection*. Münster: LIT Verlag.
- Derrida, J., 1988. Kosmopolieten aller landen, kop op! Translated from French by R. Hofstede. In: idem, *Over gastvrijheid*. Amsterdam: Boom [transl. R. Hofstede].
- European Commission (EC), 2012. *Joint statement of José Manuel Barroso, president of the European Commission, and Herman Van Rompuy, president of the European Council on the award of the 2012 Nobel Peace prize to the EU*. [press release] (Updated 19 February 2018) Available at: <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-12-779_en.htm> [Accessed 14 January 2019].
- Vision of Humanity, 2018. *Global Peace Index* (GPI). [Online] Available at: <<http://visionofhumanity.org/indexes/global-peace-index/>> [Accessed 14 January 2019].
- Grosfoguel, R., 2011. Decolonizing post-colonial studies and paradigms of political-economy: transmodernity, decolonial thinking and global coloniality. *Transmodernity: journal of peripheral cultural production of the Luso-Hispanic world*, 1 (1), [pdf] Available at: <<https://escholarship.org/uc/item/21k6t3fq>> [Accessed 14 January 2019].
- Haegens, K., 2012. Nobelprijs voor de vrede. *De Groene Amsterdammer*, 42, [Online] (updated 17 October 2012) Available at: <<https://www.groene.nl/artikel/nobelprijs-voor-de-onvrede>> [Accessed 14 January 2019].
- International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 2017. *Migrants: Vulnerabilities & protection*. [Online] (updated 20 December 2017) Available at: <<https://www.icrc.org/en/document/migrants-vulnerabilities-and-protection>> [Accessed 14 January 2019].
- Marcuse, H., 1969. *An essay on liberation*. Boston: Beacon Press.

- Merriman, H., 2016, *Why are 10,000 migrant children missing in Europe?* [Online] (updated 12 October 2016) Available at: <<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37617234>> [Accessed 14 January 2019].
- Mignolo, W., 2000. *Local histories/global designs: essays on the colonality of power, subaltern knowledges and border thinking*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Norwegian Nobel Committee (NNC), 2012. *The Nobel Peace Prize for 2012*. [Online] (Updated 12 September 2018) Available at: <<https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2012/press-release/>> [Accessed 14 January 2019].
- Rushdie, S., 1982. The empire writes back with a vengeance. *Times*, 3 Jul.
- Said, E., 1983. *The world, the text, and the critic*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Said, E., 1993. *Culture and imperialism*. London: Random House.
- Sassatelli, M., 2017. *Has Europe lost the plot? Europe's search for a new narrative imagination*. [pdf] Available at: <<https://static1.squarespace.com/static/526e5978e4b0b83086a1fede/t/59494ceee4fcb5287dc5673d/1497976047788>> [Accessed 14 January 2019], pp. 1–11.
- Sign of the times* (2018). [documentary film] Netherlands: Wilberry Jakobs.
- Townsend, M., 2016. *10,000 refugee children are missing, says Europol*. [Online] (updated 30 January 2016) Available at: <<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/30/fears-for-missing-child-refugees>> [Accessed 14 January 2019].
- Trilling, D., 2018. *Lights in the distance. Exile and refuge at the borders of Europe*. [Kindle DX version], London: Picador. Available at: Amazon.co.uk <<http://www.amazon.co.uk>> [Accessed 14 January 2019].
- UNHCR, 2018, *As Mediterranean Sea arrivals decline and death rates rise, UNHCR calls for strengthening of search and rescue*. [Online] (updated 6 July 2018) Available at: <<http://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing/2018/7/5b3f270a4/mediterranean-sea-arrivals-decline-death-rates-rise-unhcr-calls-strengthening.html>> [accessed 14 January 2019].
- UNHCR Turkey, *Turkey fact sheet – October 2017*. [Online] Available at: <<https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/60180>> [Accessed 8 August 2018].
- Woolf, V., 2018 [1915]. *The voyage out (1915)*. Frankfurt am Main: Outlook Verlag GmbH.
- Young, R., 2003. *Postcolonialism. A very short introduction*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
- Zeit Online, 2018, *Angela Merkel will Niger stärker unterstützen*. [Online] (updated 15 August 2018) Available at: <<https://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2018-08/niger-angela-merkel-mahamadou-issoufou-meeseberg>> [Accessed 14 January 2018].

Glimmers of Hope?

A Brief Analysis of Selected Civic-Led Reconciliation Efforts in Post-ISIS Iraq

Abstract

Prior to the military defeat of ISIS in 2017, reconciliation efforts in post-Baathist Iraq have largely failed to reduce sectarian violence or political and institutional instability. So, what would the key building blocks of a responsible and effective approach to community reconciliation be in post-ISIS Iraq, and given the realities on the ground, is such a process possible at all? I will illustrate the argument that the current moment does offer a new (and possibly unprecedented) chance for peace in Iraq with reference to the UNDP's most recent attempts at creating Local Peace Committees in the Anbar and Ninewah governorates.

Introduction

Despite Iraq's history of ethnic tolerance and religious diversity stretching back many hundreds of years, civilians have been subjected to multiple bouts of political oppression and sectarian conflict (often stoked from abroad) which have caused terrible suffering. No simple answer exists to address these multiple layers of injustice and trauma, which were further exacerbated by the extraordinary violence, even by Iraqi standards, during the ISIS era. When ISIS¹ conquered vast swaths of Iraq in June 2014, no one, and especially not those communities who welcomed the black-clad commandos as liberators, had any idea of the horror that lay in wait. Matched for sheer cruelty by very few groups ever, ISIS killed, maimed, enslaved, raped, terrorized, destroyed, and displaced with unparalleled viciousness. The alleged new caliphate under ISIS became its own unique version of hell on earth. Certainly Iraq, but also the larger Middle East will take decades to recover.

At the same time, the ISIS period only continued the trail of bloodshed which started much earlier. Iraq Body Count (a website that has been tracking casualty numbers in Iraq since the toppling of Saddam Hussein) estimates the number of civilian deaths during this period at no less than 288,000.² This catastrophic casualty rate hiked even further during the ISIS period. In Sinjar alone, the terrorists left approximately fifty-seven mass graves behind them. ISIS also enslaved thousands of young girls, some of whom were still in captivity when this went to print. Moreover, approximately 5.7 million Iraqis were displaced from their homes during this period. Fugitives in their own country, they had

¹ "ISIS", or the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, is also known as "IS", the Islamic State, or "ISIS", the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.

² <https://www.iraqbodycount.org/>; accessed on 13 September 2018.

to seek alternative accommodation either with family and friends or in one of many IDP (internally displaced person) camps, which shot up overnight across Iraq from Sulimaniyah in the North East to Karbala and Najaf in the South West. At the time of writing, some two million IDPs still had not returned home.

The eventual counter-attack against ISIL was brave and courageous, particularly on the part of that Iraqi troops and some of the popular Mobilization Forces who fought street to street and door to door to liberate communities. Many thousands of young men paid with their lives in the process. But during these battles, many civilians too, were caught in the crossfire or displaced. Although the precise figures remain contested, coalition airstrikes in Mosul left hundreds more dead. The historic Old City is now buried under more than eight million tons of rubble, three times the mass of the Great Pyramid in Giza. Passing through this neighbourhood one year after the liberation of Mosul, the smell of rotting bodies buried under the rubble still filled the air. It will cost multiple billions, some say as much as fifty billion USD, just to make this part of Mosul liveable again.

Against this devastating backdrop, the very idea of reconciliation remains highly contested, not only because of the sheer magnitude of the obstacles facing it, but because of severe levels of disillusionment with the quality of post-Saddam leadership in Iraq. Many Iraqis refuse even to discuss the possibility of reconciliation, claiming that the word had lost all credibility. Others ask if they are required to reconcile with ISIL, a prospect that is inconceivable to most Iraqis. As a sheik from Talafar remarked to me: “I will not allow one family member of any ISIL associate back into my community. If they set foot there, I will personally kill each of them.”³ In not dissimilar fashion, a Yezidi activist questioned: “Are you asking us to reconcile? With whom? We are a peaceful community, and yet we have suffered seventy-three genocides in our history—and number seventy-four is coming!” Her point was clear; to place the “burden” of reconciliation at the doorstep of communities who have been the primary victims of political and regional forces, seemed deeply unfair, perhaps even heartless.

At the same time, there is the danger that these realities would paralyze recovery efforts at a crucial time for Iraq, not least in addressing the fate of the most affected communities during the terrible ISIL period. It is on one such effort, which this paper focuses. From 2016 to 2018, a range of role players including the UNDP, the government of Iraq and several Iraqi and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs and INGO’s) implemented a community-led reconciliation strategy as a historic first in Iraq. Never before had communities been given the chance to lead and shape reconciliation in their own neighbourhoods at the scale that this initiative envisaged.

The argument I develop in relation to this history is simple: correctly conceptualized and implemented, community reconciliation indeed responds to vital needs and interests of Iraqi

³ Anonymous participant in UNDP Local Peace Committee workshop, August 2017.

communities; and considering the post-ISIL configuration of local, national, and international forces, possibilities for such an approach are emerging which were not present before. But to utilize these opportunities effectively, it is important to be precise about how reconciliation had failed before to avoid repeating historic mistakes, and to be patient: a five to ten year timeframe is probably the minimum time required to see concrete dividends.

In what follows, I first outline a working definition for reconciliation, followed by a summary of some of the lessons learned from Iraq's previous reconciliation efforts after 2003. Thereafter a brief description of the community-led reconciliation is provided, where after I conclude with an assessment of opportunities and risks emerging from these efforts.

Conceptual Markers

The term "reconciliation" is often used in misleading ways across a broad range of disciplines, ideological persuasions, and political affairs. In the context of this paper, reconciliation is understood as a normative framework for guiding political transitions that are rooted in, and driven by, a growing appreciation and acknowledgement of interdependence across conflict lines. Although conflicted groups very often share a comprehensive (political, economic, social) and fundamental (unavoidable) interdependence, this reality is routinely denied in favour of fantasies where the future is imagined without the presence of the enemy.⁴

By using reconciliation-as-interdependence as the primary tool for analysing, guiding, and evaluating political transition, it manifests in at least three partially overlapping forms: firstly, as an acknowledgement of political interdependence which often occurs at the inception of reconciliation; secondly, as increasingly fair and inclusive institutional reform, initiating effective, sustained, and non-violent political and economic power transfers; and thirdly, as increasingly fair and inclusive social arrangements. Ultimately, I argue, reconciliation ought to be judged against its promise of inclusivity and fairness – as articulated by political leaders, reflected in new institutions, and embodied in social and cultural arrangements. Considering these criteria throughout different phases of transition, a change in relations with the enemy can take place in the background, often unnoticed. This transition includes the perception of the enemy as a threat and unwanted interference in one's life, gradually transformed into a source of shared aspiration and hope. Through reconciliation processes which increase political, institutional and social inclusion and fairness, the experience of interdependence across enemy lines gradually changes from fear and rejection into hope for better things to come, aspiration, opportunity, and of sustainable, mutual wellbeing. At heart, reconciliation as a form of political transition, therefore, changes hostile and oppressive relationships into fairer,

⁴ For an extended argument on this approach to political reconciliation, see Fanie du Toit (2018) *When Political Transitions Work—Reconciliation as Interdependence*, Oxford University Press, 189–225.

inclusive, and more hopeful associations that facilitate the beginning of a new coexistence in the future.

In this context, reconciliation does not pre-require moral or political conversion to the ideas of forgiveness, liberal democracy, or even human rights. It rather begins when enemies acknowledge, even grudgingly, their comprehensive and unavoidable interdependence. Put differently, reconciliation is not made sustainable through apology, confession, prosecution, or reparation. Although these processes may all assist to varying degrees with reconciliation, only systematic, fair and comprehensive institutional reform, underpinned by ongoing political negotiation, can secure successful reconciliation and deliver the promised social changes. Reconciliation does not promise full closure, perfect justice, or total forgiveness, but rather an increasingly fair and inclusive society, guided by the fundamental acknowledgement that mutual wellbeing is the only sustainable way of ensuring prosperity for one's group.

National Reconciliation Efforts in Iraq Thus Far: Neither Inclusive Nor Fair

With the benefit of hindsight, reconciliation efforts immediately after Saddam's downfall did not, amongst other matters, sufficiently consider the way in which violent militarisation and party loyalty had been normalized in Iraqi society and, therefore, how complicated and challenging reconciliation would be.⁵

It is by now common cause that the controversial De-Baathification policy of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), initially designed to be the first step towards liberating Iraq from Baathist rule in favour of a more inclusive, fair dispensation, failed to result in either inclusion or deeper fairness—and as a result it worsened, rather helped to end the conflict.⁶ Although vetting is commonly acknowledged as a legitimate option within the broader transitional justice agenda, the problem with the De-Baathification policy was firstly its lack of sectarian inclusivity and secondly its lack of procedural fairness, two ingredients which I argue above are central to the promise reconciliation seeks to fulfil.

Apart from systematically excluding important sections of the Sunni community, it was also mostly punitive, not restorative, and perceived to be unfairly so. Thousands of regime officials lost their livelihoods with many having to flee. Not only were crucial functions of the state, including security

⁵ In the best work on the subject, Dina Rizk Khoury traces the political, social, and cultural processes which contributed to this normalization of war through the Iran-Iraq War, the First Gulf War and the sanctions: see Dina Rizk Khoury (2013) *Iraq in Wartime—Soldiering, Martyrdom and Remembrance*, Cambridge University Press.

⁶ The De-Baathification policy was announced in the first public order of the Coalition Provisional Authority after the fall of Saddam Hussein, and entailed efforts to purge the new political system of Baath Party members, thereby trying to diminish their influence not only in government but also in society. See for example, Safa Rasul al-Sheikh & Emma Sky (2011) "Iraq since 2003: Perspectives on a Divided Society, *Survival*, 53:4, 120–121. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2011.603565> accessed on 12 September 2018.

forces, affected by the sudden outflow of experienced individuals, but the policy showed insufficient procedural accuracy to precisely determine the differing levels of culpability of Baath party members. Both these sets of factors, led to lasting grievances within the Sunni community.

With the sectarian tensions increasing and Al-Qaeda on the rise, the Arab League attempted to mediate in Iraq's growing conflict in 2005 by hosting an "Iraq Accord Conference", originally advertised as the "Iraqi Reconciliation Conference". Since some groups perceived the Arab League as not being neutral in the conflict but "pro-Sunni", the adopted agreement never gained the support it needed to bring an end to sectarian strife.⁷ Various Sunni groups expressed their support for the League initiative, driven by its general-secretary, Amr Musa, but opinion within Shia and Kurdish circles were divided. Some even claimed that the call to reconcile was "an insult" to the Iraqi people since they were not at war with each other. It was a war against extremist elements with whom no reconciliation would ever be possible.⁸ An initial planning conference, however, did take place in Cairo in November 2005. An agreement to hold the national reconciliation conference on June 22, 2006, in Baghdad was overshadowed by the bombing of the Samarra shrine in early 2006, which brought to an abrupt end to this fledgling process.

By the time Nouri Maliki took office in 2006, it was clear that instead of promoting reconciliation, De-Baathification had become one of reconciliation's primary obstacles. Consequently, the new Prime Minister presented a new national reconciliation plan to Parliament, primarily designed to soften the blow of De-Baathification with several compensation and amnesty proposals for those who lost their jobs in 2003. In the course of this plan, some former Baath party members were allowed to re-join the political process. To this end, the plan included "a reconciliation amnesty plan, which would be only granted for those not involved in 'terrorist crimes and acts, war crimes, and crimes against humanity', and as long as they pledged to condemn violence and to back the elected national government. Finally, the plan sought to address the victims of the former government through compensation."⁹ The Maliki initiative, officially launched in December 2006, initially enjoyed broader support by all three major political blocs, Sunni, Shia, and Kurds, than that of the League. Six months later, however, the process stalled due to the withdrawal of Arab Sunni parties from Parliament in protest against the Maliki government's inability to contain armed militias, one of their key demands. Less than a year after its launch, the plan stagnated. Consequently, the strategy was not able to stop further escalation of the conflict because of the resentment against what was a growing

⁷ Ibrahim Al-Marashi and Aysegul Keskin (July 2008) "Reconciliation Dilemmas in Post-Ba'athist Iraq: Truth Commissions, Media and Ethno-Sectarian Conflicts", *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol. 13, No. 2, 250–253.

⁸ Al-Marashi & Keskin, 250, 251.

⁹ Al-Marashi & Keskin, 254.

perception of the Maliki government's exclusionary stance towards minorities and their political leaders.

Upon entering into office in 2014, Prime Minister Abadi also instituted a national reconciliation process by adopting the so-called "Baghdad Document" and by founding the Implementation and Follow-up Committee for National Reconciliation (IFCNR). However, his term in office was almost entirely consumed with fighting ISIL, dramatically limiting the range of actions his administration could take to promote reconciliation. During this period, UNAMI (the United Nations Mission to Iraq) facilitated a dialogue between political blocs which became known as the "Historical Settlement Process." This process sought to develop a responsible and inclusive political dispensation after the military defeat of ISIL. Unfortunately, by the time of writing this article, this process again stalled within an increasingly complex post-ISIL environment.

Following the national elections in May 2018, reconciliation processes appeared to be suspended as Iraqi parties awaited a manual recount of the disputed election results amidst intense jockeying and negotiations in efforts to install a new, more inclusive government. Widespread violent unrest broke out somewhat unexpectedly across the Shia south during July. Protesters in Basra were setting fire to the local Iranian Consul in apparent protest against Iran's meddling in Iraqi affairs. In the Green Zone in Baghdad, several mortar rounds landed near the United States Embassy in late August. This act again conveyed the same demand for Iraqi self-determination, this time against ongoing American presence. The election victory of Moqtada Al-Sadr, famous for his resistance to foreign influence in Iraq, can be understood as part of growing public sentiment against perceived foreign interference whether from the East or the West.

Given this history, it is hardly surprising that reconciliation efforts in Iraq since 2003 have lacked credibility in communities. Reconciliation processes were too often perceived as being politically-biased and opportunistic. All too frequently, processes and agreements appear to favour one group or another regardless of meaningful inclusion of all parties, minorities, sects, and tribes. Moreover, reconciliation is often also associated with a punitive approach. The punishment of criminals is enforced without considering the needs and demands of victims. There still is the need for a serious national dialogue on healing the wounds of the past, not only of those who suffered most but also the general population who witnessed the horrific violence first hand. The failure to consider levels of traumatization, victimhood, and stress in society was probably the most crucial reason for reconciliation's failure. These reconciliation processes focused exclusively on political dimensions and neglected social, civic or psychological levels. The overly centralized, "top-down" approach coincided with a lack of meaningful civic participation. The citizens did not feel confident and safe enough to raise their genuine views and concerns, and they doubted that their voices would be heard

by the government. Even the top-level agreements of 2006 and 2014 generated limited to no support in communities due to this lack of consultation.

It should, therefore, not come as any surprise that they failed to change conditions on the ground and achieve a tangible, “felt” impact in communities. These reconciliation agreements demonstrated a very limited impact on the ability to anticipate, mitigate or resolve conflicts at community level. Not only did these agreements lack credibility and popular support, but also the support from community leadership, which could help to resolve local conflicts. Driven by a disparate range of actors, community reconciliation efforts are too often executed in a sporadic, uncoordinated, and ad hoc manner. As a result, they largely failed to produce sustainable processes with lasting impact in communities.

Reconciliation has thus far failed in Iraq because the processes were mainly developed in isolation from citizens, their needs, skills, and interests. In the absence of an acceptable notion of citizenship, it can be argued that Iraqis have resorted to a range of communal, ethnic, tribal, and sectarian identities as a means of protection, leverage, and belonging, which transferred the conflict across the lines of affiliation. This has led to repeated violence.

Reconciliation after ISIL – A New Opening?

But not all signs are negative. As far as reconciliation is concerned, ISIL’s military defeat also produced positive signals. Iraqis across sect, ethnicity, tribe, and religion affiliations fought together and defeated a dangerous and powerful foe. This success remains a singular, and *mutual*, achievement.

More indirectly, but no less potently, the excesses and evils of radical extremism during ISIL’s reign created a strong moral consensus amongst political groups to openly oppose extremist religion. Having faced terror and destruction, Iraqis turned against religious extremism with a common determination not seen before.

Moreover, the Erbil/Baghdad conflict, which escalated when peshmerga, ISF, and Popular Mobilization Forces accessed conquered territories and of which many predicted would blow up into a new fully-fledged civil war, was, in fact, successfully mitigated though not yet fully resolved. In what became a mini-reconciliation process, the Iraqi leadership produced reasonable and negotiated solutions rather than resorting to violence as the first option.

Most significantly, it seems that the quiet preparatory work of various international agencies and NGO’s finally began to pay off in modest but concrete ways at community level where civic activism

is clearly on the rise¹⁰. Not only was there growing civic pressure on government to eliminate corruption, but also communities have begun to demand greater public involvement in local peace processes. In response to these developments in the latter half of 2017, the Prime Minister's office established an additional reconciliation mechanism, intending to support community-level opportunities for reconciliation and social cohesion. The Supreme Committee for Coexistence and Community Peace (SCCP) was meant to ensure that community reconciliation is prioritized as a core function of the Council of Ministers' Secretariat (COMSEC), signalling the acknowledgement of the importance of community reconciliation at the very highest decision-making levels.

Working closely with the SCCP and operating within what is now called the "Recovery and Resilience Programme", the UNDP too began to develop programs to respond to these developments. One such program concerns an approach to community reconciliation that seeks to integrate public awareness and education, local peace mechanisms and activism, and victim support and redress. It aims to support communities in taking concrete and effective steps towards local reconciliation at the level of neighbourhoods, towns, districts, and regions—with a focus on those areas that are most directly affected by ISIL, the massive population displacements, and social divisions.

The critical aspect of this strategy was the concept of "civic or citizenship-focused reconciliation". Historically, citizenship in Iraq had been contested first under colonial, then Baathist rule, and subsequently after the occupation post-2003. The notion of universal Iraqi citizenship based on democratic participation and human rights therefore offered a compelling, if unexplored, route out of religious and sectarian intolerance and tribalism towards national reconciliation. Emphasising the importance of civic dignity – the dignity experienced *as citizens* – was not only seen as crucial for developing social cohesion and trust within and between communities but also as an important *domestic* correction to political impunity. In many parts of the Middle East, and arguably in Iraq as well, reconciliation efforts have failed precisely because the process of reconciling elites had been allowed to develop in isolation from citizens and their legitimate needs and interests.

This perspective assumed that community reconciliation efforts which live up to these criteria would be credible in the eyes of citizens and, therefore, achieve success where previous attempts failed.

Developing Local Capacity for Reconciliation

In developing this approach, the UNDP was able to draw on its considerable internal reservoir of international experience, such as in countries like South Africa, Nicaragua, Kenya, Nepal, Ghana,

¹⁰ The painstaking work done by several organizations over many years include the United Institute of Peace (USIP), SANAD for Peacebuilding, Al-Amal Association, Partners Global, Une Ponte Per (UPP), Crisis Management Initiative (CMI), Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD), Al Mesalla, Peace and Freedom organisation (PFO), and PAX amongst others. Their support complements the work of UNDP programmes that focus on aspects of community reconciliation, such as the Iraq Crisis Response and Resilience Programme (ICRRP) together with the FFS.

Sierra Leone, and others, where mobilized citizenry, working in tandem with authorities to varying degrees, was able to promote community-level reconciliation during periods of political transition. Concretely this approach led to efforts to facilitate Local Peace Committees (LPCs) in selected hotspot areas as part of what is hoped eventually to be a nationwide “infrastructure for peace”. More formally, LPCs can be defined as area-specific community-based reconciliation mechanisms and processes with the purpose to raise civic awareness of, and participation in, community reconciliation to monitor and mitigate local conflict, build trust, and enhance social cohesion.¹¹ In Iraq, it was hoped that this structure would enable citizens to become directly involved in reconciliation as an act of civic movement-building.

John Paul Lederach first developed the notion of “infrastructures for peace” in which he sought to capture various key principles, processes, and mechanisms of peacemaking that integrates “bottom-up” with “top-down” approaches.¹² Lederach argued for a creative and systematic integration of the interdependent “multiple levels of society, from grassroots to high-level political processes” that are involved in comprehensive peacemaking. Such “vertical integration” was the single most significant weakness of various peace processes and required “strategic infrastructures and creative, sustained engagement.”¹³

Because the notion of the term “infrastructure” may indicate a certain inflexibility, Lederach later shifted from a focus on “institutions” to “platforms” to emphasize the danger of bureaucratizing peace processes. Although institutions emphasize the important shift away from “project”- focused, externally driven, and ad- hoc approaches, they tend to fall victim to “self-perpetuation”. Lederach argues that community reconciliation is not like organizing a marching band with a fixed rhythm playing the same tune exactly the same way every time. Reconciliation is more like a jazz band that can play the same tune in five different ways on five consecutive nights. Lederach stresses the point to avoid bureaucratization and instrumentalization as well as to remain open, innovative, and flexible even if someone endeavours to create some form of organized community peace process.

While agreeing with Lederach, I cannot help but remember an evening in a small Scottish village many years ago where a street band was playing with great enthusiasm for most of the night, only to be interrupted by increasingly frequent visits to the local pub. At long last, the band’s tempo and

¹¹ See for example, Andries Odendaal (December 2010) “An Architecture for Building Peace at the Local Level: A Comparative Study of Local Peace Committees”, 7, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); http://www.un.org/en/land-natural-resources-conflict/pdfs/UNDP_Local%20Peace%20Committees_2011.pdf; accessed on 19 September 2018.

¹² John Paul Lederach, *Building Peace*, 37ff. For a retrospective discussion of his intellectual journey with respect to developing the notion of “infrastructures of peace,” see John Paul Lederach, “The Origins and Evolution of Infrastructures of Peace: A Personal Reflection,” *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development* 7, no. 3 (2012): 8–13, available at <https://undp.unteamworks.org/node/417406> (accessed August 15, 2015).

¹³ Lederach, “The Origins and Evolution of Infrastructures of Peace,” 2.

rhythm started to fray a little and finally disintegrated. The last thing I remember before falling asleep was the sound the drums making their way up the high street while the trumpet and the bagpipes were heading out of town in the opposite direction. So yes, while we need to remain flexible and the structures fluid and non-bureaucratic, we also need to stay coordinated and “together” lest our community peace processes begin to resemble that Scottish band on a chilly December night, ending up with each member playing their own tune at a different street corner. The LPCs were thus an attempt to “keep the band together” and to create a community-based platform to coordinate and promote community-level reconciliation efforts.¹⁴

When appointed, all LPCs would be required to sign a code of conduct which included a set of fundamental values and principles. LPCs typically would have between ten to fifteen members. Community representatives, local government, and civic actors could all nominate members while the government had the final decision on membership. LPCs were then required to establish subcommittees which were deemed necessary to resolve specific sensitive issues faced by the community. At the time of writing, twelve LPCs had been established, two in the province of Anbar, four in Salah Al-Din and Nineveh provinces respectively, and two in Diyala province. In Anbar, the establishment of LPCs followed a rigorous public consultative process, involving more than 560 men and women, with a similar process followed in Salah Al-Din. By the time of writing, the government had identified fourteen additional priority districts where LPCs would be established as a matter of urgency. During the first half of 2018, approximately 275 current or potential LPC members received UNDP-sponsored training.

Some Early Responses from Communities

Almost immediately after the first LPCs were established in the weeks running up to Ramadan in 2018, communities began to submit their concerns and recommendations about the new structures. Typically, these concerns varied across regions, although some appeared consistent across all ISIL-affected areas.

A major and widespread concern in Anbar, Iraq’s largest province to the west of Baghdad, appeared to be tribal conflicts, which had escalated in the power vacuum left by ISIL’s demise. Anbar is home to an almost exclusively Sunni population. Conflicting perceptions about the levels of support the tribes provided to ISIL (and thus the level of accountability they would be required to assume) triggered many of these conflicts. Because of these uncertainties, some displaced families accused of supporting ISIL, were prevented from returning, while in other cases, secondary displacements took

¹⁴ See for example, Odendaal, “An Architecture of Building Peace at the Local Level”.

place. Against this backdrop, the LPC in Ramadi for example was able to facilitate the safe return of families from a particular tribe that was perceived to have supported ISIL. Approximately six hundred men, women, boys, and girls, were able to return to their respective villages due to the mediation work of this LPC. At the time of writing, a similar process had begun in Falluja, where the LPC was preparing for a mission to engage community leaders in several IDP camps to facilitate problematic cases regarding their return home. In another initiative, several Anbari LPCs, together with the Anbar's chief "Arfaa" – an officially recognized tribal "Wise Man" – successfully mediated an inter-tribal dialogue process between Sheiks from one tribe, counterparts from the opposing tribe, local government officials, and other eminent persons from the village. A similar case is that of LPCs in Amyryat Al-Sumoud and Khalidya who helped to reconcile a standoff between families from two conflicted tribes. During this particular conciliation session, the LPC facilitated an agreement that would allow families from the tribe accused of having supported ISIL to enter their areas of residence. At the same time, this agreement determined that individual alleged perpetrators could be prosecuted by the Iraq court system in line with Iraq's criminal legislation. These developments were significant since collective punishment remained a particular concern in Anbar.

In Salah Al-Din, the governorate directly north of Baghdad the social fabric historically looked different with significant Sunni and Shia groupings facing off. Over the years since the fall of Saddam, the area saw widespread sectarian clashes. In one particular town, Yathrib, Shia and Sunni tribes had been at loggerheads over land ownership and access to water, a situation that severely deteriorated when ISIL entered the fray. Once again IDPs were the ultimate victims, but this time due to sectarian, not tribal, disputes. In Yathrib, but also elsewhere, LPCs supported by Iraqi non-governmental organizations, organized several rounds of consultations with communities on the most pressing issues they faced in relation to their conflicts. Communities expressed concerns over the fairness of due processes related to the return and release of detainees, the coordination of security forces and sectarian conflict mediation. Through this process, the LPCs eventually facilitated the signing of a "code of honor" between stakeholders in the district of Balad, where sectarian conflict was particularly prevalent. This micropolitan-specific agreement proved to be a more useful tool than a governorate pact which had been signed before and enabled the return of several hundred IDPs.

Ninewah, Iraq's northern-most governorate on the border with Turkey and Iran, is home to a patchwork of minority groupings, such as the Yezidi, Shabak, Kaka'i, Turkmen, Kurds, and Christians together with larger communities of Sunni Arabs. With this social structure, issues are again markedly different from those of Anbar or Salah Al-Din. Levels of traumatization and victimization are incredibly high, given the sheer brutality with which ISIL treated minorities. Also, political problems preceding ISIL have eroded trust with Baghdad for over a decade or more. It stands

to reason then, that social cohesion, religious tolerance, and trust-building measures from Baghdad were identified as top priorities for Ninewa's community reconciliation programs. For this reason, direct engagement between the office of the Prime Minister and the minority communities paved the way for the establishment of LPCs in a selection of districts. These structures are still in their infancy, and some, like the Yezidi LPC, are not yet finalized. Yet, an early initiative by one of the LPCs indicates how these bodies will potentially be able to assist in the restoration of the social fabric of these scattered communities. In Bartela, Christians and Shabak Muslims lived cheek by jowl for centuries before ISIL exiled many Christians and destroyed several places of worship. Here, some Shabak Muslim LPC members scaled a church, damaged by ISIL, and repaired the cross in full view of the community. This event served as an open invitation to the Christians to return. One symbolic action can sometimes speak louder than a thousand words.

Two Sides of the Coin—a Brief Assessment of Some Opportunities and Attendant Risks

The principal goals of the community reconciliation programme are to maintain and broaden inclusivity and fairness, avoid politicization, and enlist communities effectively as agents of peace. But what are the opportunities and risks associated with this approach? Two risks readily stand out. First, if community initiatives are entirely civic-dominated with no government involvement at all, the risk is that in societies as “top-down” and patriarchal as Iraq, these structures may become largely toothless and irrelevant to real socio-political change. A second risk relates to the opposite scenario where civic movements become so closely affiliated and submissive to government and the existing (often patriarchal) structures in society that they in fact become an extension of the existing problems, instead of addressing them in a novel or creative way. So the real challenge is to develop civic movements pegged somewhere between *irrelevance* on the one hand and *submission* on the other. Both these risks are at play in Iraq and have developed their own unique manifestations. A key challenge, which presents at once risks and opportunities, lies in efforts to develop a bottom-up conversation not only in the wake of top-down reconciliation programmes which had done much to discredited the notion in the minds of citizens, but also in the absence of meaningful national frameworks which unite Iraqis. This makes the target of non-submissive relevance for community initiatives, that much more difficult to achieve. The program described here is an example of an attempt at a classic “bottom-up” effort to mobilize communities to work towards national reconciliation by taking care of their local needs. This procedure appears all the more important, given the widespread acknowledgement by Iraqi leaders and international observers alike that, as yet, the country lacks a genuinely national, inclusive vision of reconciliation. Thus, the reasoning continues while negotiations and political processes may appear stagnant at a national level, the smart option is

to work for peace at a community level. It is further assumed that if these efforts are successful, and if they are linked to a national “infrastructure” or – to use a more organic term – a “movement”, one could imagine a meaningful process of civic engagement where the “peace movement” makes a telling contribution to the national conversation on reconciliation. Considering these reconciliation approaches, the cases of South Africa, Northern Ireland, and Tunisia come to mind, where national reconciliation processes became significantly more inclusive and considerably fairer due to effective civic pressure “from below”.

Although there is never a wrong time to work for resilient communities who can manage and mitigate their own conflicts, the process as set out above may be even more complex in Iraq at present. Compared to the three cases mentioned above (Tunisia, South Africa, and Northern Ireland), Iraq lacks a shared political framework that would provide some form of common ground which would provide the basis for a common public voice on matters relevant to reconciliation. Put differently, in Iraq, there are still too many unanswered fundamental questions that remain uncertain, which makes both local and national conversations extremely difficult. These questions include for example, the role of Islam and Sharia law with regards to the Constitution.¹⁵ Will Iraq eventually fully embrace a secular human rights approach, or will it veer towards a theocracy? Alternatively, it may continue to follow the “messy middle road”. A similar concern relates to the status of tribal law within the national jurisdiction of the Iraqi state and the exact mandate and powers that chiefs and other tribal leaders enjoy both *de facto* and *de jure*. The solution to this issue too will have a critical impact on community-related reconciliation efforts which remain heavily dependent on the participation of tribal authorities. Another set of issues relates to the unresolved special status of Kurdistan within the Republic and the so-called “Dispute Border Areas” between Kurdistan and the rest of Iraq. An urgent conversation to resolve these simmering tensions is long overdue since areas in and around Kurdistan remain fundamentally unstable. Another massively important area that has not yet benefited from a proper national conversation is transitional justice. The needs are astronomical. Victims experience little compensation in Iraq and perpetrators of offensive human rights violations remain in power (and carry guns) everywhere. The right to truth, justice, reparations, and to guarantees of non-recurrence are the core transitional justice priorities and, therefore, merit an urgent *national* conversation, *national* framework, and *national* strategy. With national questions like these unsettled, reconciliation at community level remains significantly more complicated than it otherwise would since all these issues often determine day-to-day reconciliation processes on the ground. The lack of national leadership force communities to have to confront issues that are simply beyond a community’s

¹⁵ Al-Bayan Center for Planning and Studies (2016) “National Reconciliation in Iraq—A Comparative Study”, *Al-Bayan Publications Series* 7, 24–25.

capacity to address, and which can only be solved at a national level. Considering Iraq's situation, even if communities manage to adopt their own approaches to issues of national importance, it is almost inevitable that these strategies will stray into irrelevance or compliance at different times and in different measures across communities and regions.

Moreover, the relationship of coordination and cooperation based on some modicum of trust between government and civic actors, which LPCs seek to establish, nevertheless also remains an excellent opportunity to build trust not only through structured and facilitated dialogue between communities and high-placed government officials (as has been happening during LPC training events) but also through practical cooperation on issues of priority. This trust-building exercise remains particularly important in the case of those minorities, who have been sharing a fundamental distrust of Baghdad since 2003. This distrust had already emerged before Iraq was under Baathist rule. The lack of trust is noticeable in the relationship of the national government towards civic structures, local, and provincial government agencies that are tasked with reconciliation. Therefore, a cooperation of all three tiers of government with credible civic actors in strategic and transparent conversations about community reconciliation has the potential to restore much-needed "vertical" trust.

However, the risk of "top-down" manipulation remains real not only in the selection process but also in the way that government responds to recommendations and requests of LPCs. Some, including Odendaal, believe that the benefit of involving the government, building some form of vertical trust as well as a sense of citizenship outweighs the risk of politicizing reconciliation. According to Odendaal, it is better to have "semi-independent" LPCs than either entirely independent civic structures with no influence on government, or official LPCs which are merely an extension of the government.¹⁶ In Iraq, the reality is that no initiative is likely to have much impact without governmental support, regardless of how weak the local government may be in many areas. It is, therefore, necessary to fully involve the government and to ensure that LPCs are officially endorsed by Baghdad, which has been the case so far. At the same time, whether intentionally or inadvertently, the risk of politicization remains a problem. Vigilance will be necessary to prevent against any development in this regard. In addition to that, the choice to work with volunteers rather than remunerated staff also carries opportunities and risks. Considering Iraq's more recent history, there are good reasons to be suspicious of paying individuals for tasks in the community. In order to pursue agendas, which had a questionable impact on their community, authorities in power too often paid civic leaders in the past. Corruption followed money into the communities, and local competition had thus increased instead of decreased. This development led to considerable scepticism among Iraqis about the bona fides of some self-styled activists. The requirement that LPCs have to consist of

¹⁶ Odendaal, "An Architecture of Building Peace at the Local Level", 8.

volunteers sends a clear message about the bona fides of the LPC members, eliminates the mechanism of a stringent financial oversight as well as the real possibility of competition for positions based on ulterior motives. At the same time, however, volunteerism can put a strain on the medium-term viability of LPCs and the sustainability of their impact on communities. In a resource-scarce society like Iraq, it is a tall order to ask individuals to get involved in non-remunerated activities of the intensity and scale initially planned for LPCs on full or even part-time basis. At this point, the position to supply each LPC with a local remunerated UNDP facilitator seems to be the best interim solution. Only time can tell if this approach will be sufficient to enable a sustainable volunteer movement with substantial impact on community reconciliation.

Another fact is that young people and women have been centrally involved in the project not only as LPC members but also as co-creators of public awareness campaign messages that support the work. This is an opportunity to take reconciliation into the realm of social media, a territory which has been occupied by religious extremists rather than moderates for a long time. This new strategy helps to ensure the relevance of LPC for its most important stakeholders, who with women and young people happen to remain an extremely vulnerable group. There is still the risk that Iraq continues to be a profoundly patriarchal society in which male-dominated structures are paramount, and LPCs with youth memberships could easily be neglected. Roughly the same applies to gender issues. The involvement of strong gender groups to sensitize LPCs from the beginning with regards to the needs and demands of women victims as well as the establishment of women leaders is an enormous opportunity to enhance gender equality and gender-sensitive reconciliation. At the same time, one Sheik recently said proudly that their village had an excellent compensation scheme, ten million IRD for any man killed and five million for any women. In a society where views like this still exist (although by no means universal), there is a risk that LPCs with female and youth memberships will always be perceived as inferior.

It is therefore clear that the conscious mitigation of these risks and persistent efforts to maximize positive opportunities are necessary to ensure the “bottom-up” reconciliation process in Iraq succeed. It will remain vital that government remains involved and represented as is presently the case, but that they refrain from dominating processes. The same is true of the involvement of tribal authorities and other more traditional authorities. These forces, although necessary to be present inside the framework, needs to be balanced by activist voices, not least from vulnerable groups such as youth, women and minorities, of which there are happily no shortage at present. It is also important that civic structures are accompanied very closely to ensure that the processes and discussions inside these bodies remain inclusive and fair, and that all the voices present have an equal say. If guided in this way by established NGO’s and trusted INGO’s, LPCs have a real chance of making a lasting

contribution to reconciliation in Iraq. However, it would require the ongoing, sustained commitment of those agencies, and donors, who began the process for at least the next five to ten years.

Conclusion

Iraq's embrace of the idea of community-based reconciliation mechanisms both at governmental and civic levels provide a glimmer of hope in the otherwise grim aftermath of the battle against ISIL, which, despite its military defeat, continues to show some capacity to launch destabilizing attacks against civilian targets. The hope for a better future resides in Iraqis acknowledgement of the need for reconciliation in their communities and of the need for these processes to be inclusive and fair towards all citizens. A fledgling new partnership between the UNDP and government seeks to facilitate precisely this development but has some way to go to prove its sustainability. At the same time, early signs are positive that the mechanism is being accepted as one solution to mitigate local conflict about the most contentious and challenging issues faced by Iraqi communities as they seek to piece themselves together again after ISIL.

Bibliography

- Al-Bayan Center for Planning and Studies 2016, "National Reconciliation in Iraq – A Comparative Study", *Al-Bayan Publications Series*, vol. 7, pp. 1–46.
- Al-Marashi, I & Keskin, A 2008, "Reconciliation Dilemmas in Post-Ba'athist Iraq: Truth Commissions, Media and Ethno-Sectarian Conflicts", *Mediterranean Politics*, vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 243–259.
- Al-Sheikh, S R & Sky, E 2011, "Iraq since 2003: Perspectives on a Divided Society", *Survival*, vol. 53, no. 4, pp. 119–142.
- Du Toit, F 2018. *When Political Transitions Work: Reconciliation as Interdependence*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Khoury, D R 2013, *Iraq in Wartime: Soldiering, Martyrdom and Remembrance*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Lederach, J P 1997, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*, United States Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C.
- Lederach, J P 2012, "The Origins and Evolution of Infrastructures of Peace: A Personal Reflection", *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development*, vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 8–13. Available at <https://undp.unteamworks.org/node/417406>; accessed August 15, 2015.
- Odendaal, A 2010, "An Architecture for Building Peace at the Local Level: A Comparative Study of Local Peace Committees", *United Nations Development Programme*. Available at <http://www.un.org/en/land-natural-resources->

[conflict/pdfs/UNDP_Local%20Peace%20Committees_2011.pdf](#); accessed September 19, 2018.

Part Two

Grassroots Reconciliation: Case Study of Tucson Arizona (USA)

Abstract

Any successful societal reconciliation must have a strong grassroots element. No imposed programs without the willing and active participation of the majority population will ever succeed. However, sometimes social problems are ignored by governments either unable or unwilling to cope and reconciliation results from community grassroots efforts. As the poet John Donne wrote, “No man is an island”¹ and five centuries later we are living that reality. Thanks to technology, our world is shrinking and its populations are exploding. A global economy, world politics and weapons of mass destruction facilitated by worldwide instant communications ensure we are no longer alone. In increasingly heterogeneous societies, people of different cultures and religions, speaking different languages are neighbors. What steps can be taken to integrate them into the larger society?

Reconciliation between opposing sides takes many forms and is different in almost every instance. However, in order to be successful in all cases, it requires a willingness on both sides to be open to discussions of all disputes that separate them. Equally important is a willingness to listen and – most importantly – a willingness to compromise in order to reach a lasting resolution of the differences between them. The most underrated of all forms of reconciliation is grassroots reconciliation, which can be the most effective due to its origins from within the community itself. It is not imposed on the disputants from outside, or by any authority from above but comes from the people themselves.

In my view, there are essentially two basic forms of grassroots reconciliation: spontaneous and planned, or directed. Both are non-governmental and led by individuals in local groups, often religious or charitable organisations in a community. However, while the purpose of both is to reconcile disaffected or opposing sides within a society, the former is spontaneous, informal and loosely organised. It also involves more than one group and set of leaders. The latter, in contrast, is more formal, structured, planned, and under a single group and leader. This paper focuses on spontaneous reconciliation.

On 11 September 2001, the complacency of the United States was shattered by a series of events that took place that day. Far from the on-going conflicts and terrorism in the Middle East, which many

¹ Devotions Upon Emergent Occasions and Seuerall Steps in my Sicknes - Meditation XVII, 1624.

believe that U.S. foreign policy has helped to create, America and the world gazed in stupefaction at the smoking ruins of New York City's Twin Towers. In Washington, D.C. news reports showed the gaping hole in the west side of the Pentagon building in Washington, D.C. and near Shanksville, western Pennsylvania, the wreckage of United Airlines flight 93 smoldered in a field. In these first act of foreign terrorism against the U.S. on its soil, almost three thousand people perished as the result of these attacks ("9/11 Attacks", 2010). The chickens had come home to roost. This event was to prove a wake-up call for the US and the world in the events that were to follow.

Across the country, 2400 miles from NYC, the southwestern U.S. city of Tucson, Arizona, home of the University of Arizona, shared in the nation's shock and astonishment. A city of almost 500,000 inhabitants, over 10 percent of whom were students at the university, was also home to a small multinational Muslim community of three to four thousand people. Many were students from the Gulf States – Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the Emirates – as well as Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, and Indonesia. Most, however, were permanent residents from these countries, as well as from Bosnia, Turkey, Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, Yemen, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Nigeria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh, who, together with their families, lived and worked in Tucson. Adjacent to the university was the Islamic Center of Tucson, where most worshipped. Known locally as the ICT, it was the only Sunni mosque in the city and central to this story.

Four days later, one hundred miles north of Tucson in the Phoenix suburb of Mesa, Arizona, Sikh-American Balbir Singh Sodhi was murdered at his place of work. It was the first of several hate crimes around the country in retaliation for the 9/11 attacks. A religious Sikh, Sodhi wore a beard and a turban and was mistaken for an Arab Muslim by his attacker, "who reportedly told friends that he was 'going out and shoot some towel-heads' the day of the attacks" ("His brother was murdered for wearing a turban after 9/11. 15 years later, he spoke to the killer," 2016). The man was caught and after his trial sentenced to death. Later, his sentence was commuted to life in prison where he remains to this day.

In Tucson, one day while driving to work the imam of the Islamic Center of Tucson was chased down the street by a man in another car who threatened him with a gun. Another time, the imam was almost run off the road by another car and someone threw a rock through his car's back window. Meanwhile, the ICT began to receive threats, mostly on the phone and some people threw rubbish on the property. Muslim women, conspicuous with their hijabs were harassed in the streets and local stores. For days, the news media – both tv and print – parked their vans in front of the mosque, attempting to interview anyone who walked in or out of the mosque. When called about the harassment, the Tucson Police Department asked if they could park a marked police car with an officer in it twenty-four hours a day

next to the mosque. Also for a year afterwards, a police detective sergeant visited the ICT several times a week for months afterwards to check if everything was all right.

What happened next was unexpected. One night, a few days after 9/11, as Muslims came to the ICT for Maghreb prayers, they found a group of people holding lighted candles and forming a circle in front of the mosque. Led by local rabbi of Tucson's Reform Jewish Congregation Or Chadash, Tom Lochheim, this "peace vigil" was to demonstrate their support for the Muslim community in this difficult time. By their presence, the Jewish community and other community members hoped to deter any retaliation that might occur in reaction to the events of 9/11. Rabbi Lochheim and his group of Jews, Christians, and non-religious people continued their vigil every night for over a week. On hearing of the threats to the Muslim women, the rabbi set up a number for the women to call and arranged an escort who would be sent to their homes to accompany them wherever they wanted to go. If the women were too frightened to leave the house (and some were), someone would be sent to take care of any other necessities, such as running errands or grocery shopping. This support continued for several months until it was no longer needed.

Meanwhile, requests from churches and other organisations for speakers to talk about Islam and explain 9/11 flooded the ICT each day. For weeks, the imam and I, as ICT spokesman, were overwhelmed with invitations to give talks about Islam all over Tucson to concerned community members. As a result, we became involved in numerous community interfaith activities that followed, especially after the U.S. retaliation for 9/11 in Iraq and Afghanistan. Along with Rabbi Tom Lochheim and his Congregation Or Chadash, much of this interfaith activity was the result of the previous activities of Rev. David Wilkinson, pastor of St. Francis-in-the-Foothills United Methodist Church, and Rabbi Joseph Wisenbaum of the Reform Jewish Congregation Ner Tamid. St. Francis shared its premises with the Congregation Ner Tamid, where Rev. Wilkinson and Wisenbaum routinely co-led interfaith events together. At the center of the interfaith activism of these three religious leaders was the organisation "The International Center for Peace." They and their congregations were to become closely involved with the ICT in numerous Muslim-Christian-Jewish dialogues.

I first met Rabbi Lochheim in 1995 on the set of the local PBS/TV's community affairs program "Arizona Illustrated" in its studios on the campus of the University of Arizona. Hosted by Bill Buckmaster, the program covered a variety of topics, issues and events in the Tucson and southern Arizona area including discussions of religious questions. Over the next several years, the two of us were invited together on to the program to discuss various religious matters involving our respective communities and got to know each other as we chatted after each program. Until 9/11, that was the extent of our relationship. One day after Friday prayers at the ICT, not long after 9/11, I met Rev.

David Wilkinson. He was curious about how recent events had affected the Muslim community and, thus, decided to attend Friday prayers at the ICT and introduce himself to community leaders to offer his support. Imam Omar Shahin and I welcomed him and soon found ourselves at St. Francis attending regular monthly meetings of The International Center for Peace. Other participants included Rabbi Wisenbaum and Rabbi Lochheim, both of whom were members of the group along with others from all three congregations. The meetings focused on joint projects and events our communities could do together in support of peace, solidarity, and reconciliation. It was to prove the source of many interfaith activities involving Muslim, Christians, and Jews over the next several years.

Among these were discussions about building an International Center for Peace headquarters and a mosque on vacant land on St. Francis's property. Neither project happened due to lack of funds, but that did not dispel enthusiasm among the group for other projects and events. One was the building of a small International Peace Library with books from all three faiths available to the general public. Another project was a small discussion group involved in a Muslim-Christian-Jewish scriptural dialogue, in which selected passages from the Old and New Testaments, the Hebrew Bible/Tanakh, and the Qur'an were compared, similarities and differences noted and discussed ("3 Religions, 1 Goal: Understanding," 2002). One of the more popular events was a four-week series on "The Abrahamic Faiths," during which presentations were made on Judaism by Rabbi Joe Weizenbaum, on Islam by Imam Shahin and Christianity by Rev. Wilkinson. Each presentation began with a prayer and ended with an open forum for questions from the audience followed by a pot-luck dinner consisting of foods from the various faith traditions through which interfaith discussions were carried on at the tables. This event was well-attended with two hundred or more people at each presentation. An International Peace Library as well as an International School for Peace were established, and for two years along with a member of Congregation Ner Tamid I was a non-voting member – representing the Muslim community – on St. Francis's board of trustees.

In early 2004, Rabbi Lochheim approached me about a rabbi and an imam in Albuquerque, New Mexico, who had developed the idea of a Muslim-Jewish PeaceWalk. Its purpose was to show that Jews and Muslims should be working together to promote peace and mutual understanding. In April 2002, the two led a group of 350 Muslims, Jews, and others in the first Muslim-Jewish PeaceWalk 6.6 miles between the rabbi's synagogue and the imam's mosque. They held another walk later that year in September and one in May 2003. They even led a Muslim-Jewish PeaceWalk in New York City near the site of the Twin Towers in 2003. Now, with their help and the ICT's involvement, Rabbi Lochheim told me they wanted to bring a Muslim-Jewish PeaceWalk to Tucson. So, in late February 2004, twenty-two people met at the Islamic Center of Tucson in the first of a series of meetings to organise the first Tucson Muslim-Jewish PeaceWalk. The group consisted of Muslims who had never

met a Jew before, Jews who had never been in a mosque, and Christians who had never met either before. It also included a Sikh, a Buddhist and an atheist. All shared the same goal: promoting world peace and harmony among all faith traditions in the Tucson community. At the first meeting, PeaceWalk founders Rabbi Lynn Gottlieb and Imam Abdur' Rauf Campos-Marquetti, visiting from Albuquerque, described how the project was developed and what features were involved. Among the items discussed were obtaining city permits for the march, training of street crossing guards, periodic rest stops along the way, locations of water stops for the marchers, a shuttle bus for tired walkers, and well-stocked lunch at the end of the walk. Subsequent meetings were co-chaired by a Muslim and a Jew, who were chosen by their respective community members. All decisions were made by group consensus with everyone having a chance to speak and a vote taken on each decision made. With the walk as a vehicle and an immediate goal, the ultimate intention of the group was to create an interfaith community ("Walk for Peace: Local Jews and Muslims have overcome obstacles in an attempt to create an interfaith community", 2004).

A month later, on 21 March 2004, the participants of the first Tucson Muslim-Jewish PeaceWalk assembled outside the front of the Islamic Center of Tucson. After brief remarks from the organisers and religious leaders on the ICT's front steps, several hundred people, carrying banners and signs, set out from the Islamic Center of Tucson to walk the 5.3 miles along Tucson's Speedway Avenue, the city's main street, to Reform Jewish Congregation Chaverim. The participants walked and talked along the way, getting to know one another. Midway, everyone stopped at a park, drank the provided water, used the facilities, and the Muslims said their noon prayers. At the end of the walk at Congregation Chaverim, everyone joined together for lunch and talked about the tour, what it meant to them, and discussed plans for next year's walk. Meanwhile, various group activities, involving the PeaceWalkers and others interested in supporting peace and solidarity in the Tucson community, were held around Tucson at several venues. Many were well-attended and as bonds of friendship grew between the participants, there were on-going discussions on a variety of interfaith topics throughout the year around Tucson. The following year, as time approached for the second PeaceWalk meetings were once again held to organise the walk. This time, it was to be a Jewish-Muslim PeaceWalk from Temple Emanu-El, the largest Reform Jewish Synagogue in Tucson, to the Islamic Center of Tucson. This was to alternate over the years between different Jewish congregations and the ICT ("Jewish-Muslim PeaceWalk," 2013). The Tucson Muslim-Jewish PeaceWalks continued until 2014.

Meanwhile, personal interactions between Muslim and Jewish participants multiplied, and friendships were made. ICT members were invited to celebrate the Passover at the homes of Jewish PeaceWalkers, congregations and synagogues, as well as at the Hillel Foundation's Jewish student

center at the University of Arizona, and the city's Jewish Community Center. The Islamic Center of Tucson, in turn, invited Jewish and Christian PeaceWalkers and others to join them at a community *Iftar* dinner to celebrate the breaking of the day's fast during Ramadan. Along with some others, I was invited to join the family of a Jewish PeaceWalker as they "sat shiva" at the end of seven days of mourning for the death of a family member.

At St. Francis and elsewhere, interfaith activities of all kinds continued at an intense pace in Tucson from 2001 – 2009 with groups meeting at churches around town in a variety of committees and discussion groups. There was even an interfaith wedding between a Muslim man and a Jewish woman held in traditional ceremonies at two separate venues, one Muslim and the other Jewish. Meanwhile, the ICT received further requests for talks. For instance, I was invited to give a speech at Friday night Shabbat services at two Jewish congregations. On Friday evenings, some of us from the mosque joined the Israeli Jewish women's peace and justice group, The Women in Black, on Tucson's Speedway main street and held signs and placards protesting the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and supporting Palestine ("Who are Women in Black," 2019. This do not go well with some of the more conservative members of the Tucson Jewish community.

So, how did all this come about? What led to such a spontaneous grassroots support for the Tucson Muslim community? It was the result of outreach by the members of the ICT to the larger religious community as a whole. As its spokesman, I was active for eight years prior to 9/11 in Tucson speaking at churches, on local tv talk shows, and to special interest groups. Support for the Muslim community at a difficult time also resulted from my friendship with Rabbi Lochheim, who – as already mentioned – I met on a tv talk show. He was a key member of a strong (although small) Jewish pro-peace group in Tucson that included a vocal Israeli women-led group of Women in Black and the Jewish Voice for Peace. The Tucson PeaceWalk and support for the Muslim community at this time also found backing within a segment of the Tucson Christian community, which was already involved in local refugee issues. All this was an outcome of the events of 9/11 and the Iraq war, which prompted interest in the local tv media to get local reactions and "inside" information for their nightly tv news shows. During this time, reporters frequently come to the mosque for interviews, explanations (on camera and off), and reactions to events in local and world news. As a result, good relationships were developed early with members of the media that proved during this time to be generally sympathetic and supportive of Islam and the Tucson Muslim community.

Because of these and other activities, Muslims and Jews were talking together and learning from and about each other. Strong bonds of friendship and relationships were made during this time ("Monday is holiday for both Muslims and Jews", 2005). More than that, a community that was generally reclusive and kept to themselves became outgoing and open to the greater Tucson community and a

variety of other activities. The mosque welcomed local authorities and the public for *Iftar* and *Eid* celebrations, and mosque members have since become involved in the local food bank and other Tucson community activities. In 2013, two of Tucson's Muslim community leaders and their wives – originally from Egypt and Pakistan – were part of a multi-faith (Muslim, Christian and Jewish) group that visited Israel and Palestine to learn first-hand about the situation there from local inhabitants in both countries. Not only did they visit Islam's holy sites of Al Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock, but also the Holocaust Museum, where they met with Holocaust survivors and visited the Western Wall (where one Muslim leader donned a *kippa* and put a written prayer for world peace in the wall). They also visited Bethlehem, Sderot, Haifa, and the West Bank, met with representatives of Rabbis for Human Rights and Palestinian peace activists, had dinner with Israeli families, and lunch in Hebron with the Shaheen family, whose son lives in Tucson ("A Pilgrimage to the Holy Land," 2013). Since 2016, on every second Saturday of the month, Muslim doctors provide free monthly health clinics at the Muslim Community Center open to the public for anyone in need of it, regardless of race, color, or religion ("Second Annual Interfaith Pack-a-Thon", 2017).

The tragic events of 9/11 inspired human compassion, bonds of friendship and interfaith cooperation from its people at a difficult time in Tucson, Arizona that continues today.

Lesson learned

- 1) What can we learn from this grassroots reconciliation experience? Get involved in your community
 - a. Schools/parent groups
 - b. Charities
 - c. Community outreach with other groups and organisations
- 2) Develop good relations with local authorities (police/local government)
- 3) Appoint a spokesperson, who is
 - a) Outgoing and comfortable with public speaking
 - b) Familiar with the local language/community/culture/history
 - c) Can manage the media
 - a. Educate them about your community
 - b. Be the "source" and "go-to person" for community information
 - c. Get a sympathetic hearing for problems and issues

Note

This paper is based primarily on my experiences between 1995 and 2009, after which I left Tucson for Cambridge, England and my involvement in Tucson interfaith activities came to an end. In compiling this paper, I was fortunate to have the recollections of Rev. Wilkinson, now retired as pastor of St. Francis-in-the-Foothills United Methodist Church and a key person responsible for some of the activities mentioned. Due to the short notice, others who participated in the above mentioned activities during this period were unable to contribute to the paper. In support of some of the activities mentioned in this paper, I was able to find additional information on the internet, in local newspapers, and on social media. I hope that in the future, a more complete history of this remarkable time of interfaith harmony and collaboration in Tucson between the three Abrahamic Faiths will be written. However, the exemplary instance of interfaith activities in Tucson provides a model of sorts for community-level grassroots reconciliations elsewhere.

Bibliography

- “9/11 Attacks”, *History Channel*, 2010, <https://www.history.com/topics/9-11-attacks> (accessed 30 August 2018).
- “His brother was murdered for wearing a turban after 9/11. 15 years later, he spoke to the killer.” *PRI's the World*, 23 September 2016 (<https://www.pri.org/stories/2016-09-23/his-brother-was-murdered-wearing-turban-after-911-last-week-he-spoke-killer>) (accessed 6 September 2018).
- “3 Religions, 1 Goal: Understanding”, *Tucson Citizen*, 24 September 2002, at <http://tucsoncitizen.com/morgue2/2002/09/24/147419-3-religions-1-goal-understanding/> (accessed 6 September 2018).
- “Walk for Peace: Local Jews and Muslims have overcome obstacles in an attempt to create an interfaith community”, *Tucson Weekly*, March 18, 2004 (<https://www.tucsonweekly.com/tucson/walk-for-peace/Content?oid=1075580>) (accessed 10 September 2018).
- “Jewish-Muslim PeaceWalk, 23 March 2013”, Muslim Community Center *Facebook*, at <https://www.facebook.com/MuslimCommunityCenterOfTucson/photos/a.541484672699939/540150849499988/?type=3&theater> (accessed 10 September 2018).
- “Who are Women in Black” at Women in Black, at <http://womeninblack.org/about-women-in-black/> (accessed 5 September 2018).
- “Monday is holiday for both Muslims and Jews”, *Tucson Citizen*, 1 October 2005, at <http://tucsoncitizen.com/morgue2/2005/10/01/219537-monday-is-holiday-for-both-muslims-and-jews/> (accessed 6 September 2018).

“Jewish-Muslim PeaceWalk, 23 March 2013”, Muslim Community Center *Facebook*, at <https://www.facebook.com/MuslimCommunityCenterOfTucson/photos/a.541484672699939/540150849499988/?type=3&theater> (accessed 10 September 2018).

“A Pilgrimage to the Holy Land,” *Tikkun Daily*, 10 May 2013, at <https://www.tikkun.org/tikkundaily/2013/05/10/a-pilgrimage-to-the-holy-land/> (accessed 6 September 2018). See also, “Interfaith Group Probes Mideast Peace Issues,” *Arizona Jewish Post*, 11 January 2013, at <https://azjewishpost.com/2013/interfaith-mission-probes-mideast-peace-issues/> (accessed 6 September 2018).

“Second Annual Interfaith Pack-a-Thon”, 8 January 2017, Muslim Community Center *Facebook*, at <https://www.facebook.com/MuslimCommunityCenterOfTucson/photos/a.541484672699939/540150849499988/?type=3&theater> (accessed 10 September 2018).

Digital News and Public Opinion: the Case of Syrian Refugees in Germany

Abstract

This study investigates the portrayal of Syrian refugees in the most widely read digital news in Germany and its effects on public opinion. We focus mainly on the relationships between lexical items featured in articles about Syrian refugees published in 2015 by German, British and American news websites and those used by German students to express their attitudes towards refugees. To this end, we compiled three news datasets and disseminated an electronic survey to several German universities. The analysis of the articles shows that the expressions utilized by journalists refer to seven interrelated, broad topical frames: humanitarianism, military conflict, political responsibility, security and restrictions, dehumanization, financial burden, and integration. The analysis of the students' responses reveals that the terms they used to express their idea of refugees are linked mostly to the categories of humanitarianism and integration, and to a lesser extent to conflict. Although media contributes to shaping public opinion, these results suggest that their impact is limited by the audiences' critical thinking and reading skills.

Introduction

Research on the representation of refugees in the press has focused on the frequently biased and negative construction of their images and the consequences faced by their host communities (Cartner 2009; Banks 2012; McKay et al. 2012; Esses et al. 2013; Parker 2015). Several studies have analyzed different types of news to illustrate how their mostly improper depictions have been creating a kind of discourse that promotes their dehumanization and perpetuates negative attitudes towards them (Gabrielatos & Baker 2006; Esses et al. 2013; Banks 2012). This will, in turn, most likely propagate their foreignness and encourage their exclusion from the local communities (Cartner 2009; Parker 2015). The evidence provided for such effects is mostly derived from community surveys (McKay et al. 2012) and opinion polls (Phillips & Spinks 2013). However, the relationship between the language used in news media to describe refugees and that used by those surveyed has not yet been explicitly addressed.

Recently, a lot of attention has been given to Arab refugees fleeing to neighboring countries or Europe due to the political unrest in the Middle East. Various news reports have portrayed these refugees as an economic burden for the host countries and a potential threat to their security rather than helpless victims of war (Järvinen 2015; Elsamni 2016). The conflict between the security concerns and the

humanitarian perspectives, which has been highlighted in the media coverage of refugees in Europe, has created mixed attitudes towards Arab refugees in the host communities.

In this research project, we investigate the relationship between the portrayal of Syrian refugees in the digital news among German students during 2015 and the public perception of the refugees. We focus on the semantic analysis of the expressions used to describe refugees and migrants on news websites and how they relate to those used by German university students to express their attitudes towards the Syrian asylum seekers.

Literature Review

Research on the representation of refugees and asylum seekers in media has shown that they are usually portrayed negatively. A good number of studies reveal that this unfair depiction seems to occur across the news published in different languages and various countries (Pickering 2001; Baker & McEnery 2005; Gabrielatos & Baker 2006; Vicsek et al. 2008; Khosravini 2009; Steimel 2010; Holtom 2012; Taylor 2014). For instance, Pickering (2001) reports that refugees and asylum seekers have been represented as a problematic and deviant part of the population in Australian media. Also, Vicsek et al. (2008) found that refugees are predominantly related to negative news in Hungarian newspapers which have depicted their images in connection with issues of crime and aberrant behavior. Khosravini (2009, 2010) and Banks (2012) reported similar results.

Negative depictions of refugees in media do not only promote their dehumanization but also create hostile attitudes towards them and provide justifications for their exclusion from society (Cartner 2009, Banks 2012; McKay et al. 2012; Esses et al. 2013; Phillips & Spinks 2013). The interplay between traditional values and how these values seem to be threatened by refugees usually shape such negative attitudes (McKay et al. 2012). The media's role in this process, according to Fowler (1991), can be seen in the tendency of journalists to manipulate language to create messages that may affect the value system of a given society. For example, Gabrielatos & Baker (2006) believe that the British press is responsible for creating and maintaining a moral panic around refugees. Also, Kamenova (2014) illustrates how the recurrent distorted images of Syrian refugees in the Bulgarian media have contributed to "extremist" and "populist" discourses.

In the last few years, a number of studies have focused on Arab refugees seeking a safe haven in European countries because of the deteriorating political conflict in their homelands. Järvinen (2015) investigates how refugees, asylum seekers and immigrants from the Middle East have been depicted in Finnish news articles including their accompanying photographs between 2013 and 2014. She found that their negative portrayal in the media is rooted in their association with illegality and the fact that the press mostly refers to the refugees and migrants as numbers and passive agents. She concludes that the discussion focuses on the refugees in the context of safety and welfare of the host

communities rather than in a humanitarian context. Moreover, Elsamni studies (2016) looked at how Arab refugees have been represented in news reports published by CNN. His findings indicate that the terminology around Arab refugees in this news tends to deemphasize their status as war victims but frequently present them as a potential threat. Walker et. al. (2016) also stresses this circumstance.

The conflict between the security concern and the humanitarian perspective has been the most controversial issue in news reports about the arrival of more than a million Syrian refugees in Germany in the last few years. Various related articles, published in German and English, by highly circulated newspapers and frequently visited news websites in Germany reflect this controversy. Hence, it is no surprise that this contradictory news coverage has created mixed attitudes among Germans towards refugees; they are perceived both as victims and as a risk. Since Germany is one of the welcoming European countries to Syrian refugees, many programs have been established to help them resettle in their new home. However, unless there is strong support from both the media and the public, many attitude-driven actions could contribute to impeding their integration in German society. Therefore, it is important to raise the awareness of the young generation of the role media plays in shaping their mindset.

The present study investigates the portrayal of Syrian digital news published in Germany in 2015. We focus on the expressions the press used to describe refugees in the news and to what extent these terms have an impact on shaping attitudes towards them in the local communities, particularly among university students.

Methodology

The project contains four stages:

1. Exploring the most frequently visited news websites by German university students and their attitudes towards Syrian refugees.
2. Collecting news articles on Syrian refugees published in German and English by relevant news websites in 2015.
3. Analyzing the news articles to locate the most common expressions used to describe refugees in German, British, and American digital news
4. Comparing the most frequent related lexical items in the news and those used by the participants.
5. **Questionnaire**

We created and distributed a questionnaire via *esurveycrator* to German university students at the beginning of January 2017. Our questionnaire includes 32 items with the first 7 pertaining to the categories of age, gender, educational level, the field of study, affiliation, and native language. The

second set of six questions refers to the student's reading routines of online and print news. Based on six further questions, the survey focuses on how the participants perceive refugees and to what extent they are interested in reading news about them. We then included one question to assess the participants' critical thinking and reading abilities. Another set of twelve questions tackles their background knowledge about the Syrian refugees and asks for their opinion about moral responsibility as well as potential security consequences regarding refugees' integration to Germany. Based on a Likert scale, the final two questions examine how the participants evaluate the objectivity of news reports in general and, more specifically, those about Syrian refugees.

By 10 July 2017, we collected responses from 268 participants (74.63 percent females, 23.51 percent males, and 1.87 percent prefer not to say). The makeup of the participants is as follows: mainly German native speakers (79.2 percent), most of them studying English linguistics, enrolled mostly in Bachelor (46.5 percent), Master (24.2 percent), PhD (9.4 percent), and other diploma programs (19.9 percent). The participants are primarily affiliated with four universities, each from a different German region, i.e. Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München (Bavaria), Universität des Saarlandes, (Saarland), Technische Universität Darmstadt (Hesse), and Universität Erfurt (Thuringia).

The analysis of the participants' responses shows that they tend to read digital news more often than printed news. Seventy percent of the students state that they always or in most cases read news online while only 29.25 percent prefer the printed version. The analysis also reveals that around 77 percent of them read the same piece of news in German as well as English in 95 percent of the cases. The students' responses indicate that the most frequent news media they read are *Die Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ)*, *Der Spiegel*, *Die Zeit*, *Die Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ)*, *FOCUS*, *The New York Times*, *CNN*, *BBC*, and *The Guardian*.

With regards to their critical reading strategies when it comes to news, our participants indicate that the most significant criterion is the source of news (83.72 percent), followed by the author's intentions (69.18 percent). Specific examples (64.54 percent) and the occasion of the news report (61.63 percent) are almost equally important to our readers, ahead of the category of word choices (54.07 percent). The addressed audience (36.63 percent) and the identity of the author (34.89 percent) rank lowest in their priorities. These results indicate that our respondents tend to use critical reading and thinking when confronted with the news. Considering the news about refugees, our participants tend to be slightly more interested in refugees in general (88 percent) than in Syrian refugees in particular (69 percent), although more than half of them state their interest in learning more about Syria. What is noteworthy is that 80 percent of our participants believe that Syrian refugees do not leave their country willingly but consider it the last resort.

News Articles

Compiling the British and American News Datasets

In compiling British and American news articles on Syrian refugees, *Google News* was used to gather stories from BBC.com, while *LexisNexis* was employed to collect articles for the remaining resources. In order to ensure that the articles were actually about Syrian refugees, we searched for headlines with the following basic terms in all four sources: *Syrian refugee/s*, *Syrian asylum seeker/s*, *Syrian migrant/s*, and *Syrian immigrant/s*. The size of the collected American digital news (AN) (133 articles) includes 129,649 words, and the British news (BN) consists of 689,055 words (477 articles).

Collecting German Data

We extracted the German news data (GN) for the same period from *Google News*, the media archive provided by the Bavarian State Library, and the websites of the different news media. To compile the German dataset, we used the German counterparts of the English search terms in the headlines, such as *Flüchtling*, *Syrien*, *syrisch*, *Einwanderer*, *Migrant*. The (GN) consists of 370 articles with overall size of 322,802 words.

Data Analysis

We used *Sketch Engine*, a text analysis software, to analyze the American and British datasets for the most frequent and significant collocations of the expression *refugee*. The same applies analogously to the term *Flüchtling* in the German dataset.

Our analysis of the (BN) reveals a set of 42 expressions occur with the term *refugee*. A similar output is indicated by the examination of the (AN) with 35 terms. The most frequent and significant lexical item of these expressions is *Syrian*. A set of 42 expressions located with *the term Flüchtling* in the (GN) confirms this result. Here, the most frequent lexical item is *syrisch*, the German counterpart of *Syrian*. A closer look at these expressions reveals a connection to the following topical frames: humanitarianism, conflict, security, integration, dehumanization, financial burden, and political responsibility.

Humanitarianism

The most common expressions associated with “humanitarianism” in the (BN) were *help*, *support*, *aid*, *humanitarian and world*. These terms were also identified in the (AN) with the exception of *humanitarian*. In the (GN), the lexical items collocating with *Flüchtling* were: *aufnehmen* (to accept, to welcome), *helfen* (to help), *teilen* (to share), *Schutz* (protection) and *sorgen* (‘to care for). The following examples illustrate the context in which these terms occur:

- (1) The prime minister said in Madrid: “Britain has a moral responsibility **to help** these refugees [...]. We have already **provided sanctuary** to more than 5,000 Syrians in Britain, [...] and **offer resettlement** for thousands more Syrian refugees [...]” *The Guardian, September 5, 2015*
- (2) **The United Nations refugee agency** [...] say the people on the list are among the most **vulnerable**, including [...] **victims of torture** and people with special medical needs. *International New York Times, April 18, 2015*
- (3) Je mehr Menschen in Deutschland **Schutz** suchen, desto mehr wollen ihnen dabei helfen: Freiwillige verteilen **Kleiderspenden, nehmen Flüchtlinge bei sich auf**, geben Deutschunterricht. *Zeit online, August 27, 2015*¹

Conflict

In our datasets, the topic of conflict seems the most versatile and overlaps with other themes. The most frequent expressions indicating this topic and collocating with the term *refugee* in the (BN) were: *crisis, flee, border, war, plight, conflict, attack, displace, problem* and *force*. Some of these terms are among the top of the (AN's) list. As for the most frequent expressions in the (GN), were: *Migration, gewaltbereit* (violent), *Grenze* (border), *Flüchtlingskrise* (refugee crisis), *Terrorist, Bürgerkrieg* (civil war), *Angriff* (attack), *Flucht* (escape), *IS* (Islamic State), *Problem*.

A closer look at the concordance results for these terms reveals that they were used similarly across our datasets:

- (4) The Syrian refugees are **fleeing** violence, trauma, and horrific human rights abuses. They are victims of **terror**, not **terrorists**. *The New York Times, November 24, 2015*
- (5) Der Bundesregierung liegen keine belastbaren Hinweise vor, wonach sich **IS-Mitglieder** gezielt unter Flüchtlinge oder Asylsuchende mischen, *Zeit, August 7, 2015*²

Dehumanization

The expressions indicating “dehumanization” in our English data can be grouped into two sub-categories: packaging and water metaphors (also cf. Gabrielatos & Baker 2008). Packaging is expressed by numbers, e.g. *millions, thousands* and *hundreds* while terms, such as *flood, wave, influx, pour*, and *stream* symbolize water metaphors. A similar pattern is noticeable in our (GN), as can be seen in the following instances:

¹ [The more people seeking **protection and shelter** in Germany, the more people want to **help** them finding it. Volunteers distribute clothing **donations, welcome** refugees to their homes, and offer German lessons.]

² [The Federal Government does not have credible information that **IS-members** aimfully mingling with groups of refugees or asylum seekers]

- (6) [...] how to ensure the **thousands of Syrian refugees** [...] won't be involved in terrorism. Ryan said [...] at least one of the attackers in Paris is believed to have been part of **the waves of refugees into** Europe from Syria. *CNN.com, November 16, 2015*
- (7) [...] expedite a pact that would see Turkey patrolling the EU's southern border with Greece and stemming **the flow of hundreds of thousands of refugees**, mainly from Syria. In return, [...] the EU would also probably agree to resettle **hundreds of thousands of refugees** in Europe directly from Turkey. *The Guardian, November 12, 2015*

Financial/Economic Burden

The most significant expressions associated with the topic of the “economic burden” in our (BN) and (AN) are *fund, economic, pay, funding, money, cost, and burden*. The terms we found on the same specification in our (GN) are *Geld* (money), *einstellen* (to employ), *kosten* (to cost), *arbeiten* (to work), *arm* (poor), and *ausgeben* (to spend [money]). The subsequent samples exemplify the context in which these expressions occur.

- (8) [...] guarantee **longer-term funding for refugees** [...]. The government had said it would use **overseas aid funding** to meet the **extra costs** of the 20,000 Syrian refugees [...]. *The Guardian, October 12, 2015*
- (9) But many Republican governors, who have been frustrated for years about porous borders and the **financial consequences** of illegal immigration, said they did not want the added **burden** of monitoring Syrian refugees for signs of terrorist activity. [...] In Indiana, Gov. Mike Pence said that [...] his 'first responsibility is to ensure **the safety and security** of all Hoosiers.' *International New York Times, November 18, 2015*
- (10) Wie hoch sind die **Kosten** für den deutschen Staat, die der Flüchtlingsstrom verursacht? Experten streiten sich und erhöhen immer wieder ihre **Schätzungen**. *Focus, November 10, 2015*³

Political Responsibility

With regards to the topic of “political responsibility,” common accompanying terms in the (BN) are *accept, welcome, intake, allow, and host*. The same analysis in the (AN) identifies the following expressions: *accept, admit, allow, admission, and governor*. In this context, our examination of the terms in the (GN) dataset reveals the following output of terms: *Politik* (politics), *Behörde* (commission), *anerkennen* (acknowledge) and *Asylbewerber* (asylum seeker, lit. applicant for asylum). The following examples reflect the context of these terms in the press.

³ [How high are the **costs** the German State has to face in regard to the wave of refugees? Experts are disputing and keep raising the **figures**.]

- (11) “**We are committed to increasing the number of refugees** we take [...]” Kerry said. Kerry's meeting is part of an annual discussion **the administration has with Congress to set its refugee admissions quota for the next fiscal year.** *CNN.com September 2015*
- (12) [...] growing international and domestic demands that Britain **take in** more refugees fleeing the Syrian civil war by indicating that the UK would **accept** thousands more refugees. *The Guardian, September 4, 2015*
- (13) [...] Gesetz verabschiedet. Dabei geht es um schärfere Asylregeln, schnellere Verfahren, [...].*Spiegel, September 29, 2015*⁴

Integration

Our search of the **(BC) and (AN)** datasets indicates the following terminology when it comes to the idea of integrating refugees in host societies: *resettle, home, house, work, community, population, settle, relocate, housing, school, and education.* The lexical items reflecting this theme in our German data are *aufnehmen* (to accept), *bleiben* (to stay), *Erzieher* (educator), *Schutz* (protection), *Integration* (integration), *sicher* (safe), and *einstellen* (to employ). The following quotations of news articles give an overview of the context in which these terms occur:

- (14) President Obama [...] is joining European nations in the effort **to resettle** Syrian refugees. *New York Times, September 11, 2015*
- (15) We've identified private accommodation that can be used **to house refugees**; we've set aside [...] unoccupied housing association **homes for** use by refugees. *The Guardian July 8, 2015*
- (16) Flüchtlinge aus Syrien **dürfen** in Deutschland **bleiben.** *SZ, 25. August 2015*⁵

Security, Restriction, and Segregation

The frame of security also involves the questions of restrictions and segregation. Reporting restrictions against the entry of Syrian refugees was more obvious in the American media than in the British and German ones. Common terms related to this topic are *vet, bar, screen, stop, and block*, as can be seen in the subsequent example.

- (17) White House Deputy National Security Adviser Ben Rhodes said, "We have very **extensive screening** procedures for all Syrian [...]" *CNN.com November 15, 2015*

When it comes to the topic of security, the most frequent and significant collocations of *refugee* in **(BN)** are *risk, security, ISIS, fear, and threat* while the ones in **(AN)** are *terrorist, security, bad, safe* and *infiltrate*. As for **(GN)**, the most frequent expressions are *gewaltbereit* (violent), *Terrorist*,

⁴ [passed a bill which regards **stricter asylum rules**, faster processes [...]].

⁵ [Refugees from Syria **may stay** in Germany.]

verletzen (to violate, to injure) and *IS-Kämpfer* (IS fighter). The following quote exemplifies the use of these terms in the news.

- (18) In all three countries surveyed there is a strong agreement **for putting refugees through proper security screening regardless of their situation**, [...] *The Guardian* November 20, 2015

Relating the Themes to the Students' Perception

The analysis of the students' responses reveals that the terms they expected to occur in digital news to describe Syrian refugees relate to most of the topical frames identified earlier. The identified examples, such as *war*, *crisis*, *attack*, *flee*, and *escape* are associated with military conflict; *ISIS*, *terror*, *dangerous*, *camp* and *Muslim* with security and restrictions; *home* and *education* with integration; and *desperate*, *traumatized*, *poor*, and *helpless* with humanitarianism. The students observed the issue of dehumanization by the word *wave* and the topic of political responsibility by the terms *home* and *asylum*.

However, when it comes to the terms they used to phrase their own attitudes towards Syrian refugees, it is striking that they primarily address the frame of humanitarianism. They express compassion, sympathy, respect and empathy for the refugees and their problematic situation. The lexical items that occur most frequently in this respect are *desperate*, *traumatized*, *friendly*, *poor*, *different*, *educated*, *polite*, and *helpless*. Of course, there are also allusions to other themes, such as conflict with the term of *war* and *flee* as well as to the topic of integration, indicated by the expressions of *home*, *learn* and *language*.

The students' responses to the questions in our survey addressing volunteering to help Syrian refugees and their opinions of the consequences entailed in accepting them in Germany reflect the participants' caring attitude. For instance, 75.9 percent of them consider volunteering to help and support refugees and 97 percent believe that the asylum seekers can play a constructive role in the German society in various degrees. Another indicator for the students' belief in the potential of a successful immigration of the refugees is the respondents' rejection of any claim that the immigrants pose a threat to the security of Germany or limit the quality of their life. More precisely, 36.7 percent of them are convinced that Syrian refugees do not contribute to less security in their country, opposed by only 8.2% who assume a security threat. This rejection is evident in their responses to a question regarding the effect refugees have on the quality of life in Germany. With 63.3 percent, the majority of the participants believe that asylum seekers do not pose a threat to the quality of life in their country. In contrast, only 16.2 percent think they do.

What needs to be stressed, however, is that our participants are not representative of the German population. The students are just a small part of the German community, and many of them do not

have social responsibilities or even expectations yet. Nevertheless, they certainly belong to the educated layer of society, a group familiar with critical reading, critical thinking and well aware of their own opinions. Therefore, they are probably not easily influenced by the media.

Conclusion

To summarize, the lexical items we located in articles on Syrian refugees published by news websites that are frequently visited by German students seem to be associated with seven major themes: humanitarianism, military conflict, political responsibility, security and restrictions, dehumanization, financial burden, and integration. These topical frames occurred, in various degrees, in the coverage of refugees in 2015 by German, British, and American news outlets. Most of the terms used by our surveyed students to express their attitudes towards refugees are associated with humanitarianism specially compassion, and integration. These results indicate that they are well aware of their own opinions and able to withstand media influence to a certain extent. While we cannot claim that our participants are a representative sample of German society, they certainly belong to an educated social class that critically reflects on information they gather from media. These findings have important implications for systematical incorporation of media education in general courses offered by Western and Arab universities as well as for the integration of Arab refugees in European host communities.

Bibliography

- Baker, P & McEnery, T 2005, 'A corpus-based approach to discourses of refugees and asylum seekers in UN and newspaper texts', *Journal of Language and Politics*, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 197–226.
- Baker, P, Gabrielatos, C & McEnery, T 2013, *Discourse Analysis and Media Attitudes: The Representation of Islam in the British Press*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Banks, J 2012, 'Unmasking deviance: the visual construction of asylum seekers and refugees', *International Journal*, vol. 20, no.3, pp. 293–310. Retrieved from <http://shura.shu.ac.uk/6900/>
- BBC News (2015) available at <https://www.bbc.com/news>, accessed October (2017).
- Bleiker, R, Campbell, D, Hutchison, E & Nicholson, X 2013, 'The visual dehumanization of refugees', *Australian Journal of Political Science*, vol. 48, no. 4, pp. 398–416.
- Cartner, J M 2009, *Representing the Refugee: Rhetoric, discourse, and the public agenda*. MA Thesis, University of Notre Dame, Australia. Accessed via: <https://researchonline.nd.edu.au/theses/43/>.
- CNN (2015) available at <https://edition.cnn.com/>, accessed October (2017).
- Cooper, S, Olejniczak, E, Lenette, C & Smedley, C 2016, 'Media coverage of refugees and asylum seekers in regional Australia: A critical discourse analysis', *Media International Australia*, vol. 162, pp. 78–89.

- Die Zeit (2015), available at <https://www.zeit.de/index>, accessed November (2017).
- Focus online(2015), available at <https://www.focus.de/https://www.focus.de/>, accessed November (2017).
- Frankfurter Allgemeine (2015) available at: <https://www.faz.net/aktuell/>. accessed November (2017).
- Don, Z M & Lee, C 2014, 'Representing immigrants as illegals, threats, and victims in Malaysia: Elite voices in the media', *Discourse & Society*, vol. 25, no. 6, pp. 687–705.
- Elsamni, A 2016, *Framing Arab refugees in global news*. MA Thesis, American University of Cairo, Egypt. Accessed via: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3034271.
- Esses, V M, Medianu, S & Lawson, A S 2013, 'Uncertainty, Threat, and the Role of the Media in Promoting the Dehumanization of Immigrants and Refugees', *Journal of Social Issues*, vol. 69, no. 3, pp. 518–536.
- Fowler, R 1991, *Language in the News: Language and Ideology in the Press*, London, Routledge.
- Gabrielatos, C & Baker, P 2006, 'Representation of refugees and asylum seekers in UK newspapers: Towards a corpus-based comparison of the stance of tabloids and broadsheets', Paper presented at First International Conference: Critical Approaches to Discourse Analysis Across Disciplines (CADAAD 2006), University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK, 29/06/06–30/06/06.
- Gabrielatos, C & Baker, P 2008, 'Fleeing, Sneaking, Flooding: A Corpus Analysis of Discursive Constructions of Refugees and Asylum Seekers in the UK Press, 1996–2005', *Journal of English Linguistics*, vol. 36, no.1, pp. 5–38.
- Greenslade, R 2005, *Seeking scapegoats: The coverage of asylum in the UK press*, London, Institute for Public Policy Research. Accessed via: https://www.ippr.org/files/images/media/files/publication/2011/05/wp5_scapegoats_1359.pdf.
- Holtom, B 2012, 'Boat People in Australia: Press, Policy and Public Opinion', *GEOView*: Online Undergraduate Review of Geography and Environmental Studies. Accessed via: <http://geoview.iag.org.au/index.php/GEOView/article/view/29>.
- Järvinen, A 2015, *Migration in the Mediterranean: Media Portrayals of Refugees and Migrants*. MA Thesis, University of Tampere, Finland.
- Kamenova, D 2014, 'Media and Othering: How Media Discourse on Migrants Reflects and Affects Society's Tolerance', *Politické vedy* vol. 2, pp. 170–184.
- Khosravini, M 2009, 'The representation of refugees, asylum seekers and immigrants in British newspapers during the Balkan conflict (1999) and the British general election (2005)', *Discourse & Society*, vol. 20, no. 4, pp. 477–498.

- 2010, 'The representation of refugees, asylum seekers and immigrants in British newspapers: A critical discourse analysis', *Journal of Language and Politics*, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 1–28.
- Klocker, N & Dunn, K M 2003, 'Who's driving the asylum debate: newspaper and government representations of asylum seekers', *Media International Australia, Incorporating Culture & Policy*. vol. 109, pp. 71–92.
- Laughland-Booy, J, Skrbis, Z & Tranter, B 2014, 'Toleration or trust? Investigating the acceptance of "boat people" among young Australians', *Australian Journal of Social Issues*, vol. 49, no. 2, pp. 195–217.
- McKay, F, Thomas, S & Kneebone, S 2012, "'It Would be Okay If They Came through the Proper Channels": Community Perceptions and Attitudes toward Asylum Seekers', *Australian Journal of Refugee Studies*, vol. 25, no.1, pp. 113–133.
- Parker, S 2015, "Unwanted invaders": The representation of refugees and asylum seekers in the UK and Australian print media, *Myth and Nation*, vol. 23, pp. 1–21.
- Pedersen, A & Hartley, L 2015, 'Can we make a difference? Prejudice towards asylum seekers in Australia and the effectiveness of anti-prejudice interventions', *Journal of Pacific Rim Psychology*, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 1–14.
- Phillips J & Spinks H 2013, *Boat Arrivals in Australia since 1976*. Canberra, ACT, Australia: Department of Parliamentary Services, Parliament of Australia. Accessed via: https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/BN/2011-2012/BoatArrivals.
- Pickering, S 2001, 'Common sense and original deviancy: News discourses and asylum seekers in Australia', *Journal of Refugee Studies*, vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 169–186.
- Spiegel online, available at <https://www.spiegel.de/>, accessed December (2017).
- Süddeutsche Zeitung, available at <https://www.sueddeutsche.de>, accessed December (2017).
- Steimel, S J 2010, 'Refugees as people: The portrayal of refugees in American human interest stories', *Journal of Refugee Studies*, vol. 23, no. 2, pp. 219–237.
- Taylor, C 2014, 'Investigating the representation of migrants in the UK and Italian press A cross-linguistic corpus-assisted discourse analysis', *International Journal of Corpus Linguistics*, vol. 19, no. 3, pp. 368–400.
- The Guardian (2015) available at: <https://www.theguardian.com>, accessed December (2017).
- The New York Times (2015) available at <https://www.nytimes.com>, accessed December (2017).
- Vicsek, L, Keszi, R, & Márkus, M 2008, 'Representation of Refugees, Asylum-Seekers and Refugee Affairs In Hungarian Dailies', *Journal Identity and Migration Studies*, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 87–107.

Walker Rettberg, J &Gajjala, R 2016, 'Terrorists or cowards: Negative portrayals of male Syrian refugees in social media', *Feminist Media Studies*, vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 178–181.

Funding

This project is funded by the Deanship of Academic Research at the University of Jordan. It was conducted during a sabbatical leave by Prof. Dr. Zahra Awad at Ludwig-Maximilian University in Germany.

Acknowledgements

We are grateful to the University of Jordan for supporting this project and to Ludwig Maximilian-University Munich for hosting it, especially to Prof. Dr. Hans-Jörg Schmid for his great help in collecting the data and his continuous support. We are also grateful to Prof. Dr. Hans Sauer, Prof. Dr. Iryna Gurevych, Prof Dr. Beate Hampe, Andrea Fischer, and all colleagues in Germany for their help in collecting the data. We are thankful to our research assistant Nusaiba Al-Ali for her dedication to this project.

Experiences of Transitional Justice in Morocco

Abstract

The Moroccan experience of transitional justice has sparked debate and is still topical. It is clear that the Moroccan experience was remarkable at several levels, in fact, through it, Morocco has provided a unique Arab and international model for addressing the issue of human rights violations perpetrated for over five decades, including enforced disappearance and arbitrary detention. The Moroccan experience is an international reference in the programs of reparation, truth and reconciliation, and is considered as a guarantee of non-repetition of violations. This process culminated in the formation of the Truth Commission in 2004. It is important to highlight that this Moroccan transitional justice experience does not seem acceptable to all the actors involved, since some activists and organizations consider it not fully satisfactory.

Introduction

Following the end of the Cold War, democratic transitions began to spread throughout the world. Due to the fall of the Soviet Union, such transitions mainly occurred in Eastern Europe but also in countries of Latin America and Africa, which had often endured long civil wars.

Transitional justice is frequently framed as part of a democratic process based on the review of human rights violations in any country and on the logic of acknowledging the past while looking to the future. Transitional justice is becoming more common in countries where severe and massive human rights violations have been committed. Such a remedy is most often part of a more comprehensive process of transition towards a democratic society that respects human rights and rules of law. Transitional justice addresses difficult questions about law and politics. Its procedures are meant to signal a new way forward: a renewed commitment to the safety of ordinary citizens, particularly against abuses of state authorities.

Usually, the governing authorities arrange actions of transitional justice to initiate the shift to a democratic system, intending to achieve national reconciliation and civil peace based on justice. Particularly countries and societies that have suffered serious human rights abuses apply this procedure. "Transitional justice is a response to systematic or widespread violations of human rights. It seeks recognition for victims and promotion of possibilities for peace, reconciliation and democracy. Transitional justice is not a special form of justice but justice adapted to societies transforming themselves after a period of pervasive human rights abuse. In some cases, these transformations happen suddenly; in others, they may take place over many decades (ICTJ, 2009, p.

1)¹. The procedures of transitional justice are not limited to judicial proceedings, its process is usually comprehensive. "The political, social, and legal conditions in a country will dictate what kinds of things can be done and when."²

Morocco with its human rights violations in former times is no exception to this trend. To reconcile with its past, Morocco has returned to painful periods of its history, especially the one of severe human rights abuses between 1956 and 1999. This return was the result of the internal context of political reforms and human rights protection combined with international demands.

On April 10, 2004, the Moroccan King issued the *Dahir no.1-90-12 Royal Decree*, marking the foundation of the Equity and Reconciliation Commission (IER)³. This organization was no exception to the worldwide rise of transitional justice experiences. With the introduction of the IER, Morocco joined the club of "countries with reconciliation commissions", which is an unprecedented experience in the Arab and Muslim world. Experiences of transitional justice in Morocco occurred at the dawn of the twenty-first century, at a time when demands for respect for human rights were increasing both in Morocco and in the rest of the world.

In this article, we analyze the context of Moroccan reconciliation with regards to political reforms and international pressures. We aim to offer a better understanding of the path to reconciliation in Morocco, its processes, and limits.

The Context of the Moroccan Experience Between Political Reforms and International Pressures

Only a few people do not criticize the reign of Hassan II when it comes to human rights violations. Particular actions, such as torture, enforced disappearances, and arbitrary arrests aroused deep and widespread concern. However, the last decade of the reign of King Hassan II reveals a trend towards political reforms. In this regard, two determining factors: the Internal Context of Political Reforms and Human Rights Protection, and the International Context Supportive of Human Rights Protection have contributed to the rise of transitional justice in Morocco.

The Internal Context of Political Reforms and Human Rights Protection Preceding the IER

The Moroccan experience of transitional justice was the result of a long process of political openness and reforms that have begun in the early 1990s. Several reasons led to the creation of IER by King

¹ ICTJ, 2009, What is Transitional Justice? Available at: <https://www.ictj.org/about/transitional-justice>; accessed February 2, 2019. p. 1.

² Ibid.

³ Royal Decree, April 20, 1990, No. 1-90-12 of 24 Ramadan 1410.

Mohammed VI, including an increasing public pressure, characterized by peaceful and civil mobilization which crystallized clear projects to address the question of human rights.

The most important political reforms in Morocco during the reign of King Hassan II were the two constitutional amendments of 1992 and 1996. The latter was approved by most of the oppositional political forces and considered an important step towards democracy. Moreover, the consolidation of the rule of law seemed to guarantee fundamental liberties. These reforms usually aim at reducing the powers of the King and strengthening the role of elected constitutional bodies.

In the same vein, another significant political reform during the 1990s was the implementation of alternation by an attempt to bring opposition parties into the government. After the parliamentary elections in 1997, the King did not select the government from the *palace parties*⁴ which had been common practice before. On the contrary, he requested the leader of the Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires (USFP) party to become Prime Minister. (Santucci JC. 2006) This increase in political participation by oppositional parties was an important step with regards to the democratization process. However, these reforms were imposed from above rather than being the result of political pressure from below.

In the field of human rights, several efforts have been made to improve the image of Morocco after severe criticism from State and non-State actors. The most significant action in this respect was unquestionably the creation of the Advisory Council for Human Rights, *Conseil Consultatif des Droits de l'Homme*, in 1990 to advise King Hassan II on human rights issues⁵. A few years later, in 1993, Morocco ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the Convention on the Rights of Children, and the Convention on the Rights of Migrants. After his father's death, King Mohammed VI continued in the same direction in 1999 with the creation of the Independent Arbitration Commission. A large part of its decisions was implemented regarding reparation for victims of human rights abuses. At the same time, in 2001, the Advisory Council for Human Rights was restructure⁶. In 2003, the aforementioned Equity and Reconciliation Commission (IER), one of the world's leading bodies on transitional justice issues, was established in order to examine the severe violation of human rights in Morocco.

⁴ Jean-Claude Santucci, The multi-party system in Morocco: between the limitations of a "controlled pluralism" and an "authoritarian multi-party" dilemma, *Revue des mondes musulmans et de la Méditerranée* [online], 111–112 | mars 2006, online since 08 december 2011, accessed February 4, 2019. URL: <http://journals.openedition.org/remmm/2864> palace parties were called this way because because they had been created by the regime at the time of Hassan II.

⁵ "King Hassan II Announced the Setting Up of an Advisory Council for Human Rights", English language version of the speech, Moroccan Ministry of Information, May 8, 1990.

⁶ Royal Decree of April 10, 2001, 15 Muharram 1422.

International Context Supportive of Human Rights Protection

The new global context, the changes following the end of the Cold War, and the fall of dictatorships in Eastern Europe led to a stronger emphasis on the protection of human rights and better governance by some of Morocco's external partners. In 1992, for example, the European Parliament refused to grant Morocco a substantial aid package, primarily because of its poor performance in human rights (Glennie-Mepham, 2007).⁷

In 1990, Hassan II recognised that Morocco needed a degree of reform to avoid the similar fate of Algeria, where the failure of the democratic process had led to a protracted civil war. The mobilization of international NGOs and media played a crucial role in the political opening up of Morocco. Following the publication of a devastating report by Amnesty International, the famous *Tazmamart* prison was closed in 1991.⁸ The nineties marked the emergence of a literary movement highlighting human rights issues. The book *Our Friend the King*, published by Gilles Perrault in France, emphasizes the abuses of the regime under Hassan II, particularly those at the prison of *Tazmamart*.⁹ In short, the internal and international pressure for increased adherence to the rule of law and the consolidation of human rights, as well as the return to the events which have occurred over the *Years of lead*,¹⁰ developed at high speed in Morocco. The recognition of a deep crisis by the political system engendered the inauguration of a long process of coming to terms with the past.

The Way to Reconciliation: The Moroccan Model

In the 1990s, Morocco's political system began to move towards national reconciliation by opening up to human rights issues in Moroccan politics. The return to the *Years of Lead* was one of the most sensitive topics since it questioned the system itself. Three institutions have been created to meet the needs of reconciliation: the Advisory Council for Human Rights (i), the Independent Arbitration Commission (ii) and the Equity and Reconciliation Commission (iii).

i. Advisory Council for Human Rights (CCDH):

The Advisory Council for Human Rights was established on April 20, 1990¹¹, as stated in its founding Royal Decree. This organization confronted abuses, errors, and drawbacks, which was the first formal procedural step initiated by Morocco under domestic and international pressure. The nature of this

⁷ Alex Glennie and David Mepham, September 2007, Reform in Morocco: The role of political Islamists, Institute for Public Policy Research, https://www.ippr.org/files/images/media/files/publication/2011/05/reform_in_morocco_1593.pdf.

⁸ Amnesty International, April 1993, Morocco, breaking the wall of silence: the disappeared in Morocco, AI Index: MDE 29/01/93, <https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/188000/mde290011993en.pdf>.

⁹ Gilles Perrault, *Notre ami le roi*, Gallimard, Collection Folio-actuel, 1998. This book, which denounced the exactions of the King Hassan II, contributed to the release of the prisoners and thus, to save their life.

¹⁰ The "Years of the Iron Fist" (known in Morocco as "les années de plomb," or *years of lead*) is the name given to the period of violation of human rights in Morocco.

¹¹ Royal Decree, April 20, 1990, No. 1-90-12 of 24 Ramadan 1410.

Council, as indicated by the term “advisory”, is far from any of the executive roles, and was, therefore, unable to provide much to the legal field. Besides, it was limited to presenting the opinion and advice of the King on all activities and issues of human rights. In general, the main achievements of the Council were:

1. Enabling the amendment of the Criminal Procedure Code by:

- reducing the duration of the situation under guard or arrest
- working to provide all guarantees to the detainee when arrested or brought to justice
- ensuring the right to prevent any torture by “automatic” medical examination legislation as soon as the request or inspection is carried out.¹²

2. After the intensification of international and domestic criticisms, and by order of Hassan II in 1998, the Advisory Council for Human Rights worked to create a list of those affected by arbitrary arrests and forced disappearances. He also ordered to expedite the liquidation of this records case¹³ in no more than six months. Nonetheless, the release of detainees in 1991 and 1994 did not solve the problem of human rights abuses, and a large number of disappeared detainees remained unidentified.¹⁴

The Advisory Council for Human Rights held its twelfth meeting on April 2, 1999, to issue a memorandum containing a set of recommendations. The most important deal with the following matters:

- a list of 112 persons who meet the criteria of disappearance¹⁵
- The creation of an Independent Arbitration Commission working alongside the Council to provide the necessary material and moral compensation for those affected.

This memorandum has been subjected to several criticisms, especially from civil society, because the number of disappearances exceeded these 112 cases, and because it was perceived as a criminalization of the victims by considering that the disappeared had committed a crime against the security of the State.

ii. The Independent Arbitration Commission as the First Step Towards Reconciliation

After its thirteenth meeting, the Advisory Council for Human Rights submitted a memorandum to the King on the composition of the Independent Arbitration Commission, which was entrusted with

¹² For the organization and functions of the Advisory Council for Human Rights, see the official website of the National Council for Human Rights, www.cndh.ma.

¹³ On 16 August 1991, 40 political prisoners were released under comprehensive amnesty decrees followed by a similar amnesty in 1994 to release detainees tried in political cases.

¹⁴ Human rights organizations estimated the number of unresolved “disappearance” to be around 600 cases.

¹⁵ Forced disappearances have been defined here as cases of abduction and/or arrest and detention without trial and without communication of the place of detention. Actually these data (112) have been called into question by NGOs who estimate that they may exceed this number by far (see footnote above).

estimating the amount of compensation to those entitled to it due to the physical and moral damage resulting from an enforced disappearance¹⁶.

The Commission was composed of nine members: three judges from the Supreme Council, four members of the Advisory Council for Human Rights, a representative of the Ministry of the Interior, and a representative of the Ministry of Justice. The commission's decisions were considered irrevocable.¹⁷

The period of the Independent Arbitration Commission's work was extended from August 16, 1999, to July 14, 2003.

The Panel operated for approximately four years. In total, approximately 8,000 people testified at 196 general hearings and nearly 400 individual hearings. The Panel rendered 5,488 judgments: 3,681 applications were successful; 889 were rejected (due to the absence of any relation to forced disappearance or arbitrary detention); 750 were remitted for future deliberation; and 133 were deemed to lack sufficient evidence¹⁸.

The Independent Arbitration Commission received criticism from human rights organizations and public opinion. The most crucial issues were the following:

- lack of transparency and fairness in determining the value of compensation
- limiting its response to financial compensation, neglecting the return of dead bodies and healthcare, or official recognition of the state's direct responsibility for violations
- the shortening of the application time led to the exclusion of more than 6,000 cases¹⁹

Despite all the criticism directed to the experience with the Independent Arbitration Commission, it has to be considered a significant regional precedent in the field of reparations for human rights abuses and arbitrary detentions of which the state is responsible.

Consequently, it was not possible to stop the transitional justice process in Morocco at that point. If the Independent Arbitration Commission had recorded successes, its failures and disadvantages would have led to the search for further solutions.

iii. The Equity and Reconciliation Commission: The Keystone of the Moroccan Experience

¹⁶ Mohammed VI: "we established an Independent Arbitration Commission with Advisory Council for Human Rights to determine the compensation of victims and claimants of the declared missing and those arbitrarily detained, and gave our instructions for this commission to begin its work." King's speech August 30, 1999.

¹⁷ Rules of Procedure of the Independent Arbitration Commission: Independent Arbitration Commission for the Compensation of Victims of Enforced Disappearances and Arbitrary Detention, First Building on the Path of Transitional Justice in Morocco, Publications of the Advisory Council for Human Rights, Rabat, 2010, p. 27, In Arabic language.

¹⁸ Benyoub Ahmed Chaouki. 2004. *The Independent Arbitration Panel Report*. The Moroccan Center for Documentation, Information, and Training in Human Rights, Rabat. Morocco.

¹⁹ CNDH hands archives of independent arbitration commission over to the national archives institution, it submitted its final report on November 30, 2003, after handling 5,127 applications and receiving 6,500 out-of-delay applications, available at: <https://www.cndh.ma/an/press-releases/cndh-hands-archives-independent-arbitration-commission-over-national-archives>, accessed, April 5, 2019.

On October 14, 2003, the Advisory Council for Human Rights issued a recommendation to the King calling for the creation of a committee called the Equity and Reconciliation Commission (ERC).²⁰ This committee sought to settle the past of severe violations with justice and fairness and without retaliation and criminal accountability. On November 06, 2003, the King approved this recommendation. The members of the Commission were formed and appointed by the King on April 10, 2004.

This Commission was to be held for a maximum period of nine months, which might be extended if necessary for a maximum of three extra months. It would be responsible for:

- continuing the work of the Independent Arbitration Commission
- working to redress all material and psychological damage inflicted on the victim
- determining the burial places for the victims
- preparing a formal report to preserve the memory of this period and to ensure that it does not happen again²¹.

ICTJ considered the experience of the Moroccan Equity and Reconciliation Commission to be unique in many ways:

1. It was an initiative supported by the King to consider crimes committed by his father.
2. Among its members, there are victims of arbitrary arrest and torture.
3. It was the only investigative commission in history with authority to provide compensation directly to the victims.
4. It was the first truth commission established in the Arab world.

Composition of the ERC

The Equity and Reconciliation Commission consisted of seventeen members, including its president, experts, administrative and technical assistants. Among the commissioners there were six former political prisoners, including two who were forced into exile.²²

The operations of the Commission were divided into three main groups:

- a. **The Investigative group**, focusing on research on all information, documents, and received reports of past violations.
- b. **The Group on reparations**, focusing on compensation for material and moral damages to victims and their next of kin.

²⁰ On January 7, 2004, King Mohammed VI created the Equity and Reconciliation Commission (IER), which represents an unprecedented experience in the Middle East and North Africa.

²¹ See: Recommendation for the establishment of a committee called the Equity and Reconciliation Commission, on the official website of the National Council for Human Rights: www.cndh.ma.

²² The Statute of the Equity and Reconciliation Commission is a *dahir* issued on 10 April 2004, Official Gazette No. 5203, dated 12/04/2004, p. 1639.

- c. **The Study and research group**, focusing on preparing research and studies, collecting and analyzing data, information, and abstracts in order to complete the final report.

Based on its status, the Commission is competent to investigate abuses committed in the period from the early time of independence in 1956 until 1999, the date of the creation of the Independent Arbitration Commission (Art. 8, Status of ERC).²³

Terms of Reference and Functions of the Commission

Three documents serve as texts of reference for the ERC as noted on its website:

- the ACHR’s recommendations to the King on establishing the ERC, dated October 16, 2003;
- the King’s speech of January 7, 2004, on the creation of the ERC;
- the royal decree of April 10, 2004, which specifies the statutes of the ERC and defines its mandate, powers, and structure.

As part of the completion of the transitional justice process and overcoming the limitations and shortcomings of the mechanisms of Moroccan reconciliation, the Commission tried to define a set of tasks in order to resolve these sensitive issues. The main objectives were the following:

- To establish the nature and the extent of grave violations of human rights committed in the past, and to place them in context and light of the norms and values of human rights as well as the principles of democracy and the rule of law.
- To further research on enforced disappearances
- To identify the responsibilities of state organs or any other parties involved in violations.
- To decide the indemnity corresponding to the material and moral harm suffered by the victims.
- To grant reparation of the rest of the damage caused to the victims by making proposals and recommendations for psychological and health rehabilitation and social integration.
- To prepare a formal report containing abstracts of research and investigations into violations in the framework of memory conservation, to ensure the archiving of these events.
- To develop the conduct of dialogue and establish the elements of reconciliation (Art. 9, Status of ERC).²⁴

Outputs

Based on this purpose, the Commission conducted a comprehensive assessment of the case of enforced disappearance and arbitrary detention in cooperation with the Government, relevant public and administrative authorities, human rights organizations, victims, and their families.

The activities of the Commission can be summarized in four main ideas:

²³ Art. 8, Status of ERC.

²⁴ Art. 9, Status of ERC.

1. To establish the quality and extent of the gravity of the violations by continuing to investigate cases of disappearance and to disclose their facts, while formally recognizing the State's responsibilities.
2. To repair the damages inflicted on victims by providing compensation as well as physical and psychological health services.
3. To prepare the final report and recommendations on the preservation of memory and on legislative, institutional, and security reforms, to ensure that the incidents are not repeated and that the effects of violations are eliminated.
4. To promote national reconciliation processes in attempts to restore trust between the state and society by organizing public hearings for victims of discrimination, and recognition for what they have endured.

Perhaps the most essential step in the process of reconciliation in Morocco was the State's recognition of all violations suffered by the victims individually and collectively. The following may represent an apology:

1. The State's decision to open this case through a structured organizational path
2. The State's agreement to hold public hearings for the victims
3. The material compensation of the victims through individual and collective reparation
4. The Government's commitment to apologize in the name of the State to all the victims, their families, and the Moroccan community for all past abuses, promises, and pledges (Al-Sarraj 2014, p. 22).²⁵

The Commission examined roughly 22,000 cases of compensation, provided immediate medical treatment through a healthcare unit of the Commission to approximately 1,000 people, and interviewed victims in more than thirty regions of the country who had been affected by enforced disappearance, death in custody, and death during riots or conflict.

The Limited Approach of the Equity and Reconciliation Commission

i. Period of investigation: The serious violations committed after 1999 have not been taken into account by the ERC since the actual field of inquiry was defined from the independence to the enthronement of Mohamed VI.

ii. Impunity: The commission cannot name perpetrators. In article nine, its statute says that it will "Examine the responsibility of the state or other apparatuses in the violations and the incidents under investigation." However, according to article six, "The purview of the committee is non-judicial. It will not determine individual responsibility for violations. The fight against impunity has been

²⁵ Amr Al-Sarraj: The Experience of Transitional Justice in Morocco, The Syrian Organization for Transitional Justice, 2014, p. 22 (in Arabic, translation by the author).

dismissed by the ERC since the constitutive platform announced, contrary to the foundations of the law, that the fight against impunity would not take place because it would be synonymous to revenge and resentment, and a source of anarchy –*fitna*- (Dahir April 10, 2004).²⁶

iii. A modest record: The investigations of the ERC were quite modest. The Commission received 22,000 files on time. According to one of its sources, another 30,000 arrived after the deadline. Of these files, approximately 17,000 were processed.

Conclusion

In sum, unlike experiences elsewhere, the Equity and Reconciliation Commission was not the result of a regime change but an initiative of the regime that was itself responsible for severe violations. The Commission have been struggling between the desire for change and reconciliation and the political weight of the institutions in place that reflect the authoritarianism of the period of abuses. The tension between these two forces reflects both its significance and its difficulties. It is evident that the “transition” Morocco has recognized refers more to the death of King Hassan II and the enthronement of Mohammed VI than to the changes in the political system. However, it is also apparent that this “transition” refers to a desire to put an end to the violations committed since the independence of Morocco. Any assessment of the transition experience in the country depends, of course, on timing and context. In fact, the assessments and criticisms of 2004 differ widely from those of 2018.

Bibliography

Advisory Council for Human Rights, 2010, *Rules of Procedure of the Independent Arbitration Commission: Independent Arbitration Commission for the Compensation of Victims of Enforced Disappearances and Arbitrary Detention, First Building on the Path of Transitional Justice in Morocco*, Advisory Council for Human Rights, Rabat. Morocco.

Amnesty International, April 1993, *Morocco: Breaking the wall of silence : the disappeared in Morocco*,

AI Index: MDE 29/01/93. Available at <https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/188000/mde290011993en.pdf>; accessed Decembre 2, 2018.

Al-Sarraj A. 2014, *The Experience of Transitional Justice in Morocco*. The Syrian Organization for Transitional Justice. Available at <http://syriatransitionaljustice.org/wp->

²⁶ The Statute of the Equity and Reconciliation Commission is a dahir issued on April 10, 2004, Official Gazette No. 5203, dated April 12, 2004, p. 1639.

content/uploads/2014/06/SCTJ_The_Moroccan_Transitional_Justice_Experience.pdf;
accessed Decembre 2, 2018.

Benyoub A. Ch. 2004, *The Independent Arbitration Panel Report*. The Moroccan Center for Documentation, Information, and Training in Human Rights, Rabat, Morocco.

Glennie, A. and Mephram, D. 2007, *Reform in Morocco : The role of political Islamists*. Institute for Public Policy Research. Available at https://www.ippr.org/files/images/media/files/publication/2011/05/reform_in_morocco_1593.pdf; accessed February 2, 2019.

Royal Decree, April 20, 1990, No. 1-90-12 of 24 Ramadan 1410.

Santucci, JC 2006, "The multi-party system in Morocco: between the limitations of a "controlled pluralism" and an "authoritarian multi-party" dilemma", *Revue des mondes musulmans et de la Méditerranée*, 111–112 | mars 2006, online since 08 december 2011. Available at <http://journals.openedition.org/remmm/2864> ; accessed February 4, 2019.

Statute of the Equity and Reconciliation Commission, *Dahir* issued on 10 April 2004, Official Gazette No. 5203, dated 12/04/2004.

Ayman Yousef (with Hashem Khalil and Malak Shwaiki)

Reconciliation and Peace building in Palestine: Perspectives by the Palestinian Civil Society Organizations

Abstract

This research paper aims at shedding light on the theoretical perspectives and the operational approaches adopted by the Palestinian civil society organizations in connection with the reconciliation process. Reconciliation as a systemic process has become an inevitable necessity in Palestine after the political split and the geographical fragmentation that occurred in 2007. Therefore, the research focus is centered around answering the following questions: what are the different moves, debates, and initiatives that have been taken by civil society organizations in Palestine to end the conflict? And why they could not succeed or produce tangible results in fulfilling this goal which has far-reaching implications? This paper will take into considerations the debates, contexts and the developments of civil society organizations in Palestine and their roles at the political and national level as well as at the cultural and developmental ones. Civil society is deepening its peaceful intervention in many developed and developing countries to build domestic peace and achieve reconciliation, along with other tasks and duties. The Palestinian situation is not exceptional in this regard, but it has some uniqueness, since Palestine is not an independent and sovereign state. In the age of liberal globalization, nobody can imagine real development and democratization without proper positive interventions by civil society. Palestine is gaining momentum since it is a conflict zone. It is not only a nation under occupation, but it is also a fragmented and divided people and territory. The essence of this research is to deeply understand the roles of civil society in the reconciliation process and to assess why this process failed to bear real fruits up today.

Introduction

In this research paper I aim to shed lights on the theoretical perspectives and operational approaches adopted by the Palestinian civil society organization in connection with the reconciliation process in the Palestinian context. Reconciliation as A systemic process has become an inevitable necessity in Palestine following the political split and the geographical fragmentation that occurred in 2007. Therefore, the research problem is centered around the following question: what are the different moves, debates and initiatives taken by the Palestinian civil society organizations to put an end to the conflict Why Could They not succeed or produce tangible results in fulfilling this goal?

In this research paper I will consider debates, contexts and developments of civil society organizations in Palestine and their roles on political, national, cultural and developmental levels. In fact, the civil society deepens its peaceful intervention in many developed and developing countries to build

domestic peace and achieve reconciliation, along with other tasks and duties. Palestine's situation is not exceptional but nonetheless unique since independent sovereign state of Palestine does not exist on the ground. Indeed, in the age of liberal globalization, nobody can imagine any real developments or democratization without adequate positive interventions by civil society. Of course, Palestine has gained momentum since it is a conflict zone. In fact, it is not only a nation under occupation, but also fragmented and divided people and territories.

I aim to deeply understand the roles of the civil society in the reconciliation process, and to assess why this process failed to bear real fruit until today. To use narrative methodologies, I rely on collected primary data through organized, structured interviews and focus groups. Interviews conducted with the cadres and activists in the Palestinian civil society and other professionals and experts this field. I also consider secondary sources of the topic in the form of books, journals, magazines and websites.

Throughout the last century, Palestine was under the control of several colonial powers and hegemonic forces, including the current Israeli occupation. In 1948, a new phase of suffering began with a catastrophic loss ("An-Nakba"), ending up with the Israeli army occupying part of the land. What followed was another catastrophe "Al-Naksa" occurred in 1967, which ended with the loss of entire Palestinian lands to the Israeli occupation who have been exposing them to several human rights violations. 15th May, 1948 considers the most tragic in contemporary Palestinian history as more than 428 villages were destroyed and more than 800.000 Palestina civilians were forced to leave their land and property (Palestine Liberation Organization publication, 2018). After losing the entire land, the Palestinian community took the lead in defending the lands through popular resistance, using both armed and unarmed resistance strategies. In this context, the Palestinian civil society played a key role in developing and implementing the national agenda through a mechanism of coordination among families, village councils, popular committees, charitable societies...etc. In fact, all these entities had a role in minimizing the damages that resulted from the "Israeli" occupation and the subsequent wars caused at that time. Thus, the Palestinians were forced to organize themselves to face the new harmful situation and to preserve their national identity that was under attack (Bari, 1999).

In 1987, the First Intifada erupted with a large scale mass participation. It lasted for four years, until the Oslo accords were signed in 1993. Despite the terrible circumstances, the civil society grew and developed further to keep up with the changes that occurred on the political, economic, and social levels. One of these changes was the rise of the Palestinian Authority as national body for the first time in the Palestinian history. However, the specific role of the civil society organizations at that stage was directed at serving the Palestinian people and filling the gaps within the newly created

Palestinian Authority by acting as a watch dog on the Authority itself and by representing the demands and the rights of the marginalized sections in the Palestinian society.

Two major parties dominate Palestinian politics. One of them is Fatah - (The Palestinian Liberation Movement) and Hamas (The Islamic Resistance Movement). The former was founded by Yasser Arafat in the 1950s and has been at the head of the Palestinian national movement, whereas the latter was founded in 1987 as a moderate political Islam movement intended and committed to establish an Islamic state in Palestine. Hamas in its Charter defines itself as “local Muslim Brotherhood branch in Palestine. The movement has a comprehensive and macro Islamic approach to life, the universe, politics, culture and economics¹”

Significantly, in the absence of real political alternatives, Hamas and Fatah have continued to monopolize the political landscape in the West Bank and Gaza, particularly if we realize that the Palestinian leftist groups and factions lost its political influence with the collapse of its Soviet supporter in the last three decades. Hence, the different ideologies of the two dominant parties resulted in different approaches for dealing with the Israeli occupation.

In summer 2006, the Palestinians held parliamentary election in troubled and uncertain political environment. This election resulted in the victory of Hamas due to several political issues. First, the Palestinian Authority has been unable to govern Gaza effectively after Israel disengaged from its territory in 2005. Secondly, after the death of Arafat in 2004, Fatah was internally struggling and overwhelmed with several allegations of corruption, cronyism, weak economy, high unemployment rates, and ineffective preventive security forces (Pina, 2006).

In addition, Fatah’s lack of electoral success was due to the lack of unity within this political faction and due to the inability to speak with one voice after the death of Arafat. In fact, Fatah was unable to agree on composition of its national list and registered multiple lists just before the deadline, December 14, 2005. Whereas Hamas offered one candidate in each electoral constituency, Fatah ran several candidates in the same constituency. Consequently, support for Fatah candidates was divided, while the supporters for Hamas focused on to one candidate. It was evident that Fatah underestimated the popularity of Hamas and the significance of its political challenge (Pina, 2006).

Naturally, the consequence was an overwhelming electoral victory for Hamas and its supporters who marched through Ramallah streets, holding Hamas slogans and waving green flags. When they raised their green flag over the Palestinian Legislative Council building, Fatah supporters who provoked by this act, tried to remove the banner. With this incident, the internal struggle began in the streets of Gaza strip and tension rose up in West Bank. Both sides started to throw stones and fight with each

¹ See Hamas Charter in Arabic: <https://www.palestine-studies.org/sites/default/files/mdf->

other, until the Palestinian Authority security forces fired warning shots into the air. For months following the election, the tension between the two groups remained high (Schanzer, 2008).

After winning the election, Hamas had the responsibility of power and international scrutiny for the first time but neither Israel nor the major world powers including the US and the EU recognized the new Palestinian government. Fatah refused to hand over the wheels of power nor to join a new Hamas-led coalition, while Hamas insisted that its electoral victory had granted it a legitimate control over the Palestinian Authority. This situation created significant tensions between the two parties. Incidents of open violence between them led to dozens of deaths, particularly in the Gaza Strip. Moreover, due to several oppositions against Hamas at that time, the economic situation was deteriorating and the PA failed to pay the salaries of its employees (Schanzer, 2008).

In June 2007, armed forces of Hamas took over Gaza in what was described as a "liberation". After six days of ongoing fighting, the entire Gaza Strip was under Hamas control. The Palestinian Authority President and Fatah leader, Mahmoud Abbas, then dismissed the Hamas-led government, and a new emergency cabinet had been founded in the West Bank, led by Prime Minister Salam Fayyad (Schanzer, 2008).

This wave of violence was a milestone in the Palestinian history and a massive setback in the struggle against the Israeli occupation. It was the first time that the Palestinians were engaged in an open warfare against one another. However, it should be noted that since the beginning of the division, there have been several reconciliation attempts. A first agreement was signed in May 2011, and another one in 2012. However, in March–April 2012, the political crisis was reignited and tensions strongly increased in 2013. Again, in April 2014, Hamas and Fatah raised the hope of the Palestinians by signing a new national reconciliation deal, and finally forming a unity government in June 2014. However, the terms of the agreement were not implemented; therefore, it could not reduce the tension between the two factions. Indeed, Gaza remained under Hamas's control and the West Bank under Fatah's.

This Palestinian internal political split made the situation even more complicated. Hence, the Palestinian civil society has to carry the burden of dealing with both situations created by the occupation and the political split. Therefore, the main reason behind the creation of the civil society organizations (CSOs) was to strengthen the internal abilities of the Palestinian people in order to manage the occupation and ramifications of the political fragmentation in much better strategy and visionary approach. Primarily speaking, the task of CSOs is to rescue and support the specific field of their responsibility and under their mandate. For example, some organizations have the mandate to work on women's rights; others address children's rights; while other organizations are focused on democratization, human rights, social accountability and reconciliation (Bari, 1999). These

organizations have achieved moderately in the issues of human rights, democratic transformation and national reconciliation for many internal and external reasons and factors.

Significantly, the political split between Fatah and Hamas constituted a prominent challenge to the civil society and Palestinians in general. In the light of the internal political fragmentation and the deterioration of the surrounding Arab political order in the context of the Arab Spring, the Palestinian Question returns to be examined in regional blocks and international alliances and hubs. This split had not only weakened the Palestinian political project, but it also increased negative implications to people's resilience and steadfastness. The CSO warned to the risks of the political division and its repercussions and therefore endeavored to achieve national reconciliation. They conducted and tailored dialogues with the participation of various Palestinian political forces and adopted A wide range of activities and initiatives in this regard (Sheikh Khalil, 2008).

Peace Building and Reconciliation in Theoretical Context

In mid – seventies, Johan Galtung developed Peace building as technical term. In his quest to develop a new concept, Galtung considers peace building inapplicable in real conflict situations unless we deal with the causes at the root of violence. Hence, peace-building structures must be constructed in a way to promote suitable peace and to enhance an applicable peace management and conflict resolution (Galtung, 1976). Another school of thought looked upon peace building as an actual process aiming at strengthening national capacities and managing conflicts peacefully while matching sustainable peace with justice and development (UN Report on Peacebuilding, 2017). However, it is challenging to shed lights on peace building unless we link it to some overarching terminologies such as conflict transformation, restorative justice, healing, dealing with the past, reconciliation, forgiveness and national unity. This can be considered a bottom-up approach for peace building through encouraging decentralized social, economic and cultural structures to shift the relationships of coercion to connections of comfort and social harmony (Galtung, 1969).

Peace is considered to be the hardest point to fulfill since it requires intensive work between the conflicting factions, groups or communities. Following a logical order, peace building develops gradually after the two stages namely: peacemaking and peacekeeping. These two stages are crucial for ending bloody conflicts that can provide convenient platforms for more effective peace building strategies in later stages (Ghali, 1992). Actually, the vast of literature in the field of peace studies focuses on five consecutive stages to establish peace in much more practical and tangible terms. First, dealing with the root causes of conflicts; second, appropriate dealing with community's expectations; third, establishing an extensive network of national and international organizations; fourth,

harmonizing the national and international interests and finally matching the above-mentioned stages with peace building².

It is noted that the theoretical components of this concept indicate that peacebuilding is not only a post conflict resolution or a post accord construction, but it is a more comprehensive strategic umbrella that encompasses all arrays of processes, approaches, stages, and activities that can contribute to transforming the conflict into A more sustainable peaceful relationship. In other words, this term can be perceived to have transformational nature and a process of changing the negative relationships into more positive, constructive attitudes in the long run (Lederach, 1995). Therefore, Lederach proposed a sort of mechanism to strengthen peace building on the grounds by engaging the grassroots, local NGOs and other national and international actors to create conditions conducive to The peace process (Lederach, 2005).

The concept of reconciliation is best described by David Bloomfield. Bloomfield has observed that reconciliation is both a goal and a process (Bloomfield, 2008). So, we have to take into consideration a clear answer for the following question: How can we recognize when the goal of reconciliation has been achieved? Of course, it is not easy to answer such a question since reconciliation is not a handy roadmap and there are no bypass roads or easy descriptions for the reunifications. These societies have been divided by a long lasting violence that resulted from conflicts. Thus, there is a need for a wider understanding as well as conciliatory environment as a base for those conflicted parties. In fact, we have a difficult challenge of establishing a new form of positive co-existence.

Accordingly, others have defined the term “reconciliation”. For example, Galtung states that it means “closure plus healing; closure in the sense of not re-opening hostilities, healing in the sense of being rehabilitated (Galtung, 2001).” While according to Louis Kriesberg, reconciliation “refers to processes by which parties that have expressed an oppressive relationship or a destructive conflict with each other move to attain or to restore a relationship that they believe will be minimally acceptable (Kriesberg, 2001)”.

Working at the political\elite level is crucial to achieve reconciliation, but that arrangement remains incomplete unless we integrate the social\ communal reconciliation into the process. Civil society, in this regard, can facilitate integrating communities into more meaningful process of reconciliation with justice, social harmony and active citizenship the main driving principles on the ground (Wüstenberg, 2009).

² Peace-making -- Overview" Conflict Management Toolkit. (Johns Hopkins University, School of Advanced International Studies, Conflict Management Program). Accessed on 15 Feb. 2006. Available from <http://legacy2.sais-jhu.edu/cmtoolkit/approaches/peacemaking/index.htm>.

Civil Society in the Palestinian Context

In his theory of hegemony, Antonio Gramsci describes how states use cultural institutions to maintain power in capitalist societies. Gramsci does not understand the 'state' in the narrow sense of a government. Instead, he perceives two different ways of how the ruling class maintains its dominance in society: first they use a coercive strategy that employs the political society (army, the police, legal systems etc.) of a capitalist state to force other classes to accept its role. Second, they apply a hegemonic strategy that uses the civil society's (family's, education systems', trade unions' etc.) ideas and values to persuade the subordinate class of the idea that the rule of the capitalists is legitimate and fruitful. The civil society organizations are commonly seen as the 'private' or 'non-state' sphere that mediates between the state and the economy in this Gramscian paradigm (Ncube, 2000).

The debate on the position of the Civil Society and the expected role in the efforts of national reconciliation between the two main Palestinian parties (Fatah and Hamas) has become the main argument among the Palestinians at all Micro and Macro levels. This development comes along with the need to frame the potential use of the political position of Palestinian Civil Society through scientific studies in order to accumulate the efforts to achieve national, political, developmental and socioeconomic goals.

The combination of both our professional background and accumulated experience have expanded the idea of this research, putting additional motivation on the importance of the Palestinian Civil Society's role in activating the internal political situation. Indeed, this important issue affected the holistic Palestinian public life in different areas: economic, social, political...etc. It is noted that the strong presence of different Palestinian civil society organizations highlights the great importance of their role in peacebuilding actions internally and externally at the local and elite levels. This study came along with the passion for achieving peace, prosperity and stability within the Palestinian society and with other neighboring communities. The idea of the accumulated knowledge of the Palestinian civil society has fundamentally contributed towards solidifying public life and enhancing socioeconomic formation of the Palestinian context. Obviously, the Palestinian civil society has a particular structural role in the Palestinian Public Life. Thus, this paper highlights the main areas that determine the future of civil society contribution to the Palestinian political map.

At present, Civil society institutions work primarily to enhance peace by providing people with knowledge and skills. Nobody can deny that civil society plays a role in consolidating and disseminating knowledge related to democracy, human rights and development. At the same time, they promote skills connected with conflict transformation, negotiations, mediation and effective communication (Jarrar, 2009). The final goal of such a mission is to promote people's resilience by

encouraging them to resolve their local differences peacefully and by adopting the strategy of sustainable development especially in those areas closer to the Wall and to the Israeli settlements in West Bank. Such techniques are helpful not only to strengthen peaceful coexistence internally but also to encourage local communities to have a say in resolving national as well as local conflicts including that one between Fatah and Hamas. For instance, Taawon for Conflict Resolution, is a local Palestinian civil society organization has been engaged in such activities in the last ten years. Taawon is working with youth, women and with the weaker sections of the society and it has widely published reports and studies, along with organizing seminars and workshops to promote these values (Abu Hantash, 2009).

There were some initiatives embraced by civil society organizations in Palestine to eliminate the internal hostility. Such role was crystalized on the ground by stimulating middle class leaders from both factions (Fatah and Hamas) to meet face to face and to exchange views on the future of reconciliation.³ Mustafa Al Barghouthi from *Al Mubadara* has been optimistic about the future role of civil society in bridging the gaps between Fatah and Hamas, although in some of his interviews he indicated that there are some hindrances on the way to reconciliation. In order to have more concrete results on the ground, Albarghouthi would rather suggest alliance or solid network between civil society groups and the communal mobilization in order to precipitate change. In much micro analysis Palestinian society needs intra personal and intra individually reconciliation as both communities and individuals need to reconciled with themselves.

According to Walid Salem, an activist and academic as well, the civil society institutions are generally expected to fulfill their roles. These roles include “monitoring violations of human rights; observing elections; raising public awareness of democracy, human rights, gender issues, providing agricultural and health information, international lobbying, and organizing nonviolent activities to protest against the occupation and social domination.”⁴ . in the same context, AtharZaghal from UN women, says that “The role of civil society in general is to work as an advocacy tool, to advocate people’s and the society’s voice and put pressures on the official authorities. It is also a monitoring tool that the government uses to guarantee a social, administrative and political system that is free from violations and corruption”⁵.

These roles are justified as part of these organizations missions in order to move towards building a healthy Palestinian society and mobilizing the foundations of its existence, survival and development. Human Rights and Democracy Media Center SHAMS for example defines its vision as building civic

³ Interview with Mustafa Barghouthi Al Mubadara Chairman and Palestinian Medical Relief Society, Ramallah 18-5-2018.

⁴ Interview with Walid Salem, Jerusalem, 20-5-2018.

⁵ Personal Interview, AtharZaghal, Ramallah, 15/12/2017.

democratic society on the basis of tolerance, justice and rule of law⁶. There is a widespread belief that the civil society represents the values of tolerance, recognition, assimilation, reconciliation, democracy and amnesty. In fact, civil society has a history associated with politics, economics and developing the state and society. It can facilitate the real intellectual and cultural process towards citizenship and democracy with justice, equality and basic freedoms as the main principles and slogans (Bishara, 2012).

Moreover, they work on creating media pressure on the international community to make a change. That is why they focus on covering incidents of people who live in crucial and critical situations and broadcasting them to the world. As Amal Joumah from the Women Affair Technical Committee stresses, “the NGOs have to play an important role in bringing people's attention to the issues happening around them. This can be done through the coverage and reach out, using media, communication and advocacy campaigns more particularly in issues connected with woman in Palestinian society and their daily routine problems”⁷.

Due to the absence of the Palestinian authority, the intervention of external actors was necessary. Considering that the Palestinians' partial loss of hope in the newly constructed arrangements that took place after the Oslo Accords in 1994, the measurements by external institutions have further consolidated. Therefore, people can feel that they have something to lean on since the game has taken place and the third wheel has interfered under the umbrella of the CSOs in Palestine. Since then the organizations have interfered as third party which has supported the Palestinian people and offered aid when other authorities have failed to help. However, violence has never stopped. Considering Gramsci's theory, it is apparent how powerful forces use civil society to spread their control by containing people's pain and suffering at the end of the day.

Actually, different field interviews have been conducted by the researcher in order to measure the impact of civil society interventions in the domestic reconciliation process. Ayed Abu Eqtaish, the Accountability Program Director of the Defense for Children International, contends that “these organizations have tried many times to give a hand in solving the different sensitive situations in Palestine. Yet the political parties, whether in the internal conflict or the direct confrontation with “Israel”, have always put limits for them, as these parties always underestimate the civil society's role and even suspected it”⁸

Obviously, Abu Eqtaish, has highlighted several important points. He has pointed out the limits and the stumbling obstacles preventing civil society groups from achieving substantial change. They started to control their fund accounts harmed the effectiveness and quality of their work. They also

⁶ <http://www.shams-pal.org/>.

⁷ Phone Interview, Amal Joumaa, Ramallah, 1/1/2017.

⁸ Personal Interview, Ayed Abu Eqtaish, Ramallah, 2/1/2018.

put many checkpoints and divide the land. As Zaghal stated that "the Israeli occupation limits the ability of civil society to access all beneficiaries; hence, in order for some civil society organizations to work in all the Palestinian cities, they have to operate through multiple offices in Gaza, the West Bank and sometimes even in Jerusalem. In addition, they have to acquire legal registrations from both the Palestinian and Israeli authorities."⁹

These circumstances certainly pressure the CSOs financially and politically pressures and would reduce the quality of their services due to the amount of challenges they face. Second, some of the local NGOs intervened in the situation but the political views on these interventions are not taken as seriously as the involvement of political parties and factions. A reason for this situation might be that in the case of Palestine. The focal point lies in the political orientations and localizing groups of interests within the public concern. However, at this point, Gramsci's theory explains how these civil society organizations were made only to help in improving the situation without making any political steps or affiliations. On the other hand, CSOs were not as powerful as expected or pretended to be in actual life.

Therefore, the involvement of civil societies as an effective tool for social and political change has to be further debated and discussed in more specific and narrow context. Hadeel Elayan from Sawa Organization states that "Sawa organization doesn't have a role in the political field. However, its main role is aiding those in need including women, children and families of the victims and who have been harmed because of the occupation and the internal division".¹⁰ Elayan further says, civil society's work is related to services and consultation but they have no realpolitik. Moreover, Abu Eqtish has also stated "Defense of Children International in Palestine (DCIP) in 2014 started a campaign to hold accountable the occupation forces in the UN for using children as human shields in wars and armed clashes. However, and for the first time, the Secretary General has refused the recommendation of his representative for such a request"¹¹ after the declaration of the initiative of the DCIP Organization to protect the children in Palestine by using the political terms and legal mandate the UN put. Hence, civil society has not taken useful role in resolving the causes political cause due to the political obstacles and challenges by powerful institutions .

Debates on Political Division by Palestinian Civil Society

The leaders and activists of civil society in Palestine unanimously agreed that political fragmentation caused significant damage the Palestinian system at political, social and cultural levels. Such damage has weakened the presence of Palestine cause in international forums and organizations. Such bad

⁹ Personal Interview, AtharZaghal, Ramallah, 15/12/2017.

¹⁰ Phone Interview, Hadeel Elayan, Ramallah, 1/1/2018.

¹¹ Personal Interview, Ayed Abu Eqtish, Ramallah, 2/1/2018.

ramifications are reflected in the culture of people and their concepts of mutual peaceful coexistence. The division harmed the composition of Palestinian life in connection with social emancipation and economic developments.

The civil society played a limited but constructive in the issue of national reconciliation and the subject of peaceful resistance to occupation. Actually, civil society provided more than one initiative; but they sometimes lose influence since there are parts of Palestinian society limit their connections to the political parties¹².

Since the beginning of the political split in 2007, the civil society has openly and actively expressed its dissatisfaction and rejection of phenomenon of national tragedy. The network of NGOs, including the networks in the West Bank and Gaza Strip as well as parliamentary blocs and the participation of some political parties, formed the Committee on Public Freedoms. It focuses on human rights abuses in both the West Bank and Gaza, including political arrests, the closure of civil institutions and the assault on certain peaceful activities.¹³

The deep causes of the problem were not analyzed as an entry point for reconciliation and the political division was not treated as a reason to undermine the Palestinian political system. Articles 44, 45, and 46 of the Palestinian Basic Law (temporary Palestinian constitution) emphasize the components of the political regime as a presidential system. However, it became a mixed system after the division in which two heads of power (the president and the prime minister), might complicate the democratic nature of future Palestine state, especially in the absence of the Legislative Council and the containment of the judiciary.¹⁴

It seems apparent that PSC has no solid collective plan, which determines who the organizations are, what their objectives and how they want to achieve them. There is no vision regarding the political system and the state. Although the role of the civil society is limited since it is not part of the process and political structure, it has excellent opportunities to achieve a positive impact on the national reconciliation. Experience has shown that this moral force of civil society is not negligible if it manages its activities adequately. The leaders of civil society organizations emphasis the significance of establishing internal peace of the community far more than reconciliation efforts. The contribution of civil society institutions to the issue of reconciliation is limited and non-effective in real sense. As a result, these institutions fall outside the framework of the political system in broader terms. The

12

https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/ResearchAndStudies//Pages/The_Contribution_of_Palestinian_Civil_Society_Organisations_toward_Achieving_National_Reconciliation_in_Palestine_2007-201.aspx.

¹³ An interview with Khaled Mansour nonviolence resistance activist. 9-5-2018.

¹⁴ Interview with Naseef Mualem, PCPD general Director, 13 May, 2018.

inability of the Palestinian Authority to achieve national goals and the delay in peacemaking may provide an opportunity for civil society organizations to make a change¹⁵.

In fact, the two groups (Fatah and Hamas) make tangible efforts to create a special civil society that suits the regime of security which controls the lives of citizens as well as the economic and social organizations. Some civil society leaders spoke of the absence of efficient role of the Palestinian civil society in reconciliation efforts. Actually, democracy in public life declined dramatically including in public bodies such as local government municipalities, student councils and trade unions¹⁶. Civil society worked in a dual track strategy to end the political split. The essential elements of this strategy is encourage masses to take over the streets in protest and to document the violations of human rights and basic liberties¹⁷.

The masses lost confidence in the political parties and institutions of civil society are living in a state of self-confident to achieve their true values and traditions. At the same time, civil society institutions could not be deepening their ability to mobilize the public quickly through the student councils and social movements. They suppose, I mean PCS, to work with the aim of constructing a community alliance for the sake of putting pressures on both conflicting groups to come closer towards reconciliation.

The leaders of the civil society have moved away from the masses and their social engagements. Civil society did not provide creative solutions on grassroots level to deal with the political division. The ongoing Fatah and Islamist discourse that does not rise to the level that required to deal with the conflict in much more innovative way. Civil Society needs to be more pragmatic and realistic when it comes to putting its strategies of making internal and domestic peace at political level. Civil society needs to play all the roles that would make changes in the balance of power and rearrange the map of interests in a strategic and rational way to transform the conflict.

1. Initiatives of Palestinian Civil Society in the Context of Peace-Building and Reconciliation.

The Palestinian civil society has undertaken numerous efforts and initiatives in the issue of political split and the subsequent reconciliation file but the tangible results on the ground as we already discussed in the previous pages were limited and ineffective.

- Initiatives aiming at **ending the division and breaking the siege on Gaza Strip** as well as organizing and supporting international solidarity campaigns and return ships aimed at

¹⁵ Interview with Jad Ishaq, Jerusalem, 6 May, 2018.

¹⁶ Interview with Sami Khader, Maan General Director, Ramallah, 7 May, 2018.

¹⁷ Interview with Omer Mansour, Jenin, 4 May, 2018.

breaking the siege. The failure of the peace process undermined all efforts to develop programs for the people on much more professional basis¹⁸.

- Among the successes achieved by the society is the **initiative of reducing the effects of division** in some areas. Its most valuable success addresses the human rights violations resulting from the division, including arbitrary detention, torture, dismissal from public office, infringement of freedom of expression, peaceful assemblies and the right to form associations¹⁹.
- Civil society interventions also included **pressures to protect the humanitarian interventions** and follow up the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of **return of health, water and basic services**. There have been modest initiatives and contributions by the civil society to the reconciliation process, but although these contributions had positive impacts on the situation, they could not gain the requisite strength. However, some of these initiatives were affected by the political framework and by the state of containment and cooptation. However, only limited number of institutions remained independent²⁰.
- The most important initiatives is the **Palestinian National Initiative (Mubadara) 2006–2007** which participated in the Cairo negotiations and was included in the Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations Network (PNGO). It aimed at solving the problem of the health sector by the PNGO. Certainly, there are initiatives to communicate with institutions, international parties and organizations which are working on the issue of reconciliation.²¹
- **The youth movement took over the streets** in an attempt to end the division under various names such as “Youth of March 5”, “Youth of June” and “Youth Movements”. At the same time, joining with some civil institutions to bring about positive changes in the Palestinian society. It hopes to play the pivotal role in ending the split with minimum level of cost politically and socially.²²
- The PNGO Network formed the Public Freedoms Committee, aims at focusing on human rights violations in both the West Bank and Gaza. These violations include political arrests, closure of civil institutions and attacks on Youth activists and volunteers. It hoped to end the division and the political split by formulating initiatives of mediation between the conflict groups. Thus, it has organized many networks, marches and tents sit-in call for unity in 2011. At the time, it was able to influence the popular efforts and informed the President, Mahmoud

¹⁸ Interview with Monjed Abu Jaish, PNGO, Ramallah, 29 April, 2018.

¹⁹ Interview with AbdelRahman Tamimi, General Palestinian Hydrology Group, Ramallah, 29 April, 2018.

²⁰ Isam Aroui, General Director of Jerusalem Legal Aid and Human Rights Center, Ramallah, 28 April, 2018.

²¹ Hani Smeerat, T a'awon for conflict Resolution, Ramallah, 28 April, 2018.

²² Omar Rahhal, Shams Center, Ramallah, 30 June 2018.

Abbas, that he should visit Gaza for the sake of reconciling differences with Hamas. They told him that if he does so, he would be welcomed by Hamas and the political division will end and consequently our national project would be revived.

- Panorama civil group has managed a program funded by the European Union to coordinate the efforts of all the institutions working on peace, health, education and environment in one strategic pot. It is crucial to invest in professional initiatives such as the Swiss Reconciliation Initiative, which still exists, and establish professional experience in the field of conflict resolution and peace studies. This professionalism includes theoretical orientations and practical skills that suit the Palestinian political and social context. It is useful to adopt a national program that neutralizes external intervention and start building bridges of trust with professional negotiators, and sharing the voice of academia and the private sector in the negotiation process.²³

Challenges and Obstacles

The Palestinian civil society has not found its appropriate place against the backdrop of Oslo Era. In other words, that requires redefinition of the Palestinian civil society by the new changes of Oslo and its political, social and economic milestones. Civil society does not have enough power to generate sufficient pressure on the parties to conflict regarding the division, its role has not much differed from those of political parties which were not part of the division but became partner parties in one degree or the another over time. Besides, civil society still tries to play the role of reformer without sufficient force of the ground. When split got deeper day after day, civil society emerged as one victim of such division. Division caused deterioration in the system itself to the extent that participatory democracy emerged on paper only without real substance.

Historically speaking, the roots of the problem trace back to the establishment of the National Authority which as an extension of the PLO. The structure of the organization focused on the widespread use of money and political influence to buy elites and prevent criticism including direct repression. Containment and cooptation were used widely to cultivate new leaders and new elites and civil society was not exceptional to that trend. Trade unions and student councils established inside the occupied territories were utilized by some political factions to falsify their representation among masses.

Cultural elites, intellectuals and writers were co-opted by the Authority by offering them posts in the government as ministers, deputy ministers, advisors or ambassadors abroad. They have been privileged with huge salaries and covering other expenses. Additionally, the Authority transformed

²³ Interview with Khalid Mansour, popular and nonviolent resistance activist, Tobas and the Jordan Valley, 30 April, 2018.

funding sources to a tool of control and influence over political parties and civil society. Popular unions such as teachers' union and the syndicate of public servants were established but used also to look for funds and influence as well.

Final Concluding Remarks

The Oslo Agreement signed between the Palestinians and the Israelis in 1993 had impacted the background of civil society in Palestine due to the social, political and economic changes occurred in the Palestinian context. It is evident that civil society has not had enough power and willingness as well to put pressures on the two conflicting parties to end the status of political division and split. This is despite its role as reformer and peace promoter at least at domestic level. At the more advance stage, civil society activists felt victimized by this fragmentation because participatory democracy was unable to function at the system level and at grassroots movements as well.

The main reason behind such a problem was the Palestinian Authority strategy of putting pressures on the international funds that go to the civil society sector, along with another strategy of containing and coopting the elites of this sector by offering them portfolios and privileges. The Palestinian Authority has used the strategy of cooptation of civil and cultural elites specially writers, intellectuals and activists by offering them good positions including ministries and public offices and paying them luxurious salaries.

To conclude civil society organizations can provide neutral information conflicting groups based on professional and impartial sources. Appropriate and creative tools and channels for communication between both parties must be developed professionally. The urgent search for acceptable mediators, young energetic leaders and positive school of thoughts must be intensified.

Bibliography

- Abu Hantash, Ibrahim and others, *The Reality of Mediation between the Palestinian Youth*, Ramallah: Taawon for conflict Resolution, 2009.
- Bari, Molfetta, 1999, SEMINAR ON THE NGO CONTRIBUTION TO THE PEACE PROCESS, <http://developmentofpeoples.org/uploads/analysis/analysis1-CISP-policy-paper-asia.PDF>.
- Bishara, Azmi, 2012, *Civil Society: A Critical Study*, Doha: Arab Centre for Research and Policy Studies.
- Bloomfield, in D. Bloomfield et al, eds., 2008 *Reconciliation After Violent Conflict: A Handbook*, Stockholm: International IDEA, p. 12.
- Galtung, Johan, 1976 *Three Approaches to Peace: Peace-making, Peacekeeping and Peace building*, in *Peace, War and defence: essays in Peace Research*, Copenhagen: Ejlers, pp. 279–298.

- Galtung, Johan, 1969, Violence, Peace and peace Research, *Journal of Peace Research*, 6 (3), pp. 167–191.
- Galtung, Gohan, 2001, ‘After violence reconstruction, reconciliation, and resolution’, pp. 30–23 in M. Abu- Nimer, ed., *Reconciliation, Justice and Coexistence*, Lanham, MD: Lexington, p. 4.
- Ghali, Boutros Boutros 1992, *an Agenda for Peace*, New York: United Nations Publication, Available from: <http://www.un-documents.net/a47-277.htm>.
- Jarrar, Allam, 2009, *The Atkin Paper Series Palestinian Civil Society: Ramallah: A time for action in Amal Abusrour*, March 2009.p. 4.
- Kriesberg,L, 2001, ‘ Changing forms of coexistence’, pp. 47–64 in M. Abu- Nimer , p. 48.
- Lederach, John Paul, 1995, *conflict Transformation in Protracted Internal Conflicts: The case for Comprehensive Framework*, in Kumar Rupensingh (ed), *Conflict Transformation*, New York: Macmillan, p. 201–222.
- Lederach, John. P. 2005, *The Moral Imagination: The Art and Soul of Peace Building*, Oxford: Oxford University press.
- Ncube, Cornelia, 2000, *CONTESTING HEGEMONY: CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE STRUGGLE FOR SOCIAL CHANGE IN ZIMBABWE, 2000 – 2008*, <http://theses.bham.ac.uk/1086/1/Ncube10PhD.pdf>.
- Palestine Liberation Organization Negotiation Unit, 2018 *The Ongoing Nakbah*, Ramallah: Negotiation Affairs Department. <https://palaestina.org/fileadmin/Daten/Dokumente/Sonstiges/Nakba.pdf>.
- Peace-making -- Overview" *Conflict Management Toolkit*. (Johns Hopkins University, School of Advanced International Studies, Conflict Management Program). Accessed on 15 Feb. 2006. Available from <http://legacy2.sais-jhu.edu/cmtoolkit/approaches/peacemaking/index.htm>.
- Pina, Aaron D., 2006 “Report for Congress: Palestinian Elections”, Congressional Research Service, USA. February 9, pp. 2–10.
- Schanzer, Jonathan (2008) “ *Hamas vs. Fatah: The Struggle For Palestine*”, Paldrave Macmillan, New York. pp. 1–13.
- Sheikh Khalil, Nihad *Palestinian Reconciliation Initiatives since June 2007 to June 2008*, Gaza: The Palestinian Centre for Consultancy and Conflict Resolution BeitHikma, 2008.
- Wüstenberg, Ralf (2009), *The Political Dimension of Reconciliation: A theological Analysis of ways of dealing with guilt during transition to democracy in South Africa and Germany*, Grand Rapids/Cambridge: Wm. B. Reed. p. 181.

List of Interviewees

Abu Jaish, Monjed, Nablus, 29 April, 2018.

Abu Qtaishm Ayed, Ramallah, 2 January, 2018.
Arouri, Sami 28 April, 2018.
Barghouthi, Mustafa , Ramallah 18 May, 2018.
Elayyan, Hadeel, Ramallah 1 Februray, 2018.
Ishaq, Jad, Bethlehem, 6 May, 2018.
Joumaa, Amal, Ramallah 1 January, 2017.
Khader, Sami, Ramallah, 7 May, 2018.
Mansour, Khalid, Nablus, 9 May, 2018.
Mansour, Omer, Jenin, 4 May, 2018.
Muallam, Naseef, Ramallah 13 May, 2018.
Rahhal, Omar, Ramallah, 30 June 2018.
Salem, Walid, Jerusalem, 20 May, 2018.
Smeerat, Hani, Ramallah, 28 April, 2018.
Tamimi, Abdelrahman, Ramallah, 29 April, 2018.
Zaghal, Athar, Ramallah, 15 December, 2017.

Legal Issues Regarding the Global Refugee Crisis: the Example of Jordan

Abstract

The global refugee crisis is currently having an impact on several countries all over the world. Some nations, such as Jordan, are affected more than others. Refugees come to Jordan mainly from the Middle East, especially from Palestine, Iraq, and Syria. Historically, Jordan is considered a welcoming country for refugees. It is noteworthy that, globally, Jordan contains the highest percentage of displaced people in relation to the native population. This high number of refugees may lead to problems. In this paper, I focus on legal issues regarding the global refugee crisis. The mass influx of refugees might affect the number of crimes committed through the involvement of refugees and their violation of certain rules. The criminal responsibility of refugees and the legal refugee status should, therefore, be examined. In this research, I focus on the Jordanian policy towards forced migrants concerning the legal definition of the expression “refugee,” stated in the 1951 Geneva Convention. It is worth noting that addressing the legal problems of the refugee crisis in Jordan and its management could have a significant impact on other countries in the Middle East, such as Turkey and Lebanon. These states share some features of the crisis with Jordan and might take Jordan as a model.

I. Introduction

In this paper, I examine the global refugee crisis and its impact on the situation of crimes in Jordan. I aim at investigating how Jordan has been affected by this crisis and present its main features. A detailed examination of how the mass influx of refugees has had an impact on the number of crimes in Jordan is the main focus of this research. Besides, an analysis of how being a refugee might increase the vulnerability of a person is considered since this state seems to facilitate the development of criminal potential. In order to examine this development, it is first necessary to consider the difficulty of identifying refugee victims as victims of criminal organizations and exploiters. However, this method is complicated because of the lack of formal procedures for identifying refugee victims in Jordan; such victims are treated as any other victims. Another concern is to examine the status of refugees under Jordanian legislation, questioning the term “refugee” in this context.¹

¹ It is noteworthy that there is no official and accepted definition of the term “refugee” in Jordan. However, Jordan uses the definition of this term according to the 1951 Refugees Convention. Section (III), “The Legal Status of Refugees in Jordan,” gives a further explanation.

The political and cultural setting in Jordan is reasonably consistent with its approach to resolving crises. Hence, its crisis management routine matches common international standards and, therefore, complies with international law. It is noteworthy that Syrian refugees are attracted to Jordan because of the similar lifestyles in both countries. With this paper, I intend to fill the gap in the critical literature about the relations between the welcoming of refugees and the violation of legislation in Jordan, highlighting both the crimes (or possible crimes) committed by refugees and those that perceive them as victims. This research may provide recommendations for the Jordanian government, other countries, NGOs, civil society organisations, or any other body concerned with the problem to gain a better understanding of, and consequently, a better way of addressing the problem.

The available data regarding the rate of crimes committed by or against refugees is not precise and comprehensive. The lack of precise and extensive data is likely to be because there are several different bodies dealing with the issue of refugees in Jordan, and cooperation among them is rarely comprehensive. Additionally, many of these crimes are difficult to detect. Thus, it is necessary to analyse practices that may influence refugees to violate legislation but also to address those situations in which refugees can be considered victims of crimes in Jordan.

II. Jordan's Policy towards Refugees

This section highlights the Jordanian policy towards refugees by illustrating how the unrest in neighbouring countries has escalated the impact of the refugee crisis on Jordan. Besides, this section emphasises the fact that Jordan has been considered a welcoming country for refugees (mainly from the Arab world) throughout history. However, it is necessary to consider that the legal framework that deals with refugee issues is not sufficiently clear.

The unrest and instability in several countries in the Middle East, particularly in Palestine, Iraq, and Syria, leads to the perception of Jordans as a welcoming country for their refugees since the country is part of the Arab world but with a more stable situation. When Jordan was known as Transjordan at the end of the nineteenth century, it received refugees from Armenia, Chechnia, Circassia and Assyria (ILO 2015, p. 9). Then, In 1948 and 1967, Jordan hosted a massive number of refugees from Palestine. The reason for these incidents were two major wars between Arab countries and Israel (Chen 2009, p. 42). As a result of the first Gulf War in 1990 and the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq in 2003, Jordan welcomed a large number of Iraqi refugees. Finally, Jordan received recently a significant number of refugees from Syria as a result of the unrest and civil war in the country in 2011. (ILO. 2015, 5, 9–10, 24). Jordan hosts, for instance, the largest number of Palestinian refugees of any country in the world,

containing more than two million Palestinian refugees. Most of them now have Jordanian citizenship (Saliba 2016). Some refugees have been living in Jordan for a long time and still do not own a legal passport. Instead, they still hold temporary passports since, according to the authorities, they are not qualified to have legal passports. This circumstance seems astonishing considering that before 1988, refugees from Palestine were given full Jordanian citizenship except for refugees from Gaza in 1967 (Gabbay 2014, p. 1). Jordan has the highest proportion of refugees worldwide in relation to its native population with 89 refugees per 1,000 inhabitants (Chatelard 2010, UNHCR 2018, p. 1). According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,² Jordan is one of the countries that are affected most by the Syrian refugee crisis. However, this statistic does not include the number of Palestinian refugees under the mandate of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees, “UNRWA”, which regards one out of three people a refugee (UNHCR 2017, p. 2). The central countries of origin of the arriving refugees in Jordan are Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Sudan and Somalia (UNHCR 2018, p. 1). Jordan is lacking a clear legal framework for refugees but has, nonetheless, provided asylum for people from several different countries, particularly from Iraq and Syria during the recent years (Saliba 2016). Jordan’s open-border policy towards Syrian refugees was praised by the international community (Achilli 2015). Besides, Jordan also granted a wide range of services, such as access to education and health, to the refugees. However, Jordan tries to avoid perceiving Syrians as refugees since this acknowledgement would result in certain obligations that impose Jordan under its state responsibility towards refugees (Saliba 2016). Among others, these obligations include non-refoulement, “the right to seek and enjoy asylum from persecution and the right to leave one’s country” (Hurwitz 2009, p. 173). Iraqis who are residing in Jordan do not fulfill the criteria to be regarded as refugees according to the 1951 refugee convention (UNHCR 2013, p. 2; Olwan 2007, p. 2). Instead, Jordan refers to these people as “visitors,” “Arab brothers,” “irregular guests,” or simply “guests” (UNHCR 2013, p. 2; ILO 2015, p. 12; Olwan 2007, p. 2). These terms have no legal meaning (ILO 2015, p. 12; Olwan, 2007, pp. 23–25). However, such terms, which are used by the public and officials, make refugees feel more welcome in Jordan. One of the main challenges refugees and asylum-seekers face in Jordan is thus the lack of legal status, which hinders them to work in Jordan legally. However, the Jordanian Government tolerates the illegal work of these migrants in Jordan. This exception is limited to a certain category of refugees because there is no possible solution but resettlement for the majority of refugees until the UNHCR finds an answer (UNHCR 2013, p. 2).

² The following information is provided in accordance with the fact sheet of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees of June 2018.

III. The Legal Status of Refugees in Jordan

This section examines the legal status of refugees in Jordan by addressing how they have been considered according to the Jordanian legislation and other relevant international instruments, specifically the Memorandum of Understanding signed between Jordan and the UNHCR (MOU, Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Jordan and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 1998). Moreover, this section analyses the definition of the term “refugee” to emphasise and clarify the use of it in this paper.

Article twenty-one of the Jordanian Constitution states that “political refugees shall not be extradited on account of their political beliefs or for their defence of liberty” (The Jordanian Constitution, Art. 21).³ The Jordanian Constitution only considers “political refugees” and does not mention any other “category.” Besides, although the Jordanian Constitution addresses the principle of *non-refoulement* (UNHCR 2013, p. 7), no specific national law deals with the legal status of refugees (ILO 2015, p. 5). Jordan admits the principle of *non-refoulement* (Saliba 2016), and indeed, the country recognises that it may not return refugees forcibly to their countries in cases where their freedom or lives could be under threat (ILO 2015, p. 23). The principle of non-refoulement is regarded as a part of customary international law, and Jordan is, therefore, required to apply it regardless of whether it ratifies the 1951 Refugees Convention or not (Ibid.). Jordan also agrees that internationally accepted standards should be the basis of the treatment of refugees and asylum seekers (Saliba 2016). It is noteworthy, however, that Jordan deals with refugee issues mainly by means of the cooperation with the UNHCR. The main objectives of the UNHCR in Jordan are as follows: to maintain the protection for persons of concern in Jordan and to expand it by providing several services, such as health care and education. Second, within the scope of the UNHCR, they aim to offer safety nets for vulnerable and to find long-term solutions to support refugees by providing vocational training and several different types of activities (UNHCR 2013, p. 1). It might be argued that although the political will exists in Jordan to generally comply with international bodies, conventions, and standards concerning human rights issues, including refugees’ status, there is no domestic Jordanian refugee legislation (Ibid).⁴ Thus, the main legal instrument that deals with the legal status of refugees in Jordan is the Memorandum of Understanding signed between Jordan and the UNHCR. This Memorandum of Understanding outlines certain important international protections and safeguards for refugees and asylum seekers (UNHCR 2013, p. 1). By this Memorandum of

³ لا يسلم اللاجئين السياسيون بسبب مبادئهم السياسية او دفاعهم عن الحرية

⁴ Jordan is not a state party to the 1951 Refugees Convention (Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 1951) and the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 1967). Additionally, Jordan is not a state party to the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness 1961).

Understanding, international protection will be provided by the UNHCR to people falling under the UNHCR mandate.⁵ The Memorandum of Understanding outlines the legal framework of how to treat refugees in Jordan (Saliba 2016). Thus, through the Memorandum of Understanding, Jordan accepts the definition of refugees of the 1951 Refugees Convention (Ibid.). According to this definition (Convention Related to the Status of Refugees 1951), a refugee “is someone who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion” (Ibid, Art.1). However, this definition does not cover all categories of refugees in need of help. In contrast, it only addresses the refugees with “a well-founded fear of being persecuted.” This definition, therefore, ignores groups of refugees who do not achieve the level of the protected category stated in the definition (Lister 2012, p. 6).

The Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (1969) expands on the definition of refugees in the UNHCR by defining a refugee in the following terms:

The term “refugee” shall also apply to every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality (Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa 1969, Art. 1.2).

The scope of this definition is broader than the one of the UNHCR and includes those victims who are not covered by the UNHCR definition (Lister 2012, p. 8). In Jordan, no legally binding definition of the term “refugee” exists. The country relies on the definition used in the 1951 Refugees Convention in accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding between Jordan and UNHCR (Saliba 2016). In order to not put limitations on who might be included under the legal definition of refugees, a consensus definition has not been adopted. However, the absence of such a definition could lead to vagueness in lawmaking, increase mistakes in enforcement, enhance the feeling of uncertainty, and therefore, result in unpredictable outcomes (D’Amato 1983; Dari-Mattiacci, Deffains 2007, p. 635; Harel, Guttel 2008, p. 480). More importantly, the principle of legality, *nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege* (The Jordanian Penal Code Art. 3), will be violated by the absence of a clear definition of a refugee. It is often deemed preferable not to define terms with regard to criminal matters in Jordan, except when defining is necessary to resolve a dispute among jurists over the meaning of the term in question, or when defining

⁵ Jordan and the UNHCR signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to allow the UNHCR to act within its mandate to provide international protection to persons falling within the scope of this mandate.

is necessary to change the meaning of a term which has been manifested in its usage but needs to be transformed (Al-Saeed, K. 2011, 38). The MOU between Jordan and the UNHCR also provides legal status to refugees and states that the UNHCR can find a long-term solution⁶ to this issue. Such a solution could be voluntary repatriation to their country of origin or resettlement in a third country. Furthermore, in accordance with this Memorandum of Understanding, refugees who achieved the status of refugee under the mandate of the UNHCR should not stay in Jordan for more than six months (Saliba 2016). The Memorandum of Understanding emphasises several rights for asylum seekers and refugees, such as freedom of practising religion and religious education.⁷

Providing religious rights must not contradict with Jordanian legislation and public decency. Asylum seekers and refugees are also exempted from departure fees and overstay fines (Saliba 2016). The UNHCR conducts interviews with asylum seekers entering Jordan illegally. Such interviews aim to determine the status of an asylum seeker within seven days of entry to the country. However, this determination period can be extended up to one month in exceptional cases if other procedures are required (Saliba, I. 2016). Generally, the refugee status determination process is a set of interviews between the UNHCR and the asylum seeker. During the interview, an officer from the UNHCR questions the asylum seeker regarding their background, what happened to them in their country to make them leave and why they cannot go back to their country. Therefore, the UNHCR can determine whether the asylum seeker meets all criteria for the definition of refugee⁸. All asylum seekers have to go through the “Refugee Status Determination (RSD),” since it is regarded as the legal or administrative process that enables the UNHCR to determine whether the asylum seeker is eligible to international protection as a refugee. The Refugee Status Determination is an essential process for refugees in order to realise their rights in accordance with international law (UNHCR, Refugee Status Determination).⁹ Additionally, regarding the determination period, it is to be noted that the UNHCR personnel is bound to this period. In this regard, article three of the MOU between the government of Jordan the UNHCR states that “it was agreed to allow UNHCR to interview asylum seekers who entered Jordan clandestinely and are being held by competent authorities. UNHCR would make its determination within seven days except in exceptional cases requiring other procedure and the period should not exceed a month.”

⁶ The agreement between the UNHCR and Jordan states that refugees should not stay in the country for more than six months.

⁷ The rationale behind the MOU is that asylum seekers and refugees must not be subjected to discrimination based on their religion, nationality, or race, and should have, wherever possible, similar rights as Jordanian nationals regarding legal assistance and litigation.

⁸ ARDD, Arab Renaissance for Democracy and Development, 2018 <<https://ardd-jo.org/refugees-jordan-faq>>.

⁹ UNHCR, Refugee Status Determination. [online] Available at: <https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-status-determination.html> [Accessed 20 Apr. 2019].

IV. Practices that Lead Refugees to Violate Legislation

In this section, I examine several practices that might lead refugees in Jordan to violate some legislation, such as the Jordanian Residence and Foreigners' Affairs Law, or the Jordanian Labour Law.

IV.I The Right to Residency

According to Art. 20 of the Jordanian Residence and Foreigners' Affairs Law, foreigners¹⁰ who wish to stay in Jordan for a period longer than three months should receive authorisation from the Directorate of Public Security/Division for Residence and Foreign's Affairs. Additionally, foreigners need to apply for a resident permit.¹¹ Otherwise, they can be prosecuted, fined, and even imprisoned or forced to leave the country (the Jordanian Residence and Foreigners' Affairs Law, Arts. 31, 32, 34, 36). The Ministry of the Interior has the power to revoke a residence permit without any explanation (the Jordanian Residence and Foreigners' Affairs Law, Art. 19) despite deportation being an administrative decision and thus subject to the Administrative Court's review (The Law of Administrative Judiciary, Art. 5; Olwan 2007, p. 10). This "absolute power" also affects foreigners who are married to a Jordanian citizen (Olwan 2007, p. 9). In the view of the above, it is essential to note that the Jordanian Residence and Foreigners' Affairs Law does not distinguish between refugees/asylum seekers and "regular" foreigners; it applies to all non-Jordanians (Saliba, 2016).

IV.II The Right to Work

Article twenty-three of the Jordanian Constitution states that "work is the right of every citizen, and the State shall provide opportunities for work to all citizens by directing the national economy and raising its standards" (The Jordanian Constitution, Art. 23(i)). It is evident that this only applies to Jordanian citizens. Foreigners (of any kind) who wish to work in Jordan are subjected to special rules according to the Jordanian Labour Law and need a specific work permit (The Jordanian Labour Law, Art. 12). In terms of work permits, refugees, asylum seekers, and other non-citizens are treated equally (UNHCR. 2013, p. 2). Working illegally without such permission can result in penalties that include fines and deportation (The Jordanian Labour Law. Art. 12). Skilled workers are allowed to work in Jordan as part of the labour force, a rule of which refugees with specific skills can benefit (The Jordanian Labour Law, Art. 12; ILO 2015, p. 23). The category of skilled workers requires that these people possess capabilities and expertise that Jordanian workers do not have, or that they are experienced in trades where the

¹⁰ Any person who does not possess Jordanian nationality (The Jordanian Residence and Foreigners' Affairs Law, Art. 2).

¹¹ Under Art. 22(a) of the Jordanian Residence and Foreigners' Affairs Law 'A residence permit shall be valid for one year and be renewable subject to the requirements prescribed in this Law'.

Jordanian population is lacking skilled workers (The Jordanian Labour Law, Art. 12). Syrian workers are treated with priority over other foreign workers as they do not require a valid passport and benefit from reduced costs and simplified procedures (ILO 2015, pp. 23–24). However, illegal work is, of course, forbidden and may lead to prosecution. Therefore, refugees may violate the Jordanian Labour Law if they are illegally employed. According to article four of the Instructions regarding the Terms and Procedures for the Use and Recruitment of Non-Jordanians Workers, every employer who chooses to hire a non-Jordanian should fill in the “use and recruitment form.” This form contains specific information about the establishment, such as its name and that of the owner or director in charge, as well as its address, nature of work, branches, the name of the worker and their passport data, as well as their nationality the desired profession in the establishment.

V. Refugees as Victims in Jordan

This section highlights the situations in which refugees are victims of crimes, such as human trafficking, forced marriages, and forced labour.

V.I Human Trafficking

Refugees may become easy targets for human traffickers who consider Jordan the final destination or a transit country (JAHTNC 2013, p. 21). Jordan has been classified as an origin, transit, and destination country for several different forms of human trafficking (United States Department of State 2017, p. 229). According to article 3(a) of the “Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime”, these forms include “the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs (Trafficking in Persons Protocol 2000, Art. 3(a)).” Syrian children and women, in particular, must be perceived as victims subjected to sexual exploitation, forced marriages, and labour (Lee, 2014). It is noticeable that as a result of the mass influx of refugees coming to Jordan from neighbouring countries, mainly Syria, trafficking has become a severe matter in Jordan recently, and many refugees have already become victims of this development (JAHTNC 2013, p. 21; Olwan 2011, pp. 1,12). Jordan is committed to protecting trafficked refugees. Several human rights conventions and protocols force countries to be active in protecting vulnerable people (Obokata, T. 2006, p. 153).¹² If the

¹² The *Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings* (2005, Arts. 10–17); the *Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others* (1951, Arts. 16, 17, 19); and

countries of origin of the refugees concerned are unable or unwilling to provide protection for them or if the refugees might be subjected to torture, inhuman treatment, or degradation upon their return, protection could be realised by applying the principle of *non-refoulement* (Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 1951; Trafficking in Persons Protocol 2000, Art. 14 (1); Obokata 2006, pp. 155–156).

V.II Forced Marriage

Refugee women and girls might be exposed to forced marriages as a result of poverty and their unclear legal status. Some of them may consider it a *survival strategy* in exceptional situations. According to the *Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery* (1957), the definition of forced marriage is as follows:

Any institution or practice whereby: (i) A woman, without the right to refuse, is promised or given in marriage on payment of a consideration in money or kind to her parents, guardian, family or any other person or group; or (ii) The husband of a woman, his family, or his clan, has the right to transfer her to another person for value received or otherwise; or (iii) A woman on the death of her husband is liable to be inherited by another person (Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, Art. 1(c)).

First, it is necessary to define the differences between *forced* marriages and *arranged* marriages. Forced marriage is an illegal practice, like underage marriage and domestic violence, while arranged marriage is connected with dowries (Enright 2009, p. 333). Additionally, forced marriage does not depend on consent, while arranged marriage requires full consent (Ibid., 339–340). Following encouragement by the UNHCR, the Ministry of Interior instructed courts and religious judges in Jordan not to deport refugee women in case their Jordanian husbands divorce them, (UNHCR. 2013, 3). The minimum age for marriage, according to the Jordanian Personal Status Law, is eighteen for both boys and girls under normal circumstances. However, in exceptional circumstances, this age limit can be lowered to fifteen if the marriage would serve the best interests of the boy or the girl (The Jordanian Personal Status Law, Art.10). A religious judge determines whether the exception applies or not on a case-by-case basis (UNHCR 2013, p. 3). Some Syrian refugees resorted to unregistered religious marriages for under age children. In addition to ethical and moral issues, this phenomenon causes further problems in terms of birth certificates for the children of these couples since Jordanian law does not recognise such marriages. UNHCR emphasised this issue during its work with religious judges and courts (Ibid, pp. 3–4).

the *Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography* (2001, Arts. 8–10).

Jordanian women do not have “the right to confer nationality to their children directly” (UNHCR 2013, p. 7). This is particularly devastating for those refugee children whose fathers disappear. They risk statelessness, a condition that may cause additional problems for them to renew their documents, and as a result, they risk their fundamental rights (Ibid.)

V.III Forced Labour

Forced labour, according to the Forced Labour Convention (1930, Art. 2(1)) is “all work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily”. Forced labour is forbidden in Jordan, and the Jordanian Constitution opposes it in almost all cases. Only when a *state of necessity* requires forced labour or when a competent court demands convicted persons to perform compulsory labour formulates an exception (The Jordanian Constitution, Art. 13).

Additionally, forced labour violates Jordanian Labour Law since work always requires the consent of the worker (The Jordanian Labour Law, Art. 17). Forced labour may include several practices, such as refusing to pay the worker all of his wages, paying it with deliberate delay, or paying less than agreed (Tamkeen for Legal Aid and Human Rights 2009, p. 33).

VI. Conclusion

In this paper, I analyse the global refugee crisis and its impact on the number and kind of crimes in Jordan. This examination shows that Jordan can be regarded as an excellent humanitarian example concerning the welcoming of refugees. Despite limited financial resources, Jordan has been able to handle the refugee crisis more effectively than other countries with larger budgets. The main argument of this paper is that a refugee or asylum seeker could be particularly vulnerable on several levels, which may spur some displaced people to develop flawed survival strategies. There is no domestic Jordanian refugee legislation, and the country is neither a party of the 1951 Refugees Convention and the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees nor of the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. In conclusion, the legal “vulnus” about refugees in Jordan seems a serious issue that must be addressed as soon as possible. Refugees, who have no legal option to choose otherwise, might violate the right to residency. A similar situation concerns the right to work. Crimes that are explicitly committed against refugees include human trafficking, forced marriages, and forced labour. In order to solve some of these problems or at least to soften some of their consequences, I provide some advices which might be useful in the near future. It is recommended that Jordan ratifies the 1951 Refugees Convention and its 1967 Protocol. This ratification would have a significant impact on Jordan regarding obligations to protect refugees and

asylum-seekers. Moreover, it might strengthen the position of the country within the international forum. Besides, a thorough reform of the legislation system concerning immigration and refugees is necessary. The Jordanian Residence and Foreigners' Affairs Law needs to be updated, particularly regarding the issues of deportation and the process of asylum seeking. A clear definition of the term "refugee" in the Jordanian Law might significantly support these changes. More specifically, the creation of a precise local definition of the term, that does not contradict the one stated in the 1951 Refugees Convention, but that is tailored to the Jordanian situation will, most likely, be more effective in solving the problematic situation in the country.

The permission for refugees to work in Jordan among similar groups of citizens should be prioritised since it will not only enhance their status but also help them financially. Such circumstances will probably reduce the level of the refugees' vulnerability to criminals. Finally, raising awareness about refugees in Jordan is essential since the influence of this method can prevent refugees from committing crimes as well as protect them from becoming victims of hate crimes and discrimination.¹³

Bibliography

- Achilli, L 2015, *Syrian refugees in Jordan: A reality check*. [online] Cadmus.eui.eu. Available at: <http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/34904> [Accessed September 5, 2018].
- Al-Saeed, K 2011, *Explanation of the General Provisions in the Penal Code: A Comparative Study*. Amman, Daralthaqafa.
- Chatelard, G 2010, *Jordan: A Refugee Haven*. [online] migrationpolicy.org. Available at: <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/jordan-refugee-haven/> [Accessed September 5, 2018].
- Chen, T 2009, "Palestinian Refugees in Arab Countries and Their Impacts", *Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia)*, vol.3, no.3, pp. 42–56.
- Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others (1951), entered into force July 25, 1951, 96 UNTS 271.
- Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (1969), Adopted September 10, 1969, entered into force June 20, 1974. 1001 UNTS 45.
- Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (1961), adopted August 30, 1961, entered into force December 13, 1975, 989 UNTS 175.

¹³ An example of raised awareness among refugees from Syria in Jordan is the launching of the campaign "Work Permits Protect Your Rights" by the NGO "Care International." The aim of this campaign is to inform such refugees regarding the necessity of obtaining work permits to secure Syrian refugee rights and preventing them from being subjected to abuse in their workplace. More information available at: <http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/awareness-campaign-aims-help-refugees-%E2%80%9Bensure-their-rights%E2%80%99> [Accessed April 20, 2019].

- Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951), adopted July 28, 1951, entered into force April 22, 1954, 189 UNTS 137.
- Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (2005), entered into force February 1, 2008, ETS 197, 16.V.
- D’Amato, A 1983, “Legal Uncertainty”, *California Law Review*, vol. 71, no. 1, pp. 1–55.
- Dari-Mattiacci, G & Deffains, B 2007, “Uncertainty of Law and the Legal Process”, *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE*, vol. 163, no. 4, pp. 627–656.
- Enright, M 2009, “Choice, Culture and the Politics of Belonging: The Emerging Law of Forced and Arranged Marriage”, *Modern Law Review*, vol. 72, no. 3, pp. 331–359.
- Forced Labour Convention (1930), no. 29, adopted on June 28, 1930 by the General Conference of the International Labour Organisation at its fourteenth session, entered into force May 1, 1932.
- Gabbay, S 2014, “The Status of Palestinians in Jordan and the Anomaly of Holding a Jordanian Passport”, *Journal of Political Sciences & Public Affairs*, vol. 2, no.1, pp. 1–6.
- Harel, A & Guttel, E 2008, “Uncertainty Revisited: Legal Prediction and Legal Postdiction”, *Michigan Law Review*, vol. 107, no. 3, pp. 1–39.
- Hurwitz, A 2009, *The Collective Responsibility of States to Protect Refugees*. New York, Oxford University Press.
- ILO (2015), International Labour Organization. *Access to work for Syrian refugees in Jordan: a discussion paper on labour and refugee laws and policies*. [online] Available at: http://www.ilo.org/beirut/publications/WCMS_357950/lang--en/index.htm [Accessed September 5, 2018].
- JAHTNC (2013), The Jordanian Anti-Human Trafficking National Committee, *The First Report on Combating Human Trafficking in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan* (2009–2013).
- Lee, H 2014, *Syrian women in Jordan at risk of sexual exploitation at refugee camps*. [online] Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2014/jan/24/syrian-women-refugees-risk-sexual-exploitation> [Accessed 5 Sep. 2018].- Lister, M 2012, “Who are Refugees?”, *Law and Philosophy*, vol. 32, no. 5, pp. 645–671.
- MOU (1998), Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Jordan and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Adopted April 5, 1998, the Official Gazette, no 4277, May 3, 1998.
- Obokata, T 2006, *Trafficking of human beings from a human rights perspective*, Leiden, Nijhoff.

- Olwan, M 2007, *The Legal Framework of Forced Migration and Refugee Movements in Jordan, Migration and Refugee Movements in the Middle East and North Africa, The Forced Migration & Refugee Studies Program* [online] Schools.aucegypt.edu, available at: <http://schools.aucegypt.edu/GAPP/cmrs/Documents/MohamedOlwan.pdf>, accessed September 5, 2018.
- Olwan, M 2011, *Trafficking in Persons in Jordan* [online], Cadmus.eui.eu, available at: <http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/17795>, accessed September 5, 2018.
- Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography (2001), adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution A/RES/54/263 of May 25, 2000, entered into force January 18, 2002.
- Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1967), adopted January 31, 1967, entered into force October 4, 1967, 606 UNTS 267.
- Saliba, I 2016, *Refugee Law and Policy: Jordan* [online], Loc.gov, available at: <https://www.loc.gov/law/help/refugee-law/jordan.php>, accessed September 5, 2018.
- Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery (1957), entered into force April 30, 1957, 226 UNTS 3.
- Tamkeen for Legal Aid and Human Rights (2009), *The Report of the Conditions of Migrant Workers in Jordan*.
- The Jordanian Constitution (1952), Official Gazette, no. 1093, January 8, 1952, p. 3.
- The Jordanian Labour Law as amended, no. 8 of 1996, Official Gazette, no 4113, April 16, 1996, p. 1173.
- The Jordanian Penal Code as amended, no. 16 of 1960, Official Gazette, no. 1487, May 11, 1960, p. 374.
- The Jordanian Personal Status Law, no. 36 of 2010, Official Gazette, no. 5061, 16 October 16, 2010, p. 5809.
- The Jordanian Residence and Foreigners' Affairs Law, no. 24 of 1973, Official Gazette, no. 2426, June 16, 1973, p. 1112.
- The Law of Administrative Judiciary, no. 27 of 2014, Official Gazette, no. 5297, August 17, 2014, p. 4866.
- Trafficking in Persons Protocol (2000), Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, entered into force December 25, 2003. G.A. Res. 25, annex II, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Supp. no. 49, at 60, U.N. Doc. A/55/49 (Vol. I).

UNHCR (2013), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *Submission by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees For the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights' Compilation Report - Universal Periodic Review: Jordan* [online], available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/513d90172.html>, accessed September 5, 2018.

United States Department of State (2017), *Trafficking in Persons Report*.

UNHCR 2017, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2017* [online], available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/5b27be547.pdf>, accessed April 16, 2019.

UNHCR 2018, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *Fact Sheet: Jordan* [online], available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/jordan/unhcr-jordan-factsheet-february-2018>, accessed April 16, 2019.

UNHCR, Refugee Status Determination, [online], available at: <https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-status-determination.html>, accessed April, 20 2019.

Syrian Refugees Information Prediction System (RIPS) in Germany: Applied Digital Humanities

Abstract

Due to the sharp increase in the refugee flow numbers to Germany, there is a critical requirement for more investigations and studies on how emerging technologies can be used to address arising short- and long-term challenges of social inclusion in hosting countries.

After their arrival to Germany, refugees have to deal with a wide range of issues, such as learning a new language, negotiating family relationships, and managing with discrimination (Gifford and Correa, 2009). They cannot spend years in reception facilities, and they need permanent settlements, especially after they have been officially recognized as refugees. An important help to solve this problem may come if an accurate prediction system is made for the hosting country to show the strong and weak points of its infrastructure. Not many useful prediction system tools have been proposed to accomplish this goal due to the challenge to be able to choose the parameters to classify human behavior accurately. The proposed methodology is to use Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs): a Multilayer Perceptron (MLP) feed-forward neural network is used to develop a Refugees Information Prediction System (RIPS). The input layer of the system includes nine variables for each refugee, such as age, gender, etc. The output layer will provide a number which represents the willingness of the refugee to stay in Germany or not.

Introduction

Refugees, especially in their first times in their hosting country, happen to spend some time in camps or organized reception structures. Sometimes, even in European countries, camps do not guarantee basic human rights and frequently allow limited access to food, water, etc.¹ Germany hosts the second-largest immigrant population in the world (OECD, 2017). Displaced people (asylum seekers and, then refugees) who reach Germany come from all the hottest areas in the world, among which Sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia (Afghanistan, Pakistan), and the Indian Sub Continent.

¹ Safe shelter is mostly provided by the United Nations (Sheefa, 2015).

Machine Learning and its Applications

Machine learning is one of the most significant fields in computer science that uses statistical techniques to make the computers capable to “learn” (i.e., progressively improve performance on a specific task) with all kinds of data without being programmed.

It is considered as the basis for artificial intelligence. In our research, it is particularly significant since algorithms help to create the prediction of possible behaviors of people (refugees in our case). It may even, in the future, build samples and models for prediction, which can be used in different environments according to the single situations.

Current machine learning technology can identify, classify, and even interpret large data sets like video and *images genome* sequences, internet load traffic statistics, language recordings, etc. The designer or researcher can even train classifiers.


Machine learning has been successfully applied in many different fields because of its effectiveness in dealing with large numbers and big data (Fausett, 1994). Its first, easiest, and most well-known application is *Spam filtering: identify email messages as spam or non-spam in categories*. (Schapire, 2008, p1), but it is currently being used for Credit card fraud detection, medical diagnoses, and even weather forecast.

Refugees in Europe 2015–2020

Considering, in the background, the difficult situation of Syrian refugees and IDPs, we will focus more in-depth on the number of asylum seekers who have reached Europe in the last five years, which has been the largest in the last 30 years. This is raising questions about the EU's ability to quickly handle the newcomers into its economy and societies and challenges the standard refugee welcoming policies. Furthermore, this quick coming of a great number of new foreigners has spurred new themes concerning security, public safety, acceptance policies, and laws, etc. (Shekhar, 2016).

Around 1.2 million refugees officially arrived in Germany in 2015; this number made Germany the leading destination country for asylum seekers <https://www.unhcr.org/globaltrends2018/>.

Right after the closure of the so-called Balkan Route and the EU-Turkey refugee agreement on March 2015, the number of asylum first applications decreased considerably in Sweden and Austria and, less dramatically, in Germany (Figure 1 shows the Monthly inflow of first-time asylum seekers, 6/2014–6/2017, -Grote 2017-)



The massive wave of refugees and asylum seekers surprised the German authorities and society, as it happened almost everywhere in Europe. Emergency camps had to be built, and new procedures had to be introduced in refugee acceptance policies.

The main goal of this research is to predict whether those refugees are willing to stay or leave Germany. This is the first extensive empirical evaluation of location prediction. We have considered, in this work, several different parameters to set the prediction tools as accurate as possible.

A tremendous number of settings may affect the prediction procedure like age, gender, education, social network. Since the number of refugees had reached twenty-seven percent of the immigration of non-EU citizens overall (www.unhcr.org), the number of data to be analyzed has been remarkable. We have noticed, though, that more than 85 percent of asylum seekers from Syria have been granted a form of international protection.

A Neural Network for Prediction

Neural networks are tools that are engineered to predict (and build a prototype on it) how the brain operates to develop practical strategies. The functionality of a neural network is commonly simulated through dedicated software; in the case of this research, Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) application is used. ANN approaches the human brain in a completely different way from the machine and digital computer. The structure of the human brain is, in its complexity, parallel, and nonlinear as far as the processed information procedures are concerned. ANN can manage "the neurons" to run some computations and operations (e.g., pattern recognition classifications, motor control) much faster than any computer can do today. To achieve this top performance, it applies massive interconnections between

computing cells known as *Neurons* or *Processing Units*" (Haykin, 2009). This is invaluable important for the topic of this research to predict the refugee's perception of the willingness to stay in Germany or leave.

In the "old days," researchers were getting results from the data they collected personally or with their team. Today, through ANN, we can analyze huge amounts of data, and they do need an integrated engineering-based approach. We have to consider, though, that, even though this technology, it would be virtually impossible to build a machine that can mimic or even resemble the human brain. The work of the neural network shows several remarkable features, though, that need to be taken into consideration, such as non-linearity. ANN can be linear or nonlinear, but being inherently nonlinear is an essential feature of the mechanism in charge of input signals generation (e.g., speech signal). Furthermore, ANN may be applied in education, too. Learning supervision, in collaboration with teachers, may be more effective with the help of this tool. In fact, through the application of a large set of samples, and after a careful adaptation of the synaptic modification of the network², you can keep on training it until there are no more changes in its synaptic weights. The neural network will then be able to adapt according to the surrounding environment and ready to operate. It could also keep on training itself in order to adapt to different upcoming environmental circumstances (Haykin, 2009).

The main features of an Artificial Neural Network may be summarized as follows:

- The schema connections among neurons.
- The *learning algorithm* or *training algorithm* (see above).
- Its activation³
- The bias Neuron
- The Activation state⁴
- The Threshold value⁵

This paper uses a back-propagation (BP) neural network to predict where refugees in Germany are most willingly going to settle. This research analyzes the data through Geographic Information System (GIS) to track migration routes from Syria to Europe in the five years between 2011–2016.

² to minimize the differences between the desired response and actual response.

³ the neural network consists of simple processing units (Neurons) and directed connections among them. (Gurney, 2007)

⁴ it defines the reaction of the neurons.

⁵ it is a unique value assigned to the neuron. EG: if the threshold value of a neuron is θ_i , it marks the spot of the maximum gradient value of the activation function. It is needed for the hidden layer in the Neural Network, which known as *transferee function* (which can be sigmoid, threshold, or linear). Without them, NN would be the same as plain perception (Ogus & Saritas, 2010).

The more complex the network structure is, the more accurate the model will be. By predicting the permanent residence of the refugees, we accurately analyze the places they attend (dwellings, schools, and hospitals), and their usual routes, in space and time.

Data Preparation and System Architecture

ANNs react much better with complicated processes such as problem classification using abstract values and their application to the human prediction location is a new field, that has not been investigated in depth through this tool, yet. This section illustrates how data was collected and prepared to build the prediction system.




Figure 1: Concept map for the mixed method intervention design -SRIPSG- (special thanks to Dr. Iyad AlDajani)

- Collecting data: this qualitative study is based on a sample of 20 participants that are living in Germany.
- Interview with refugees: (through social media, not in person).
- Qualitative Data: All interviewees were selected randomly all over Germany, with a special focus on Berlin and Hamburg. Eleven interviewees were male, and nine were female. The age of the refugees we interviewed was as follows: six 18–24 yo; five 25–30, six 31–39, and three above 40. Eight refugees in our sample have high school certificates, and 7 have a college or university degree. The majority already had working experience (thirteen respondents). Twelve of our interviewees have arrived in Germany 1–3 years before the interviews, and only six had been more than three years in Germany at the time of the conversation. Only two respondents already

had a decision on their status, while thirteen others had not. Thirteen have come with their family, and seven came alone. Seven interviewees already lived in an apartment, three were living in a refugee shelter, and seven stayed in a temporary residence.

Through the Intervention software (ANN), we used a Multilayer Perceptron (MLP) feedforward neural network to develop a Refugees Information Prediction System (SRIPSG). Special attention has been paid to predict the will of the refugees who were living in a refugee shelter to leave it as soon as possible or not. All interviews were conducted following a semi-structured approach, with questions related to their journey to Europe, their current situation in Germany and one of their families, their participation in educational programs, and their perceptions of social inclusion in their new home. We used these data⁶ as initial parameters to make ANN start to perform.

- Quantitative data: through the interviews of this group of migrants, we have noticed that there are several common issues they have been through during their migration process. Sometimes even after they arrived in Germany, they were still facing obstacles and challenges that may affect their future. We have considered these factors as additional main parameters to prototype our prediction software, even in order to train it properly.

Residence

“The camp was hosting 1,400 people from one day to the other. Since Germany has a federal structure, all refugees are distributed to different states” (Miriam 2016).

Big cities seem to be more attractive; they may provide more opportunities to newcomers, such as a more developed labor-market, cultural infrastructures, etc. figure 12 shows the most attractive cities for refugees in Germany. (Buch et al., 2013).

The growth or decline of cities' populations is mainly driven by migration flows (Gans, 2018). In line with this finding, Rodriguez-Pose and Ketterer (2012) argue that the ability to attract residents plays a fundamental role in cities' prospects. The attractiveness of urban areas for migrants is, therefore, essential for local administrations and urban planners (Royuela et al., 2010). A central point of the demands is that all federal states should give refugees access to health insurance. Hamburg and Bremen are providing an excellent example in this regard.

⁶ Together with, of course gender, language, social status, age, being asylum seeker or refugee, current location and travel history.




Figure 2: City-specific effects [Buch- Hamann-Niebuhr- Rossen, 2013]

Language

Most of the refugees hosted in camps speak little or no German (some of them do not even understand English). Upon arrival, they have to go through some serious bureaucracy at different governmental offices. Most of them need to finalize their asylum applications to get a temporary permit of stay, health insurance, etc. Not speaking German, all these formalities become more difficult, and the help of translators and intercultural facilitators is frequently needed.

Camps offer language classes, but German is not easy to learn, especially for low educated refugees. Fluent German is required in order to be able to have access to the job market or even to rent a house out of the camp⁷.

Gender

The vast majority of asylum seekers are male and young, especially in Austria and Germany, where men make up for approximately two-thirds of new arrivals (Table 1).

Table 1: Asylum seekers by gender (Grote, 2017)

	Male	Female
Austria	67%	33%
Germany	65%	35%
Sweden	60%	40%

Consequently, female refugees are a minority that needs extra protection. UNHCR and the Council of Europe have provided asylum application procedures and reception conditions guidelines to be made more gender-sensitive.

⁷ Refugees are allowed to work after three months with the permission of the Employment Agency and after passing the Foreigners' Office labor market tests.

In reception centers, women should be housed separately from men, and women should have safe access to private sanitary facilities. Much has still to be done, since girls and women may be more easily become victims of human trafficking or sexual harassment. Furthermore, women were socially more isolated than men, experienced more significant difficulties in meeting and interacting with members of the host society, and participated less frequently than men in the activities of their communities.

Lack of childcare provision, transportation difficulties, and the social isolation that results from staying at home looking after children, make them less likely to be employed than men.

Destination Choice

Displaced people and refugees, when possible, choose, as the destination of their migration, a country in which they already have friends or family members or people they know, who come from the same countries.

Migrating with your family might be strong moral comfort, but the German government provides subventions for the families who live in camps, but if the husband, for example, finds a job in the city close to the camp, this subvention is discontinued. This makes family members in the difficult situation of being forced to choose between staying in the camp with your family or work outside, but with no social support. This makes, paradoxically, easier to move alone. (Gans 2018)

Age

Official statistics show that more than 83% of all asylum seekers in Europe in 2015 were younger than 35 (Grote, 2017). This indicates the importance of investing (by the hosting countries) in education and professional training programs for these young migrants.

Location history

Trips and temporary residence of refugees may be tracked by earth observation- geographical information system (EO/GIS) together with the help of social media and other ICTs.

The GIS (ArcGIS) can even anticipate the mobility of the people helped by the statistics (for example, the routes of Syrian refugees during the 2011 crisis). It is a stable and open source software, and it can accept the constant growth of its database. This allows researchers to discover potentially useful patterns hidden in the data-sets.



Figure 3: Syrian Refugees Main Routes

Routes to Germany

People fleeing the conflict in Syria can take three different paths to safety and freedom:

The land route to Turkey, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Germany: they travel through Turkey – a country Syrians enter without having a visa—from which the point of entry in the EU is Greece or Bulgaria.

Air route directly to Germany, there are no statistics, so after reaching the European Union, there is no such indication that shows how Syrians reach the region, just those who apply for asylum will be reflected in statistics.

Sea route across the Mediterranean to Greece, Cyprus, Malta or Italy (and possibly France and Spain): those who take this route enter as irregular migrants and try to seek asylum once in Europe⁸.

When, in September and October 2015, thousands of refugees reached Germany, the country decided to suspend the Syrian newcomers from the Dublin III Unit procedure. Having in front of them the chance of spending a long time in Germany as asylum seekers and then as refugees, increases the opportunity to settle there.

Prediction System Application, Results, and Evaluation

All neural networks receive numerical inputs. Therefore, the factors (variables) listed above were encoded into numerical values.⁹

⁸ For European Laws on Forced Migrants and Asylum, see the Dublin III Unit. https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum/examination-of-applicants_en accessed July 11, 2020.

⁹ Age will be kept as it is (a migrant is 28 years old, the assigned number will be 28), since it is already in a binary format. Variables with two attributes, such as the gender, being asylum seeker or refugee, the refugee location history, Language and if you have come with family or alone are encoded with binary values (0, 1). For instance gender: 0 represents a female, and 1 represents a male; Asylum Seeker or refugee: 0 represents being asylum, and 1 represents a refugee, arrival to Germany 1 represent their settlement more than three years and 0 for less than three and so on.

To estimate the predictive model performance, we used the *cross-validation* technique. It is considered one of the best options to evaluate and compare the learning algorithms. It divides the set of data into two segments: one for the training of the system, and the other for the validation of the results of the whole model (Yan, 2006).

The cross-validation is performed in multiple rounds with different partitions, and the result is averaged over the round to reduce variability and avoid bad splits that may lead to overfitting.

In our case, we have used ten-fold cross-validation, a percentage of 80%, 10%, and 10% of the complete data samples have been applied to represent the training, validation, and test subsets, respectively (Yan, 2006).

In order to find out the best possible prediction system for the refugees, multiple architectures were built and then compared, based on classification accuracy. The model which performed the highest classification accuracy (less generalization error) was chosen¹⁰.

The results can be explained as follows: if you have too few hidden layers, you will get high training error and high generalization error due to underfitting (Xu and Chen, 2008). This was noticed in the low accuracy we obtained when the network was built with one hidden layer and two hidden layers. Also, if you have too many hidden layers, you may get low training error but still have high generalization error due to overfitting (Xu and Chen, 2008). This was noticed when we built the networks with three hidden layers. From this, we can conclude that experiments are the only way to determine the best neural network architecture that is suitable for solving a specific problem. After the best neural network architecture is chosen (with a 0.7 learning rate) as the prediction system and tested independently, the average accuracy is computed to determine how well the chosen architecture will perform on new samples that it has never seen before. The prediction efficiency depends not only on the number of considered input variables and on the efficiency of the network architecture, in any case. ANN learns by example (there is no need for *if-then* result), especially in our case, in which it is used to determine whether a refugee is willing to stay or not. Applying more features and parameters to the system, we will get more accurate results: as tests have shown, the accuracy for the machine learning classification for one hidden layer is 77.1%, for two hidden layers 80.8% and for three hidden layers it reaches 81.8%.

Variables with 3 independent attributes such as the route to Germany will be encoded by three values (0, 0.5, 1) where 0 presents the route by land, 0.5 presents the journey by sea and 1 presents the trip by air. Variables with ten independent attributes, such as refugee residence are encoded using: with each number representing Berlin, Hamburg, München, Köln, Frankfurt a. M, Essen, Dortmund, Stuttgart, Dusseldorf, Bremen respectively.

¹⁰ The different ANN architectures have been tested using WEKA[®] version 3.9.2, run under Windows 10 with an Intel[®] Core™ i5-7300U CPU@ of 2.60 GHz, and 8.00 GB of RAM.

As we have seen, the training system combines top-down with bottom-up information, and it has been created to be flexible and interpretable. It demonstrated to be able to accurately classify real refugee behavior in Germany using a limited amount of training data available.

Conclusion and future work

In this mainly methodological paper, we have described a computer-driven system and mathematical modeling which aim at identifying and predicting human behaviors.

Our system combines top-down with bottom-up information in a closed feedback loop with both components employing the classification approach multilayer perception. The proposed approach has been demonstrated in terms of training efficiency and classification accuracy.

The system has been created to be flexible and interpretable. It demonstrated to be able to classify real refugee behavior in Germany accurately. This is especially important, given the limited amount of training data available.

The neural network shows its remarkable ability to find out and deduce meanings from complex or inaccurate patterns. This would be too difficult for the human brain or other less performing computer techniques.

The natural development of this research will be the one of training the system more in-depth through the addition of more features and parameters besides the help of the GIS to track the location history of the refugee.

Being able to predict with good accuracy the willingness of the refugees to stay in Germany or not, the government would be able to help them more effectively, through infrastructure, services, and practical support.

Acknowledgments

This paper is to be considered as a spinoff of my master's thesis. I have successfully defended at the Department of Computer Science of the University of Jordan. Therefore I wish to express my sincere gratitude to my first supervisor, Prof. Dr. Mohammad Al-Shraideh, to Prof. Dr. Martin Leiner of the Friedrich-Schiller Universität in Jena, Germany (my second supervisor) and Dr. Iyad al-Dajani (FSU Jena). I am extremely thankful and indebted to them for sharing their expertise with me, and for their sincere and valuable guidance and encouragement throughout this path.

Bibliography

- Alex, D. et al. (2010). *They stated that the artificial Neural Network Model (ANNM) for Cost Estimation: City of Edmonton's Water and Sewer Installation Services*, "The Journal of Construction Engineering and Management," 136 (7), pp. 745–756.
- Aiyar, S. et al. (2016). *The refugee surge in Europe: Economic Challenges*, "National Institute Economic Review," 235(1), pp. F16–F31.
- Buch, T. et al. (2013). *What Makes Cities Attractive? The Determinants of Urban Labour Migration in Germany*, "Urban Studies" 51(9), pp. 1960–1978.
- Costa, L. et al. (2011). *Analyzing and modeling real-world phenomena with complex networks: a survey of applications*, "Advances in Physics" 60 (3), pp. 329–412.
- Chukwu, C. (2012). *Analysis of some meteorological parameters using an artificial neural network method for Makurdi, Nigeria*, "African Journal of Environmental Science and Technology," 6 (3), pp. 182–188.
- Fargues, P., and Fandrich, C. (2012). *Migration after the Arab Spring*, "MPC Research Report 2012/09", Migration Policy Centre, European University Institute, Florence.
- Fausett, L.V. (1994). *Fundamentals of neural networks: architectures, algorithms, and applications (Vol. 3)*. Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall.
- Grote, J. (2017). The Changing Influx of Asylum Seekers in 2014–2016: Responses in Germany.
- Gans P., (2018). Urban Population Development in Germany (2000–2014): The Contribution of Migration by Age and Citizenship to Reurbanisation*.
- Haider, M., Pakshirajan, K., Singh, A., and Chaudhry, S. (2007). *Artificial Neural Network-Genetic Algorithm Approach to Optimize Media Constituents for Enhancing Lipase Production by a Soil Microorganism*. "Applied Biochemistry and Biotechnology," 144(3), pp. 225–235.
- Hornik, K., Stinchcombe, M., and White, H. (1989). *Multilayer feedforward networks are universal approximators*, "Neural Networks," 2(5), pp. 359–366.
- Haykin, S.S (2009). *Neural networks and learning machines/Simon Haykin*. New York: Prentice-Hall.
- Helbling, M., and Kalkum, D. (2017). *Migration policy trends in OECD countries*. "Journal of European Public Policy," [online] 25(12), pp. 1 779–1797. Available at: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13501763.2017.1361466>.
- Kriesel, D. (2007). *A brief introduction on neural networks*, online publication, <http://www.dkriesel.com>
- Sui, D. (2004). *Tobler's First Law of Geography: A Big Idea for a Small World?* "Annals of the Association of American Geographers," 94(2), pp. 269–277.

- Krose, B., and Van der Smagt, P. (1996). *An introduction to neural networks*, Amsterdam: The University of Amsterdam Press.
- Maier, H., and Dandy, G. (1998). *The effect of internal parameters and geometry on the performance of back-propagation neural networks: an empirical study*, "Environmental Modelling and Software," 13(2), pp. 193–209.
- Mehrotra, K, Chilukuri, K, Mohan and Ranka, S. (1996) *Elements of Artificial Neural Networks*, (1st ed.), New York: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Inc.
- Negnevitsky, M. (2005). *A guide to intelligent systems. Artificial Intelligence*, 2nd edition, Hobart, AUS, Addison Wesley-Pearson Education.
- Rob Schapire (2008) *Theoretical Machine Learning*, available online at https://www.cs.princeton.edu/courses/archive/spr08/cos511/scribe_notes/0204.pdf.
- Riedmiller, M., and Braun, H. (1993), *A Direct Adaptive Method for Faster Backpropagation Learning: The RPROP Algorithm*, Proceedings of Neural Networks, IEEE International Conference, San Francisco, 586–591.
- Sheefa S., (2015), *United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: The State of the World's Refugees, In Search of Solidarity*", *UNHCR*. Geneva, Switzerland.
- Song, L., Kotz, D., Jain, R. and He, X. (2003). *Evaluating location predictors with extensive Wi-Fi mobility data*, "ACM SIGMOBILE Mobile Computing and Communications Review," 7(4), p. 64.
- Schmidhuber, J. (2015). *Deep learning in neural networks: An overview*, "Neural Networks" 61, pp. 85–117.
- Bluche, T. (2010) *Mathematical Formula Recognition using Machine Learning Techniques*, Oxford, UK, Oxford University Press.
- Unwin, D. (1996). *GIS, spatial analysis, and spatial statistics*. "Progress in Human Geography," 20 (4), pp. 540–551.
- Parusel, B, and Schneider, J. (2017). *Reforming the Common European Asylum System*, Stockholm, Delmi Report.
- Rumelhart, D., Hinton, G., and Williams, R. (1986). *Learning representations by back-propagating errors*, "*Nature*," 323 (6088), pp. 533–536.
- Yan, H., Jiang, Y., Zheng, J., Peng, C., and Li, Q. (2006). *A multilayer perceptron-based medical decision support system for heart disease diagnosis*. "Expert Systems with Applications," 30(2), pp. 272–281.

Veropoulos, K. (2001). *Machine Learning Approaches to Medical Decision Making*, Doctoral thesis, Department of Engineering Mathematics, University of Bristol, United Kingdom.

Iyad M. Al-Dajani

The phenomenology of Internet Communication Technology Applications for Social Change Towards Reconciliation: Applied Ethics in Digital Humanities

Abstract

The article aims to research the phenomenology for the impact of internet communication technologies (ICT) on social change towards conflict transformation for the reconciliation process. Applying Reconciliation methods in online social networks applications such as Facebook, Twitter, Youtube. The study explores internet research methodologies for applying the “*Hölderlin Perspective*.” (Martin Leiner, Susan Flämig, 2012, p. 18). Also, the research identifies the dissemination for the theoretical foundation of Applied Phronesis in internet communication technologies for conflict transformation, as it is part of an internet research methodology used to explore digital humanities in reconciliation research (Al-Dajani, 2020).

The study applies the philosophical and theoretical foundations of Applied Phronesis in Internet communication technologies, in three phases they are respectively, “*Episteme*,” “*Techne*,” “*Phronesis*.” (Al-Dajani, 2020).

The phases explore the reconciliation process in the middle of conflict, methods for internet research designs, ICT for Reconciliation, ICT for social change towards conflict transformation into the Reconciliation process. The research presents the three phases as a methodological triangulation that applies the *Phronesis Approach in Internet Communication Technologies*, as the philosophical foundation of transitions into conflict transformation towards Reconciliation process, applying Mixed-Method Research design, Netnography, to collect data, analyze and interpret data in the research.

The outcome is a process for Reconciliation into conflict transformation, applying that concurrent methodological triangulation, providing essential context and meaning to the analysis, interpretation, and evaluations of the applied methods for social change towards the reconciliation process as part of conflict transformation transition. As part of research into digital humanities for conflict transformation inwards, the reconciliation process in the middle of the conflict.

Applied Ethics in Digital Humanities: The Philosophical and Theoretical Framework (Al-Dajani, 2020)

The theoretical framework starts with “*Applied Phronesis*” to social science research, which is accredited to the work done by Flyvbjerg (Flyvbjerg, 2001), (Flyvbjerg et al., 2012), and then applied to Mixed

Method Social Research design accredited to the work done by (Creswell et al., 2018) . and applied in Netnography accredited to work done by (Kozinets,2015). The methodological triangulation was introduced as synthesis (Al-Dajani, 2020) that provides internet communication research that leads to the reconciliation process utilizing ICT for conflict transformation in the middle of the conflict.

This method is very new in applied philosophy into internet communication technology for developing a reconciliation process in the middle of conflict, see the figure below:




Figure 4 The Theoretical Framework Foundation

Applied Phronesis in Internet Research Methodologies (Al-Dajani, 2020).

According to Newman, in his book Networks, social networks are considered a way to build egocentric social networks that thrive on the ideology of the community; this article explores this concept and the drive of the online social network towards conflict transformation for the reconciliation process.

The research introduces the Applied Phronesis in ICT as a philosophical foundation to explore internet communication technologies such as online social network sites, which can have a recursive impact on developing an ultra-dynamic effect for social change toward the reconciliation process. This ultra-dynamic effect can be positive or negative, derived from participants in communication through online social networks, affecting a social-cultural and economic change within societies form online interactions (Al-Dajani, 2020).

Interactive online communication develops the exchange of knowledge between online participants to reach practical wisdom between participants, utilizing internet communication technologies for this purpose, then advance the impact from online to a real impact on societies and communities.

According to Aristotle, Phronesis is practical wisdom which, by applied Phronesis, would reach its participants within conducting that method to wisdom and knowledge – stating the status of prudent. Therefore to apply Phronesis is conducted in three phases. “*Episteme*,” the Know-how, which means in our context information and knowledge, and the second part “*Techne*,” which illustrated as the how-to, or how does the internet-communication-technology (ICT) impact societies towards social change and conflict transformation. The relation of combining two phases, according to Flyvbjerg, develops “*Phronesis*,” wisdom and prudence on the topic researched with the online interactivities between the online social media.

Therefore the research is defined into three phases, “*Episteme*,” “*Techne*,” “*Phronesis*,” respectively.

The figure below illustrates Applied Phronesis in Internet communication technologies for social change towards the reconciliation process (Al-Dajani,2020).




Figure 5 ICT Phenomenology for social change towards the reconciliation process (Al-Dajani,2020)

Discussion

The phenomenology explores, *Flyvbjerg (2001)* seeks for the Phronimos, which is an agent that starts the interaction relationship between the phases of applied Phronesis, the “*Episteme,*” and the “*Techne.*” Flyvbjerg introduces the power relation with knowledge, “*knowledge leads to power, and power leads to knowledge*” (Flyvbjerg, 1998, p226). Applying the power relation by using Internet communication technologies in social science develops an effect on social change, according to Habermas’ theory of communication. In this context, ICT applied by the Phronimos can develop the power in social science for social change through the phronimos, who is the agent for social change in the environment of change, in this study, it is the conflict. It is the engagement of different online participants in communication using the online social media that develops a recursive interaction leading to change in the virtual society. That change eventually affects off-line communication and activities, transforming activities from online workshops into real physical workshops to impact social change. According to specific goals or ethical positions, the change can be negative or positive on every level. Researching the integration of mixed-method research design, applying it into a Netnography method, and analyzing Netnography using Qualitative content analysis methods and exploring ICT online application to develop online reconciliation workshops in practices that lead to understanding the narrative of the two parties encounter, whether they are enemies or not. Which leads and ignites that start towards social change for the reconciliation process in conflicts (Al-Dajani,2020).

“Episteme” - Reconciliation Process

The Reconciliation Process in the middle of a conflict (Al-Dajani,2020)

Reconciliation has a broad meaning in definitions, as it conjugates to many different aspects in different domains to construct peaceful relations or to restore relations between enemies. Reconciliation

is the restoration of the relationship between individuals, groups, states after the violence, war, genocide, civil war, gross human rights violations like segregations (Apartheid), enslavement, or similar activities. Reconciliation as policy requires a long term strategy with many practices with multiple levels” (Leiner, 2016, p. 183).

Reconciliation is needed when “societies involved in a conflict evolve widely shared beliefs, attitudes, motivations, and emotions that support adherence to the conflictive goals, maintain in the conflict, delegitimize the opponent, and thus negate the possibility for a peaceful resolution and prevent the development of peaceful relations” (Yaacov Bar-Siman Tov, 2004, p. 13). Social beliefs where fear anger

and hatred become part of the social ethos in society, they are formed in conflict, adopted by society members maintained from government institutions and supported as part of the collective social memory stagnates the conflict, and a tool to protect against the enemies encountering ideologies. The social ethos of conflict fuels the continuation of conflictive relations and develop obstacles for the progress of peacebuilding. These kinds of conflicts do not change by day and night, nor by peace agreements, they need a social change within the society and new belief for coexistence and harmony, but to reach the social change, the society must introduce social change towards the reconciliation process. (cf. Bar Tal, 1998, 2001, and 2007). The reconciliation process is needed for social change, that inhibits the development of peaceful relations between entities that conflict. It requires hard efforts that it needs to overcome social, cultural, and economic obstacles that perpetuated conflict; ICT can introduce the bottom-up approach for social change.

There are several types of conflicts that need Reconciliation; the first is the one that evolves inter groups that of the one-state and another outer group, such as two-state in conflict, or inner-groups, and outer groups presenting different social, economic, political capitals.

The inner group reconciliation has to commit for social change, which means new belief as united ideology, promote peaceful relation as a new form for interaction and develop a stable foundation for cooperation and peaceful acts that symbolizes the relation, such as empathy, shared future, recognition of the narrative of the other. Another type that needs Reconciliation is the between States that are in conflict, which sometimes involved only the leaders and agreements signed only by them without concerning their people, they hope to change the stagnated relations into peaceful relations and restore justice, that is based on recognition, respect, the right to coexist and cooperate justly. The objective for Reconciliation path as a process to change the motivations of the goals and beliefs, attitudes, and emotions for most of both societies or nations that conflict. This process of Reconciliation leads to changes in the type of relations between the societies and evoke it towards harmony and empathy as developing respect for one another.

The development of tensions among groups is one of the properties for fertilizing conflicts for social change, whether between individuals or groups, and that is because of conflicting ideas between them. Reconciliation usually involves nations that have conflict within an ethnic, religious, or ideological level. Those conflicts might have contradictory goals that need to be met on both sides and harms them socially, culturally economically.

According to (Bar-Tal & Bennink, 2004, p. 14), Reconciliation is the formation of peaceful relations between societies that have been involved in a stagnated conflict after a former resolution is achieved.

The Jena Center for Reconciliation Studies in Jena at Friedrich Schiller University adopted the *“Hölderlin Perspective.”* The theory is to emphasize on Reconciliation amid conflicts. Leiner explained in his book *“Latin America between Conflict and Reconciliation,”* the book explains *“Hölderlin Perspective”*; inspired by the German poet Friedrich Hölderlin (1770–1843), who wrote in his novel *“Hyperion.”* *“Versöhnung ist mitten in Streit und alles Getrennte findet sich wieder”* (Leiner, Flaming, 2012, pp. 8–18). In the English language, it is translated as *“Reconciliation is in the middle of the strife, and all that was separated finds each other again.”* (Friedrich Hölderlin, 2004, p. 169). This notion adopts that Reconciliation can be part of conflict transformation that transforms conflict into peaceful relationships within the conflict in the range of time building a shared future. Reconciliation is known to many scholars that it always requires the support of the majority of society, to be possible.

However, the *“Hölderlin perspective,”* Reconciliation requires to be in the middle of conflict and can develop even within the minority to change and transform them into a majority in societies and communities in conflict. Reconciliation has a holistic combination as a process, inclusive in its results, the pervasive process towards the conflict in developing a common future both are combined in a recurrence action in accords to establish an effect on both parties in conflict (Al-Dajani, 2020).

Reconciliation is vital to reach a stable and lasting restoration of bad relations or to develop good relations within the middle of conflicts. Reconciliation must evolve with mutual respect and justice between enemies, this is merely a process, that provides mutual recognition and acceptance for the narrative of the other, and accepting their interest and goals, providing mutual trust, mutual recognition, developing cultural, economic, political relations, and respecting the sensitivity and consideration of the other parties needs and interests. (Bar-Tal & Bennink, 2004, p. 15) in the midst of conflict. When Reconciliation becomes a process within groups that are amid conflicts, in the intergroup, both groups become united in their political-economical cultural systems and develop a single political entity. However, in conflicts between nations, it becomes a relation between two states that has the acceptance and the recognition of the other, forgiving each other for past adversaries, restoring good relations with good intentions, and develop a political restructuring of former relations.

Reconciliation calls for restructuring mechanisms of social, cultural, economic, and political spheres. This restructured system can be implemented on both of out-groups, Reconciliation between two states and within the inner-groups Reconciliation within to entities of states.

The structural elements that evolve from Reconciliation are, opening and maintaining regular channels of communication between the government of the two states; reducing violent threats and tensions on borders, demilitarization, disarmament, reduction of military human resources on borders, developing

joint institutions and organizations, developing free and open trade, developing cooperative and economic projects, exchanging vital information, and developing independent joint ventures in different areas, developing free and open tourism, and mostly exchanging cultural, social spheres. (Bar-Tal & Bennink, 2004, p. 16).

Also, in addition to the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration programs, (DDR), as the reconciliation process contributes to security and stability by disarming combatants, removing them from military structures, and socially and economically integrating them into societies (Taies Nezam, Alexandre Marc, 2009). These illustrated principles and methods can be endorsed by the use of ICT as a broad spectrum of the majority of the societies can be part of it.

Reconciliation is a process of building or rebuilding relationships, often after conflict, repression, and the violation of human rights, but in this case, we call Reconciliation is in the middle of the conflict referencing the "Hölderlin Perspective," by Professor Martin Leiner, where it implies that as conflict persists between two nations, where Reconciliation is possible in the midst of conflict.

Reconciliation in the Arab world has a different meaning for the term, Reconciliation term in Arabic is known by some scholars as "Moussalha, "where reconciliation might also lead to coexistence " Ta'ayoush," which adheres to invoke ideas of conciliation and appeasement in light of the divisions and tensions that have arisen from the conflict. In other words, terms for Reconciliation in the Arab world might vary indifferently with different concepts that might not appeal to both sides that conflict. Such terms that Reconciliation might lead to "Moujalassa, " which means the act of sitting together, this concept you sit to discuss issues with your enemies to reach consensus on matters that are evolving with negative on both sides. Reconciliation might be understood as "Moujayara," which means I will respect you as a neighbor. "Moussamaha" which means forgiveness, which might please some in conflict and other might understand it as weakness, another one is "Moussafat" which means in that context a resolution with the other, also "tardi" which means to please the other, and accept his terms as part of acceptance to reconcile. Alternatively, "Taswiya" means a settlement and an agreement, and lastly, "tatbi" normalization, which is in a harm's way within the Israel Palestinian conflict, which we see that it is understood in that context. These terms in Arabic are always misunderstood because they always depend on the situation they are evoked. For that reason, it is a vital cause to achieve an understanding in the Arab World about the interpretation of Reconciliation and to focus on achieving the prosperity of Reconciliation in the Middle East (Rim El Gantri; Karim El Mufti, 2017).

Methods for Reconciliation

To apply online social media using Internet communication technologies (ICT) applications and software for developing awareness and practice methods in Reconciliation processes that would evolve into conflict transformation and enhancing the values and principles of democracy in communities and societies. ICT paves the way for a social change for the recognition of the other by replacing the negative image of the relationship between both entities of conflict, to a renewed positive image driven by prosperity for both entities in all levels of society, cultural, and economic capitals, and emerge a vision of a shared and common future in the conflict.

Methods for Reconciliation are diverse, depending on the type of conflict, whether it is an interstate conflict or intrastate conflict, according to (BarTal,2004). Those methods influence social change from conflict to Reconciliation, there should be a social structure mechanism for social change, and a psychological structure for change in the conflict sphere, ICT can develop the technological environment for conflict transformation and adopting the methods of Reconciliation and impacting those spheres in the conflict.

When developing a social network site, one should emphasize that structure while developing the social network site and emphasis also on those methods when starting the empirical work, such as the analytics produced from the datasets imported from the social network sites. The concept is to develop a social network site that adheres to the reconciliation process between entities in conflict.

First let us elaborate about the reconciliation methods introduced (Bar-Tal & Bennink, 2004, pp. 20–38) for social change, and they are according to those principles:

1. The Societal Beliefs about Groups Goals: this principle aims to develop a peaceful relationship with a former enemy, transforming conflict goals, and social beliefs. ICT might help for the recognizing of the different narrative of the other or the enemy, and transforming old goals into new goals, and challenge the beliefs that hold the aspiration for both parties that are in conflict or post-conflict or shaped by conflict resolution agreement, or in the middle of conflict and adapt Reconciliation in the middle of a conflict. Introducing both goals using ICT can be a tool for the pervasive Reconciliation process, which develops a social impact on society as it can reach a broad spectrum of society, and can build a deliberative correspondence between the stakeholders that are in concern. For example, online deliberation can develop a transformation for the justification of the goals and social beliefs that out breached or maintained the conflict and might evolve towards conflict transformation.

2. Social Beliefs about Rival Groups. The image of the adversary group has to change, asking two parties to define the adversary image and how it can be transformed to develop a peaceful relation. In other meaning, it is essential to recognize its members and legitimize its new role in advancing towards Reconciliation. This approach develops the desire of both parties to develop and maintain the acceptance of the other. Moreover, the other important aspect of this principle is to elaborate on the victimhood of the other.
3. Societal Beliefs about one's group: this principle elaborates about the social belief of someone's group; it is part of the conflict and its new role in the Reconciliation process. The previous part where the group was glorified by its actions and no wrongdoing, self-praising, ignoring, and censoring information that might harm or give negativity towards the group, this must change. In that sense, the group must take responsibility for its actions in the conflict. It can be understanding as self-recognition for actions being taken in conflict.
4. The Social beliefs about the relationship with the former enemy: The transformation for the relation between the two groups that were in former conflict, must change. The new relations between the two groups must stress its importance of cooperation and its friendly relations. By respecting each other's needs, goals, and general wellbeing.
5. The social Beliefs about Peace: This is an essential aspect, can be referred to as the prosperity of Reconciliation, and develop guidelines to achieve it. According to Bar-Tal, the process for Reconciliation must lead to a new definition for social beliefs and stressing about the multidimensional nature of Peace and Reconciliation. In outlining the cost and benefits for Reconciliation and the methods to achieve it and introducing the aspiration for living in peace and taking inconsideration's two sides' interest for prosperity and the pursuit of happiness.

The Jena Center for Reconciliation Studies, under Professor Dr. Martin Leiner, presented different new elements that have a new approach towards the process of Reconciliation (Leiner, 2016, p. 186):

- (1) "*The Past*: Many interpretations about how to deal with the past, which should never be neglected or forgotten. Understanding the past is an essential aspect of conflict transformation. The past must be dealt with, learned from the mistakes done in the past, and the emphasis is to build good relations and a common future towards a reconciliation process.
- (2) Truth: The acknowledgment of the truth by both parties, including the victims and their perpetrators. Accepting the narrative of the other, and acknowledging the wrongdoing from both sides, must lead to the reconciliation process.

- (3) Conserving the past: The remembrance of the past is essential, this can be done by building memorials, museums, books are written by historians, and by conservation of the site, of suffering, and the history of the past should never be forgotten.
- (4) The importance of guilt: The individual perpetrator must accept his guilt of doing wrong and should be punished, in a different way, which should be accepted by both parties.
- (5) The importance of forgiveness: it depends on the verbal expression of guilt, forgiveness might reveal the disturbing aspect of attitudes and drive attitudes towards the reconciliation process, and drive to the acceptance for change towards the other.
- (6) Accepting empathy: understanding the narrative of the other and respecting each other narrative of history, culture, and future aspiration must be part of the reconciliation process.
- (7) The importance of emotions: emotions can thrive to the healing of the victim's feelings to atrocities done by the perpetrator. The emotions must be restored to its original sentiments, neglecting hate and animosity for the other.
- (8) The acceptance of the perpetrator into the moral of the community, after acceptance of Apology, or punishment or reparations. The changing of the image of the perpetrator must be accepted by society.
- (9) The vision for a shared future: Both parties have to understand the vision of a better future for both parties in conflict, towards a new reality called the reconciliation reality.
- (10) The identity of the victim and the perpetrator should be stable all time, with no change towards it, not for future perspectives or historical aspects.”

Those principles stated above can be the epistemology part of the research, as part of the Phronetic empirical thought known as Phronesis is to adopt epistemology and *Techne* to approach practice wisdom and reach prudent wisdom, and imbed those parts in the online social network sites integrated with social applications such as Facebook, Twitter, and You-Tube.

The *Techne* phase of the Phronetic Approach for Reconciliation process is based on Bar-Tal's work on the methods for Reconciliation (Bar-Tal & Bennink, 2004, pp. 11–38) and Leiner's empirical work for strategic practice for reconciliation process (Leiner, 2016, pp. 182–203), to introduce those aspects of strategies and to advance their impact using ICT, those strategies are:

Apology: This type illustrates confrontation with the past and taking responsibility for the actions done during the conflict and admitting them. If this type is not dealt with, Reconciliation is not possible, and that because each party as portraits, it is the victim and harbors negative feelings, and those negative

feelings might result in instigating new conflict. *“Apology is a formal acceptance for responsibility for misdeeds carried out during the conflict and an appeal to the victims for forgiveness. It implies pursuing justice and truth”* (Bar-Tal & Bennink, 2004, p. 29)

Truth and reconciliation commissions TRC: The commissions are a way to deal with the atrocities done in the past and to reveal the truth about what happened in the past. It is considered as a mechanism to serve justice for victims of past atrocities. In this act, compensation is not possible, but it reveals acts of violence, discriminations, acts of violations for human rights, and other deeds of racism in the conflict. TRC must establish a comprehensive record for the cause of brutal acts, nature, and the extent of the violation of human rights. Those TRC gave amnesty to perpetrators as they became part of the victimhood for their disclosure of violent acts in a political context. TRC worked on restoring dignity for the victims by allowing them to recount their experience and share it. Lastly, preventing human rights violations and recommending measures for reparations.

Public Trails: The public trails are a significant part of the reconciliation process, bringing the perpetrator to justice, that committed human rights violations and crimes against humanity. This method aims to acknowledge and reveal the suffering of the victim and to recognize the violent acts done by the perpetrator. When trails are carried out, and the perpetrator is being punished, it gives kind of retribution for the victim, and that justice was carried out. However, those trials are subjected to only the perpetrator and not the group; this reveals the group from the violent acts done by the perpetrator, which allows them to be part of the reconciliation process.

Reparations Payments: This method is most appealing in the Reconciliation as it requests from both parties to take responsibility for the wrongdoing and to compensate the victims of this atrocity that is committed by the two entities in the conflict. Indicating the guilt and the recognition for the suffering, and that the victim is willing to forgive his perpetrator and see the human aspect of the conflict.

Writing a shared history: The method calls for recreating the history of the past, that can be agreed upon groups that were in conflict, the past that can be learned from its atrocities, and the idea of “never again.” It takes historians from both sides to agree on a shared history and to negotiate an agreed past of events for both nations in conflicts. It also provides a basis for a new collective memory, which esteems toward Reconciliation.

Education: This method is fundamental as it is only the only way to change the psychological barriers of the past, through education that promotes Reconciliation. Such as peace studies, and reconciliation studies, conflict transformation, and conflict resolution studies, as the method is significant, as it impacts the students and members of society that are vital for education. It will construct the student's way of thinking, such as their values, beliefs, attitudes, motivations, skills, behavior, that endorses the reality for the reconciliation process, and prepares them to live in the era of peace and Reconciliation.

Internet Communication Technologies: Can help bridge nations in conflict, as it is part of the internet view, and its applications are widespread all over the globe. Today ICT is electronic and part of daily human life as it is part of our mobility, social, communication, political habits. ICT can be used to spread information about new strategies for Reconciliation, that can affect nations in conflict. Most importantly, that ICT serves as a channel for communication and send messages for peace and Reconciliation to different rivals in conflict. For example, on Oct 27, 2017, Beirut and Tel Aviv were chosen as the best tourism cities to be visited in the Middle East. A beirute.com, a media company, twitted that “ please remove us from this Narrative.” The tweet went viral, and the Mossad Hastaged hashtag #TelAvivLovesBeirut, and it went viral, and Lebanon rejected very negatively. Therefore they did not want their city to be affiliated with Tel-Aviv. This kind of communication which is in an open domain called the internet went viral to everyone around the world, this kind of message can be sent over the internet to express the need to reconcile with the other. However, it also illustrates the strength of the internet and that it can bring strong rivals to communicate with each other.

Published meetings between presentations of the group in conflicts: When conflicted groups have joint meetings, with their leaders or their academics, it should be published. This illustrates that both groups are working for Reconciliation and not a single counterpart. For example, Tzipi Livni, The minister of justice in the Israeli government in Oct-2017 on her official page, requested for recognition, that Israelis and Palestinians are cooperating for peace and to fight crimes of terrorism, and denounced that the Israeli prime minister, who keeps saying there is no one to have peace with, is working with Palestinians as a counter measurement again terrorism. The Israeli and the Palestinians are meeting together to provide security for both nations. These kinds of meetings, if announced, just illustrate that both are working to better lives of their people and can be an aspect of the reconciliation process, and if published, it would be a better aspect to spread that there is a process for Reconciliation in the Israelis Palestinian conflict.

The Work of NGOs': Non-governmental organizations, either from NGOs that are part of the society or from an international community, can contribute to the process of Reconciliation. Those NGOs can illustrate that peace relations can have brought benefits to societies. Such as spreading messages about the importance of the reconciliation process, about the prosperity of Reconciliation, and the benefits of having peaceful relations with past enemies.

Joint Projects: Those projects are significant as they can help bridge barriers between enemies that in conflict by facilitating and researching psychological Reconciliation. It can connect members of two groups from a different level of society in one same project. They are providing the opportunity of different members from different nations. To have personal encounters, which would foster the understanding of the narrative of the other, and would also teach them about peace relations and why it is crucial for both nations.

Culture Exchange: This can help each opponent in conflict learn about the other. Such as translation of books, visits of artists and academics to different conferences, exhibitions, and festivals.

Strategies for Reconciliation

Strategies for the reconciliation process through the aspects (Leiner, 2016, p. 186):

- (1) Political and Legal Provisions.
- (2) The creation of collective security, with disarmament and crises management.
- (3) Apologies and symbolic acts that spread empathy and understanding.
- (4) Reparations and other attempts for justice restoration.
- (5) Cooperation in regards to aspects of economic, legal, and international issues, for example, helps in cases of disasters. Such as fires in Haifa Israel, on Nov 15, 2016, Palestinian firefighters went to Haifa as part of a mission to help Israelis firefighters to control the fires that went all around the Haifa district, burning nature and houses around.
- (6) Cooperation in civil society, programs that can help the understanding of Reconciliation, and the benefit of Reconciliation, such as hands for peace, or seeds for peace...
- (7) The acceptance of history, which means the confrontation of each historical narrative of the other.
- (8) The confrontation for the historical narrative of the individuals between victims and perpetrators. The right for the victims to know, rituals, purification, encounters between victims and perpetrators, truth and reconciliation commissions.
- (9) The integration of both groups on a common prosperous future in the cultural, economic, and political sphere.

- (10) Intentional strategies to humanize the image of the other, such as overcome negative stereotypes, school books commission, and change the image of the other in media and to change the educational materials about the other in a respected sphere towards Reconciliation.”
- (11) To change the discourse of religious leaders from the aspect of war to the aspect of Reconciliation and respect, understanding the narrative of the other.

ICT is acknowledged for being a means for development and social reconstruction in the interest of social justice. This introduces that ICT can be used to renew social relations in a different context in conflict, criticizing the deterministic social model affecting the conflict, this transforms ICT into an instrument of social transformation for social justice (Charalambos Vrasidas, Michalinos Zembylas, Gene V Glass, 2009, p. 20). ICT can be a tool for the reconciliation process. (Cole, Crawford,2007) introduced ways for using ICTs for peace and Reconciliation (Charalambos Vrasidas, Michalinos Zembylas, Gene V Glass, 2009, p. 221)

Table 2 ICT for Reconciliation Process. The table illustrates applied ICTs for the methods for Reconciliation to implement social change. (Al-Dajani,2020)

Methods for the Reconciliation process	Social Change	Examples of ICTs
<i>Apology</i>	Provide Information	Internet Connectivity
<i>Education</i>		Mobile Phones and Personal Data assistant.
<i>Published meetings</i>		Geographic information systems.
<i>Truth and reconciliation commissions</i>		forums
<i>Public Trails</i>		Radio
<i>Reparations Payments</i>		Chat
<i>The Work of NGOs'</i>		Videos
<i>Joint Projects</i>		
<i>Writing a common history</i>	Help People Process	Social Network sites, and portals.
<i>Published meetings</i>	Information	Data Visualization Tools.
<i>Truth and reconciliation commissions</i>		Online dispute resolution tools.
<i>Public Trails</i>		
<i>Reparations Payments</i>		
<i>The Work of NGOs'</i>		
<i>Joint Projects</i>		

<i>Education</i>	Improve	decision	Virtual Command Center.
<i>Public Trails</i>	making		Games and Simulations
<i>The Work of NGOs'</i>			Online dispute resolution tools.
<i>Joint Projects</i>			
<i>Apology</i>	Reduce Scarcity		Mobile Phones.
<i>Education</i>			The hand-held portable device,
<i>The Work of NGOs'</i>			such as iPad, Tablets.
<i>Joint Projects</i>			
<i>Apology</i>	Support Relationship		Social Network Tools
<i>Published meetings.</i>			Online Collaboration tools
<i>Truth and reconciliation commissions</i>			Mobile Phones
<i>Public Trails</i>			Virtual Reality
<i>Reparations Payments</i>			Tele centers.
<i>The Work of NGOs'</i>			
<i>Joint Projects</i>			
<i>Apology</i>	Help	People	Translation Software
<i>Truth and reconciliation commissions</i>	Understand	Each	Blogs.
<i>Public Trails</i>	other		Social Network Tools.
<i>Reparations Payments</i>			Multimedia
<i>Joint Projects</i>			
<i>The Work of NGOs'</i>			

“Techne” - ICT for Reconciliation

Methods for Internet Research (Al-Dajani,2020)

Internet Communication Technologies develops the aspiration towards understanding the reconciliation process through interactive communication in online social networks sites and applications such as Facebook, Twitter, You-Tube, embedding the methods for Reconciliation in “*episteme*” and “*Techne*” to reach *Phronesis*, leading to prudent in the aspiration toward reconciliation process.


The Intent for Integration in Mixed Method Social Justice Design

ICT has the purpose of involving participants actively in the research and bringing about change for individuals to affect their communities. Integrating sophisticated design to advice explicit value-based and ideological perspectives, this can be researched through applying mixed methods (Greene, 2007). Applied Phronesis, which is accredited to (Flyvbjerg,2001), is a method to reach practical wisdom in a practical context; this is an Aristotelian thought. Applying Phronesis in the online social network media is to adopt epistemology and technology in the online social network communication practices. in that sense, the content of the social network site is the “*epistemology*,” and the practices that happen in the online domain of the social network site is “*Techne*.” This aspect develops two types of datasets impacting humanities or online behavior, one of the contents from the online social network media and one for the communication activities of the online members and visitors of the social network site. Analysis and interpretation of the online social network site and the practices by participants and humanities can take place to thrive the visitors and the member for social change towards the reconciliation process.

Mixed-Method Research Design for Internet Research

A method is an approach which engages participants, including the public and community providers, who affect and are affected by a problem of concern within the community and aims to combine knowledge with taking actions, by Applying the Phronetic Internet Research approach discussed in the previous section, for social change, conflict transformation towards reconciliation process, to improve the reality of the social, economic, political capitals in the community (Creswell & Vicki,2018).

Since the application of the online social network media has to foster aspiration towards the reconciliation process, the best action is to introduce The Mixed Methods Participatory – Social Justice Design introduced by (Creswell & Vicki, 2018). In this case, all research questions are to implement the reconciliation methods online, discussed in the previous sections. The figure below illustrated how the Mixed Method for social design is conducted.



This Concept Map was created with IHMC CmapTools

© 2014-2015 IHMC

Figure 3 Mixed Method for Social Justice Design for Reconciliation Process in Internet Research (Al-Dajani,2020).

The figure illustrates the steps, from the start of developing the online social network site, and collecting the dataset from the mixed data developed from the online social media in the two contents the epistemology; the content of the online social network site and the interactive online communication, the interactivity content of interactions from the online social network site until interpretation and examining the hypothesis.

(Netnography) Internet Research Method

This type of study, according to (Kozinets, 2015) is called Netnography or digital ethnography, the study of online human interaction, thought text, images, videos, online application. *“Netnography is a given name for a set of related data collection, analysis, ethical and representation research practice, where a significant amount of data collected and participant observational research conducted originates in manifests through the data shared free on the internet, including mobile applications.”*(Kozinets, 2015).

Netnography approach to study human interaction can be adopted from Kozinets work, and they are as follows *Kozinets, 2015, p. 97*.

- (1) Introspection: The research must identify himself, to the participants, and in the research and the role that he is operating in the research. Kozinets illustrate it as “*Inward-looking initial investigation, formulate research focus, understand what you want to research and why it matters to you and others.*”
- (2) Investigation: The research must define the methods used in research and to address the aspects of validity and reliability of the research conducted. Including initial knowledge of the subject needed to be researched, the initial readings, phenomena, and empirical sites for the research, it was initiating the research questions that align with the research hypothesis.
- (3) Information: The free and the ease of access to information for the participants in the research. The researcher must consider the ethical consideration of the practice. The researcher has to organize and categorize information, regarding the time and incident of the consent form needed, and with whom. The researcher has to consider in this phase whom to cite.
- (4) Interview: this is affiliated for researchers that want to conduct the online interview, those interviews must be conducted to answer the research questions, and the qualitative data and the quantitative data should be embodied within the question to answer the hypothesis of the research. This phase includes a more in-depth investigation needed into the interviews and relating to the research questions.
- (5) Inspection: The data collected valid and reliable from its source, closer examination, and decision making about which sites, people, and focus to use. They are developing categories and subcategories related to the hypothesis in the research.
- (6) Interaction: The researcher must start designing and preparing to launch the social network site for Netnography practice, the full data collection strategy, of qualitative and quantitative methods.
- (7) Immersion: The Netnographer empirical work, collecting the big data from the interactive data from the online social network site, and organize it concerning the researcher questions.
- (8) Indexing: sorting the data according to its categories and subcategories .analyze the data, and describe the data in context, allow categories to emerge concerning the hypothesis.
- (9) Interpretation: using interpretation methods, in this research, the mixed-method research design, is to assist in the method for interpretation.
- (10) Iteration: Means to conduct the research methods in an iteration mode to get out more datasets to be examined for interpretation.

(11) Integration: The integration of datasets and why.

Those phases of research can assist the researcher in understanding the social network site since this journal is a methodological way for understanding internet research in the way it thrives for Reconciliation, those phases are studied after implementing the social network site and its online application.

This Netnography or ethnography research for the online community is *“utilized for more than a century to represent and understand the behaviors of people who belong to almost every race, nationality, religion, culture, and age group and even behaviors of some nonhuman species groupings.”* (KOZINETTS, 2002, p. 62)

A Netnography design, internet-mediated programs to implement in theory and practice the mixed-method approach for Qualitative & Quantitative datasets result from the Netnography, and then apply content analysis methods to explore and examine the data collected that emerges new themes or examine the central hypothesis in question.

After researching and applying the Netnography Approach they analysis phase must be conducted, and the analyst applies Qualitative content analysis, one of the most famous for this art is Krippendorff (Krippendorff, 2013, p. 188) that introduces the methods of analysis for the data sets provide from the online interactions Netnography approach:

- (1) Counts: The means word counts, it investigates the most used words from the datasets develops.
- (2) World clouds: its words that appear in front of the screen and the more significant in size, the most used from the collected datasets.
- (3) Cross Tabulation, Association, and Correlations: making relations between text and its appearances in different areas in the research.
- (4) Images, Portrayals, Semantic Nodes, and Profiles: using images and graphs and charts of analysis in the procedure of the research.
- (5) Contingencies and contingency Analysis.
- (6) Word cluster analysis.

Those are analytical representation techniques for the researcher to research as part of his work for analysis. The other aspect that to aid with computer software is referred to it as Computer Assistant for Qualitative Content Analysis Software CAQCAS. Here some examples of that software.

1. Nvivo for windows. www.qsrinternational.com
2. Atlas <http://atlasti.com/de/>
3. Gefi <https://gephi.org/users/download/>

4. Navis for Facebook. In www.facebook.com

Those are some software that would help in the analytics for the social network site, in-text analysis, image analysis, computational analysis and content analysis, and support for qualitative data analysis.

***“Phronesis”* ICT for social change towards reconciliation process**

Prudent for the use of Internet communication technologies

Reconciliation is “literally means repairing the damaged or broken bonds of unity and friendship between God and humanity and between human beings and their fellow beings on a personal and on a communal level.” (Gathogo, 2012, p. 5). Reconciliation as a term has a different meaning and different metaphors, it is a means to an end, and the end is equality, freedom, prosperity and the pursuit of happiness for the community or the nations that conflict, or after a conflict, this can adapt the prosperity of Reconciliation, introducing the reality of Reconciliation.

ICT within the reconciliation process develops Pervasive Reconciliation from the bottom-up approach; using Internet communication technologies can develop inclusive reconciliation process from and beyond future generations, this type, is a process, to tackle aspects of the reconciliation process in between enemies, to build bridges in evolving the recognition of the other, understanding the narrative of the other, shared history, learning from the past, building a shared future, a better future for the new generations, and developing a new reality for the reconciliation process. ICT impacting Reconciliation and applies the bottom-up approach introducing new realities and new conventional futures for both entities in conflict.




Figure 6 New Reality in the Reconciliation Process - Phronesis

The Jena Center for Reconciliation at the Friedrich Schiller University in Jena, Germany, adopted the notion of the “*Hölderlin Perspective*” that Reconciliation can be in the middle of conflict, to build bridges and restore commonwealth and aspiration, between private groups or outside groups. Reconciliation becomes a process, and the term used is the reconciliation process. This process can be applied in the middle of conflict, or after the conflict has ended with peaceful agreement to develop peaceful relations. When applying the reconciliation process in the middle of conflict, it is breaking frozen conflicts to reach for the prosperity of Reconciliation for both private groups and outside groups.

ICT is a powerful tool for the reconciliation process; it is to start to hit the break of the wall of frozen conflict and direct it towards the reconciliation process. Reconciliation term has a lot of mean and many metaphors; there is no reaching for it. Nevertheless, there is prosperity from the process of Reconciliation. ICT is a standard tool to build social, economic, and political capitals, social capital, in a sense that it builds bridges between communities in the cultural and social level, open dialog between groups in conflict and build healthy relations with them. As in the economic level, ICT can build economic relations between thriving groups, in one group depending on the other group, through providing ICT business consultants and helping in developing ICT applications, such as outsourcing software, web designs, and other ICT applications. At the political level, ICT can harness oppositions from different parties, private groups, and outside groups, without any restrictions. ICT is an alter dynamic power, as it shifts from one end to another without having the authority to control it. It is called counter-hegemonic, it can disrupt ideological campaigns and the control of information by groups of people that are in a different opposition of power. (Charalambos Vrasidas, Michalinos Zembylas, Gene V Glass, 2009, p. 219) ICT can be an ill tool used for terrorist agendas or a tool for reconciliatory ends, a means for the reconciliation process in the middle of the conflict.

Reaching the “*Phronesis’s phase*” develops the road for the reconciliation process utilizing internet communication technologies for that purpose, as illustrated in the table below, according to a study done by Al-Dajani. (Al-Dajani,2020)

Table 3 ICT for Reconciliation Process. (Al-Dajani, 2020)

Methods for the Reconciliation process	Netnography	Social Change	Examples of ICTs
<i>Apology</i>	<i>Introspection</i>	Provide	Internet Connectivity
<i>Education</i>	<i>Investigation</i>	Information	Mobile Phone and personal Data assistant.
<i>Published meetings</i>	<i>Information</i>		

<i>Truth and reconciliation commissions</i>	<i>Interview inspection</i>		Geographic information systems.
<i>Public Trails</i>	<i>interaction</i>		forums
<i>Reparations Payments</i>	<i>immersion</i>		Radio
<i>The Work of NGOs'</i>	<i>indexing</i>		Chat
<i>Joint Projects</i>	<i>interpretation</i>		Videos
	<i>iteration</i>		
	<i>instantiation</i>		
	<i>integration</i>		

<i>Writing a common history</i>	As the Above	Help	People	Social Network sites, and portals.
<i>Published meetings</i>		Process		Data Visualization Tools.
<i>Truth and reconciliation commissions</i>		Information		Online dispute resolution tools.

<i>Public Trails</i>				
<i>Reparations Payments</i>				
<i>The Work of NGOs'</i>				
<i>Joint Projects</i>				
<i>Education</i>	As the Above	Improve		Virtual Command Center.
<i>Public Trails</i>		decision		Games and Simulations
<i>The Work of NGOs'</i>		making		Online dispute resolution tools.

<i>Joint Projects</i>				
<i>Education</i>	As the Above	Reduce		Mobile Phones.
<i>The Work of NGOs'</i>		Scarcity		The hand-held portable device, such as iPad, Tablets.

<i>Apology</i>	As the Above	Support		Social Network Tools
<i>Published meetings.</i>		Relationship		Online Collaboration tools
<i>Truth and reconciliation commissions</i>				Mobile Phones
<i>Public Trails</i>				Virtual Reality
<i>Reparations Payments</i>				Tele centers.

The Work of NGOs'

Joint Projects

<i>Apology</i>	As the Above	Help	People	Translation Software
<i>Truth and reconciliation commissions</i>		Understand		Blogs.
<i>Public Trails</i>		Each other		Social Network Tools.
<i>Reparations Payments</i>				Multimedia

Joint Projects

The Work of NGOs'

The table develops proof that ICT can be a powerful tool for social change towards Reconciliation, in aspects of how, why, when, and where. This proves the hypothesis in question. The future perspective for this approach is that centers can work on applying this method to reach a reconciliation process or understand the reconciliation process within their communities.

Bibliography

- Al-Dajani, I. (2020). *Internet Communication Technology for Reconciliation: Applied Phronesis Netnography in Internet Research Methodology*. Cham, Switzerland, Springer International Publishing, 322 pp.
- Al-Dajani I. Leiner (2019) *Reconciliation in the Middle of Conflict: An Approach to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict* In Palestine-Israel Journal Vol 24 No.3., Jerusalem. DOI: <https://pij.org/articles/1975/reconciliation-in-the-middle-of-conflict-an-approach-to-the-israelipalestinianconflict>.
- Al-Dajani I (2020) Looking at Trump's "Peace to Prosperity" Plan In Palestine-Israel Journal, Vol. 25 No. 1&2 2020. DOI: <https://pij.org/journal/99>.
- Bar-Tal. S. & Bennink D. (2004): *The Nature of Reconciliation as an Outcome and as a Process* In Bar-Siman-Tov, Y. (Ed) From Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation. New York: Oxford University Press: pp. 11–38.
- Bar-Tal. S. & Bennink D. (2004): *The Nature of Reconciliation as an Outcome and as a Process* In Bar-Siman-Tov, Y. (Ed) From Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation. New York: Oxford University Press: pp. 11–38.
- Nezam T, Marc A. (2009). *Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration*. Retrieved from worldbank.org:

<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/Resources/244362-1164107274725/DDRFinal3-print.pdf>.

Bar-Tal & Bennink. (2004). *From Conflict to Reconciliation*. Oxford: University Press.

Charalambos V., Zembylas M., Glass G. (2009). *ICT for Education, Development, and social justice*. Charlotte: Information Age.

Creswel, J. W. (2014). *Research Design Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Method*. California: SAGE.

Creswell J, Vicki L, Clarck P. (2018). *Designing and Conducting Mixed Method Research*. California: SAGE Publication.

Flyvbjerg, B. (2001). *Making Social Science Matter*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Flyvbjerg B, Landman T., and Schram S., 2012 eds., *Real Social Science: Applied Phronesis*, Cambridge University Press, pp. 97–285.

Gathogo, J. (2012, 11, 08). *Reconciliation Paradigm in Post Colonial Africa: A Critical Analysis*. Retrieved from <http://booksandjournals.brillonline.com/content/journals/10.1163/15743012-12341235>: http://booksandjournals.brillonline.com/content/journals/10.1163/15743012-12341235;jsessionid=f1OS3ewZ1C5g8PVu4AchDL_i.x-brill-live-03.

Kozinets, R. (2015). *Netnography Redefined*. London: SAGE Publication Ltd.

Krippendorff, K. (2013). *Content Analysis, An Introduction to its methodology*. California: SAGA Publication Ltd.

Leiner, M. (2016). *Thinking differently about identity and harmony - The Potential of Asian Thinking for Reconciliation*. In: Philipp Tolliday, Maria Palme and Dong-Choon Kim, Asia-Pacific between Conflict and Reconciliation. Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG. p. 183–204.

Leiner M., Flämig S. , eds. (2012). *Latin America between Conflict and Reconciliation*. Bristol: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

Newman. (2010). *Networks*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

El Gantri R.; El Mufti K. (2017). *Not Without Dignity. International Center for Transitional Justice*, Vol 50.

Libya after Seven Years of Impasse: Prospects of the Transition

Abstract

After the analysis of Libya's recent history after the fall of the regime (the country lived under various constitutions from 2011 on), this paper goes through the multi-dimensionality of the crisis, the current concept of nationhood and nation-state in the country, to propose several theoretical and practical recommendations to the different actors, for a possible, positive, outcome.

Background

In order to understand the complexity of Libya's constitutional history, we must discuss how Libya has written and lived under a variety of different constitutions. Since the fall of the autocratic regime in 2011, the Libyan nation has been struggling through a transitional period aimed at restoring a constitutional framework. However, Libya's constitutional *interregnum* long predates the recent revolution, dating back to the suspension of the Libyan constitution in 1969. Libyans had lived under this constitution and the social contract associated with it for 19 years, the constitution having been adopted in 1951. Known as the "Independence Constitution", it was a result of a consensus-building process preceded by the establishment of a national covenant between Eastern tribes of Harabi in 1946 known as the *Mithaq al Harabi*.

This is the context within which legislative authority in Libya emerged and how the criterion of political representation was achieved. This legislative authority was the House of Representatives, with its elected representatives who were elected directly by the people, and the Senate, with its appointed representatives who were appointed by the King. In addition to transparent elections in 1952, a judiciary branch as well as an executive branch, composed of the King, the government, the army, the police, and the intelligence services, were established. It was in this constitutional context that the process of rebuilding the Libyan nation and state took place (Langhi, Z. 2017). The constitution included provisions for fundamental rights and freedoms, the inviolability of property, equality and non-discrimination on any basis as well as the right to education for all.

Parliamentary life was vibrant and many pieces of legislation were passed in a very short period of time. Another characteristic of this era was the high level of freedom afforded to the representatives in relation to their second responsibility, namely monitoring the executive branch. The successive governments were put under intense pressure, and there many reconfigurations of the regime between 1951 and 1969.

In parallel with the establishment of these state institutions, there was a rapid increase in the number of public initiatives and many associations, forums, and platforms were established on the community level. What is significant about this movement is that it presents a nation-building process from the ‘bottom up’ and was not imposed from the top.

The coup d'état of September 1, 1969 declared all the constitutional institutions that had existed during the monarchy void. Under the guise of ‘revolutionary legitimacy’, several constitutional steps were taken, the Constitutional Declaration in December 1969 was proclaimed, in which it was decided that the Arab Republic of Libya would be handed over to the authority of the Revolutionary Leadership Council. It later became obvious that this was only to conceal that they were setting the stage for an autocratic regime. On April 15, in the infamous *Zuwara* Speech, Gaddafi announced his ‘Five Points’, laying the groundwork for what he called the ‘People’s Revolution’.¹ Until then, Libya had been governed by a constitution which had been drafted by the people's representatives. Following Gaddafi’s speech, the country was ruled by a new ideological framework formulated by the autocratic ruler.

In 1975, Gaddafi ^{imposed} the ‘Green Book’, which he had written himself, on the Libyan people and on the state’s institutions, denying anyone the right to discuss, modify, comment, criticize, reject or vote on it. On March 2, 1977, Gaddafi announced the Authority of the People, to inaugurate the era of the *Jamahiriya* and the collapse of the state. Ultimately, the Libyan nation lived for forty-two years without a constitutional framework, ruled according to principles that contradict the most basic principles of justice, democracy and constitutionalism.

From a comparative constitutional studies perspective, this represents one of the longest constitutional interruptions found in any modern political system. The National Transitional Council (NTC), which was formed after the February 2011 Revolution to exercise the powers of the transitional authority, issued the first Constitutional Declaration in August 2011. This was to be the cornerstone of the process of restoring a constitutional framework. That Fall, the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) was established and mandated to have a political nature, facilitating the political process and leading the transition to democracy. The Constitutional Declaration laid the foundation for the elections for the

¹ The Zuwara Speech included five points which were in their essence a termination of the state. The points were: • The abolition of all laws that were currently in force. • The elimination of political parties and enemies of the Revolution. • The declaration of the Cultural Revolution. • The declaration of the Administrative Revolution and the elimination of bureaucracy. • The declaration of the People's Revolution. In the wake of that speech, Gaddafi imprisoned hundreds of students, writers, thinkers, journalists and intellectuals just because they opposed his treatise. Gaddafi used that revolution to claim "the installation of the government of the masses based on direct and popular democracy", a concept from which the "Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya" later took its name.

National General Conference in June 2012. These general elections were the first legislative elections in 52 years and fulfilled the democratic criterion of transparency. However, some stakeholders boycotted the elections, such as those calling for the adoption of the federal system as well as those loyal to the previous regime.

The transitional period witnessed a variety of efforts aimed at achieving stability and constitutional building, and in response to that, a series of crises emerged. This prolonged the transitional period, which is now in its seventh year. During this period, UNSMIL has had five different leaders, each having launched an initiative in the hopes of contributing to resolving the existing conflicts and stabilizing the country. The most recent leader, Ghassan Salamé, launched an initiative in 2017, which will be presented in detail in a later section.

Accordingly, a series of questions arise. What are the prospects for the transitional period? Will crisis and stalemate dominate the scene and become the epithet of this period? What are the chances of Ghassan Salamé's initiative succeeding?

A Comprehensive Diagnosis Towards Charting a Way Forward

1. Multidimensionality of the crisis and the need for a holistic and integrated approach

The Libyan crisis is multifaceted. The country suffers not only from political and security level divisions, but also from schisms within the constitutional, social, economic, administrative, regional and cultural spheres. The multidimensional nature of the crisis requires a holistic and integrated approach and does not benefit from initiatives that utilize unilateral approaches.

2. A conceptual deficiency in the collective sense of nationhood

There is a lack of a collective sense of nationhood, which in turn reflects on the process of nation-building. The idea of nationhood is a conception shared by a group of people who may be of different ethnicities and cultures, but who share a connection to a common homeland. They identify with a 'national personality' with unique characteristics, shared memories, a shared narrative, and shared concerns. We can refer to 'nation-building' as all the steps that contribute to consolidating this sense of nationhood, and the moral and material translation of this feeling. It is a result of the establishment of the concept of the political nation in the collective consciousness which is an ongoing effort to find and reform what reflects this idea, morally and materially.

This lack of a shared sense of nationhood manifests itself in social divisions and exclusion. It can also be found in the rise of minority identities, such as tribal, regional and ethnic, at the expense of national

identity. The shortcomings in the process of nation-building are reflected in the mismanagement of the tensions over identity issues and also in the failure to counter violent extremism. The spread of imported extremist religious ideologies has had a tremendous negative effect on the local religious identity, which was known to be moderate (*wasati*) for centuries (Kakar, P & Langhi, Z. 2017). To understand the nature of this problem, it is useful to recall the previous autocratic regime's policies. It destroyed the moral fabric of the Libyan nation and caused a deficiency in social capital and disruption of the national memory for forty-two years.

3. A conceptual distortion in relation to the idea of the nation-state

The entire region has a legacy of difficult relations to the concept of the nation-state. As Nazeeh Ayoubi points out in *The Amplification of the State* (2011), the state suffers from incompetence and lacks the legitimacy of achieving development and institutional rationalization. Its survival depends on two elements: the monopoly of wealth in rentier states and the monopoly of violence under military rule (Balqziz, A. 2008). Abd Al-Ilah Balqziz adds that there is “a weak comprehension of the state in the public imagination.” Historically, nation-states in the Arab World have not emerged in a way similar to the way they did in the European context, after years of war and conflict followed by a consensus-building process. Balqziz also believes that states in the region do not possess a vision nor a project, therefore failing to leave an imprint on the collective consciousness, while also suffering from weak community representation (Migdal, J. 1988). Migdal outlines the importance of understanding the cultural contexts in which states arise: societies which have social entities such as tribes or religious sects tend to have a distinctive dynamic relationship between state and society. The state contributes to shaping society just as society contributes to the formulation of the state, neither dominating the other. Neglecting this leads to the failure of any state-building process.

Libya is not an exception to this phenomenon. The state in Libya was fragile and its existence was based on the two aforementioned elements. The regime held a monopoly on wealth and on violence, making it more of an authority than a state. In fact, the Libyan experience was more fragile compared with others in the region due to its short history of being a nation-state, having only been independent for 19 years. Therefore, it is imperative to remember that most of the crises the Libyan state faces are the product of autocratic policies and methods, and anarchist revolutionary policies that hindered a peaceful transfer of power and the implementation of the rule of law. These crises are also the result of the constitutional framework being suspended for twenty four years. This does not exempt most current political actors from responsibility for their mismanagement and ill responses to the challenges facing the country during

the transitional phase. Therefore, the public's imagination of the state is distorted, as is their idea of what the process of state-building entails. The first signs of this distortion appeared in the mismanagement of the dispute over constitutional legitimacy, peaceful transfer of power and how the 42-year long constitutional interruption was addressed. The NTC issued a new Constitutional Declaration (based on the new 'revolutionary legitimacy'), which further violated constitutional legitimacy.²

Also, the structuring of official bodies and the definition of their competencies during the transitional period was characterized by improvisation, conflict, the prioritization of personal gain and abandonment of constitutional principles, such as the separation of powers and the devolution of power. This was evident in the overlap of legislative and executive jurisdictions.

This lacking comprehension was also manifested in the unequal distribution of wealth among the three regions as well as in the mismanagement of the dispute over which system of governance is needed; whether it was better to adopt a federal or a unified system. Another manifestation of the distorted concept of the state was the refusal of militias to submit to the authority of the state, to willingly disarm and let go of assets they controlled and integrate into state institutions.

The lack of understanding of the concept of statehood and the need to combine nation rebuilding and state rebuilding efforts appeared in the structuring of 'political representation'. Most conflicting political actors and leaders lack real constituencies and are not representative of sectors of the local communities, despite claiming that they are. Some political actors have only very weak representation, not representing constituencies of considerable weight. Despite this, they still claim to be representative of broad segments of Libyan society.

Furthermore, this elite who lacked a popular constituency has held a monopoly on the management of the transitional period. This elite was proposing solutions and negotiating the fate of the Libyan nation. This fundamental flaw overshadowed the transitional period, the political dialogue and negotiations, leading to the marginalization and exclusion of local communities. The consequence was a conviction held by the Libyan people that the transitional period – and thus any constitution that will emerge from this period – is not representative of the nation. It was a flagrant violation of the essence of a constitution-building process to exclude local communities from contributing to the management of the transitional period, and ignoring their views on the proposed solutions. A proper constitutional framework is the

²As previously stated, the correct application of the law and constitutional legality dictated that the first action taken by a country restoring a constitutional framework after an illegal constitutional suspension should be the activation of the suspended constitution, after which, there would be three legitimate alternatives: 1) keeping the constitution as it was. 2) amending the constitution. 3) reaching a constitutional consensus- based on the constitution itself- to conduct a constitutional process that would result in a new constitution. Taking into consideration that any action other than activating the last constitution is a null procedure that would not have a legal effect.

result of a contract between *all* the stakeholders and any proposed solutions must serve society as a whole, not just the relations between the conflicting influential stakeholders. This has resulted in a shift, from the societal will approach to one which prioritizes the “will of political actors and their external allies.” Ever since the uprising in 2011, the major concern of "societal will" has been fixing the fundamental flaw in the Libyan constitutional framework and ending the four-decade-long constitutional suspension. This suspension, in turn, was based on the confiscation of societal will. This major concern was not merely temporary or incidental for the Libyan nation; it has been deeply rooted in the Libyan polity since the birth of the nation-state in the Independence era. The most dangerous aspect about the manner in which the conflicting actors and UNSMIL deal with the ongoing negotiations is the inclusion of disputes between the conflicting parties in the Constitution, known as the "constitutionalization of disputes or tensions". These constitutional articles are created solely to regulate these disputes and prevent their exacerbation. This is a blatant violation of the essence of the concept of the constitution, which is a framework for establishing accord and unity, not animosity and division.

The misunderstanding of the concept of statehood and the need to combine nation-building and state-rebuilding efforts also appeared in the weak structure of the political actors that were supposed to lead the settlement and peace-building process. There is a lack of political, social, cultural, psychological, economic and developmental expertise in the structure of each team representing each of the conflicting Libyan parties. Thus, they are incapable of formulating long-term visions and strategies for a solution. This social, psychological, economic, developmental and cross-disciplinary expertise, if available, could have contributed in diagnosing the gaps in the collective consciousness concerning politics, security, economics and identity. It could also have contributed to designing a national dialogue process that would address serious substantive questions, making a real contribution to resolving these issues.

The deficiency also appeared in the imposition of the democratic blueprint approach by influential international powers since the start of the transitional stage, an approach which is presented to the majority of countries undergoing a transitional period. The basic elements of this pre-fabricated approach are to hold elections, form political parties, draft a new constitution and hold a referendum on the new constitution." When this approach failed to yield the desired result, the international powers sought to organize a political dialogue between the parties. However, the political dialogue itself was only an alternative pre-fabricated approach. In other words, influential international powers did not deviate from stereotypical thinking, adhering to the usual templates. This is despite the fact that many case studies over the past half-century clearly indicate that there is no transition "blueprint" suitable for all countries and all conflicts. The patterns of political organization in transition vary from country to country, as does

the nature of the conflicts and the capabilities for their resolution. It is important to point out that some studies show that there is a major problem in the international community's approach (especially the neoliberal approach) to reconstructing failed states. They tend to only address the institutional aspect and focus on what is known as good governance and economic reform policies, while ignoring the urgent need to address the issue of legitimacy and the political and social cohesion of societies (Lemay-Hébert, N.2009).

1. Crises on the levels of the nation and the state remain relatively limited in quantity and severity

Despite what we have written previously, it is important not to exaggerate these crises on the nation and state levels. In terms of quantity and severity, they remain relatively limited, since the crises and the behavioural dysfunction are restricted to certain segments of Libyan society. It is also worth mentioning that the aforementioned local efforts towards stability and the limited nature of the crises prevented a relapse, in terms of stability, and a Libyan civil war.

2. The restricted jurisdiction of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya

By having their mandate limited to the political sphere, UNSMIL's hands have been tied when it comes to fundamental security issues and the drafting of long-term policies and strategies. Additionally, the time periods by which UNSMIL's mandate is extended tend to be short, as the UN Security Council typically only extends the mandate in increments of three, six, or twelve months. This hinders any serious efforts to find long-term solutions and strategies. It also reflects the international community's approach to the Libyan crisis, marked by improvised solutions and short fixes.

3. Charting a way forward: If that is the case, how can a shared sense of nationhood be constructed in a process of nation-building?

The process of nation-building begins with raising awareness through educational campaigns centered around the ideas of national narrative and collective memory. These campaigns should aim to foster the Libyan collective consciousness, to establish the concept of multiple units of identity, and to build a national social covenant. This covenant should be based on re-identifying the National Libyan Character, highlighting the commonalities and the unique characteristics of each of its components.

This solution must be, first and foremost, socio-political, and founded on a 'bottom-up' approach based on localized solutions. One way to ensure the success of such a solution is to engage important local community stakeholders, such as women and the youth.

When it comes to rectifying the misconception of statehood and state building, we must first clarify these concepts. One of the fundamental aspects of state building is the establishment of a social contract based on the following: a) balanced political representation, b) equal distribution of powers to prevent a

concentration of powers, c) equal distribution of wealth, d) social justice, e) decentralization and local governance,³ f) accountability and transparency, g) good governance, h) disarmament and demobilization of armed groups and rehabilitation according to an economic security approach (not just a security one), i) rule of law and human rights, j) improvement of the competence of the judiciary, k) and alternative frameworks for conflict resolution.

Finally, there is a significant overlap between nation reform and state reform. Notably, this overlap can be found in the concept of citizenship, based on respecting diversity, and the inclusive national reconciliation framework. Any reform must be based on a logical ordering of the steps of reform taken during the transitional phase, and must adopt a holistic approach.

The Salamé Initiative's chances of success

There are many factors that indicate that the Salamé Initiative has a greater chance of succeeding than the initiatives of previous heads of the UNSMIL. The first factor is the relative retreat of terrorist groups, ISIS being a prime example. The second factor is the length of the transitional period, which has exhausted the majority of political powers. The third factor is the emergence of a new wave of horizontal reconciliation. Horizontal reconciliation is the reconciliation based on initiatives by societal actors and forces opposed to vertical political reconciliation which is between political forces and the state.

Lastly, Salamé's 'bottom-up' approach to expanding societal participation in the dialogue through national meetings, thereby paving the way for the Inclusive National Conference, is a noteworthy and commendable effort. Salamé recognizes Libya's need to re-establish a new social contract, due to the extent of fragmentation in Libyan society⁴, before a procedural decision is made about its constitution (Salamé, G. 2011). However, in order to not worsen the situation, caution must be exercised in the aftermath of these national gatherings and the Inclusive National Conference. Recommendations on this specific matter will be included in the Policy Recommendations section below.

There is an additional factor which presents a major obstacle to stability in Libya, namely regional and international intervention and the proxy war inside the Libyan territories. This worries Libyans and UN

³ For more on why federalism can be a way forward in Libya, read: Karim Mezran and Mohamed El Jareh, The Case for New Federalism in Libya. (DECEMBER 23, 2014) Atlantic Council. [HTTP://WWW.ATLANTICCOUNCIL.ORG/IMAGES/FILES/ISSUEBRIEFFEDERALISMINLIBYA_HARIRI_5.PDF](http://WWW.ATLANTICCOUNCIL.ORG/IMAGES/FILES/ISSUEBRIEFFEDERALISMINLIBYA_HARIRI_5.PDF).

⁴ Mr Ghassan Salamé has written an extensive study about our societies' need of restructuring a new social contract. In it, he explains his view of the constitutional legitimacy issue and the need to bypass it to a rational institutional legitimacy through a new social covenant based on a rights perspective.

envoys alike, with more than one UN envoy having described how his mediation efforts were interfered with due to foreign regional and international powers.

Policy Recommendations

Broadly speaking, Libyans are not confident that scheduled future steps will result in a paradigm shift leading the transition to the right direction. However, they have not lost all confidence in the process of restoring the state and are thus prepared to interact positively with these steps. Libyans are concerned about holding elections and a referendum in a milieu full of chaos and schism. Put differently, many Libyans believe it is favorable to postpone those steps until the phenomenon of illegal armament have been ended, and until social cohesion is restored.

1. Recommendations related to the Roadmap's entitlements

- It is imperative to ensure that future entitlements, including elections and referenda, do not lead to more division and violence, which would minimize their intended value.
- Elections must not be held without a constitutional framework. The predicament is that the Constitutional Declaration did not include any articles necessitating holding other parliamentary and presidential elections. Moreover, the Political Agreement of December 2015 is yet to be included in the Constitutional Declaration. Therefore, there will be a need to amend the Constitutional Declaration in order to establish the constitutional framework that regulates the elections.
- The question of who will amend the Constitutional Declaration, the House of Representatives or the House of Representatives and the High Council of State, must be answered. Also, it needs to be decided which version of the Constitutional Declaration will be amended, since there have been many previous amendments. The seventh of these amendments was based on the February Committee Proposal and was challenged before the Supreme Court. The Court ruled to accept the challenge, which led to the beginning of a schism in the state institutions. The conflicting parties have quite obviously strived to employ the law as a political tool, which has led to the present labyrinthine situation. Everyone is improvising, which will only add to the state of anarchy.
- There is an urgent need to unify the state institutions before acting on these entitlements, i.e. the elections and/or the referendum. What would enhance the added value of these entitlements is creating a comprehensive, realistic vision of how to handle the arms chaos and the hegemony of armed groups before the time for the entitlements arrives, especially as reports from international

organizations and monitors warn against holding elections in an environment of arms chaos and impunity. The latest report from Human Rights Watch states that the violence that came on the heels of the last general Libyan Elections in 2014 led to the collapse of the central authority and the main institutions, especially law enforcement and judicial powers, which produced two opposing governments, competing over legitimacy. The criminal justice system collapsed, and civil and military courts remain largely closed in the east and the south of the country while operating in a limited capacity in other places. Law enforcement and criminal investigation administrations all over the country are only partially operative, mostly unable to implement arraignment orders issued by the courts or to enforce arrest warrants...Libyan courts are not in the position to resolve electoral disputes, including registration and results (Libya: No current Free Election in Current Climate, Humans Rights Watch, 2018).

There are a number of measures that should be implemented in order to maximize the added value of the steps to be taken in the future:

- a) The nature of these steps must be made clear by explaining the nature of the Inclusive National Conference and its agenda. Furthermore, the reason for the inclusion of neutral Libyan parties and civil society actors in the planning of the agenda and drafting the Conference's decrees must be clear to all. Their purpose is to enable "national ownership" of these national meetings and of the Inclusive National Conference.
- b) There must be an agreement signed by all parties expressing their commitment to accepting and complying with the results of these entitlements, even in the case of losing. This could be in the form of a national charter emanating from the Inclusive National Conference.
- c) Upon doing so, there ought to be independent, international along with national civil society monitoring of the elections under the umbrella of the UN. There should be also international guarantees to achieve a peaceful transfer of power and penalize those obstructing the process.
- d) It is essential to exert the utmost effort to maximize the benefit from these entitlements in strengthening societal unity and to ensure that they do not yield unfavorable results, such as exacerbating division. It is also imperative to strive to call on all parties to announce their commitment to forsake severe polarizing speech which entrenches division, and this could also be in the form of a national charter emanating from the Inclusive National Conference. None of these entitlements can be achieved successfully before political stakeholders agree to come together in an inclusive national conference and lay the foundation of a national covenant or charter.

- There must be a measure which ensures that the proposed Inclusive National Conference does not turn into a new public body, which would add to the state of institutional dysfunction.
- As for the referendum, the articles included and the mechanism of conducting the referendum must be agreed upon beforehand. Additionally, the situation and the possible alternatives in the case that the people reject the constitution via the referendum, must be stated. According to studies conducted by Collin (2015) and Ece Özlem and Öge (2012), referenda – contrary to how they are envisioned – might contribute to increased polarization and violence, especially if the country is in a transitional period and still subject to armed conflict. Other studies indicate that holding public referenda in multicultural and multiethnic countries could have unfavorable results. While a referendum is a legitimate mechanism from a democratic procedural perspective, realistically, it might have a negative impact on the situation of some of the components of society. Therefore, the lesson learned is the necessity of ensuring that none of the fundamental rights of any components of society are left to public referenda and majority rule, as that would go against the essence of inclusive democracy (Koinova, M. 2014).

2. Recommendations related to UNSMIL

- UNSMIL should:
 - a) Reformulate its strategy.
 - b) Assemble a neutral advisory team comprised of local civil society members.
 - c) Combine the interaction with political actors and the interaction with civil society powers and benefit from their expertise in implementing the Roadmap.
- The UN Security Council should:
 - a) Widen the scope of UNSMIL’s mandate so that it can deal with fundamental issues by addressing the root causes.
 - b) Amend UNSMIL’s structure with regards to its allocated resources and how well they function.
- The UN Security Council should amend UNSMIL’s structure through:
 - a) Increasing the expertise of the staff in UNSMIL who have in-depth knowledge of Libya and who have expertise in the region.
 - b) Increasing the expertise of UNSMIL in mediation and conflict resolution, paying attention to employing female experts and experts who have experience in the field.
 - c) Adding experts in critical fields, especially those with a knowledge of social, psychological, gender, development, and economic issues.

3. Recommendations related to the constitutional situation

The constitutional issue must be resolved before elections are held to end the transitional period. According to both Libyan and non-Libyan studies, the Draft Constitution presented by the Constitutional Drafting Assembly has fundamental flaws. Furthermore, the results of this survey indicate that there are concerns of an outbreak of future crises if this draft is adopted. Therefore, one of the possible conciliatory solutions could be to reactivate the constitution that was suspended on August 31st, 1969, until stability is established (Lamen, F. & Mezran, K. 2016). In this case, another inclusive constitutional process could start drafting a new constitution, one which respects human rights and the multicultural nature of the country while also staying true to Libyan constitutional heritage.

4. Recommendations related to resolving non-political crises

‘Bottom-up’ societal platforms must be established, especially platforms composed of women and youth, to launch initiatives with the purpose of studying the previously mentioned non-political crises and developing comprehensive solutions that address the multiple dimensions of the crises (Langhi, Z. 2014). Since 2011, the task for Libyan women & youth has been enormous. Not only have they had to fight to secure space in the political sphere, but they also have had to raise awareness about equality and rights, and to mobilize support horizontally and vertically across different social groups and political domains. Challenges for women have continued to escalate over the past 7 years, marked by the scaling of armed militias, rising insecurity within communities, and the intransigence of the new political establishment. Libyan women & youth have persistently faced these mounting challenges with flexibility, courage, and determination. They have continued to fight against the exclusion of their views from the political and peace dialogue process.

Editors

Dr. Davide Tacchini, is currently Research Fellow and Project Coordinator at the Friedrich-Schiller-Universität (Jena Centre for Reconciliation Studies) in Jena, Germany and Adjunct Professor of Arabic Language at the University of Parma, Italy. His most recent publications include: *Islam and Democracy, Muslim Voices Amongst Us* (with the Hon. Amédée Turner, London-Milan, Mimesis Int'l, 2020), of *Radicalismo islamico: Il diario del soggiorno di Sayyid Qutb, negli Stati Uniti dal 1948 al 1950* (Milan, Obarrao Editore, 2015); has edited with A. Angelucci, M. Bombardieri, and A. Cuciniello, *Chiesa e Islam in Italia: incontro e dialogo*, (Bologna, EDB, 2019), with A. Angelucci and M. Bombardieri, *Islam e Integrazione in Italia (Islam and Integration in Italy)*, Milan-Venice, Marsilio, 2014). He has authored a number of articles on radical Islam, Christian-Muslim relations, Islam in Europe and the West, and Islamic reform, Migration and Religion, Reconciliations studies. He lectures widely on both sides of the Atlantic and in the Arab world.

Dr. Zeina M. Barakat is a Jerusalem-born Palestinian who holds a doctorate in reconciliation studies from Friedrich-Schiller University in Jena, Germany, where she is currently a postdoctoral fellow and project coordinator „From Heart of Stone to Heart of Flesh “since 2013. She studied at al-Quds University in Jerusalem and taught at Friedrich-Schiller University in Jena and Europa-Universität Flensburg. She is the author of many academic books and articles including, *Sexual Harassment* (2012), one of the few books in Arabic dealing with this taboo topic in Arab society. Her latest book was published in 2017: *From Heart of Stone to Heart of Flesh: Evolutionary Journey from Extremism to Moderation*. Her research interests include gender, narratives, reconciliation, empathy, and collective memory.

Prof. Dr. Martin Leiner studied protestant theology and philosophy in Tübingen and Heidelberg. In 1998 he became a professor in Neuchâtel/Switzerland and was president of the ethics center of the University of Geneva for some years. Since 2002 Prof. Leiner is a professor for systematic theology and ethics at the faculty of theology of Friedrich-Schiller-University in Jena. Since 2008 he is researching reconciliation, while 2013 he became the founding director of Jena Center for Reconciliation Studies (JCRS). He published a variety of books and articles ranging from psychological interpretations of the Bible, the philosophy of dialogue of Martin Buber, to methods of theology and transdisciplinary reconciliation studies.

Dr. Iyad M. AlDajani is currently AARMENA (Academic Alliance for Reconciliation in the Middle East and North Africa) project coordinator and Post-Doc researcher at the Jena Center for Reconciliation Studies (Friedrich-Schiller University) in Jena Germany. He earned his BA in computer sciences and an MA in regional studies and American Studies at Al Quds University. He got his Ph.D. in communication science from Friedrich Schiller University. He specialized in Applied Phronesis in Internet communication Research Methodologies. He is also a certified analyst using *Nvivo* for Windows in applying academic research methodologies for researching Data Science. He is an innovative and creative researcher in the field of overcoming violence, religious peacemaking and reconciliation through applied Internet communication technologies and online social networks and media. In the Middle East, he has also become one of the most important activists working in the field. He has recently published his Doctoral Thesis, *Internet Communication Technology for Reconciliation: Applied Phronesis Netnography In Internet Research Methodology*. New York, Springer Publishing, 2020.

Contributors

Prof. Dr. Ralf K. Wüstenberg is Professor for Systematic and Historic Theology at Europa-University Flensburg and Senior Research Associate in the University of Cambridge. After studying Theology in the Universities of Berlin, Cambridge, and Heidelberg, Dr. Wüstenberg graduated from Humboldt-University Berlin (Dr. theol.) and Ruprecht-Karls-University Heidelberg (Habilitation). In 2002/2003 Ralf Wüstenberg taught as Dietrich-Bonhoeffer-Scholar at Union Theological Seminary, New York, and in 1999 he was a Visiting research fellow in the University of Cape Town. As ordained vicar, he served in the Lutheran Church at Berlin Cathedral (Berliner Dom) in the years 2003–2005. Professor Wüstenberg is author and editor of 22 books in the field of Dietrich-Bonhoeffer research, political reconciliation studies (with a focus on the political dimension of reconciliation in South Africa and Germany), and Muslim-Christian relations. His recent book is entitled „Islam as devotion. Discovery into the interior of another religion“ (Minneapolis: Fortress Press/Lexington).

Dr. Francesco Ferrari coordinates the doctoral program "Religion Conflict Reconciliation" at the Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena. After his Ph.D. obtained at the University of Genoa (Italy) about the philosophy of Martin Buber (2014), he is a post-doc researcher at the Jena Center for Reconciliation Studies. His current research focuses 1. on the role of the so-called “diseases of temporality” (resentment, remorse, nostalgia) in reconciliatory processes according to different authors from the moral philosophy of the XX Century; 2. on the relationship between alienation, trust, and recognition in reconciliatory processes.

Dr. Carolina Rehrmann works as executive manager of the Jena Center for Reconciliation Studies and Post-Doc at the Institute for Political Science at the Chair of International Relations at Friedrich-Schiller-University of Jena and managing director of German-English Springer Edition “Innovation in Conflict Research”. She holds a PhD titled „The Cyprus Conflict. A socio-psychological discourse analysis“. As PhD-scholar of German Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation and university affiliate, she has been researching and teaching at FSU Jena, as well as private University of Witten/Herdecke, while being research fellow at a number of universities abroad. She is regularly attending international conferences and publishes on topics within the broader sphere of IR-constructivism and social psychology, comprising collective memory in South East Europe, inner-German relations and reconciliation, German-Greek relations, intractability, post-conflict societies, gender politics, and transitional justice.

Dr. Amjad Abu El-Ezz has been teaching European studies at An-Najah National University in Palestine since 2013. He holds PhD and MA in European studies from Durham University. Before joining An-Najah he worked for British American Security Information Council as Gulf Director. Between 2011–2013 he worked for the United Arab Emirates embassy in London as a researcher. Responsible for analysing EU Foreign Policies towards the NENA region. His book “The European Union and the Palestinians” analyses the EU’s policy towards the Palestinians, its aid and democracy promotion. Dr. Abu El Ezz worked as an international journalist for more than 10 years.

Tim Bausch, M.A., Tim Bausch is working as a research assistant at the chair of International Relations. His research topics are Power Relations and Resistance in the context of conflicts. His regional focus is on the broader middle east. He holds degrees in Political Science and Human Geography from the University of Jena (B.A.) and in Peace and Conflict Studies from the University of Marburg (M.A.).

Stella Kneifel, M.A. joined the University of Erfurt as a PhD student in history in 2018 and the Orient Institute Beirut as associate researcher in March 2019. In her research work she examines the networks of relations between the Arab states and the GDR that have developed as a result of student and teacher exchanges. The main object of investigation are relationships that could arise through the exchange of knowledge, which under certain circumstances still have an effect today. She holds degrees in Sociology and Education from the University of Jena (B.A.) and in Middle Eastern Sociology and History from the University of Erfurt (M.A.).

Dr. Dalal Iriqat is Vice President for International Relations at the Arab American University, Assistant Professor of Conflict Resolution, Diplomacy and Strategic Planning at the AAU in Palestine. She is a weekly columnist at AlQuds Newspaper. Dalal is an advisor of Strategic Communications at the PMO. Dalal Iriqat has a PhD in Public Administration from Paris I Sorbonne, A Masters degree in Diplomatic Studies from Westminster University in London and a Bachelor of Political Science from the University of Jordan.

Dr. André Zempelburg studied Jewish Studies and Philosophy at Potsdam University. He was a research assistant at the Jena Center for Reconciliation Studies and earned his PhD in Religious Studies. His dissertation is about the concept of atonement and reconciliation in the Jewish tradition.

Prof. Dr. Wietzke De-Jong Kumru is currently professor of Protestant theology at the Europa-Universität, Flensburg, her focus main focus has been, in the last few years, on theology of religions and interreligious dialogue. She studied Protestant theology in Kampen (NL) and in Berlin. In 2013 she earned her doctorate from the Protestant Theological University in Amsterdam (NL) with a dissertation on postcolonial feminist theology. From 2014 to 2015 she has been research assistant at the Chair for Religious Studies and Mission Studies at the Johannes Gutenberg University, Mainz.

Her main research fields are: religion, culture and gender, i.e. Intercultural theology, Postcolonialism, Feminist theology, Mission, Ecumenism and Interreligious Dialogue / Theology of Religions. Current research project: Remembering to heal. A European plea for post-colonial theology (application for an own position approved by the DFG in 2015).

Dr. Fanie du Toit is Chief Technical Advisor for Reconciliation at the UNDP Iraq office since 2016 when he stepped down as the Executive Director of the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR) in Cape Town, South Africa. His main interest, as practitioner and scholar, is on the relationship between reconciliation and transitional justice processes in societies emerging from conflict and political oppression. In 1995, he completed a Doctoral Degree in Philosophy of Religion at Oxford University- focusing on religious truth in plural societies. In 2007, he received UNESCO's International Prize for Peace Education on behalf of the IJR, for work done on post-apartheid curriculum development, mainly in the areas of history and civic education. In 2014, he was appointed Honorary Associate Professor to UCT's Department of Political Studies.

Prof. Dr. Michael Denis Berdine was born in Los Angeles, California but was raised in Bahrain, England, India, Italy and Germany, due to his father's executive position with the Caltex Oil Company. He holds a BA and MA in Modern British and European History, an MA in Near Eastern Studies, and a PhD in British Imperial History from US University. His area of research is Britain in the Middle East and he has most recently published *Redrawing the Middle East: Sir Mark Sykes, Imperialism, and the Sykes-Picot Agreement* (I.B. Tauris, 2018) and *The Accidental Tourist, Wilfrid Scawen Blunt and the British Invasion of Egypt in 1882* (Routledge, 2005). A convert to Islam in 1992, he was active in interfaith activities in the US until he moved to the UK in 2009. He recently retired as principal of the Cambridge Muslim College (UK). A dual US/UK citizen he lives with his wife in Cambridgeshire, UK.

Prof. Dr. Zahra Ahmad Ali Awad is Professor of Linguistics at the University of Jordan. After a doctorate in Linguistics and Foreign Language Instruction from the State University of New York, she

joined Jordan University of Science and Technology as the Head of the English Language Unit where she started an ESP program in coordination with the British Council. In 2004 she moved to the University of Jordan as i.a. Chair of the Department of Linguistics. She has been researching fellow at the University of Liverpool (TCT), Philipps University at Marburg (DAAD), Purdue University (Fulbright) and Texas Tech (Fulbright), as well as visiting scholar at Abu Dhabi University and Ludwig- Maximilians University. Her research focuses on i.a. on discourse analysis, cross-cultural communication and ESP. She has published extensively in international journals, conference proceedings and book chapters, co-authored two textbooks on ESP.

Dr. Rabah Aynaou holds a PhD, with first class honours at Mohammed 1st University Faculty of Law, in 2009. He holds a Postgraduate Research Degrees (DESA) in public law – New Dynamics of International Relations, Peace and Human Rights, Faculty of Law from University Mohammed 1st in 2000. Rabah Aynaou is a current professor of Public Law at Mohammed 1st University in Oujda in Morocco. His teaching activities include courses on Human Rights, International Law, International Humanitarian Law, Refugee Law, and security. Rabah Aynaou was a Visiting Researcher at NATO Defense College – NDC Rome – Italy (September to December 2014), and he attended the courses at The Hague Academy of International Law in 2011 – the Netherlands. His research focused on Refugee Law in Morocco and migration issues. Rabah Aynaou was a Michigan Grotius Research Scholar at the University of Michigan Law School from October 3, 2017, to December 31, 2017.

Prof. Dr. Ayman Yousef “Haidaria” is Professor in political sciences and international relations at the Arab- American University in Palestine. I got my PhD in Middle Eastern Studies from the M.S University in Baroda, India in 2000 and i obtained Fulbright fellowship to study the US foreign policy in South Carolina in 2002. I published articles in many local, regional and international journals. My research interests are Palestine question, political elites, civil society, student and youth movement, democratization, the US strategies in the Gulf and the Middle East. I like to volunteer in international projects that involve peace initiatives and conflict transformation moves. I got many international awards to travel abroad including Marie Currie, Amideast, DAAD, and Erasmus Mondous. My latest publication is “The transformative potential of the Palestinian youth student movement on the Palestinian universities”, in Alapaslan Ozerdem and Others, The Transformation of Palestine Israel Conflict, Rutledge, London, 2017.

Dr. Muath Al-Zoubi is an Assistant Professor in Law, as well as he is the Assistant Dean in Law School at the University of Jordan. Dr. Muath was awarded his PhD from Brunel University London. He is an Associate Fellow of the Higher Education Academy (UK). Dr. Muath is also an Attorney at Law under the Jordanian Bar Association and a member of the International Bar Association. He has presented his works in different countries (The UK, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, and Jordan).

Zahra' Langhi is a peace activist and expert on gender, conflict resolution, and peace building. She is specialized in prevention & countering violent extremism, women peace & security, and mediation & national dialogues. Her research intersects gender equality with Islamic history, metaphysics, mysticism and female spirituality in comparative religions.

Langhi's is also the co-founder and CEO of Libyan Women's Platform for Peace (LWPP), a socio-political movement focused on peace-building, inclusivity and gender equality.

Zahra's work has gained international recognition by the Rockefeller foundation, Helen Clark, and the Charter of compassion led by Karen Armstrong.

In 2011, she co-founded Libyan Women's Platform for Peace (LWPP), with 35 leading Libyan women, and she is the organisation's director. She also coordinated the Libyan Women's Political Empowerment (LWPE) program, in conjunction with UNWomen and Karama.

Zahra' has served as an advisory board member of the Arab Human Development (UNDP) Report on Youth, and as an advisor to the Preparatory Committee of the National Dialogue in Libya.

Langhi is an advisor to the Libyan National Dialogue. Along with Lord Alderdice, Zahra' co-chaired The Hammamet Conference Series, an international platform for dialogue and progress in relations between the UK and North Africa.

In 2018, Zahra' joined the UN- ESCWA (Economic Social Commission for West Asia). Her portfolio is women, peace and security agenda and prevention of violent extremism.

Acknowledgements

Editing this book has been a long, fruitful and sometimes troubled process, but it could not have been possible without effective team work.

We would like to acknowledge and thank all those who have contributed to this volume with their papers, and/or with their participation in the first AARMENA conference in Jena, Germany in August 2018.

We would like to express our sincere gratitude to all our colleagues at the Jena Center for Reconciliation Studies (Friedrich-Schiller-University in Jena, Germany), for their encouragement, advices and support.

Special thanks go to Christin Neubauer for her language based proofreading.